汉密尔顿·赫尔默的7大力量法则

就像百视达当年说的：'我们可有这么多实体店呢'。

I mean, Blockbuster's saying, oh, you know, we got all these stores.

对吧？

You know?

人们很喜欢它。

People love it.

他们进来。

They come in.

他们可以浏览。

They can browse.

这有什么问题吗？

What's wrong with that?

想到有人用这种粗放的方式群发红色信封邮件，他们会说，这算什么玩意儿？

And the idea of somebody doing this rough and ready group sending out red envelopes in the mail, they'd say, what the hell?

你懂吗？

You know?

这根本行不通。

This is just not going anywhere.

所以他们存在严重的认知偏差，认为自己的模式是有效的。

So they're very cognitively biased towards thinking that their model works.

此外还存在代理问题，经济学家称之为代理问题，即企业控制者的利益可能与企业的长期利益不一致。

And then there are also agency issues, what economists call agency issues, which means that the person who controls the business may not have interest aligned with the long term interest of the business.

例如，CEO的薪酬通常与当年或未来几年的业绩挂钩。

So for example, CEO comp is often about this year's performance or the next few years performance.

所以为了四年后才能实现的收益去打破现状，你可能会说，我不想趟这浑水。

So to upset the apple cart for a gain that will happen four years out, you may say, you know, I just don't wanna go there.

显然对初创企业而言，逆向定位可能很有效，Netflix就是个绝佳案例。

Obviously for startups, counter positioning can be great and Netflix is a fantastic example.

但还记得多年前比尔·格尔利写过一篇博客，那时安卓系统刚开始崛起。

But even remembering a blog post, Bill Gurley wrote a number of years ago in the beginning of when Android was starting to take off.

我记得标题是《低于免费：史上最具颠覆性的商业模式》。

And I think the title of it was less than free, the most disruptive business model ever.

要知道，你们用的是安卓系统，它的成本比免费还低。

Know, you had Android, which cost less than free.

如果你是手机制造商，他们会付钱让你在手机上安装安卓系统，而诺基亚则试图通过销售自己的系统来赚钱。

They would pay you to use it if you're a handset manufacturer to put it on your phones versus Nokia that's trying to make money or sell their stuff.

即使是谷歌，因为他们有独立的商业模式

Even as Google, because they had the separate business model of

搜索业务，使他们能够以完全相反的商业模式进入这个相邻市场。

search, they're able to enter this adjacent market with a completely counter positioned business model.

汉密尔顿，读过《创新者的窘境》的听众会觉得这听起来似曾相识。

Hamilton, listeners who have read The Innovator's Dilemma, this is gonna sound vaguely familiar.

这种力量与书中的概念最为相似。

This would be the power that's most similar to that concept.

就像我们之前问过的，力量与护城河有什么区别？

And the same way that we asked earlier, what's the difference between power and moat?

你如何看待反定位与那种宏大理论的关系？

How do you think about counter positioning relative to that sort of grand theory?

我建议大家读一读《创新者的窘境》这本书。

I recommend everybody to read that book Innovator's Dilemma.

这是一本杰出的著作。

It's a brilliant book.

克里斯滕森是创新领域的学者，研究深入，但两者差异很大。

Christensen was just a scholar of innovation and deeply researched, but it's pretty different.

如果想用数学方式理解，这两个概念之间存在多对多的映射关系，也就是说反定位并不意味着颠覆性技术，颠覆性技术也不意味着反定位。

So if you wanna get sort of mathematical about it, there's a many to many mapping between the two concepts, which is to say that counter positioning doesn't imply disruptive technology and disruptive technology doesn't imply counter position.

举几个例子。

Give you some examples.

我认为In-N-Out汉堡就是对麦当劳的反定位。

So I would argue that In N Out Burger's is counter position against McDonald's.

这完全没有任何技术含量。

There's no technology involved particularly at all.

而且按照克里斯坦森的低端颠覆理论，它并不具有颠覆性。

And it's not disruptive in terms of Christensen's philosophy as low end.

你知道，

You know,

这就像是一个客观上更差的产品。

this is like a objectively worse product.

是的。

Yeah.

所以你要回到克里斯坦森最初那本更有趣的书，里面描述的产品无法完全满足所有人需求。

So you're going back to Christensen's original book, which I think is the more interesting one, where there's a product that kinda doesn't satisfy everybody.

我的意思是，你可以说特斯拉最早的汽车就是那样。

I mean, you could argue that Tesla's first cars were like that.

另一个方向是，如果某项技术具有颠覆性，它可能不会被反向定位。

The other direction is that if something is a disruptive technology, it may not be counter positioned.

所以这很直接。

So that's straightforward.

而且它们之间不存在映射关系，以及权力直接对应价值或权力与价值之间存在一一映射的事实，意味着颠覆性技术与价值无关。

And and the fact that they don't map to each other and the fact that power maps directly to value or there's a one to one mapping between power and value means that disruptive technology does not map to value.

简单来说就是，你可以颠覆某个领域，但这可能是个非常糟糕的生意。

And the simple thing about that is you can disrupt something, and it can be a really lousy business.

这种情况经常发生。

Happens all the time.

你污染了水源，却得不到好结果。

You poison the well, but there's no good endpoint for it.

我们可能过度引用吉利的话了，但我最近看到一条推文大致说：以90美分价格出售美元的产品市场契合度是无限的。

We may be, overly quoting girly here, but I think I saw a recent tweet, something along the lines of there is an infinite amount of product market fit for selling dollars for 90¢.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

所以仅仅为了吸引人们而定价导致亏损，这种做法毫无力量可言。

So just pricing something so that people are attracted to it and losing money, there's no power there.

现在正是感谢节目好友ServiceNow的好时机。

Now is a great time to thank good friend of the show, ServiceNow.

我们曾向听众讲述过ServiceNow惊人的起源故事，以及他们如何成为过去十年表现最佳的公司之一，但听众对ServiceNow实际业务仍存疑问。

We have talked to listeners about ServiceNow's amazing origin story and how they've been one of the best performing companies the last decade, but we've gotten some questions from listeners about what ServiceNow actually does.

今天我们就来解答这个问题。

So today, we are gonna answer that question.

首先，近期媒体常用一个说法：ServiceNow是企业级的'AI操作系统'。

Well, to start, a phrase that has been used often here recently in the press is that ServiceNow is the, quote, unquote, AI operating system for the enterprise.

具体来说，ServiceNow二十二年前创立时仅专注于自动化。

But to make that more concrete, ServiceNow started twenty two years ago focused simply on automation.

他们最初将实体文书工作转化为软件流程，服务于企业内部的IT部门。

They turned physical paperwork into software workflows initially for the IT department within enterprises.

仅此而已。

That was it.

随着时间推移，他们在这个平台上构建了更强大复杂的任务处理能力。

And over time, they built on this platform going to more powerful and complex tasks.

服务范围从IT部门扩展到人力资源、财务、客户服务、现场运营等其他部门。

They were expanding from serving just IT to other departments like HR, finance, customer service, field operations, and more.

在过去二十年间，ServiceNow已完成了连接企业各个角落所需的所有基础工作，为自动化实施铺平了道路。

In the process over the last two decades, ServiceNow has laid all the tedious groundwork necessary to connect every corner of the enterprise and enable automation to happen.

当人工智能出现时，从定义上讲，AI本质上就是高度复杂的任务自动化。

So when AI arrived, well, AI kinda just by definition is massively sophisticated task automation.

而谁已经构建了平台和企业间的连接架构来实现这种自动化？

And who had already built the platform and the connective tissue with enterprises to enable that automation?

ServiceNow。

ServiceNow.

那么回答这个问题：ServiceNow如今是做什么的？

So to answer the question, what does ServiceNow do today?

他们说连接并赋能每个部门时，是认真的。

We mean it when they say they connect and power every department.

IT和人力资源部门用它来管理全公司的人员、设备和软件许可证。

IT and HR use it to manage people, devices, software licenses across the company.

客户服务部门使用ServiceNow来检测支付失败等问题，并将其路由到内部正确的团队或流程来解决。

Customer service uses ServiceNow for things like detecting payment failures and routing to the right team or process internally to solve it.

供应链组织用它进行产能规划，整合其他部门的数据和计划，确保所有人信息同步。

Or the supply chain org uses it for capacity planning, integrating with data and plans from other departments to ensure that everybody's on the same page.

不再需要在不同应用间切换，重复输入相同数据。

No more swivel chairing between apps to enter the same data multiple times in different places.

就在最近，ServiceNow推出了AI代理，任何岗位的员工都能创建AI代理来处理繁琐事务，让人专注于大局工作。

And just recently, ServiceNow launched AI agents so that anyone working in any job can spin up an AI agent to handle the tedious stuff, freeing up humans for bigger picture work.

ServiceNow去年入选《财富》全球最受赞赏公司榜单和《快公司》最佳创新者工作场所，正是因为这一愿景。

ServiceNow was named to Fortune's world's most admired companies list last year and Fast Company's best workplace for innovators last year, and it's because of this vision.

如果你想在企业每个角落都发挥ServiceNow的规模和速度优势，请访问servicenow.com/acquired，告诉他们Ben和

If you wanna take advantage of the scale and speed of ServiceNow in every corner of your business, go to servicenow.com/acquired and just tell them that Ben and

David推荐了你。

David sent you.

谢谢ServiceNow。

Thanks, ServiceNow.

好的。

Okay.

接下来我想讨论的是一个在很多方面都很经典的话题，我想我们的许多听众已经对此思考良多并有所了解，但我们想就其中的一些细微差别请教您的观点——网络效应。

Next one I wanna talk about is in many ways classic, and I think many of our listeners already have thought a lot about this and know, but I we wanna ask your perspective on some nuances of it, network effects.

在硅谷乃至全球范围内都被广泛讨论。

Hugely discussed in Silicon Valley everywhere.

人人都知道网络效应是什么。

Everybody knows what network effects are.

但您在书中提到的一个观点我认为非常准确，而且作为投资者我也观察到：你可以没完没了地讨论网络效应，但真正重要的是网络效应的强度。

But one of the things you talked about in the book that I think is so accurate and I've observed as an investor, you can talk about network effects till the cows come home, but it's the intensity of the network effect that really matters.

而这一点在进入市场前极难预判。

And it is so hard to know that ex ante in a market.

作为网络参与者，我究竟在多大程度上关心网络中的其他参与者？我又有多在意具体是哪些其他参与者？

What is the actual degree to which I care as a participant in the network about other participants in the network, and how much do I care about which other participants?

关键在于它们复杂且难以捉摸。

The key thing about it is that they are complex and hard to figure out.

所以单纯断言只能让你理解真实情况的0.01%。

So just asserting them gets you point o o 1% of the way of understanding what's really going on.

我们在审视投资机会时就见证过这点。

And we've seen that when we look at investment opportunities.

当然，首先要尝试绘制图谱，因为记住：它们并非同质化的。

First place to start, of course, is to try and create a map because remember, they're not homogeneous.

它们不一定是线性的。

They're not necessarily linear.

它们不对称。

They're not symmetrical.

这里举几个例子说明。

So just to give you some examples.

如果把优步看作一个平台的话

So if you think of Uber, this is a platform.

它通过强大的实用性连接司机与乘客，比出租车好得多，极大改善了我们的生活

It connects drivers with passengers with powerful utility, much better than taxis, and it changes my life for the better.

我在温哥华一家初创公司担任董事，那里的出租车行业游说势力很强，不管他们是怎么运作的

I sit on a board of a start up up in Vancouver, and Vancouver taxi lobbies are strong or what or however it's worked.

他们没有这种平台

They don't have it.

所以我开完董事会后

And so I finished my board meeting.

走到路边

I go down to the curb.

他们叫了出租车

They've called the taxi.

我完全不知道车会不会来

I have no idea whether it's coming.

也不知道车在哪里

I have no idea where it is.

最后通常只能放弃，随便找个街角拦出租车

And, eventually, I usually just give up and just go to find some corner to hail a cab.

所以这种平台优势非常明显

And so very powerful benefits.

但优步的网络效应是否能转化为实质性的盈利能力？

But does Uber have power from network effects in a way that will translate into meaningful profitability?

我认为初步判断是否定的，这是我的猜测

I would say first order no would be my guess.

我不是专家，但初步判断，我认为不行

I'm no expert in this, but first order, I'd say no.

原因在于，如果你思考当前状况，就会发现当市场上存在规模相当的竞争对手时——比如Lyft在这个市场或其他市场的存在——他们也能实现类似的网络效应。

And the reason is is if you think about what's going on, it's that if there is a similarly sized or reasonably sized competitor, Lyft, for example, in this market or others in other markets, that they can achieve a similar network effect.

如果你观察区域扩张中的密度经济，我们想说的是这种关系是非线性的。

And if you look at the density economics of as you scale in a region, what we're saying is it's nonlinear.

在某个节点上，增长会趋于平缓。

At some point, it flattens out.

因此如果市场足够大，能让多家公司在那个平缓区间共存，那么这对你就没有帮助。

And so if the market's large enough for more than one company to exist in that flat spot, then it doesn't help you.

所以你必须考量所有这些细微差别。

So you have to look at all those nuances.

但我的书有个独特之处：我一直非常谨慎地确保所有内容都能回溯到价值层面。

But one of the unusual things about my book is I've always tried to be very careful to make sure that everything maps back to value.

如果有人问这本书的基本假设是什么？

So if you said, what is the fundamental assumption of this book?

那就是战略与价值在数学上是互为对偶的。

It's that strategy and value are mathematically their duals.

从用户加入网站的意愿到实际变现能力（这取决于用户停留时长等因素）的映射函数，你必须理解这点才能判断是否存在竞争优势。

And so the mapping function from that desire to join the site versus actually being able to monetize it, which is based on how much time you spend on it and all that kind of stuff, is you have to understand that to understand whether there's power or not.

接下来要讨论的最后一个概念将是我最喜欢的。

The last one we're gonna talk about after this is gonna be my favorite.

但转换成本这个概念让我觉得特别有趣，因为人们通常认为转换成本是传统行业才有的特征。

But switching costs, I thought this was super interesting because people think about switching costs as, I think, tend to be like old school industries or whatnot.

但我意识到很多科技公司也拥有巨大的转换成本优势。

But I realized there's a huge amount of switching cost power in a lot of technology companies too.

以Slack为例。

Take Slack, for instance.

Slack既具有网络效应，也存在转换成本。

Slack has network effects, but also switching costs.

我们用的是Slack。

We run on Slack.

如果要切换平台，对我们组织来说成本会非常高。

If we were to switch, that would be a huge cost to our organization.

你是怎么开始考虑这个问题的？

How did you start thinking about that?

自从你发表这篇文章后，科技界的其他人是否意识到这可能是一个他们未曾考虑过的权力来源？

Have other people in tech since you published this realize, like, oh, this might be a more a source power I'm not thinking about?

我不知道。

I don't know.

我觉得人们之前考虑过这个问题。

I think people had thought about it.

转换成本涉及很多需要仔细考虑的微妙因素。

There are a lot of subtleties around switching costs that you have to think through.

首先，这通常会造成与客户的零和博弈局面。

I mean, one is that in general, it creates a win lose situation with your customer.

因此这里存在一个管理难题。

And so there's sort of a management problem in that.

其次还存在竞争动态——如果你的产品很有吸引力且转换成本高，竞争对手会疯狂尝试开发降低转换成本的方案。

And another is that there's a competitive dynamic, which is if you have something that's attractive and a high switching cost, the competition will try like crazy to create something that mitigates the switching costs.

所以你会看到次级应用配备转换工具，但这些工具往往不够完善。

So you'll see a lesser app have a translator device, but often the imperfection of those.

比如EDA电子设计自动化工具，它们都有配套的元件库。

So if you look at EDA, know, electronic design automation tools, there are libraries that are associated with those.

但当你从一个工具公司转到另一个时，转换效果从来都不理想。

But if you move from one tool company to another, the translation never works very well.

每个CRM系统都会说：把你的数据从Salesforce导出来，我们帮你搞定。

Or every CRM system is like, export your data out of Salesforce, we'll do it for you.

对，完全正确。

Right, exactly.

或者把PowerPoint导出到Google幻灯片，我想这个问题我们可能每周都会遇到。

Or exporting a PowerPoint to Google Slides, a problem that I think all of us probably deal with on a weekly basis.

转换从来都不完美，所以如果是非常重要的演示或其他内容，你就不愿意切换平台。

The translation is never perfect, and thus, if it's a very important presentation or whatever the thing is, you're not willing to switch.

没错。

Right.

但另一个微妙之处在于，记住，只有存在重复的经济互动时，你才能从中获利。

But then another subtlety is that remember, you can only monetize that if there's a repeated economic interaction.

所以你必须购买更多东西。

So you have to buy more stuff.

必须要有某种剃须刀片模式的商业逻辑。

There's got to be some kind of razor blades aspect to it.

对吧？

Right?

如果只有转换成本而你再也不购买额外的东西，那就无关紧要了，因为利润来自那些后续交易。

If there's just switching costs and you never buy anything more, it doesn't matter because it's in those additional transactions.

这就是为什么你看ERP公司会收购这么多不同的东西，因为这些是他们可以互动的不同工具。

And so that's when you look at ERP companies, why they acquire so many different things, because these are different tools they can interact with.

这些都是真实存在的。

They are real.

当它们嵌入公司流程时，就能展现出特别强大的优势。

A place where they can be especially strong is when they become embedded in a company process.

就像我们之前讨论过的那家销售实验室设备的公司。

So we were talking before about there's a company that sells lab equipment.

比如我们之前讨论过的10x Genomics，他们的设备就深度嵌入了人们的工作流程中。

We're talking about 10x Genomics before, for example, where a piece of equipment gets embedded in how people do things.

他们不仅习惯了，而且整个流程都是围绕它设计的，要更换非常困难。

They not only get used to it, but there's a whole process designed around it and switching it out is really hard.

我只是好奇问问。

How about I'm just curious.

你在思考这个问题时，想到了什么或有什么例子吗？

As you've been thinking about this, what do you think about or what would be an example?

比如Slack就是个例子，但问题在于它是否还能充分变现。

I mean, Slack's an example, and there's a question of whether it's still sufficiently monetizable.

是啊。

Yeah.

嗯，我特别想探讨SaaS公司这方面的情况。

Well, I was wondering in particular with this for SaaS companies.

SaaS是否是一种商业模式创新，当结合转换成本优势时能发挥最大效力，因为它的变现方式不同于传统本地部署软件。

Is SaaS a business model innovation that if you have a switching cost source of power can work really well together because the monetization is not like old on prem software.

以前是卖整套Cboe系统安装。

You sell a big Cboe installation.

砰的一下。

Boom.

前期就要投入大笔资金。

That's a lot of money up front.

现在你得持续销售后续产品。

Now, you gotta sell more stuff in the future.

而SaaS模式下，你时刻都在持续销售。

With SaaS, you're just constantly selling all the time.

没错。

Yeah.

所以如果SaaS模式具备强大的转换成本优势，那真是如虎添翼。

So if a SaaS model has really good switching costs, boy, does that help.

我是说，这确实很有帮助。

I mean, it really helps.

实际上我认为这些公司的融资方式是以转换成本作为主要权力来源的。

I actually think the way that these companies are financed are predicated on switching costs as a primary source of power.

我是说，想想人们愿意以如此低廉的每用户月费——甚至年费——来销售这些产品。

I mean, think about people are willing to sell these things at such a low per seat per month price, or even, let's say, annual price.

我的意思是，企业不一定要雇佣外勤销售代表，而是雇佣内勤销售人员，因为一旦你引入了这些SaaS系统，就会有持续复购的预期。

I mean, people are not necessarily hiring field sales reps, but they're hiring people to do inside sales because once you get one of these SaaS systems in, there's just an expectation of repeat.

当你用风险投资人估值的方式为这些企业融资时，某种程度上就是基于这种预期。

And when you go and you capitalize these business in the way that venture capitalists value them, it's kind of predicated on that.

预期的客户流失率相当低。

The expected churn rates are fairly low.

是啊。

Yeah.

在这类业务中需要警惕的是客户获取成本。

The thing you have to be careful about in these kinds of businesses is customer acquisition cost.

所以当高转换成本广为人知后，人们就明白每个客户本质上都关联着未来现金流。

So as it becomes more known that there are these high switching costs, people understand that there's essentially a cash flow future associated with each customer.

然后他们就会开始说：哦，没错...

And they'll start to say, oh, yeah.

我们应该让他们免费注册，或者实际上用奖金激励。

Well, we should sign them up for free or actually with a bounty.

久而久之，转换成本的价值实际上会被获取成本套利掉。

Or so what happens over time is that actually the value of the switching cost becomes arbitraged out by the acquisition cost.

这就是为什么在我的权力演进理论中，转换成本属于起飞阶段——因为此时真实的商业逻辑尚未反映在获客价格上。

That's why if you go back to my power progression, that's why the switching cost is in the takeoff phase because that's the period in which the true economics are not yet reflected in the acquisition price.

所以你必须结合某种能首先获取客户的手段，因为你最初根本没有客户基础。

And so you have to combine it with something that gets you the customers in the first place because you don't have the customers in the first place.

你要么通过更优越的产品实现这一点，要么在价格尚未完全反映其价值时采取行动。

And either you do that through something that's superior or you do it when the pricing of it hasn't fully arbitraged out the value.

你看，有太多企业为了获取客户不惜血本，结果却成了糟糕的生意——即便存在转换成本。

See, there are lots and lots of businesses where people just pay too much for customers, and it turns out to be a really lousy business even though it has switching costs.

这很有意思。

It's interesting.

这让我更深入地联想到Slack。

That also really makes me think more of Slack.

Slack横空出世时，

Slack came on the scene.

他们是这个阶段真正的创新者——将消费级移动通讯成功应用于商业场景。

They were the first real innovator in this phase of consumer grade mobile messaging is also useful in businesses.

我们开始吧。

Let's do this.

在那个阶段他们获取了海量客户，建立了如今持久发展的上市公司。

They acquired tons and tons of customers in that phase, built a big company that's gonna be enduring now public company.

但现在他们正与微软Teams展开生死较量，经济高效地获取客户的能力已经

But now, they're competing to the death with Microsoft and Teams, and the ability to economically acquire customers is at

大不如前了。

least not what it used to be.

没错。

Yeah.

看来两位都经验丰富。

So the two of have so much experience.

让我问你这个问题：

Let me ask you this question.

关于反定位策略，最耐人寻味的就是这个'软件吞噬世界'的命题。

So on counter positioning, one of the things that is really interesting is this whole software eats the world thing.

你是否认为，一般来说，那些高度以软件为核心的公司，以及它们对业务的处理方式，对于那些非软件核心的传统企业而言，要转型就必须彻底颠覆原有模式，以至于形成对立局面？

Do you think that in general, companies that are a highly software centric and how they approach a business that for incumbent that isn't that way, that for them to adopt has to blow up their model so much that it's counter positioned.

这不仅体现在软件吞噬世界带来的好处上，更在于障碍层面——如果你要从零开始打造一家软件为核心的公司，这是否就像吞下一颗难以下咽的苦药？

It's not only that software eats the world on the benefit side, but the barrier side is that if you develop a company from the ground up that's software centric, is that just a really tough pill to swallow?

当前汽车行业就是个绝佳例子。

So a great example is current auto companies.

与特斯拉相比，传统车企的差异在于后者从底层就以软件思维构建体系。

So versus Tesla is the fact that they've thought about software, built things up from that level.

现在看看宝马的工程模型，天啊，转型实在太艰难了。

And now if you look at the engineering models of BMW, boy, it's tough.

你觉得这个现象具有普遍性吗？

Is that is that generally true, you think?

其实我最近一直在思考这个问题，特别是在评估几个投资机会时。

I've been thinking a lot about this recently, actually, as it pertains to a couple of different investment opportunities I'm looking at.

我做的关键区分是：传统企业的价值究竟会被技术产品取代，还是被技术赋能产品取代。

And a distinction that I draw is if the value of the incumbent can actually be replaced by a technology product rather than a technology enabled product.

举例说明，技术赋能产品就像Redfin，他们能用多种技术手段优化流程。

And to illustrate this, let's say a technology enabled product is something like Redfin, where there's lots of ways they can apply technology to make the process better.

但本质上它仍是传统中介，需要经纪人带你看房，商业模式不变，房产交易佣金也大同小异。

But at the end of the day, it's a traditional brokerage with a person who's showing you the house and it's the same business model with pretty similar fees on the transaction of the house.

而像Netflix这样的纯技术企业就不同，它是完全数字化的服务，彻头彻尾由软件驱动。

And you look at other businesses like a pure technology business like Netflix, where it's a digital service that's distributed digitally, it's software all the way through.

当你思考现有企业是否有生存机会时——

And if you're thinking about, do the existing incumbents stand a fighting chance?

我的答案是对技术赋能企业他们有机会，因为传统企业也能像新入局者那样轻松实现技术赋能。

My answer would be yes against technology enabled businesses because they can tech enabled just as easy as these new entrants can start tech enabled.

虽非易事，但至少能在该维度展开竞争。

Not just as easily, but it's possible to compete on that vector.

但当销售的是纯技术产品时，其真正的价值主张对消费者而言正是这项独特技术本身。

But when it's a pure technology product that's being sold, that is the actual value proposition to the consumer is this unique piece of technology.

这时我认为这种不可避免的命运就会开始发生。

That's when I think this unavoidable fate starts to happen.

是的。

Yeah.

非常、非常有趣的区分。

Very, very interesting distinction.

哦，关于反定位有一点我本该早提到的，听众们要始终牢记这点，这非常关键。

Oh, one thing I should have mentioned before about counter positioning that your listeners should always keep in mind, which is really critical.

这是唯一一种部分力量来源，也就是说要记住，当你思考并试图判断一家公司是否拥有力量时，必须针对每种类型的竞争对手来评估力量。

It's the only one that's a partial source of power, which is to say that remember power, when you think about it and try and figure out if a company has power, you have to look at power versus every type of competitor.

包括现有和潜在的，也包括直接和功能性的。

So existing and potential, but also direct and functional.

即那些以不同方式满足相同需求的竞争者。

So people that satisfy the same need but a different way.

就反定位而言，它无法回答针对潜在竞争对手的力量问题，因为其他人可以模仿同样的策略。

And in the case of counter positioning, it doesn't answer the power question for potential competitors because other people can mimic the same.

我之前举过戴尔的例子。

So I gave the example of Dell before.

戴尔的力量当然消失了，因为最终每个人都能做到同样的事。

Dell's power went away, of course, because ultimately everybody could do the same.

所以如果你着眼于反定位并希望获得真正的持久性，还需要另一种力量来源。

And so if you look at counter positioning and you want real durability in addition to that, you want to have another source of power.

我们观察企业时，经常看到现有或潜在竞争者中，比如亚马逊、微软或谷歌等公司正在尝试，通常是通过垂直整合的方式。

When we're looking at companies, it's very common that one of the either potential or existing competitors are, you know, Amazon's trying it out or Microsoft or Google or somebody and often in a vertical integration play.

因此你必须想清楚：他们能做到吗？

And so then you have to think through, can they do it?

此外，这类情况可能还涉及定位对立的问题。

And also, there can be counter positioning issues involved in something like that.

当然，Slack是直接反对这类事情的，你知道的。

And of course, Slack is straight up against that kind of stuff, you know.

所以我在思考另一件事。

So there's something else that I've been thinking about.

我很好奇你对这个问题是否有过深入研究，或者在职业生涯中遇到过类似情况。

I'm curious to get your take on if you've seen good research on it or it's come up in your career at all.

总的来说，当我在先锋松鼠实验室的工作室里评估一家公司的竞争格局时，我总在思考我们将面对哪些竞争对手。

In general, when I'm looking at the competitive landscape for a company that we're starting at Pioneer Squirrel Labs in the studio, I'm trying to figure out who are we going up against.

最理想的情况是存在一些老牌企业，那些成立二十多年的大型成熟公司。

The ideal situation is there's incumbents, big companies that are twenty plus years, know, they're mature companies.

可能还有一两家与我们同期成立的初创企业，但不会有成立三四年左右的公司。

And there's maybe one or two other startups that are in our vintage, but there's not somebody that's like three or four years old.

我的逻辑始终是：我们完全在不同的竞争赛道上——用你的话来说——无论那些老牌企业如何获得优势，无论他们当时有什么创新机遇。

And my logic on that is always, we're competing on a completely different playing field than however, to put it in your language, however that incumbent got power, and whatever that opportunity was for them to create something new and novel.

我很乐意用不同策略竞争，或者用相同资源但更好的执行力来超越对手。

And I'm perfectly fine competing maybe either with a different strategy or to try and out execute someone that has the same resources I do.

但我不想与那些在相似技术背景下比我早起步三四年、拥有先发优势、可能刚好抓住机遇窗口期的人竞争。

But I don't want to compete against someone that's three, four years ahead of me in approximately the same technology vintage with the same sort of world available to them who just has a lead and may actually be started something at the beginning of the window that is now closing.

这和你的想法一致吗？

Does that square with how you would think about that?

完全共鸣。

Completely resonates.

完全共鸣。

Completely resonates.

那么企业在起飞阶段会发生什么？

So what happens in the takeoff phase of a business?

想想现在的情况。

Think about what's going on.

客户数量远超产品供应。

There's more customers than product.

没人确切知道什么才是正确的商业模式。

Nobody knows exactly what the right model is.

在某些市场，这意味着可能会有相当多勉强存活的竞争者。

And in certain markets, that means that there can be quite a few competitors that are kind of viable.

而在某些市场，如果它们真的异常强劲，就可能出现利润极其丰厚的公司。

And in some markets, if they're really incredibly robust, there can be wildly profitable companies.

所以我在想，哦，当时有300家汽车公司吗？

So I thought, oh, were there 300 automobile companies?

可能还有，我不知道，大概100家个人电脑公司之类的。

And there were probably, I don't know, a 100 PC companies or something.

我记得那是一段很棒的经历。

I remember it was a great experience.

那是在...让我想想。

This was back in let's see.

那肯定是19...天啊，这真要暴露我的年龄了。

It must have been '19 boy, this will really date me.

我想是1984或85年。

I think it was 1984 or '5.

我当时去硅谷参观，因为那时我还在波士顿，而且已经开始了自己的创业。

I I was out visiting Silicon Valley because at that point, was back in Boston, and I'd already started my own business.

我去参观了一家叫Chromemco的公司，他们作为个人电脑公司正处于惊人的上升期。

And I was visiting a company called Chromemco, and they were on this incredible trajectory as a PC company.

现金流为正，增长速度达到三位数，我记得，发展得非常顺利。

Cash positive, growing triple digits, I think, and doing really well.

他们刚与西尔斯百货签了个大单子做分销。

They just cut a big deal with Sears for distribution.

所以他们的创始人之一带我参观了这里的设施，结束后我说，罗杰，非常感谢。

And so one of their founders toured me through their facility out here, And we finished, and I said, well, Roger, thanks very much.

这次参观真的很愉快。

That was really enjoyable.

我很感激。

I appreciate that.

但行业洗牌时你们打算怎么办？

But what are you gonna do when there's a shakeout?

他脸色瞬间阴沉下来。

And this cloud came over his face.

他差点把我赶出办公室。

He almost threw me out of his office.

我是说，情况糟到那种程度。

I mean, it was that bad.

他说永远不会有什么行业洗牌。

He said, there'll never be a shakeout.

因为当时正处于水涨船高的繁荣期。

It's not gonna happen because they were in this period when the rising tide was raising all boats.

虽然他们自豪的是造出了最大的S100总线计算机。

And you have this tremendous feeling, and yet their claim to fame was they're the largest s 100 bus computer.

说真的谁在乎这个？

I mean, who cares?

对吧。

Right.

你明白吗？

You know?

而且PCI插槽比任何其他都多。

And more PCI slots than any.

对。

Right.

正是如此。

Exactly.

所以本，在你描述的情况下可以看到，有些公司确实做得不错。

And so what you could see in the situation you're describing, Ben, is that there are companies that are doing just fine.

他们正在获取客户，但竞争套利尚未真正发生。

They're getting customers, but competitive arbitrage hasn't really taken place.

而你担心的（这很合理）是，如果有人比你领先几年，且处于中期阶段的权力类型——这在科技网络、规模经济、转换成本中最常见。

And what you're worried about, which makes sense, is that if somebody is several years ahead of you and it's one of the middle phase types of power, which is most common in tech network, economy, scale, economy, switching costs.

这三种是最常见的情况。

Those are the three most common ones.

如果是其中一种，那么你的规模就很重要。

If it's one of those, then your size matters.

所以如果他们领先于你，当形势严峻时，当市场稳定下来时，你将处于不利地位。

And so if they're ahead of you, when push comes to shove, when the market settles down, you will not be in good position.

因此我认为例外情况是，如果你有这样一家公司，看到他们正在获得巨大的相对市场份额，可能有其他更早期的公司，但他们的商业模式存在某些问题...

And so I'd say an exception to that is that if you have a company like that and you see that they're just gaining enormous relative market share, there might be some other company that's earlier, but there's something about their business model that just doesn't

比如谷歌与Excite的对比。

work Google as versus Exciter.

没错。

Right.

所以如果是这种情况，那么第二个问题就是：为什么会发生这种情况？这种情况会持续吗？

And so if that's the case, then there's the second order question, which is why is that happening and will it continue?

但这更多属于边缘案例。

But that's more of an edge case.

所以我基本同意这个观点，这确实是个需要注意的地方。

And so I agree with the basic idea that that's kind of a watch out.

我要更进一步说，更有趣的投资机会其实非常罕见，那就是当某个企业几乎独占一个品类，竞争对手无论如何都无法真正与之匹敌的情况。

I'll go one step further, which is that an even more an interesting investment opportunity, they don't come along very often, but is one where it's almost a category of one where a competitor somehow there's something about the way they are that there's nobody really quite like them.

如果这种模式运转良好且现金流为正，这在很多方面都令人安心。

That's reassuring in a lot of ways if it's working, if it's cash flow positive.

这完美过渡到了你书中最让我喜欢的部分。

This is the perfect transition to my favorite part of your book.

在这种情况下，权力往往是一种垄断资源。

In cases like that, often a power is a cornered resource.

正如你所说，我认为这在科技领域其实相当罕见，但科技界人士却认为这并不罕见。

And as you say, I think this is actually quite rare in tech yet, I think people in tech think it's not rare.

专利就是个典型例子。

A classic example is a patent.

比如在生物科技领域，你拥有专利就等于拥有了垄断资源，这是别人无法获得的。

You know, you're in biotech, you have a patent, you have a cornered resource, you have it, nobody else can have it.

我很好奇，首先想听听你对垄断资源的整体看法，但特别让我反复思考的是，很多科技从业者，尤其是风投人士，认为高管人才和创始人才是垄断资源。

I'm curious well, a, your thoughts on cornered resources in general, but in particular, something that just really spun around in my mind reading this is lots of people in tech, especially lots of VCs, think that executive talent and founders are a cornered resource.

你在书中明确指出高管并非垄断资源，因为他们的价值会被市场套利。

And you make the point in the book that executives are not cornered resources because their value can be arbitraged by the market.

我认为在硅谷，创始人的价值其实也会被套利。

I think that actually the value of founders gets arbitraged too in Silicon Valley.

因为如果你拥有一位明星创始人，他们就能以极高的估值融资。

Because if you have a superstar founder, they're gonna raise money at such a high price.

是啊。

Yeah.

简单说点关于领导力的看法。

Just to sort of a comment on leadership.

领导力极其重要，在战略中更是如此，正如我在书中所说，所有战略都始于创新并围绕其构建。

So leadership is unbelievably important, and it's unbelievably important in strategy because as I said in the book, all strategy starts with invention and building up something around that.

真正拥有伟大领导者的公司与那些领导力不足的公司确实存在差异。

And there really is a difference between companies with truly great leaders and ones that aren't as great.

所以这很重要。

And so it matters.

但你面临的问题是充分性。

But the question you're dealing with is sufficiency.

这足够吗？

Is it enough?

我在书开头举的例子就是完美的例证。

And the example I start my book with is a perfect example for this.

对你们来说可能有点老，但就是英特尔。

It's a little old for you guys, but it's Intel.

他们当时有两项业务。

So they had two businesses.

他们最初是一家存储器公司。

They started as a memory company.

他们起步时就拥有顶尖的人才。

They started with the best of the best.

我是说，他们有

I mean, they had

戈登·摩尔，鲍勃·诺伊斯。

Gordon Moore, Bob Noyes.

是的。

Yeah.

没错。

Right.

对。

Right.

然后他们引进了安迪·格鲁夫。

And and then it brought in Andy Grove.

在发明方面有鲍勃·诺伊斯。

And so on the invention side, Bob Noyes.

在执行方面有安迪·格鲁夫，在工艺制造方面有戈登·摩尔。

On the execution side, Andy Grove, and on the process manufacturing side, Gordon Moore.

我的意思是，这简直是全明星阵容。

I mean, this was the all stars.

但他们的存储器业务却行不通，因为没有电源供应，其他人可以后来居上。

And yet their memory business was not working because they had no sources of power, and other people could come after them.

尽管他们拥有卓越的领导力，可能是最早进入的，还有各种财务资源，但这仍然不够。

And despite their great leadership and probably being first in and all kinds of financial resources, it just wasn't enough.

最终演变成了一场大规模的价格战，大量新进入者能够迅速复制英特尔的一切并与之竞争。

And that ended up having basically a massive race to the bottom with tons of new entrants who were able to spin up, you know, everything that that Intel had and compete against them.

但如果你看看他们最终掌握主导权的CPU领域，领导力确实至关重要。

But then if you go to what they did eventually have power in, which is CPUs, again, leadership really mattered.

他们提出了中央处理器的构想，问题是这真的很重要吗？

So they have come up with this idea for central processor, and the question is, is this a big deal?

我们要支持这个吗？

Do we back this?

你知道吗？

You know?

董事会大多数人都反对。

And most of the board was against it.

他们的销售主管坚决认为这永远不会成功——而他是个精明的人。

Their head of sales was adamant that this would never turn into anything that was and he was a sharp guy.

我并不是固执地认为这永远不会有什么结果。

I don't mean to mean adamant that this would never turn into anything.

安迪·格鲁夫坚决反对这件事。

Andy Grove was dead set against it.

我相信这是正确的。

I believe it's correct.

鲍勃·诺伊斯走出去和人们交谈，这就是发明的本质。

And Bob Noyce went out and kind of talked to people, and this is the nature of invention.

高度不确定性、极大带宽、深刻洞见。

High uncertainty bars, very large bandwidth, deep insights.

他最终说了不。

And he finally said, no.

我真的认为这最终会有所成就。

I really think this eventually is gonna go somewhere.

然后董事会主席叫什么名字来着？

And and then the chairman of the board what was his name?

想不起来了。

Can't remember.

是阿瑟·洛克吗？

Was it Arthur Rock?

不是。

No.

好像是罗森之类的。

Rosen or something.

我记不清了。

I can't remember.

总之，他支持了鲍勃·诺伊斯，尽管他们当时确实资金紧张，他们还是决定推进这个项目，这对他们来说非常艰难。

Anyway, he backed Bob Noyce, and they committed to it even though they really didn't have the cash, and, it was a very hard thing for them.

所以这个案例中领导力确实很重要，但还不够充分。

And so there's a case where leadership really mattered, but it wasn't enough.

因此这里的问题在于充分性。

And so the question here is sufficiency.

如果你把一个伟大的领导者放到另一个行业，并不会显著降低该行业能否成功的不确定性。

If you take a great leader and put him in a different business, that doesn't massively reduce the uncertainty bars that the business is gonna be success.

是的。

Yeah.

这很有道理。

That makes a lot of sense.

你如何解释皮克斯这个案例？这也是你书中提到的另一个例子，在人才资源部分，约翰·拉塞特、艾德·卡特姆和史蒂夫·乔布斯的组合——史蒂夫是最佳远见者和资金提供者，约翰是最佳动画师和故事讲述者，艾德则是最佳技术专家。

How do you square that with Pixar, which is another example in your book, the corner resources segment where the combination of John Lasseter, Ed Catmull, and Steve Jobs being sort of the best visionary and source of capital with Steve, the best animator and storyteller with John, and then the best technologist with Ed.

皮克斯的智囊团，以及他们招募的所有导演等人，确实是他们获得这些人才资源的主要或重要力量来源。

The Pixar brain trust, and you look at all the directors on down that they did recruit, really was their main or a big source of power for them cornering those people resources.

我是否忽略了皮克斯还有其他重要力量来源？

Am I missing that there was another big source of power for Pixar?

没有。

No.

没有。

No.

没有。

No.

我认为这个故事有一些微妙之处。

I think there's some subtleties to that story.

我对此有自己的看法，在书中也稍微讨论过这一点。

I just have my own view about this, and I talk about this a little bit in the book.

要制作优秀的动画电影，你必须想出精彩的故事。

You have to come up with great stories for good animated films.

智囊团本身不足以确保这一点，其标志就是有多少导演因项目问题被替换。

The brain trust itself was insufficient to guarantee that, And the marker for that is how many directors had to be replaced that were into their projects.

于是你回过头来追问，那些未被替换的导演有什么共同点。

And so then you go back and then ask what was in common with the directors that weren't replaced.

除了布拉德·伯德——他本身就是个传奇故事，才华横溢——答案是这个核心团队，他们共同创作了原版《玩具总动员》，宛如兄弟连。

And with the exception of Brad Bird, who's a a whole story by himself, brilliant guy, the answer is that it was this core group of people that worked together that came up with the original Toy Story movie, and that they were sort of a band of brothers.

他们共同经历了创作真正引人入胜的动画电影意味着什么。

And together, they had an experience of what it meant to create really compelling animated films.

这就是他们随后取得的一系列成功。

And that was their string of successes that followed from that.

而当时虽有智囊团存在，却未能将这种经验传递给其他导演。

And that the fact that there was a brain trust at that time, they weren't able to transfer that into other directors.

但后来迪士尼收购皮克斯时，部分理念确实重塑了迪士尼动画。

But then later on, what happened was you saw when Disney acquired Pixar, some of that sensibility, they did revise Disney animation.

就皮克斯近期而言，我认为新导演群体的前景非常乐观。

And more recently with Pixar, I'd say that the prospects for a new pool of directors is very good.

但最初的稀缺资源未被套利，因为那些人希望保持团队完整。

But I think the original corner resource and it wasn't arbitraged out because those people wanted to stay together.

当然，这些导演在其他动画工作室都收到过邀约。

So, certainly, those directors offered jobs in other animated studios.

我确信他们都收到过，但都拒绝了。

I'm sure they all were, but they said, no.

不。

No.

我要留在皮克斯。

I'm staying with Pixar.

如果鲍勃·艾格能直接雇佣艾德和约翰，他就不会收购皮克斯了。

If Bob Iger could have just hired Ed and John, he wouldn't have bought Pixar.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

没错。

Exactly.

而且我是艾格的超级粉丝。

And I'm a huge fan of Iger's.

我是说，我认为作为一个战略家，他做出了三个关键性的迪士尼决策，每一个我都觉得非常出色。

I mean, I think as a strategist and, you know, he made three critical Disney decisions, all of which I thought were brilliant.

我认为他收购皮克斯的决定是意识到动画电影是迪士尼的核心，尽管从投资银行家的角度看价格昂贵，但他明白必须重振这一块，否则整个迪士尼品牌都会面临风险，所以值得更高的价格。

And I think his Pixar decision was he realized that at the heart of Disney was animated films and that even though the price, an investment banker would say this is really expensive, He realized that actually they had to revive that or the whole Disney franchise was at risk, so it was worth a much bigger price.

我们这个节目的团队都知道，我们都是达格的忠实粉丝。

We're huge Dagger fans on this show as all of our teams know.

哦，他的书也精彩绝伦。

Oh, and his book is incredible.

我们尽量保持客观，但只要一聊到迪士尼相关话题，我们俩能说上好几个小时。

And we try to be a little less partial, but both of us, whenever we get going on anything Disney related, we'll be here for a few hours.

好了，听众朋友们。

Alright, listeners.

现在是个好时机来感谢我们节目的长期合作伙伴Vanta——领先的主动信任平台，帮助您自动化合规管理并控制风险。

This is a great time to thank our longtime friend of the show, Vanta, the leading agentic trust platform that helps you automate compliance and manage risk.

大卫，我和克里斯蒂娜以及Vanta团队联系过，获取了最新消息。

David, I, caught up with Christina and the Vanta team to get the latest.

哦，太好了。

Oh, nice.

听众们可能知道Vanta最初专注于合规自动化。

So listeners probably know Vanta started by focusing on compliance automation.

因此帮助公司获得SOC2、ISO27001、GDPR和HIPAA认证。

So helping companies to get their SOC two, ISO twenty seven zero zero one, GDPR, and HIPAA.

关键洞见是构建一个能持续监控所有合规与风险的系统，而不仅是为年度审计服务，让你能始终对安全态势保持信心。

The big insight was to build a system that could monitor all of your compliance and risk continuously, not just once a year for your audit, so you could feel confident in your security posture all the time.

但现在他们意识到，真正的业务是让你更容易赢得客户信任。

But now they have realized that the business that they're really in is making it easier for you to earn the trust of your customers.

没错。

Yep.

有道理。

Makes sense.

当你开始扩展时，会面临更多合规安全要求和工具，这可能导致混乱。

So when you start scaling, you end up with more compliance and security requirements and more tools, which can get very chaotic.

Vanta已成为随你扩展的24/7人工智能安全专家。

Vanta has become the always on AI powered security expert that scales with you.

用Vanta的话说，他们是'你永远无需招聘的最佳安全团队'。

And as Vanta puts it, they are the best security hire you'll never have to make.

当然，全球增长最快的公司如Cursor、Snowflake、Replit、Linear和Ramp都使用Vanta，确保其安全方案始终领先并真正推动业务增长。

And, of course, the fastest growing companies in the world like Cursor, Snowflake, Replit, Linear, and Ramp all use Vanta to make sure that their security programs are always a step ahead and function as a real driver of growth for the business.

完全合理。

Makes total sense.

有意思。

It's funny.

大约五年前我们刚开始与Vanta合作时，我记得

When we first started working with Vanta almost five years ago, I think it was

嗯。

Yep.

我们当时想，这真是那种优秀的'被收购宇宙'产品，让你只专注产品差异化，把非核心事务外包出去。

We thought, oh, this is one of those great acquired universe products that lets you focus only on what differentiates your product and outsource the things that don't.

但在过去几年里，他们的产品进步如此之大，已不仅仅是Vanta为你服务这么简单。

But over the last couple years, their product has advanced so much that it's not just Vanta does that for you.

实际上现在Vanta能做得更好。

It's now actually Vanta does that better.

没有实时监控系统，你根本无法让供应商和客户建立这种程度的信心与信任。

Without a real time monitoring system, there's just no way that you could give your vendors and customers this level of confidence and trust.

没错。

Yep.

所以如果你的公司准备重新专注于提升啤酒口感，把合规审查和安全评估交给Vanta的AI自动化系统，现在就加入他们遍布全球的12,000家客户行列吧。

So if your company is ready to go back to making your beer taste better and leave the compliance and security reviews to Vanta's AI powered automation, join their now 12,000 customers around the globe.

只需访问vanta.com/acquired，告诉他们是本和大卫推荐你的，就能获得1000美元免费额度。

You can just head on over to vanta.com/acquired and tell them that Ben and David sent you, and you'll earn a thousand dollars of free credit.

网址是vanta.com/acquired。

That's vanta.com/acquired.

权力的潜力往往存在于市场这种动荡变化和起飞状态中。

The potential for power, you know, often comes in that sort of flux and change the takeoff state in the market.

我很好奇，随着我们逐渐接近尾声...

I'm curious as we, you know, kind of move move towards the end here.

你们是否总结出识别市场权力机遇的有效机制？

Have you come up with any good mechanisms for identifying when opportunities for power exist, like, in given markets?

是持续保持雷达扫描状态然后突然发现'好机会'吗？

Do you just kinda keep a radar screen operating and be like, okay.

这些正在发生的动荡领域很有价值，可以孕育新公司——或者说我们在这方面有些独门秘籍

Well, these are interesting areas of flux that are happening and new companies can be built or I'd say there's a little bit of secret sauce in that from our

从我的投资视角来看。

from my investment perspective.

这会是下一本书的内容。

That'll be the next book.

嘿。

Hey.

好吧。

Alright.

所以订阅者必须支付更多费用。

So you have to subscribers have to pay more.

是啊。

Yeah.

这大致如你所想的那样。

So it's kind of what you would imagine.

我的意思是，你正深陷其中。

I mean, you're in the thick of it.

这是一个快速发展的技术前沿，似乎正在彻底改变整个领域的可能性。

It's a rapidly advancing technical frontier that seeming to change the possibilities in a whole space.

正如我开始前提到的，遗传学对我们来说非常有趣。

So I was mentioning to you before I started, genetics is very interesting to us.

当然，我们对治疗方法没有洞见，但整个领域——你能明显感受到测序成本和其他方面的惊人下降，使得过去在成本或时间上不可行的事情现在成为可能。

Of course, we have no insight into therapeutics, but that whole field, you can tell that the incredible cost decline of sequencing and other aspects of it creates the possibility of doing things that were never cost justified before or time justified.

你要寻找的就是这类能带来阶跃式变化的事物。

You look for things like that that are step changes.

此外，我认为还需要了解技术如何在经济中流动。

And then I think there's an awareness of how technology flows through an economy.

上周五，我和我在耶鲁的一位老教授迪克·尼尔森共进午餐，他是研究技术变革的天才级人物。

Last Friday, I had lunch with one of my old professors at Yale, Dick Nelson, who's this genius level person on technical change.

他是这个领域的深刻思想家之一。

He's one of the deep thinkers on it.

我认为你所看到的是，一项技术最初总是以其最粗略或宏观的应用形式出现，然后逐渐渗透到各个层面。

And and I think what you see is that you start with a technology with sort of its most gross or macro application, and then it works its way through.

因此，如果你将摩尔定律或硅视为推动一切发展的驱动力之一。

So if you think about Moore's law or silicon as being one of the drivers of everything.

首先，你要直接关注芯片领域。

So first, you go straight to where it's chips.

先是芯片本身，然后是芯片逐步融入设备。

It's the chips themselves, and then the chips work their way into devices.

接着设备再逐步渗透到应用中。

And then devices work their way into applications.

所以如果一项技术是基础性的，它会经历不同阶段，最终使围绕它形成的业务在经济上变得可行。

And so if a technology is fundamental, it moves through different phases where it actually becomes or businesses around it become economically viable.

以Netflix为例再说明一下。

So think of Netflix, for example, again.

如果他们当初开展红色信封业务时就尝试做流媒体，那时你需要存储空间、互联网支持等等条件。

So if they tried to do streaming when they had started their red envelope business, you had to have storage, You had to have the Internet, all that stuff.

随着技术发展，会有一个时机使其在商业上变得可行。

And so there's a time as technology moves through that it becomes commercially viable.

当然在此之前还有科学层面的铺垫。

And then there's, of course, a precursors to this, which are scientific stuff.

以量子计算为例。

So think of quantum computing.

首先你当然要理解量子力学，然后还要解决量子纠缠等问题——

So first, of course, you gotta figure out quantum mechanics, then you gotta deal with entanglement and all the

我们可能还没准备好进入应用阶段。

We're probably not ready for applications just yet.

但希望未来人们能基于不同模型重新点燃对核聚变的期待。

But hopefully, there will be a time where people are now reviving hopes again about, fusion based on different models.

我喜欢这个说法。

I like that.

这也是个很好的过渡。

That's a good transition too.

最后一个问题。

Last question.

你现在在忙什么项目？

What are you working on now?

接下来会有什么发展，这七种力量或许还会有更多？

What's next for, the seven and maybe more powers to come?

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

首先，我很想找到另一种力量。

Well, first of all, I would love to find another power.

但目前为止还没找到。

So far, haven't.

我们合作的每家公司最终都会面临这个问题。

So every company that we deal with faces this question eventually.

就是说，如果我成功了，我就建立了一家拥有力量的公司。

Is that, okay, if I'm successful, I've established a company with power.

然后呢？

What's next?

所以第二幕。

So act two.

我正在思考的是，我们是否能对此提出些有趣且有价值的见解？

And what I'm trying to figure out is do we have anything that's interesting and valuable to say about that?

我认为从一开始，我们确实需要更坦率地探讨权力保护伞下真正包含的微妙之处。

And I think from the first step of it, I think we do have something, which is to be a little more forthcoming about some of the subtleties about what really comes under a power umbrella.

我举个例子。

I'll give you an example.

一个自然的拓展方向会是地理扩张。

A natural place to go would be geographic expansion.

哦，让我们进入另一个市场吧。

Oh, let's go into another market.

但事实证明，如果用权力视角来看这个问题，会得到完全不同的答案。

Well, it turns out if you think of that in power terms, you get very different answers.

比如优步进入不同地区时，这其实无关紧要，因为其经济模式依赖的是实体密度带来的规模效应。

So if you think about Uber going into a different geography, it doesn't matter because the economics are a physical density scale economies.

即使存在强烈的品牌效应和大量外国游客，理论上这很重要，但实际上无关紧要。

And if it turned out there was high branding and there are a lot of foreign visitors, it matter, but it doesn't matter.

或者说，几乎不可能构建那种固定成本的技术资产。

Or, like, impossible to build that fixed cost technology asset.

没错。

Right.

所以这完全取决于逐个市场的具体情况。

And so it's all about market by market.

老实说，他们'为全球所有人提供交通服务'的使命宣言与权力格局并不真正匹配。

So to be honest, their mission statement of transportation for everybody around the world doesn't really map to power.

我想他们现在可能已经意识到这点了。

And I think they probably know that now.

他们很聪明，也很能干。

They're smart and able.

但如果你看网飞，情况就完全不同了。

Now if you look at Netflix, it's a different matter.

因此，如果你考虑Netflix进军不同地域市场时，关键问题在于记住——那里的核心竞争优势是规模经济。

And so if you think of Netflix going into a different geography, the question there is remember, the key competitive advantage there is scale economies.

他们有固定内容可以覆盖更多订阅用户，因此单用户成本更低。

So there's fixed content that they can drive across more subscribers, and so the cost per subscriber is less.

内容成本占很大比重，所以这是个巨大的优势。

And content's a big part of cost, so that's a big, big advantage.

当他们进入新地域时，问题就变成：我们来自A地域的内容有多少比例适用于B地域？哪怕只有20%也值得考虑。

So if you go into a different geography, for them, the question then is, does a reasonable percentage of our content from geography a apply to geography b, and even if it's only 20%.

假设你要进入英国市场，而你20%的美国内容适用当地。

So let's say you're going into England and 20% of your US content applies.

如果面对一个只做英国本土的竞争对手，20%乘以海量内容库就是巨大优势。

If you're versus a English only competitor, 20% is times that large amount is a gigantic deal.

更妙的是，凭借极其精细的用户数据，他们可以调整内容开发方向以增强跨市场吸引力。

And then the dynamics of it become even more interesting because if they're unbelievably granular data, they can then actually tilt their content development to have more crossover.

这种关于如何延伸竞争优势的思考非常有趣，当然从经济角度看也很重要——毕竟建立优势本就艰难。

So thinking that through of how to extend power where the power umbrella fits is something that's that's really interesting, and it's important economically, of course, because getting power is really hard.

任何能让你发挥优势的领域都值得关注，哪怕这些领域有时看似非传统。

And if there are any place that you can take advantage of your and it's sometimes unusual.

想想迪士尼进军主题公园的例子。

Think of Disney going into theme parks.

又回到迪士尼了。

Back to Disney again.

我们说到点子上了。

Here we are.

正如你提到的，这让我想起了迪士尼。

As you were mentioning, it made me think of Disney.

我们在迪士尼专题节目里讨论过这个。

We talked about this a little bit on our Disney plus episode.

实际上，我认为福克斯在这方面做得非常好，正如你描述的过去十年左右在地理和权力方面的优势。

Fox actually, I think, did this really well what you were describing with geography and power of over the last ten years or so.

它才出现了大约十年。

It's only been around for ten years.

我记得福克斯锁定了印度板球超级联赛的所有流媒体版权。

I believe Fox locked up all the streaming rights to Indian Premier League cricket.

你可能会想，哦，那在印度才有意义。

And you would think like, oh, well, that's relevant in India.

但其实不然，这在全球范围内都很有影响力。

Well, no, that's actually relevant all around the world.

所以这是迪士尼收购福克斯的重要原因之一。

And so that was a big part of the Disney acquisition of Fox.

因此，如果你获得高概率的权力，这将彻底改变对公司价值的确定性。

So the fact that if you get a high probability of power, it's a step change in the certainty about the value of the company.

所以任何时候你能将其扩展到更多客户或更多场景，接下来的问题就是：好的，

And so anytime you can extend that to more customers or, more situations, then the question after that is, okay.

那之后还有什么？

What's beyond that?

这是一个经过深入研究的方向。

And that's a deeply researched area.

这里面有很多内容。

There's a lot in that.

我还不确定我们在这方面能有很多补充。

I'm not convinced yet that we have a lot to add to that.

那是第三本书的内容。

That's book three.

是的。

Yeah.

我们会考虑这件事的。

We'll think about it.

那么，汉密尔顿，听众们在哪里可以找到你呢？

Well, Hamilton, where can listeners find you?