签证后续事宜与当今支付生态系统（与Gaurav Ahuja对话）

跟我们聊聊整个商户奖励体系吧。

Talk to us about this whole merchant rewards world.

嗯。

Yeah.

当然。

Absolutely.

到目前为止，我们讨论的所有奖励都是一对一的。

So all the rewards we've talked about till now are one to one.

它们是像摩根大通和摩根大通卓越卡、美国运通和美国运通白金卡与其用户之间的关系。

They're between a bank like Chase and Chase Sapphire or Amex and Amex Platinum and their users.

当你引入一个新变量——商户时，事情就变得非常有趣了，因为出现了一个新的奖励池。

When you add a new variable into the mix, which is the merchant, I think things get really interesting because there's a new rewards pool.

不仅仅是手续费和利息收入被货币化了。

It's not just interchange and interest revenue that's monetized.

商户也会提供奖励，因为他们认为你现在会更频繁地在他们的店里消费。

It's a merchant also giving rewards saying, I think you're gonna spend more at my store now.

所以，你可以接触到第三个价值池，那就是商店的更多销售额和更高利润率。

So I could there's a third value pool you get to tap into, which is more sales and more margin for the store.

这就是背后的原因。

That's the why here as the backdrop.

现在让我谈谈Imprint。

Now let me get into Imprint.

所以，正如我们之前讨论的，如果你拥有亚马逊信用卡、达美航空信用卡或好市多信用卡，这些都属于我们所说的类别联名信用卡。

So if you guys have, as we've talked about, an Amazon credit card or a Delta credit card or a Costco credit card, these are all versions of what we call as a category co branded credit cards.

而Imprint所做的非常简单。

And what we do at Imprint is pretty simple.

我们为最优秀、最大的商户提供联名信用卡服务。

We power these co branded credit cards for the best and largest merchants.

目前，我们已经从Thrive、Kleiner、Stripe和Ribbit等公司筹集了超过1亿美元。

So today we've raised something like $100,000,000 plus from Thrive and Kleiner and Stripe and Ribbit.

在过去六七个月里，我们的交易量增长了十倍，并为一些大型商户提供信用卡服务。

This year we've 10xed our transaction volume in the last six or seven months, and we power cards for some very large merchants.

如果你们中有南方的听众正在收听这一集，我们与HEB合作，它是美国前五大杂货店之一，年营收约400亿美元。

If you have any southern listeners tapping into this episode, we work with HEB, which is a top five grocery store in the country that does about 40,000,000,000 of revenue.

是的。

Yeah.

HEB实际上是一家总部位于德克萨斯州圣安东尼奥的运营得非常出色的公司。

HEB is actually, like, a really amazingly well run company based in Texas, based in San Antonio.

你们能与他们合作真是太棒了。

Huge that you guys work with them.

当然。

Totally.

我们非常喜爱他们。

We've absolutely loved them.

一个有趣的事实：他们以店内现制的玉米饼而闻名，还有一款黄油玉米饼香薰蜡烛。

Fun fact for everybody listening, they're famous for their tortillas that are made fresh in the store, and they have a butter tortilla candle.

所以一定要去买一个。

So definitely go get that out.

那么它是如何运作的呢？

So how does it work?

当你说到Imprint为他们提供支持时，Imprint具体做了什么，而AGB却无法直接创建他们自己的联名卡项目？

When you say Imprint powers them, what is it that Imprint does where AGB couldn't sort of directly create their own co branded card program?

也许将这一切与我的个人故事联系起来会更有帮助，再次说明我为什么是个信用卡迷。

It's maybe helpful to tie this all back to the personal story, why I'm a credit card junkie again from before.

我跟你说过我有几十张信用卡，但让我们理解一下背后用户的使用行为。

I told you I have dozens of credit cards, but like, let's understand the user behavior behind those.

大多数信用卡只是躺在我家的壁橱里，没有在我生活中实际出现。

Most of them just sit in my closet at home, and they don't have a physical presence in my life.

我解释这些是因为理解这个品类背后的‘为什么’非常重要。

I'm explaining all this because the why is really important to understand behind this category.

大多数信用卡并没有在我生活中实际出现。

Most of them don't have a physical presence in my life.

尽管它们一直躺在我的壁橱里，却在引导我的消费流向正确的地方。

And despite living in my closet, they're doing their job directing my spend in the right places.

所以，如果我要购买机票，我会非理性地告诉自己，不应该去比较联合航空、美国航空和精神航空的价格。

So if I'm making an airline purchase, I will irrationally tell myself I shouldn't go price check United and American and Spirit.

我只会选择达美航空，并在那里预订，因为使用我的卡片预订所能获得的额外积分和可能的免费升舱，这种情感价值远远超过了实际的金钱价值。

I'm just going to Delta and I'm booking there because that value from booking with my card and the extra points I'm getting and the potential free seat upgrade I'm getting, the emotional value I feel there is so much greater than the actual dollar value.

或者类似地，如果我要进行一笔大额消费，比如买一个戴森风扇，我一定会确保通过亚马逊购买，以获得亚马逊信用卡的5%现金返还，而不是在dyson.com上购买。

Or similarly, if I'm making an expensive purchase, say a Dyson fan, I'm gonna make sure I'm doing it on Amazon to get my 5% cash back with the Amazon credit card versus dyson.com.

同样，优步和Lyft，其实很容易通过打开两个应用来比价。

Similarly, Uber, Lyft, so easy to price compare by opening up both apps.

但我不会这么做。

I'm not doing that.

我会直接选择优步，因为我知道使用优步信用卡可以获得5%的现金返还。

I'm going straight to Uber because I know I'm getting my 5% cash back on the Uber credit card.

所以，这些本质上都是营销工具。

And so these are marketing tools at their heart.

它们并不是金融产品。

They are not financial products.

这就是我提到的，通过引入商家所增加的额外变量。

And that's the extra variable I was talking about by adding in a merchant.

相对于你们在节目中讨论的方式，这是作为投资者的我真正被这个市场吸引的原因。

And relative to the way I think you guys talked it on the episode, this is the investor in me coming out, why I'm so economically attracted to this market.

这并不是关于维萨的营销。

It's not about marketing for Visa.

我觉得你们在节目中可能是这样呈现的，过去确实如此。

I think that's how you guys might have laid it out in the show and it used to be that way.

在90年代，曾经出现过一种风靡一时的联名卡。

It used to be in the 90s there were these affinity cards that went viral everywhere.

每所大学都有自己的卡，每个非营利组织都有自己的卡，每支体育队伍也都有自己的卡。

Every university had a card, every nonprofit had a card, every sports team had a card.

在我看来，这种逻辑有点噱头。

The logic was kind of gimmicky in my mind.

我的用户喜欢我，他们会喜欢一张印有我形象或标志的卡片，并且会使用这张卡。

It was my users love me, my users will love a card that has my image or logo on it, and they'll use my card.

就是这样。

That was it.

然而，对于与商家合作的联名卡，我们讨论的是价值池的转移，是商业模式的创新。

However, with co branded cards, specifically with merchants, we're talking about a value pool shift, we're talking about a business model innovation.

想象一下，你是沃尔玛。

And so imagine you're Walmart.

每次你看到顾客在沃尔玛结账时刷一张卡，比如花旗双倍现金卡或富国银行自由卡，你都在看着一家银行获得2%的交易手续费，花旗或富国银行获得每消费一美元平均约8%或至少6%的利息收入。

Every time you see one of your customers swiping a card at checkout at Walmart, say it's a Citi Double Cash card or a Chase Freedom card, you're watching a bank get 2% of interchange, Citi or Chase getting 2% of interchange, and as we talked about, another maybe 8% or 6% at least of interest revenue on average per dollar spent.

所以，这家银行根本没有帮助促成我和顾客之间的交易，却从我商店的每笔消费中抽取8%的收益，为什么我不直接作为沃尔玛与银行合作，通过收益分成拿回其中一部分，再把这些回报给我的顾客呢？

So this bank that did nothing to help consummate the transaction between me and the user is getting 8% of every dollar going through my store, why don't I instead, as Walmart partner with the bank, and take some of that 8% by working with that bank through a revenue share back, and I'm gonna give that portion back to my users.

现在，这就变成了一块免费的价值池。

So now it's this free value pool.

我已经有沃尔玛的忠诚度计划，这对我的回报是正向的，人们在使用我的忠诚度计划时更愿意多消费。

I already have a Walmart loyalty program, it's positive ROI for me, people wanna spend more when they're using my loyalty program.

我可以通过与联名卡合作，在不增加额外成本的情况下，进一步提升这一价值，甚至可能使其翻倍。

I can boost that at no extra cost and maybe double the value in it by working with the co branded card.

因此，你可以用它来服务那些消费占比最高的高价值用户。

And so it's this thing that you can use for your highest value users that account for most of your spend.

那么，银行为什么愿意这样做，与商家分享他们的收入池呢？

And why is the bank willing to do this and split their revenue pool with a merchant?

这取决于哪家银行，这也是我在结构上认为我们能够进入这个领域的原因。

It depends on which bank, and this is structurally why I think we're able to enter.

如果放眼全局，很明显这是一个相当庞大的行业。

If you zoom out, already it's clear that this is a pretty big industry.

所有信用卡交易量的30%实际上都来自商户或商店自有品牌卡片，仅合作发卡的交易量就达到了一万亿美元。

30% of all credit card volume is actually going on merchant or store branded cards, so that's a trillion dollars of transaction volume just on co branded credit cards.

但正如你正确指出的，对于摩根大通和美国运通来说，它们对与商家进行收入分成的兴趣门槛非常高。

But I think as you properly point out, Chase and Amex, the bar is really high for them to care about doing a rev share with a merchant.

因此，只有像亚马逊这样的巨头，才会让摩根大通担心推出一张 Chase 亚马逊卡；或者只有达美航空这样的公司，才会让美国运通担心推出一张达美美国运通卡。

And so it's gotta be Amazon for Chase to worry about doing a Chase Amazon card, or it's gotta be Delta for Amex to worry about doing a Delta Amex card.

但大多数时候，情况都是这样：我是摩根大通，我是美国运通，我本来就赢了。

But most of the time it's like, Hey, I'm Chase, I'm Amex, I'm already winning.

每五张信用卡中就有一张是 Chase 信用卡，每五张信用卡中就有一张是 Amex 信用卡。

One in every five cards is a Chase credit card, one in every five credit cards is an Amex credit card.

因此，他们已经很好地捕获了全部 8% 的价值。

So they're already doing a good job capturing that full 8%, the full value themselves.

他们几乎没有动力去与普通商家合作。

They have zero or very little incentive to partner with a standard merchant out there.

所以当你查看数百个联名项目列表时，大多数都不是 Chase 和 Amex，只有少数几个。

So that's why when you look down the list of hundreds of co brand programs, most of them are not Chase and Amex, that's just a handful.

你应该避免合作的主要是这些银行：Synchrony 银行、Comenity Bread 或 US 银行。

It's most of these banks that you should never be working with, which are Synchrony Bank, Comenity Bread, or US Bank.

你从不希望与这些银行合作的原因是，一方面，它们不是科技公司。

And the reason you never wanna work with these banks is that on the one hand, they're not technology companies.

其次，我认为它们并不真正理解自己的营销产品。

But then secondly, I don't believe that they realize their marketing products.

它们仍然认为自己卖的是金融产品。

They still think they're financial products.

在技术方面，这些银行并不自行构建其核心银行系统。

On the technology front, these banks, they don't build out their own banking core.

它们各自都建立在Fiserv或TSYS之上。

They each sit on top of Fiserv or TSYS.

以Comenity银行为例，今年早些时候它曾出现故障。

Bread Comenity, as an example, went down earlier this year.

你无法发行卡片。

You couldn't issue a card.

你无法登录账户。

You couldn't log in.

它的商户感到非常不满。

Their merchants were extremely annoyed.

即使是高盛公司，虽然支撑了神奇的Apple Card体验，但并没有自行开发前端界面。

Even Goldman Sachs, powered the magical Apple Card experience, on the one hand, they didn't build out the front end.

所有这些前端功能都是由苹果公司开发的。

Apple built all of that out.

另一方面，他们也没有构建自己的核心系统。

And on the other hand, they didn't build out their own core.

他们使用了一种名为CoreCard的系统。

They used something called CoreCard.

所以，他们到底做了什么？

And so it's like, what did they do?

我看到这种情况，发现其中存在很多明显的漏洞。

And I look at this and it leaves a lot of obvious gaps.

商家仅仅为了与这些银行中的某一家合作上线，就要花费十二到十八个月的时间。

It's like merchants take twelve to eighteen months just to get launched with one of these banks.

每次商家想要对忠诚度计划做一点调整，都极其困难，因为你必须回到谈判桌前，重新协商整个收入分成协议。

Every time a merchant wants to make a tweak to a loyalty program, it's extremely difficult because you have to go back to the negotiating table and basically rebel out the entire rev share agreement.

银行不知道如何与商家共享交易详情，想象一下，如果你登录自己的达美航空账户，却无法查看自己在卡片上的消费金额，也就无从得知自己离目标的会员等级还有多远。

The bank doesn't know how to share transaction details with the merchant, so imagine going to your Delta account and not knowing how much you've spent on your card to see how close you are to accruing the value status that you were hoping to get.

顺便说一下，Synchrony有两个不同的登录入口。

Synchrony, by the way, has two different logins.

因此，在网页和移动端，你会有两个不同的登录账户；或者如果你有两个由Synchrony支持的商户卡，它们也会有不同的登录账户。

So for web and mobile, you'd have two different logins, or if you had two merchant cards both powered by Synchrony, they'd also have different logins.

这最让我感到沮丧。

This is the thing that frustrates me the most.

这是技术层面的问题。

That was the technology piece.

另一方面，他们没有意识到，这些其实都是营销项目。

They don't realize, on the other hand, that they're marketing programs.

作为商户，你的最佳客户就在这里，你拥有一个最忠诚用户的面板，他们最频繁地在你的店铺消费。

Here are your best customers as a merchant, and you have this panel of your most loyal users spending the most at your store.

你掌握了他们所有的交易记录。

You have all their transactions.

你掌握了他们每一项商品的详细数据。

You have all their SKU level detail.

但你却无法通过你的银行合作伙伴与这些客户互动、发送促销信息、与他们建立联系、在恰当的时机发送恰当的信息，甚至无法获取最基本的信息，比如他们到底在花哪些钱。

But you have no ability through your bank partner to interact with these customers, send them promotions, engage with them, send them the right messages at the right time, or even just the basics on gleaning insights about what are they spending.

让我多了解一下我的最佳用户。

Let me tell me more about my best users.

这真是太遗憾了。

It's just such a shame.

有一点需要澄清，这些银行——比如你们提到的Synchrony这类公司——你们说根本不应该与之合作，它们实际上是专门从事商户信用卡项目的银行。

One thing just to be clear, these banks, the synchronies and the like of the world that you say, you know, you should essentially never be working with, these are dedicated banks for, like, merchant card programs.

这些银行不像我们之前在本集中讨论过的那些为金融科技公司提供支持的社区小银行。

These aren't like we were talking about earlier in the episode, the small community banks that are powering Fintechs.

它们可不是那种夫妻店。

These are not like mom and pop shops.

大卫，你这个观点太棒了。

That's such a great point, David.

大多数信用卡公司吸引用户时，只在一个维度上竞争，那就是奖励，也许还有消费者应用中的用户体验。

Most credit card companies are competing on one dimension when they're going after users, which is rewards and maybe user experience in their app for that consumer.

我们试图竞争的维度要复杂得多。

The dimensions we're trying to compete on are much more multifaceted.

我们正在为商家构建一个完整的产物业务层面。

There's this entire layer of product surface area that we're trying to build for the merchants.

当然，我们必须拥有出色的产品体验，但同时我们还需要为每个合作商家的市场部门打造一套完整的B2B营销工具。

So of course, we've got to have great user product, but we've also got to build an entire B2B effectively marketing tool for marketing offices at each of the merchants that we work with.

从向你的核心用户发送特定促销活动，到分析他们在全年内的消费行为洞察，再到告诉你：‘今年12月，得克萨斯州的另一位商家想加入我们的忠诚度计划’。

So everything from sending specific promotions to your best users or understanding the insights on how they're spending throughout the year or being able to say, I have another merchant in Texas who wants to be a part of our loyalty program for the month of December this year.

我该如何无缝地将他们纳入我的卡网络作为合作伙伴？

How do I add them in seamlessly as a partner to my to my card network?

这些才是软件应该能帮你实现、而其他人无法做到的事情。

Those are the sorts of things that that software should be able to let you do that somebody else can't.

所以如果我理解得没错，你的意思是，既然可以证明你确实能提升用户忠诚度，你就知道，如果顾客频繁使用这张卡，就存在一个额外的收入池，可以用来打造更优质的奖励机制。

And so if I'm understanding right, what you're essentially saying is because it is provable that you actually can increase loyalty, you know that there is an additional revenue pool to play with in creating even better rewards for frequent shoppers if they use this card.

完全正确。

Exactly right.

有意思。

Interesting.

对于沃尔玛或任何其他商家来说，他们的逻辑是，目前他们都已找到了最理想的忠诚度计划投资。

The logic for a Walmart or any other merchant out there is that right now, they've all got loyalty programs that they've found the perfect investment into.

因此，沃尔玛认为，将年销售额的2%投入忠诚度计划，能为我购物篮中的优质客户带来正向的投资回报。

So they're saying as Walmart, devoting 2% of my annual sales to a loyalty program is yielding positive ROI with the good customers in my basket.

现在，通过这种联名卡，我可以在不增加任何成本的情况下，将这一比例提升到3%或4%，从而从最高消费用户身上挖掘更多价值，让他们不再在竞争对手处消费，而只在我店里消费。

Now with this co branded card, I can make that 3% or 4% at no extra cost to me, and all of a sudden, juice a lot more value from my highest spend users and get them to stop spending at my competitors and only at my store.

而且我还有一件事之前没明白。

And there's also I didn't understand this before.

对于商家卡项目，根据收益分成协议的条款，商家在一定程度上也能参与银行从这些卡片中获得的利息收入。

For merchant card programs, depending on the terms of the rev share agreement, the merchants also get to participate to some extent in the interest revenue that the banks are making from those cards.

这也是对的吗？

Is that correct too?

是的。

Yeah.

虽然具体表述方式可能因交易结构而异，但最简单的理解是：每消费一美元，就会有一部分比例返还给商家。

It might not be exactly framed that way depending on how the deal is structured, but the simplest way to think about it is for every dollar spent, there's some percentage that is going to the merchant.

商家会利用这一比例，部分或全部用于其忠诚度计划。

The merchant is using that percentage, some or all of it, to devote into their loyalty program.

明白了。

Gotcha.

所以回到ATB的例子，他们当然可能之前就已经有自己的信用卡和借记卡，但在这些平台上，他们对客户及其消费行为和忠诚度的掌控与洞察远不如现在精细。

So back to the ATB example, they certainly could have created and perhaps they likely did have their own, you know, credit and debit cards before, but they had nowhere near the fine level of control and insight into their customers and their customer spends and their customer loyalty on these platforms.

我认为这甚至更基本。

I would say it's even more basic than that.

我认为，作为一个品牌，如果你在意用户体验，你选择的银行合作伙伴就是你品牌的延伸。

I think as a brand, if you care at all about your user experience, the bank partner that you choose is an extension of you as a brand.

很难把Synchrony或其他这些老牌银行摆在客户面前，还指望他们对你的品牌保持高NPS评分。

And it is very hard to put Synchrony or any of these other legacy banks in front of your customers and expect them to still be high NPS on your brand.

今天解释信用卡生态系统，与1995年解释它完全是两回事。

Trying to explain the credit card ecosystem today versus trying to explain it in 1995 is completely different.

比如价值分布在哪里、如何分配、各比例是多少，九十年代时整个系统的运作方式还相当清晰。

Like, where the value pools are, how it's cut, what the percentages are, it was a pretty clean story in the nineties of how this whole system works.

而今天，对于任何关于谁在何种情况下赚钱的问题，答案基本上都是：这要看情况。

And the answer today to basically any question about who makes money in what scenario is, well, it depends.

令人惊讶的是，尽管整个系统没有发生巨大变化，但每个人似乎都已明白，比如商户折扣率，正如你所说，格罗夫，三十年来基本保持不变。

And it is wild how everyone has sort of figured out without massively changing the overall system, you know, like the merchant discount rate is still to your point, Grov, approximately what it was thirty years ago.

但每个人都逐渐意识到，在特定情况下，我提供了更多价值，因此我希望就这个细分市场和这种场景谈判一项定制协议，以便我能获得更多的经济收益。

But everyone has sort of figured out, well, for this particular situation, I'm providing more value and therefore, I'd like to negotiate some custom deal for this segment in this scenario where I'm able to get more of the economics on it.

我认为这是一个非常棒的见解。

I think that's a really good insight.

这个生态系统变得越来越复杂，而这就是一个典型的例子：商家现在成为了一个新的变量，一个你可以通过销售增长来挖掘的新价值池。

The ecosystem has gotten increasingly complex, and this is just one example where merchants are now a new variable added in and a new value pool that you can tap into because of sales uplift.

但类似的情况还有很多。

But there's tons of examples of this.

我认为企业卡和企业支出是另一个例子，其中出现了新的变量。

I think corporate card and corporate spend is another version of this where there's new variables popping in.

当然，当你开始考虑企业与差旅结合时，情况会变得更加复杂。

Certainly, it gets even more complex as you start to think about corporate also with travel.

现在你开始看到OTA以及OTA的利润介入其中，像Ramp这样的公司正试图进入这一领域并从中获利。

So now you're getting OTAs and the OTA margin involved in this, and companies like Ramp are are trying to get into this space and take advantage of it.

我认为，每增加一个新变量，你就能挖掘出新的价值池，这既带来了更大的复杂性，也创造了更多机会，让各方的激励能够更好地对齐——而过去，这通常只是简单的点对点关系。

I think every new variable you add into this, there's new value pools you can tap into, which creates both more room for complexity, but also more room to just align incentives for the right people transaction versus what in the past has always been really one to one.

对此最恰当的表述是：作为一家企业，你不能再认为‘我有3%的信用卡处理费，剩下的97%才是我需要运营的业务’。

And the right framing for this is probably as a business, you can no longer think about, well, you know, I have 3% or whatever it is that I owe in card processing, and then I'll think about the other 97% as my business that I have to run.

这3%现在已经被融合了，它虽然是信用卡处理费，但你也可以利用它来为自己谋利，可以更聪明地运用它。

That 3% is sort of blended in now with, yeah, it's card processing, but I could use it to my advantage, I could be clever with it.

对于某些客户，它可以是这个比例。

I could say for some customers, it's this percent.

对于另一些客户，它可以是那个比例。

For some customers, it's that percent.

它模糊了过去那种清晰的界限——一边是你运营的业务：获取客户、销售商品、留住客户；另一边是‘哦，对了，我还要付一些支付费用’，好像那是另一个独立的成本。

It it sort of gets rid of the clear bright line between the business I'm operating where I acquire customers and sell goods and retain those customers, and, oh, yeah, I owe some money for payments as this this cost over here.

确实如此。

Certainly.

我认为，如果你以正确的方式看待这个问题，总会有一些商家把这3%看作一个固定成本，能做的事情非常有限，因此他们仍会将其视为3%的成本。

I think if you're thinking about it the right way, there are always going to be those merchants who look at that 3% and have a limited number of things they can do with it, and so we'll continue to look at it as the 3% cost.

因此，我们之前在本集中讨论过的对Visa和Mastercard的所有压力依然存在。

Thus, all the pressure that we've been talking about earlier in this episode on Visa and Mastercard.

我认为这一点在你们提到的低利润行业里尤其成立。

I think where that will particularly hold true is you guys mentioned low margin businesses.

相比零售商品业务，什么行业的利润率更低呢？比如一个佣金率极低的平台。

What's even lower margin than, say, a retail goods business might be, for example, a really low take rate marketplace.

因此，你可能只能从平台上所有成交总额（GMV）中获得5%到10%的净收入。

And so you might only be getting a five to 10% net revenue take rate on all the GMV going through your marketplace.

但你仍然需要支付3%的费用——不是基于你的净收入，而是基于全部成交总额（GMV）。

But, boy, you still gotta pay 3% not on your net revenue, but 3% fees on the entire GMV.

因此，从你净收入的比例来看，这是一项非常沉重的成本负担。

So as a portion of your net revenue, it is a really high cost to bear.

好了，各位听众。

Alright, listeners.

现在是一个感谢本节目新朋友Koyfin的好时机。

Now is a great time to thank a new friend of the show, Koyfin.

这很有趣。

And it's funny.

他们是新来的，但实际上我已经使用他们的产品好几年了。

They're new, but actually, I've been using their product for years.

我为每一集新收购的节目所做的研究项目都离不开Koyfin。

My research project for every single new acquired episode involves Koyfin.

所以当他们联系我赞助节目时，我想，这真是太方便了。

So when they reached out to sponsor the show, I thought, well, this is convenient.

确实如此。

Indeed.

Koyfin是一款深受个人投资者和金融顾问喜爱的金融研究工具。

So Koyfin is a financial research tool loved by both individual investors and financial advisers.

个人用户用它进行股票研究、绘制财务图表和追踪投资组合，而金融顾问则用它来构建模型投资组合并制作客户提案。

Individuals use it for stock research, graphing financials, and portfolio tracking, and financial advisers use it to build model portfolios and create client proposals.

他们提供实时市场数据和强大的分析工具。

They have live market data and powerful analytics tools.

所以这有点像彭博终端，但价格却便宜得多。

So it's kinda like a Bloomberg terminal except without the huge price tag.

对吧？

Right?

是的。

Yes.

基本上是的。

Essentially.

这是一个网页应用，完全自助服务。

It's a web app, and it's totally self serve.

在我使用它的头几年里，我实际上从未与公司任何人沟通过。

I've actually not talked to anyone at the company for the first few years that I used it.

所以Koyfin是一款面向广大用户的产品，比如所有节目的听众都会使用，而不仅仅是华尔街的投资银行家。

So Koyfin is a product that the broader market, like all acquired listeners, would use, not just Wall Street investment bankers.

我用它来获取我们研究的每家公司的增长率、毛利率、市盈率或收入倍数等数据。

It's where I pull things like growth rate or gross margins or the PE ratio or revenue multiples for every company we study.

你还可以通过历史图表或与其他公司对比来观察这些数据随时间的变化。

And you can compare these things over time with historical graphs or against other companies.

当我们研究像劳力士、玛氏或宜家这样的私营公司时，我也经常用它来查看可比公司，以估算这些公司如果上市会值多少钱。

It's often what I use when we're studying private companies too, like Rolex or Mars or IKEA to look at the comparables to estimate what these companies would be worth if they were public.

他们还提供一个筛选器，可以跨数千只股票进行筛选，从而快速发现投资机会。

They also have a screener that lets you filter across thousands of stocks so you can quickly surface investment ideas.

没错。

Yep.

所以，总体思路是，如果你习惯于依赖数据，那么在思考投资时，这些数据就应该随时可得。

So the general idea is if you're someone who's used to living in data, you should have that at your fingertips as you think about

投资。

investing.

没错。

Exactly.

它提供了围绕机构级数据的出色数据可视化图表。

It's got these great graphs for data visualization wrapped around institutional grade data.

所以，如果你想了解今天股价背后所隐含的假设，Koyfin 就是为你准备的。

So if you wanna understand what assumptions are baked into the stock price today, Koyfin is for you.

我正想说，Acquired 的听众有一个很棒的优惠，但 Koyfin 的免费产品实际上已经非常强大了。

I was about to say that Acquired listeners have a great offer, but Koyfin's free product is actually already really robust.

这正是我多年来一直在使用的。

Which is what I was using for years.

我知道。

I know.

我知道。

I know.

但确实，对于 Acquired 的听众，还有你，本，如果你访问 koyfin.com/acquired 并升级到付费版，你将享受第一年 20% 的折扣。

But indeed, for Acquired listeners and also for you, Ben, if you go to koyfin.com/acquired and you end up upgrading to paid, you'll get 20% off your first year.

感谢 Koyfin。

Our thanks to Koyfin.

这是 koyfin.com/acquired，或者点击节目笔记中的链接。

That's koyfin.com/acquired, or click the link in the show notes.

哇。

Wow.

我以前从来没想过这个问题，但我的第一反应是 Airbnb。

I've never actually thought about this, but, like, my mind immediately goes to Airbnb.

他们是怎么处理这个问题的？

Like, how do they deal with this?

嗯，Airbnb 是一个高抽成的平台。

Well, Airbnb is a high take rate marketplace.

我的意思是

I mean

我的意思是，yes 和 no 都有。

Well, I mean, yes and no.

它在 GMV 上的抽成并不高。

It's not a high take rate on the GMV.

在扣除费用之后，确实是这样。

After you factor in fees, it is.

也许这就是他们应对的方式。

Maybe that's how they deal with it.

所以我不太清楚 Airbnb 的任何人是如何考虑这个问题的。

So I don't know exactly anyone at Airbnb or how they've thought about this.

但从外部来看，他们不久前推出了一款名为 Stripe Link 的新产品。

But outside in, you can see they launched with a new product called Stripe Link not too long ago.

对于还不了解的人，Stripe Link 就像 Shop Pay，但适用于整个网页上的任何场景，而不仅仅是电子商务。

And for anybody who doesn't know yet, Stripe Link is kind of like, think about Shop Pay, but for anything on the web, not just ecommerce.

它会根据你的手机号码或电子邮件、身份信息以及你在任何结算页面保存的支付方式来记住你。

It remembers you based on your phone number and or email and your identity and your saved payment methods at any checkout.

然而，Airbnb 选择的实现方式并不是作为信用卡记忆工具或通过记住身份来提高转化率，而是作为与银行账户关联的支付方式工具。

However, the way Airbnb has chosen to implement this is not as a credit card remembering tool and remembering your identity for increased conversion that way, but as a bank linked payment method tool.

因此，这向我表明，他们也希望像其他市场平台一样，降低处理费用。

And so that would indicate to me that they have hopes of, yes, also lowering the processing fees just like other marketplaces might as well.

通过将资金流动从信用卡和借记卡渠道转移到ACH渠道。

By shifting the money movement from the credit and debit rails to the ACH rails.

没错。

You got it.

这使得超低抽成比例的平台业务基本上无法盈利。

It does make super low take rate marketplace businesses basically nonviable.

你可以想象，如果你的平台只收取5%的抽成，而支付处理费用却占了总收入的40%左右。

You could imagine if you only take a 5% take rate on your marketplace, the payment processing is 40% ish of your your total revenue.

要想在扣除其他成本后仍保持盈利，几乎是不可能的。

It's pretty hard to have below the line costs and and stay profitable as a going concern.

我觉得说得非常好。

I think that's very well said.

因此，在许多低抽成比例的经纪行业中，它们往往更偏向B2B模式，也因此几乎总是使用ACH或现金交易。

And it's why in a lot of brokerage industries that are low take rate, they tend to be more b to b, and they tend to be as a result, almost always ACH and or cash.

对吧？

Right?

房地产领域充满了这样的例子：你绝不会用信用卡支付这类款项，因为手续费高得难以承受，因此它们一直沿用ACH或支票支付，正是由于这一巨大的障碍。

Real estate is filled with examples like this where you'd never use a card to go make that payment because the fees would be unbearable, and they've stayed on ACH and or check as a result of that very large barrier.

我想对于Imprint来说，这个问题有两个方面：我们一直在讨论亚马逊的商户信用卡项目、Deltas，还有像HEB这样你们服务的大客户。

Well, I imagine for Imprint kind of the, you know, idea two part of this, you know, we've been talking about the Amazon merchant card programs, the Deltas, you know, even the HEBs, like the really large customers that you all have.

这部分也一定是为了让规模较小的商户也能获得自己的信用卡项目，并战略性地考虑那3%的费用。

Part of this also must have been about just kinda democratizing access for merchants at lower scale into having their own card programs and thinking strategically about the 3%.

对吧？

Right?

在过去，一个中型区域商户能否得到这些银行的重视，来定制他们的项目？

In the old world, would a mid sized regional merchant be able to get the time of day from one of these banks to customize their programs?

我猜大概不可能。

I'm imagining probably not.

我觉得这个观点非常好。

I think that's such a good point.

我认为Visa有时会被误认为是一家缺乏创新的公司，或者至少投资者可能会这么认为。

I think Visa can sometimes get a bad rep for being a non innovative company, or at least that's what investors might say.

他们会说，这是典型的大型公司利润。

They'd say, it's classic big company profits.

他们没有任何创新的动力。

They have no incentive to innovate.

他们好几年都没推出过任何新东西。

They haven't done anything new in years.

至少我以前听过这种说法。

At least I've heard that narrative before.

我得告诉你，大卫，正如你所言，我们在Imprint与Visa的合作体验却大不相同。

And I gotta tell you, David, to your point, our experience at imprint has been pretty different with Visa.

我会举几个例子。

So I'll hit on a couple of examples.

一个是业务拓展的例子。

One is a BD example.

另一个是技术方面的例子。

The other is a technology example.

这个业务拓展的例子是为那些想更多了解Visa的听众准备的，帮助你们理解Visa如何看待联名信用卡市场。如果一家新商户打算推出一张新卡，或者想与另一家银行续约信用卡合作，当然。

The BD example is for your listeners looking to learn more about Visa to give you insight on how they think about the co branded credit card market, if a new merchant is looking to launch a card or re up a deal for a card with a new bank, Sure.

这看起来像是商户和银行之间的交易，但Visa和万事达都在暗中观察，而且他们都嗅到了机会。

It might seem like this deal between the merchant and the bank, but Visa and Mastercard are kind of watching, and they both smell blood.

他们都会想：我得让与我合作的银行拿下这笔交易。

They both look at this and say, I gotta get the banks that I work with.

对Visa来说，这可能意味着让摩根大通去赢得这笔交易。

So for Visa, that might be Chase, for example, and get Chase to go win that deal.

因为如果摩根大通赢了这笔交易，就意味着我也赢了，这笔交易量就会流向我。

Because if Chase wins that deal, it means I win the deal, and that volume is coming to me.

在Visa和万事达之间相对稳定的市场份额市场中，这些交易可能规模相当可观。

In what is a pretty steady state market share business between Visa and Mastercard, these can be pretty big chunks.

假设你作为Visa，成功把好市多的信用卡业务从美国运通手里抢了过来，那这就意味着有1%的信用卡消费总额直接转移到了Visa身上。

If you, as Visa, just swung over the Costco card to you for away from say Amex as a hypothetical, that's 1% of all card spent that just moved over to you as Visa.

天啊。

Oh, god.

是的。

Yes.

仅Costco卡片的交易量就大约占所有卡片消费的1%。

The Costco card alone is roughly on the order of magnitude of 1% of all card spend.

这些是他们为争取业务而少有的机会和战略方式。

These are one of their few opportunities and strategic ways to try to go win business.

令人欣喜的是，他们并没有仅仅局限于过去认为安全的旧银行来开展新的商户计划。

And what's been awesome to see is they aren't just staying with what they would have considered to be safe old banks for new merchant programs.

我知道这在HEB对我们很有效，而且在我们已赢得但尚未推出的其他新合作中也同样有效。

And I know this was effective for us at HEB, and it's effective for us in new deals that we've won but not yet launched with.

Visa正在积极主张：你必须与Imprint合作。

Visa's out there saying you gotta work with imprint.

这是最适合你的银行。

This is the best bank for you.

看到他们在这一过程中大力扶持初创企业，真的令人惊叹，因为人们原本以为他们并非创新者，这完全与事实相反。

And it's really amazing to see them leaning into startups in a process like this because the story of them not being innovators totally wouldn't lead you to believe that.

所以这是这方面业务拓展的部分。

So that's the BD kind of side of this.

这一方面的技术层面是，Visa 已经努力让自己变得更加易接触。

The technology side of this is, Visa's tried to make themselves a lot more approachable.

过去，作为一家想进入这 3% 互换费率领域的初创公司，你无法直接连接到 Visa。

And in the past, it used to be that you couldn't as a startup looking to play in this 3% interchange world, get directly connected to Visa.

你必须通过某个与 Visa 有关系的大公司作为中介。

You had to go through some intermediary that was big and had a relationship with Visa as a conduit.

因此，你可能会与核心处理器合作，或者与像 Stripe Issuing、Marketa 或 Lithic 这样的发卡公司合作，它们与 Visa 有协议，你可以借助它们的渠道。

So you would have worked with a core processor, you would have worked with some card issuing company like Stripe Issuing or Marketa or Lithic, and they would have had a deal with Visa that you'd ride the back of.

然而，现在 Visa 推出了一个名为 Cloud Connect 的产品，而我们 Imprint 正在使用它。

However, now Visa has launched something called Cloud Connect, and it's what we use at Imprint.

它实际上让我们可以直接接入，从而获得对 VisaNet 的直接访问权限。

And it actually is this instance that we can plug into directly, and it gives us direct access into VisaNet.

因此，我们现在是直接通过 Visa 连接到账本，而不再需要依赖以前必须合作的大型集团。

So we are directly plugged into the ledger through Visa, not working with some big conglomerate that they had to go partner with before.

这不仅仅是技术上的改进，他们还配备了专门与金融科技公司沟通的团队，懂得如何用我们的语言交流。

And it's not just technology, they've got teams of people who can talk to FinTechs, they know how to speak our language.

看到这一切真的非常令人振奋。

It's been a really cool sight to see.

所有这些都说明了技术不断进步的巨大力量。

All of this speaks to just the general power of technology getting better.

从我们之前讨论的内容来看，这取决于交易的类型、客户的身份以及他们使用的卡片。

Everything from our previous discussion on, well, it depends on the type of transaction, on who the customer is, on which card they're using.

如果没有更先进的技术，你就无法在每笔交易的基础上进行这种精细的个性化细分。

You can't do this sort of clever individual segmentation on a per transaction basis without more advanced technology.

或者在这个更近期的例子中，有了这个API，如果没有现代技术，你就无法支持成千上万的小型合作伙伴直接接入VisaNet。

Or in this more recent example, this this API, you can't facilitate thousands of small, you know, partners working directly and plugging into VisaNet without, you know, modern technology.

因此，这确实支持了这样一个观点：随着技术的进步，随着Visa采用现代技术，你可以为这些交易以及每笔交易中涉及的所有不同参与方，构建一个更加智能的路由生态系统。

And so it it does definitely support the story of as technology gets better, you know, as Visa adopts modern technology, you sort of can have a much more cleverly routed ecosystem for these transactions and for all these different parties involved in each transaction.

我认为这完全正确。

I think that's totally right.

而且你看。

And look.

我以创始人的身份，结合个人经历，看到了这些积极的方面。

I'm seeing all these positive things with my founder hat on and from personal experiences.

但如果我完全抽离自身，暂时以投资者的身份来看待这些，我会觉得，嗯，它们确实不错。

Then if I totally remove myself from the situation and put my investor hat on for a second, I look at these things and I say, hey, they're they're great.

你知道，万事达卡也涉足了其中一些领域。

You know, Mastercard's leaned into a few of these things as well.

它们有一个名为Finicity的产品，有点像Plaid的竞争对手。

They have a product called Finicity, which is kind of a plaid competitor.

它们还有一个名为SessionM的商户忠诚度软件。

They have a product called SessionM, which is a merchant loyalty software.

但当我审视它们时，我不禁想，希望我没有冒犯任何人，但谁会在意这些呢？

But then I look at them and I think, boy, like, I hope I'm not offending anybody, but who the heck cares about these?

然而，它们却能推动高达五千亿美元的企业价值。

Well, they move the needle on a half $1,000,000,000,000 of enterprise value.

我们正经历一场从现金向数字支付的巨大长期趋势，这一趋势将持续数十年，而其他这些事情对这些企业来说都只是边缘业务。

We've got this massive secular shift going on from cash to digital that will last for decades, and these other things are on the margins for these businesses.

这让我想起了谷歌，过去三十年来，线上搜索和数字广告的浪潮一直推动着它的发展。

It kind of reminds me of Google of what has been a thirty year tailwind of just movement to search online and digital advertising online.

谷歌推出的每一个其他消费者产品，对它们的利润表几乎都没有什么影响。

And every other consumer product that Google launched just kind of doesn't move the needle for their P and L.

但这并不重要。

And it doesn't matter.

有趣的是，这似乎是一个Visa和MasterCard希望增加其网络交易量的案例。

What's interesting, this seems like a case where Visa and MasterCard want this increased volume on their networks.

因为这正是它们整个业务的核心。

Like, that is core to, like, their whole business.

但构建这类技术及营销技术项目，以促进其网络上更多的交易量，并作为网络间的竞争手段，似乎并不是Visa的核心优势。

But building these types of technology and marketing technology programs for merchants to enable that more volume happening on their networks and as competitive vectors between the networks, that feels like less of Visa's core competency.

因此，它们开放API，允许Imprint这样的初创公司来做这些，就显得很合理了。

So it makes sense, right, that they would, like, open their APIs to allow startups like Imprint to do this.

我认为这完全正确。

I think that's absolutely right.

所有这些事情都表明——如果你觉得我理解错了请告诉我——维萨正在利用技术进行防御。

All of these things are and tell me if you think I'm seeing this wrong, ways that Visa is using technology to play defense.

比如，我们必须留住这个商户，或者我们必须把商户从万事达的网络拉到我们的网络上来。

Like, oh, we have to keep that merchant on our network, or, oh, we gotta go get that merchant to be on our network instead of Mastercard's network.

在这一集中，我们更多讨论了他们如何利用技术进行进攻，比如能否拓展到消费者支付之外的商业支付领域，像Visa Direct或B2B支付？

On the episode, we talked sort of more about ways they're using technology for offense, which is can we expand beyond our core market of consumer to business payments, like with Visa Direct or with b two b payments?

你认为这个说法可信吗？即除了消费者到商业的数字支付趋势之外，还有其他巨大驱动力推动维萨的未来？

Do you think that that story is is credible of a huge driver of Visa's future is something other than the consumer to business tailwind of digital payments?

我确实认为他们还有其他可以挖掘的领域。

I definitely think there are other categories for them to tap into.

无论是消费者支付中渗透率较低的类别，还是你提到的B2B支付，这些显然是正在增长的市场部分，我知道他们的商务拓展团队正在与金融科技公司积极布局。

Whether it's underpenetrated categories of consumer payments or to your point, b two b payments, those are definitely growing parts of the pie that I know their BD team is leaning into with fintechs.

以消费者端的租金支付为例，这是信用卡消费中渗透率较低的领域。

Take rental payments as an example on the consumer side as an underpenetrated area of spend for credit cards.

他们在这里做了一些事情。

They've done a couple of things here.

他们与一些金融科技公司合作，推出了针对租金支付的返现信用卡，当用户使用信用卡支付租金时，能返还大量费用。

They've partnered with some fintechs who are launching rental payments rewards cards that actually give back a lot of the fees to users when they do manage to pay rent with a credit card.

但其次，在过去几年里，他们实际上降低了租金支付的交换费或商户服务费（MDR）。

But then secondly, within the last few years, they've actually lowered interchange fees or lowered MDR for rental payments.

因此，Visa 并不是采用一刀切的商户服务费模式。

And so Visa is not a one size fits all type of MDR.

每个类别都有不同的商户服务费，他们有意识地降低了某些对日常消费者至关重要的类别，如杂货和汽油的费率。

Every category has a different type of MDR, and they've purposefully lowered it in some categories like grocery or gas that are kind of necessary for the everyday consumer.

而在其他类别中，费率则较高，他们也将租金支付纳入了较低费率类别之一。

While it's higher in other categories, they've added rental payments to one of the lower categories on their list as well.

这些是他们在消费者端可以调整利润的几种手段。

Well, those are some of the levers they can push on the margins on the consumer side.

在企业对企业（B2B）方面，我认为他们正很好地抓住了那些快速增长的企业信用卡初创公司。

On the b to b side, I think they're doing a great job leaning into all of the rapidly growing corporate credit card startups out there.

让我一直感到惊讶的是，你们在这一集中提到了麦当劳的广告，那在九十年代简直让人震惊——他们居然接受信用卡。

And one thing that's constantly surprising to me is you guys talked about on the episode this McDonald's advertisement that felt kind of like a shock in the nineties of this is a big deal.

他们接受信用卡。

They accept credit cards.

我有时在想，我们在B2B领域是否也正处在同样的阶段：企业们才刚刚意识到，要在2023年保持竞争力、赢得业务，并让自己的客户支付流程尽可能简便，就必须接受信用卡付款。

I wonder sometimes if we're in the same place in that journey on the b two b side of businesses just starting to realize that I've gotta accept credit card payments in 2023 to be able to stay competitive and win business and make my process of accepting customers as easy as possible relative to my competitor.

因此，许多服务行业正因此开始采用信用卡支付，而Visa正紧随其后，确保自己能抓住这一机遇。

So I think a lot of the services industries are starting to adopt credit card payments as a result, and Visa is right there making sure they are ready to capture it.

我从未想过我们是否应该让收购方为我们的赞助商接受信用卡付款。

It's never crossed my mind of should acquired accept credit card payments for our sponsors.

但，也许吧。

But, like, maybe.

我不确定。

I don't know.

也许我们正朝着这样一个方向前进。

Maybe that's a world that we're heading towards.

如果费用足够低的话。

If the fees were low enough.

我的意思是，这是一个有趣的现象：如果消费者在商家之间存在真正的竞争，那么Visa应该大幅降低商户服务费，以推动ACH支付转向信用卡支付。

I mean, it's one of these interesting things where if there is real competition for a consumer between merchants, then Visa should massively lower the MDR so that they can shift ACH payments to card payments.

但当没有竞争时，比如我搬进一栋公寓楼，我并不会因为谁允许我使用信用卡、谁要求我输入银行信息而选择搬进哪栋楼。

But when there's not competition, like, let's say I move into a apartment building, I'm not making the decision on which apartment building to move into based on who's gonna let me use a credit card versus who's gonna require me to enter my bank information.

如果我是公寓楼的房东，几乎没有什么能迫使我去接受信用卡支付。

If I'm that apartment building owner, there's almost nothing that you can do to compel me to take credit cards.

阻碍这种增长，但这个领域似乎很难真正产生实质性改变。

Push back on that growth, but that feels like a hard category to ever actually move the needle on.

我同意你对B2B领域更兴奋，而对突破消费领域中那些看似无法突破的类别（如租金支付）则持较低期待。

I agree with your higher excitement on the b two b side and lower excitement on cracking some categories within consumer that have seemed uncrackable, like rental payments.

目前租金支付领域正在发生的变化，与你刚才说的并不完全一致；我们开始看到的新趋势，并不是个体房东说‘我要接受信用卡’。

The way it's starting to happen in rental payments is less of what you just said though in the so the emerging properties we're starting to see are not individual landlord saying, hey, I'm gonna accept cards.

这位个体房东仍然会继续使用Venmo、支票或现金，就像他们今天非正式做法那样。

That individual landlord is still gonna take Venmo or check or cash, whatever it might be that they're doing informally today.

这更多发生在物业管理层面。

It's happening more on the property management side.

这些大规模运营的公司正试图将业务正规化，因此更容易考虑将所有支付方式数字化，而不是仅仅接受现金或非正式支付方式。

So these companies operating at scale that are trying to formalize their business, it's much easier to think about digitizing all of your payments versus just accepting cash or informal payment methods.

这并不是说它们自己承担了所有的信用卡费用。

And it's not to say that they're accepting all the credit card fees themselves.

在大多数情况下，它们实际上会将大部分费用转嫁给用户。

They actually do pass on a lot of the fees in most of these instances to the user.

因此，它们在结账时让用户承担费用。

So they have the user at checkout.

这感觉有点像电子商务体验。

Again, it's kinda feels like an ecommerce experience.

Equity Residential 是一家正在这样做物业管理软件公司的良好例子。

Equity Residential is a good example of a property management software company doing this.

它们在结账时会向消费者提供支付费用的选项，你会对用户接受这一方式的比例感到惊讶。

They at checkout will offer the consumer the option to pay for fees, and you'd be surprised at the uptake rate of users buying into this.

我提到的一个趋势是，像Visa和Mastercard这样的公司正在与初创企业合作。

And one of the trends I was referring to is people like Visa and Mastercard working with startups.

有一个叫Built的公司表示：当然，用户你支付了费用，但让我们用这笔费用的返利形式回馈给你。

There's one called Built out there that are saying, sure, user, you're paying a fee, but let us give you rewards back in the version of that fee.

在某些情况下，我们甚至可以与物业管理方合作，利用用户因支付更便捷而愿意入住此楼宇所带来的转化率提升，从而创造另一个价值池。

And maybe in some cases, we can even partner with the property manager to get another value pool of what is now increased conversion from users feeling like it's easier to pay and live at this building.

因此，这仅仅是行业的一小部分，但我试图解释一些叙事，说明它们如何可能突破那些迄今难以进入的新市场。

So that's, again, small portion of the industry, but I'm trying to explain narratives as to where they could crack into new markets that they've just had a tough time cracking into so far.

所以，当我们在这里讨论B2B支付、租金支付、细分消费者用例、ACH和银行系统与信用卡网络时。

So, you know, as we're talking here about b to b payments and about rental payments and niche consumer use cases and ACH and banking versus credit card networks.

这自然让我想到一个巨大的问题，至少对初创企业和风投而言：是否有可能出现一个具有强大全球网络效应的竞争对手？

This, of course, takes my mind to the really big question out there, at least for startups and VCs of, like, is there any potential that a competitive, you know, very large global network effects payment network could emerge out there?

一个真正能与Visa和Mastercard双头垄断抗衡的支付网络？

Like a true competitor to the Visa and Mastercard duopoly.

长期以来，很多人都在讨论这个问题。

And lots of people have talked about this for a long time.

我们在Visa的那期节目中花了大量时间讨论这个问题。

We spent a lot of time on this on our Visa episode.

这种情况真的有可能发生吗？

Is there any path that this could actually happen?

是的。

Yeah.

正如我们一直反复讨论的，这似乎是一个艰巨的任务。

It seems like a tall task as we've kinda keep circling around.

Visa和Mastercard似乎已经根深蒂固，并且非常擅长保护自己的地位。

It just feels like Visa and Mastercard are so entrenched and do such a good job protecting their positions.

但话虽如此，我觉得探讨一下谁可能开始抢占市场份额还是挺有趣的——也许不是直接击垮它们，用我以前的说法，而是找到一些机会缺口。

But all that said, I think it's fun to go through the theoretical exercise of who could start to take away share, so maybe not cut them off at the knees, to use my old language, but find pockets of opportunity.

总的来说，我想到两个领域。

Broadly, I think about two areas.

你们提到的第一个领域是：目前有哪些处理商已经在这项业务中占有一席之地？

The first area you guys touched on, so who are the processors out there already that have one foot in the door on this business?

要取代Visa作为处理商，需要什么条件？

What does it take to displace Visa as a processor?

要么在支付接受端实现大规模，要么在消费者端实现大规模。

It's either really large scale on the payment acceptance side or it's really large scale on the consumer side.

有几家公司的名字，PayPal、Shopify，你们在这一集里好像没提到。

And there's a few names, PayPal, Shopify, you guys didn't mention, I don't think on the episode.

Stripe推出了Stripe Link，Square你们肯定提到了。

Stripe launched Stripe Link, Square, you definitely mentioned.

所以也许我们可以逐一分析这四家公司，PayPal是第一个真正的威胁。

So maybe to tick through each of those four, like PayPal is the first legitimate threat here.

他们已经证明了，是的，我们可以将一部分支付处理业务引导至用户的银行账户或PayPal钱包，而不是通过卡片。

And they showed that, yes, we can take some share of our payment processing and direct it to a user's bank account or their PayPal wallet instead of a card.

目前还不清楚这种趋势是否会进一步扩大市场份额，但至少这意味着他们可以在一批不经过Visa的交易中保留全部支付处理利润。

It's not clear that that is ever gonna increase share from here, but it certainly means they can keep the entire payment processing spread on a select number of transactions that don't go through Visa.

因此，他们至少证明了这是可能的。

So they at least proved it was possible.

我认为Shopify在形态上最接近PayPal，但在我看来，它的体验要好得多。

I think Shopify is probably the most similar in form factor to PayPal, but a way better experience in my mind.

我猜测，Shop Pay占Shopify总GMV的百分比，远高于PayPal钱包占Braintree在线处理总量的百分比。

My guess is that Shop Pay is a way higher percentage of total Shopify GMV than PayPal wallet is of entire Braintree processing online.

你可以设想一种情况：随着Shop Pay推出了奖励机制，即这种返现概念，他们可以将你的五个默认支付方式之一设为银行账户，并每次默认使用它，同时提供一定比例的奖励，鼓励你使用银行账户支付。

And you could see a world where Shop Pay, now that they have rewards, this rewards cash concept, they make one of your five default payment methods your bank account and default to that each time and offer you some percentage of rewards to go pay with bank account.

这将是另一个类似PayPal的典型案例。

That would be another example that comes to mind, similar to PayPal.

在Square方面，他们在消费者端的实力要强得多。

On the Square side of things, they're way stronger on the consumer end.

他们拥有5000万月活跃用户，这在当今市场是一个惊人的数字。

They've got 50,000,000 MAUs, which is an incredible number of MAUs to have in today's market.

但在支付受理端，我认为尽管Square每年在Square终端上的处理量达到数百亿美元，但这些客户大多是小型企业，要改变用户行为并不容易。

On the processing side, the payment acceptance side though, I do think while they have a couple 100,000,000,000 of processing volume every year on Square terminals, those are still really small businesses and it's hard to change user behavior that way.

所以，是的，当我去咖啡店时，我可以扫描Cash App的二维码，这是一种极其快捷的体验，能够绕过Visa和MasterCard。

So yes, when I go to my coffee shop, I can scan the Cash App QR code and it's an amazingly fast experience that does bypass Visa and MasterCard.

但除非你看到一些大型商户，否则很难看到这个故事真正展开。

But until I think you get some big, big merchants, it's hard to just see that story play out.

积极的一面是，他们收购了Afterpay，而且杰克花了很多时间在Afterpay本身上，他们找到了一种非常好的方式，将它整合进网络，使得我刚才提到的咖啡店扫描Cash App二维码的体验，也能在任何接受Afterpay的地方出现。

The positive narrative there would be they bought Afterpay, and Jack is spending a lot of time, he says, on Afterpay itself, that they find a really good way to integrate that into the network such that that same coffee shop scan the Cash App QR code experience I just mentioned starts to show up anywhere Afterpay is accepted to.

这无疑会给他们带来巨大助力。

That would be certainly a boon in their direction.

对于像Square这样拥有消费者端市场但尚未大规模覆盖终端端的公司来说，它们目前只服务这些小型商户，那么它们是否应该收购Verifone或类似公司，从而让Cash App支付也能在这些大型商户中使用呢？

Would the natural play for someone like Square who has the consumer side of the marketplace but not the terminal side of the marketplace at scale at least, they've got only these sort of small merchants, should they go buy Verifone or someone like that and then enable the pay with Cash App on, you know, these huge merchants also?

是的，这是个有趣的想法。

Yeah, that's an interesting thought.

所以，任何带有屏幕的终端设备，本质上都可以开始显示Cash App的二维码，这大概就是你的意思吧。

So any terminal with the screen effectively, they can start to put the Cash App QR code is kind of where you're going with that.

没错。

Right.

当然，商户需要主动选择接入，而且这还必须对他们有经济上的吸引力。

And of course, the merchants would have to opt in, and of course, it would have to make economic sense for them.

但你可以想象，商家会对这个感到非常兴奋。

But you can imagine, the merchants would be really excited about this.

哇。

Wow.

就像有5000万消费者可以使用的快速支付通道，而我不必支付全额商户折扣？

Just as fast payment rails that 50,000,000 consumers have access to and I don't have to pay the full merchant discount on?

这听起来太棒了。

This sounds amazing.

完全正确。

Totally.

我认为值得指出的是，这可能是你名单上最大的竞争对手苹果公司最直接能做的事情。

And I think it's worth calling out, this is probably the most direct thing that Apple, the biggest competitor on your list, could probably do.

所以我认为你们两人在节目结尾达成了共识，即苹果需要要么成为一家银行，要么克服某些合规制度，才能完成交易闭环。

So I think the two of you ended your episode with the understanding that Apple had a tall task of needing to either be a bank or overcome some compliance regime to be able to close the loop on the transaction.

实际上，我不确定这个门槛有那么高。

I actually am not sure the bar is that high.

所以，他们拥有所有这些用户，而且顺便说一句，这些是最有价值的用户。

So again, they've got all the users out there, and they're, by the way, the highest value users.

对吧？

Right?

想想每一个同时在 Google Play 商店和 iOS 上发布的应用。

Just think about every app that launches on both Google Play Store and iOS.

大部分价值都来自 iOS 用户。

Most of the value comes from the iOS users.

所以他们拥有的正是这些合适的用户，而且你已经可以完成交易闭环了，但苹果却从不提及这一点。

So these are the right users that they've got, and already you can close the loop, but Apple doesn't talk about this.

所以，如果你要用 Apple Pay 支付，而 Apple Pay 现在已经遍布整个网络，是的，你的卡片会作为支付选项之一弹出，但你的 Apple Cash 钱包也是其中一个选项。

So if you are going to pay with Apple Pay, which is splattered all over the web at this point, yes, your cards pop up is one of the things you can choose to pay with Apple Pay, but your Apple Cash Wallet is also one of those options.

我猜，你们俩中有谁经常使用 Apple Cash 钱包吗？

My guess is, do either of you use your Apple Cash Wallet frequently?

没有。

No.

没有。

No.

那是因为我们三个人不够潮。

That's because the three of us are not cool.

我们现在不是年轻高中生了。

We're not young high schoolers at this moment in time.

但如果你现在去调查高中生群体，Apple Cash 已经超越 Cash App，成为这一群体中排名第一的点对点支付应用。

But if you go survey high school users at this moment in time, Apple Cash has surpassed Cash App as the number one peer to peer app for this population.

因此，当我思考人们会在不知不觉中自然完成闭环的机会时，这对我来说就是一个机会。

And so as I think about opportunities of where people are going to naturally start closing the loop without thinking that they're closing the loop, that feels like one opportunity to me.

这只是线上方面。

And that's just the online side.

至于线下方面，我提到这一点是因为在我心目中，这就像 Verifone 的例子。

For the offline side, the reason I brought this up is because that's kind of the Verifone example in my mind.

如果有人有能力在谈判桌上强势出击，苹果难道不能去和每一个现有的支付处理器合作，说：‘请把我添加为你们核心处理器的支付网络之一’吗？

Couldn't Apple, if anybody has the scale to play hard at the negotiating table, couldn't Apple go work with each of the payment processors that work out there and say, yes, add me as a network with your core processors?

这看起来像是一个值得思考的结果，而他们并不需要成为银行或某种合规体系。

That feels like an outcome that is worth thinking about without them needing to be a bank or some kind of compliance regime.

因此，高中生正在使用苹果现金作为他们的点对点钱包，因此他们经常在其中存储余额。

And so high schoolers are using Apple Cash as their peer to peer wallet, therefore, they constantly have balances stored in there.

这几乎就像银行账户的延伸。

It's almost like an extension of a bank account.

所以对他们来说，这将是自然而然的下一步，而我们三个人却从未在其中保留余额。

And so it would be a natural next step for them, unlike us, the three of us who never have balances in there.

当他们在结账时点击苹果支付，他们会看到自己的现金余额，并开始将其作为默认的支付方式。

When they click Apple Pay at checkout, they see their cash balance right there and they start selecting that as a de facto way to go pay.

因此，在某些方面，这已经是一种闭环的雏形。

So in some ways, it's already a version of closing the loop.

好的。

Okay.

所以我们正在讨论这个有趣的苹果场景。

So we're talking about this interesting Apple scenario.

他们在这里能做什么？

What could they do here?

所以，高拉夫，你刚才提出的建议，我认为和苹果支付现在的做法不同。

So, Gaurav, what you were proposing a minute ago is different, I think, than what Apple Pay does now.

他们现在的做法是，在每笔交易上加收10到15个基点，并说：我不关心这笔交易如何路由，我们都能从中赚一点好处费。

So what they do now is they throw, what is it, 10 basis points or 15 basis points on top of every transaction and say, I don't really care how this transaction routes, we get a little spiff on top.

因此，使用苹果支付时，交易成本会稍微高一点。

So it's a little bit more expensive a transaction when you use Apple Pay.

而你刚才所建议的是：如果他们建立一个与维萨并行的独立网络，直接说：我们不通过维萨网络处理，而是用自己的网络处理。

And what you were sort of proposing there is, what if they bootstrap another parallel network to Visa, and they say, well, rather than running it over the Visa network, we're gonna run it over our own network.

维萨是如何通过激励和约束手段，让商家继续使用其网络而非其他支付方式的？

How does Visa think about sort of carrots and sticks that it has with merchants to keep transactions running over their network versus alternative payment methods?

我认为，这里的源头很可能是各个网络所合作的收单终端或处理机构，因为苹果必须获得它们的批准才能推进这一流程。

I think the source here would likely have to be the processing terminals or the processors that each of the networks are working with, because that is who Apple would have to go to to get approval in this process.

而且这类机构并不多。

And there are not a lot of them.

目前这个市场已经相当集中了。

This is a pretty consolidated market at this point.

完全正确。

Exactly right.

完全正确。

Exactly right.

所以当只有少数几家时，你可以想象，他们今天的大部分业务都是来自Visa。

So when there's a few, and you can imagine, most of their business today is Visa.

Visa威胁说：如果你与苹果合作，我就不再与你合作。

Visa's threatening, Hey, if you work with Apple, I would not work with you.

这将是他们可以施加给市场的明显惩罚手段。

That would be the obvious stick that they can go apply to the market.

美国司法部很可能会对此提出很多意见。

That the DOJ would likely have a lot to say about.

没错。

Exactly.

Visa告诉Verifone，他们不能接受其他支付方式。

Visa tells Verifone they can't accept alternative payments.

没错。

Exactly.

而且，我们正在进入两到三层的假设：如果苹果进入市场，然后Visa做出反应，所以目前这一切都只是有趣的推测，但接下来的诱因是：苹果进入市场后将收取1%的手续费，我们是否第一次降低MDR以匹配这个费率？

And look, we're getting into two or three layers of hypotheticals if Apple entered and then if Visa responded, so this is all fun storytelling at this moment, but the carrot then is, okay, Apple's come into the market and they're gonna charge 1% fee, do we, for the first time, lower MDR to match that?

我们仍然会保留Visa在MDR中的份额，但银行会说：抱歉，你必须接受，否则你将从苹果那里获得零份额。

We're still gonna keep our Visa share of MDR, but banks like, sorry, you gotta deal with it, because otherwise you're gonna get zero from Apple.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

想想这件事真是令人着迷。

It's fascinating to think about.

而且这几乎让人感觉，这个领域迟早会发生一些变化，因为正如我们之前讨论的那样，钱包以及哪张卡位于钱包顶部的概念，现在已变得不再重要，因为在许多情况下，你的手机已经成为支付方式。

And it almost does feel like an inevitability that something in this area will happen because as you and I have talked about in previous conversations, the wallet and the notion of what card is at the top of your wallet is so much less relevant now now that your phone in many cases is the payment method.

我不太在意用的是哪张卡，或者走的是哪个支付通道。

Like, I don't care often, like, what card gets used or what rails it goes over.

我只关心我会把手机靠近你的小设备，我知道在后疫情时代，这笔交易一定会成功完成。

All I care about is I'm gonna hold my phone up to your little thing, and I know in a post COVID world that the transaction's gonna complete.

那么，在整个交易链条中，谁才是真正提供价值的呢？

And so like, who is providing value in in the whole chain of the transaction here?

很多情况下，现在提供价值的是终端设备和手机公司。

Like a lot of who is providing value is now the terminal and the phone company.

说得太好了。

That's so well said.

换个说法，这就是一种抽象化的用户体验。

It's an abstracted user experience is another way of saying that.

对吧？

Right?

当你用手机支付时，你的所有卡片之上其实多了一层抽象层。

There's an abstraction layer above all of your cards when you're paying with your phone.

我认为，顺便说一句，这也让像我这样的奖励爱好者更容易持续优化，总是选择最适合每笔交易的卡片。

I think that's also, by the way, what would make it easier for a rewards nerd like me to constantly optimize, right, and always be choosing the best card for the best transaction.

事实上，有一些初创公司正是基于这一价值主张开展业务。

In fact, there are some startups out there that specifically lean into that value prop.

它们说：总是用我们的卡支付，我们会将交易自动转到你提供给我们的最佳卡片上。

They say, always pay with our card, and we're gonna reroute the transaction to your best card that you send to us.

哇。

Wow.

所以你可以像这样使用代理卡片吗？

So you can do, like, proxy cards like that?

是的。

Yeah.

它们的商业模式是：对于任何你没有比我们卡片更好奖励方案的交易，我们就自己保留这些交易。

And the business model there is for anything where you don't have a better rewards proposition than our card, we get to keep those transactions for ourselves.

快捷。

Fast.

这简直是完美的过渡。

This is the perfect transition.

我们一直在‘Visa、Mastercard的潜在竞争对手’这一部分进行讨论。

We've been talking in this potential competitors to Visa, Mastercard section.

我们谈到了所有这些大公司，比如苹果、Stripe、Square、Shopify等等。

We've been talking about all these big companies, you know, Apple, Stripe, Square, Shopify, etcetera.

这些都很好，但我们都是私人公司投资者。

That's all well and good, but, like, we're all private company investors here.

让我们聊聊初创公司吧。

Let's talk about, like, startups.

有没有什么突破口？

Is there a vector?

我的意思是，你在这个领域做了这么多工作。

Do you think I mean, you do so much work in this space.

是否存在一个终极目标，让一家新的公司或新的网络能够赢得胜利？

Is there a vector that there really is, like, a the ultimate prize here that a new company, that a new network could win?

天啊。

Gosh.

我回到故事的开端。

I go back to the beginning of the story.

还记得整个旅程最初是从支付网络开始的吗？

Remember how this entire journey started with payment networks?

这一切都要追溯到大莱俱乐部。

It all dates back to the diners club.

正如你在节目中出色指出的那样，大莱俱乐部实际上无法横向扩展。

And the diners club, as you so well highlighted in your episode, doesn't really scale horizontally.

因此，这为美洲银行卡铺平了道路，使其成为一种可以在任何地方使用的横向网络，而不仅限于餐厅。

And as a result, that's what paved the way for BankAmericard to be this horizontal network that could work anywhere, not just at restaurants.

但我非常喜欢大莱俱乐部叙事中的核心理念：在纽约的餐饮行业里，网络效应就这样自然产生了，我认为这是一个非常有力的洞察。

But I love the kernel from the Diners Club narrative that there was this network effect that emerged in just the restaurant industry in New York, and I think that's such a powerful insight.

所以，大莱俱乐部最初首次推出时，只在一家餐厅上线。

So Diners Club in its very first instance was launched at one restaurant.

那家餐厅有200名用户，他们是那个时代的‘广告狂人’，在纽约市外出享用美味佳肴。

That one restaurant had 200 users that were, think the mad men of their days, going out in New York City, having great meals.

他们可能不仅仅在一家餐厅消费，而是会去多家餐厅。

And they probably didn't just shop at one restaurant, they probably went to multiple.

这意味着纽约市的其他高档餐厅也希望能接触到这些用户。

And what that means is the other high end restaurants in New York City also wanted access to those users.

这些用户已经拥有Diners Club卡，因此其他餐厅更有可能加入Diners Club网络。

Those users already had a Diners Club card, so those next restaurants are more likely to want to join the Diners Club network.

一年后，他们拥有了27家餐厅，而不仅仅是一家。

So after a year, they had 27 restaurants, not just the one.

这27家餐厅吸引了47,000名持卡人，以此类推。

Those 27 restaurants now attracted 47,000 cardholders and so on and so forth.

你逐渐看到这种良性循环开始形成。

You kind of saw this virtuous cycle emerge.

十年后，Diners Club卡在该网络上拥有一百万用户。

After a decade, Diners Club card had a million users on the network.

因此，由于众多原因，这个业务并没有真正成功，这就是为什么维萨和BankAmericard最终取而代之。

And so for so many reasons, the business didn't really work, and that's why Visa and BankAmericard took over.

但这个核心理念很有趣，因为每个行业都有这种核心用户动态，而我确实一直在此类领域进行投资。

But but but that kernel is interesting because every industry has this power user dynamic, and it's certainly one that I've invested behind.

我热衷于研究世界各个角落，了解那些消费最高、对该行业最忠诚的用户是如何运作的，以及他们具体的需求是什么。

I love studying different corners of the world and understanding how the highest spenders, the most loyal users of that industry really operate and what their specific needs are.

你放眼望去，到处都能看到这种现象。

You can look everywhere and you see it.

在移动游戏领域，前6%的用户贡献了所有移动游戏消费的88%。

So in mobile gaming, the top 6% of users are 88% of all mobile gaming spend.

在医疗行业，我认为大约10%的患者占据了所有医疗支出的78%。

In healthcare, I think it's something crazy like 10% of patients are 78% of all patient expenses.

在其他行业也是如此，比如货运用户、大麻购买者、奢侈品服饰消费者。

And the list goes on in other industries trucking users, cannabis purchasers, luxury apparel shoppers.

这些行业中的每一个都有具备特定需求的核心用户。

There are power users in every one of these industries that have specific needs.

为了更具体地说明这些需求，以医疗行业为例，如果你需要进行一笔大额交易，可能不仅仅是刷一张Visa卡那么简单。

And just to make those specific needs really tangible, take healthcare as an example, If you have a large transaction you got to make, it's probably not as simple as just paying with your Visa card.

它可能更加复杂。

It's probably more complex.

你必须使用你的健康储蓄账户（HSA）或灵活支出账户（FSA）。

You've got to use your HSA or your FSA account.

这其中显然涉及保险理赔。

There's obviously insurance billing involved in that.

而对于高客单价的交易，你还得提供‘先买后付’选项。

And then you've even got for high AOV transactions, you've got to have buy now pay later.

在结账时，或者相当于结账的环节，你必须提供某种分期付款贷款选项。

You've got to have some sort of installment loan option at checkout or the equivalent of checkout.

当然，你可能会说医疗行业太复杂了，当然那里情况不同，但就连大麻行业也是如此。

And sure, you can maybe say healthcare is too complex an industry, of course it's different there, but even look at cannabis.

大麻行业有监管要求，在大多数州，每次你在药房购买时，都需要出示驾照，以证明你不是非法购买这种大麻产品的人。

There's regulatory needs in cannabis, and every time you make a purchase at a dispensary, you need to show your driver's license in most states and prove that you're not an illegal buyer of this cannabis product.

移动游戏没有监管要求，但这家移动游戏公司希望根据你的游戏水平、在游戏中的停留时间、达到的等级，以不同的价格向你奖励或出售物品和金币、宝石。

Mobile gaming, no regulatory requirements, but that mobile game company wants to reward you or sell you items and sell you those coins or gems as packages at different rates depending on how good of a player you are, how many minutes you spend in the game, what level you achieved.

因此，针对特定行业的结账方式为这些处理支付的垂直领域公司创造了机遇。

And so the vertical specific nature of checkout introduces opportunities for these vertical companies who process payments to emerge.

当我思考创业机会时，每个机会可能都有一些特定领域，可以像PayPal展示的那样，针对某些特定的高价值用户群体——尽管这些用户可能只是极少数。

And as I think about startup opportunities, each of them probably have pockets of areas they can start to do what PayPal showed as possible, which is for certain pockets of the power users, which might be a very small end of users.

如果我能提供激励，让他们绑定银行账户，我就能自己保留全部3%的差价。

If I can give them an incentive to link their bank account, I can actually keep the entire 3% spread for myself.

这就是游戏的名称。

That's the name of the game.

虽然我不认为这是击败Visa的策略，但这确实是一个非常棒的机会，我对此充满热情，也看到许多创始人正在积极追求。

And while I don't think that's the strategy to go take down Visa, it is this really great opportunity that I know I'm excited about and see a lot of our founders going after as well.

这很有趣。

It's funny.

看衰Visa的理由并不是有人会直接抢走Visa的全部业务。

The bear case on Visa is not that someone is going to come in and take all of Visa's lunch.

这些垂直和利基机会，如果世界保持简单、技术没有发展到今天这个程度，本可以被它们占据，但现在却被一群碎片化的专业玩家蚕食了。

It's that a lot of these vertical and niche opportunities that they could have taken if the world had stayed a simpler place and technology had not progressed this far, get eaten away by a fragmented set of little specialized players.

没错。

Exactly.

对吧？

Right?

Diners Club 最初就是一个垂直用例，因为当时根本不存在其他选择；而后来，Visa 的标准化协议和统一的会计方法席卷了全球所有领域。但技术实际上让垂直化再次变得更容易，使支付流程能更贴合每种具体场景。

The Diners Club was this vertical use case to start because nothing existed before then, and then the standardized protocol of Visa and a standardized accounting method took over for everything everywhere, but technology has actually made it easier to verticalize again and make checkout more specific to each use case.

这是个很好的观点。

That's a great point.

尤其是医疗保健这个例子，正如你所说，那里有各种监管问题。

Particularly like the healthcare example, and as as you say, there's all sorts of regulatory stuff there.

所以，也许可能，也许不可能，但我知道，在我过去几年的经历中，仅在珍妮的案例里，就能想到三四个例子——那些金额巨大、支付来源多样、并非我们主动选择、却不得不如此的场景，尤其是在经历辅助生育的时候。

So like maybe it's possible, maybe it's not, but you know, I can think of three or four examples just in, Jenny, in my own history over the past few years where you have enormous transactions, multiple diverse payment sources, all sorts of not because we wanted it that way, but it just had to be that way, particularly when you're going through fertility.

我的意思是，那是一笔高达304万美元的交易，涉及众多相关方。

I mean, that was a $3,040,000 dollar, you know, transaction with so many parties involved.