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这个产品周期最根本的不同在于，软件本身就能完成工作。
The thing that is fundamentally different about this product cycle is that the software itself can actually do the work.
因此，如今软件的市场机会已不再仅限于IT支出。
And therefore, the market opportunity for software today is no longer just IT spend.
它主要是劳动力。
It's largely labor.
并不是所有工作都会消失。
It's not like all the jobs will go away.
实际上我认为这根本不会发生。
I actually think that's not gonna happen at all.
有很多事情，如果能花一美元雇人完成，我百分百会这么做。
There are a lot of things where if I could hire somebody for a dollar to do this task, I would a 100% do that.
但我从没找到过一美元就能雇佣的人。
I've never been able to hire somebody for a dollar.
现在我能用一美元雇佣软件了。
Now I can hire software for a dollar.
尽管了解模型能力和前沿动态很重要，但你仍需思考如何应用这项技术。
While it is important to understand model capabilities and what's happening in Frontier, you still need to figure out how to apply that technology.
我认为模式的重要性与过去相比丝毫未减。
I think modes matter just as much as they did before.
唯一的变化在于供需关系中，由于创建这类软件的壁垒大幅降低，理论上杯子里的软件供给量增加了。
The one change is that in the supply demand equation, there's conceptually more supply of software on the cup because the barrier to creating this stuff has gone down dramatically.
我认为人工智能是差异化的绝佳工具。
I think AI is an incredible tool for differentiation.
想象一个语音代理能用50种语言全天候合规交流，这种高度差异化能力显然远超人类。
The idea that a voice agent can speak in 50 languages fully compliantly twenty four seven, highly differentiated, you know, certainly versus the human.
在我看来，这种能力的'AI属性'并非
The AI ness of that capability, in my opinion, is not
防御性的优势来源。
a source of defense ability.
这已是行业共识。
It is just so consensus.
比如，云计算当初就不是共识。
Like, cloud was not consensus.
移动技术当初也不是共识。
Mobile was not consensus.
这就是为什么现有企业会搞砸。
And that's why the incumbents kinda screwed up.
所有人都在说AI摧毁了护城河概念，说任何人都能在卧室里随手写出Zendesk的竞品，说20家公司都在做和你一模一样的东西。
Everyone's saying that AI killed the concept of moats, that anyone can vibe code a Zendesk competitor in their bedroom, that 20 companies are building the exact same thing you are.
那为什么软件公司现在可能比历史上任何时候都更具防御性？
So why are software companies potentially more defensible today than any other time in history?
十六位普通合伙人David Haber和Alex Rampell看到企业为过去被称为功能的东西收费2万美元，因为这个所谓的功能现在能替代一整个人力。
A sixteen z general partners David Haber and Alex Rampell are seeing companies charge $20,000 for what used to be called a feature because that so called feature now replaces an entire person.
他们观察到初创公司正在进攻那些过去根本不值得用软件触碰的市场，比如原告法律和汽车贷款服务，因为突然之间市场不再是IT支出而是人力支出。
They're watching startups attack markets that were never worth touching with software, like plaintiff law and auto loan servicing, because suddenly the market isn't IT spend but labor spend.
反直觉的真相是这样的。
The counterintuitive reality is this.
这股制造无限竞争的力量，同时也在无人关注的领域创造着万亿美元的机遇。
The same force creating infinite competition is also creating trillion dollar opportunities in places nobody's looking.
在本期节目中，我们将探讨势头与护城河的关系，为什么第十九个玩家总会失败，以及如何找到那个'刚刚好'的黄金地带——小到巨头不屑一顾，却又能让你建立商业帝国。
In today's episode, we explore the relationship between momentum and moats, why the nineteenth player always dies, and how to find the Goldilocks zone where you're too small for giants to care about but big enough to build an empire.
我们花了大量时间讨论护城河，探讨护城河的演变，以及在这个新时代是否还存在护城河。
We've spent a lot of time talking about moats and how moats have evolved and are there still even moats in this new era.
不如你来分享一下我们最近的讨论内容，或者你对这个更宏观的护城河问题有什么看法？
And so why don't you reflect and share some of the conversations we've been having or some of your perspectives on this broader moat question?
大卫，要不从你开始？
Maybe, David, we'll start with you.
我就直入主题说个激进观点吧。
Maybe just to jump right into it with a hot take.
我认为护城河依然重要，而且很多...
I think moats still matter, and I think a lot of
护城河依然重要。
the moats Moats still matter.
仍然重要，确实如此。
Still matter, exactly.
我认为它们大体上是相同的。
I think they're largely the same.
我经常在差异化和防御性之间思考这个问题。
I often think about this between differentiation and defensibility.
我认为AI是实现差异化的绝佳工具。
I think AI is an incredible tool for differentiation.
想象一个语音助手能用50种语言完全合规地工作，24/7全天候服务，这相比人类确实具有高度差异化。
The idea that a voice agent can speak in 50 languages fully compliantly, 20 fourseven, highly differentiated, certainly versus the human.
但在我看来，这种AI能力的本质并不构成防御性优势。
But the AI ness of that capability, in my opinion, is not a source of defensibility.
它主要是差异化。
It's largely differentiation.
在我看来，软件产品的防御性来自于：拥有端到端的工作流程、应用场景的掌控、成为记录系统、具备网络效应，以及深度嵌入客户业务流程。
The defensibility of a software product resides, in my opinion, from owning the end to end workflow, from the context in which that it's applied, becoming the system of record, having a network effect, deeply embedding yourself within your customer.
我认为这些经验法则一直是我们评估软件公司时始终会关注的重点。
I think these were the heuristics that were always things that we would always look for when evaluating software companies.
我认为这个产品周期最根本的不同在于，软件本身确实能够完成工作。
I think the thing that is fundamentally different about this product cycle is that the software itself can actually do the work.
因此，当今软件的市场机会已不仅仅是IT支出，而主要是劳动力替代。
Therefore, the market opportunity for software today is no longer just IT spend, it's largely labor.
挑战往往在于，每个人都能小规模地构建某些东西，而许多——我不会称之为网络效应——但一些防御性壁垒只有在大规模时才会显现。
The challenge often has been that everybody can build something at small scale, and a lot of the I wouldn't call them network effects, but some of the defensibility moats only become apparent at large scale.
所以，就像很多人讨论的那样，举个例子，比如很久以前，前AI时代。
So, like, a lot of people talk about, okay, take an example from, like, long time ago, pre AI era.
如果我正在建立一家反欺诈公司，而且我见过很多人，对吧？
If I am building an anti fraud company, and I've seen lots of people, Right?
我会比一家刚成立、只见过少数案例的新反欺诈公司做得更好吗？
Am I going to do a better job than a net new anti fraud company that's seen a few people?
这就是为什么这被称为数据网络效应，尽管我和Martine很久以前在另一个播客里讨论过数据网络效应是否真实存在，但它确实像引力一样——实际上一个原子确实对你施加引力，但你只有在非常大尺度上才能观察到。
And the reason why this would be called a data network effect, although there's another podcast that Martine and I did a long time ago debating whether or not data network effects are real, but it's something that really it's almost like gravity gravity actually, like, one atom actually has exerts gravity on you, but you only really see it at, like, very, very large scale.
比如地球，你能感受到重力。
Like, the Earth, you notice the gravity.
太阳，你能感受到重力。
The sun, you notice the gravity.
木星，你能感受到重力。
Jupiter, you notice the gravity.
但那个玻璃杯的重力你就感受不到。
You don't notice it for, that glass.
很多数据网络效应也是同样道理——在非常小的规模下，当有20家公司都说要阻止欺诈时
And it's the same thing for a lot of these data network effects where at very, very small scale, when you have 20 companies that are all saying, I'm going to stop fraud.
好吧。
Alright.
他们都在构建相同的东西。
They're all building the same things.
他们都使用相同的算法。
They all have the same algorithms.
但当你观察过40亿人并识别出哪些是坏人时，现在你就能向每位新增客户、每位购买你反欺诈技术的客户推销（以此为例），因为你接触过更多客户，实际上能获得更好的效果。
But when you've seen 4,000,000,000 people and like these people are bad, now you can sell each incremental customer, each customer of your anti fraud technology, to use this example, because you've seen more customers and you can get actually better results.
但挑战在于，很多这类护城河效应只有在达到超级超级超级大规模时才会真正显现，同样的逻辑也适用。
But the challenge is that a lot of these moats only really are evident at mega mega mega scale, and the same argument would apply.
这就好比说，'哦，我见过四个客户'。
It's like, oh, like, I've seen four customers.
大卫见过三个。
David's seen three.
我已经见过四个了。
I've seen four.
他见过三个。
He's seen three.
选我的软件。
Pick my software.
但这就像，你只见过四个客户。
But it's like, you've seen four customers.
这意味着还有80亿客户你未曾接触过。
That means there are 8,000,000,000 customers you haven't seen.
还有80亿客户他未曾接触过。
There are 8,000,000,000 customers he hasn't seen.
这有什么区别呢？
What's the difference?
而在超大规模下，情况就变成了：好吧，我已经接触过40亿客户了。
Whereas at mega scale, it's like, all right, I've seen 4,000,000,000 customers.
而他接触过10亿客户。
He's seen 1,000,000,000 customers.
这时候就很容易看出我的产品效果会更好——但这需要规模支撑。
Well, it's actually kind of easy to see that the results of my product will be better, but that's at scale.
但很多问题都集中在从零到一的阶段，很难论证我的方案更优——如果是反欺诈领域，很难证明我的反欺诈风控更好。
And a lot of the question is on the zero to one phase, it's hard to make the argument that I have better, if it's fraud, I have better fraud underwriting.
如果是AI处理工作，比如我对某类客户进行过更多电话沟通，因此能做得更好。
If it's AI do the work, like, I've done more phone calls to a particular type of customer and therefore I do a better job.
在小规模阶段很难论证这一点。
It's hard to make that argument at subscale.
这往往就是挑战所在——如果你成为世界上最大的公司，那么你自然就拥有了护城河，这几乎是显而易见的。
And this is often the challenge is that it's kind of self evident that if you become the biggest company in the world, then you have a moat.
但如何达到能真正展示这种规模的阶段呢？
But how do you get to the scale where you actually could show?
如果面对900万个小打小闹的竞争者，而你自己也只是其中一员，光喊着要扩大规模却没人能做到——因为软件开发实在太容易了，你就永远无法达到那种规模。
You can't get to that scale if you have 9,000,000 ankle biters and you are yourself an ankle bitter of just we are trying to get to scale and nobody can because it's so easy to actually produce software.
这就是人工智能的双刃剑：开发软件变得极其容易。
And that's the double edged sword of AI is that it's very, very easy to produce software.
每个人都能实现那些显而易见的点子，正因为它显而易见，所有人都会去开发——但你能达到真正能展示护城河的规模吗？
Everybody can go do something that is a very obvious idea, because it's obvious, everybody's gonna go build it, but can you get to the type of scale where you actually could show a moat?
可以说这变得更难了，因为潜在竞争者的基数更大了。但如果你能达到超级规模，就能碾压他们。
And that has gotten arguably harder because you have a larger end count of potential competitors, But if you get to mega scale, then you could show them out.
这本质上就是从0到1和从1到n的区别。
And that's kind of the zero to one versus one to n.
或许可以谈谈在AI时代，即便是大型企业在防御性方面与Web2时代相比有何不同。
Maybe talk about what's different about defensibility for even the bigger players today in the AI era than it was in, let's say, the web two era.
如今的企业是更具防御性、更弱防御性，还是我们应该如何评估这种防御力的强度？
Are the companies today more defensible, less defensible, or how should we think about sort of the strength?
我认为防御性较弱的部分原因，正是许多企业软件在公开市场遭受重创的原因。
I think the less defensible part, this is why a lot of enterprise software has gotten beaten up in the public markets.
主要有两个原因。
It's kind of two reasons.
第一，如果采用按席位定价的模式，你如何制定一个让用户觉得公平的定价策略？
Number one is that if you're doing per seat pricing, like, how do you come up with a pricing model that people feel is fair?
很大程度上这只是心理因素。
And a lot of it is just psychology.
过去二十年来，不知为何大家都采用'每月每席位'定价——你应该听过我那个笑话。
And for whatever reason, for the last twenty years, it's like per seat per month with you've heard my joke.
就像星巴克的中杯、大杯、超大杯那样的软件收费模式。
The tall grande venti model of, like, software charging.
不知怎么的，这种定价方式让人觉得公平。
It's like somehow that felt fair.
至于它是否真的公平，我也不知道。
And whether that is fair or not, I don't know.
但人们会说，哦，好吧。
But, like, people are like, oh, yeah.
每月每个座位85美元。
It's $85 a seat per month.
嗯。
Yeah.
好吧。
Okay.
听起来还算合理。
That sounds reasonable.
但如果你在四十年前提出这种定价，人们会笑掉大牙的。
Whereas if you proposed that pricing forty years ago, you would have been laughed out of town.
所以这就成了常态。
So this just became the norm.
正如我之前所说，公开上市的软件公司受到一些冲击的原因在于，哎呀，可能你卖出的席位会减少。
And the reason why, as I was saying, public software companies have been beaten up a little bit is like, uh-oh, maybe you won't sell as many seats.
如果现在不需要雇佣那么多平面设计师，Adobe还能卖出那么多席位吗？
Is Adobe gonna sell as many seats if now you don't have to hire as many graphics designers?
或者如果软件能自动回答所有查询，Zendesk还能卖出那么多席位吗？
Or is Zendesk going to sell as many seats if the software just answers all the queries?
答案是否定的。
Like, the answer is no.
这并不意味着这些公司就完蛋了。
It doesn't mean that the companies are toast.
实际上它们的收入可能会翻五倍，因为现在改为按效果收费而非按席位收费，但这只是第一部分。
They might actually quintuple their revenue because now they charge per outcomes as opposed to charging per seats, but that's kinda part one.
第二部分是，等等，现在任何人都能快速编写出一个Zendesk的竞品。
Part two is, wait a minute, now everybody can vibe code up a Zendesk competitor.
所以也许企业会停止购买软件。
So maybe companies will just stop buying software.
这一点我们还没看到任何迹象，但我认为存在这两方面的风险。
This one, I don't think we've seen at all, but I think there is like these two sided, these two risks.
但回答你的问题，防御性会改变吗？
But to answer your question, does defensibility change?
既然现在你能自己编写软件了，那我为什么还要支付你的利润空间呢？
Well, if you now are able to code your own software, like, why am I paying like, your margin is my opportunity.
看看这些软件公司的利润率。
Well, look at the margin of software companies.
比如说，Salesforce的毛利率高达80%。
Like, Salesforce has an 80% gross margin.
比如，他们应该保持1%的毛利率，还是说大家都不该再用Salesforce了。
Like, should they have a 1% gross margin, or nobody should use Salesforce anymore.
这将是护城河真正开始瓦解的有利论据，但我认为我们根本还没看到这种情况发生。
That would be the pro case of Moats really starting to disintegrate, but I don't think we've seen that happen at all.
因为事实证明，一方面人们正在经历两件事。
Because it turns out people on the one hand, two things are actually happening.
一是这有点像克莱顿·克里斯坦森的理论。
One is that this is kind of like Clay Christensen theory.
就像在位企业过度满足了市场需求。
It's like the incumbents overshoot the market.
Salesforce、Zendesk或NetSuite的功能集远远超出你的实际需求，也超出任何单个客户的需求，因为它要涵盖所有边缘案例，就像你用Microsoft Word时——你上次写书是什么时候？
So the amount of features in Salesforce or Zendesk or NetSuite, it way exceeds the feature set that you need, that any individual customer needs, because it's meant to encompass, it's like all of these weird edge cases, and you kinda see this if you use Microsoft Word, when was the last time you wrote a book?
什么时候？
When?
从没写过。
Never.
对吧？
Right?
但我没写过书。
But I haven't written a book.
它包含了所有这些功能。
It has all of these things.
他们可能有50个功能，但如果你真要写书呢？
They probably have 50 But software if you do write a book, guess what?
微软Word为书籍作者准备了所有这些功能，比如制作目录之类的。
Microsoft Word has all these features just for book authors to, like, make a table of contents or something.
但我根本用不上这些。
It's like, I don't use that.
所以他们不断往里面塞更多东西，结果就超出了市场需求。
So they keep bundling more stuff in there, so they overshoot the market.
理论上这会让某些人用起来更方便，但回到我最初的话题，这种'我要凭感觉编码出微软Word'的想法，其实会遇到很多你根本想不到的边缘情况。
And theoretically, it's gonna make it easier for somebody, but kind of going back to where I started with this topic, like it turns out that this concept of I'm just gonna vibe code Microsoft Word, it's like there are these edge cases that you just don't know about.
所以实际上，你为什么不自己种粮食、自己焊接铝材或自己盖房子呢？
So it's actually, you know, why don't you grow your own food or weld your own aluminum or build your own house?
其实利用比较优势理论会简单得多，直接说'我要买现成的产品'就行了。
It's just it's kinda easier to use this concept of comparative advantage and just say, I'm going to buy something off the shelf.
所以无论如何，我认为护城河效应和以前一样重要。
So, anyway, so I think moats matter just as much as they did before.
一个变化在于供需方程中，从概念上讲未来会有更多软件供应，因为创建这些东西的门槛已大幅降低。
The one change is that in the supply demand equation, there's conceptually more supply of software on the come because the barrier to creating this stuff has gone down dramatically.
我认为另一方面是，虽然会有更多软件出现，而且生产软件的边际成本正渐近趋近于零，但这些公司如何更深度嵌入客户的方式已经改变——因为软件正在承担工作，因此在许多情况下它实际上正在替代人力。
I think the flip side to that too is that while there will be more software, and again, the kind of marginal cost of producing software is declining asymptotically towards zero, the way that these companies are getting more deeply entrenched within their customers has differed because, again, the software is doing the work, and therefore, in many cases, it's actually replacing labor.
所以如果你已经将团队转型为软件，你现在就更加依赖那个产品来运营业务。
And so if you've transitioned a team out that has now become your software, you're now much more dependent on that product to run your business.
再者，是用另一款软件替代它更难，还是重新雇佣团队更难？
And again, is it more difficult to replace that software with another piece of software or to rehire that team?
我认为这是个开放性问题，但软件正在承担更多工作，因此我认为它们会更深度嵌入客户体系。
I think it's an open question, but again, the software is doing more of the work and therefore I think getting more deeply embedded within their customers.
部分问题是定价的黄金区间。
Well, part of it is just like the Goldilocks zone of pricing.
所以我很久前就发过推文或X线程讨论这个。
So I wrote some tweet or whatever it's called, X thread about this a long time ago.
我称之为保洁服务问题。
I call it the janitorial services problem.
因为如果我找到你，你是一家未来会著书立说的巨头公司的CEO。
Because if I went to you, you're the CEO of a giant company where you write your books in the future.
你管理着30万人的公司，我作为埃里克找到你，我能让你的马桶清洁度提升9%，同时节省1%的卫浴用品或保洁服务开支。
So you have a 300,000 person company, I find you as Eric, I can get your toilets 9% cleaner and save you 1% on your toiletry spend, or your janitorial services spend.
你不仅毫不在意，甚至懒得费神去联系公司里真正负责这事的人，对吧？
Not only do you not care, you don't even care enough, you won't even exercise the mental energy to find the person in the company who does care, right?
这意味着你们的保洁服务开支永远不会有变化。
And that means that your janitorial services spend will never change.
问题在于很难打入这个市场，好消息是同样也很难被替换。
And the problem is it's hard to get in, the good news is it's hard to get out.
但如果是像90%利润都流向我的情况——比如作为通用电气CEO，你90%的利润都归我——你的首要任务就是不惜代价摆脱对我的依赖。
Whereas for something, it's like 90% of my profits go to like you, I'm now 90% of your profits as the CEO of GE, they're going to me, your number one priority is, like, getting the hell off of me.
对吧？
Right?
而且，左右不停地发标书。
And, like, doing RFPs left and right.
所以部分原因也在于，这件事的相关性。
So part of it is also just, like, how relevant this is.
而有些公司就处于这种无关紧要的舒适区，比如这些保洁服务，即便你有900万个竞争对手，他们也不会有什么变化，这就是为什么我们内部讨论的很多策略都是关于新领域的。
And there are some companies that operate in this Goldilocks zone of irrelevance, like these janitorial services, where even if you have 9,000,000 competitors, like, they're just not gonna go anywhere, which is why, like, a lot of the strategy that we talk about internally is greenfield.
对吧？
Right?
这些公司就像被永久困住了一样。
It's like those companies are they're they're stuck for good.
是否有大量新创公司不会使用那些糟糕的老牌清洁服务公司，而是会被你的推销打动——比如我能让你的厕所更干净，同时收费更低？
Is there a high rate of new company creation that will not use the crappy old janitorial services company, but will actually resonate like your pitch of, like, I will get your toilets cleaner and I will charge you less money.
这确实很有吸引力，但对那些还在用老一套的人来说就没那么有说服力了。
That really resonates, but that's not gonna resonate to the people that are using the old fashioned stuff.
有哪些处于'金发女孩区域'的公司或领域案例？又有哪些处于'绿地区域'的公司或领域案例？
What are examples of company or space in the Goldilocks zone, and what was an example of company or space in the Greenfield zones?
嗯，比如薪资公司，对吧？
Well, like payroll companies, right?
像ADP和Paychex这样的公司，总市值高达数千亿美元，利润非常丰厚，而薪资处理...其实你可以自己处理薪资。
Like ADP and Paychex, mean, are companies that are collectively worth hundreds of billions of dollars, very, very profitable, and how does pay like, you could do your own payroll.
实际上，这某种程度上是软件行业的一个很好的隐喻。
Actually, it's kind of a good metaphor for software in general.
就像，为什么你必须...为什么我不能直接付钱给你？
Like, why is it that you have to like, why can't I just pay you?
你是我的员工。
You're my employee.
为什么我不能直接给你开张支票？
Why can't I just, like, cut you a check?
因为我还得代扣税款。
Well, because I have to withhold taxes.
那我该代扣多少税呢？
Well, how much tax do I have to withhold?
嗯，这要看情况。
Well, it depends.
对吧？
Right?
而且还有这种超级复杂的查询表格。
And there is this, like, super complicated lookup table.
比如，你住在这个县，但在纽约待了这么多天，还有这样那样的特殊情况。
It's like, well, you live in this county, but you spend this many days in New York and this, that, and the other thing.
哦，你还欠着子女抚养费，国税局要扣你的工资。
Oh, and you owe child support and the IRS is garnishing your wages.
所有这些事情都非常复杂。
All of these things that are very complicated.
所以事实证明直接找ADP更便宜，他们只收你，我不知道，大概每人每月50美元，而你本来可能要付100美元。相比整个工资支出，这只是九牛一毛。
So it turns out it's just cheaper to go to ADP, and ADP just charges you, I don't know, like $50 a month per person that you might be paying a 100 It's a paltry sum compared to the overall amount of payroll.
所以实际上没人会更换他们的工资服务公司。
So nobody really switches their payroll companies.
这可以作为一个例子。
Like that would be an example of one.
另一方面，很多公司在2022年市场真正经历低迷后意识到：等等，我有1000名员工时缩减到200人，但还保留着1000个Salesforce许可证，对吧？
On the other side, I had a lot of companies coming out of 2022 where the market really went through a downturn, and they're like, wait a minute, I'm spending four I had a thousand employees, I downsized to 200 employees, I had a thousand licenses for Salesforce, right?
1000乘以每月100美元，再乘以12是多少？
What's a thousand times a $100 a month, times 12?
那就是一年120万美元。
That's $1,200,000 a year.
哇，这可是一大笔钱，因为我只有200名员工，现金储备只够六个月，我必须省下这笔钱。
Wow, like, that's a lot of money because I only have 200 employees and I only have six months of cash, like, I gotta save that.
但他们在薪资支出上却没有这样做。
And they didn't do that for their payroll spend.
所以你会看到很多公司确实想优化他们的整体软件成本，特别是当他们意识到总体而言——大多数人实际上并没有使用这些席位。
So you see it like a lot of companies do wanna rationalize their overall software cost, especially for these things where they recognize in aggregate, like most people aren't actually using the seats.
所以我会说，比如Salesforce这类工具，还有一些创意工具。
So I'd say, like, you know, Salesforce type stuff, you know, some of the creative tools.
比如Adobe就非常昂贵，你可能只是随意签了个全公司范围的许可协议，心想为什么不呢？
Like, if you like, Adobe is very expensive, and you might just do, like, a wall to wall license saying, why not?
但当你思考如何节省500万美元时，就会重新审视这个问题。
But then you look at if you're like, how do I save $5,000,000?
没人使用这些软件时，它却要花费50亿美元。
Nobody's using this while it's $5,000,000,000.
而对于那些交付与支付密不可分的服务（这与软件定价模式截然不同）
Whereas for things where inextricably the delivery and the payment are linked, right, which is very, very different than pricing for software.
比如工资单服务——显然我不会为不在职的员工支付这项费用。
Like payroll, obviously, I'm not gonna pay for payroll services unless you are employed here.
反观我们公司有600名员工的情况
Whereas, have 600 people that work at our firm.
我想我们持有600份微软Office的三月许可
I think we have 600 licenses from Microsoft Office March.
我敢打赌这里很多人可能一年都没打开过Excel
Like, we probably I bet there are a lot of people here who have not opened Microsoft Excel in a year.
那我们为什么要为此付费呢？
So why are we paying for that?
这就是关于合理化软件支出的理念。
And that would be the idea of kind of rationalizing software spend.
所以这其实要看情况，但我认为按席位定价模式——那种为整个组织统一付费的方式往往最先被淘汰，而那些与实际使用紧密绑定的服务则不同。
So it it it kinda depends, but I think per seed pricing, where it's like it's just easier to pay for the entire thing wall to wall, you know, in your entire organization, those are often the first to go versus things that are, again, inextricably linked to the actual usage.
嗯。
Yeah.
你之前提到我们观察到——基本上你说的担忧是可能企业会采用某种定制版的Zendesk替代方案，但目前为止我们还没看到这种情况。
So you mentioned earlier that we've seen, you know, basically, you mentioned there was this concern that maybe instead of Zendesk, it will, you know, companies will, you know, there'll be a vibe coded version of it, but we've seen none of that so so far.
你的思维模型是认为我们会在成本极高或存在全新机会的领域看到这种现象吗？你对哪些类型的软件会被替代有何预判？
Is your mental model is we'll we'll see it to the in examples where the the cost is significantly high or in which there's sort of greenfield opportunities, or what is sort of your mental model for the types of software that will replace?
对。
Yeah.
我认为全新机会领域总是成立的，但要实现这种机会需要同时满足两个条件。
I mean, I think the greenfield one is always true, but when you look at greenfield opportunities, you need two things to be true.
创业者需要有极大的耐心，告诉自己：如果我创办一家全新的薪酬公司，我不会试图向通用电气这样的客户推销，因为我明白他们已经被ADP牢牢绑定，这种局面永远不会改变。
You need the entrepreneur to be very, very patient and say, I'm not going to try to sell to everybody who's if I'm if I'm starting a net new payroll company, I'm not going to try to sell to GE because I recognize that they are are hostages to ADP, and that's never gonna change.
所以一方面是创业者的这种耐心，另一方面是需要足够高的新公司创建率才能真正奏效。这就是为什么，比如在电子健康档案或电子病历领域，每天有多少新的医院系统诞生？
So one is that patience of entrepreneur, and the other one is you just need a a high enough rate of new company creation to really make it work, which is why, like, to pick on one space of electronic health records or electronic medical records, how many new hospital systems are created every day?
我的意思是，这个数字基本为零。
I mean, it rounds to zero.
所以如果我想开发一个新的电子病历系统去与Epic或Cerner竞争，我确实可以这么做。
So if I'm trying to go build a new EHR system to go compete with Epic or Cerner, I can do that.
有很多边缘案例，就像我作为创业者可能有耐心，但等等，我需要向大型医院系统销售500万美元的交易。
There are a lot of edge cases, it's like and I might have patience as an entrepreneur, but wait a minute, like, I need to sell $5,000,000 deals to big hospital systems.
地球上每一家医院目前都在使用电子病历系统。
Every single hospital on Earth is currently using an EHR system.
要让这个模式运作起来真的非常非常困难。
It's gonna be really, really hard to make that work.
所以我认为这两点都需要成立，就是要有那种愿意保持耐心的合适类型的创业者。
So I think think both of those need to be true, like the right type of entrepreneur who's willing to be patient.
因为这往往是一场非常孤独的游戏，就像我开发了这款很棒的产品，但等等，我还没有任何客户，而你希望看到高增长，因为你看到市场上其他公司正飞速发展，而我的公司却没有，我在硅谷，需要招募最优秀的人才。
Because it's often a very lonely game of it's like, I built this great product, wait a minute, I don't have any customers yet, and you wanna see high traction because you're seeing in the rest of the market, like some companies are just going like this, and my company's not, and I'm in Silicon Valley, and I need to recruit the best people.
他们想去业绩增长迅猛的公司工作，但开拓新领域需要耐心。
It's like they wanna work at the company that has the graph like this, but you need this Greenfield requires patience.
是的。
Yeah.
所以我们讨论的是护城河依然重要，而且在很多方面它们看起来非常相似。
The so we're talking about how moats still matter, and in in many ways, they they look pretty similar.
让我们暂时为对方立场辩护一下。
Let let's steel man the other side for a second.
你知道，我们甚至是在什么背景下进行这场对话的？有些人会说，嘿。
Where, you know, where are we even having this conversation where some people say, hey.
品牌才是更快的交付速度，还是因为这个领域有所不同？
You know, brand is the is is is more shipping velocity or because this area is different?
他们论点中最有力的部分是什么？
What's the steel man of their argument?
听着，我认为当前市场的噪音比以往任何时候都大，所以我觉得找到脱颖而出的方法在当下比过去更为重要，我敢这么说。
Look, I think this market is noisier than ever, so I think finding ways to stand out from the crowd probably matters more today than it has in the past, I would argue.
另一个关键点是底层技术变化太快，作为创始人，你需要站在前沿，理解模型能力的边界，因为它能彻底改变你产品的基础效能或功能。
Think the other thing is that the underlying technology is changing so quickly, and so as a founder, you want to be living on the frontier and understanding what model capabilities look like, because it can dramatically change the efficacy or the capability of your underlying product.
我认为当前这波浪潮中一个特别有趣的变化是，尤其是我们看到的各种垂直应用领域的创始人类型。
One of the things that's changed, I think, that's been really interesting in this current wave of, especially vertical applications that we've seen, the type of founder.
如今的创始人往往比前几代人更年轻、更技术化，他们可能对特定行业不够熟悉，但对技术工具却驾轻就熟。
Think founders today are often younger and more technical than we've seen in prior generations, so they're less often native to the particular industry, but they're fluent in the toolset.
这非常重要，同样道理，你必须保持在前沿，了解即将到来的趋势。
I think that's really important, to the same point, you've got to stay on the frontier and understand what's coming.
与此同时，我写过一篇题为《场景为王》的文章。
At the same time, I wrote this piece that I call Context is King.
虽然理解模型能力和前沿动态很重要，但你仍需思考如何应用这些技术。
While it is important to understand model capabilities and what's happening in the frontier, you still need to figure out how to apply that technology.
尽管创始人本身可能对行业不够熟悉，但他们在公司早期阶段就会着重招聘具有行业背景的人才。
While the founders themselves are maybe less native to the industry, they're still hiring for context very early in a company's life cycle.
我担任董事会成员的一个很好的例子是一家名为Eve的公司。
A good example of this that I sit on the board of is a company called Eve.
Eve的两位创始人是Rubrik最早的员工，Rubrik现在是一家上市的基础设施公司。
The two founders of Eve were the earliest employees at Rubrik, which is now a public infrastructure company.
他们在原告法律领域建立了一家法律人工智能公司。
They built a legal AI company in the plaintiff law space.
他们两人都没有就业法或个人伤害方面的特定背景，但他们深刻理解如何将文档提取技术和语音以及更广泛的语言模型应用到这个非常特定的工作流程中。
Neither of them had any particular background in employment law or personal injury, but they deeply understood how to apply document extraction technology and voice and LMs more broadly to this very particular workflow.
他们实际上已经聘请了原告律师作为员工。
And they've hired plaintiff attorneys actually on staff.
所以每当有新模型发布时，他们都会从行业内人士那里了解它对案件起草、推理能力的影响。
So anytime a new model is released, they are understanding from people in industry the impact that it's having on drafting, on their ability to reason through a case or a matter.
这又回到了那种既要建立品牌、保持发展势头、了解前沿动态，又要找到在特定客户情境中应用该技术的平衡点，因为我始终坚信这正是许多防御性优势的来源所在。
Again, it's sort of this tension of building the brand, having momentum, understanding what's happening on the frontier, and yet figuring out ways to apply that technology in the context of your specific customer, because again, I deeply believe that that is where a lot of the sources of defensibility reside.
我很想找到其他技术能强化其商业模式而非侵蚀它的企业案例，比如在法律领域，如果你让员工效率提升50倍，实际上是在侵蚀你的计费小时。
I'd love to find other examples of businesses where the technology reinforces their business model, it doesn't compete with it, meaning in lots of areas of legal, if you make your employee 50 times more efficient, you're eroding your billable hour.
在他们的业务中，他们采用风险代理模式，意味着只有胜诉才能获得报酬，因此他们对采用AI技术没有任何限制。
In their business, they operate at a contingency basis, meaning they only get paid if they win, So there's no sort of limit to the amount of AI that they want to adopt.
如果你能将效率提高五倍，就能承接五倍的客户量。
And if you can become five x more efficient, you can take on five x more clients.
总之，这些都是我希望找到的某种特质，而且某种程度上也可能成为一种警示信号。
Anyway, these are sort of characteristics that I think, you know, I'd love to find more of, and, hopefully, that can be kind of a bad signal too.
我认为另一个有力的观点是：如果你相信品牌价值——这几乎是自证的事实，因为我买什么？
I think the other steel man is if you believe that brand matters, which it almost tautologically does because what do I buy?
我买我听说过的东西。
I buy the thing that I've heard of.
对吧？
Right?
所以这里存在优势。
So there's an advantage there.
如果你认为对许多公司和产品而言，规模效应在某种程度上是有效的。
And if you believe that for a lot of companies and products, somehow having scale is effective.
对吧？
Right?
所以不是网络效应，而是规模效应。
So not a network effect, but a scale effect.
如果我是Honey Nut Cheerios，知道人们会大量购买我的麦圈，我就能建个大工厂，而不是手工一个个生产麦圈，对吧？
So if I'm Honey Nut Cheerios and I know that people are gonna buy lots of my Cheerios, I can I can build a big factory and not, you know, hand crank out each Cheerio?
我将拥有这些规模经济带来的复合优势。
I'm I'm going to have these compounding advantages just in terms of economies of scale.
对吗？
Right?
比如亚马逊，它真的有网络效应吗？
Like, Amazon, is that does that really have a network effect?
没有。
No.
它更像是，我买的所有东西都能在第二天或两天内送达，这挺不错的，而他们之所以能以低成本做到这点，是因为有这么多人都在买东西。
It's, like, it's kinda nice that everything that I buy will show up the next day or in two days, and how can they do that at low cost because so many people are buying things?
因此，有些事物具备规模效应，同时还能从品牌中获益。
So there are some things that have scale, and those things also benefit from brand.
如果你能行动最快，对吧？如果你能聚集资本和劳动力，就像我筹集最多资金一样，这是个非常通用的概念，但就像地球上大多数事物一样，如果规模最大，达到真正巨大的引力级规模，那它自然会运作得更好。
So if you can move the fastest, right, so if you can agglomerate capital and labor, so it's like I raise the most money, it's a very, very generic idea, but somehow, like most other things on planet Earth, if it's the biggest and, like, really, really big kinda gravitational scale, then it's just gonna work better.
那么我能最快到达那个阶段吗？
So can I get there the most quickly?
但有20家公司正在做完全相同的事情。
But there are 20 companies that are doing the exact same thing.
到那时，我不会说势头本身就是护城河，但势头最有可能让你达到具备真正护城河的引力级规模。
And at that point, I wouldn't say that Momentum is a moat per se, but momentum has the highest chance of getting you to gravitational scale where you do have a moat.
相反，如果你做不到这点，就会被活活吞噬，因为你无法手工生产每一颗麦圈。
And if you don't do that, by contrast, you're just gonna get eaten alive because you can't hand crank out the Cheerios.
你必须达到能建造工厂的规模。
You you have to get to the scale where you're able to build a factory.
而且你拥有最大的工厂，就能以最低成本生产最多产品，那么发展轨迹是什么？
And you have the biggest factory, you can crank out the most things at the lowest cost, so what is the trajectory?
你与所有竞争对手相比，优势斜率是多少？
What is the slope of you versus all of your competition?
如果你的斜率不够理想，你就无法在这场竞争中胜出。
And if you have not a good slope, you're just not gonna win that game.
是的。
Yeah.
关于Web2公司防御性的问题之一是：
One of the questions for defensibility in in Web two companies was, hey.
谷歌会不会某天开发我们的产品？或者Facebook，或者其他行业巨头？
Would Google you know, would those will they some someday build us or or Facebook or name your incumbent?
在AI领域，OpenAI或其他大公司会如何影响我们对AI时代框架的思考？
In in the AI arts, will open AI or will some other major company how we think about framework in the AI era?
有意思。
It's funny.
我感觉18个月前，这个GPT说唱歌手还挂在每个人嘴边。
I feel like eighteen months ago, this GPT rapper was on everybody's lips.
我认为它很大程度上是被用作贬义词。
And I think it was largely used as a pejorative.
某种程度上，我认为在某些领域，如果模型能力和应用能力高度重叠，那将处于风险之中。
Think, to some degree, I think there are some spaces where the model capability and the application capability, if they're very overlapping, I think you're in a risky spot.
但现实是，有太多市场——我认为一个显著的变化是，许多过去对销售软件毫无吸引力的市场，现在却成了极具潜力的创业领域，很大程度上是因为市场现在关注的是劳动力成本，而不仅仅是IT支出。
But the reality is that there's so many, I think one of the remarkable things that's happened is there are so many markets that were never particularly interesting to sell software into that are now radically interesting spaces to build companies in, again, in large part because the market is now labor, not just IT spend.
原告法律就是一个例子。
Plaintiff law being an example.
Alex提到，我们有家叫Salient的公司，将语音代理应用于汽车贷款服务。
Alex says, We have a company called Salient in applying voice agents to auto loan servicing.
五六年前，我们会考虑向非银行汽车贷款机构销售软件的软件公司吗？
Five, six years ago, would we be back to a software company selling to non bank auto lenders?
很可能不会。
Probably not.
这家公司表现非常出色，很大程度上是因为能用50种语言全天候合规地与50个州的客户沟通，这种能力与个体相比具有显著优势，他们发现其收款效率远高于人工，成本效益比差异巨大。
The company's doing incredibly well, again, in large part because the capability of being able to speak in 50 languages, fully compliantly with customers in 50 states working 20 fourseven, is just so differentiated versus the individual, and they're finding that their ability to collect is meaningfully higher than that labor, that the cost benefit trade off is so dramatic.
这家公司正从那些历史上可能没有数百万美元IT预算的客户那里获得大量收入，鉴于对业务的影响，他们现在非常愿意为这样的产品付费。
The company is getting a lot of revenue from those customers who may not have had you know, millions of dollars of of IT budget historically and are now very willing to pay for a product like that, you know, given the impact on the business.
我们很久以前讨论这个问题的方式——这几乎带有贬义色彩——就像是在问：你是在构建一个功能、一个产品，还是一家公司？
And and the way that we used to talk about this a long time ago is and this this almost had a pejorative slant to it, but it's like, you building a feature, a product, or a company?
这三者之间有什么区别？
And what's the difference between the three?
功能就像是针对现有产品进行微调，使其略有提升。
Well, a feature is like there's an existing product, and you tweak that product to make it marginally better.
产品则不是那样。
A product is, you know, not that.
它应该是某种记录系统，或是能追踪某些事物的东西。
It's like some, hopefully, system of record or something that keeps track of something.
而公司可能是三者中最具防御性的，你拥有一个产品，或许还掌控着一个平台。
And then company is probably the most defensible of those three where you have a product and, you know, maybe you own a platform.
平台往往能造就最有价值的公司。
Like, the platforms tend to be the most valuable companies.
但是，你知道，一个功能就像，我开发了一个Chrome插件，这并不意味着什么——顺便说一句，当时市面上已经有很多Chrome插件了。
But, you know, a feature is, like, I've built a Chrome plugin, and that doesn't mean and, like, there were by the way, were lot of Chrome plugins.
比如Honey就是个Chrome插件，后来以40亿美元被收购了。
Like, Honey was a Chrome plugin that got bought by four for $4,000,000,000.
真希望那是我做的。
Like, I wish I had done that.
对吧？
Right?
那才叫一个好功能。
That's that's a good feature.
但那终究只是个功能。
But that was a feature.
而产品就像是，哦，我开发了自己的浏览器；公司则是更进一步的，好吧，
You know, a product would be like, oh, I built my own browser, and a company is like, alright.
比如我的浏览器公司真的能赚钱。
Well, like, my own browser company actually makes money.
比如，即使你有10个产品，如果你没有一条可持续的道路让公司在十年或二十年后依然存在，那你实际上并不拥有一家公司。
Like, you don't actually have a company, even if you have 10 products, if you don't have a sustainable path to have that company be around in ten or twenty years.
我认为David刚才说的另一种理解方式是，现在这些功能——显然在这三者中，功能是最具贬义且看似最微不足道的。
And I think kind of another way of thinking about what David just said is that now the features, like, you know, the feature was the most pejorative and seemingly small of all of those three, almost obviously.
有些功能可以极其盈利，因为它就像——等等。
Some of the features can be incredibly profitable because it's like, wait a minute.
这感觉像是一个功能，因为它可以被添加到Salesforce中，对吧？或者被添加到其他系统中，但我能为这个功能收取的费用却高出几个数量级，因为它就像是——嘿，我将成为你牙科诊所的前台接待员。
Like, this it feels like a feature because it could get added to Salesforce, right, or it could get added to one of these other things, but the amount of money that I can charge for my feature is orders of magnitude more because it's like, hey, I'm going to be the front office receptionist for your orthodontic clinic.
这就是我的工作。
Like, that's my job.
这就是那个功能。
Like, that's the feature.
它建立在你们当前使用的任何软件之上，但我现在每年可以为此收费2万美元，因为它替代了人工劳动。
And it sits on top of whatever software you currently use, but the feature I can now charge $20,000 a year for because it is doing the job of labor.
但是，哎呀，我的功能所依赖的现有产品，他们会去开发那些功能模块吗？
But, uh-oh, will the existing product that my feature is riding on top of, will they go build those those pieces of functionality?
或者会不会有另一家公司出现，直接说，嘿
And or will another company show up that just says, hey.
我们要用这个内置了功能集的新产品来开拓全新市场
We're gonna sell the greenfield with the new product that kind of has this feature set embedded.
功能型产品公司依然存在，但我从未见过功能模块能如此快速实现收入规模
And, you know, feature product company, it still is out there, but I've just never seen a world where the features, if you will, can can get to revenue scale as quickly.
顺便说，你往往得从功能开始，因为客户不会——想想客户的视角，即软件的企业买家
And by the way, you you kind of often have to start with the feature because a customer isn't like, think of it from the customer's perspective, the customer being the business buyer of software.
就像，我知道
It's like, I know.
我可不想被一家垃圾软件公司绑定二十年
I wanna be locked into a piece of shit software company for twenty years.
这才是我作为买家想要的
That's what I'm looking for as a buyer.
才不是
No.
就像，哦，我有个问题要解决。
It's like, oh, I have a problem to solve.
我的问题是无法为我的牙科诊所招聘前台接待员，或者我无法用普通话或粤语打电话催收汽车贷款还款。
My problem is I can't hire a front office receptionist for my orthodontic clinic, or I can't call people in Mandarin or Cantonese to go, like, repay their auto loans.
比如，我该怎么办？
Like, what do I do?
哦，突然出现了一个提供这种功能的产品，砰，我就成了买家。
Oh, something shows up and it offers that functionality, boom, I'm a buyer.
然后这个功能必须尽快反向填补产品，反向构建公司。
And then that functionality has to that that feature has to backfill product, backfill company as quickly as possible.
所以这个道理在今天依然适用，就像10年、20年或30年前一样。
So that's still true today as it was ten or twenty or thirty years ago.
但不同之处在于，这个功能带来的收入实在太高了，需求也极其旺盛，因为在很多情况下，你实际上就是在响应招聘广告的需求。
But the difference, again, is that the feature that the revenue for the feature is just so high and the demand for it is so high because, again, in many cases, you're just responding to help wanted ads effectively.
是啊。
Yeah.
因此我认为这带来的影响就是，市场上涌现出了大量有趣的新领域可以去开拓。
And so I think the effect of that is that there's been sort of like a Cambrian explosion of interesting markets to go after.
要知道，我觉得指望OpenAI去开发牙科诊所前台助手作为他们的核心业务是不现实的。
You know, I think it's unrealistic to believe that, like, OpenAI is gonna go build, the front office assistant for the dental clinic as their core business.
他们不可能覆盖所有细分市场。
They aren't going do that across every single market.
我认为另一个动态是，对许多这类公司而言，产品价值的一部分实际上在于协调众多不同模型公司之间的工作。
I think the other dynamic is that for many of these companies, part of the product value is actually orchestrating the work across lots of different model companies.
因此我认为，让一个基础模型业务向上发展，实际上可能会限制应用程序的潜在影响。
And so I think having one foundation model business going kind of up the stack, I think, limits the actual impact of the application potentially as well.
嗯，想想这个与其他平台公司的对比，Facebook是Web 2.0时代最杰出的平台公司，从他们开放Facebook平台开始（我记得大概是2007年），人们就在Facebook上建立自己的业务。
Well, think if you kind of think about this versus other platform companies, so Facebook was the preeminent platform company of Web two point o, so call it from whenever they opened up Facebook platform, which I think was like 2007, people built their businesses on top of Facebook.
Facebook永远不会做那些具体的事情。
Facebook would never do those particular things.
所以Facebook永远不会突然出现然后说：嘿，你知道吗？
So Facebook is never gonna show up and say, Hey, you know what?
我们应该开发一款农场游戏。
We should build a farming game.
他们却说，不，我们要打造一个平台，让像Zynga这样的公司来开发这些农场游戏。
They were like, No, we're gonna have a platform that allows companies like Zynga to build these farming games.
但平台通常的做法是——如果他们不直接与底层产品竞争——他们会说，我要征税，但征税方式完全取决于我的喜好。
But what the platform normally does, if they don't actually go compete with the underlying products, is they say, I'm going to tax it, but I'm going to tax it in ways that are kind of at my fancy.
所以这周是10%的税率，这是我的承诺。
So this week it's 10% taxes, that's my promise.
哦等等，我改变主意了，现在要收40%的税。
Oh wait, I changed my mind, now it's gonna be 40% taxes.
这就是为什么在别人的平台上构建总是很危险。
That's why it's always dangerous to build on somebody else's platform.
所以我认为需要关注两点：第一是平台所有者会与我竞争吗？
So I think the two things to look at are number one is will the platform owner compete with what I'm doing?
这也是另一个金发姑娘区域问题，对吧？
And that's also another Goldilocks Zone question, right?
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因为我为什么要发布这张VisiCalc对比Lotus 1-2-3再对比Excel的图表呢？
Because why is it I published this graph of VisiCalc versus Lotus one, two, three versus Excel.
VisiCalc在1979年发明了电子表格，当时拥有100%的市场份额，因为他们是唯一的玩家。
So VisiCalc invented the spreadsheet in 1979, had 100% of the market because they were the only player in town.
Lotus开发了一个更好的版本。
Lotus built a better version of that.
到1985年Lotus占据了约70%市场份额，同年微软发布了Mac版Excel。
Lotus got to, like, I think 70% market share by 1985, which was when Microsoft released Excel for a Mac.
到了2000年，微软已占据96%的市场份额。
And then by 2000, Microsoft had 96% market share.
这是为什么呢？
And why is it?
因为他们拥有Windows系统。
Because they owned Windows.
平台所有者通常都会成为赢家。
Like, the platform owner normally wins.
但那是因为在1997年，买电脑的理由实在太明显了
But that's because it was just such a huge like, why do I buy a computer in 1997?
因为我想用电子表格
Because I wanna use a spreadsheet.
这两者之间有着本质的联系
Like, it was just so intrinsically linked.
这是计算机在商业应用中的主要用途之一
Like, that was one of the main use cases for computers and business use.
对吧？
Right?
就像使用电子表格那样
It's like using spreadsheets.
所以这就像是违反了金发姑娘原则
So that was like a violator of Goldilocks zone.
而其他情况下，你只需要担心平台所有者会对你征税，但他们可能会以非常非常奇怪的方式征税
Whereas other things where it's like all you have to worry about from the platform owner is that they're going to tax you, but they might tax you in very, very bizarre ways.
但大卫提到的一点是，现在有多个模型公司并存，这很棒。
But part of what David was saying in terms of like, there are multiple model companies, which is great.
Windows的问题在于它曾占据95%的市场份额。
Like, the problem with Windows was that it was like 95% of the market.
95%的客户都在使用Windows系统。
Like, 95% of your customers used Windows.
所以如果我开发一个竞品电子表格软件，基本就完蛋了，因为平台方会直接碾压我。
So if I'm gonna go build a competing spreadsheet, I'm just toast because the platform owner is just gonna drown me.
现在至少有五家模型公司，算上中国那些模型和开源项目就更多了。
Now there are five model companies, or more, when you include all the Chinese models and whatnot, open source.
我不必担心被垄断，但要警惕他们说'哇这个功能太相关了'。
I don't have to worry about that, but I do have to worry about them saying, wow, this is so relevant.
为什么OpenAI能让一家上市公司CEO辞职，转而去当他们的应用部门CEO？
Why is it that OpenAI got a public company CEO to quit her job and just to become the CEO of applications at OpenAI?
或许因为他们手握巨大的应用机遇。
Maybe because they have a huge application opportunity.
但好处在于，许多这类事物虽然冷门，却依然规模庞大。
But this is the nice thing, is that a lot of these things are so obscure, but they're still big.
但我不认为OpenAI会涉足这些领域，比如他们会去做牙科护理管理吗？
But I don't think OpenAI is gonna go do them because it's like, are they going to do, like, dental care management?
他们当然可以这么做，但如果真这么做了，我会看空OpenAI，因为这就像他们已经没正经事可干了。
Like, they they could, but if they've done that, then I would be short OpenAI because it's like they've run out of good stuff to do.
这种事他们应该留到2029年再做。
That's something that they should do in 2029.
接下来这件事——我想我之前跟你讲过——当我向Facebook负责业务发展的丹·罗斯推销时，彻底改变了我的人生观。
And then this is, I think I told you this story before, this changed my outlook on life when I pitched this guy, Dan Rose, at Facebook, who was running business development there.
我当时说：这是个巨大机遇，你们应该用我们的支付系统，我们会这样操作，能为Facebook赚取巨额利润。
I'm like, this is a huge opportunity, you should use us for payments, we're gonna do this, we can make so much money for Facebook.
他非常耐心友善，我至今仍和他同在一个董事会，我特别欣赏这个人。
And he was so patient and nice, and I love this guy, I'm on a board with him to this day.
他说：亚历克斯，这主意太棒了。
He was like, Alex, that's such a great idea.
我当时想，好吧，这单稳了。
I was like, all right, I got the deal.
没错，他说这是个好主意，但我们不会采纳，因为你给我画了个大饼。
Yes, he said it's a great idea, but we're not gonna do it because you're pitching me a goal.
就像，我们身边到处都是金砖。
Like, we have gold bricks all around us.
他说得对。
And he was right.
我是说，2010年的Facebook，想想看，那得赚多少钱？
I mean, like Facebook in 2010, I mean, how much money?
Facebook的营收一直在增长。
Facebook has grown their revenue.
他们现在每个季度的利润，比2010年全年的营收还要多。
They have more profit every quarter today than they had revenue per year in 2010.
这公司简直太不可思议了。
It's just such an incredible company.
他说，你这是在向我推销一块百米开外的金砖，而且它是真实存在的。
And he's like, you're pitching me a gold brick that's like 100 feet away, and it's real.
就像，我很喜欢那块金砖，但我们身边已经有成百上千的金砖，我只需弯腰就能捡起来，所以我不会去拿远处那块。
Like, I love that gold brick, but we have like hundreds of gold bricks where I just have to like stoop down at my feet and pick them up, so I'm just not gonna do that one right there.
这些大公司就是这样思考的。
And that's how these big companies think.
但好处在于这些都是金砖。
But the nice thing is that these are gold bricks.
这些金砖比以往任何时候都要大，因为你有可以替代人力的软件。
These gold bricks are bigger than they've ever been, because you have software that can do the job of labor.
是啊。
Yeah.
说到这个，如果你在运营OpenAI，你会如何考虑哪些金砖——或者说用什么样的思维模型来思考，哪些事应该优先做，哪些可以交给别人去做？你会怎么思考这个问题？
Which is on that note, if you were running OpenAI and you were thinking about which gold bricks or how do you even, what mental model would think about, sort of what are the things that you should be doing first versus the things that, hey, maybe let other people do, how would you be thinking about that question?
我觉得很大程度上这其实是两个问题。
I mean, I think a lot of it is where well, it's it's two things.
第一点是我们希望成为所有人的后端。
Number one is we want to be the back end for everybody.
就像这个平台，我认为有两方面。
Like, the platform I I think it's two things.
第一点是我们能否成为几乎所有开发者的平台？
Number one is can we be the platform for pretty much everybody who's building anything?
所以我们不会涉足冷门领域，比如牙齿矫正护理，至少在2045年前不会。
So we're not going to go into obscure spaces like, you know, orthodontic care, at least not until 2045.
所以我们要确保每个开发者都在使用我们的产品。
So let's make sure that every single developer is using us.
这也是微软在1980年代击败苹果的部分原因，因为苹果让软件开发变得非常困难。
And this is part of why Microsoft crushed Apple in the 1980s, because Apple made it really hard to develop software.
实际上有趣的是，苹果和微软最初都是编译器公司起家的。
And what's actually kind of interesting is that both Apple and Microsoft had Microsoft started off as a compiler company.
他们最早的产品不是微软Office，也不是DOS，而是为BASIC编程语言开发的解释器，并且做得很大。
Their very, very first products, they were not Microsoft Office, it was not DOS, they built a BASIC interpreter for the programming language BASIC, and they had a big business.
他们最大的竞争对手是Borland，这家公司只做编译器。
Their biggest competitor was Borland, which only made compilers.
就像早期的战斗口号，如果你问任何早期微软员工，都是‘击败Philippe’。
And like the early rallying cry, if you talk to any early Microsoft employee, was Beat Philippe.
Philippe Kahn是Borland的CEO。
Philippe Kahn was the CEO of Borland.
所以微软专注于这方面，并从中赚了很多钱。
So Microsoft was focused on that, made a lot of money on that.
而苹果当时的想法是，我们也应该从中赚钱。
And Apple was like, we should make money on that too.
他们有个产品叫MPW，全称是Macintosh Programmers Workshop。
And they had a product, it was called MPW, Macintosh Programmers Workshop.
我记得八十年代时我还用过它。
I remember I used to use it in the nineteen eighties.
这个集成开发环境（或者说编程工具）当时要价2000美元，按八十年代的物价水平。
And it was like $2,000, I think, in nineteen eighties money to buy this IDE or, you know, programming thing.
这就像是问，你怎么负担得起那个价格？
And it's like, how do you afford that?
所以，虽然如此，但我们还是得从中赚钱。
So, like but it was like, we have to make money on that.
微软在这方面赚了不少钱。
Microsoft's making money on this.
然后你瞧，DOS和Windows软件产品的数量比Macintosh软件产品多出了大概一万倍。
And then lo and behold, there were, like, 10,000 times more, you know, DOS and Windows software products than there were Macintosh software products.
当然，苹果在iPhone推出时纠正了这个错误，他们现在提供了Xcode——用来开发Mac产品和iPhone、iOS应用的工具，是免费的。
And of course, Apple corrected that mistake when the iPhone came out, when they did now, like Xcode, which is the way that you build products for Mac products, or Macintosh and iPhone, iOS, it's free.
所以他们算是纠正了那个错误。
So they kinda corrected that mistake.
但针对你的问题，我想说两点。
But I'd say two things to answer your question.
第一点是，我们能否成为世界上最大的消费品牌？
Number one is, can we be the biggest consumer brand in the world?
ChatGPT目前拥有8亿周活跃用户。
So ChatGPT has 800,000,000 weekly active users.
把这个数字提升到50亿。
Get that to 5,000,000,000.
即使Gemini三今天发布，性能可能提升五倍，但那些作为普通消费者使用ChatGPT的人会转投吗？
Even if Gemini three came out today, it might be five times better, but are people that are using ChatGPT just as consumers, are they going to switch?
或许会，但可能性不大，因为他们已经将其设为默认选项，并成为所有开发者的后端支持。
Like, maybe, but it's unlikely just because they kinda make that their their default and then be the back end for everybody who's building anything.
这样一来，所有的金砖都会向你涌来。
And that way, it's like all the gold bricks come to you.
我
I
我认为另一个需要预见的是，我们已经开始从一些大型模型公司看到，他们可能会向每个大型企业销售哪些重要的横向应用？
think the other thing that we should anticipate, we're already beginning to see from some of these big model companies, are what are the big horizontal applications that they can likely sell to every large enterprise?
我想你今天从谷歌的反重力发布中已经看到，集成开发环境（IDE）将成为其中之一。
And I think you saw today with Google's anti gravity launch, the IDE is going to be one of those things.
如果考虑语言模型的产品市场契合度，编码绝对是顶级应用之一。
Think if there's product market fit for LMs, coding is definitely one of the top categories.
思考一下企业中的大型横向应用有哪些。
Think thinking about what are the big horizontal applications in the enterprise.
我认为某种程度上，这已经初现端倪，就是Palantir所抓住的机遇。
I think there's also, to some degree, I think this has been earlier to play out, it's the Palantir opportunity.
我认为这项技术在大企业中的普及仍处于非常早期的阶段。
I think we're still very early in the proliferation of this technology into large enterprise.
与此同时，与云计算等先前产品周期不同，如果我是一家大型上市公司的CEO，我会自问：我们是否需要云计算？
At the same time, unlike prior product cycles like the cloud, if I'm the CEO of a large public company and I'm asking myself, do I need to be in the cloud?
这在某种程度上是个深奥的问题。
It was sort of an esoteric idea.
如今，我只需向任何一款模型输入提示词，就能直观理解它可能对我业务产生的影响。
Today, I can plug a prompt into any one of these models and intuitively understand the impact that it could have on my business.
无论是客户支持部门、工程部门，还是所有后台职能部门，效率都将得到提升。
The efficiency gains in my customer support organization, in my engineering organization, in all of my back office functions.
与此同时，他们中的许多人不知道从哪里开始。
At the same time, many of them don't know where to start.
我认为你会看到这些大型模型公司采用这种咨询式、前置部署、类似Palantir的销售方式进入超大型企业。
I think you will see this consultative, forward deployed, Palantir esque sale into very large enterprise from some of these big model companies.
再次强调，我认为我们还处于早期阶段，但你已经在Anthropic谈及想要打入金融服务和其他市场的言论中听到了些端倪。
Again, I think we're early in that, but you've heard inklings of this with Anthropic talking about wanting to build into financial services in other markets.
我同意。
I agree.
我认为最大的机会就是Alex所描述的，但你会看到他们有选择性地尝试构建横跨所有这些领域的应用，然后可能会挑选几个标杆客户，为这些大型企业量身定制集成方案，但那些ACBs（应用案例）你知道，确实很有意义。
Think the biggest opportunities are the one that Alex is describing, but I think you will see them selectively try to build applications that cut across every one of those, and then they'll probably choose a few lighthouse customers to build largely bespoke custom integrations into these bigger enterprises, but where the ACBs you know, just really make sense.
在Web2时代，赢家通吃现象很普遍。
In in in Web two, there was a lot of winner take most.
你刚才提到AI的一个优势就是能产生多个赢家。
You were talking about one of the benefits in AI is that there there's multiple winners.
在多大程度上整合是不可避免的？或者说你认为这种分化会如何发展？
To to what extent is is consolidation in in inevitable, or or how do you think sort of this this split plays out?
嗯，我认为如果有20家公司都在做同样的事情，历史经验告诉我们这是个糟糕的市场，但之后，我不知道，排名后15的公司就会破产。
Well, I I think if you have 20 companies that are all doing the same thing, what has historically happened is that it's a bad market if there are 20 companies doing it, but then, I don't know, the bottom 15 just go bankrupt.
然后可能会出现一些整合，第一名收购第二名，第二名收购第三名，假设我们有一个正常运作的联邦贸易委员会之类的机构，这些都会被批准，因为这又不是什么正畸诊所应答软件之类的东西。
And then maybe there's some consolidation where number one buys number two, number two buys number three, and assuming that we have a functional FTC and whatnot, it's like all of this is approved because it's not like you're taking this is like orthodontic clinic answering software or something.
于是原本糟糕的市场就变成了一个好市场。
So and then what was a bad market becomes a good market.
这某种程度上又回到了为什么势头很重要——如果20家公司都处于完全相同的规模，那对客户其实是好事，因为价格会趋近于零，或者说趋近于电力成本。
And this kind of goes back to, like, why momentum is important because if you have 20 companies that are all at the exact same scale, then it's actually great for the customer, which is like the the prices go to zero, or they converge on the price of electricity.
虽然这并不是说你要去建立一个牙齿矫正问答软件的垄断地位，而是当你达到一定规模后可以收取更高费用，因为你最终交付的产品质量就是更高。
Whereas if you this is not saying you want to go build a monopoly in orthodontic answering software or something, but rather you can charge more if you get to a certain scale because whatever the the quality of the product that you're delivering at the end of the day is just higher.
而你必须达到关键规模才能实现这一点。
And you have to get to the critical scale to get there.
有时你只需要让这些市场自行发展。
And sometimes you just need these markets to work themselves out.
就像我经营TrialPay公司时，我们大概有20个竞争对手，那时候很艰难，因为大家都在亏本定价。
I mean, like when I was running my company, TrialPay, we had, I don't know, 20 competitors, and it was tough because it's like, you know, everybody would be pricing their product at a loss.
要知道，这种亏本促销策略只有在你最终能领先时才有效，你必须最终实现盈利，但没人真正为此制定计划，因为风险投资的钱在补贴一切，这不会形成健康的市场。
You know, this loss leader only works if you end up leading with, like, you have to make money at the end, and nobody really had a plan for that because the venture capital dollars were really subsidizing everything, and that does not get a good market.
最终会形成什么样的好市场呢？有时候这就是像Vista这样的私募股权公司会做的——我们会收购一家作为我们的支柱。
What does become a good market at the end, and sometimes this is what, you know, Vista, the private equity firm would do, is like, we're going to buy one as our anchor.
我们会压低价格让其他五家退出竞争，最终我们就能得到一个相当不错的产品、业务或公司。
We're gonna go lowball and put the other five out of their misery, and now we end up with actually a pretty good product at the end or a pretty good business at the end, pretty good company at the end.
所以我认为这种情况可能会在这里重演，因为你不可能让一个市场上所有人都亏本经营，却没人能达到规模效应。
So I think that will probably play out the same way here, because you just can't have a market where you have everybody loss leading and nobody's big enough to get any kind of scale effects.
难道会出现第十九名玩家存活的世界吗？
Is there gonna be a world where the the nineteenth player survives?
杰克·韦尔奇常说，你必须成为第一或第二，第三到第一百名毫无价值。
I mean, Jack Welch would always say, you have to be number one or number two, and there's no value to being number three through a 100.
我认为这一点从未改变。
I don't think that's changed.
没错。
Right.
对吧？
Right?
即使在模型供应商的例子中也是如此吗？
Even in the model provider example?
我还好奇如果价格下降会怎样
And I'm also curious if prices go down
是的。
Yeah.
我、我、我不明白，我是说，人们知道XAI、Anthropic、OpenAI、Gemini这些大公司，但实际还有很多人们没听说过的小公司，它们也筹集了大量资金。这些公司运作正常，但如果你不是处于技术前沿，或者落后很多，还想靠这个谋生，那根本行不通。
I I I don't I don't see how, like, there actually are, I mean, people know XAI, Anthropic, OpenAI, Gemini, like, they know, or Quen, they know the big ones, but there are actually, there's a long tail of things that people haven't heard of, where it's like they've raised lots of money, just like not, it works fine, but how can you, like the model company is the most cutthroat, because like, unless you're, if you're state of the art minus, minus, minus, and you're trying to earn a living, that's just not gonna work.
所以
So that
这个游戏极其残酷。
game is super cutthroat.
我认为唯一可能偏离这一规律的领域，正如Martine经常提到的，是当市场增长极其迅速时，最终会出现专业化分工。
I think the one area where that may have diverged, and Martine talks about this a lot, is when markets are growing so quickly, end up having specialization.
我认为在其他领域，比如一些创意工具或专门服务高端市场的从业者中，我正在制作电影，我想要创作具有社交价值的内容。
I think in other modalities, in some of the creative tools or people I've specialized to serve the upmarket, I'm producing movies, I want to create social quality content.
这些都是模型可以专门服务的不同市场。
These are different markets that the models can specialize in.
时间会证明这些市场随着时间的推移会有多强的防御性，但也许早期的乐观看法是一切看起来都是重叠且竞争的，但你知道，市场仍在增长，一切都有可能扩展，人们也会随着时间的推移逐渐专业化。
Time will tell how defensible those become over time, but maybe that's the optimistic take that early on everything looks overlapping and competitive, but we're still so you know, the market is growing that everything can kind of expand and people can kinda specialize over time.
之前当你讨论功能与产品的区别时，是不是史蒂夫·乔布斯曾经告诉德鲁·休斯顿说Dropbox只是一个功能？
Earlier, when you were talking about the feature versus product, it it didn't Steve Jobs once tell Drew Houston that Dropbox was was just a feature?
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是，这就是为什么它一直带有贬义，但这正是我想表达的观点——没人会说'我需要这家公司'。
I mean, that that's why it's it's always been this pejorative thing, but that's that's kind of the point that I was getting to is that nobody wants to, like, oh, I need this company.
不。
No.
而是说'我需要这个功能'。
It's like, I need this feature.
时不时地，你会遇到一个绝非仅是功能的产品，因为它完全出人意料。
Every now and then, you see a product that is not a feature because it's just, like, so far out of left field.
比如，2022年10月之前没人预料到ChatGPT会主宰他们的日常工作流程。
Like, nobody was anticipating ChatGPT dominating their daily workflow in 2022 in October.
但当它问世时，人们反应是‘天啊’。
But then once it came out, it was this, like, holy crap.
这太不可思议了。
I this is incredible.
而这绝非一个功能。
And that's not a feature.
你可以争辩说它是iPhone上的一个功能，但不对，iPhone只是它的载体。
You could argue it's a feature on top of your iPhone, but, no, the iPhone is the delivery mechanism.
那是一个实实在在的产品。
That's a that's a product.
他们显然已将其发展成了一家公司。
And they they've obviously turned that into a company.
而其他一些东西，比如，为什么会有杀毒软件这种东西存在？
Whereas other things, it kind of is like, you know, why is there antivirus software?
这几乎完全说不通。
That almost doesn't make any sense.
难道操作系统不应该本身就防止你感染病毒吗？
Like, shouldn't the operating system stop you from getting viruses?
为什么还需要第三方工具来实现设备间的同步？
Like, why do you need a third party tool to do synchronization between devices?
但事实证明，自从乔布斯发表那个评论后，Dropbox能存活并发展壮大的原因就在于，这件事要做好真的很难。
But it turns out, like, the reason why Dropbox has survived and thrived since Steve Jobs made that comment is, like, it's really hard to do well.
还有很多其他例子。
And there's a lot of other things.
一旦你构建了那个功能，就可以用各种其他产品来填补，Dropbox在这方面做得相当不错。
Like, once you've built that feature, you can backfill with all sorts of other product, which is what Dropbox has done a pretty good job of.
但这确实很难，因为在别人的平台上构建的风险就在于——我要做的这个东西本该是他们应该想到的，如果他们更有远见的话。
But it it is hard because this is the the danger of building on somebody else's platform is that, you know, I'm gonna build this thing that they should have had, right, if they had the foresight.
如果它不在‘恰到好处’的区间运作，那就真的会让人惊叹。
And if it doesn't operate in the Goldilocks zone, right, it's like, wow.
这简直能让苹果的利润翻三倍。
This is so this will, like, triple Apple's profits.
假设Dropbox真能让苹果利润翻三倍的话。
Let's just say that Dropbox would have tripled Apple's profits.
他们会因此放弃开发iPad之类的产品吗？
Would they have dropped every would would they have focused on building that versus the iPad or something?
不管怎样，就像史蒂夫最后的那个小发明一样，确实如此。
Whatever, like, Steve's last, gizmo was, like, sure.
但如果它处于这种无关紧要的‘恰到好处’区间，比如保洁服务，那就无所谓了。
But if it's kind of in this, like, Goldilocks zone of irrelevance, like janitorial services, it's like, yeah.
他们确实应该做这个。
They should do that.
但你知道，平台所有者总会变得懒惰。
But, you know, platform owners get lazy.
这就是为什么，我iPhone上有一半由苹果开发的功能其实都不太好用。
This is why, like, you know, half the things on my iPhone don't really work if they're built by Apple.
随便举个例子，收听节目的父母如果尝试过屏幕使用时间功能，就会觉得这简直是人类的耻辱。
Try like, any any parent that's listening to this, if they've tried screen time, it's just like an embarrassment upon humanity.
因为他们不需要作为独立产品去销售，也就不需要在功能上竞争。
And because they don't have to go sell as a it's like they don't have to compete on feature.
他们竞争的方式就是根本不参与竞争。
They compete on the fact they don't even compete.
他们就像是平台本身。
They just like they're the platform.
直接推出功能。
They roll it out.
即使做得很糟糕，但这确实为其他人创造了机会，可以通过开发某个功能真正超越平台。
It's gonna be bad, and that does create an opportunity for somebody to come up with a feature and actually outcompete the platform.
但你必须小心，因为显然平台方最终会来和你竞争。
But you have to be careful because it's like, obviously, the platform owner is gonna go compete with you.
这就是为什么我常常觉得企业家最吸引我的地方——当他们深谙此道时，他们研究过每次平台更迭的历史，比如我们讨论过的交流电与直流电之争，这些关于谁将成为底层技术标准的争夺战从未停歇。
And that's why often what I find very compelling about entrepreneurs, when they know this, they've studied how is it that from every single platform shift from like, you know, we were talking about AC versus DC current, like, there have always been these battles for like who's gonna be the underlying, you know, layer.
最优秀的企业家都研究过这些，并且制定了明确计划。
The best entrepreneurs have studied this, and they have a plan.
他们清楚自己掌握着某项关键功能优势。
They're like, I know I have a feature.
就像Drew早就明白这一点。
Like, Drew knew this.
他知道Hacker News上那些愚蠢评论的存在——
He's like, I know that, like, there's this stupid comment on Hacker News.
类似'这不过就是把某功能、某功能和某功能拼凑起来'的论调。
It's like, oh, this is just like our sync with this, that, and the other thing.
没错。
It's like, yeah.
Drew当然心知肚明，但他依然打造出了价值百亿美元的企业，因为他早有战略布局。
Of course, Drew knows that, But he built this into a $10,000,000,000 company because he had a plan.
最优秀的企业家往往明白，这并不是天真幼稚的想法。
And the best entrepreneur is they often like, okay, I know it's not this naivete.
他们会说，我要打造这个产品。
It's like, I'm gonna build this.
他们绝不可能做出这个产品，因为他们太愚蠢无能了。
There's no way that they're gonna build it because they're too dumb and stupid.
不，事实并非如此。
It's like, no, they're not.
就像这些公司，如果他们齐心协力，就会调动大量资源来与你竞争。
Like, these companies, if they get their act together, they will marshal a lot of resources to go compete with you.
他们可能需要五年时间，但100%会这么做。
It might take them five years, but they will 100% do it.
你必须用产品来补充你的功能，并且要为这个产品建立护城河，而不是想着大公司永远搞不明白这个。
You have to backfill your feature with a product, and you have to have a moat for that product as opposed to like, oh, yeah, the big company will never figure this out.
这种想法是不对的。
It's like, That's not true.
我认为独特之处还在于，我前段时间写了一篇题为《混乱收件箱问题》的文章，这其实是我们观察到跨多个行业普遍采用的一种楔入策略。
I think what's also unique, I wrote this piece a while ago called The Messy Inbox Problem, and it was sort of a wedge strategy that we've been observing across lots of different industries.
核心思路就是接入各种非结构化的数据源。
It's just this idea that you hook into a bunch of your different unstructured data sources.
可能是电子邮件、传真或电话。
It could be email, it could be fax, could be phone.
以Tenor为例，他们训练了一个模型，能够从这些数据源中提取所有相关患者信息，然后向下游接入某个记录系统，在他们案例中是电子健康记录系统。
Tenor, as an example, has trained a model to be able to extract all the relevant patient information from those data sources, to plug it downstream into some system of record, in their case, in EHR.
但这种模式同样适用于CRM、ERP等各类系统处理场景。
But this exists in a CRM, an ERP, what have you.
我认为这个功能的切入点很有意义，主要是因为它位于软件销售漏斗的上游。
I think that wedge for that feature is interesting in large part because it lives up funnel from software.
你正在取代个人的人工判断环节。
You're replacing the human level judgment of the individual.
通常是秘书收集物理事实后录入人力资源系统。
Often, secretary is collecting the physical facts and then plugging it into the HR.
现在许多AI公司可以切入并蚕食原本属于点解决方案软件公司的下游工作流程。
Now a bunch of AI companies can wedge in and then eat away at all the downstream workflows that might have been their point solution software companies.
Tenor不再仅仅处理混乱的收件箱问题。
Tenor is no longer just doing the messy inbox.
他们现在正在处理排程、预先授权、资格认证和福利等业务，利用这个切入点试图成为端到端的平台。
They're now doing scheduling and prior auth and eligibility and benefits, and they've used that wedge to try to become the end to end platform.
最终，或许会成为记录系统本身。
Eventually, maybe to become the system of record.
但同样，由于现在可以用软件替代人力，我认为这为这些功能转化为实际产品创造了机会，在他们这个案例中，甚至可能发展成为完整的公司。
But again, because you can replace the human labor now with software, I think it's creating opportunities for these features to actually become products and, in their case, I think become whole companies.
嗯，我认为这正是与以往所有平台变革截然不同的地方——它获得了如此一致的共识。
Well, I think this is the thing that, in my mind, is very dramatically different than every other platform shift, is that it is just so consensus.
云计算当初就没有这种共识。
Like, cloud was not consensus.
移动化转型时也没有这种共识。
Mobile was not consensus.
这就是为什么现有企业某种程度上搞砸了。
And that's why the incumbents kinda screwed up.
有时候情况就像——用硅谷的术语来说——完全与他们的商业模式‘正交’，因为比如我卖的是年销售额500万美元的产品，突然要改成每月收费10万美元？
Where it's like and then sometimes it was just, like, completely I'll I'll use the the the Silicon Valley term, orthogonal to their business model, because it's like, I sell $5,000,000 a year products, and wait a minute, I'm gonna charge $100,000 a month?
这确实很难。
Like, that's just hard.
我怎么给我的销售人员发工资？
Like, how do I pay my salespeople?
怎么完成季度业绩指标？
How do I make my quarterly numbers?
所以这就是为什么Workday打败了PeopleSoft，Salesforce打败了Siebel。
So that's why Workday beat PeopleSoft, or that's why Salesforce beat Siebel.
所有这些都发生了，但背后都有这种‘那个新东西很蠢’的观念，就像觉得iPhone很蠢一样。
So all of these things played out, but behind it was this concept of it's like that new thing, that iPhone is stupid.
就像著名的史蒂夫·鲍尔默视频片段里说的：没人会买一部800美元还没有键盘的手机。
Like, there's no version of the famous Steve Ballmer clip of him saying this, Nobody's gonna buy an $800 phone with no keyboard.
人工智能领域可没有这种说法。
There's no version of that for AI.
这就好比，你怎么找到一个大型企业的CEO，甚至是一个小型企业的CEO？
It's like, how do you find a big CEO, or even a small CEO?
没人会用那个能让你效率提升100倍的工具。
Nobody will use that tool that makes you 100 times more productive.
当然。
Course.
这也是为什么对大多数现有企业来说这就像一场盛宴，因为任何拥有记录系统的企业都会添加一个按钮或功能（用我们的行话来说）来赚更多钱。
And this is why it's kind of a bonanza for most of the incumbents as well, because anybody who has a system of record will add a button or a feature to use our parlance that will make them more money.
所以，就像遍地都是金砖一样。
So, like, they're just kinda gold bricks everywhere.
但挑战在于，现在没有像云计算、移动互联网或许多Web2.0时代那样的空白领域可以占领——那时候的情况是现有企业搞砸了，他们没注意，还嘲笑新技术。现在没人嘲笑这项新技术了。
And the challenge, though, is that there isn't this kind of white space to occupy in the same way that there was for cloud or for mobile or for a lot of the web two point o things where it's like you just like, the incumbent screwed up, they weren't paying attention, they scoff at this new technology, like nobody's scoffing at this new technology.
现在所有人都在试图拥抱它，但机会往往存在于那些看起来太小的领域——这些领域根本没有现有企业参与，实际上可能会创造出数万亿美元的价值。
Like everybody's just trying to embrace it, but the opportunity often exists where a lot of the areas that just seem too small, they don't have an incumbent at all, like, those actually might turn out to be, like, you know, trillions of dollars of value.
这比上一代更令人兴奋，当时的情况是：'哦，我只要把本地部署的东西全盘照搬到云端，搞成订阅制计费模式'，而且还要在大厂们都说'这很蠢，我看不懂'的时候去做这件事。
And that's kinda what makes it much more exciting than, like, last gen where it's like, oh, I'm just gonna copy everything that was on prem and make it, you know, recurring billing cloud, and I'm gonna do that at a time when the big guys say that's stupid, and I don't get it.
有人认为移动互联网本质上是延续性的，虽然确实催生了像优步、爱彼迎等价值千亿美元的全新公司和用例，但你看那些老牌企业，有些通过移动互联网成为了万亿美元市值的公司。
So some argue that mobile was ultimately sustaining and that although there were net new companies and use cases that were $100,000,000,000 like Uber and Airbnb, etcetera, that, you know, the incumbents, you know, some of them became trillion dollar companies, you know, who got it by mobile.
当我们审视AI时代的商业影响时，你用什么思维模型来分析老牌企业与初创公司——或者说全新企业——在价值捕获方面的关系？
When we look at the, you know, business impact of of the AI era, what's your mental model for thinking about sort of the incumbent versus start up or or kind of net new company in terms of value, you know, value capture?
我、我觉得很多方面是相似的。
I I I think a lot of it is the same.
比如，除非你真的搞砸了定价模式，或者采用按席位收费的方式，否则要让市场接受一个完全不同的产品是非常非常困难的，而且你还是在公众视野下运营，技术团队又不行。
Like, unless you really screw up the the pricing model or, you know, you're all per seat pricing, it's very, very hard to just get the market to adopt something that is just violently different, and you're operating in the public eye, and your technology team is bad.
需要同时满足很多条件才行。
There are lot of ands that need to happen.
我很难相信现有企业会真正遭受打击。
I have a hard time believing that incumbents will really suffer.
我是说，可能确实存在一些问题。
I mean, there probably are some things.
举个例子，这某种程度上又回到了分销与技术之争。
Take one example of, and this kinda goes back to distribution versus technology.
比如所有这些业务流程外包公司（BPO），它们是全球最大的雇主。
Like, all of these business process outsourcing companies, these BPOs, they're the largest employers on the planet.
比如塔塔、威普罗、印孚瑟斯这些公司。
So, like, Tata, Wipro, Infosys.
所以如果我是摩根大通，我说我需要一个客服中心，这个客服中心需要能访问客户记录，要确保安全，所有人员都要经过培训，而且我需要有大约10万人能接听电话。
So if I'm JPMorgan and I say, I need a call center, and this call center needs to have access to, like, customer records, and it needs to be safe, and everybody needs to be trained, like and I need to have, like, a 100,000 people that can answer the phone.
你知道谁能帮你做到吗？
You know who can do that for you?
印孚瑟斯，对吧，或者塔塔。
Infosys, right, or Tata.
塔塔在这个案例中已经完成了与摩根大通的整合。
Tata has already done the integration with JPMorgan in this case.
他们可能只需加入AI，就不再需要10万人手，还能维持摩根大通的合同，他们在恰到好处的黄金地带运营，能赚到百倍的钱。
They might just add AI, and now they don't need a 100,000 people, and they maintain that JPMorgan contract, and they operate in the the area of the Goldilocks zone where it's like they're gonna make like a 100 times more money.
这是一个例子。
That's one case.
这是塔塔公司的利好情况。
That's the bull case for Tata.
利空情况则是摩根大通可能会犹豫。
The bear case is like JPMorgan's like, wait a minute.
比如，应该与初创公司合作来做这件事，还是应该自己来做。
Like, should partner with the startup to do this, or we should do this ourselves.
现在，塔塔彻底失去了这段合作关系。
And now, Tata loses that relationship altogether.
两种走向都有可能。
And it could go either direction.
我认为很多这类事情都尚未定论，但默认情况下现有企业可能会表现不错，不过你可以从中挑选很多案例。
I think a lot of these things are really up for grabs, but I think the default is that the incumbents probably will do well, but you can pick a lot of these cases.
这就是为什么你会看到公开市场不知如何应对——有些情况对许多软件公司非常不利，但也存在另一种情况：如果你处于合适的黄金地带，并且拥有实际构建这些技术并接纳新技术的势头，你就能维持所有客户关系，业务也会更加盈利。
Mean, this is why you see the public markets kinda don't know what to do, where there is a case that is very, very bad for a lot of software companies, but there is an alternative case, which is like, if you operate in the right Goldilocks zone, and you have the right momentum to actually build these things and embrace these new technologies, you'll maintain all of your customer relationships, and you're just gonna have a more profitable business.
关于AI，我认为最引人注目但几乎所有人都误解的一点是：人们总说它会摧毁所有工作——但事实并非如此。
And it's not that you're gonna do this, like the most compelling thing I think about AI that almost everybody gets wrong is like, oh, it's gonna destroy all the jobs.
就像我们来自硅谷的敬爱代表正试图封杀AI。
Like, our beloved representative from Silicon Valley is trying to eliminate AI.
这简直太疯狂了，我们选出的代表竟想让硅谷倒退到种柑橘的农民时代，这想法实在太荒谬了。
It's just so crazy that our elected representative wants to turn us back to farmers of tangerines and whatnot in Silicon Valley, which again, I think is crazy.
但工作机会并不会全部消失。
But it's not like all the jobs will go away.
实际上我认为这种情况根本不会发生。
I actually think that's not gonna happen at all.
真正会发生的是：当很多工作能用1美元雇人完成时，我百分之百会这么做。
What's going to happen is there are a lot of things where it's like, if I could hire somebody for a dollar to do this task, would I a 100 percent do that.
但我根本不可能用1美元雇到人。
I cannot hire somebody for a dollar.
我这辈子从来就没能用1美元雇到过人。
I've never been able to hire somebody for a dollar.
现在我可以用一美元雇佣软件了。
Now I can hire software for a dollar.
所以很多这类任务，看看Uber出现后有多少人开始打车，对吧？
So a lot of these tasks, look at how many people took taxis post Uber, Right?
就像，你有没有听人说过，你今天可能是坐Uber来的。
And it's like, did you hear people say like, you you probably took an Uber to get here today.
对吧？
Right?
二十年前你会选择打车吗？
Would you have taken a taxi twenty years ago?
根本不可能。
Like, no way.
对吧？
Right?
因为那时候你上哪儿找出租车去？
Because it's like, where would you find the taxi?
你要怎么安排呢？这简直太复杂了。
How would you arrange the it's just like way too complicated.
而一旦你让它变得极其丰富且价格低廉，所有人都会使用它。
Whereas once you make it very, very abundant and less expensive, everybody's gonna use this.
我认为这正是Rokhan及其同类所忽视的——并不是说‘我要去消灭所有工作’。
And I think that's what Rokhan and his ilk are missing, which is it's not like, oh, I'm gonna go and say, I'm going to eliminate all the jobs.
想想我刚才提到的摩根大通的例子。
Think of it in that JPMorgan example that I just mentioned.
如果摩根大通的每个客户都能拥有一位每天可以交谈的个人朋友，帮助他们解决财务生活中的每个问题，这不是很棒吗？
Wouldn't it be cool if every single customer of JPMorgan Chase could have their own personal friend that they could talk to every single day there that would help them with every single element of their financial life?
或者就像我被卡在下载应用这一步。
Or it's like, I'm stuck downloading the app.
我不知道该怎么设置它。
I can't figure out how to get it set up.
哦，可以实时找个人帮你解决这个问题。
Oh, talk to somebody in real time that will help you about that.
他们为什么不做呢？
Why don't they do that?
这就像成本已知很高，而价值可能很低。
It's just like the cost is known, it's high, and then the value is probably low.
一旦你能将成本降至零，你就会开始在那些原本根本不会考虑雇佣人类的领域使用AI，因为你既无法培训人类，也找不到合适的人选，而且人力成本太高。
And as soon as you can bring the cost down to zero, now you're gonna start hiring AI in all of these different areas that you just would never bother hiring a human for because it's just like you can't train the human, you can't find the human, and the human's too expensive.
这是个不错的结束点。
It's a good place to wrap.
各位，感谢参加播客。
Guys, thanks for coming to the podcast.
细节不重要。
Motes don't matter.
抢占先机。
Get ahead.
是啊。
Yeah.
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Thanks for listening to this episode of the a 16 z podcast.
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