拉古·拉古拉姆：人工智能、机器人技术与基础设施的重生

我们收到了思科的报价，基本上就是要在后院挖个洞把公司埋了。于是，我长途跋涉去找Ragu。你还记得这次会议吗？

We had an offer from Cisco, and it was to, like, basically put a hole in the backyard and bury the company. And so, like, I took the long walk up to Ragu. Do you remember this meeting?

是的，是的，我记得那次会议。

Yeah. Yeah. I remember the meeting.

然后我说，听着。我们有思科的报价。我们很想进入虚拟机管理程序领域。你知道Ragu说什么吗？他说不行。

And I'm like, listen. We have this offer from Cisco. We would love to be in the hypervisor. And you know what Ragu said? No.

你当时就懂得利用杠杆了。

You you you understood leverage at the time.

是啊，不算超级天才，但也没那么笨。如果

Yeah. Not super genius, but I'm not that dumb. If

如果你想了解企业软件是如何真正构建并通过多次平台变革实现规模化的，没有人比Raghu Raghuram更值得学习，他是a sixteen z新任董事总经理兼普通合伙人。本期节目中，a sixteen z联合创始人Ben Horowitz与普通合伙人Martine Kosato和David George与Raghu坐下来探讨了跨技术世代真正构建和重塑伟大公司所需的条件。我们深入探讨了Netscape和VMware的经验教训，科技史上最成功收购之一的背后策略，以及AI和机器人技术如何再次彻底改变基础设施。让我们开始吧。

you wanna understand how enterprise software really gets built and scaled through multiple platform shifts, there's no better person to learn from than Raghu Raghuram, a sixteen z's newest managing director and general partner. In this episode, a sixteen z cofounder Ben Horowitz and general partners Martine Kosato and David George sit down with Raghu to talk about what it really takes to build and reinvent great companies across generations of technology. We go deep on the lessons from Netscape and VMware, the strategy behind one of the most successful acquisitions in tech history, and how AI and robotics are transforming infrastructure all over again. Let's get into it.

Raghu，在Netscape时，你第一次见到Ben和Mark？是的。当时是什么情形？你当时对他们有什么看法，他们现在和那时相比如何？

Raghu, at Netscape, you met Ben and Mark for the first time? I did. So what was that like? And what did you think of them at the time, and how are they now compared to then?

哇，问题真尖锐。不过这是好事。本，我不认为你会重新发送offer，对吧？

Wow. Loaded questions. It's a good thing. I don't Ben, I don't think you resend offers, do you?

顺便说一下，马克也没参加这个播客。

So By the way, Mark's not on the pod too.

所以请记住这一点。

So just keep that in mind.

你现在比之前温和多了。但是...

You're a lot more mellow now than before. That is But

确实存在一些特殊情况。

there are some circumstances.

这一点在他作为董事会成员时也同样适用。

That that is also true of him as a board member.

是的。不。你告诉过

Yes. No. You told

告诉我这个。他的医患沟通方式有所改善。

me that. His bedside manner has improved.

是的，有所改善。

Yes. Has improved.

作为辩护，我只想说我们当时处于一个非常奇怪的情境——我们推出了浏览器，那在当时堪称史上最轰动的软件产品。它让所有人都能上网。而微软当时在桌面操作系统上拥有97%的市场份额，基本上是完全垄断。苹果电脑那时还不成气候。

In my defense, I would just say that we were in this very weird situation where we came out with the browser, and it was like the biggest kind of software hit ever at the time. It put everybody on the Internet. And then Microsoft who had 97% market share on the desktop. So basically a complete monopoly. Macs weren't a thing or anything else.

他们决定将彻底消灭我们作为使命。那时我们还在收费销售浏览器，每份50美元。他们采取的手段我至今罕见——比如在Windows系统中植入漏洞来破坏我们的客户端，让浏览器无法运行。

And they decided their whole mission was to put us out of business. And we were selling the browser for money at that time. It was $50 a browser. And they did things that I really haven't seen since. So they would put bugs in Windows to break our client, our browser so it wouldn't work.

他们甚至在下载器中设置了一个特定于13MB到13.3MB文件的漏洞，而我们的安装包正好是13.1MB。还干过更绝的：当我们与当时最大的PC厂商康柏达成协议，准备在所有康柏电脑预装网景浏览器时——

They set their download thing on their downloader that had a bug in it between like 13 megabytes and 13.3 megabytes. And our download was like 13.1 megabytes. It did stuff like that. Amazing. The craziest was when we cut a deal with Compaq, which was the biggest PC vendor to kind of bundle Netscape with all the Compaq PCs.

我们联合召开了盛大发布会，这事登上了《华尔街日报》头版头条（当时可是大事）。结果第二天康柏就打电话要求解约。我们追问原因，对方表示这对双方明明都是双赢。

And we did a big announcement with them. It was front page of the Wall Street Journal, above the fold, the whole thing, which was a big deal in those days. And the next day Compact called us and said, you have to let us out of the deal. And we're like, why do we have to let you out of the deal? It's like a great deal for everybody.

他们坦白说：微软威胁如果不取消合作就停止供应Windows 95系统，这样康柏就会倒闭——就是这种下作手段。

And they said, Microsoft is withholding Windows 95 from us unless we break the deal. We'll go out of business. Like that type of tactic.

哇，所以

Wow. So

我们当时承受着巨大压力，简单来说就是这样。我在网景公司制定的战略，就是让Raghu接替所有浏览器收入，转而创造服务器收入。但问题是我们根本没有服务器产品。要知道浏览器业务的年收入峰值曾达到2.5亿美元。这意味着我们必须在极短时间内填补巨额收入缺口——因为两年间收入就从2.5亿直接归零了。

we were under a lot of pressure, just long to say. And so then the strategy at Netscape that I hired Raghu into was basically to replace all the browser revenue with server revenue. But the problem is we really didn't have any server products. The browser was you know, peaked at like two fifty million dollars a year. And so it was a lot of revenue to replace in a very, very short order because it went from $250 to $0 over a two year period.

总之，可怜的Ragu就这样被我招进来了——我当时可以说非常急迫。他刚...

And so anyway, so poor Ragu gets hired in by me, who was feeling very urgent at the time, I would just say. Got something right out

刚从研究生院毕业对吧？是直接毕业就来了。对。好的。

of grad school, right? Were straight out of grad school. Yeah. Okay.

没错。但我没时间搞那些慢节奏的培训。他的训练完全是军事化管理风格。

Yeah. But I didn't have time for a lot of that slow training type of stuff. He was all, like, very, like, military style training.

一直都是战时状态。

It goes wartime all the time.

是啊。能说说你们在'战争'期间的故事吗？不。

Yeah. What are some of the stories of the war that you were No.

我是说，回想起来，本（Ben）简直无所不能，你绝对想象不到。哪怕数据表里漏了个逗号，他都能发现。对吧？太疯狂了。大家以前都怕和他一起过评审。

I mean, I think if I think back, Ben was on top of everything, like, you wouldn't believe. It was like, you couldn't miss a comma in your data sheet, and Ben would catch it. Right? It's crazy. People used to dread going into reviews with this guy.

但第二点要为他辩护的是，当时我们根本没有服务器产品，我记得你同时招了大概六七个产品经理。我们没人懂产品管理——有人才入行一两年，还有像我这样的。记得网上流传很久的那篇文章吗？现在还有，讲好PM和坏PM的？

But the second thing, though, in his defense, because we had no server products, I think you hired, what, six or seven product managers at the same time. None of us knew any product management. Some people are, like, one or two years in the industry. Some people are like me. So remember there was this paper floating around on the Internet for a long time, still is, the good PM, bad PM?

对。不是

Yeah. Didn't

本？当然是本写的。是你那篇对吧？

Ben? Of course, it's Ben. That's yours. Right?

那是本写的。不是吗？

Ben wrote that. No?

就是他写的。嘿本，专门为那六个人写的。

He wrote it. Hey, Ben. For those six guys.

对。

Yeah.

这本不是给我们的，也不该被发表。

It wasn't meant for us. It wasn't meant to be published.

那是给你的。

That was for you.

这是一份培训文件。曾经是份培训文件。恭喜你。你是来受训的。所以

It a training document. It was a training document. Congratulations. You're for training. So that

关于本的第二点其实是，我是说，系统化组织行为学。我认为那些观点在当时常常正确，现在也常常适用。当然，现在他已经就此著书立说了。

was actually the second thing to say about Ben is even I mean, systematizing organizational behavior. I think all of that is that's true often then and true often now. Obviously, now he's written books about it.

好的，我想快进跳过这部分。显然我们有马丁、本和拉古，还得谈谈奈西拉。对。

Alright. So I wanna fast forward a bunch here. So obviously, have Martine, Ben, Ragu. We got to talk about Nysira. Yeah.

马丁，显然你是SDN的联合创始人和发明者。

Martine, obviously, you're the co founder and the inventor of SDN.

是的。

Yeah.

本（Ben）是投资方兼董事会成员。

Ben was the investor and board member.

是的。

Yeah.

显然，拉古（Raghu）是VMware这次收购的主要推动者。所以我很想听听你们三位之间的互动故事。

And obviously, Raghu was the champion of the acquisition at VMware. So I'd love to hear the dynamic across the three of you.

简而言之，本通过投资拯救了我的公司免于倒闭，并协助运营。后来因为我们太喜欢拉古了，就把这家优质公司以很大折扣卖给了他。

I mean, The short version is that Ben saved my company from going out of business by investing in it, and then helped run it. And then because we love Raghu so much, we gave him a big discount on a great company.

又来了。明明是溢价收购。我

Here we go. It was a premium. I

就喜欢这种'大折扣'的说法，毕竟那可是当时最高价的收购案。

love that it's positioned as a big discount because it the highest priced acquisition of its time.

确实如此，但看看后续的营收数据，拉古这笔买卖简直太划算了。

Think it was, but if you look at the revenue numbers that thing did after the fact, Ragou got it very cheap.

是的。那是

Yeah. That's

非常便宜。但但很奇怪，因为，是的，我们只有我是说，我不知道。我们实际上没有我不想说我们的收入是多少，因为我不确定那是否真的算收入。我们有一些支票。支票。

very cheap. But but it was weird because, yeah, we only had I mean, I don't know. We didn't really have I didn't wanna say what our revenue was because I don't know if it was really even revenue. We had some checks. Checks.

是的。对。当时有

Yeah. Yes. There were

一些支票。是的。

some checks. Yeah.

顺便说一下，故事的一部分是我们收到了思科的收购要约，但我们不想卖。所以我想如果我们不能进入虚拟机管理程序市场，我们卖的就是能集成进虚拟机管理程序的网络产品。但整个虚拟机管理程序市场几乎都是VMware的。是的。所以我就想，如果我们进不了虚拟机管理程序市场，我们基本上就没有市场了。

And by the way, so part of the story is we had an acquisition offer from Cisco, and we didn't want to sell. And so I thought if we don't get into the hypervisor what we sold is we sold networking that would go in the hypervisor. But, like, the entire hypervisor market was VMware. Yeah. And so I'm like, well, if we don't get in the hypervisor, we kinda don't have a market.

我想，只有一个人能控制虚拟机管理程序。就一个人。那就是Ragu。所以我独自一人去见了Ragu。

I'm like, there's one person that controls the hypervisor. One person. And that was Ragu. So I took the lonely trip up to see Ragu.

等等。这是在你收到思科要约的时候吧。

Hold on. This was when you had an offer from Cisco, though.

我们收到了思科的收购要约，基本上就是要在后院挖个坑把公司埋了。我们知道这是因为硬件业务受到威胁。于是我长途跋涉去找拉古。你还记得这次会议吗？

We had an offer from Cisco, and it was to, like, basically put a hole in the backyard and bury the company. And so we knew that because it was threatening hardware. And so, like, I took the long walk up to Ragu. Do you remember this meeting?

记得，记得。我记得那次会议。

Yeah. Yeah. I remember the meeting.

我当时就说，听着，我们收到了思科的报价。我们很想进入虚拟机领域。你知道拉古怎么说吗？就两个字：不行。

And I'm like, listen. We have this offer from Cisco. We would love to be in the hypervisor. And you know what Ragu said? No.

你当时明白其中的利害关系吗？

You understood leverage at the time?

当然，我虽然不是超级天才，但也没那么蠢。

Yeah. I'm not super genius, but I'm not that dumb. It

这不是什么细微差别，就是直接拒绝。我当时觉得我们基本上完蛋了，只能卖给思科。

wasn't a nuance. It was no. I that's at the time, I thought we were basically done. We'd have to sell to Cisco.

那后来是怎么从节点发展到去问拉古的？

So then how did it progress from node to Ask ask Raghu.

等我到家的时候，希卡已经给我打过电话了。所以内部肯定有过一些讨论。

By the time I got by the time I'd gotten home, Shikhar had called me. So there must have been some internal conversation.

不。我们之所以拒绝，部分原因是我们也想收购那家公司。

No. So part of saying no was because we wanted to acquire the company as well.

是的。是对BD交易的拒绝。对，对。必须理解这一点。

Yeah. It was no to the BD deal. Yeah. Yeah. Have to understand.

所以情况有点像，嘿，我们可以联手和思科竞争。而拉古说，不，不是那种联手。是那种'我要吞掉你'的联手。

So it was kind of, hey. We can gang up and compete with Cisco. And Raghu was, no. Not gang up like that. Gang up like, I will swallow you.

对。对。

Yeah. Yeah.

我要买的是奶牛，不是牛奶。没错。

I'm buying the cow, not the milk. Yeah.

是的。不过我应该说，我

Yeah. I but I will say I

我是说，对我来说，拥有庞大的营销市场根本不合逻辑。

mean, there was no scenario in the world where it made sense for me to have big markets for marketing.

独立自主。当然。

Independent. Of course.

是的。但更积极地说，我们知道必须推出下一个能像虚拟机那样主导企业市场的产品。没错。这显然就是它。值得称赞的是帕特·基辛格，他当时是CEO，也是我的上司，他和我一样对此深信不疑。

Yeah. But more positively, we knew we had to get the next product that was gonna sort of rule the enterprise like the hypervisor did. Yeah. And this clearly was it. And Pat Gelsinger, to his credit, he was the CEO at the time, my boss, he was as equally convinced about it as I was.

乔·图斯也是如此，他当时当然是EMC的CEO，而EMC持有VMware 80%的股份。所以从这方面来看没有任何犹豫。

And so was Joe Tucci, who's Of course. CEO of EMC, which was that held 80% of VMware. And so there was no hesitation from that point of view.

没错。非常好。实际上我们用一个周末就搞定了。

Yep. No. Was very good. We got it done over a weekend, actually.

是啊。确实。这是最快的企业开发工作之一。没错。

Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. It was some of the fastest corp dev work. Yeah.

因为我认为VMware团队和拉古也意识到，如果思科真正明白发生了什么，他们会不惜任何代价收购它，因为这是思科唯一的实际威胁。

Because I think also the VMware team and Raghu realized that if Cisco actually realized what was going on, they would buy it at any price because it was the only actual threat to Cisco.

说到速度，这是个贯穿始终的教训，尤其面对大企业、企业发展和收购等情况时。速度至关重要，真的至关重要。

And speed, I mean, that's a lesson that carries through, especially against bigger companies, corp dev and acquisition and so on. Speed matters a lot. Speed matters a lot.

确实。以那个规模在周末完成交易，还是史上最高收购价...这速度非常快。

Yeah. Getting a deal done over the course of the weekend at that size, the highest price paid ever Yeah. Is very fast.

我想说，Raghu作为领导者有很多众所周知的优势，比如产品等方面。但这次整合的复杂程度怎么强调都不为过——实际上VMware内部团队同样优秀，某些领域他们更强，某些领域我们更出色。

I will say, I mean, Raghu has so many strengths as a leader, which many people know, product, etcetera. But it's hard to overstate how complex the integration was because the reality was is that the VMware had an internal team that was doing work just as good. Like, literally, they were just as talented, just as good. Some areas, they were stronger. Some areas, we were stronger.

我们拥有的独特优势是Linux相关技术，毕竟我们专注开源。但我们团队规模更小，却要消化这笔巨额收购。Raghu负责将这支获得高额回报的小团队与规模更大的团队整合。双方都做出了卓越贡献，最终我们成功实现了融合。

Now what we had that they didn't have is we had all the Linux stuff just because we were doing this open source stuff. But we were a smaller team, and we were a team that actually got this big acquisition. And so Raghu is in charge of integrating this smaller team with a large payout with a larger team. Both teams had done this great work in having that work out. Listen, we managed to do it.

确实。

I mean Yeah.

我们成功做到了。

We managed to do it.

那么你们具体是怎么做到的？

Yeah. So what did you how did you actually do it?

我是说，Nasira团队也展现出了卓越的领导力，对吧？还有VMware团队也在那里共同努力。这是一点。是的。

I mean, it took a lot of great leadership from the Nasira team as well. Right? And the VMware team that was in there to get to work together. That's one. Yeah.

总体而言，最终对客户重要的价值主张包含了VMware和Martina所构建的元素。一旦意识到这点，事情就变得简单了。棘手之处在于该选用谁的基础产品，对吧？那是最困难的部分。

And then overall, it turned out the value proposition that mattered to the customer had elements of what VMware had built and what Martina had built. So once you realized that, then it became easier. The tricky part was whose base product do you use. Right? That was the hardest part of it.

但一旦我们解决了这个问题，剩下的就变得可行了。

But once we solved that, then the rest became possible.

我...我要说，在我们销售时，我给前任CEO Diane Greene打了电话，我说，好吧，我需要些指导。您能给我些建议吗？她只说了一句：'保留你的销售团队'。就这样。

I I I will say when when we were selling, I put in a call to Diane Greene, who was the CEO before, and I said, like, okay. I would love some guidance. Like, is there anything you can, you know, point me to? And she said, keep your sales team. That was it.

这大概就是全部指导了。而我...我直到事后才明白其价值——VMware确实了不起。Ragoo和Pat也很出色，他们基本让我们在前几年能不受干扰地自主发展，对吧？

That was kind of the guidance. And I I didn't appreciate that until after we landed, which is if and by way, VMware is phenomenal. Like, Ragoo and Pat were phenomenal. They kind of allowed us, you know, to do our thing for the first few years pretty much unencumbered. Right?

随着时间的推移，你必须更认真地整合。关键在于，拥有自己的销售团队时，你能更好地领导产品团队——因为他们直接负责赋能、直接感知客户需求、直接接触客户。所以如果你真正掌控市场，从市场端统一团队会容易得多。老实说，除了领导层的放权态度外，关键因素之一就是我们能保持并发展独立的销售团队。当然，最终我们会重新融合。

And then over time, you have to integrate kinda more seriously. So the thing is when you have your own sales team, you can actually lead your you can lead your product team much better just because they're directly doing the enablement, they directly see the customer pull, directly have access to customers. So it's much easier to unify a team from the market on in if you actually control that market. So I honestly think one of the keys in addition to the leadership, in addition you know, the, you know, the hands off approach was just we were able to keep and grow our independent sales team. And then over time, of course, we will mesh back in.

是啊。说实话，这个品类当时还不成熟，产品也远未完善。确实如此。

Yeah. And let's face it. The category was not built out. The product suddenly was not built out. Yeah.

如果没有独立的销售团队，我们根本无法打造出产品。是的，我们做到了

So without an independent sales team, we would not have been able to build a product. Yeah. We got

在葡萄园上。

on the vineyard.

所以，是的。好吧。那就稍微炫耀一下，因为这是最成功的整合案例之一。

So so Yeah. Okay. So then brag a little bit, because this is one of the most successful integrations.

是的。

Yes.

而且，你知道，这可能是科技史上财务收购最成功的案例之一。那么接下来的几年发生了什么？

And, you know, financially acquisitions probably in the history of technology. So what happened in the coming years afterwards?

是的。我认为这对VMware来说有两方面的价值。一方面是独立营收，这部分创造了约20亿美元的营收，顺便说一句，这是许可证收入。

Yeah. I mean, I think there were two dimensions of value to VMware. One is the independent revenue from this. I mean, this cut about $2,000,000,000 in revenue, and this was, by the way, license.

而你把它卖出了

And you sold it for

10亿3？20亿。这就是为什么它创下了折扣记录。是的。

a billion 3? 2,000,000,000. This is why it was a discount record. Yeah.

试着理解低于1倍的收入倍数。

Get your get your mind around a less than one times revenue multiple.

是的。我正想说，第二个是对VMware核心业务的乘数效应。

Yeah. So I was just gonna say, the second is the multiplier effect on the VMware core franchise.

是的。

Yeah.

当然。因为它让...我是说，微软的产品在慢慢变好。开源也在进步。是的。而现在我们得以重新定义企业核心虚拟化堆栈，明确表示你必须拥有这个，还必须拥有网络功能。

Sure. Because it made the I mean, Microsoft's product was slowly getting better. Open source was getting better. Yeah. And now we were able to redefine the core virtualization stack in the enterprise to say, you gotta have this and you gotta have networking.

没错对吧？所以单从收入倍数的角度来看，它已经回本10倍了。

Yeah. Right? And so just purely on a multiple of revenue point of view, it's it's paid for 10 times.

非常巨大。我还要说，有段时间我们就像是...你知道，Nasira收购案中的那个业务单元，曾占VMware增长的很大一部分。是的。没错。所以不仅仅是收入本身的问题。

Massively. I will also say there was a there was a portion of time when we were like, just the BU that was the you know, part of the Nasira acquisition was a significant portion of VMware growth. Yeah. Right. So not not only was it just like the revenue alone.

实际上如果你看整体

Was actually if you looked at the overall

收入增长，确实如此。

revenue growth, like yeah.

对。我是说...对。基本上增长主要来自

Yeah. Like, I mean Yeah. Yeah. Like, basically, the growth was coming from

某些交易。对增长率有显著贡献。我忘记具体数字了。

the deals of something. Meaningful contributor to the growth rate. I forgot the numbers.

不过对，46%。

But yeah. 46%.

就是这样。我给你看...我记得。记得你

There you go. I'm showing you the. I remember. Remember. You

刚才说的差不多是这个数。

were saying just something around there.

好吧，这里有一个

But he Well, here's one

不过要维护那个销售价格，我记得我们和银行家开会时，我们的估值点简直爆表了。在所有已成交的交易中，没人达到过这种程度，那个点甚至超出了图表范围。

To to to defend the the the sales price, though, I remember when we had the meeting with the bankers, the dot for our multiple was, like, literally off the chart. Like, of all the deals that had been sold, nobody had that like, it it just didn't even fit on the chart.

营收有多少

How much revenue was

？我们当时只超过了一个对标点，就是Yammer。

it? There was what there there was there was one other dot that we beat, which was Yammer.

哦对，微软收购的Yammer。明白了。

Oh, yeah. Yammer with Microsoft. Okay.

没错没错，就是Yammer。但他们当时

Yeah. Yeah. It was Yammer. But they had, like,

两千万。整合得稍微差些。对对对。

20,000,000. Slightly less successful integration. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

为了达成那笔交易，我们减少了David Sachs的销售。

We're selling less David Sachs for getting that deal done.

对，对。好的。巨大的成功案例。好的。

Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Huge success story. Okay.

你知道，那是Nysera并入VMware的事。显然，你曾在VMware工作，后来最终成为了CEO。谈谈你建立公司的经历吧。

So, you know, that's Nysera into VMware. Obviously, you were at VMware and then became the CEO ultimately. So talk about your experience building the company.

在我们收购Nysera的时候，我们正处在产品扩张的道路上。显然，我是说，Sarah写了一篇很棒的文章，关于

At the time when we bought Nysera, we were on a product expansion path. So obviously, I mean, Sarah wrote a great piece on

平台。对。成为一个平台需要什么。

the Platform. Yeah. What it what it takes to be a platform.

没错。就好像她在VMware一样。对吧？因为这完全遵循了同样的策略。一旦你在核心市场达到一定的饱和度，就必须拓展相邻市场。

Yeah. It was as though she was at VMware. Right? Because it literally follows the playbook. And so once you get to a certain level of saturation in your core market, you gotta build out the adjacent markets.

对吧？这就是我们的目标。我们先构建了管理系统，然后引入Nissera负责网络部分。存储和安全则由我们自主研发，就这样逐步完善了整个体系。

Right? And that's what we were up to. We built management, then we brought Nissera for networking. We did our own thing on storage and then security. So we were progressively building that out.

这就是我们接下来七八年的主要任务。此举极大地扩展了我们的本地部署业务版图。嗯。尽管云计算正在兴起，我们依然保持着主导地位。正如你所知，在企业级市场，变革从来不会一蹴而就，总是需要时间沉淀。

So that was our task for the following seven, eight years. What that did is it vastly expanded the on prem franchise. Mhmm. Because even though cloud was coming, we were continuing to dominate And on as you well know in the enterprise, things never go fast. They always take their time.

它们并不会真正消失。新事物会出现，但确实如此。

They don't really go away. New stuff comes on, but yes.

没错，完全正确。我认为这是使命的重要部分之一。其次是我们最初尝试了云的变体方案——我们自建的云平台，但未能成功。于是我们调整策略，围绕混合云概念重整行业布局，因为大多数企业既使用AWS也使用我们的服务。所以我们决定走合作路线。

Yeah, exactly. So I think so that was one big part of the mission. The second is we initially tried a variant of the cloud, called we add our own cloud thing which did not work. And then we recoiled the industry around what we call the hybrid cloud because most of these enterprises, they had some in worked some stuff on AWS and stuff stuff on us. So we said, let's go partner.

这又是一次颠覆性举措。是的。因为当时人们认为双方会爆发激烈冲突。

And that was another radical move. Yeah. Because people thought this was gonna be a blood far path between the two.

确实，这是当然的。

Yeah. Of course.

我当时就在推进这件事。嗯。对吧？后来为了拓展开发者生态，我们收购了Pivotal。

So I was doing that. Mhmm. Right? And then we had to get the developer franchise, so we went and acquired Pivotal.

是的。

Yes.

最初是作为所有这些数据中心业务的总经理，后来作为首席运营官，基本上是在构建产品组合。

It was basically building out the the product portfolio, first as a GM for all these data center businesses and then as a COO.

这也很疯狂。就像你在基础设施中看到的那些成功经验，比如帕尔梅里茨试图进入应用堆栈，这很难跳过堆栈的某些部分，然后你又回到了做相邻领域。你们进行了有机产品开发，比如vSAN，对，成为了价值十亿美元的产品线。还进行了无机收购，也成为了十亿美元级别的产品线。

It's also crazy about it. It's like the amount of lessons that you saw in infrastructure where successful, like, you know, under Palmeritz is trying to go to the application stack, which is very tough to, like, skip parts of the stack, then you went back to doing adjacencies. You do organic product build out like vSAN, which Yep. Became billion dollar product lines. You did inorganic acquisitions became billion dollar product lines.

所以我觉得，VMware在某种程度上体现了商业战略的广泛范围。但比其他任何公司都更明显。在思科这样的硬件公司也能看到，但很少有其他公司需要同时应对这么多层面的竞争。

So I feel like, you know, like, the broad scope of business strategy was embodied at VMware at some point. But I think more than any other company. Like, you can see it in hardware companies like Cisco, but very other few other companies had to play that many games.

实际上，如果你想存活超过十五到二十年，就必须掌握所有这些玩法。

Well, in reality, if you're gonna be around for more than fifteen, twenty years, you gotta play all those things.

是啊，就是

Yeah. That's

这样。确实

true. Fair

够了。对吧？

enough. Right?

是啊。是啊。

Yeah. Yeah.

没错。因为市场变化太快了。对。对。所以，我认为如果你能围绕执行方法保持一致的思路，那完全有可能实现。

Yeah. Because the markets change on you so fast. Yep. Yep. So but, yeah, I think if you have a consistent theme around how to do it, then it's quite possible.

是的，实际上VMware有趣的是诞生在云计算之前。虽然它算是种云技术，但几乎连第一代都算不上，更像是云计算技术的前身。所以云计算立刻给业务带来了压力。这是非常困难的产品周期处境。

Yeah, and actually VMware interestingly was born before the cloud. So although it was kind of a cloud technology, it was like a very it was almost like not even first generation. It was like pre first generation cloud technology. So the cloud immediately put pressure on the business. This is very difficult product cycle circumstance.

哦，确实。还有商业模式也是。抱歉你说什么？

Oh, yeah. And the business model too. Sorry?

没错。甚至当时大多数人对VMware的初体验其实是作为一款消费产品。

Yeah. Even, like, even, like, most people's first experience with VMware that were around at the time was actually as a consumer product.

是的。

Yes.

就是，字面意思就是，就像是'对'、'对'、'对'，然后突然变成'不对'。真的就像我第一次用的时候，大概是九十年代末，我当时就觉得'天啊，我居然在Windows机器上运行红帽系统'。

Like, it was literally, like, it was like Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Was it was like no. Was really like like, the first time I used was, like, the late nineties, and I was like, I'm running Red Hat on my Windows machine.

就是这样。然后你就从，比如一个消费级产品，逐渐变成某种特定形态，当然你也知道后来做了服务器整合，变成了那种很专业的企业级产品。早期还有各种OEM业务，整个商业模式非常非常复杂。

That was it. And so, like, you go from, like, a consumer product to, like, this certain then and then, of course, you know, you did server consolidation and became, like, you know, deep enterprise product. And then, of course, there's all the OEM stuff that happened early on. It was a very, very complex business.

没错，确实很复杂。顺便说，这正是创始人远见发挥作用的地方。黛安和门德尔从一开始就清楚必须拿下服务器市场，对吧。

Yeah. It was a complex business. And by the way, that's where the founder vision comes to play. Diane and Mendel, right from day one, knew that they had to get to the server. Yeah.

他们其实早就规划好了路线。他们说'听着，我们先靠桌面产品打响知名度——顺便还能把系统bug都解决掉——然后再进军服务器市场，最终打入数据中心'。

And they actually charted their path. They said, hey. We're gonna get known with a desktop product, which by the way is gonna work out all the bugs in the system. And then we're gonna go into the server and then into the data center.

真了不起。

Amazing.

所以你

So you

必须承认他们在这方面真的很厉害。

gotta give them a lot of credit for that.

是的。当然。是的。是的。

Yeah. For sure. Yeah. Yeah.

那么在Exit公司时，公司规模有多大？营收多少？有多少员工？

So at Exit at Exit, how large was the company? How many how much revenue? How many people?

我们的营收是135亿。而且

So we were 13 and a half billion in revenue. And

你加入时公司大概有多大？

How big was it when you joined, roughly?

我记得大概是10到15，季度大约40，类似这样。每年40左右，差不多这样。

I think it was 10 to 15, about 40 a quarter, something like that. 40 a year, something like that.

400亿？

40,000,000,000?

每年4000万。

40,000,000 a year.

或者类似这样的。

Or something like that.

130亿？是的。

To 13,000,000,000? Yeah.

真是刺激。太不可思议了。没错。再说一遍，那团云就在你面前，简直是最难以置信的

What a ride. That's incredible. Yeah. Again, with the with the with the cloud in your face, like, that's the most incredible

部分？不，曾经是。

part No. It was.

在微软。嗯，微软。还有微软。是的。当然。

At Microsoft. Well, Microsoft. And Microsoft. Yeah. Of course.

VMware当时就运行在...是的，Windows上。对吧？我是说，就像，你知道的，Netscape。对。

VMware was sitting on top of Yeah. Windows. Right? I mean, like, you know, Netscape Yeah.

微软那堆垃圾叫什么来着

What was the name of Microsoft's crap

Hyper V. Hyper V.

Hyper V. Hyper V.

Hyper V. Hyper V. 是的。是的。是的。

Hyper V. Hyper V. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

不。我是说，我认为在网景那轮之后，最让我有成就感的是击退了Hyper V。

No. I mean, I think after the round of Netscape stint, the thing that gave me most satisfaction was beating back Hyper V.

是的。当然。正想说。是的。

Yeah. Of course. Was gonna say. Yeah.

没错。你会

That's right. You're gonna

面对同样的

face the same

我当时就想，你们别想再得逞第二次。

I'm like, you're not gonna get me a second time.

嗯。

Yeah.

再给我一次机会。我太喜欢这个了。

Give me a second time. I love that.

是的。所以呢，135亿美元，大约37,000人。

Yeah. So yeah. So the the 13 and half billion dollars, about 37,000 people.

难以置信。

Incredible.

企业价值690亿美元。

And $69,000,000,000 in enterprise value.

是啊。一百万。哇。

Yeah. A million. Wow.

没错。真是惊人的表现。好了，现在我想换个话题。你拥有如此丰富的经历。

Yeah. What a run. Okay. So I now want to shift topics. You have this incredible set of experiences.

你精通计算、网络存储，经验可能比任何人都丰富。你打算在这里怎么运用我们？

You know compute, network storage, maybe better than anyone experience wise. What are you going to do with us here?

是的，我认为从根本上说有两三个领域让我非常兴奋。一个就像我们上周讨论的那样，从基础模型一直到发电站都将重新匹配。

Yeah. I mean, I think I would say fundamentally two or three areas where I'm super excited by. One is like we were talking about the other week. Everything from the foundation model down all the way to the power station is gonna get readmatched.

嗯，当然。

Yeah. Of course.

对吧？要满足AI所需的全部计算资源别无他法。这为全世界打开了无限机遇。

Yeah. Right? There is just no other way you can supply all the compute that AI is gonna need. Right? And that opens up all the opportunity in the world.

过去十五年里，硬件供应商确实没有机会，因为超大规模云厂商都内部自研了。现在有了Neo Clouds，世界发展得太快，连云巨头都跟不上。OpenAI会自建很多设施，Oracle等等也是如此。

Mhmm. For the last fifteen years, all the you did really not have opportunity as a hardware vendor because everything was being done in house by the hyperscalers. Right. Now there is Neo Clouds, and the world is moving so far, even too fast for the hyperscalers. OpenAI is gonna build a lot of things on their own, Oracle, etcetera, etcetera.

所以现在出现了一个真正的基础设施市场，为创新者打开了大门。我认为这将成为早期公司和成熟公司的重要领域。

So now there's a legitimate infrastructure market Mhmm. That's opened up for innovators. Right? So I think I'm super excited by that. I think that's gonna be a significant area for both early stage companies as well as late stage companies.

是的，还要帮助成熟公司在这个市场中找准方向。

Yeah. And helping late stage companies navigate that market Yeah. As

首先，将会出现新型的服务提供商等等。我认为这是第一点。第二点，也是与你们在增长方面更深入的合作，企业转型将通过AI实现，这将带来大量机遇。第三点是数据中心相关领域，比如应用于数据中心的机器人技术，以及整个机器人领域。

And there's gonna be new types of service providers, etcetera. I I think that's one. The second one, and this is more in partnership with you on the growth side, these enterprise the enterprise transformation will happen, right, through AI. I think that's gonna open up a lot of opportunities. And then the third is adjacent areas to the data center, like robotics applied to the data center, generally robotics as a whole.

这些都是物理AI的领域，换句话说，我认为这些重要领域将充满令人兴奋的事物，值得深入研究和探索。

Those are all areas that are gonna be physical AI, in other words, significant areas that I think are gonna be a lot of exciting things, a lot of fun to go study and work on.

所以，当Raghu和我们讨论加入时，我深刻意识到这是一个非常独特的历史时刻——即便是很小的公司也面临着需要像Raku这样人才广泛知识面的问题。比如像CurseRite这样的公司，其生态系统已包含规模化的大型企业。

So, you know, one thing that really occurred to me, you know, as Raghu was, you know, talking to us about joining is where this very unique point in history where even very small companies have the problems that would draw on the breadth of someone like Raku. Like, think about someone like CurseRite. You know? Like, the the ecosystem includes, like, kind of incumbents at scale. You know, the company is at scale.

如何管理平台？如何管理云服务？所有这些都达到了像VMware那样的复杂程度。而这正是因为AI发展如此迅猛。

How do you manage platforms? How do you manage the clouds? All of these things are at the sophistication that you would actually see a VMware. Right? And it's just because AI is growing so fast.

我多次强调，Rigoo是行业里最优秀的技术战略家，我对此深信不疑。但更重要的是，他在合作伙伴关系、OEM协议、应对行业巨头、竞争对手、挑战者等各类事务上拥有丰富经验。如果能将这些精华提炼出来...

And so one thing that I'm I mean, I've said this, you know, many times is Rigoo is the best techno strategist in the industry, and I and I I I strongly believe that, but, also, he has this wealth of experience when it comes to partnerships, you know, OEM deals, dealing with incumbents, you know, dealing with competitors, dealing with challenger, dealing with stuff, like, the whole thing. So it's like if you can distill all that down into

国际扩张。

International expansion.

国际扩张。国际扩张。

International expansion. International expansion.

确切地说，这适用于投资组合中那些并不...的公司。所以你会觉得，哦，这应该只涉及成长期的项目，但实际情况完全不是这样。

Like, literally, it applies to the companies in the portfolio that aren't that yeah. So, like, you would think like, oh, this is some you know, this is only gonna be growth stage stuff, and it's absolutely not the thing that's

不相关。这就是现状。这些早期公司之所以能如此迅速地触及大公司的问题，是因为它们发展得太快了。完全正确。这就是有机需求的魔力，以及他们共同看到的市场池。

not relevant. That's the that's the dynamic. They are early stage companies that reach the problems of big companies so fast because they grow so fast. Totally. And so this is the magic of organic demand and, like, the market pool that they're all seeing.

实际上，当Rego刚加入时，我几乎每晚都会打电话向他求助，比如为一个10人小公司的事。我会说'Rego能帮忙引荐下吗？能和我们聊聊这个吗？'这就是我们正在经历的现状——所有环节都在同时发生变革。

In in fact, as as, you know, Rego was coming on board, I I mean, probably every night, I would call him asking for some help with, like, you know, a 10 person company. I'm like, Rego, can you help with this intro? Can you talk to us, you know, about whatever? And so and this is the reality of what we're living in. Everything's chain being changed all at once.

这些问题本应是资深CEO才会面临的重大挑战。所以能有这样的经验和人才在团队中实在太好了。

The problems are the problems that you would face as a very serious senior CEO. And so it's great to actually have that kind of experience and talent around the table.

没错。初创公司现在就要面对本该是大公司才会考虑的问题。

Yeah. Early stage companies are having large company questions being posed to them.

过去这类问题要到第10或15年才会遇到，比如如何实现多渠道、多产品线。但现在创业才一年半就遇到了。看看这些公司，你会发现...

Well, it used to be like year 10 or 15 when you're facing things like, how do I be multichannel, multi Yeah. Product, And now it's like year one and a half. No. See the companies. All you see,

并购交易，对吧。

see M and A, Like Yeah.

当然。公司销售

Of course. Companies selling

他们的时间。运作得非常好。这些大型云服务合作伙伴。我是说，我们有公司会筹集资金，然后促成价值1亿美元的GPU交易。对吧？

their time. Working very well. These very large cloud partners. I mean, we have companies that will, like, raise money and then broker a $100,000,000 GPU deal. Right?

我是说，这种事经常发生。

I mean, this happens all the time.

像tinycom这样的，非常小的公司。

With with tinycom like, very small companies.

小人物。所有这些事情，我是说，所有这些你必须管理的事情。

Small people. On these I mean, all of these things that you have to manage.

是啊。而且至今不变的事实是，这些创始人运营公司一年或两年后，仍然不具备那些技能。

Yeah. Well, and the thing that's still true is none of the founders a year into running the company or two years in have any of those skills.

对，当然。

Right, of course.

能有人可以交谈真是极大的鼓舞。我的意思是，这具有变革性，因为你会犯的错误数量就在那里，可能会让你粉身碎骨，这简直太疯狂了。嗯，我们也必须改变，对吧？就像你建立公司的方式不同了。技术栈也不同了。

And so it's just such a boost to have somebody to talk to. I mean, it's transformational because the number of mistakes that you will make right there and blow yourself to bits is just insane. Well, and we have to change too, right? Like the way you build a company is different. The technology stack is different.

你雇佣的人的类型也不同。所以我们自己也必须不同。对我来说，拉古在这里很棒的一点是，在这方面有很多事情要做，你知道的，要在各个方面都进行改进。所以我也需要帮助。

The type of people you hire are different. And so we also have to be different. And so one of the things that for me is great about having Ragu here is there's a lot to do on that front, you know, to kind of improve on every dimension there. So I need help too.

是的，没错。这既是公司规模迅速扩大、快速发展的结果，也是迅速面临大公司问题的结果。是的。同时公司保持私有状态的时间也变得更长了。现在，

Yeah, exactly. It's both the combination of the companies growing really big, really fast, and facing big company problems really fast. Yeah. At the same time that companies stay private so much longer. Now,

这一点

of that

也是如此。

is true too.

就像我们也必须适应这种动态。

Like we have to evolve to that dynamic as well.

所以，是的。

So Yeah.

雷吉，你提到你对机器人技术很感兴趣，而且显然有丰富的经验。我很想听听你对当前机器人技术领域的看法，以及未来几年最让你兴奋的是什么。

So one of the areas, Reggie, that you mentioned that you are intrigued by and you have obviously great experience in is robotics. I'd love to hear your state of the world of robotics right now and what gets you excited over the next few years.

是的。我开始研究数据中心建设和服务器建设这些领域，你会发现，首先，这些行业目前高度依赖人工，信不信由你。这些AI服务器的建造大约70%到80%都是靠人力。

Yeah. I mean, I started looking into the data center construction and all that, right, and server construction. And you find that, number one, all those industries are highly manual today, believe it or not. Right? So these AI servers that people are building is like 70% labor and or 80% labor.

对吧？

Right?

哇。

Wow.

如果你看看

And if you look at

是啊。

Yeah.

那些需要转化为可用基础设施的GPU集群和电力转换，唯一可行的解决方案就是大规模应用机器人技术。然后你会发现，从数据中心机器人化建设中能提炼出哪些通用元素？我认为这同样适用于许多制造业的机器人化建设。人形机器人显然是最激动人心的概念，但实现人形机器人工作的技术路径本身就极具价值，因为沿途产生的所有技术都有广泛用途。没错。

The Brazilians of GPUs that have to get turned into usable infrastructure and all the power that's getting converted, the only way that's gonna happen is there's gonna be a lot of robotics. And then you look at that and you say, turn out, say what are the generalizable elements from from a robotic build out of data centers? I think that applies to pretty much the robotic build out of lot of manufacturing things. I mean, humanoid is obviously the most exciting concept, but the pathways to getting humanoids to work itself is very valuable because of all the ways you can use everything that comes along the way. Yeah.

我是说，这确实是件非常有趣的事。而且需要横向的基础设施，比如必要的数据基础设施。嗯。如果想获得正确的训练，就必须同步来自不同地方的这些传感器。因此需要建设大量新的基础设施。

I mean, that's that's the really interesting thing. And there's horizontal infrastructure that's needed, like the data infrastructure that's needed. Mhmm. And if you wanna get the right training, you got all these sensors from various different places that has to get synchronized. So there's a lot of new infrastructure that needs to get built.

我认为机器人技术过于垂直化，它更多是由目标市场定义的，而非纯粹的横向技术。这正是为什么我很高兴Reggie专注于这方面，因为在基础设施创建、服务器和数据中心等领域，我们可以成为真正的专家，而他在这方面有很多背景。我觉得有点讽刺的是，我们写了篇关于中国在某些方面领先美国的文章后，很多人就以为我们要投资人形机器人。听着——

So I think robotics is so verticalized that, you know, it's more defined by the market it goes after than something pure horizontal, which is which is which is why I'm very happy Reggie was focused on it because when it comes to things like, you know, infrastructure creation and servers and data centers, like, we can become real experts in that, and he's got a lot of background in that. And I I just think, you know, it's kind of funny because, you know, we wrote this piece on, like, where where China is, you know, head of The United States. And then a lot people are like, okay. Well, that means you're investing in humanoids. I'm like, listen.

人形机器人确实很有趣。也许Emphysema Hornets公司有人在投资人形机器人。我对此一无所知，但我对芯片制造等领域非常了解。所以我认为我们需要用系统性的方法来理解这个市场。

Humanoids are very interesting. Maybe somebody at Emphysema Hornets is investing in humanoids. I know nothing about this, but I do know a lot about, like, the manufacturing of chips, for example. Right? And so I think, you know, listen, we need to take a systemic approach to understanding this market.

这里面蕴含着巨大的机会。我们会进行广泛的研究，但肯定会专注于我们熟悉的领域。

There's a tremendous amount of opportunity. We're going to do a broad set of research, but, you know, we will definitely focus on the areas that we understand.

没错。完全同意。我认为你提出的关键点是，在人形机器人普及之前，会有大量具有实际应用价值的案例出现。

Yeah. Absolutely. Yeah. And I think the important point that you're making is there's going be a ton of productive use cases that happen that lead up to that point where you have humanoids walking around and doing personalized Yeah.

是的。基础设施的发展史告诉我们，基础设施其实是解决方案的副产品。没错。通常是先有解决方案，然后自然衍生出所需的基础设施。

Yeah. And the history of infrastructure is infrastructure is actually a second order thing to the solution. Yeah. Yeah. First, you come up with some solution and then the infrastructure falls out of it if almost.

我认为机器人技术也需要遵循这个规律。先有垂直解决方案，然后自然形成配套的基础设施。

And I think that's what has to happen in robotics too. So Yeah. So you have a vertical solution, and then you get the infrastructure.

没错。我是说，我记得我们确实在无人机热潮中投入了大量资金。如果你当时观察那些企业，我们与其中许多都有合作经验，起初我们会把它们当作科技公司来评估。比如，哦，这是一家无人机公司。你要看技术，也要看团队。

That's right. I mean, I remember, like, you know, we we actually invested a lot in the drone wave. If you actually looked at those businesses at the time, and we had experience with a lot of them, like, you kind of you know, at first, we'd evaluate it as tech companies. Like, oh, this is a drone company. You look at the tech, and you look at the team.

但后来你会发现，如果你要向保险行业销售产品，某种程度上你必须成为一家保险公司。实际上他们购买的是...无论是从人那里购买还是从无人机那里购买。如果你涉足建筑业，你就是建筑公司；如果是农业，你就是农业公司。

But then you find, like, if you're selling into insurance, you kinda have to become an insurance company. And, like, they're actually buying, you know, like, whatever. It's either you're buying it from a human or you're buying it from a drone. And if you're in construction, you're a construction company. You're ag, you're an ag company.

因此我认为我们从中得到的教训是：你必须真正成为这个领域的专家。所以你要专注于此。

And so I think from that, we've learned that you have to really be a specialist in this space. So you're gonna do it.

就像是

It's like

你不能只做个普通的基建投资者。不过话说回来，有时你会遇到需要整合的环节——比如制造机器人时，你需要使用一些通用工具。以自动驾驶行业为例，事实证明你需要高精地图和仿真系统。对吧？

you can't just be kind of a garden variety infrastructure investor. That said, sometimes you get these aggregation points where to build the robotics, you need you know, there are horizontal tools you can use. So for example, in the AV industry, it turns out you needed high definition mappings and you needed a simulation. Yep. Right?

所以你可以创建像Applied Intuition这样的公司，通过软件来实现。这类横向投资确实存在机会，有时是软件，有时是硬件。但我认为越是接近实体机器人，就越需要深耕垂直领域。一旦

And so, like, you could create a company like Applied Intuition, which allows you to kinda do software. So there are opportunities to do these kind of horizontal investments. Sometimes they're software, sometimes they're hardware. But I think the closer you get to the actual robot, the more you have to verticalize in the industry. Once

你解决了垂直领域的问题，横向环节自然会显现出来。

you solve the vertical problem, the horizontal pieces come out naturally.

是的。没错。对。完全正确。而且存在共性

Yep. Yep. Yeah. Absolutely. And there's commonalities

你指出的那些。是的。绝对正确。正是如此。

that you identify. Yep. Absolutely. That's exactly right.

没错。太棒了。能有拉古加入我们真是太幸运了。

That's right. Cool. We're so lucky to have Ragu with us.

能来到这里我太幸运了。

I'm so lucky to be here.

得了吧，这太棒了。他另一个了不起的地方是完美契合。当然。我无法形容这有多宝贵。真的

Come on, This is awesome. And the the other great thing about him is he fits right Yeah. Of course. Which I can't say how valuable that is. That that

哦，是啊。

Oh, yeah.

完美的仿制品。

Perfect counterfeit.

周五晚上九点还在摸鱼，满脑子想着市场和那些事儿。

Friday night, slacking at 09:00, with with thoughts on markets and stuff.

如果你没什么好东西的话。

If you're empty nice stuff.

没错，正是如此。

Yeah. Exactly.

确实。好吧，

Exactly. Well,

我们超爱这个，太棒了。

we love it. Awesome.

谢谢格雷格，太棒了。

Thanks, Greg. Awesome.

好的，没问题。

Yep. Okay.

谢谢。好了，各位。

Thanks. Alright, guys.

干杯，感谢

Cheers, Thanks for

参与。谢谢。

doing this. Thanks.

是的。谢谢

Yeah. Thanks

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