浏览器（与网景及Mozilla首席架构师、Brave首席执行官Brendan Eich对话）

所以他辞职了，但我们继续前进。

So he quit, but we kept going.

尽管我们必须成为这个套件的基础，因为我们移除了ICQ和AIM按钮，但Mozilla还是流行起来了。

And even though we had to be the basis for this suite, because we stripped out the ICQ and AIM buttons, Mozilla got popular.

我们发布二进制版本，因为我们想要测试者。

We were doing releases, binaries, because we wanted testers.

这也是一个重大转变。

That was a big change too.

许多开源项目说，代码就在那里。

A lot of open source projects said, there's the code.

你自己构建吧。

Build it yourself.

没错。

Right.

当然，这意味着99%可能使用该软件的人会立即被排除在外，因为他们不会——是的。

Which, of course, like, 99 of people who could use the software are immediately out right away because they're not gonna Yes.

是的。

Yes.

在他们的本地机器上编译。

Compile on their local machines.

当然，一旦你构建并发布软件，就会遇到那些连互联网哪头是哪头都分不清的用户。

And, of course, once you build the software and release it, you're getting people who don't know which end of the Internet is which.

但他们提供了很好的反馈，从核心用户或真正懂软件的黑客，到可以说网络精通但经验较少的人，再到分不清搜索引擎和浏览器的普通用户，整个用户群体就像洋葱的多层结构。

But they give you good feedback and there's a whole sort of layers of the onion from your lead users or your actual hackers who do know software out to, let's say, web savvy but less experienced folks out to the average people who don't know the difference between a search engine and a browser.

因此我们甚至在Firefox之前就开始以某种方式发展Mozilla，我认为这让网景公司感到羞愧和威胁。

And so we started growing Mozilla even before Firefox in a way that I think kind of shamed and threatened Netscape.

但网景公司当时也正经历着每年一次的高层大换血。

But Netscape was also getting these annual decapitations.

所以到2003年，我们通过IBM的朋友得知网景部门即将被关闭。

And so by 2003, we learned through our IBM friends that there was gonna be curtains for the Netscape division.

由于巨大的运气，莲花公司创始人米奇·卡普尔（他本人领教过微软的手段）与美国在线高管泰德·莱昂西斯是朋友。

And through an enormous stroke of luck, Mitch Kapor, who founded Lotus 01/23 and has his own experience with Microsoft's tricks was friends with Ted Leonsis, one of the AOL executives.

泰德是个好人，不懂技术，拥有我们曾有的资本。

Ted's a very nice guy, not technical, owns the capitals we did.

没错。

Right.

我想他是另一支运动队的。

He's another sports team, I think.

他们在首届D会议上偶遇了，对吧，沃尔特·莫斯伯格。

And they ran into each other at the very first d conference, right, Walt Mossberg.

对吧？

Right?

哦，哇。

Oh, wow.

泰德说，嘿，米奇。

And Ted said, hey, Mitch.

我有个东西，摩苏尔。

I've got this thing, Mosul.

我不知道该怎么处理。

I don't know what to do with.

结果米奇当时正在搞一个叫开源应用基金会的东西。

And it turned out Mitch was doing something called the Open Source Application Foundation.

他还雇了米切尔·贝克——她在2000年网景裁员时被秘密解雇，我直说吧，就因为管理层不喜欢Mozilla。

And he had hired Mitchell Baker who had been fired undercover of a layoff, I'll say it, in 2000 by Netscape management because they didn't like Mozilla.

那是他们的眼中钉。

It was a thorn in their side.

也许米切尔就是。

Maybe Mitchell was.

米切尔太贵了。

Mitchell was expensive.

所以他们进行了裁员，米切尔突然就不在了。

So they had a layoff and suddenly Mitchell was gone.

我打电话问，是你辞职了吗？

And I was on the phone saying, did you quit?

她说，不是。

And she said, no.

这不是我的选择。

This was not my choice.

然而，第二周在马佐拉社区电话会议上，米切尔却担任了治理领导，负责技术领导工作。

And yet, the next week on the Mazola community call, there was Mitchell doing the governance leadership, why the tech leadership.

所以，试图摆脱它的网景管理层此时气得咬牙切齿。

So, the Netscape management that tried to get rid of it were grinding their teeth at this point.

他们无法扼杀Mozilla。

They couldn't kill Mozilla.

他们无法斩首它，就像网景部门每年都被砍掉脑袋一样。

They couldn't decapitate it as the Netscape division had its head taken off annually.

但当我们得知AOL要关闭网景时，泰德值得称赞地询问了米奇该怎么办。

But when we learned AOL was gonna shut down Netscape, Ted, to his credit, asked Mitch what to do.

而米奇雇佣了米切尔·贝克，她从成立后大约八个月起担任Mozilla经理，直到被解雇。

And Mitch had hired Mitchell Baker, who'd been the Mozilla manager from about eight months into the founding up till she was laid off.

这真是巨大的，你知道，好运气，因为米奇随后告诉泰德该怎么做，尽管AL公司有个副总裁一直冷嘲热讽——这个人大家都不喜欢，他总想落井下石——但泰德还是做了正确决定，给了我们200万美元分两年拨付，用于启动Mozilla项目。

And that was just huge, you know, good fortune because Mitch then told Ted what to do and in spite of some sniping by a VP at AL nobody liked who really wanted to stick the knife in and twist it, Ted did the right thing and gave us 2,000,000 over two years to spin out the Mozilla project.

而且我认为米切尔想以非营利形式运作这个项目。

And I think Mitchell wanted to do it as a nonprofit.

他们认为这样做有很好的基础。

They thought there'd be some good basis for that.

米奇本人，我不想搞风险投资，也不想做成商业项目。

Mitch himself, I didn't wanna do VC funding and didn't wanna do a commercial thing.

我只是想尽力保住这些代码的活力。

I just went along to try to keep the code alive.

我们在二月份就知道该怎么做了，因为Firefox其实早在2001年就启动了，你可能都想不到。

And we knew what to do in February because Firefox had already started in 2001, if you can believe it.

但到2002年时它被命名为Phoenix。

But it became known as Phoenix by 2002.

而Firefox是从零开始完全重建的。

And Firefox was completely rebuilt from the ground up.

对吧？

Right?

它是基于我之前提到的ZUL工作成果，戴夫·海亚特等人开发了这个可编程前端栈，看起来就像网页一样。

Well, it was based on the ZUL work that I mentioned that Dave Hyatt and others had done to make a programmable front end stack on what looks like the web.

用的是XML、JavaScript和CSS。

It's XML and JavaScript and CSS.

自定义工具栏，甚至包括当时Mac OS的原生菜单栏，所有这些都能通过XML实现集成。

Custom toolbars, even menu the native menu bar on the Mac OS at the time, all that could be integrated through XML.

它是声明式的。

It was declarative.

经过足够努力后，它的速度足够快。

It was fast enough with enough work.

它允许所有这些扩展。

It allowed all these extensions.

你提到我们称它们为附加组件。

You mentioned we called them add ons.

那是最早的浏览器扩展生态系统，远早于Chrome的。

That was the first browser extension ecosystem way ahead of Chrome's.

而Firefox就是这样构建起来的。

And it was the way Firefox got built.

因为当我们剥离了所有ICQ的冗余后，仍然觉得功能过多。

Because once we had the suite unbadged of all the ICQ junk, we still had sort of too many functions.

就像一把瑞士军刀。

Like, it's a Swiss army knife.

你真的需要边写邮件边浏览网页吗？

Do you really need to browse the web while you compose an email?

它还有富文本编辑和通讯录管理功能。

And you had rich text editing and manage your address book.

于是我们提出了一个愿景。

So we came up with a vision.

Dave Highton在2003年撰写了Azolla路线图更新，提出让一个应用专注做好一件事。

Dave Highton and wrote the roadmap update from Azolla in 2003 that said, let's make one app do one thing well.

我们将基于一个共同的前端工具包构建所有功能，提供扩展支持，这样既能简化用户体验，又不会把高级用户推向Opera——那个总是内置太多选项的浏览器。

We'll build them all on a common front end toolkit, give them extensions so that we can simplify the UX but not drive the advanced users away to Opera, which always had too many options built in.

而且你甚至能在Mozilla上找到那份路线图。

And that roadmap you can still find even on Mozilla.

我认为它肯定存在于网络存档中。

I think it's certainly in the web archive.

在我看来那是份相当不错的路线图，因为它推动项目不仅向Firefox发展，还包括了Thunderbird。

It was a pretty good roadmap in my opinion because it got the project moving toward not only Firefox, but Thunderbird.

甚至连旧套件，志愿者们也想把它命名为SeaMonkey并继续开发，他们确实坚持了很长时间。

And even the old suite, the volunteers wanted to call it SeaMonkey and carry it on, and they did for a good long time.

但Firefox最初在2001年被称为Mozilla/浏览器。

But Firefox was originally Mozilla slash browser in 2001.

那时它只是网景公司内部的一艘小海盗船。

It was just a small pirate ship within Netscape.

团队成员有布莱克·罗斯、戴夫·海特等少数几人。

It was Blake Ross and Dave Hyatt and few others.

还有乔·休伊特。

Joe Hewitt.

对吧？

Right?

乔·休伊特开发了自动完成功能，后来还做出了超棒的Firebug插件。

Joe Hewitt did the the auto complete satchel and eventually did Firebug, which was awesome.

他后来被Facebook聘用，开发了最初的Facebook应用。

He then got hired by Facebook and built the original Facebook app.

布莱克·罗斯和乔·休特创立了Parakeet公司，并将其卖给了Facebook。

Blake Ross and Joe Huett founded Parakeet and sold that to Facebook.

事情就是这样发生的。

That's how that happened.

但我们失去了布莱克，他去了斯坦福。

But we lost Blake to Stanford.

我不得不从网景公司招募本·古杰来接替布莱克，从Firefox 0.6版本开始一直持续到某个时候。

I had to recruit Ben Goodger out of Netscape to take over for Blake, and that went from Firefox 0.6 on to one o.

本在插件、搜索集成以及让Firefox在Windows系统上表现出色方面做了大量重要工作。

And Ben did a lot of the important work on add ons and search integration and making it really sing on Windows.

因为这是开源软件当时没有做到的另一点。

Because that's the other thing open source didn't do.

那时的开源社区还在说，哦，它在Linux上运行良好。

Open source at that point was still saying, oh, it works on Linux.

但具体是哪个版本的KDE或Gnome，还是其他已被遗忘的桌面环境呢？

Well, which flavor of KDE or Gnome or forgotten other ones?

但他们没有

But they didn't

关心Windows系统。

care about Windows.

在我看来，社区总是需要——当我说社区时，指的是一个非常广泛的群体。

It seems to me that the community always needs and when I say the community, it's a very broad community.

它包括所有使用浏览器的人，甚至可能更广泛。

It's all people who use browsers and maybe even more general than that.

但他们总需要一个敢于挑战权威的激动人心的挑战者。

But they always need some exciting challenger that's fighting the man.

火狐似乎恰逢其时，聚集了一群真正热衷于此的合适人选。

And it seemed like Firefox was right place, right time with the right group of people who were actually passionate about this.

而困在AOL网景里的人则逐渐失去了激情。

Whereas everyone who was stuck inside of Netscape at AOL had sort of lost the fire.

AOL起初以为这是战略资产，后来意识到它已无路可走。

AOL at first thought this was a strategic asset, now realized it wasn't going anywhere.

因此，如果你拥有合适的团队，这正是抓住时机的时刻——当IE不再有真正的挑战者时，你就能真正放手一搏。

And so you had this sort of moment to seize if you had the right team where there was no legitimate challenger anymore to IE, and so you could make a real run at it.

你是这么想的吗？

Is that sort of how you think about it?

是的。

Yes.

你的描述几乎像分形结构——核心团队就像海盗船，嘲笑着网景管理层臃肿愚蠢的套件，同时开发出卓越工具，比如休伊特开发的Firebug和自动补全功能。

And the way you described it was almost like fractal structure because the core team was like a pirate ship kind of sassing Netscape management for their foolish bloated suite and also making great tools and things that Hewitt worked on, Firebug and and the autocomplete stuff.

这使得早期用户对它的热爱远超其他浏览器。我记得火狐0.8版在2004年初发布，到0.9版时，尤其是看到火箭即将发射的势头，整个网络先锋用户群都沸腾了。

And that led to early adopters loving it so much more than all the other browsers So that when Firefox was at 0.8 in early I think it was early two thousand four, and then 0.9 especially when we could see the rocket ready to launch, the whole lead user cohort of the web was just charged up.

那时我通过弗里茨·施耐德（他引荐的）联系上了谢尔盖·布林，并在0.9版本时达成了搜索协议。

At that point, we I'd made contact with Sergei Brin through somebody he sent my way named Fritz Schneider, and we'd gotten the search deal going in zero point nine.

我们还得到了弗里茨的团队——谷歌的Gin团队来协助火狐。

But we'd also gotten Fritz's team, the gin team at Google helping Firefox.

所以他们在开发Chrome之前，研究的浏览器正是火狐。

So they were working on browsers before Chrome, it and the browser to work on was Firefox.

没人认为这能成功。

Nobody thought it could be done.

当时普遍观点认为，即使Firefox已拥有数百万用户且增长迅猛，你们永远无法抢占那份市场份额。

The conventional wisdom still was that you're never gonna take that market share even though Firefox already had a few million users and was growing rapidly.

这确实促使一些和我们共事的人，比如Bart DeCreme，去尝试Firefox的商业分支版本。

And this did commit some people who worked with us at the time like Bart DeCreme to go try a commercial fork of Firefox.

那就是Flock。

That was flock.

没成功。

Didn't work.

融了一大笔风投资金。

Raised a bunch of VC.

哦，是啊。

Oh, yeah.

后来卖给了Zynga，2011年就关闭了。

Got sold to Zynga and then shut down in 2011.

还有其他分支版本。

There was other forks too.

比如我曾在Mac上用过的Camino。

I mean, was, I used Camino on the Mac.

那是Dave Hyatt开发的另一款浏览器。

That was Dave Hyatt's other browser.

Dave的著作量惊人。

Dave wrote prolifically.

他写了很多代码。

He wrote a lot of code.

所以他写了一个仅限Mac OS的浏览器来学习Cocoa工具包，我记得是叫这个。

So he wrote a Mac OS only browser to learn the Cocoa, I think it was, toolkit.

戴夫在苹果公司工作。

Dave works for Apple.

我记得他是2001年去的。

He went there in 2001, I believe.

他算是创造了Safari，因为他知道如何让KHTML引擎兼容网页。

He kind of made Safari because he knew how to make the KHTML engine web compatible.

这个引擎来自Linux，没有经过大众市场用户的实战检验，所以无法正常加载网站。

And it was from Linux, and it wasn't battle tested in the field against mass market users, so it didn't load websites properly.

最终导致2005年WebKit从KHTML分叉出来，但能把戴夫招进苹果对当时的Safari经理唐·梅尔顿（也是XNetscape成员）来说是个重大胜利。

Eventually, led to WebKit being forked from KHTML in 2005, but getting Dave at Apple was quite a coup for Don Melton, the manager at the time of Safari, who was also XNetscape.

但这就像重启市场的分形效应——顶撞上司、崭露头角，向世界展示人们日常使用的更好工具。

But there was just this fractal effect of restarting the market, you know, sassing your boss, showing up, I e, showing the world a better tool for something that people used every day.

对吧？

Right?

人们会轻视浏览器。

People would discount the browser.

就像当年有人说'桌面端胖应用回来了'，或是iPhone发布八个月后（因为最初iPhone的应用模型其实是网页应用）。

There was like, oh, fat apps are back on the desktop, Windows long hoard, or when the iPhone launched, eight months after actually because the initial app model for the iPhone was web apps.

一个绝妙的解决方案。

A sweet solution.

但原生应用必须存在，因为游戏需要移植。

But native apps had to be there because of games being ported.

然后原生应用获得了特权，并拥有了网页所不具备的应用商店优势。

And then native apps got privileges and got App Store affordances that the web didn't.

而且大约每十年就会重复同样的事情。

And it's same thing every ten years or so.

你总会看到有人在阻碍网页的发展。

You just get people holding the web back.

通常，这是垄断势力或市场力量在作祟。

Usually, it's a monopoly power or a market power.

然后新秀崛起，因为人们仍然在使用网页。

And then the the upstart comes because people still use the web.

网页的价值是如此巨大。

The value in the web is is so great.

而且，你知道，所有这些应用中都嵌入了网页视图，顺便说一句，也都嵌入了追踪器。

And, you know, there's embedded web views in all these apps, and there's embedded trackers in all these apps, by the way.

我们也在通过与Guardian iOS防火墙VPN的合作来拦截这些内容。

We're we're blocking those too with our partnership with Guardian iOS firewall, the VPN.

感觉

It feels

对我来说，在叙事和市场认知方面，这与硅和半导体有些相似。

kinda similar to me in terms of narrative and market perception to silicon and to semiconductors.

就像，你知道，几年前人们觉得半导体行业很无聊。

Like, you know, a couple years ago, people like, ah, semiconductor is so boring.

就像，你知道的，并不是所有的创新都，嗯，远远超出那个层面的。

Like, you know, it's not like all the innovations, you know, way way way up the stack from that.

实际上，事实证明半导体极其重要，而台积电，你知道的，是一家非常、非常、非常重要的公司，全球市值前十的企业之一。

Well, like, actually, turns out the semiconductors are pretty freaking important and TSMC is like, you know, a very, very, very important company and one of the top 10 most valuable in the world.

浏览器给我的感觉也类似。

The browser feels similar to me.

虽然很容易低估它，但世界上大多数人每天的大部分时间其实都在浏览器上度过。

Like, it's so easy to discount it and yet the majority of, like, people in the world spend the majority of their days on it.

是啊。

Yeah.

这是个永不过时的应用。

It it's an immortal app.

它是通用应用。

It's the universal app.

屏幕越大、输入带宽越好，你就越会生活在浏览器里——连Slack这种应用你都不愿安装客户端。

The bigger the screen and the better the input bandwidth, the more you live in the browser and you don't want to install some you know, even Slack.

我们Brave的很多Slack用户都直接用浏览器加载网页版Slack，而不是用Slack官方那个臃肿且维护迟缓的Electron应用。

We have a lot of our users of Slack at Brave use the browser to load Slack as a web app instead of loading this bloated electron app that Slack has been slowly maintaining.

这里存在真正的取舍，我认为这正是浏览器永不过时的部分原因，但网页内容本身也具有粘性和累积性，这点同样重要。

There's a real trade off there that I think is part of the browser's immortality, but the web content is also sticky and accretive, and that's important too.

没错。

Yeah.

我用一句话总结吧。

I'll sum it all up in one sentence.

Firefox表现非常出色，占据了巨大的市场份额。

Firefox did really, really well and gained a huge, market share.

但当Chrome推出后，它的市场份额逐年被蚕食，现在只剩3%左右。

And then when Chrome launched, it's been slowly etched away every year by Chrome now, and it's down around something like 3%.

所以我想直接快进到你们开始考虑Brave浏览器的时刻。

So I wanna fast forward all the way to the moment where you're starting to think about Brave.

然而，之前有过多次尝试开发具有不同理念的新兴浏览器。

And yet, there's been all these attempts to start a new upstart browser that has a different take on things.

我想到了Dolphin浏览器。

I'm thinking of Dolphin.

我想到那些没有成功的尝试。

I'm thinking of that have not worked.

是的。

Yeah.

所以，Flock当时在做社交或Web2.0。

So, yeah, the flock was doing social or web two point o.

这使得它成为Firefox增长市场的核心，但这并非好的增长策略，因为你必须让人们放弃Firefox，然后在增长的外围领域超越他们。

It make it the very center of Firefox's growing market, and that's not a good growth strategy because you have to get people off Firefox and then somehow beat them on the on the outer rings of growth.

而Firefox在那个领域已经发展得更快，你很难从最核心的极客黑客技术圈Web2.0人群中争取到太多叛变者。

And Firefox was already going faster there and you weren't gonna get too many defectors from the innermost nerdy hacker technoradi web two point o people.

所以Flock失败了。

So Flock failed.

Rockmelt是在Chrome之后出现的，基于Chrome的WebKit分支——当时这还算不上独立技术——并试图增加社交功能。

Rockmelt was went after Chrome came out and was based on the Chrome fork of WebKit, which wasn't its own thing really then, and tried to add social.

我想只是我还没和蒂姆·豪斯谈过这件事。

I think it was just I haven't talked to Tim Howes about this.

我想这只是为了试图把它卖给扎克伯格。

I think it was just aimed at trying to sell it to Zuck.

嗯，扎克伯格不想要浏览器。

Well, Zuck doesn't want a browser.

他已经有浏览器了。

He's got a browser.

他对Facebook在桌面端的网页应用非常满意，而且那时他已经瞄准移动端，因为iPhone已经问世，他想要完整的移动原生应用。

He's very happy with the Facebook web app on desktop, and then he was at that point already aiming at mobile because the iPhone was out, and he wanted full native apps on mobile.

所以他永远不会收购RockMelt。

So he was never gonna buy rock melt.

所以岩石融化计划失败了。

So rock melt failed.

海豚做得很好，因为我觉得他们有那个人——我忘了她的名字。

Dolphin did well because I think they had this I forget her name.

她是个很棒的营销专家。

She was a great marketer.

她在多个亚洲国家达成了所有这些分销和增长黑客协议。

She got all these distribution and growth hack deals going in various Asian countries.

随着移动端通过安卓系统崛起，他们确实在打造一款优秀的移动浏览器方面做了可靠的工作。

And they did a credible job on making it a good mobile browser as mobile came up through Android.

安卓某种程度上重新启动了那个G1项目。

Android kind of double started that g one.

它叫什么名字来着？

What was it called?

那是第一款安卓设备。

It was the first Android device.

它叫T-Mobile G1。

It was The t mobile g one.

它并不好用。

It was not good.

2006年我和谷歌的安迪·鲁宾聊过。

I talked to Andy Rubin at Google in 2006.

对。

Yeah.

但安卓系统花了很长时间才勉强达到可用水平，即便我对苹果有诸多不满，至今仍无法使用安卓。

But Android took a while to get anywhere near decent and I still can't use it even though I've got many complaints about Apple.

我没记错吧？

Am I remembering right

海豚浏览器是不是有段时间——虽然最初不是——但后来转型标榜自己注重隐私？

that Dolphin at some point, I don't think originally, but maybe later in its life pivoted to be like, oh, we're privacy focused.

对吧？

Right?

所以人们开始关注这个问题了。

So, like, people were starting to think about this.

现在所有人都在这么干。

Everybody's doing that now.

在某些情况下，他们连澡都不洗就直接喷隐私香水。

They're putting privacy perfume on without taking a shower in some cases.

哦，我喜欢这个。

Oh, I love it.

但在海豚浏览器之外，UCWeb是亚洲另一款成功的主流浏览器。

But one of the big browsers that succeeded in Asia besides Dolphin was UCWeb.

而且UCWeb在印尼、孟加拉和印度市场逆袭了Chrome。

And UCWeb grew against Chrome in Indonesia and Bangladesh and India.

在印度某些邦，它的市场份额甚至超过了Chrome。

In some Indian states, it had more share than Chrome.

我们注意到UCWeb的做法之一是屏蔽广告。

And one of the things we noticed that UCWeb did was it blocked ads.

说实话，作为开发过火狐浏览器却连最基本的隐私功能都不完善的团队，这有点尴尬，但事实如此。

So having done Firefox and been in the situation where we we didn't even have the best privacy features, it's kind of embarrassing, but it's true.

在隐私保护方面，Mozilla做得不如苹果的史蒂夫·乔布斯。

Mozilla did not lead on privacy as well as Steve Jobs did at Apple.

最早的Safari浏览器就有隐私窗口功能。

The very first Safari had private Windows.

它内置了第三方cookie拦截器。

It had a third party cookie blocker.

当时火狐浏览器这两项功能都没有。

Neither these things were in Firefox at the time.

隐私窗口功能倒是很快就跟进了。

Private windows came in quickly.

我在职期间，我们从未推出过第三方cookie拦截功能。

We never shipped a third party cookie blocker in my time there.

总是有人担心会惹出麻烦。

There was always concern about rocking the boat.

不得不说，可能确实存在对谷歌搜索合作的潜在担忧，担心这会产生什么影响。

I have to say there was probably some implicit concern about the Google search partnership and what would be the effect on that.

因为当然，Mozilla的绝大部分收入都来自与谷歌的搜索协议——将谷歌设为默认搜索引擎，从而从谷歌获得数亿美元的收入。

Because of course, the vast majority of Mozilla's revenue comes from the Google search deal to use Google as the default and get paid hundreds of millions of dollars from Google.

是啊。

Yeah.

这确实是资助Mozilla的一大妙招，虽然最后是谷歌买单，但也预示着谷歌会开发自己的浏览器。

It really was the one big trick for funding Mozilla and it was, you know, Google at last, but it also foretold Google doing its own browser.

对吧？

Right?

我们其实也预见到了这一点。

We we could see this coming too.

我们不想在协议中索取过多收入，以免他们觉得开发Chrome更划算，所以我们尝试调整策略。

We didn't want to take so much revenue in the in the deal that it became cheaper for them to do Chrome, so we tried to adjust that.

但我们所做的只是让Chrome的推出推迟了几个月，最多一年。

But all we did was defer Chrome maybe a few months, a year at most.

甚至不确定我们是否真的延迟了它。

It it wasn't clear we deferred it at all.

因为到2005年，苹果的Dave Hyatt和Maciej Stokovic等人就说过：我们别再给KHTML打补丁了。

Because by 2005, Dave Hyatt and, Maciej Stokovic and others at Apple had said, let's stop patch bombing KHTML.

让我们打造自己的迷你版Mozilla。

Let's make our own little mini Mozilla.

它将由苹果运营，但使用webkit.org。

It'll be run by Apple, but it'll be webkit.org.

这将是一个正经的开源项目。

It'll be a proper open source project.

为他们高兴，他们做到了。

And good for them, they did it.

这后来不仅成为Safari的基础，也成为了Chrome的基础。

And that became the basis for not only what they put in Safari, but for Chrome.

所以我2005年最后一次见到拉里·佩奇时，他眼里闪着光。

So there was a gleam in Larry Page's eyes when last I saw him 2005.

他说，是啊，网络变得如此简洁。

He was saying, yeah, web gets so clean.

我当时说，拉里，去做你自己的浏览器吧。

I'm like, Larry, go do your own browser.

没问题的。

It's fine.

别担心火狐。

Don't worry about Firefox.

你应该做自己的浏览器。

You should do your own browser.

所以我们在2006年就知道他们在做了。

So we knew in 2006, they were doing it.

我们知道他们当时正把人员从Firefox项目撤下来。

We knew that they were at that point pulling people off Firefox.

而且我在AOL和Mozilla共事过的一些人正在开发那个原型。

And that some of the people I'd worked with at AOL or at Mozilla were working on the prototype.

他们花了相当长时间才把它做出来。

And took them a while to get it out.

Chrome于2008年9月1日发布，最初并不被看好，显然人们更关注快速的JavaScript引擎之类的特性。

Chrome came out in 09/01/2008, and it wasn't really in at first, clearly about fast JavaScript or all the stuff that people think of.

它更重要的创新是通过隔离Flash播放器进程，使得单个标签页崩溃时不会拖垮整个浏览器。

It was more about isolating the Flash player so that when it crashes in a tab, it doesn't drag your whole browser down.

是的。

Yes.

没错。

Yes.

还有那本漫画

And that comic

他们随产品发布的漫画简直是天才营销策略，极客们会为这种进程隔离标签页的设计理念疯狂。

that they shipped was just freaking brilliant as a marketing strategy for the nerds out there that would really appreciate process isolated tabs.

对。

Yeah.

它包含了一切要素。

It it had everything.

里面还有Lars Bach关于VA的内容。

It had Lars Bach about VA.

当时有我在AOL共事过的达伦·费希尔。

It had Darren Fisher who I'd worked with at AOL.

但在某个时间点，具体记不清了，我从一位在谷歌工作的朋友那里听说了这件事。

But some point, I don't know when, I heard this from a friend who was at Google.

拉里坐直了身子说：等等，我们做的是搜索广告业务，而Chrome居然没有追踪我们的用户？

Larry sat up and said, wait, we're running a search advertising business and Chrome isn't tracking our users?

我们到底哪里做错了？

What what are we doing wrong?

于是在2016年，谷歌的隐私政策发生了变化。

And so in 2016, Google's privacy policy changed.

这发生在我创办Brave之后，但我会从这里开始讲述完整的故事，因为当时ProPublica注意到了，《卫报》转载了他们的报道。

This was after I started Brave, but I just I'll tell the full story of Brave by starting there because at that point, ProPublica noticed, The Guardian republished their piece.

他们某种程度上说谷歌已经越过了卢比孔河（破釜沉舟）。

They sort of said Google's crossed the Rubicon.

他们把所有的数据都连接到了一个庞大的广告交易和数据收集系统中。

They've connected all their data into one big ad exchange and data collection system.

除了谷歌分析（Google Analytics）被单独划分出来，但也不清楚它还有多少隐私性可言。

With a carve out for Google Analytics, it's not clear how much Google Analytics is private anymore.

至于Chrome浏览器，如果你用谷歌账号登录右上角那个独立功能，就会被锁定为广告投放目标。

And Chrome, if you sign into the browser, which is a separate feature in the upper right corner, using your Google account, then you're trapped for ad targeting.

这就是谷歌的商业模式。

It's Google's business.

但很多人不知道这一点，有些人也没有登录浏览器。

But a lot of people didn't know this, and some people didn't sign into the browser.

嗯，二月份的时候，谷歌说，天哪。

Well, in February, Google said, gosh darn it.

人们登录浏览器的次数不够多。

People aren't signing into the browser enough.

我们打算只要你在某个标签页登录了Gmail或YouTube，就直接执行。

We're gonna just do it whenever you sign in to Gmail or YouTube in a tab.

我们会让你在所有标签页自动登录，并追踪你的活动。

We'll just sign you in across all the tabs and we'll track you.

哦，哇。

Oh, wow.

如果你不喜欢这样，可以在谷歌账户设置里选择退出。

If you don't like it, you can opt out in the Google account settings.

是啊。

Yeah.

没错。

Right.

但没人会这么做的。

But nobody's gonna do that.

而我确实会。

And I do.

我是说，对，你会这么做。

I mean, yeah, you'll do that.

以前在会议上演讲时，我会问有多少人在用Chrome，有多少人知道这个，有多少人选择了退出。

But used to do talks at conferences, ask how many people were using Chrome, how many people knew this, how many people opted out.

要知道，那些手多得数不清，然后它们开始坠落，接着就出现了涨红的脸和惊愕的表情。

And the hands, you know, were numerous, and then they started falling, and then there were red faces and consternation.

这不仅仅是谷歌的问题。

This is not just Google.

我拿他们开刀是因为他们成了最大的公司，但收购DoubleClick是他们早期跨越的一条类似卢比孔河的界限。

I pick on them because they became the biggest, but and buying DoubleClick was an earlier sort of Rubicon they crossed.

因为我想谢尔盖在2003年曾对我的一个朋友说过，哦，我们绝不会在发布商页面上做那种将广告追踪与搜索广告挂钩的事。

Because I think Sergei told a friend of mine in 2003, oh, we would never do, like, tracking for ads on publisher pages that tied into our search ads.

我们绝不会在整个网络范围内进行追踪。

We we would never track across the web.

那样做太邪恶了。

That would be evil.

哎呀。

Oops.

好吧，情况变了。

Well, it changed.

嗯，邪恶的定义会随着利益的大小而改变。

Well, the definition of of evil shifts depends on how large the incentives are.

是啊。

Yeah.

而且上市还会让你对股东负有受托责任，这种压力很难抗拒。

And going public also just puts a fiduciary duty to your shareholders on you that is hard to resist.

这就像是，你知道的，资本主义那头盲目贪婪的野兽。

And this is kind of the, you know, the the animal, the blind voracious beast of capitalism.

当我思考Brave浏览器时，我意识到Mozilla不仅被其搜索引擎合作伙伴所束缚，而且很可能因为无法在Chrome的核心特性乃至分发渠道上竞争而走向衰亡——后者在大规模应用时尤为关键。

So when I was thinking about Brave, I realized not only had Mozilla become captured by its search partner and was probably gonna die because it couldn't compete not just on Chrome intrinsic qualities, but on distribution, which really matters at scale.

你必须为此付费。

You have to pay for it.

对吧？

Right?

微软已经觉醒，先是做了IE浏览器，最终推出了Edge。

Microsoft had woken up and was doing IE and finally did Edge.

这还是在他们将Edge转向基于Chromium之前。

And this is before they switched Edge to be based on Chromium.

当时他们肯定仍在通过Windows系统分发它。

They were certainly still distributing it on Windows.

他们某种程度上在强行捆绑。

They were kind of tying it.

而且我认为情况变得更糟了。

And I would say it's gotten worse.

Windows 10和11变得更加激进——尽管最近在某项具体措施上有所收敛，那简直像是回到了反垄断案的时代。

Windows ten and eleven have gotten even more aggressive, though they backed off on one particular thing recently, where it's almost like back to the antitrust case.

他们会说：嘿，你还没用Edge呢。

They're saying, hey, you're not using Edge.

我们注意到了。

We've noticed.

要不要试试Edge？

Would you like to use Edge?

或者说，哎呀，我们把你的默认浏览器重置为Edge了。

Or oops, we reset your default browser to Edge.

这种情况也会发生。

That happens too.

这对谷歌来说是个问题。

And this is a problem for Google.

所以谷歌不得不付费分发Chrome。

So Google has to pay to distribute Chrome.

Mozilla没有资源做这种事。

Mozilla doesn't have the resources to do this.

我在职时Firefox的增长完全是自然增长的，我认为。

Our growth with Firefox when I was there was completely organic, I think.

而且我离开后可能也主要是自然增长。

And it's probably was mostly organic after I left.

他们可能做过一些增长黑客手段。

They might have done a little growth hacking.

所以他们

So and they

在移动端从未做大。

never got big on mobile.

我很想听听你的解释。

I'd love your explanation.

再次说明，我问这个问题不是因为我没想法，而是想听听你的见解。

And again, I don't ask this because I don't have thoughts myself, but I wanna hear from you.

为什么被追踪是件坏事？

Why is it bad to be tracked?

是啊。

Yeah.

人们如果足够精明，就会想起黎塞留的那句格言。

People sometimes if they're savvy, they'll remember Richelieu's epigram.

我不确定这句话是否真的出自他。

I don't know if it really came from him.

你知道的，给我六句最诚实之人说的话，我就能找到绞死他的理由。

You know, give me six sentences from the most honest man and I'll find a way to hang him.

对吧？

Right?

斯诺登改变了局面。

Snowden changed things.

人们突然意识到，等等。

People realized, wait a minute.

这里存在违反联邦法律的行为。

There's violations of federal law here.

我认为谷歌工程师们很愤怒，他们一直在使用电信暗光纤却没有加密骨干流量。

Google engineers who've been using Telco Dark Fiber without encrypting their backbone traffic were outraged, I think.

而且数据泄露让人困扰。

And data breaches bother people.

还有我提到的第三方问题，那些嵌入像素和脚本，你根本不知道自己的数据去了哪里。

And the third party problem I mentioned, those embedded pixels and all those embedded scripts, you don't know where your data is going.

这不仅仅是追踪你以提供更优惠的交易或让网站上的广告更个性化。

It's not just that it's tracking you to give you a better deal or to make your ads more personalized on a website.

这些数据正从窗口飞出去，不仅流向暗网，还公开可用。

That data is flying out the window, and it's going into stuff that is available to the not only the dark web, but just available publicly.

这个骇人听闻的故事，我就不点名了。

The horrifying story, I won't name names.

我们Brave有个供应商掌握着人们的个人信息。

We have a vendor at Brave that has information on people.

他们把数据共享给了益博睿。

It shared it with Experian.

我们之前不知道这种情况正在发生。

We didn't know this was happening.

我不清楚是否违反了隐私法。

I don't know if there's a privacy law that was breached.

我们认为他们的隐私政策被他们自己的行为破坏了——或是他们默认开启了这个我们不知情需要手动关闭的设置。

We believe their privacy policy was breached by their own action or their setting of this as a default that we didn't know we had to opt out of.

益博睿简直就是数据泄露之城。

Experian is just breach city.

对吧？

Right?

这些都是笑话。

These are jokes.

这是犯罪行为。

It's criminal.

我不确定这算不算真的犯罪，但感觉像是犯罪。

I I don't know if it's literally criminal, but it feels criminal.

对。

Right.

于是人们逐渐意识到隐私就像身处险境——一旦被困住就不安全。

So consciousness of privacy as something where you're unsafe if you're trapped grew.

最初的态度是：我不在乎。

Initially, was like, I don't care.

困住我吧。

Trap me.

我毫无隐私可言。

I have no privacy.

只要让我的体验更个性化就行。

Just make my experience more personal.

但后来变成了：等等。

And then it became, wait a minute.

存在第三方甚至第七方，就像凯文·贝肯的六度空间理论。

There's some third party or seventh party, seven degrees of Kevin Bacon.

有个在俄罗斯的人正在追踪我。

There's somebody in, you know, Russia who's tracking me.

这可不好。

That's no good.

有人在现实世界通过地理围栏技术设局困住我。

There's somebody playing games to trap me around physical world using geofencing.

通过广告确实可能实现这一点，很可能已有恶意行为者这么做了。

That's possible with ads, and it's been done probably by malicious actors.

这里涉及间谍行为。

There's spy stuff going on.

人们意识到这不仅是'哦，某处有我的档案'这么简单，而是更严重的问题。

People realized that this was a bigger problem than just, oh, something somewhere has some dossier on me.

因为一旦你的档案存在于服务器上，就极可能被复制或泄露，最终出现在成百上千台服务器中。

Because once you have a dossier on a server, it's very likely it's gonna get copied or leaked, it's gonna be in a 100 servers or a thousand servers.

而你无从知晓这些数据的具体去向或被用于何种不良用途。

And you won't know where it is or to what bad uses that we put.

与此同时，欧洲隐私法以抽象方式兴起——虽未明确定义术语，但采用了关于人际互动的常识概念。正如乔布斯曾向莫博士直白解释的：隐私意味着除非我明确为特定受益目的提供数据，否则你无权获取。

So meanwhile, privacy law was coming up in Europe that in its own abstract ways, and that is without defining its terms, did use sort of common sense notions about how we interact, which Steve Jobs himself once talked to Mossberg about in very plain terms, which is privacy means you don't get my data unless I know I'm giving it to you for a specific purpose that benefits me.

这本质上是一种等价交换。

And there's sort of a quid pro quo.

这正是GDPR试图通过'目的限制'原则实现的效果。

And that's what the GDPR tries to do with purpose limitation or purpose specificity.

所以当你同意那些管理混乱、毫无意义的cookie弹窗时——我并非为它们辩护。

So when you consent to those cookie dialogues, which are all misregulated, mismanaged, and nonsense, I'm not defending them.

和所有法规一样，GDPR也充满意外后果。

And GDPR, like all regulations, is full of unintended consequences.

其本意是询问：你是否同意出于必要或非必要原因设置追踪cookie？

What they're trying to do is say, do you consent to let a tracking cookie be set, let's say, for some essential or inessential reason?

其中必要用途存在豁免条款。

And there are carve outs for essential reasons.

当你使用搜索引擎时，那是第一方。

When you go to a search engine, it's a first party.

你提供数据以获得更好的搜索结果。

You're giving it data to get better results.

因此这里存在一个基本目的，可以证明某种数据处理是合理的。

So there's an essential purpose there that that can justify some kind of data being processed.

这不一定是在追踪，因为数据仅存在于该搜索引擎。

It isn't necessarily tracking because it's only at that search engine.

但当你面对所有这些网站弹出的cookie同意书时，比如点击这里了解更多，结果发现有300家供应商。

But when you're dealing with all these sites that throw these cookie consents, you know, click here to learn more and there's 300 vendors.

如果你想选择退出，必须逐个点击它们，而且经常找不到相关页面。

And if you wanna opt out, you have to go click on them, and often there's no page there.

返回了一个404 HTTP响应。

There's a four zero four HTTP response.

没有电话号码。

There's no phone number.

无法选择退出。

There's no way to opt out.

所以声称可以轻松选择退出完全是欺诈行为，而且这不仅在欧洲，在世界许多地方也是违法的。

So it's a complete fraud that you can opt out of this easily, And that's also against the law in many places in the world, not just Europe.

全球各地正在出台许多这类隐私保护法律。

A lot of these privacy laws are coming up around the world.

这与Brave浏览器的兴起大致是同步发生的。

And this was, sort of concurrent with the rise of Brave.

但关于隐私的意识仍在增长，这帮助我们保持领先地位，正如我提到的研发工作使我们既快速又高效。

But the consciousness about privacy is still growing and that's helping us because we were at the forefront and doing this R and D I mentioned, which made us fast and efficient.

你可以看到DuckDuckGo等其他公司加入进来，它始终在Bing上提供更注重隐私的搜索前端。

And you're seeing others jump in with DuckDuckGo always had a more private sort of search front end on Bing.

在关键词搜索方面，它基本上还是Bing。

It's pretty much Bing still for the keyword search.

他们已有移动浏览器，现在正增加桌面浏览器和其他产品。

They had mobile browsers, now they're adding desktop browsers and other products.

正如我提到的，苹果因隐私问题获得公正认可，我认为这直接源自史蒂夫·乔布斯在Safari隐私窗口和第三方cookie屏蔽上的举措。

And like I mentioned, Apple gets fair credit for privacy concerns that I think came directly from Steve Jobs in Safari private windows and third party cookie blocking.

苹果以某种正当性将自己定位为隐私守护者。

And Apple rests itself in privacy with some justice.

而现在，谷歌试图声称发明隐私沙盒来拯救其业务——我是说，拯救世界。

And now, Google's trying to claim to invent the privacy sandbox to save its business I mean, to save the world.

抱歉。

Sorry.

你知道，他们正强行推进标准化，并推广到其他浏览器中。

You know, and ram it through standardization and, into other browsers.

让我更具体地问一下大卫的问题。

Let me ask David's question a little bit more specifically.

为什么私密计算体验对你个人而言很重要？

Why is a private computing experience important to you personally?

是的。

Yes.

所以我提到了这种日益增长的隐私意识，隐私是多方面的，涉及不同程度和种类的威胁。

So I mentioned this rising consciousness of privacy, how privacy is sort of multisided and involves different degrees and kinds of threats.

因此这些对我很重要。

So that those matter to me.

毫无疑问。

No doubt.

但我也认为用户必须拥有隐私以获得经济优势。

But I also think the user has to have privacy for economic advantage.

否则，我们无法与网络权力进行集体谈判。

Otherwise, we have no way of collective bargaining with the network powers.

任何网络都会有权力中心。

And any network is gonna have power centers.

这只是因为网络效应。

It's just because of network effects.

而且，你知道，无论它们收集大量数据还是仅仅成为一家成功的企业，它们都将拥有经济力量、市场力量，而用户可能只是这些被剪去羊毛的绵羊。

And, you know, whether they collect much data or just become a successful business, they will have economic power, market power, and the users may just be these sort of sheep to be shorn of their wool.

这就是广告技术的模式。

That is the model for ad tech.

但如果用户能保护自己的数据，他们就可以要求更高的价格。

But if users can guard their data, they can demand a higher price.

他们可以要求更好的条款。

They can demand better terms.

他们可以使用加密协议进行交易，在不放弃隐私的同时，仍能提供真实的归因或确认，比如广告浏览或购买。

They can use cryptographic protocols to transact without giving up their privacy while still giving authentic attribution or confirmation of, you know, ads viewed or purchases.

所以对营销人员来说，关键在于让他们在最佳时机接触到用户，而不是单独追踪每个人。

So what matters to the marketers if you get them in, you know, their best day is not that they track you individually.

他们根本不知道该如何处理这些追踪数据库。

They wouldn't know what to do with these tracking databases.

通常是由他们雇佣的供应商来完成，比如谷歌、脸书等公司。

It's usually vendors they hire that do it, or Google, Facebook, and so on.

但他们想知道能触达哪些受众群体，以及这些群体或其细分群体的转化效果如何。

But they want to know what audience they can address, and they want to know how well that audience or cohorts within it convert.

他们想对受众进行细分，看看是否能用伪科学（主要是回归分析、逻辑回归）来做效果和增长营销。

They want to segment that audience and see if they can do performance and growth marketing with pseudoscience, mostly regression, logistical regression.

基本上就是用非常简单的统计数据来判断这个广告活动有效，那个没效果。

Mostly, you know, very simple statistics to see this campaign's working, this one's not.

我要在这个渠道多投钱，那个渠道少投点。

I'm gonna spend more money on this and less on that.

我还要试试这种新的付费媒体推广方式。

And I'm gonna try this new, you know, paid media approach.

我打算试试Brave浏览器的新隐私广告系统，因为那里有些用户不受常规手段影响。

I'm gonna try this new Brave browser private ad system because there are some users there that are off the reservation.

这些用户无法被触达和定位。

They are not reachable, addressable.

他们过去在Chrome上用uBlock Origin，现在转用Brave了。

They used uBlock Origin on Chrome, now they're using Brave.

我无法通过常规的媒体渠道和广告方式接触到他们。

I can't get to them through my usual, you know, media channels and advertising methods.

所以我打算在Brave上投点钱。

So I'm gonna put a little money on Brave.

这就是我们如何建立起私人广告业务的，作为Brave Rewards的一部分，它使用基本注意力代币。

And that's how we built up the private ad business as part of Brave Rewards uses the basic attention token.

这对我也很重要，因为我一直在思考经济学。

And that matters to me too because I always thought about economics.

我从小就对它感兴趣，但我和Mozilla都认为，我们会被谷歌干掉。

I was interested in it from a young age, but I also and Mozilla thought, we're gonna get killed by Google.

我认为Mozilla的每个高管都这么想过。

I think every executive thought this at Mozilla.

我说这个没有违反任何保密协议。

I'm not breaching any NDAs to say this.

这个问题或许只有开发第二个浏览器并将其作为Firefox的伴侣来营销才能解决。

It was something that maybe can't be solved without really doing a second browser and marketing it as a companion to Firefox.

实际上我曾一度和Dave Hyde讨论过做这件事，但我没能把他从苹果挖过来，我还尝试过争取Hewitt。

And I actually talked, at one point with Dave Hyde about doing this, but I couldn't recruit him away from Apple, and I tried to get Hewitt as well.

那本该是一个基于WebKit的Mozilla浏览器，但风险太大了。

And it would have been a WebKit based Mozilla browser, but it was too risky.

我找不到需要的人才。

I couldn't get the talent I needed.

这最终会损害Firefox，而且对士气也不好。

It would undermine Firefox at some point, and it would have been bad for morale.

所以，你知道，也许Mozilla被困住了，但我不希望Brave也被困住。

So, you know, maybe Mozilla is trapped, but I didn't want Brave to be trapped.

我当然不希望自己或孩子被困住，因为这些垄断可能持续得比应有的时间长得多，他们可以一直剪羊毛直到羊群挨饿。

And I certainly didn't want myself or my children to be trapped because these monopolies can last a lot longer than they should, and they can really keep shearing those sheep until sheep are starving.

这种情况已经发生了。

And that's happened.

我认为这就是我们在所有审查和对搜索结果那种粗暴干预下所走向的方向。

I think that's where we're headed with all the censorship and the heavy handed interference in sort of search results.

2015年开始对YouTuber进行变现限制，不仅针对那些应该被审查的恶劣内容——否则你会失去观众并招致他人追责——

Demonetization of YouTubers in 2015 started, and it wasn't just, you know, over atrocious content that should be censored because otherwise, you're gonna just have people after you and you're gonna lose viewers.

还包括各种没人能理解的事情，导致YouTube创作者们不断亏损。

It was over all sorts of things that nobody can understand, and they were just losing money as as YouTube creators.

就像那些只是分享爱好的创作者，发现他们的广告收入突然下降了。

Like, these were just creators who were talking about their hobbies and they they found their ad revenue going down.

哦，完全同意。

Oh, totally.

是啊。

Yeah.

谷歌改了YouTube算法，脸书改了Instagram或脸书算法，结果整个创作领域就像被清桌了一样。

Google changes YouTube algorithms, Facebook changes, Instagram or Facebook algorithms, and, like, it completely wipes the table of whole, you know, sectors of creators.

没错。

Yeah.

在英国，确实有过涉及搜索算法和SEO调整的监管案例。

In in The UK, there were actual regulatory cases involving this, search algorithm, SEO sort of change.

马特·卡茨在谷歌任职时经常写博客，他试图保持这方面的透明度。

Matt Cutts, when he was at Google, used to blog, and he tried to be transparent about it.

但很明显谷歌拥有巨大权力，他们在某种黑箱中运作，就像个赌场。

But it was clear Google had a lot of power, and there's sort of a a black box that they're operating inside of, and it's a casino.

庄家永远赢。

The house always wins.

所以我想采用计算机早期时代我们熟悉的方式——那时你是部门小型机或实验室小型机的系统管理员，或是个人电脑管理员，必须亲自获取CD光盘。

So I wanted to use something that we knew about in the old days of computing where you were the system administrator of your department's minicomputer or your lab's minicomputer or you were your PC's administrator, you had to get the CD ROM.

你必须自己安装系统。

You had to install it.

那真是麻烦透顶。

That was a total pain.

那时存在各种攻击。

It was attacks.

但你可以把数据存储在那里。

But you could keep your data there.

你能确保自己清楚系统运行状况。

You could make sure that you knew what was going on.

那时的系统在许多方面比如今的联网设备更具完整性——现在的设备会背着你自动更新，可能出错或失控，还有各种第三方追踪。

Your system had, in many ways more integrity than our modern day connected devices do, where they can be updated behind your back and things can go wrong or sideways and there's all this third party tracking.

因此我想让用户通过隐私保护重获掌控权，通过Brave浏览器所称的'防护盾'，通过你口袋里的超级计算机——就是90年代那种超标量微架构处理器。

So I wanted to get back to the user having power through privacy, through shields, that's what Brave calls them, through the power in your pocket, which is the supercomputer, you know, the micro unity super scalar architecture from the nineties.

然而这种算力某种程度上被浪费了。

And yet it's kind of underutilized.

尽管处理器速度提升了上万倍，软件体验却远没有好上万倍。

Software is not 10,000 times better even though the processors are that much faster.

出问题了。

Something's gone wrong.

因为即便在90年代初，硅谷图形操作系统的体积就已经开始膨胀。

Because even in the early nineties, silicon graphics operating system was getting bloated.

而我们当时还在讨论从8MB内存升级到16MB内存。

And we're talking about going from eight meg RAM to 16 meg RAM.

我是说，这点内存容量现在看起来简直荒谬得可怜。

I mean, just ridiculous small amount of memory.

然而软件却越来越臃肿，X Window、Motif这些垃圾框架。

And yet the software was getting bloated, x Windows and Motif and all this garbage.

所以软件并没有变得更好。

So software has not gotten better.

在某些方面反而更糟了。

It's in some ways gotten worse.

我希望Brave能高举优质软件的旗帜，打造更精简的软件，捍卫用户隐私的软件——因为它能赋予你们经济议价权，有机会改变网络拓扑结构。要知道，中心化势力总是此消彼长地聚集财富。

And I wanted Brave to wave the flag of better software, tighter software, software that defends your privacy because it gives you economic bargaining power, a chance at changing the topology of the network where, again, there's always gonna be central powers that come and go and accumulate wealth.

但如果用户能够反击，他们就能拥有其他选择，比如加密货币、代币和智能合约系统。

But if the users can fight back, they can have, let's say, other options like cryptocurrencies and tokens and smart contract systems.

我正想说，对大多数普通人而言，当Brave刚起步时，经济权力这个概念确实难以理解。

Well, I was gonna say, you know, maybe for the majority of people out there when you were starting Brave, yeah, like, oh, economic power, I get it.

就像谷歌、脸书它们掌握着权力。

Like Google, Facebook, they've got power.

但作为个体，我怎么可能拥有经济权力呢？

But how on earth would I ever as an individual have economic power?

那不是我们的卖点。

Wasn't our pitch.

我们的卖点是私密、快速、低耗电。

Our pitch was private, fast, you know, low battery use.

实际上在2019年世界移动通信大会上，英国这家名为绿色幽灵的公司过来表示认可。

And we actually at Mobile World Congress twenty nineteen, this green specter company from The UK came by and said, yeah.

我们测量过。

We've measured.

你们是安卓上最省电的浏览器。

You're the you're the least power hungry browser on Android.

这很棒，因为它验证了我们研究团队的成果。

It was awesome because it confirmed our own research team's results.

但你必须用人们日常的感知来推销。

But you have to sell with what people feel every day.

他们感受到的是页面加载延迟。

What they feel is that page load lag.

他们感受到电池在耗尽。

They feel that battery being drained.

他们感受到数据套餐的限制。

They feel the data plan.

即使他们用的是无限流量套餐，仍会有感知上的差异。

Even though they may be on an unlimited data plan, there's still ways they perceive it.

但现在，我是说，

But now, I mean,

我能想象对那些认为‘是的，我可以通过在互联网上关注来赚钱’的人来说，这种感觉很真实。

I imagine it feels real to people that like, yeah, I can make money with my attention on the Internet.

对人们来说，这种感觉非常真实。

Like, it feels very real to people.

这很有趣，因为我们在全球有不同的广告费率等级——美国最容易吸引广告买家，英国和欧洲次之，依此类推。

It's so funny because we have different tiers of ad rate card around the world because it's easier to get ad buyers in The US and paying the most in The UK and Europe after and so on.

因此我们有很多来自低费率地区的粉丝，他们赚得没那么多，但这些收入对他们可能更有价值。

And so we have a lot of fans around the world who are in lower tier regions, they aren't making as much, but it may go a longer way for them.

我们并不是想让人暴富，也不是在搞拉高出货的把戏。

It isn't like we're trying to make people rich or we're doing a pump and dump.

我们试图让用户获得一个成长中企业70%的收益——如果你看看在线广告和数字广告领域，这个市场每年仍有超过3000亿美元的规模。

We're trying to make users get 70% of the revenue of a growing business that if you look at ad online and digital advertising, it's still 300,000,000,000 plus a year.

这是个巨大的市场。

That's a huge business.

如果我们能获得其中的1%，并把其中的70%分给用户，那就是21亿美元。

If we just get, you know, 1% of that and we share 70% of that with our users, It's at 2,100,000,000.0.

对吧？

Right?

为了让听众完全明白，我简明扼要地说：当一条广告展示给我时——这是通过Brave广告网络购买的广告，广告主愿意接受这种不搞复杂定向投放的方式。

So to be super crisp to make sure listeners understand it, an ad is displayed to me, and this is an ad that's purchased through the Brave ad network where the advertiser is willing to say, look, I know that this isn't gonna do a bunch of crazy targeting stuff.

这条广告只是投放在Brave广告网络上。

This is just going on to the Brave ad network.

用户观看广告后，该广告收入的70%会以基本注意力代币的形式出现在用户的钱包里。

A user views that ad, and then 70% of the revenue from that ad shows up in the user's wallet in the form of the basic attention token.

是的。

Yes.

不过当你说网络时，人们会想到追踪，因为网络有很多追踪方式。

Though when you say network, people think tracking because networks have lots of ways to track.

所以我们采取的做法是，通过一个链接将所有广告放入目录中，链接指向广告创意——可能是图片、网页或视频，这些内容存储在边缘缓存中。

So what we do instead is we put all the ads into a catalog through a link to the creative for the ad, the image or web page or video that's in an edge cache somewhere.

我们不认为这是敌对行为。

We don't consider that an adversary.

广告链接和相关关键词会被录入目录，该目录会以相同方式每天多次更新给每个地区的大量用户。

The link to the ad and some keywords about the ad go into a catalog, and the catalog gets updated to a large number of people in each region, and it gets updated several times a day the same way for everyone.

因此下载该目录并不会暴露你的身份。

So you are not identified by downloading that catalog.

这有点像获取安全的反钓鱼列表、安全浏览列表或反恶意软件网站列表。

It's kind of like getting a safe anti phishing list or a safe browsing list, anti malware site list.

这就是我们解决广告网络问题的方式——传统广告技术会在前端追踪你，甚至在决定展示什么广告之前就收集你所有数据。

And that's how we solve the problem of ad networks that today in conventional ad tech will track you on the front side and take all your data even before they've decided what ad to show you.

我们基于这个目录在浏览器内完成决策。

We do the decisioning in the browser based on this catalog.

所以之前提到的所有数据流上的机器学习都在浏览器内完成。

So all the machine learning on the mother of all data feeds I mentioned earlier is in browser.

顺便说一句，只有当你选择加入这个系统时才会启用。

It's only on if you opt into the system, by way.

默认情况下它是关闭的。

It's not turned on normally.

这就是广告匹配的功能。

And that's what does the ad matching.

我明白了。

I see.

是的。

Yeah.

我在想，2015、2016年时我确实为参与的一些初创公司在Facebook上购买广告，那时的定向精准程度简直不可思议。

So I'm wondering how I mean, I was definitely buying some ads on Facebook for startups I was involved with in twenty fifteen, sixteen, and it was unfreaking real, the level of targeting.

我的意思是，你甚至可以精准定位到某一个人。

I mean, you could target one person.

没错。

Yes.

作为广告主，你会觉得这简直是魔法。

And as an advertiser, you're like, this is magic.

我能精准获取我想要的客户。

I can acquire exactly the customers that I want.