霍华德·马克斯与安德鲁·马克斯：价值所在

但最终会有家中国公司崛起，做短视频之类的。

But eventually, actually, this Chinese company is gonna start, and it's gonna be short form vid yeah.

这次Facebook就搞不定了。

Facebook won't figure it out this time.

于是所有消费者注意力都会转移。

And so all the consumer attention's gonna shift.

我大概只会觉得：你错了。

And I'd just be like, you're wrong.

我就是不相信你。

I just don't believe you.

是啊。

Yeah.

那当然是真的。

That's of course true.

但我认为另一个值得注意的有趣现象是，那些广泛流传的图表展示了技术采用速度的加快。

But I think the other thing that's really interesting to note, and there are these very widely circulated charts of the speeding up of technological adoption.

所以在我看来，那时的企业比现在更容易保持长久。

And so it was very possible for companies to be much more durable back then than it is today in my opinion.

我的意思是，如果你回到1950年，想想看，有多少企业能让我高度确信它们在十年后仍会保持现状？

I mean, you transport yourself back to 1950 and you think about, well, how many businesses are there where I think I can say with high conviction that they'll be the same in ten years as they are today.

我认为这个数字可能会比现在高得多——在你不了解管理层为巩固护城河、抵御竞争或持续进化采取什么措施的情况下。

I think that number would probably be much, much higher than you could say today without understanding what management is doing to further entrench their moats or fend off competition or continuously evolve or whatever.

真的很难说一艘无人掌舵的船能保持航向不变。

It's very, very hard to say, well, with no minding of the ship, this business will just stay consistent.

如今几乎没有能让蠢材经营的企业了。

There are very few businesses that idiots can run these days.

但我马上告诉你安德鲁的观点。

But I'll tell you two second what Andrew's saying.

如果你回溯到我五十年代的青年时期，或六七十年代的年轻时代，根本感受不到世界在变化。

If you go back to my youth in the fifties or when I was a young man in the sixties and seventies, you just didn't have the feeling that the world was changing.

现在回想起来，我当时对世界的认知模型就像舞台上一成不变的背景板。

My thought model for the world at that time, looking back at it, is kind of a consistent backdrop, like on a stage.

演员们在固定不变的背景前表演他们的戏码，但背景本身却始终如一。

And the actors do their thing in front of the backdrop, but the backdrop doesn't change.

因此存在周期性的起伏、过度与修正，诸如此类，但世界本身并未发生太大变化。

And so there are cycles, ups and downs, excesses, and corrections, and all these things, but the world didn't change much.

在我整个青少年时期，漫画书的价格一直是十美分。

And the comic book was a dime for my whole youth.

但如今，每一分钟都在发生翻天覆地的变化。

But today, everything changes every minute.

那么这里有个问题。

So here's a question then.

企业的估值是否应该降低？

Should companies be worth less?

既然未来更具不确定性，颠覆更易发生，护城河比以往任何时候都更不稳固，我们是否应该减少对未来现金流的预期年限？

Because if the future is more uncertain and it's more likely that things get disrupted and moats are less permanent than they've ever been, shouldn't we consider less future years of cash flows?

嗯，就像所有事物一样，这是一把双刃剑。

Well, like everything, it's a double edged sword.

我的意思是，一方面你刚刚指出，若不悉心经营，企业更容易被颠覆。

I mean, on the one hand, you just made the point that without minding the ship, companies are much more potentially disruptable.

但另一方面，这意味着如果你具备竞争优势，并持续深挖这些优势，用以进军相邻市场、推出新产品、拓展地域市场等，就能创造更多价值。

But on the other hand, that means if you have competitive advantages and you continue to mine those advantages and you use them to enter adjacent markets or launch new products or going after other markets geographically or whatever, There's much more value creation to be had.

我认为对于真正这么做的企业而言，利用自身优势进行拓展的能力可能达到了前所未有的高度。

And I think the ability to leverage your advantages and build more for the companies that are really doing so has probably never been higher.

顺便说一句，借助互联网，你可以触达全球市场。

And by the way, with the Internet, you can address global markets.

我们刚刚讨论了可以面向邻近城镇发行的报纸。

We just talked about newspapers where you can address the town next door.

我最喜欢的投资类文章之一，其实并非直接关于投资，而是出自布莱恩·阿瑟之手。

One of my favorite writings on investing, it's not actually about investing, but it's this guy Brian Arthur.

他写过一篇名为《新商业世界中的收益递增》的文章。

And he wrote something called increasing returns in the new world of business.

那是在九十年代中期发表的。

And that was in the mid nineties.

他观察到在新世界里，随着互联网等新型分销模式的出现，优秀企业可以持续壮大，而旧时代的成长空间则相对有限。

And he made the observation that with the new world, with the new distribution models of things like the internet and whatever, the best companies could continue to get bigger and bigger, whereas you were sort of capped out more in the old world.

因此随着时间的推移会出现规模收益递减现象。

And so you would have diminishing returns to scale over time.

顺便说一句，这个观点简直精准得不能再准了。

And by the way, that couldn't have been more right.

你看随后几十年的市场，苹果、亚马逊、谷歌和微软这些企业确实在持续扩张。

You look at markets over the subsequent couple decades and you have companies like Apple and Amazon and Google and Microsoft that just continue to get bigger and bigger.

我认为这很大程度上源于它们不断在各个市场扩大统治力。

And I think a lot of that comes from the fact that they're just continue to dominate more and more of various markets.

关于那篇论文，有个我一直特别喜欢的趣闻。

This is one of my favorite pieces of trivia of all time about that paper.

布莱恩·阿瑟与《骏马》《老无所依》的作者科马克·麦卡锡是好友，科马克还帮忙润色了那篇文章的文笔。

Brian Arthur was friends with Cormac McCarthy, the author who wrote All the Pretty Horses and No Country for Old Men, and Cormac helped shape the prose in that piece.

哦，真有意思。

Oh, very interesting.

它非常成功的原因之一。

One of the reasons why it's very successful.

嗯，是的。

Well, yeah.

我想对经济学家来说，这本书写得非常出色。

I guess for an economist, it was extremely well written.

趁我还有机会，我想在安德鲁列出的持续扩张模式成功标准上再补充一点。

Before I lose the opportunity, I just wanna add one thing to Andrew's list of criteria for success in this continued expansion mode.

那就是能够避免成功带来的负面效应的公司。

And that is companies that are able to avoid the negative effects of success.

必须保持精简、灵活、去官僚化并着眼未来。

You have to stay lean and flexible and unbureaucratic and future looking.

安德鲁，你指出了一个非常有趣的现象，这里存在两种相互冲突的力量在对抗。

Andrew, you're pointing out this really interesting thing where you have two opposing forces that have butting heads.

其一是我们现在拥有全球可触达的市场。

One is now we have globally addressable markets.

因此总可寻址市场更大，市值潜力也就更大。

So TAMs are bigger, therefore, market caps can be bigger.

与此同时，由于范式转换速度空前加快，竞争也比以往任何时候都来得更快。

And at the same time, you have competition happens faster than ever because paradigms change faster than ever.

所以尽管单个企业的机遇空前巨大，但未来的不确定性也达到了历史之最。

And so therefore, the future is less certain than it's ever been despite the fact that the opportunity for any given business is the largest it's ever been.

是啊。

Yeah.

顺便说一句，我不会只说全球市场，我认为战略相邻市场也同样重要。

And by the way, wouldn't just say global markets, I would say strategically adjacent markets as well.

再看看那些大公司，它们如何不断拓展业务，在现有业务边缘领域越做越大。

Again, look at the big companies and how they continue to step out and do more and more in things that are tangential to their existing businesses.

亚马逊就是个很好的例子。

I mean, Amazon's a great example of that.

他们从图书起家，然后进军媒体领域，接着不断扩张。

They started in books, then they went to media, and then continued on and on and on.

最终他们利用规模优势进入了云计算等各种领域。

And eventually, they leveraged their scale into cloud computing and whatever.

还有数据库和各种相关业务。

And that into databases and all sorts of stuff.

没错。

Yep.

是的。

Yeah.

完全正确。

Exactly.

本，安德鲁说他从没听过你正常语速的声音，因为他总是加速听播客。

Ben, Andrew mentioned that he'd never heard your voice at real speed because he listens to podcast accelerated.

我认为可以这样理解：把达尔文主义调高几个档位。

I think the way to think about it is take Darwinism and turn up the knob a few clicks.

事实就是如此。

It's what it is.

这是赢家与输家的游戏，可能比以往任何时候都更加戏剧化，而且发生得更快。

It's winners and losers, maybe more dramatic than ever and happening faster than ever.

然后我认为这一切都与我们在备忘录中提到的另一点相吻合，这一点非常重要，那就是市场和游戏都在不断演变。

And then this all I think dovetails into one other point that we made from the memo that I think is really important, which is that markets evolve and games evolve.

我曾经是个痴迷的扑克玩家。

I was an obsessive poker player.

我一直以来对各种游戏都很痴迷。

I've always been an obsessive games player generally.

我和我爸爸经常坐在一起玩西洋双陆棋，可以玩上很久。

And my dad and I, we sit around and we'll play backgammon for forever and whatever.

我就是在扑克热潮兴起时迷上扑克的，当时克里斯·马尼梅克赢得了世界扑克大赛，线上扑克也开始流行。

And I I got obsessed with poker right when the poker boom happened, was Chris Moneymaker won the World Series of Poker, and they started online poker.

马尼梅克和法尔哈。

Moneymaker and Farha.

是的。

Yeah.

说得好。

Well done.

这真是令人印象深刻的扑克冷知识。

That's very impressive poker trivia.

所以当线上扑克刚推出时，由于没人知道怎么玩，这游戏还很新，如果你只是坐在那里，只玩A和K这样的牌，你就能赢钱，非常简单。

So when online poker first launched and everyone got into the poker boom, because no one knew how to play and it was so new, if you just sat around, you played aces and kings and nothing else, you could win money, and it was very easy.

随着时间的推移，人们逐渐掌握了技巧，对游戏的理解也更深了一层。

And then over time, people figured that out and they sorta figured out the next level of the game and whatever.

原本的制胜策略变成了极易被利用的策略，这种演变发生了太多次，以至于我现在打扑克可能很糟糕。

And the winning strategy turned into the very exploitable strategy and that evolution has happened a lot more times to the point that I'm probably terrible at poker now.

但无论如何，我认为市场上也发生了同样的事情。

But anyway, I think the same thing has happened in markets.

回到巴菲特刚开始投资的年代，获取公司信息、进行公司交易，甚至仅仅是了解公司情况都极其困难。

And so back in the times when Buffett was starting, information about companies and the ability to transact in companies, and actually even finding out about companies was extremely hard.

我的意思是，你得跑去图书馆。

I mean, you had to go to the library.

你得取出穆迪手册。

You had to take out the Moody's manual.

他当时四处奔波，从农民手里收购股票凭证。

He was driving around buying stock certificates from farmers.

是啊。

Yeah.

不知道你们有没有看过穆迪手册，其实内容并不多。

I don't know if you've ever looked at a Moody's manual, but there's not that much there.

所以如果你对某家公司感兴趣，得写信索要年报等等。

And so if you were interested in something, had to mail away for the annual report and so on and so forth.

然后你还得打电话给经纪人，让他们想办法买入流动性差的股票。

And then you had to call your broker, and they had to figure out how to buy an illiquid stock.

由于获取信息和交易存在如此多的障碍，价值更容易隐藏在显而易见的地方。

And because there was so much friction to getting information and transacting, it was much more possible for value to be hidden in plain sight.

我虽然没经历过那个年代，但我知道这点，因为巴菲特亲口说过这就是他的做法。

And I wasn't there, but I know this because Buffett says that this is exactly what he did.

你可以观察某个事物并清楚地看到公司持续向前发展，如果你对未来持保守预期，就能明显理解其价值相对于这些前景是被低估的。

You could look at something and just plainly see that the company just continued to march ahead and just plainly understand that it was undervalued relative to those prospects if you had conservative assumptions about the future continuing.

而如今，信息已经完全无处不在。

And nowadays, information is totally ubiquitous.

任何人都可以购买股票。

Anyone can buy a stock.

有大量聪明人在股市投资，但同时还有算法、机器学习等各类技术手段。

There's tons and tons and tons of smart people investing in the stock market, but there are also algorithms and machine learning and all this type of stuff.

因此很难相信仅凭某种肤浅的直觉理解，看看财务报表就能形成非常基础的观点，并以此获得能盈利的洞察。

And so it's very hard to believe that you can just have some sort of knee jerk surface level understanding of something and just look at financials and have some very elementary view on something and have it be some sort of insight that's profitable.

我从这段话中记住的短语，备忘录里也有，就是'关于当下易于获取的量化信息'。

Well, the phrase I took away from that, and it's in the memo, is readily available quantitative information about the present.

安德鲁指出了市场的演变过程。

And Andrew pointed out the evolution of markets.

我在六十年代中期就读芝加哥大学时，被教授的有效市场假说认为所有价格都是正确的，因为每个人都在努力寻找被低估和高估的机会。

And, you know, I was taught at Chicago in the mid sixties, the efficient market hypothesis that everything is priced right because everybody's working so hard to find the bargains and the overpricings.

当然，这只是理论框架，并非所有价格都正确。

And of course, that's a framework and it was not true that everything was priced right.

但随着时间的推移，价格确实变得更准确了。

But certainly over time, things are priced more right.

这个理论正变得越来越正确。

It's become more true.

没错。

Right.

低效之处，我更愿意称之为错误，即市场定价失误的现象，它们从何而来？

Inefficiencies, which I prefer to say mistakes, things the markets misprices, where do they come from?

它们源于无知与偏见。

They come from ignorance and prejudice.

因此穆迪公司对单一B级债券持有偏见。

So Moody's had a prejudice against the single b bond.

它对漂亮50指数股存在偏爱，大多数投资者亦是如此。

It had a prejudice in favor of the Nifty 50 as did most investors.

而我幸运地发现了一些要么不为人知，要么未被理解的事物。

And I was lucky to find some things that either others didn't know about or didn't understand.

但人类知识是累积性的。

But human knowledge is cumulative.

最近它正以惊人的速度向前推进。

And lately it's been rushing forward at an incredible pace.

因此很难想象我能从互联网上获取什么能让我赚钱的信息，因为其他人同样可以获取这些信息。

So it's hard to imagine that there's a piece of information that I can get off the Internet that's going to make me any money for the simple reason that everybody else can get it off the Internet.

在固定利润的前提下，这是场零和博弈。

This is a zero sum game for a fixed amount of profit.

利润将流向表现优异者，而这是以表现不佳者的损失为代价。

And it'll go to the people who do better at the expense of the people who do worse.

所以你必须拥有优势，无论是知识优势还是技能优势，才能成为这个等式中的赢家。

So you have to have an advantage, a knowledge advantage, a skill advantage if you're gonna be one of the people who ends up on the positive side of that equation.

回到我们早先讨论的话题，仅对一家看似人尽皆知的公司做定性判断是非常危险的。

And so to bring this back to what we were talking about earlier, it's very dangerous to just make qualitative judgments about a company that seemingly everyone has.

哦，这是一家很棒的公司的确，它会持续取得成功，但关键问题是，这已经在股价中反映了多少？

Oh, this is a great company, whatever, and it'll just continue winning without also saying, well, to what extent is this reflected in the price?

这就是投资的全部意义，无论是价值投资还是成长型投资。

And so that's the whole point of investing, whether it's value investing or growth investing.

这正是我们在备忘录中提出的观点。

That's sort of the point we make in the memo.

我的意思是，你必须能够对公司的未来前景做出判断，然后还要能评估这些预期有多少已经体现在当前价格中。

I mean, you have to be able to make judgments about the future prospects of the company, and then you have to be able to say, well, to what extent is this already reflected in the price?

如果你谈论的是公开股票或任何公开市场，我们刚才讨论的这种动态效应非常强烈。

If you're talking about public equities or any public market, that dynamic is so strong that we were just talking about.

市场上有太多信息了。

There's so much information out there.

是的。

Yes.

也许你能获得一些优势，但这非常困难。

Maybe you can have some advantage, but it's very hard.

如果你转向流动性相对公开市场差很多的私募市场，你可能会获得更多优势。

If you're instead operating in a private market that is at least relatively to the public markets much more illiquid, you can have more advantages.

所以你把职业生涯转向了主要做早期私募市场投资。

So you've shifted your career to doing mostly early stage private market investing.

这是主要原因吗？

Is that a big reason for that?

嗯，我想说的是，首先，我认为很难说风险投资市场效率极低。

Well, so what I'd say is, first of all, I think you'd be hard pressed to say that venture is super inefficient.

这不是一个人人都能参与交易的市场，实际上很难进入那些看似优秀公司的投资领域，而且对这些项目的投资竞争异常激烈。

It's not a market where everyone can transact, and it's actually hard to get in the place where you can invest in seemingly great companies, but the competition to invest in those things is very fierce.

所以我不会说我是意识到风投是一个超级低效的市场。

So I wouldn't say that I came to the realization that venture was this super inefficient market.

我只是想利用这种洞察力或其他什么。

I wanted to capitalize on that insight or whatever.

顺便说一句，抛开我热爱寻找创始人、与创始人共事、以及风投业务中诸多令我着迷的部分不谈。

And by the way, and leaving aside the fact that I love hunting for founders, I love working with founders, I love so much that goes into the whole business of venture investing.

但如果只谈这个命题本身，我进入这行的首要原因是，它更适合我的技能组合——对长期未来做出定性判断。

But if you want to just talk about the proposition, the reason why I went into it is, number one, it sort of suits my skill set more to make long term qualitative judgments about the future.

我认为风投的很大一部分工作，在于发现你今天的投入与项目成功后的潜在价值之间的巨大差距。

And I think venture, so much of what you're doing is you're finding huge gaps between what you're paying today and what this could be worth if it's right.

所以你必须真正想象：如果十年后这个项目成功了，那家企业会是什么样子？

So you have to really imagine in ten years if this is successful, well, what could that business look like?

比起公开市场投资所需的分析方式，这种思考模式更适合我的能力特长。

And much more so than the sort of analysis that goes into being a public markets investor, that really suits my skill set much more.

另一个原因是这更像是一种概率性事业。

And then the other thing is it's a much more probabilistic endeavor.

我的意思是，你要寻找的是那些预期价值极高的投资——平均而言你可能会亏损，但只要足够多的这类投资中有一部分成功，最终就能获得丰厚回报。

I mean, what you're doing is you're trying to find extremely high expected value investments where the average occurrence is that you're gonna lose your money, but make enough of those bets and so it works out to be a great return.

此外还要尽可能帮助企业，密切跟进以便向表现良好的项目追加资金等等。

And then by the way, try to help the companies in whatever way you can and follow them closely so you can add more capital to the ones that are doing well and whatever.

因此整个事业确实更符合我的特质。

And so that whole endeavor really suited my makeup much more.

哦，有点。

Oh, bit.

我们在开始录音前聊过天。

We were chatting before we started recording.

我回顾了在霍华德商学院时的笔记，还有你的书《最重要的事》。

I went back through my notes from business school from Howard, your book, The Most Important Thing Illuminated.

几乎每页都写着：风险等于永久性资本损失。

And every other page on there is, like, risk equals permanent capital loss.

尽一切可能避免永久性资本损失，而风险投资并非如此。

Do everything you can to avoid permanent capital loss, and venture is not that.

确实不是，而且我也不认为自己特别擅长那种方式。

It's not that, and I also don't think that I would be particularly great at that.

我是说，如果要我管理10家公司的投资组合，不仅整体回报要达到20%，每家都要在20%左右，或者在10%到30%之间浮动。

I mean, if you told me I had to have a portfolio of 10 companies where not only would the portfolio return be 20%, but they'd all be roughly 20%, or they'd go somewhere between ten and thirty or something like that.

我不确定这种方式是否适合我的技能组合。

I mean, I just don't know if that would be as suited with my skill set.

1978年我离开股票领域，主要是因为漂亮50的糟糕表现，作为研究主管的我与之密切相关。

And in 1978, when I left the equity area, it was really because of the terrible performance of the Nifty fifty which I as director of research was associated with.

于是他们问我：接下来想做什么？

So they said to me, what do you wanna do next?

我说：做什么都行，只要不用余生都在默克和礼来之间做选择。

And I said, I'll do anything except spend the rest of my life choosing between Merck and Lilly.

你可以找来世界上最优秀的医药分析师，每年第一天让他预测：默克和礼来哪家表现会更好。

You can take the best drug analyst in the world and sit him down on the first day of every year and ask him which is going to perform better, Merck or Lilly.

我猜他有一半的概率能猜对。

And my guess is he'll get it right half the time.

但好消息是，我老板说希望我去债券部门工作。

But the good news is my boss said, I want you go into the bond department.

这正好发挥了我的量化分析能力和保守的性格特点。

And it played to my quantitative skills and to my conservative personality.

如果他们当时说让我创立风投基金，准备在亚马逊初创时就投资，那我肯定会搞砸，因为我不是个乐观主义者。

And if they would have said, I want you to start a venture capital fund and be ready to invest in Amazon when it starts, I would have been a disaster because I'm not an optimist.

我也不是未来主义者。

I'm not a futurist.

在财务方面，我有点胆小如鼠。

And financially, I'm something of a chicken.

关键在于，到目前为止，安德鲁和我都选择了适合我们的道路。

So the point is, so far Andrew and I have gravitated things that are right for us.

这比硬要做不适合自己的事，试图方枘圆凿要轻松太多了。

And that's a hell of a lot easier than doing something which is wrong for you and trying to put a square pig in a round hole.

最让我感兴趣的是，用传统投资视角或巴菲特式投资理念来看待风险投资，这非常有意思。

One of the things that really interests me is applying some of the more traditional investing lenses or Buffett investing lenses or whatever to venture is really interesting.

因为我觉得必须思考：如果成功它能值多少钱？以及成功的概率有多大？

Because I think you have to think about well, what can this be worth if it works and what's the potential probability that it works?

在我看来，要做到这点，能够想象出企业未来的模样会非常有帮助。

And in order to do that, in my opinion, I think it's very helpful to be able to visualize what the business could look like.

如果这家公司十年后上市，投资者在考虑投资时会看到什么？

And if the company IPOs in ten years, what's that person gonna be looking at when they're thinking about investing in the company?

所以你必须试着想象，这个业务未来可能的财务状况会是什么样子，尽管它现在完全处于萌芽阶段？

So you have to sort of visualize, well, what could the financials of this business look like down the road even though it's totally nascent?

这个业务的护城河可能会是什么样子？

And what could the moats in that business look like?

要实现目标可能需要多少资金？

And how much capital might it take to get there?

竞争的可能性有多大？

And what's the likelihood of competition?

他们在市场上站稳脚跟后可能会发展成什么样子？

And what could they evolve into after they establish themselves in that market?

诸如此类的问题。

And etcetera, etcetera.

我觉得这真的很有趣。

And I think it's really interesting.

对我来说，这确实非常、非常发人深省。

And to me, I find it to be, yeah, really, really thought provoking.

记得我说过，安德鲁说过，现成可得的当前量化信息不会给你通往成功之门的钥匙。

Remember what I said, that Andrew said readily available quantitative information about the present is not going to give you the key to the castle.

不过他几分钟前说过，他擅长对未来做出定性判断。

He said a couple of minutes ago, however, that he's good at making qualitative judgments about the future.

那么，如果每个人都掌握了公司当前的所有数据和处理手段，你如何获得知识优势？

And so, if everybody has all the company data about today and the means to massage it, how do you get a knowledge advantage?

答案是，你要么必须以某种方式更好地处理当前数据（这很有挑战性），要么必须更擅长做出定性判断，要么必须更擅长预测未来。

And the answer is you have to either somehow do a better job of massaging the current data, which is challenging, or you have to be better at making qualitative judgments or you have to be better at figuring out what the future holds.

所以，他不得不从那些传统价值投资者转型，就像巴菲特常说的用50美分买价值1美元的东西，这主意其实不错。

So, he's had to evolve from the old value people who, you know, Buffett talks about buying dollars for 50¢, which is not such a terrible idea.

但更像是他现在做的，应对这些关于质性和未来性的挑战。

But to doing more like he does, dealing with these challenging aspects of qualitative and future.

是啊。

Yeah.

我是说，我觉得你得找到适合自己的方式。

I mean, think you just have to find the type of thing that suits you.

我喜欢做个乐观主义者，喜欢思考'如果成功了会怎样'。

I like being an optimist and I like thinking about, well, what could this be if it works?

也有人喜欢说'这家公司显然很糟糕，但没大家想的那么糟'。

And there are other people that like saying, well, this company clearly sucks, but it doesn't suck as much as everyone thinks.

或者人们认为这业务要完蛋了，但我觉得它只是会受重创而已。

Or people think this business is going to die, but I think it's only going to be maimed or something.

它会慢慢拖上更多年才死透。

It will die slowly over more years.

要知道这种能力极其珍贵，靠这个能获得惊人回报。

You know, that's an incredibly valuable skill to have and you can make incredible returns doing that.

只是这不适合我的天性。

It's just not in my nature.

橡树资本，我想我们最出名的是投资困境债务。

Well, Oak trees, I think the thing we're known best for is investing in distressed debt.

88年我们刚开始做时，我和合伙人布鲁斯·高什就有这个想法。

And when we started that in '88, my partner Bruce Garsh and I had this idea.

这其实是布鲁斯的主意，但他加入了我，而那时我在高收益债券行业已有十年经验。

It was actually Bruce's idea, but he joined me and I'd been in the higher bond business for ten years at that point.

人们会说，这太疯狂了。

People would say, well, that's crazy.

你居然要购买那些破产公司的债务。

You're going to buy the debt of companies that are bankrupt.

它们根本不会偿还债务。

They're not going to repay the debt.

答案是：首先，它们确实不会全额偿还，但会支付部分。

And the answer is, A, they're not going to repay it in full, but they're going to pay part.

这可能就足够了。

That may be enough.

或者如果债权人未获偿付，他们将获得公司所有权。

Or if the creditors are unpaid, they get the company.

这可能具有价值。

That may have value.

但这对我很有利。

But that was good for me.

对布鲁斯·卡什来说更是绝佳机会。

It was great for Bruce Karsh.

但对安德鲁来说并不合适。

It wasn't the right thing for Andrew.

幸运的是，我们最终走向了正确的方向。

So fortunately, we gravitated in the right direction.

现在是感谢本节目好友ServiceNow的最佳时机。

Now is a great time to thank good friend of the show, ServiceNow.

我们曾向听众介绍过ServiceNow惊人的创业故事，以及它如何成为过去十年表现最佳的企业之一，但仍有听众询问ServiceNow的实际业务。

We have talked to listeners about ServiceNow's amazing origin story and how they've been one of the best performing companies the last decade, but we've gotten some questions from listeners about what ServiceNow actually does.

所以今天，我们就来解答这个问题。

So today, we are gonna answer that question.

首先，最近媒体频繁引用的一个说法是：ServiceNow是企业级AI操作系统的代名词。

Well, to start, a phrase that has been used often here recently in the press is that ServiceNow is the, quote, unquote, AI operating system for the enterprise.

具体来说，ServiceNow创立于22年前，最初专注于自动化领域。

But to make that more concrete, ServiceNow started twenty two years ago focused simply on automation.

他们将实体文书工作转化为软件流程，最初服务于企业内部的IT部门。

They turned physical paperwork into software workflows initially for the IT department within enterprises.

仅此而已。

That was it.

随着时间的推移，他们在这个平台上不断扩展，处理更强大复杂的任务。

And over time, they built on this platform going to more powerful and complex tasks.

服务范围从IT部门延伸到人力资源、财务、客户服务、现场运营等部门。

They were expanding from serving just IT to other departments like HR, finance, customer service, field operations, and more.

在过去二十年的发展过程中，ServiceNow已为企业搭建了连接各个角落所需的繁琐基础设施，为实现自动化铺平道路。

And in the process over the last two decades, ServiceNow has laid all the tedious groundwork necessary to connect every corner of the enterprise and enable automation to happen.

因此当AI技术兴起时——从定义上说AI本身就是高度复杂的任务自动化——

So when AI arrived well, AI kinda just by definition is massively sophisticated task automation.

而谁早已搭建好支持这种自动化的企业级平台和连接网络呢？

And who had already built the platform and the connective tissue with enterprises to enable that automation?

ServiceNow。

ServiceNow.

那么回答这个问题：ServiceNow如今是做什么的？

So to answer the question, what does ServiceNow do today?

他们说连接并赋能每个部门时，是认真的。

We mean it when they say they connect and power every department.

IT和人力资源部门用它来管理全公司的人员、设备和软件许可证。

IT and HR use it to manage people, devices, software licenses across the company.

客户服务部门使用ServiceNow来检测支付失败等问题，并将其路由到内部正确的团队或流程来解决。

Customer service uses ServiceNow for things like detecting payment failures and routing to the right team or process internally to solve it.

供应链组织则用它进行产能规划，整合其他部门的数据和计划，确保所有人都在同一页面上。

Or the supply chain org uses it for capacity planning, integrating with data and plans from other departments to ensure that everybody's on the same page.

不再需要在不同应用间来回切换，重复输入相同数据。

No more swivel chairing between apps to enter the same data multiple times in different places.

就在最近，ServiceNow推出了AI代理，任何岗位的员工都可以创建AI代理来处理繁琐事务，让人力专注于更具战略性的工作。

And just recently, ServiceNow launched AI agents so that anyone working in any job can spin up an AI agent to handle the tedious stuff, freeing up humans for bigger picture work.

ServiceNow去年入选了《财富》全球最受赞赏公司榜单和《快公司》最佳创新者工作场所，正是源于这一愿景。

ServiceNow was named to Fortune's world's most admired companies list last year and Fast Company's best workplace for innovators last year, and it's because of this vision.

如果你想在业务的每个角落都利用ServiceNow的规模和速度，请访问servicenow.com/acquired，并告诉他们

If you wanna take advantage of the scale and speed of ServiceNow in every corner of your business, go to servicenow.com/acquired and just tell them

是本和大卫推荐你来的。

that Ben and David sent you.

谢谢，ServiceNow。

Thanks, ServiceNow.

我们想请教两位关于投资业务中公司建设方面的问题。

We wanted to ask both of you about the firm building aspect of the investment business.

在我的职业生涯中，我深刻认识到成为杰出的投资者是一项极具挑战性的事业，足以让人穷尽一生去追求。

One thing I've certainly learned in my career is that being a great investor is a very challenging proposition and an activity that can easily be one's life work.

而打造一家卓越的投资公司则是完全不同的挑战。

Building a great investment firm is a very different challenge.

很少有人能在这两方面都做到出类拔萃。

It's very rare that people can be great at both of those.

这也不是可以轻易承担的次要挑战。

And it's also not a second challenge to take on lightly.

两位对此有何看法？

How did each of you think of this?

我在花旗银行度过了前十七年，那是个管理密集的官僚机构，所以我对这些事务相当在行。

Well, having spent my first seventeen years at Citibank, which is a management intensive bureaucracy, I was pretty good at those things.

我不是那种从车库起家的创业者，明白吗？

I was not a guy who started in a garage, know?

流程化和深思熟虑的作风正对我的路子。

And so processes and deliberateness were right up my alley.

但另一方面，我们创立橡树资本时，市场对另类投资的需求异常强劲。

But on the other hand, we started Oaktree at a time when the quest for alternative investments was extremely strong.

我认为当时的需求远远超过了供给。

The demand I think outstripped the supply.

大多数人基本放弃了从股票和债券中获取所需回报的期望。

Most people kind of gave up on getting the returns they need from stocks and bonds.

我们当时有很大的顺风助力。

So, we had a big tailwind.

布鲁斯和我主要做的是创建一种文化。

And what Bruce and I did for the most part is create a culture.

我们从未有过宏观管理或微观管理的心态。

We didn't ever have a macro managing, micromanaging mentality.

我们太忙了。

We were too busy.

经营公司不是我们的日常工作。

It was not our day job to run the company.

我们只是顺便做做，并不需要密集的管理。

We did that as a sideline and it wasn't management intensive.

所以我们在利润率方面并不出色，但它们基本上能自我维持。

So we weren't great on the profit margins, but they kind of took care of themselves.

而且我们在薪酬方面很随意。

And we were haphazard about compensation.

你知道，我们总是对最后一个进门的人做出反应。

You know, we kind of respond to the last person to walk in the door.

但正确的文化在正确的时间，加上我认为一些杰出的人才，就足以让公司成功，尽管从管理角度看它基本上是个无制导导弹。

But the right culture at the right time with I think some exceptional people was enough to make the company a success, even though it was largely an unguided missile in terms of management.

您是如何考虑划分核心业务投资能力与寻找管理资本这一业务命脉之间的职责的？

How did you think about splitting up the responsibilities of the core competency of the business investing versus the necessary lifeblood of the business of finding capital to manage?

还有招聘等一切事务。

And recruiting and everything.

我们当时最大的优势在于，橡树资本的创始团队共有五人——除了布鲁斯和我之外还有三位成员，在创立时我们平均已共事九年。

Well, the great advantage we had is that the people who started Oaktree, there were five of us, three others in addition to Bruce and me, had worked together on average for nine years at the time we did it.

因此，我们不需要与陌生人磨合，也无需摸索合作模式。

So, we weren't dealing with strangers and trying to figure out an MO.

我们要做的只是在橡树资本延续TCW时期的工作方式。

All we had to do is what we had been doing at TCW before Oaktree.

大体而言，我的职责是外出募资、拜访客户，并代表公司在更广泛的社群及潜在客户中建立形象。

And for the most part, that meant I was out raising the money and visiting with the clients and representing us to the greater community and clients and prospects.

而布鲁斯和其他成员则负责资金管理。

And Bruce and the others were back managing money.

大卫你提到我的著作《投资最重要的事》，这本书其实源自2002年左右我写的一份同名备忘录。

And David, you mentioned my book, The Most Important Thing, that actually evolved from a memo of that title that I wrote around '2.

备忘录中曾有个关于公司经营的章节，因与投资无关最终未收录进书里。

And that had a section on how to run a company, which I spared the readers of the book because it had nothing to do with investing.

但我在其中强调过，合伙人关系的核心在于价值观一致且能力互补。

But I said in there that the key among partners is to have shared values and complementary skills.

我们的价值观确实高度契合。

And we absolutely shared values.

大家都是重视家庭、作风保守的风险厌恶型人格。

We're all family men and conservative people and somewhat risk averse and so forth.

安德鲁指出我们或许该吸纳一位不那么规避风险的创始人，不过我们发展得还不错。

Andrew points out we probably could have used one founder in the mix who wasn't quite as risk averse, but we did okay.

我们的能力确实互补——我能处理布鲁斯未必擅长（虽然他实际能力比自认的更强）或不愿参与的对外事务。

But we had complimentary skills and I could do things in the outside community that Bruce maybe couldn't do, although he's better at it than he thinks, but had no interest in doing.

他在资金管理方面能做到我做不到的事情。

And he could do things in terms of managing money that I couldn't do.

但好消息是我们都接受我刚才所说的这个事实。

But the great news is we each accepted the truth of what I just said.

因此这产生了许多尊重，相互的尊重。

And so that produces a lot of respect, mutual respect.

这就是为什么我们能有长达三十五年的出色合作关系。

And that's why we've had such a great partnership for thirty five years.

然后对我们来说，我

And then for us, I

我的意思是，虽然我对我父亲和他的合伙人所建立的事业感到无比自豪和钦佩，但我们的方式几乎完全相反，只是因为这种方式适合我们。

mean, while I'm incredibly proud of and impressed by what my dad and his partners have built, our approach is sort of totally opposite just because it suits us.

这听起来像是父子之间的一个主题

That sounds like a theme between father

和儿子。

and son.

是的，我的意思是，并不是为了刻意相反，而是我和我的合伙人舒斯特从开始就共同负责投资计划、项目筛选和投资决策，我们作为长期亲密好友的关系也很有帮助。

Yeah, I mean, it's not for the sake of being opposite but my partner Shuster and I who we both since we started have run the investment program and the sourcing and investment decisions and it helps that we've been longtime extremely close friends.

我们经常交流，感觉就像每天都要掐自己一下，不敢相信我们能做这些我们如此热爱的投资工作。

And we talk all the time and we just feel like we have to really pinch ourselves that we get to do this every day, that we just love, love the investing.

对我们来说，长期获得绝对世界级的回报是我们所有人的动力。

And to us, what motivates all of us is having absolutely world class returns over a long period of time.

尽管你们在其他许多方面理念不同，但看来你和你父亲一样都有那种竞争意识。

You seem to share that competitive streak with your dad even though you have different ideals in many other ways.

是啊。

Yeah.

你知道吗，本？

You know what, Ben?

如果你没有竞争意识，就不该进入投资行业。

If you're not competitive, you shouldn't be in the investment business.

对。

Yeah.

但我要说的不是与别人竞争。

But I would say it's not competitive with others.

而是与自己的竞争。

It's competition with ourselves.

我的意思是，我们只想做到自己力所能及的最好。

I mean, we just wanna be the best that we possibly can be.

所以我们在公司所做的一切都是为了这个目标，并不是说其他方法不够有效或对别人不适用。

So everything we do at our firm is in service of that and it's not because other approaches aren't also extremely valid or work for other people.

只是这种方式最能激励我们。

It's just that this is what motivates us.

因此我们无意扩大公司的业务范围，或是把公司变成大型资产管理机构。

And so we have no ambition to broaden our firm in terms of strategies or turn our firm into some big asset manager.

如果我们的工作从投资转向管理，我们会非常不开心，这种代价不值得。

And if our jobs turned from investing into management, we'd be extremely unhappy and that trade off isn't worth it.

所以我们所做的一切都是为了能从事热爱的事业，最大化投入其中的时间，并尽可能获得最佳回报。

So everything we do is in service of trying to do what we love and maximize our time doing that and have the best returns that we possibly can.

我们认为在这个行业中，真正重要的是你与创始人的声誉，以及尽可能广泛地建立与众多极具潜力的天才创始人的联系网络。

And so do the things that we think enable that, which in our opinion in this business is really all about your reputation with founders and having as broad of a network of as many incredibly talented potential founders as you can.

然后尽我们所能与他们建立最佳的关系。

And then being able to do whatever we can to build the best relationships we can with them.

我认为这来自于帮助他们，同时也来自于成为出色的合作伙伴和朋友。

And I think that comes from helping them, but I think that also comes from being great partners and also friends.

这就是我们建立公司的方式，它非常与众不同。

That's how we build the firm and it's very different.

你指出橡树资本和TQ投资业务的本质截然不同，因此核心竞争力也非常不同。

You point out that the nature of Oaktree and TQ's investment businesses is very different, and thus the core competencies are, you know, very different too.

安德鲁，你不写面向公众的备忘录。

Andrew, you don't write public facing memos.

你也不常上播客节目。

You don't go on too many podcasts.

感谢你参加我们的节目。

Thank you for joining us here.

但这可能不像在橡树资本时那么重要了。

But it's probably just not as important as it was at Oaktree.

听着。

Look.

风投界有其他人在这方面做得非常出色。

There are other people in venture who do that stuff extremely well.

风投界的其他人会上播客节目吗？

Other people in venture go on podcasts?

我认为那些播客很棒，做播客的人可能既出于热爱，也因为这对他们确实大有裨益。

I think those podcasts are great, and I think people who do it probably do it because they enjoy it but also because it really helps them.

我的意思是，它能与创始人共同打造优秀品牌，扩展人脉网络，大幅提升可信度等等。

I mean, builds great brands with founders and increases their network and adds a lot of credibility and all that type of stuff.

我觉得到了一定阶段，你自然会选择适合自己的方式。

I think at some point, you just sort of do what suits you.

我们有适合自己的方式，别人也有他们适合的方式。

And we have certain things that suit us and other people have things that suit them.

这根本不是'上播客对我们利大于弊吗'或'该不该公开露面'这类战略性问题。

And it's not really a strategic question about if going on podcasts help us or hurt us or being public facing or whatever.

你只需要做自己认为正确的事。

It's just you sort of do what you think is right for you.

这倒挺有意思的。

Which is funny.

霍华德，这让我想起你以前说过的话——必须确保投资策略符合你作为投资人的气质，这几乎是同一个道理。

That's the echo of, Howard, something I've heard you say in the past, which is that you just have to make sure that your investment strategy suits your demeanor as an investor, which is almost saying the same thing.

其实我和戴维在播客业务中经常讨论这个问题。

I mean, David and I talk about this a lot in the podcasting business.

我们会纠结：是否应该根据市场需求调整内容？

We say, should we change the content to match what the demand seems to be?

还是说干脆——

Or should we just say, you know what?

不如找到一种能自然展现本真的方式，因为那样做起来才最有趣。

Let's find a way to do what's natural to us because that's what we're gonna have the most fun doing.

这正是我们将获得竞争优势并保持持久性的领域。

That's where we're gonna have competitive advantage, and that's where we're gonna have durability.

我认为同样的理念也适用于刚才讨论的这三个方面。

And I think that same concept applies in all three of those things just discussed.

当被问及职业建议，或与现今的学生交谈时，我说的内容与本刚才说的非常一致，本。

When I'm asked for career advice, when I speak to students nowadays, I say something very, very much in line with what you just said, Ben.

我说，寻找能发挥你优势、规避你弱点并且你会乐在其中的事情。

I say, look for something that plays to your strengths and avoids your weaknesses and that you'll enjoy doing.

听起来这正是你所做的，并且成功实现了转变。

And it sounds like that's what you've done and turn it around.

我们何其幸运，能够从事自己热爱的事业。若将这份热爱从等式中移除，你还剩下什么？

We are so lucky to have the ability to do something we enjoy And take that out of the equation, what are you left with?

人生只有一次。

We only have one life.

我们应当充分把握。

We should make the most of it we can.

我认为任何有选择权却为了赚更多钱而从事自己不喜欢工作的人，都在犯世界级的错误。

I think anybody who has a choice and does something he doesn't enjoy just to make more money is making a world class mistake.

我认为学习和进化非常重要。

I think learning and evolution are really important.

在我们公司，学习对我们至关重要，这关乎我们的本质属性——持续尝试拓展能力边界，直面犯过的无数错误等等。

Learning at our firm is really important to us and it's just important to who we are as people and continuing to try and expand our competencies and rub our nose in the many mistakes we make and all that type of stuff.

因此你必须找到适合自己的方向，但也不能过度固守舒适区，仅因不符合舒适区就全盘否定某些事物。

And so I think you have to find something that suits you, but you also can't get too hung up in your comfort zone and just say, well, doesn't fit in my comfort zone, so I'm just going to totally ignore that.

你们在伯克希尔那期节目里讨论过这个话题。

And you guys talked about this on your Berkshire episode.

我是说，对巴菲特的一个批评可能是他完全忽视了科技领域。

I mean, one critique you could make of Buffett is he just totally ignored technology.

科技不仅变得无处不在，而且我认为——他确实是个极其聪明的人，深谙商业的多元要素。

And technology not only became much more pervasive, but I also think that I mean, he's an incredibly smart guy and he understands lots of different elements of business.

当他谈及科技时，我想他指的是那些科学实验性质的项目——你知道的，技术优势是企业长期制胜的关键。

And when he talked about technology, I think he was referring to science projects, you know, where your technical advantage is what will allow your business to succeed over time.

但有很多科技公司所做的事情并非那么前沿。

But there are lots and lots of technology companies where what they do is not so incredibly cutting edge.

真正驱动他们业务的护城河，其实与其他行业的壁垒非常相似。

And really what powers their business is moats that are very similar to other sorts of things.

你们还邀请过汉密尔顿·赫尔默，这类护城河往往横跨科技与非科技企业。

You also had Hamilton Helmer on here and a lot of those sort of moats traverse both technology and non technology businesses.

所以我毫不怀疑巴菲特本可以大获成功，但

So I have no doubt that Buffett could have totally nailed it, but it

这确实超出了他的舒适区。

was just not in his comfort zone.

你看，这揭示了投资中的二元性，或者说众多悖论之一。

You know, this points out a dichotomy in investing or maybe a conundrum of which there are so many.

因为我们刚谈到坚守能力圈、做擅长且适合的事很重要。

Because what we just talked about was it's important to stick to your last and do what you're good at and fits with you.

但保持开放心态也同样关键，而我愿意

But it's also essential to be open minded and I'm willing to

脖子都快扭断了。

getting whiplash.

是啊。

Yeah.

但听着，要成为一名优秀的投资者，你必须保持自信，因为你要支持那些不确定的项目，并在它们表现不佳时坚持持有。

But look, to be a good investor, you have to be confident because you have to back things that are iffy and stay with them if they go bad.

如果你参与公开证券市场，当股价下跌时，你可能还需要加仓。

And if you're in the public securities market, you have to maybe buy more of them when they decline.

但也不能过于自信，以至于固执己见，不断在错误的方向上追加投资。

But not so confident that you're big headed and keep throwing bad money after good.

你必须集中持仓，让你一生中为数不多的好点子真正带来巨大收益。

You have to concentrate your holdings enough so that the few good ideas you get in your lifetime really make a big difference.

但你也需要分散投资以防范不可预见的风险。

But you have to diversify to protect against the unforeseen.

所以，这才是问题的核心。

So, this is really the nub of it.

这个领域如此迷人，因为在我看来，我们讨论的这些内容无法被简化为算法。

It's such a fascinating field because in my opinion, the things we're talking about can't be reduced to an algorithm.

而这正是我们人性价值所在——正如安德鲁所说，要对未来做出更优质的定性判断。

And this is where our humanity pays off because Andrew talks about making better qualitative judgments about the future.

我愿意相信计算机短期内还无法在这方面做得很好，这样我们仍能保有成功的空间。

I like to believe that computers will not be doing that well for some time so that we'll still have some scope for success.

或者如果它们做到了，那就不再是竞争优势了。

Or if they do, then it will cease to become a competitive advantage.

对。

Right.

不过，我们需要保留一些竞争优势，你懂的。

Well, but we need to have some competitive advantages left, you know.

但我认为这源于质量和未来。

But I think it comes from qualitative and future.

我常说，我不认为计算机能坐下来审阅五份商业计划书，就能提前识别出哪家会成为亚马逊；或是见过五位CEO，就能知道哪位会成为史蒂夫·乔布斯。

I always say that I don't think that a computer can sit down with five business plans and figure out which one is Amazon in advance or meet five CEOs and know which one is Steve Jobs.

而且能做到的人也不多。

And not many people can do it either.

这才是关键。

That's the important thing.

但少数能做到的人，确实能为客户创造价值。

But the few who can, can really help their clients.

如果那个发现亚马逊的人还能发现谷歌、发现Facebook，直到你能断定这是能力而非运气使然，那你就真正掌握了核心竞争力。

And if the person who finds Amazon can also find Google and can find Facebook and to the point where you can conclude, okay, it's skill, not luck, then you really have something.

这里有个哲学问题。

So here's a philosophical question.

如果争论双方都能提出非常可信的论点，而你总是可以同时支持两者，最终陷入两难——说到底，一切终归取决于判断力。

If there's a very credible trope to be made on either side of an argument, and you can always make both of them and then be stuck in the middle, ultimately, everything always comes down to judgment.

那么判断力从何而来？

So where does judgment come from?

嗯，这是个好问题。

Well, that's a great question.

2011年《最重要的事》即将出版时，我和查理·芒格共进午餐，因为他在市中心工作，就在我隔壁的办公楼里。

I was having lunch with Charlie Munger back in 2011 when Most Important Thing was about to come out because he worked downtown right next to me in the building next door.

当我起身离开时，他说：记住，这一切都不该是容易的。

And when I got up to go, he said, Just remember, none of this is meant to be easy.

认为这很容易的人都是愚蠢的。

Anybody who thinks it's easy is stupid.

于是我写了一份备忘录，如果没记错的话，应该是9月15日。

And so I wrote a memo, I think it was September 15, if I'm not mistaken.

我在备忘录里谈到了这一点。

And I talked about that.

我将其命名为《这并不容易》。

I called it It's Not Easy.

我的一位朋友写了本关于英国投资的书，书名很直白：《简单但不容易》。

A friend of mine wrote a book on investing in The UK and the title is simple but not easy.

我们应该做的事情描述起来很简单。

The things we're supposed to do are simple to describe.

但要做得比别人好、始终如一且经得起时间考验，可不容易。

It's just not easy to do them a, better than other people and B, consistently and C, over time.

归根结底都取决于判断力。

It all comes down to judgment.

不过本，这不是你的问题。

Now, that's not your question, Ben.

你的问题是：这种判断力从何而来？

Your question is where does it come from?

你还记得《最重要的事》第一章讲的就是第二层思维。

And you remember that the first chapter of the most important thing talks about second level thinking.

以更高层次的方式思考，不仅要与众不同，还要更胜一筹。

Thinking at a higher level than others differently, but also better.

也就是说要更加正确。

That is to say more correct.

偏离共识思维很容易，但要做到正确偏离并不总是容易的。

It's easy to diverge from the thinking of the consensus, not always easy to diverge correctly.

但这就是优秀投资者必须做到的。

But that's what a superior investor has to do.

你可以称之为第二层思维、变异感知、知识优势、洞察力、背景或判断力。

You might call it second level thinking, variant perception, knowledge advantage, insight, context, judgment.

但它是一种无形之物。

But it's an intangible.

有人问我，你能教会别人成为第二层思考者吗？

People say to me, Can you teach somebody to be a second level thinker?

我说，我不知道。

And I said, I don't know.

这有点像让篮球教练教身高。

It's kind of like asking the basketball coach to coach height.

他再努力也无法让球员长高。

All his efforts won't make his players any taller.

有些人能领悟，有些人则不能。

Some people get it, some don't.

是的。

Yeah.

我认为这可能源于多个方面，但有些想法会是深刻知识与理解的结合，真正明白什么重要、什么不重要及其原因的基本框架。

I I would say it probably comes from a lot of different places, but some ideas would be some combination of sort of deep knowledge and understanding of what you're doing and the real framework for what matters and what doesn't and why.

我会说是理性——即逻辑思考而非感情用事的能力，这与了解自己、知道偏见会在何处影响决策过程相辅相成。

I would say rationality which is the ability to think logically and not emotionally, which sort of dovetails with knowing yourself and being able to know where your biases will infect the decision making process.

此外我认为随之而来的还有知识上的谦逊，明白即使所有这些条件都满足，你仍有可能犯错，同时清楚自己未知的领域。

And then I think there's intellectual humility that comes with it, knowing that there's a good chance that you can be wrong even if all those things are true and also knowing what you don't know.

所以要知道哪些领域你无法妄加评论，哪些需要学习，哪些应该寻求他人意见等等。

So knowing where you can't opine and where you have to learn and where you should seek others and things like that.

安德鲁，我想这对你可能不太适用，但在橡树资本时，你确实招募了大量人员。

Andrew, I imagine this is less so for you, but certainly at Oaktree, you recruited a lot of people.

超过一千名员工。

Over a thousand employees.

对吧？

Right?

因此你必须对他人的判断力做出评判。

So you had to make judgment about other people's judgment.

你是怎么做到的？

How did you do that?

你知道，早在七十年代初我当分析师时，我跟踪研究施乐公司。

You know, back when I was an analyst in the early seventies, I followed Xerox.

当时有位投资组合经理问我：华尔街卖方分析师中谁是最懂施乐的专家？

And one of the portfolio managers said to me, who's the best Wall Street analyst on Xerox sell side?

我说过，最认同我观点的是某某人。

And I said, well, the one who agrees with me most is so and so.

这不就是我们判断谁最聪明的标准吗？

Isn't that our definition of who's the smartest?

不，但事实上我们寻找的是聪明人。

No, but the truth is we look for smart people.

我们寻找的是我妻子南希所说的'慧眼'。

We look for what Nancy, my wife calls smart eyes.

那些能比常人更透彻理解事物本质、能分辨轻重缓急、能超越现成量化信息的杰出人才。

Exceptional people who get things maybe a little better than others who understand what's important and what's not, who can go beyond the readily available quantitative information.

看吧，道理其实很简单。

And look, it's very simple.

就像石油一样。

Like with oil.

低油价的解药就是低油价本身。

The cure for low oil prices is low oil prices.

有些人能凭直觉理解这点，有些人则始终不明白。

Some people get that intuitively, some people don't understand it.

你必须找到那些能凭直觉领悟的人。

You have to get the people who get it intuitively.

但我认为同样重要的是，我们寻找具有团队精神的人。

But I think also very importantly, we look for team players.

我们寻找那些善于协作交流、能虚心接纳同僚/下属/上级意见，并将所有想法融会贯通的人才。

We look for people who can work and exchange ideas and can do well with ideas from their peers, from their lessors, from their superiors, managers, subordinates, you know, and throw it all together.

我们不想要独狼型的人。

We don't want the lone wolf.

我们不想要那种'各凭本事吃饭'类型的人。

We don't want the you eat what you kill kind of person.

我们也不会根据个人一年的量化表现来支付报酬。

And we don't pay people on the basis of their one year's quantitative performance as an individual.

我们也不希望人们以这种方式工作。

And we don't want people to work that way.

我可以肯定地说，我在招聘方面几乎拥有同样丰富的经验。

I definitely can attest to having nearly as much experience in recruiting.

我们现在已经为团队增加了整整三个人。

We've added a whole three people to our team now.

但我确实认为，风险投资决策的绝大部分在于理解创始人并对创始人有感觉。

But I do think that the vast majority of the venture investment decision making is about understanding founders and having a sense for founders.

我的意思是，在讨论了所有这些商业分析之后，我们坚信投资考量的绝大部分是支持正确的人。

I mean, again, after talking about all this business analysis stuff, we firmly believe that the vast, vast majority of the investment consideration is backing the right people.

因此我认为你每天、每周所做的都是在评估人，所以你必须以同样的方式来做这件事。

And so what you're doing, I think every day, every week is evaluating people and so you have to do that in the same way.

所以我认为首先，当你听到一个风险投资提案时，我们听到的很多提案都是这样：这个人上台后就开始说，这是我上过的学校，这是我工作过的地方，然后我在这里工作过，现在我在做这个，让我告诉你我在做什么。

And so I think first of all, when you hear a venture pitch, so many of them that we all hear are like, you know, the person gets on and it's like, here's where I went to school, here's where I worked, and then I worked here, and now I'm doing this and let me tell you what I'm doing.

我就会说，不不不，让我们停下来。

And I sort of say, no, no, no, let's stop.

我想花很多时间去了解你。

I want to spend a lot of time understanding you.

我认为真正判断一个人能力的方法，是深入了解他的经历和背景，理解他做决策的原因。

And I think the real way to suss out judgment is by going through the person's story and background and understanding why they made decisions.

因为对于未来可能发生的事情，你多少可以伪装应付过去。

Because you can sort of fake your way through prospective things.

就像我在学校招聘时，金融面试有所谓的宝典指南，你可以死记硬背所有关于如何应对各种问题的标准答案。

And when I, and I'm sure you guys were recruiting at a school, you know, there was the vault guide for finance interviews and you could memorize every single answer about how you would do this and how you do that and whatever.

在计算机领域有本叫《编程面试揭秘》的书，由三位前微软员工编写，确实是快速通过这些面试的捷径。

In CS there was a book called Programming Interviews Exposed written by three ex Microsoft guys and it was truly the way to whiz through any of these.

没错，但你无法伪造你过去的实际经历。

Yeah, but you can't fake what you've done.

所以如果你深入探究一个人过去的所作所为及其原因，看他们是否基于自己的判断做决定，是否持续学习成长，是否基于第一性原理思考，是否敢于逆流而行，是否因热爱而行动，以及他们的想法是否源于对实际问题的具体认知和深刻理解——通过这些，你就能很好地评估一个人的判断力。

And so if you really dive into what people have done and why and if they've made decisions based on their own judgment, and if they've learned and evolved, and if they've made decisions based on first principles and we're willing to go against the herd and we're willing to do things because they're passionate, and if their idea comes from specific knowledge of a real problem and a real deep understanding, I think you can evaluate judgment very well based on that.

我认为这套方法同样适用于招聘。

And so I think that translates into hiring too.

真正了解一个人过去的经历及其背后的原因。

Really understanding what people have done in the past and why.

此外我认为在招聘过程中也可以针对具体技能进行测试。

And then I think you can also test for specific skills in the hiring process.

我的意思是，你需要明确为什么要聘用某人，然后可以通过实际方式来验证这些特质。

I mean, I think you wanna understand why you wanna hire someone, and then I think you can test against those things in real ways.

说来有趣。

It's funny.

关于创始人这个话题，我最近刚和父亲讨论过一笔潜在的天使投资。

On the founders thing, I was having a conversation with my dad about a potential angel investment recently.

他说，我知道人们总说创始人最重要，但你认为这具体意味着什么？

And he was like, I know people always say the founder's the most important, but what is your view of what that actually means?

我就随口给出了这个回答。

And I sort of just barfed out this answer.

霍华德，听起来像你之前讲的故事。

Howard, sounds like your earlier story.

这个想法突然冒出来，我当时就想，他们是不是怪人？

It just came to you, and I was like, are they a weirdo?

特别是，他们在某件事上是否怪异到偏离平均值四个标准差的程度？

And in particular, are they a weirdo at something where there are four standard deviations from the mean at that thing?

这个特质可以是任何方面的。

And it could kinda be anything.

但如果这个人不能在每件事上都处于平均水平，这家初创公司就永远不会成功。

But if this person can't be in the middle of the distribution at everything, or else this startup will never be successful.

是啊。

Yeah.

我觉得有意思的是，通过惊人地擅长常规事务也能以多种方式成功——比如成为最会按图索骥的人，或者破解前人走过的流程。

Well, I think what's interesting also is that there are so many ways to succeed by being amazingly good at the conventional thing, by being the best at going through the map or following the map or whatever, and sort of hacking whatever the process is that everyone's done before you.

但对于初创企业来说，并没有太多现成的地图可循。

But with startups, there's not much of a map.

虽然有些通用原则，但在任何特定领域，你都在做前人未做过的事。

I mean, there might be some general principles, but in any given area, you're doing what you're doing for the first time.

即使别人也在做，你也要尝试用不同的方式做得更好。

Or if someone else is doing it, you're trying to do it differently and better and whatever.

所以你必须能够独立思考，并且对自己有真正的信念。

So you have to be able to think for yourself and you have to have real conviction in yourself.

因此我认为，那些更不墨守成规的人，是愿意基于他们认为对自己正确的事情和自己的观点行事的人，而不是仅仅在常规事物上做到最好。

And so I think to your point, the people who are more unconventional are people who are willing to do things based on what they think is right for them and their own views versus just being the best at what's conventional.

你知道，我几周前发布的最后一份备忘录叫做《恕我直言》。

You know, my last memo came out a couple weeks ago was called I beg to differ.

它通篇都在讲保持与众不同的必要性。

And it was all about the need to be different.

这正像你所说的那样。

And it's exactly what you're saying.

通往卓越的道路不可能通过做和其他人一样的事情来实现。

The path to exceptionality cannot come through doing what everybody else does.

而我们正在讨论的这些事——尤其是安德鲁所做的——其优势就在于没有清晰的路线图。

And the advantage of the things we do, especially Andrew does, that we've been discussing, is the fact that there is no clear roadmap.

没有一个简单的算法能持续产生正确的结果。

There's no simple algorithm which will produce a consistently correct outcome.

但我们这里讨论的是具有挑战性的概念。

But we are dealing with challenging concepts here.

而看得不同且更透彻的人将会胜出。

And the person who sees differently and better is the one who's gonna win.

曾管理耶鲁大学捐赠基金的大卫·斯文森就常说要去做那些令人不适的独特之事。

David Swenson, who ran the endowment at Yale, used to talk about the need to do things that are uncomfortably idiosyncratic.

你必须特立独行才能分割税收并取得胜利。

You have to be idiosyncratic to split tax and to win.

对许多人来说，这会让他们感到不适，因为他们会与所谓的常识脱节。

And for many people, it'll be uncomfortable because they'll be out of step with so called common sense.

但你必须去做

But you got to do

无论如何。

it anyway.

关于为什么创始人就是一切这一点，我自己有个直觉的理解方式，就像你父亲问的那个问题：想象一下你能想到的最棒的创业点子。

One way that I sort of intuit for myself about this point about why founders are everything, sort of the question I guess your dad asked is, think of the best startup idea you could possibly imagine.

我不知道。

I don't know.

有人给了你谷歌的PageRank算法。

Someone gave you Google's PageRank algorithm.

我正好也在想这个。

That's literally what I was thinking of too.

然后想象你生活中一个平庸的人，或者比平庸稍好一点，得A-或B+的人。

And then imagine someone from your life that's mediocre or maybe better than mediocre or an a minus or a b plus.

甚至是在常规事情上有才华的人。

Or even talented at conventional things.

是啊。

Yeah.

那个人能创建谷歌的几率有多大？

What are the odds that that person would have built Google?

零。

Zero.

零。

Zero.

对吧？

Right?

这是因为，首先，即使你有一个绝佳的点子并且执行了所有必要的步骤，创办一家公司依然很难。

And that's because, number one, it's hard to build a company even if you have a great idea and execute on all the things you have to execute.

但其次，如果你在某件事上做得好，其他聪明人就会想，嘿，这里有很多价值可以获取。

But number two, if you're doing something well, other smart people are gonna be like, hey, there's a lot of value to capture here.

我要去竞争。

I'm gonna go compete.

所以你不光要建立自己的公司，还必须胜过所有竞争对手。

So not only are you gonna have to build your company, but you're gonna have to outcompete everyone else.

我认为只有非凡之人才能展现非凡的判断力，吸引并留住其他杰出人才，具备伟大创始人所需的一切素质，才能成就这样的事业。

And I just think it takes exceptional people who can exhibit exceptional judgment, who can attract and retain other exceptional people, and all the things that go into being a great founder to build those sorts of things.

好了，听众朋友们。

Alright, listeners.

现在正是感谢我们节目的老朋友Vanta的好时机，这家领先的主动信任平台能帮助您自动化合规管理并控制风险。

This is a great time to thank our longtime friend of the show, Vanta, the leading agentic trust platform that helps you automate compliance and manage risk.

大卫，我和克里斯蒂娜以及Vanta团队交流了最新进展。

David, I, caught up with Christina and the Vanta team to get the latest.

哦，不错。

Oh, nice.

听众们可能知道Vanta最初专注于合规自动化。

So listeners probably know Vanta started by focusing on compliance automation.

帮助公司获取SOC2、ISO27001、GDPR和HIPAA认证。

So helping companies to get their SOC two, ISO twenty seven zero zero one, GDPR, and HIPAA.

关键洞察在于构建一个能持续监控所有合规与风险的系统，而非仅在年度审计时检查，让您能时刻对安全状况保持信心。

The big insight was to build a system that could monitor all of your compliance and risk continuously, not just once a year for your audit, so you could feel confident in your security posture all the time.

但他们现在意识到，真正的业务是让您更容易赢得客户信任。

But now they have realized that the business that they're really in is making it easier for you to earn the trust of your customers.

是的。

Yep.

有道理。

Makes sense.

当您开始扩展业务时，会面临更多合规安全要求和工具，局面可能变得非常混乱。

So when you start scaling, you end up with more compliance and security requirements and more tools which can get very chaotic.

Vanta已成为随您业务扩展的24/7人工智能安全专家。

Vanta has become the always on AI powered security expert that scales with you.

用Vanta的话说，他们是您永远无需招聘的最佳安全人才。

And as Vanta puts it, they are the best security hire you'll never have to make.