剧本：200多家公司故事中的经验教训

关于这个评论，有趣的是，我问埃里克：你当初创建Zoom时，是想打造一个价值数十亿美元的世界级巨头公司，还是仅仅在想如何做出一个优秀的产品？

So the interesting thing about that comment is I asked Eric the question, did you try to create a gigantic multi billion dollar world beating company with Zoom or were you just thinking about sort of how can I make a great product?

他根本就没有真正回答我的问题。

And he, like, didn't even really answer my question.

他只是痴迷于生存这个概念，从创业之初一直到今天，他一直在思考如何交付优秀的产品并生存下去。

He was just obsessed with this notion of survival and that when he started the company all the way even through to today, what he's thinking about is how do we, you know, ship great product and survive.

没错。

Yep.

这正是许多伟大创始人所具备的心态。

It's such a it's a mindset of so many great founders.

是的。

Yes.

好吧。

Alright.

第五点。

Number five.

实力带来更强的实力。

Strength leads to strength.

所以我们选这张图，很大程度上只是为了能在这么巨大的屏幕上展示马克·安德森——在互联网泡沫巅峰时期，登上了《时代》杂志封面，赤脚端坐王座，那是更简单的时代。

So there's a chance that we picked this one mostly just so we could show Marc Andreessen on this very, very large screen, on the cover of Time Magazine at the height of the .com mania on a throne, barefoot, simpler times.

我觉得2021年也应该有一张类似的照片。

I feel like there needs to be some sort of similar image for 2021.

对。

Yeah.

我得想想那会是什么样子。

I have to think about what that is.

是的。

Yeah.

我们稍后再争论。

We'll contest later.

是的。

Yeah.

所以，长期关注的听众对这个都很熟悉。

So long time acquired listeners will know this one well.

这实际上始于反身性的概念。

This really starts with the idea of reflexivity.

所以，如果你为公司获取了新的资源，比如获得更多资本、签下下一个最重要的客户，或聘请一位关键人才、为团队引入一位优秀的高管，那么从定义上讲，你就比获取这些资源之前更有价值了。

So, if you go acquire new resources, your company, you know, if you go get more capital or that next most important customer or a great key hire, you bring in the right executive to your team, you are now by definition more valuable than you were before you acquired that resource.

因此，问题就变成了：你如何利用你如今更宝贵的资产，去获取下一个资源，从而变得更强大、更成功？

And so, the question becomes, well, how do you leverage your now more valuable asset into getting the next next resource and becoming even more powerful, even more successful.

我常想到的一个极端例子，是去年在这里的资本营与迈克尔·莫比森的一次对话：如果你看特斯拉2020年的市值，你会觉得他们根本不值那么多钱——这其实是非常合理的看法。

And an extreme example that I always think of about this comes from a conversation that I had right here at Capital Camp last year with Michael Mobison which was if you looked at Tesla's market cap in 2020, you would say that there's no way they're worth that and that would be a very reasonable thing to say.

但他们确实利用股价以极小的股权稀释发行了新股，在那一年为资产负债表筹集了超过100亿美元的现金。

But what they definitely did do is use that share price to sell new shares at very little dilution and raise over $10,000,000,000 of cash to the balance sheet that year.

所以，不管你原先认为他们值多少钱，现在他们肯定更值钱了，因为他们手头多了整整100亿美元的现金，而且知道怎么用它。

So, whatever you thought they were worth, they're definitely worth more now because they have a fresh $10,000,000,000 in cash and they know how to use it.

因此，这归根结底是独特地调动资源的能力，回到2009年马克·安德森的A16Z，当时他们一推出第一支基金就大举出击。

So, it really comes down to sort of the ability to uniquely marshal resources and to bring it back to Marc Andreessen in 2009 when A16Z raised their fund one, they came out swinging.

对于当时关注科技行业的人来说，他们为第一支基金筹集了3亿美元。

For folks who were sort of observing the tech industry at this point, they raised $300,000,000 for fund one.

在2009年。

In 2009.

在2009年。

In 2009.

所以，马克和本非常清楚这一原则。

So, Mark and Ben knew this principle very well.

他们意识到，我们制造了巨大的轰动，建立了强大的品牌，人们仅仅因为我们一出道就做了这件疯狂的事，就已经把我们视为顶级风投公司了。

They realized what we made this huge splash, we've got this big brand, people already think we're like a top venture firm just because we did this crazy thing out of the gate.

我们该如何巩固这一地位？

How do we solidify that position?

因此，就在第二年，他们筹集了一笔6500亿美元的基金。

So the very next year, they raised a $650,000,000,000 fund.

百万。

It million.

十亿。

Billion.

抱歉。

Sorry.

我忘了是哪个年代了。

I forgot what decade it was.

我们还没到2022年呢。

We're not in 2022 yet.

没错。

No.

但我的意思是，正如你所看到的，他们基本上一直保持着这种心态，

But I mean, as you can tell, like, they they basically kept going with this mindset of

就在昨天，他们又筹集了45亿美元的加密货币基金。

Just yesterday, they raised another 4 and a half billion dollar crypto fund.

他们目前管理的资产规模在300亿到400亿美元之间。

And they're somewhere between 30 and 40,000,000,000 under management now.

在成立后的十三年里，他们基本上从未把资源视为一种静态的概念，觉得‘好了，现在我们可以做一些有趣的事情了’。

In in what, thirteen years since founding, they basically never took their resources and took that as like a static notion of like, oh good, now we can, you know, do some interesting things with this.

他们总是审视自己拥有的所有东西，然后说：好吧，我们现在处于强势地位。

They basically always looked at everything they had and say, okay, we're in a strong position.

我们如何变得更强大？

How do we get stronger?

我们如何更快地做更多事，并让现有的资源不断复利增长？

How do we do more faster and compound what we have?

所以，我认为关键在于始终思考：我刚刚变得更值钱了，这让我有能力再次变得更有价值，始终谨慎而积极地抓住下一个机会。

So, I think there's really something to just always thinking, okay, I just got more valuable and that puts me in a position to get even more valuable again and always just be really thoughtful and super aggressive about seizing that next opportunity.

关于这一点，我们必须提到的另一个例子来自收购经典案例——真正的元老级美国资本主义企业：标准石油公司，它完全照搬了这一策略。

The other example that we have to mention on this one from the acquired canon is literally the o g o g o g American capitalist business, which is Standard Oil, did this ran this playbook to a t.

就像元老级的约翰·洛克菲勒，当你说到‘元老级’时，他简直就是个黑帮老大。

It's like the o g John Rockefeller was When you say o g, like, he's, like, actually a gang ster.

他可能真的就是个黑帮分子。

He he may actually have been a gangster.

你知道，他从来不会满足。

You know, he was never satisfied.

无论标准石油变得多大，都永远不够大。

No matter how big Standard Oil got, it was never big enough.

无论他通过任何手段收购了哪个竞争对手，或者无论他和哪条铁路达成了交易，

No matter what competitor he would acquire into the fold by whatever means necessary or no matter what railroad he just did a

一笔交易。

A deal.

他总会利用这一点说：好吧，明天早上我醒来后，我们就要想办法利用我这个价值更高的公司。

A deal with, he would always use that to say, okay, tomorrow morning I wake up and we figure out how to use my new more valuable company.

好了，听众们。

Alright, listeners.

是时候谈谈我们另一个最爱的公司了，Statsig。

It's time to talk about another one of our favorite companies, Statsig.

自从你们上次听到我们谈论Statsig以来，他们有了一个非常令人兴奋的更新。

Since you last heard from us about Statsig, they have a very exciting update.

他们完成了C轮融资，估值达到11亿美元。

They raised their series c, valuing them at $1,100,000,000.

是的。

Yeah.

一个巨大的里程碑。

Huge milestone.

恭喜整个团队。

Congrats to the team.

而且时机很有趣，因为实验领域正在迅速升温。

And timing is interesting because the experimentation space is, really heating up.

是的。

Yes.

那么，为什么投资者将Statsig估值超过10亿美元？

So why do investors value STAT SEG at over $1,000,000,000?

这是因为实验已成为全球顶尖产品团队产品栈中至关重要的部分。

It's because experimentation has become a critical part of the product stack for the world's best product teams.

是的。

Yep.

这一趋势始于Facebook、Netflix和Airbnb等Web 2.0公司。

This trend started with web two dot o companies like Facebook and Netflix and Airbnb.

这些公司面临一个问题。

Those companies faced a problem.

如何在快速扩展至数千名员工的同时，保持一种快速、去中心化的产品和工程文化？

How do you maintain a fast, decentralized product and engineering culture while also scaling up to thousands of employees?

实验系统是这一问题的重要解决方案。

Experimentation systems were a huge part of that answer.

这些系统让公司全体员工都能访问一套全局的产品指标，从页面浏览量到观看时长再到性能表现。

These systems gave everyone at those companies access to a global set of product metrics, from page views to watch time to performance.

每当一个团队发布新功能或新产品时，他们都能衡量该功能对这些指标的影响。

And then every time a team released a new feature or product, they could measure the impact of that feature on those metrics.

因此，Facebook可以设定一个公司级目标，比如增加应用内使用时长，然后让各个团队自行探索如何实现它。

So Facebook could set a company wide goal like increasing time in app and let individual teams go and figure out how to achieve it.

将这种模式扩展到数千名工程师和产品经理身上，就会带来指数级增长。

Multiply this across thousands of engineers and PMs and boom, you get exponential growth.

难怪实验现在被视为必不可少的基础设施。

It's no wonder that experimentation is now seen as essential infrastructure.

没错。

Yep.

如今，像Notion、OpenAI、Rippling和Figma这样的顶尖产品团队同样依赖实验。

Today's best product teams like Notion, OpenAI, Rippling, and Figma are equally reliant on experimentation.

但他们不是自己搭建，而是直接使用Statsig。

But instead of building it in house, they just use Statsig.

他们使用的不仅仅是Statsig的实验功能。

And they don't just use Statsig for experimentation.

在过去几年中，Statsig增加了快速产品团队所需的所有工具，例如功能开关、产品分析、会话回放等。

Over the last few years, Statsig has added all the tools that fast product teams need like feature flags, product analytics, session replays, and more.

所以，如果你想帮助你团队的工程师和产品经理更快地构建产品并做出更明智的决策，请访问 statsig.com/acquired，或点击节目说明中的链接。

So if you would like to help your team's engineers and PMs figure out how to build faster and make smarter decisions, go to statsig.com/acquired, or click the link in the show notes.

他们提供非常慷慨的免费套餐、5万美元的初创企业计划，以及面向大型企业的实惠企业合同。

They have a super generous free tier, a $50,000 startup program, and affordable enterprise contracts for large companies.

只需告诉他们，是本和大卫介绍的。

Just tell them that Ben and David sent you.

好的。

Alright.

第六点。

Number six.

这是另一个让我深有感触的建议。

This is another one that is near and dear to my heart.

永远都不算晚。

It's never too late.

这个教训其实有两层含义。

And there are actually two meanings to this lesson.

其中之一也是马克·安德森的另一句至理名言。

One is also another great Marc Andreessen piece of wisdom.

他曾在一次采访中说过一句非常著名的名言，我想那是2014年的一次采访，他说：我1994年来到硅谷，那时硅谷正处于休眠状态。

So there's a great famous quote of his from an interview, I think this was in 2014 that he did, where he said, I came out here in 1994 to Silicon Valley and the valley was in hibernation.

我当时强烈的感觉是，我错过了这一切。

My big feeling was I just missed it.

我错过了整个时代。

I missed the whole thing.

这一切发生在八十年代，我来得太晚了，硅谷已经结束了。

It had happened in the eighties and I got here too late and Silicon Valley was over.

但显然，这完全不对。

And obviously, that was completely not true.

有趣的是，硅谷和科技是以浪潮形式发展的。

And what's cool about this is that like Silicon Valley and technology moves in waves.

这与摩尔定律有关。

It's related to Moore's Law.

每当计算能力提升十倍，就会出现一个新市场、一种新范式、一项新技术被创造出来。

Every time there's a 10 x in computing, there's a new market, there's a new paradigm, there's a new technology that gets created.

所以，是的，马克说对了。

And so, yes, Mark was right.

他错过了个人电脑浪潮。

He missed the PC wave.

对于那波浪潮来说，他来得太晚了。

It was too late for that.

但他赶上了互联网浪潮的时机。

But he was right on time for the Internet wave.

只要摩尔定律仍然成立，只要你从事科技、投资科技或打造科技驱动的产品，就永远不会太晚。

And as long as Moore's law holds, if you work in technology, if you invest in technology, if you build technology enabled products, it's never too late.

你总是在即将到来的下一代技术的门槛上。

You are always right on the cusp of the next generation that's coming.

‘永远不晚’的另一层含义是，观看这段视频的人和在礼堂里的人会注意到，这张幻灯片上没有马克·安德森，而是。

The other meaning of it's never too late, folks who are viewing the video and here in the auditorium will notice we have not Marc Andreessen on this slide, but Doctor.

台积电的创始人张忠谋。

Morris Chang, the founder of TSMC.

因此，我认为这是从《Acquired》中学到的另一个教训，即莫里斯·张在56岁时创立了台积电。

And so this is, I think, other lesson that I've really taken from Acquired, which is that, in this vein, which is that Morris Chang was 56 years old when he founded TSMC.

而如今，我认为台积电是全球价值第十一高的公司。

And TSMC is today, I believe, the eleventh most valuable company in the world.

没错。

Yep.

但很容易想到，与‘总会有下一代’、‘总会有另一种方式’相对的另一面是

And it's so easy, you know, the flip side of the coin of there's always another generation, there's always another way

我们应当指出这一点

And we should say it

这可能是维持地缘政治紧张局势平息的原因。

may be the thing keeping geopolitical tensions at rest.

就像，它可能

Like, it it may

是那种没人敢去破坏的力量，因此我们才得以维持和平。

be the force that nobody wants to destabilize and therefore we have peace.

这不仅仅是一家公司。

Like, it's not just a company.

但如果你听马克的说法，很容易觉得总会有下一波浪潮。

But it's easy to think, you know, if you listen to to Mark or that there's always another wave.

那是年轻人的事。

That's for young people.

就像史蒂夫·乔布斯、马克·扎克伯格、维塔利克·布特林，这些年轻人引领了新一轮的技术浪潮。

Like, it's it's Steve Jobs, it's Mark Zuckerberg, it's Vitalik Buterin, it's these young kids who get these new waves of technology.

但现实并非如此。

And the reality is that's just not true.

这仅仅是一种心态。

It's just a mindset.

你必须愿意投身其中，即使56岁也能创办全球第十一大的公司。

Like, you have to be willing to dive in and do it and you can do it at 56 years old and still build the eleventh most valuable company in the world.

我们在整理这个内容时，我跟大卫争论说，这没什么新鲜的，你知道，只是最近才显得新颖。

When we were doing this, putting this together, I was arguing with David that, like, this isn't novel, you know, this is only novel recently.

如果你回想起六七十年代的风险投资，那时资助的是像思科、仙童这类公司的资深人士，他们之前已经设计过五款芯片，到了五十多岁才去创办新公司，打造他们人生中的第六款芯片。

Like if you think back to what venture capital was in the sixties and seventies, it was funding veterans of the Ciscos of the world and, you know, the Fairchilds of the world who had designed, you know, five chips before to go start a new company and build the sixth chip of their life, you know, in their fifties.

是的。

Yeah.

只有随着互联网和云计算的出现，创业成本变得极低，才出现了大量年轻创始人创建消费互联网公司的浪潮，但这实际上只是历史中的一个短暂现象。

And it's only the advent of the internet with cloud computing with, you know, super low cost to start a company that there has been this wave of very young founders creating these consumer internet companies but that's actually a blip in history.

有趣的是，现在风向完全偏向了这种传说：哦，这些年轻的天才创始人，以至于我们甚至不得不提出一个如此夸张的观点：哇，56岁的人也能创办一家改变世界的重要公司。

Funny that now the pendulum has swung so far to the lore being, oh, these young hotshot founders that we have to even make this crazy point of, wow, a 56 year old can start an important world changing company.

是的，‘叛逆的八人’当时可都不是二十多岁。

Yeah, the traitorous eight were, you know, not in their twenties.

没错。

Yes.

好吧。

Alright.

这是一个许多人都会认出的熟悉面孔。

This is a familiar face that many of you will recognize.

第七点：不要把期权误认为现金流。

Point number seven is don't mistake options for cash flow.

这来自我们与迈克尔·莫比森的对话，我们之前提到过去年在营地上见过他。

This is from our episode with Michael Mobison who we mentioned we met here last year at camp.

那么，我们说的‘不要把购买期权误认为投资现金流’是什么意思呢？

So what do we mean by don't mistake buying options for investing in cash flow?

这里有一个词叫‘投资’。

Well, there's this word investing.

这个词本周被频繁提及。

It's come up a lot this week.

它被用于多种不同的语境中。

It is used for multiple purposes.

这是一个被过度使用的词，传统上，按照本·格雷厄姆的定义，投资是指你关注一家企业从今天起未来所产生的系列现金流。

This is sort of an overloaded word and classically defined investing in the Ben Graham sense is that you are looking at a series of cash flows that a business generates from today into the future.

你应用某种折现率，将这些现金流折算为当前的价值。

You apply some discount rate, you value those, you know, cash flows at what they're worth in this present day.

你会关注企业的特征，比如潜在的利润率提升或增长速度，并基于你已知的当前现金流做出各种假设，试图确定这家企业的价值，并在此价格水平上投入资金进行投资。

And you look at things like characteristics of the business like potential margin expansion or their growth rate and you make all sorts of assumptions based on, again, the cash flows that you know to exist today and you try and come up with some price that that business is worth and you try and put some money in and invest at that price.

但本，这听起来完全不像我们所做的。

But Ben, that doesn't sound at all like what we do.

不是。

No.

大卫和我是专业的种子轮风险投资人，人们称我所做的为投资，但尽管用的是同一个词，它实际上并不涉及我刚才提到的任何内容。

David and I are professional seed stage venture capitalists and people call what I do investing but while it's the same word, it doesn't involve literally any of the things that I just mentioned, you know, in that that previous comment.

我觉得称这为投资真是很有趣。

It is funny to me that that it is it is called investing.

通常情况下，这只是一个创始人和一个写在餐巾纸上的想法。

Like it is it's typically just a founder and an idea on a napkin.

那你如何对现金流做出任何假设呢？

So how can you make any assumptions about the cash flows?

而且而且

And And

所以我们就会想，这个创始人和这个想法值两千万美元。

then we're like, well, that founder and that idea is worth $20,000,000.

真有趣的是，人们觉得风险投资家是如何得出估值的，这简直就像巫术一样。

Oh, it's so funny to me that that people think it's complete voodoo math how how venture capitalists come up with with valuations.

我觉得迈克尔的评论和他的想法在这里很有道理，因为一旦你承认没有贴现现金流，就不再试图去说，在什么世界里这个值钱？

This is where I think that that sort of Michael's comment and his his his thoughts on this make a lot of sense because once you admit that there is no DCF and you stop trying to say, in what world is that worth?

两千万、一千万或七千万美元——对于一个早期想法阶段的项目，我们最近就见过这样的估值？

$20,000,000 or $10,000,000 or $70,000,000 at an idea stage which we've seen recently?

那么，如果你愿意放下这一点，静下心来深呼吸，说好吧，如果我们不基于传统的投资贴现现金流，那我们该如何为这个项目定价呢？

Well, then if you're willing to let that go and you meditate and take your deep breath and say, okay, well how do we price this thing then if it's not based on, you know, classic investing DCFs?

实际上，早期阶段的风险投资根本不是基于现金流的投资。

Really, venture capital in the early stage is not at all cash flow based investing.

它实际上是期权投资。

It's actually options investing.

当你以这种方式思考时，世界就开始变得更有意义了，因为你怎么去评估一个期权的价值？

And as you sort of think about it that way, the world starts to make more sense because how do you value an option?

你会看一下潜在结果的范围，以及这个期权出现各种结果的概率，这实际上就是风险投资家在做的，无论他们是否在认知上这样思考。

Well, you look at the range of potential outcomes and the probabilistic likelihood of that option and the entire range of outcomes which is actually what venture capitalists are doing whether they're cognitively thinking about it that way or not.

你基本上是在问：这家公司成为十亿美元公司、百亿亿美元公司，或者归零的概率有多大？

You're basically saying, what's the chance that this is a billion dollar company or a $100,000,000,000 company or zero?

当然，这引出了一个观点：你需要构建多元化的投资组合，而不仅仅是投资于单个大型公司，因为潜在结果的范围如此广泛，你需要找到方法来平滑这种风险，同时仍能受益于不对称回报的潜力。

And of course, this leads to the idea that you need diverse portfolios rather than just investing in single large companies because this range of potential outcomes is so wide that you need to find ways to sort of smooth that risk while still benefiting from the potential of an asymmetric return.

这也完全解释了为什么风险投资家如此痴迷于总可服务市场（TAM）。

It also completely explains why venture capitalists are so obsessed with TAM.

当我刚进入这个行业时，这是让我感到困惑的一点：为什么每个人都如此关注TAM？

It was one of the things when I first got into the industry, I was like, why does everybody care so much about the TAM?

难道不应该还有其他更值得关注的方面吗？

Like, aren't there other aspects that you should care about?

但TAM对期权估值的影响最为敏感。

Well, that's what's most sensitive to the valuation of the option.

它决定了可能结果的规模大小。

It is magnitude of the outcomes that are possible.

你可以进一步讨论其可能的权重，但结果的规模越大，这个选择的价值就越高。

Like you can then debate the probable weighting of it, but the higher the magnitude of the outcomes, the more valuable the option is going be.

对。

Right.

如果我认为这件事有x%的可能性成为下一个苹果，那我现在该出多少钱？

If I think there's some x percent chance that this thing becomes the next Apple, what should I pay for it now?

你实际上问的就是这个问题，而不是通过现金流折现法去推算一个数值。

That is actually the question you are asking rather than DCF ing your way to something there.

但当然，把人们毕生的心血说成是购买一个期权，这种说法显得过于冰冷且糟糕。

But of course, it's it's sterile and kind of terrible to talk about people's life's work as buying an option.

因此，这引出了一个重要的推论。

So there's an important corollary to this.

是的。

Yes.

这是来自我们Altos Ventures的朋友，特别是Ho Nam，他提出了一个非常精彩的观点。

And this is from our friends over at Altos Ventures and in particular Ho Nam and he makes this great point.

他前几天在推特上重新发布了这个观点，嗯，好吧。

He actually just remade it on Twitter the other day which is, yeah, okay.

你应该更多地把估值和风险投资看作是期权，而不是像投资上市公司那样基于现金流来思考。

Like, you probably should think about valuations and venture capital investing more like options than you do thinking about investing in public companies on a cash flow basis.

但不要把初创公司当成彩票。

But don't mistake startups for lottery tickets.

从投资角度看，这些可能是你的期权，但这些创始人都是有家庭、生活、银行账户和员工的真人。

These may be options to you from an investing standpoint, but these founders are real people with families and lives and bank accounts and employees.

风险投资与公开市场投资根本不同的另一点是，它是一个多轮博弈，而不是单轮博弈。

And the other other thing that is fundamentally different about venture capital investing versus say public market investing is it's a multi turn game, not a single turn game.

因此，即使你很清楚自己的期权将一文不值，你如何行为、如何对待这些创始人仍然很重要，因为你不知道他们下一步会做什么。

And so how you behave and how you treat these founders even if it's clear that your option is gonna expire worthless, you don't know what those founders are gonna go do next.

你不知道他们的朋友是谁。

You don't know who their friends are.

你不知道他们会去和谁交流。

You don't know who they're gonna talk to.

你不知道桌边其他投资者对你在那段时间的行为或不作为会有什么看法。

You don't know what the other investors around the table might think about the way you behaved or didn't behave during that period of time.

所以我认为，这两种动态很好地解释了硅谷的文化：你进行的是基于期权的投资，但这是一个多轮博弈。

So it's this interesting I think these two dynamics really explain the culture in Silicon Valley a lot which is you're doing options based investing but it's a multi turn game.

是的。

Yeah.

实际上，没有人真的只做其中一种。

And in practice, nobody's actually just doing one or the other.

每个人的投资风格都处于这个谱系的某个位置，因为除了纯粹的价值投资者——他们关注公司的账面价值，或者像我这样的种子轮或准种子轮投资者——只看一张餐巾纸上的草图和一个有想法的创始人，有时甚至没有想法，大多数人其实处于中间地带。

Everyone's style of investing is somewhere on the spectrum here because other than the pure play value investors who are, you know, looking at the the the book value of a company or the seed stage investors or the pre seed like me who are looking at a napkin sketch and a founder with an idea or sometimes even no idea, most people are actually in the middle.

所以大多数人必须结合两种观念：一是这个项目有多大潜力、能有多大，二是他们确实在产生收入，有时甚至已经有了现金流，因此我可以对这些数据应用某种倍数。

So most people have to blend some notion of what are the chances this could be big and how big with the idea that, hey, they're actually generating revenue and sometimes even, you know, cash flow as a start up and I actually can apply some multiple to that.

显然，这个倍数可能会迅速变化，你必须随之调整。

And obviously the multiple can change rapidly on you and then you have to adapt.

但每个人都在某种程度上兼顾了这两种方法。

But everybody's doing a little bit of one and a little bit of the other.

好的。

Alright.

在下一课中，关注是什么让您的啤酒更好喝。

For our next lesson, focus on what makes your beer taste better.

我们在《Acquired》的许多集里都提到过这个小片段，这是杰夫·贝佐斯在2008年Y Combinator创业学校上的照片，那是

So we brought up this little vignette on a whole bunch of episodes on Acquired, but this is an image of Jeff Bezos at the 2008 Y Combinator startup school, which was a which is a

一个历史性的时刻。

which is a moment in history.

一个非常重要的历史时刻。

A very important moment in history.

Y Combinator过去至少会举办这些线下活动，我不知道他们现在是否还做，可能现在都是线上了。

So YC, at least used to, I don't know if they they still do, it's probably virtual now.

是的。

Yep.

会在硅谷举办这些线下活动。

Would put on these physical events in Silicon Valley.

我去过一次比尔·格雷厄姆市民礼堂的活动。

I went to one in the Bill Graham Civic Auditorium.

没错，我也去过一次。

That's right, I went to one too.

他们会邀请创始人和行业领袖来演讲，激励下一代创业者，本质上是为了激发人们申请YCombinator。

And they would bring founders and luminaries to come and talk and inspire the next generation of founders and basically to inspire applications to YC.

所以在2008年，贝索斯来了，那时AWS刚刚上线，他借此机会向所有这些初创公司和未来的初创公司宣传，说明为什么他们应该选择AWS而不是自己搭建基础设施。

And so in 2008, Bezos came and this was right after AWS had launched and he used it as a marketing opportunity to market to all of these startups and future startups about why they should build on AWS instead of rolling their own infrastructure.

我们应该说，这个策略取得了惊人的成功。

Which we should say this strategy worked ludicrously well.

AWS通过从西雅图把人运到湾区，疯狂地向这些初创公司布道，从而在云计算领域领先了五年。

Like AWS probably a five year lead on cloud by piling people on the plane from Seattle going down to the Bay Area, evangelizing like crazy to all these startups.

在2008年YCombinator创业学校那个房间里的所有这些微型初创公司中，当时甚至还没有成立的公司就是Airbnb。

To all these tiny startups who in that very room at the 2008 YC startup school, a startup that had not even been built yet was Airbnb.

Airbnb的三位创始人当时就在那个YCombinator创业学校的现场，这正是他们决定那一年申请YCombinator的原因，剩下的就是历史了。

The three Airbnb founders were at that YC startup school and that's why they decided to apply to YC that year and the rest is history.

这对贝索斯有效，对YC也有效。

Worked for Bezos and it worked for YC too.

确实如此。

Indeed.

但如果你去观看这段演讲，我强烈推荐，这是一场很棒的演讲。

But if you go watch the talk, which I highly recommend It's great talk.

真的非常棒。

It's really great.

杰夫用了一个奇怪的类比来说明AWS，他谈到了二十世纪初欧洲的啤酒酿造厂。

Jeff uses this sort of odd analogy for AWS where he talks about European beer distilleries, beer breweries around the turn of the twentieth century.

你会想，好吧，杰夫。

And you're like, alright, Jeff.

你到底想说什么？

Where where are you going with this?

他的观点是，电力刚刚被发明，这是一项巨大的赋能技术，对消费品、比如啤酒这样的快消品产生了巨大影响。

And the point the analogy he makes is electricity had just been invented and this was this massive boon enabling technology for consumer, you know, products, CPG like like beer.

他们现在可以利用电力酿造比以往多得多的啤酒。

They could now brew vastly more quantities of beer than you could before using electricity.

但最早采用电力的酿酒厂，自己建造了发电设备。

But the first breweries to adopt it, they built their own power generators.

他们自己生产电力。

They made their own power.

这在前几年效果不错，但需要大量资本投入，还要投入大量人力来运营发电设备。

And that, you know, worked fine for a few years, but it was super capital intensive, required all this operational labor to run the power generators.

后来，公用事业公司出现了，下一代酿酒厂不再自己发电。

And then the utilities companies came along and the next generation of breweries, they didn't make their own power.

他们只是从公用事业公司租用电能，结果迅速超越了第一批使用电力的酿酒厂，因为你知道吗？

They just rented it from the utility companies and they, you know, ran roughshod over the first generation of breweries to use power because guess what?

谁为你提供电力，根本不会影响啤酒的味道。

Whoever makes your electricity has no impact on how your beer tastes.

事实上，自己发电并不会让啤酒味道更好。

Literally, making it yourself does not make your beer taste better.

但这确实提高了你的成本结构。

But it does raise your cost structure.

这确实提高了你的成本结构。

It does raise your cost structure.

因此，杰夫对所有这些初创公司的建议是，专注于能让啤酒口感更好的方面。

And so Jeff's argument to all of these startups was, you know, focus on what makes your beer taste better.

所以这里有两点启示。

So there's two lessons here.

第一点是他所主张的，作为初创公司，你应该专注于客户会在意的产品属性，不仅仅是初创公司，任何公司都应如此。

One is what he's arguing, that as a startup, you should focus solely, not just startup, any company, you should focus solely on the attributes of your product that your customers are gonna care about.

其他一切，比如你的基础设施，都不重要。

Everything else, your infrastructure doesn't matter.

外包。

Outsource.

第二点，也是更重要的启示是，如果你看看贝佐斯实际做了什么，而不是他说了什么，就会发现做一家公用事业公司是极其、极其赚钱的生意。

The second, perhaps more important takeaway from this, if you look at what Bezos did, not what he said, is that being a utility company is an exceedingly, exceedingly great business.

尤其是作为一家不受监管的公用事业公司。

And particularly being an unregulated utility company.

是的。

Yes.

我的意思是，这正是亚马逊成为盈利企业的根本原因。

And I mean, that's the reason that Amazon became a profitable business.

确实如此。

It absolutely is.

而且不仅仅是亚马逊。

And and not just Amazon.

如果你想想看，你知道，

If you think about, you know

我会说，这是一家盈利公司，你知道，它们积累了太多现金，以至于无法全部再投资。

And I would say profitable company, you know, where they piled up too much cash to reinvest all their cash flows.

但如果你思考一下这种模式——什么是不受监管的公用事业公司以及科技，它可能如此具有防御性和强大。

But if you think about this model of like what is an unregulated utility company and technology, it it can be so defensible and powerful.

就像Square就是这样。

Like that's what Square is.

Shopify也是这样。

That's what Shopify is.

我认为我们Acquired平台上三分之二的赞助商都是这样的，比如Vanta、Modern Treasury、Vouch，甚至Mystery，只要你能提供一个关键的、不可或缺的基础设施，其他公司需要它，但它并不会让他们的啤酒更好喝，这就是一个绝佳的领域。

That's what I think two thirds of our sponsors on Acquired are, you know, that's what Vanta is, Modern Treasury, Vouch, even Mystery, all of, you know, if you can provide a critical, mission critical piece of infrastructure that other companies can use that they need but doesn't make their actual beer taste better, it's a great place

如何获取它。

to How to source it.

我刚刚在想，再偏离一下话题，因为在这里聊天很有趣。

I was thinking about this, just to go off script again because it's fun up here.

我认为这实际上和劳动分工的经济理论是一回事，只是应用到了企业层面。

I think the this is actually the same thing as like the economic theory of specialization of labor but applied to businesses.

现在人们普遍认识到，当人们专注于某件事并做到极致，然后转向擅长其他事的邻居来获取他们需要的服务，而不是每个人都事必躬亲时，GDP往往会增长。

Where it's basically well understood at this point that GDP tends to go up when people get really good at a thing, focus their time on doing that thing and then turn to their neighbor who's good at a different thing to provide that service back to them rather than everybody doing everything for themselves in their lives.

而这就是在商业层面上的同一种现象。

And this is just that on a business scale.

完全正确。

Totally.

好吧。

Alright.

下一个话题让我非常有共鸣，我花了很多心思制作这些视觉素材，请耐心看一下这些图示。

The next one is one that is near and dear to my heart and I had a lot of fun illustrating this, so bear with me on some of these visuals.

这个话题是扩大规模还是聚焦细分市场。

So this one is scale up or niche down.

我想先谈谈聚焦细分市场。

And I wanna start first by talking about niching down.

这张照片是精心挑选自Brooks Running的官网。

So this photo is ripped with love from Brooks Running's website.

这是一家很棒的伯克希尔公司。

It's a great Berkshire company.

几周前在西雅图的Arena活动中，我们邀请了他们的CEO吉姆·韦伯上台分享。

We had Jim Weber, the CEO, on stage with us for our Arena show a couple weeks back in Seattle.

对于不知道的人，布鲁克斯是一家非常特别的公司。

So for folks who don't know, Brooks is a pretty special company.

2002年吉姆加入时，他们其实还不是。

Back in 2002, when Jim came in, they weren't, frankly.

他们面向所有人，提供一切产品。

They were everything to everyone.

他们不仅生产跑鞋，还生产各种鞋子，包括你在家庭烧烤时穿的20美元的鞋子。

They didn't just make running shoes, they made everything shoes including $20 shoes that you would wear at a family barbecue.

他们为各种运动制作了各种服装。

And they made all sorts of apparel for all sorts of sports.

公司正在亏损，每年亏损约500万美元。

The company's losing money, think 5,000,000 a year in the red.

他们的年收入约为6000万美元，但显然未能从中获取太多价值。

They were doing about 60,000,000 in revenue but obviously not able to capture a lot of value out of that.

因此，当吉姆接手扭转公司局面时，他做的第一件事就是决定：我们要成为一家跑步公司，专注于为注重跑步表现的跑者服务。

And so when Jim came in to turn the company around, the first thing he did was decide we are gonna be a running company and we are gonna be a running company for performance runners, for people who care about their running.

于是他立即联系了众多分销商和大型零售店，砍掉了整个产品线。

And so immediately went to a bunch of their distributors, big box stores, slashed entire product lines.

他们的收入从六千万美元骤降至三千万左右。

So, they went from 60,000,000 in revenue down to 30 or something like that.

他们淘汰了所有亏损的产品线。

They got rid of all their unprofitable product lines.

他们取消了所有非专业跑步的产品。

They got rid of anything that wasn't performance running.

他们彻底重组了整个分销渠道，只专注于专业跑步鞋，大力投入研发，并真正投资于在跑者中建立品牌。

They blew up their whole distribution channel and they started caring only about these performance running shoes, focusing on R and D, and really investing in building brand with runners.

好吧，我就不讲整个故事了，直接跳到二十年后。

Well, I'll save you the whole story and just flash forward twenty years.

成功了。

It worked.

起初他们缓慢增长，但随着时间推移，回报开始显现，他们逐渐成为全球最顶尖的跑步鞋公司之一。

They grew slowly at first but then over time it really started to pay off and they really started to be known as one of the best running shoe companies in the world.

事实上，在你看到的任何大型马拉松比赛中，当使用高速摄像机拍摄时，他们的鞋子都是排名前几的。

In fact, they're one of the top couple at any big marathon that you'll see when they take the high speed cameras.

布鲁克斯、布鲁克斯、布鲁克斯、布鲁克斯，当然还有一些亚瑟士和一些新兴品牌，还有那些全新的、疯狂的耐克鞋子。

Brooks, Brooks, Brooks, Brooks, and of course some ASICs and some some newer brands too and and of course the the the new crazy Nike shoes.

但他们意识到，我们无法击败耐克。

But they just realized we are not going to beat Nike.

我们无法在所有领域都击败耐克。

We are not going to beat Nike at the everything game.

所以我们必须聚焦细分市场，玩另一种游戏。

So we have to niche down and play a different game.

我之前提到过，他们的收入从六千万下降到三千万左右。

So I mentioned that 60,000,000 to 30 ish million in revenue.

去年，他们的收入接近12亿美元，在疫情期间取得了优异业绩，并持续受益于跑步成为全球最大且增长最快的运动服饰机会之一的趋势。

Last year, they did close to 1,200,000,000.0 and had a great year last year through the pandemic and continuing to ride this wave of running becoming one of the the largest and fastest growing athletic apparel opportunities in the world.

这是一个令人惊叹的复利故事，也是伯克希尔式的典范。

It's such an amazing compounding story and Berkshire story.

过去二十年里，他们的年增长率一直保持在30%到40%之间。

They've been growing at 30 to 40% a year for like the last twenty years.

这太惊人了。

It's amazing.

持续性。

Duration.

持续性。

Duration.

所以，这也便于规模化扩张。

So, it also works to scale up.

所以，来个快速案例研究。

So, quick case study.

几年前，我们做过一期关于《纽约时报》的节目，当时美国所有中型报纸都因互联网带来的冲击而破产，但《纽约时报》却变得空前庞大，业务比以往任何时候都更健康。

We did an episode on the New York Times a couple years ago and while every mid sized newspaper in The US was going bankrupt thanks to disruption brought by the internet, the New York Times became gigantic and a healthier business than ever.

《纽约时报》意识到，自己应该成为这一领域唯一的全国性品牌，也是为数不多的值得信赖的全球性品牌之一。

And the Times saw the idea to be sort of the one national brand and one of the few trusted global brands in the space.

正如我们所知，互联网对那些身处中间的人而言可能是残酷的，因为它让世界上每个人都能轻松免费地获取任何报道。

The internet as we know can be brutal to people caught in the middle because it enabled everyone in the world to access any reporting basically for free pretty easily.

因此，谁拥有世界上最好的全球或国家新闻报道，自然就会吸引所有流量，而中间的媒体则陷入困境。

And so then whoever has the best reporting in the world on global or national stories, of course, sort of gets all of the traffic and everyone in the middle is stuck.

所以，这显然伴随着巨大的成本。

So, this obviously has an enormous cost associated with it.

你需要基本上雇佣所有最优秀的记者，需要拥有最多的记者，还需要投入巨大的技术建设。

You know, you need to basically hire all the best reporters, you need to have the most reporters, you need to build out, I mean, massive technology investments.

如今，《纽约时报》本质上已经是一家科技公司。

The New York Times is truly a technology company at this point.

所以，固定成本极高。

So, super high fixed cost.

你必须相信自己真的能够实现全球规模的运营，才能证明这些固定成本是值得的。

So, you got to believe that you're actually going to be able to operate at that global scale to justify all of these fixed costs.

所以，这里的要点是：当然你可以专注于细分领域，当然也可以扩大规模，但你绝对不希望被困在中间。

So the point here is, sure you can niche down, sure you can scale up, but you really don't want to get caught in the middle.

现在，从媒体角度来看，这有点有趣。

Now, on the media side, it's kind of funny.

你有一些像《Acquired》、《Strathecery》和我们的好朋友《Colossus》这样的小型企业。

You've got these tiny little businesses like Acquired, Strathecary, our good friends at Colossus.

互联网虽然对中间地带的人极为严酷，但也使得这些深度细分领域得以形成。

The internet, while being extremely punishing to the middle, also enables these deep niches to form.

这是一种有趣的现象：如果你保持结构简洁，并且极度专注于某个细分领域，你就能聚集起全球所有对你的细分领域感到古怪的人，把他们整合在一起，形成一个喜欢三小时商业科技播客的社群。

It's sort of this interesting barbell effect where if you keep your cross structure low and you're super super focused on a niche, you can aggregate all the people who are weird on the internet about your niche in the entire world and basically aggregate them together and create community of people who like three hour business technology podcasts.

我认为，重要的是要意识到，这可能不会一夜之间发生。

And I I think like it's important to realize that this may not happen overnight.

比如《Acquired》，我们花了七年时间才达到二十五万订阅者。

Like for Acquired, it's taken seven years for us to get to a quarter million subscribers.

但只要你持续不断地清晰传达你的媒体内容能为人们带来的价值，人们自然会找到你。

But if you're just like repeatedly loud and specific about the value proposition that you can bring to people by following your media publication, people find their way.

你知道，时间、足够的传播和足够的内容，终会发挥作用。

You know, time and enough distribution and enough content kind of does its thing.

所以，我们始终要记住，很高兴我们没有选择成为一家中等规模的媒体公司。

So, always sort of focus back on I'm glad that we didn't decide to be, you know, a mid scale media company.

这真的就是你和我，加上一些麦克风，而《纽约时报》可以去占据那个市场。

That it's really like, alright, it's you and I and some microphones and the New York Times can have that market.

这里还有几点要说。

So a couple other points here.

我认为这并不仅仅局限于媒体领域。

I don't think this is unique to media.

我认为媒体是第一个经历这种中间被挤压的行业，但这种情况将会发生在所有领域。

I think media was the first to experience this sort of squishing in the middle but it's gonna happen to everything.

互联网的影响仍在持续扩散。

The the Internet is still rippling out in all of its effects.

我的意思是，你肯定能在风险投资领域看到这一点。

I mean, you can see it in venture capital for sure.

你有像红杉和安德森这样的大型基金，同时新兴的早期阶段专业基金也不断涌现，对于那些非常专注的小型基金来说，存在着巨大的机会。

You've got big funds like Sequoia and Andreessen that get massive and then niche funds, especially for the early stage emerge and there's great opportunities for small funds who are very focused.

那些被困在中间的人处境艰难，而且毫无特色。

Those caught in the middle are in a tough spot and they're super undifferentiated.

你可以想象这种情况也会发生在大学身上，哈佛和斯坦福的品牌会安然无恙。

And you can imagine this happening with universities, Harvard and Stanford brands are gonna be just fine.

这些品牌可能会继续增值，因为它们能够利用互联网触达越来越多的人。

Like those will continue to probably grow in value as they're able to address more and more people using the Internet.

显然，这一过程进展缓慢，因为没有人愿意贬低自己的品牌。

Obviously, that happens slowly because no one wants to devalue their brand.

但随着这种观念越来越被广泛接受，我认为这些品牌会变得越来越强大。

But as that becomes more and more widely accepted, I I think those brands will just continue to get more powerful.

你可以想象，除了媒体、资本和教育之外，其他许多行业也会发生类似情况。

You could imagine this happening in a bunch of other industries too besides just media, capital, education.

因此，作为最后的一个小例证，我想展示几张市值图表。

So as a final little illustration at this point, I just want to pull up a couple of market cap slides.

1997年，全球市值前十的公司中只有三家是科技公司。

So in 1997, there were three companies in the top 10 in the world that were technology companies.

如今，前十名中有八家是科技公司。

Today, it's eight of the top 10.

从那时到现在发生了什么？

What happened between then and now?

互联网渗透到了整个世界。

Well, the internet penetrated the whole world.

显然，规模回报在这里高度集中，你可以看到，世界上最有价值的公司不仅是科技和互联网公司，而且它们的价值比以前大得多。

And obviously, the returns to scale got massively concentrated here where you can see that the most valued companies in the world, not only are they technology internet companies, they're much more valuable than they were before.

因此，有一个看似反直觉的现象：互联网原本是一个去中心化的网络，起源于大学的服务器，但不知为何，它极大地集中了支撑我们日常所有活动的平台的规模回报。

So, there's this sort of counter intuitive thing that the Internet was a decentralized network, it started as servers at universities and then somehow it massively concentrated the returns to scale for the platforms that underlie everything that we do all day every day.

另一方面，它也使长尾市场的可行性成为可能。

And on the flip side, it also enabled the viability of the long tail.

现在，我们不再像过去那样拥有大约30家中型零售商了，完全不是这样。

It's not, you know, that we have 30 mid sized retailers in The US anymore the way that we used to, not at all.

现在有亚马逊，那么Shopify上现在有多少商家呢？

There's Amazon and then there's How many merchants are there on Shopify now?

我们有大约200万 Shopify 商户和超过3000万亚马逊卖家。

We've got something like 2,000,000 Shopify merchants and over 30,000,000 Amazon sellers.

互联网带来的平台化，同时也让长尾经济变得可行。

The platformification that the the Internet sort of brought really enabled viability of the long tail at the same time.

好了，听众朋友们。

Alright, listeners.

首先，

Well, first off,

节日快乐。

happy holidays.

节日快乐。

Happy holidays.

也祝你节日快乐，本。

And happy holidays to you, Ben, as well.

谢谢。

Thank you.

嗯，趁着休息、旅行和享受优质播客的时光，我们和Odd Lots播客的朋友们聊了聊，他们建议说：嘿。

Well, in the spirit of downtime and travel and enjoying great podcasts, we were talking with our friends over at the Odd Lots podcast, and they suggested, hey.

我们今年二月在Odd Lots上合作的那期节目真是太棒了。

That episode we did together on Odd Lots back in February, it was so great.

如果我们在今年年底在两个节目结尾都推荐一下这期节目呢？

What if we highlight on both of our shows at the end of the year?

我们说：好啊。

And we said, yes.

这还用说吗。

No brainer.

好主意。

Great idea.

我们聊到了节目中提到的诸多亮点：台积电、爱马仕、玛氏、英伟达，以及打造一家伟大公司所需的一切。

We talked about all the hits on it, TSMC, Hermes, Mars, NVIDIA, and everything that goes into making a great company.

后来我们又和他们聊得更多，才发现今年我们两个节目都迎来了十周年，真是不可思议。

And then we were talking with them some more, and we realized that both of our shows turned ten years old this year, which is crazy.

所以这是命中注定。

So it was fate.

我们得这么做。

We gotta do it.

Odd Lots 真是太棒了。

So Odd Lots is awesome.

它是我最喜爱的节目之一，也是我获取深度研究的首选来源。

It's one of my favorite shows and always a go to source for acquired research.

没错。

Yep.

他们关于台积电的几期节目实际上是我们做那期节目的主要参考资料。

Their episodes on TSMC were actually some of our main sources for that one.

是的。

Yeah.

乔和特蕾西做得非常出色，他们之间那种神奇而默契的搭档氛围让听节目变得特别有趣。

Joe and Tracy do an awesome job, and they have that sort of magical, great cohost dynamic together that makes listening just really fun.

所以，如果你正在寻找一些节日旅行时可听的音频内容，不妨去听听《Odd Lots》。

So if you're looking for more audio content for your holiday travel, go check out Odd Lots.

你可以从我们与他们的那期节目开始，我们会在节目笔记中提供链接。

You can start with our episode with them, which we'll link to in the show notes.

但说实话，他们的任何作品都不会让你失望。

But, honestly, you can't go wrong with any of their work.

完全正确。

Totally.

祝贺他们迎来十周年，也祝大家节日快乐。

Congratulations to them on ten years, and happy holidays, everyone.

节日快乐。

Happy holidays.

现在，回到节目本身。

Now back to the show.

好的，快到终点了，我们继续聊聊媒体这个主题。

All right, coming down the homestretch, staying on the media theme.

两年前，我们在哈波工作室做了关于奥普拉的这一期节目，那真是太棒了。

So we did this episode on Oprah two years ago now in Harpo Studios, and it was so great.

我们从那次经历中学到的一个重要观点是，当奥普拉刚开始自己的节目并做出一项重大商业决策时，有人对她说：不要只做艺人，要拥有生意。

And what our big takeaway from that was a line that was said to Oprah right as she was starting her own show and made a momentous business decision, which was don't be talent, own the business.

我喜欢这样理解这一点：如果你想在媒体行业成为百万富翁，你就应该非常非常努力，精通自己的技艺，成为必看的内容，独一无二，完全不同于商品，你应该像斯蒂芬·库里或莱昂纳多·迪卡普里奥那样。

And the sort of way that I like to think about this is if you wanna be a millionaire in the media business, you should work really really hard, you should own your craft, you should become must see content, totally unique, the opposite of a commodity, you should be Steph Curry, Leonardo DiCaprio, you know, what have you.

如果你想在媒体行业成为亿万富翁，你就应该做上述所有事情，并且永远永远不要放弃或出售你内容的版权。

If you wanna be a billionaire in the media business, you should do all of those things and you should never ever ever ever give away the rights to your content or sell the rights to your content.

这就是奥普拉所做的。

And that's that's what Oprah did.

今年早些时候，我们也讲了泰勒·斯威夫特的故事。

We also told the Taylor Swift story earlier this year.

你知道，泰勒最初只是另一个乡村音乐艺人，然后又只是一个流行歌手。

You know, Taylor started as just another country music artist and then just another pop artist.

但在过去几年里，她通过找到方法重新获得自己原创音乐的版权，彻底改变了整个行业的结构，这是一个了不起的故事。

And and then in the past few years, she's completely changed the whole structure of the industry by figuring out ways to get back the rights to her original music, which is an incredible story.

这在媒体行业相当独特。

And this is fairly unique for media.

对吧？

Right?

对于内容创作者来说，这比当一名篮球运动员要容易得多。

Like for content, it's this is easier to do than if you were, say, a basketball player.

是的。

Yes.

没错。

Yeah.

运动员在自己的运动领域很难做到这一点。

It's it's hard for athletes to do this, at least in their sports.

运动员可以拥有自己的个人品牌，并利用它来发展副业，但他们所从事的运动本身，仍然是在别人的规则下进行。

Like athletes can own their personal brand and they can leverage that into building something on the side, but the thing that they do, they're playing within someone else's game.

关于内容的有趣之处在于，你总能让自己定义游戏规则，因为互联网提供了这种可能性。

The interesting thing about content is you can always just make it your own game because the internet enables this solution.

这是这件事最后一件酷的地方，你知道，多亏了Substack、播客、YouTube、TikTok、Instagram，现在比以往任何时候都更容易了。

That's the last, you know, cool thing about this, which is that thanks to Substack, podcasting, YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, you know, it's never been easier.

你不需要NBC。

You don't need NBC.

你不需要环球音乐集团。

You don't need Universal Music Group.

事实上，他们可能会拖你的后腿。

In fact, they might hold you back.

任何人都可以在互联网上发布任何内容。

Anybody can publish anything on the internet.

好的。

Alright.

这一点相当显而易见，但这是另一个贝索斯式的观点，我想提到1997年第一封致股东的信中，他写道：由于我们注重长期发展，人们可能已经能背出这句话了，我们做决策和权衡取舍的方式可能与一些公司不同。

This one is reasonably self explanatory but it's another Bezosism and so I want to bring up in the very first shareholder letter in 1997, he wrote, because of our emphasis on the long term and people probably might know how to recite this by heart at this point, we may make decisions and weigh trade offs differently than some companies.

我们将专注于增长，强调长期盈利和资本管理。

We will focus on growth with an emphasis on long term profitability and capital management.

在这一阶段，我们选择优先考虑增长，因为我们相信规模对于实现我们商业模式的潜力至关重要。

At this stage, we choose to prioritize growth because we believe that scale is central to achieving the potential of our business model.

这绝对是贝索斯的方式，本质上是在说：如果你不在这辆车上，那就下车吧，因为这就是我们要做的。

This is absolutely Bezos' way of basically saying, if you're not on my bus, get off because this is what we're doing.

他们二十年来始终如一地践行诺言，从未盈利。

They stayed true to their word for twenty years without turning a profit.

正如我们之前讨论的，如果没有AWS，你可以说他们今天依然不会盈利。

As we talked about earlier, you could argue they still wouldn't be profitable today if it weren't for AWS.

二十年来，他们将零售业务的每一分钱都进行了再投资。

They've reinvested every dollar of the retail business for two decades.

如果他们不能公开、坦率地表明自己的意图，就绝不可能执行他们所采取的战略。

There is zero chance that they would have been able to execute the strategy that they did if it weren't for their ability to be loud and proud about their intentions.

当我们逐渐接近尾声时，我会少一些羞于提及具体的例子。

And as we sort of drift toward the the close here, I'll be a little bit less bashful about acquired specific examples.

我本想强调其他企业，但这个例子实在太贴近自身了。

I've wanted to highlight other businesses but this one's sort of too close to home.

我们痴迷于这样一种理念：把我们的观众当作聪明人来对待。

We're obsessed with this idea of treating our audience like they're smart.

这并不是最快的增长路径，因为我觉得我们可以听从每个人的建议。

And this wasn't the fastest path to growth because I think we could have listened to what everyone told us.

播客节目时长应该为半小时。

Podcast episodes need to be a half hour.

播客节目需要每周准时更新，以保持内容的节奏。

Podcast episodes, you know, need to drop every single week so you keep this content cadence.

但我们想在互联网上做一些特立独行的事，并且毫不掩饰地坚持这一点。

But we wanted to be weird on the internet about something and we wanted to basically be unabashed about it.

所以，我想说，现在与我们互动的社区成员，以及所有在这里提到‘我听过这个节目’的人，

And so I'd say that the people that we get to interact with now in the community and all the folks that we met here who mentioned, oh, I've listened to the show.

我们最终拥有了正是我们想要的听众，以及

We ended up with exactly the listeners that we wanted and the

那些我们希望共度时光的人，因为如果你说不想和我们同乘一辆车，那没关系，请尽快下车。

people that we want to spend time with because there's a long game to play if you're saying if you don't want to be on the bus with us, that is fine, please get off as soon as possible.

确实如此。

Indeed.

这正好引出了我们从Acquired七年经验中得出的最后一个教训。

Which is the perfect lead in to our final lesson from seven years of Acquired.

说到上车，我们都得上车去参加派对。

Speaking of getting on the bus, we all need to do that to go to the party.

那我们在派对上要做什么呢？

And what are we gonna do at the party?

我们会玩得开心，而这正是这一切的意义所在。

We're gonna have fun, and that is what this is all about.

如果你能找到一件能让你在事业或生活中真正享受的事情，而对其他人来说这只是工作，那你就能比别人跑得更远、更久、更快、更好。

If you can find something that you can do with your business, with your life, where you have genuinely have fun doing it, and for other people who do the same thing, it's work, you are gonna run farther and longer and faster and better than everybody else.

这还有一个额外的收获。

And there's actually another takeaway to this.

所以我们最近在我们的竞技场演出上放了一张我们和朋友帕金斯·麦考密克以及马里奥·加布里埃利的照片。

So we we put the an image of of us and our our friends, Packing McCormick and Mario Gabrielli at our arena show the other week up here.

这简直太棒了。

It was just such a blast.

整个事情，这段旅程一直都非常有趣。

This whole thing, this whole journey has been so fun.

但首先，你会比那些把这当作工作的人更加努力。

But one, you're gonna work harder than people for whom this is work.

比尔·盖瑞在他的《追逐梦想》演讲中提出了一个绝佳的观点，我们在Acquired节目中也讨论过，每个人都应该去YouTube上看一看。

And Bill Gurley makes this great point in his running down the dream talk, which we've talked about on Acquired, everybody should go watch that on YouTube.

但另一个观点是，如果你真的享受做这件事，那么去传播、推广、营销，并吸引人们关注你所做的事情，就会容易得多。

But the other point is that it's so much easier to evangelize and grow and market and have people attracted to whatever it is you're doing if you genuinely have joy in doing it.

而快乐是无法真正伪装的。

And and joy is not something you can really fake.

所以，这是我们最重要的教训。

So, that's our biggest lesson.

在过去七年里，我们一直玩得非常开心。

We we have had such a blast doing these past seven years.

我们有幸结识了帕特里克和布伦特、整个Capital Camp团队，真的非常感激。

We've gotten to meet amazing folks like Patrick and Brent, whole Capital Camp team, and, we're just so thankful.

现在是一个感谢我们节目的好朋友ServiceNow的好时机。

Now is a great time to thank good friend of the show, ServiceNow.

我们曾向听众讲述过ServiceNow令人惊叹的起源故事，以及它们在过去十年中如何成为表现最出色的公司之一，但我们也收到一些听众的问题，询问ServiceNow到底做什么。

We have talked to listeners about ServiceNow's amazing origin story and how they've been one of the best performing companies the last decade, but we've gotten some questions from listeners about what ServiceNow actually does.

所以今天，我们将回答这个问题。

So today, we are gonna answer that question.

首先，最近媒体上经常使用的一个说法是，ServiceNow是企业的‘人工智能操作系统’。

Well, to start, a phrase that has been used often here recently in the press is that ServiceNow is the, quote, unquote, AI operating system for the enterprise.

但为了更具体地说明，ServiceNow在22年前创立时，仅仅专注于自动化。

But to make that more concrete, ServiceNow started twenty two years ago focused simply on automation.

他们最初将企业的IT部门中的纸质文件转化为软件工作流程。

They turned physical paperwork into software workflows initially for the IT department within enterprises.

仅此而已。

That was it.

随着时间的推移，他们在这个平台上不断扩展，承担了更强大、更复杂的任务。

And over time, they built on this platform going to more powerful and complex tasks.

他们的服务范围从仅支持IT部门，扩展到了人力资源、财务、客户服务、现场运营等其他部门。

They were expanding from serving just IT to other departments like HR, finance, customer service, field operations, and more.

在过去的二十年里，ServiceNow 奠定了所有繁琐但必要的基础工作，将企业的每个角落连接起来，从而实现自动化。

And in the process over the last two decades, ServiceNow has laid all the tedious groundwork necessary to connect every corner of the enterprise and enable automation to happen.

所以当人工智能出现时，根据定义，AI 本质上就是一种极其复杂的任务自动化。

So when AI arrived well, AI kinda just by definition is massively sophisticated task automation.

那么，谁已经构建了平台和企业间的连接纽带，以实现这种自动化呢？

And who had already built the platform and the connective tissue with enterprises to enable that automation?

ServiceNow。

ServiceNow.

因此，要回答这个问题：ServiceNow 如今究竟做什么？

So to answer the question, what does ServiceNow do today?

当他们说连接并赋能每一个部门时，我们是认真的。

We mean it when they say they connect and power every department.

IT 和人力资源部门使用它来管理公司内的人力、设备和软件许可证。

IT and HR use it to manage people, devices, software licenses across the company.

客户服务部门使用 ServiceNow 来检测支付失败，并将问题路由给内部相应的团队或流程来解决。

Customer service uses ServiceNow for things like detecting payment failures and routing to the right team or process internally to solve it.

供应链部门则用它进行产能规划，整合来自其他部门的数据和计划，确保所有人步调一致。

Or the supply chain org uses it for capacity planning, integrating with data and plans from other departments to ensure that everybody's on the same page.

不再需要在不同应用之间来回切换，重复输入相同的数据。

No more swivel chairing between apps to enter the same data multiple times in different places.

最近，ServiceNow 推出了 AI 代理，让任何岗位的员工都能快速创建一个 AI 代理来处理繁琐事务，让人类专注于更重要的工作。

And just recently, ServiceNow launched AI agents so that anyone working in any job can spin up an AI agent to handle the tedious stuff, freeing up humans for bigger picture work.

ServiceNow 去年入选《财富》杂志全球最受赞赏公司榜单，以及《快公司》年度最佳创新工作场所榜单，这都归功于这一愿景。

ServiceNow was named to Fortune's world's most admired companies list last year and Fast Company's best workplace for innovators last year, and it's because of this vision.

如果你想在业务的每个角落都利用 ServiceNow 的规模与速度，请访问 servicenow.com/acquired，并告知他们是本和大卫推荐的。

If you wanna take advantage of the scale and speed of ServiceNow in every corner of your business, go to servicenow.com/acquired and just tell them that Ben and David sent you.

谢谢 ServiceNow。

Thanks, ServiceNow.

好了，各位听众。

Alright, listeners.

希望你们喜欢我们在资本营的对话。

Hope you enjoyed our talk from Capital Camp.

请告诉我们你们的反馈。

Please let us know your feedback.

访问 acquired.fm/slack。

Acquired.fm/slack.

真想进去和你聊聊，听听你从所有剧集中最喜欢的那些主题。

Would love to hang out with you in there and hear some of your favorite themes from all the playbooks over episodes.

我其实没仔细数过，但肯定很多。

I actually didn't count exactly, but it's a lot.

我也没数过。

I didn't either.

我觉得，连同所有LP集在内，已经超过200个了。

It's I think it's well over 200 when you include all the LP episodes.

嗯。

Yeah.

加上那些的话，是二百五十个。

It's two fifty when with those.

哦，哇。

Oh, wow.

所以我们肯定漏掉了很多。

So we definitely skipped a lot.

我原本有18个，大卫可能删减到了12个。

I had 18, and David maybe trim it down to 12.

所以我很想知道，我们没聊到的那些里面，有没有是你想提出来的。

So I'm curious if some of the ones that we didn't talk about are ones that, that you wanna bring up.

我原本想选10个，但本坚持得太厉害了，所以我给了他两个额外的。

I originally wanted 10, and Ben was fought too hard that I gave him two extras.

对。

Yes.

非常感谢您本季以及这些特别节目中与我们同行。

Well, thank you so much for being with us, this season and on these special episodes.

这六个月过得真棒。

It's been an awesome six months.

我们对接下来的六个月充满期待。

We're super pumped for the next six months.

我们已经规划了一些精彩的内容，下次见。

We have some great stuff planned, and we'll see you next time.

下次见。

We'll see you next time.