史蒂夫·鲍尔默专访

他们决定要构建一个既像又不像他们操作系统的产品。

They decided they wanted to build something that was sort of their operating system and sort of not.

这是82年、83年的事。

This is 'eighty two, 'eighty three.

我们和他们将共同构建其中一部分。

We and they would collectively build part of it.

我们将能够将其授权给其他厂商。

We would be able to license it to others.

他们会在1970年3月的模拟器上构建一个作为数据库的增值层。

They would build a value add layer that was a database in the 03/1970 emulator.

现在说起来很疯狂。

Crazy to say now.

我们当时要开发操作系统和所谓的演示管理器，也就是图形用户界面。

We were going to work on the operating system and what was called presentation manager, call that the graphical user interface.

他们将在我们编写的代码中获得等同于所有权的权利

They were going to have rights equivalent to ownership in the code we

写的。

wrote.

这听起来太复杂了。

This sounds so convoluted.

确实非常复杂。

It was so convoluted.

天啊，有段时间我十六周内飞了十六次东海岸，大部分是去南佛罗里达，有几次去纽约，坐红眼航班，达美航空的Dash航班大约十一点起飞，凌晨五点到达亚特兰大，七点左右转机到西棕榈滩，赶得上九点在IBM开会，然后工作一整天，再坐晚上七点的航班回家，大约十点半或十一点到家，24小时往返。

Man, there was a time when I made 16 trips to the East Coast in sixteen weeks, most of them to South Florida, a couple of them to New York, leave on the red eye, the Delta Dash flight at around eleven get into Atlanta around five get the flight to West Palm Beach at about seven get in and be able to be at a meeting at 09:00 at IBM and then work all day, catch the 07:00 flight home, be here about 10:30 or eleven twenty four hours down and back.

因为如果你们要共同开发东西，记得那时候还没有真正的电子邮件。

Because if you're building something together, remember, there's no real email at the time.

我们那时真的是用磁盘来回寄送文件。

We were literally shipping disks back and forth.

然后他们决定要在英国开发演示管理器部分。

And then they decided they were going to do the presentation manager piece in England.

所以后来又有很多飞往英国的航班。

So there were also then a lot of flights to England.

哦，然后德克萨斯州是数据库和

Oh, And then Texas is where the database and

通信 这听起来像是波音公司。

communication This sounds like Boeing.

这是一份联合开发协议，是为了保持与IBM合作的代价，过程非常复杂。

It was joint development agreement and it was the price of staying involved with IBM and it was convoluted.

为了行动速度，我们继续推进之前已启动的Windows系统。

And we did then keep for speed of action, we kept going on Windows, which we had started.

对听众来说，我们讨论的都是OStwo系统。

For listeners, everything we're talking about is OStwo.

这个操作系统基本上...哦，从未

It's operating system that basically Oh, never

是OStwo扩展版之类的，他们有自己版本。

was OStwo extended edition or something, which they had their edition.

而Windows就像是你们的B计划。

And Windows was like your plan B.

就像是你们的备选方案。

It was like your side.

不，Windows就是我们的计划。

No, Windows was our plan.

后来他们想做这个新操作系统，我们说服他们必须要有图形用户界面。

And then they wanted to do this new operating system and we convinced them, you got to have a graphical user interface.

我们试图向他们推销Windows，但他们很抗拒。

And we tried to sell them Windows and they were resisting.

好的。

Okay.

所以现在看起来你几乎是在敷衍IBM，说'好啊，我们一起做OS2吧'。

So it almost seems like you're humoring IBM at this point with, yeah, let's do OS2 together.

我们真的认为幽默。

We really think the Humor.

驱动力远不止

Drive is It's more than

我会说，你知道，那时我的工作是管理系统软件。

lip I would say, you know, my job was managing by then system software.

所以我负责Windows，也负责Shiptune。

So I had Windows, I had Shiptune.

我曾经是Windows 1.0的开发经理，哎呀。

I'd been the development manager for Windows one point Oh, shit.

你在Windows 1.0发布会上的精彩视频。

The great videos of you from the Windows one point zero launch.

太棒了。

Are so good.

不，那是销售部门的事。

No, that's the sales side.

实际上我管理工程师，因为之前负责的人没成功，而我们得把这个产品做出来。

I actually manage the engineers because the guy who was doing it wasn't being successful and we had to ship the thing.

所以那时候我从工程师那里学到了一些工程管理知识，基本上是他们得教会我如何有效管理。

And so that's when I learned some about engineering management from the engineers basically had to teach me to be effective.

我们正努力跟上OS2的步伐。

We're trying to keep with OS2.

比尔对IBM非常失望。

Bill's very frustrated with IBM.

我也很沮丧，但我知道我的职责就是驾驭这头熊。

I'm frustrated, but I know my job is to ride the bear.

所以比尔在全力推进Windows，但我们仍怀疑OS2可能胜出，毕竟它来自IBM，可我们也不能就此停滞三四年。

And so Bill's pushing Windows hard, but we still suspected OS2 could be the winner because it came from IBM, but we couldn't just stop for three or four years.

我们不能重蹈覆辙，就像后来演变成Vista的那个项目。

We couldn't make the mistake we sort of made in the thing that became- Vista.

Vista。

Vista.

于是我们继续开发Windows，同时兼顾OS2，直到1990年5月，他们突然给了我们致命一击。

So we kept going with Windows, we kept going with OS2, and then May 1990, they come along and shoot us.

当时我正和妻子在外跑步。

I was out running with my wife.

等等，是IBM对你们下手了？

Wait, IBM shot you.

没错。

Yeah.

他们和我们离婚了。

They divorced us.

他们把我们扫地出门。

They threw us out.

我想

I thought

故事是这样的，你们Windows团队逐渐壮大，你们都认为，也许我们可以摆脱小弟的身份。

the story was you all Windows was getting gathering strength, and you all thought, like, you know, maybe we can step out from the little brother.

他们后来盯上了你们。

They came after you.

不。

No.

不。

No.

那时他们已经有了新领导，叫吉姆·卡诺维诺。

They had a new leader by then, a guy named Jim Canovino.

他对我们很恼火，因为我们还在卖Windows。

He was getting frustrated with us because we were still selling windows.

我们仍在推广Windows。

We were still promoting windows.

这是我们第一次遇到反垄断问题。

Mean, this was our first antitrust problem.

不知道你们是否了解，当时联邦贸易委员会认为我们和IBM在合谋划分市场，因为我们做过一些市场定位。

I don't know if you guys know this, is the FTC at the time thought we and IBM were working to divide the market because we had done some positioning.

Windows有什么优势？

What's windows good for?

OS2有什么优势？

What's OS2 good for?

我们和IBM曾经那样做过。

We and IBM had done that.

然后他们说，不，你们这是在串通。

And then they said, No, you guys are colluding.

那是我们第一次引起反垄断机构的注意。

That's when we first got attention from antitrust authorities.

甚至早于按处理器许可的问题。

Is even before the per processor licensing issue.

那是和司法部一起出现的。

Came That came with the DOJ.

这是联邦贸易委员会的案子，他们基本上在90年就开始了，就在我们即将离婚的时候，我想是90年，也许是89年。

This was an FTC case and they started it in basically 'ninety, just as we were getting I think 'ninety, maybe 'eighty nine, as we were getting our divorce.

当时我和妻子正在改造我们的房子。

My wife and I were remodeling our house.

我们住在一套公寓里。

We were living in a condo.

我们在跑步途中停下来用了洗手间之类的。

We stopped on a run, used a restroom or something.

我拿起《华尔街日报》，读到IBM要和我们分道扬镳的消息。

I pick up the Wall Street Journal and I read that IBM's divorcing us.

好了，听众朋友们。

All right, listeners.

现在正是感谢摩根大通支付公司朋友们的好时机。

Now is a great time to thank our friends at JPMorgan Payments.

你肯定见过史蒂夫1999年著名的'开发者、开发者、开发者'口号，我们稍后会在节目中与他讨论这个话题。

You almost certainly have seen Steve's famous 1999 developers, developers, developers chant, which we will talk about with him later in the episode.

这种以开发者为核心的核心理念，在他1999年提出时就很正确，至今依然适用。

The ethos, though, of focusing on developers was valid when he said it in 1999 and still holds true today.

和史蒂夫一样，摩根大通支付也认识到支持开发者是一项长期投资。

Like Steve, JPMorgan payments recognizes that supporting developers is a long term investment.

我们之前讨论过摩根大通在支付技术和研发上投入的170亿美元。

We've talked about the $17,000,000,000 that JPMorgan invests in technology and r and d and for payments.

这意味着有专门的团队致力于简化开发者的工作。

That means dedicated teams focused on making developers' lives easier.

去年我们讨论过摩根大通支付的开发者门户。

Last year, we discussed JPMorgan Payments' developer portal.

从宏观上看，他们的平台本质上让开发者能在安全操作的同时，免于处理全球支付的复杂性。

And at a high level, their platform essentially empowers developers to operate securely while abstracting away the complexities of global payments.

如果你查看该平台上的工具套件，就会发现摩根大通持续推出更多技术解决方案，以有效实现全球范围的支付接收、管理和发送。

If you look at the suite of tools available on that platform, the takeaway is JPMorgan has continued to roll out more and more technical solutions to effectively accept, manage, and send payments on a global scale.

他们的API配备了所有预期的技术文档，包括详细的测试指南和支付概念解释，帮助你在业务扩展时构建应用程序。

Their APIs come with all the technical documentation you'd expect with detailed testing guides and explaining payments concepts to build your application as you scale your business.

假设你在一个电子商务公司工作。

So let's say you work at, say, an ecommerce company, for example.

你需要补货，但供应商在另一个国家。

You need to restock your products, but your vendor is based in another country.

在进行任何交易之前，你会想使用验证服务API来确认账户所有权，并确保款项支付给正确的供应商。

Before any transaction happens, you'd wanna use the validation services API to verify account ownership and ensure that your payment is directed to the correct vendor.

那你必须用当地货币支付他们，而且你没时间评估多种解决方案并整合各种API。

Then you've gotta pay them in their local currency, and you don't have time to evaluate multiple solutions and stitch together various APIs.

所以摩根大通的单一全球支付API能帮你轻松搞定这一切，包括多种支付渠道和方法。

So JPMorgan's single global payments API can help you take care of all that, including multiple payment rails and methods easily.

而这只是一个应用场景。

And that's just one use case.

传统上，各行业的开发者不得不在金融科技的创新灵活性与全球银行的安全规模之间做出选择。

Developers across industries traditionally had to choose between the innovation and flexibility of a fintech and the security and scale of a global bank.

摩根大通支付部门的使命就是消除这种选择，让你两者兼得。

JPMorgan payments is on a mission to eliminate that choice and offer you both.

如果你是金融科技领域的开发者，或想在软件中嵌入支付功能，请访问jpmorgan.com/acquired了解他们不断增长的API列表。

If you're a developer working within a fintech or looking to embed payments within your software, head on over to jpmorgan.com/acquired to learn more about their ever growing list of APIs.

如果有听众记得我们在Chase中心演出后的见面会，我们准备再办一次。

And if any listeners remember the meetup that we did after our Chase Center show, we're actually gonna do it again.

我们计划在Radio City演出后的第二天（16号）再办一场见面会。

We're planning another meetup the day after Radio City on the sixteenth.

我们很快会在Slack社区分享更多细节，但想提前告知大家以便安排行程。

We will share more details soon in the Slack community, but wanted to give folks a heads up in case you were planning for travel.

7月16日晚上，与摩根大通支付部门的朋友们举办精彩见面会。

Evening of July 16, a great meetup with our friends at JPMorgan payments.

我拿起《华尔街日报》，看到IBM要和我们分道扬镳的消息。

I pick up the Wall Street Journal, and I read that IBM's divorcing us.

那这意味着什么？

And so what does that mean?

要放弃与OS/2的合作关系吗？

Walking away from o o s two collaboration?

嗯哼。

Uh-huh.

基本上是他们把你踢出去了，踢走了微软，说我们要把OS/2收归内部开发。

Basically, they kicks you out, kicked Microsoft out, said we're we're taking OS two in house.

正是如此。

Exactly.

完全正确。

Exactly.

所以你就坐在那里。

And so you're sitting there.

Windows当时还不是强大的Windows。

Windows isn't powerful Windows yet.

Windows那时只是个雏形概念。

Windows is this fledgling kind of idea.

我们当时还有个叫640K内存限制的问题。

We still had something called the six forty ks barrier.

你无法寻址超过640K的内存。

You couldn't speak to more than six forty ks of memory.

直到Windows 3.1才突破640K限制，我记得应该是91或92年发布的。

We didn't break the six forty ks barrier until I think Windows 3.1, which I want to say was 'ninety one or 'ninety two.

所以你们就这样一路发展。

So you're on this run.

你看IBM要和我们分道扬镳了。

You see IBM is divorcing us.

你们对Windows系统还没有真正建立起信心。

You don't really have confidence in Windows yet.

你现在的感受是什么？你觉得未来可能的发展方向是？

What are you feeling, and what do you think the pass possible

巫师先生。

Mister Wizard.

哇哦。

Woah.

天哪。

Shoot.

我的老天。

Oh my god.

我们当时可以说是充满干劲——用'吓坏了'来形容也行。

We were so we were so you could say energized if you like scared also works.

这感觉就像，我的天啊。

It's like, oh my god.

现在我们必须直面这头巨熊了。

Now we have to confront the bear.

你们这时候已经是价值十亿美元的企业了。

You're already like a billion dollar business at this point.

到92年年底，你们的收入达到了28亿美元。

By '92, you end '92 at 2,800,000,000.0 in revenue.

IBM，它依然是。但你仍然是个小角色。

IBM, it's still But you're still a pipsqueak.

对IBM来说，我们依然是小角色。

We're still pipsqueak to IBM.

记住，我们没有企业级影响力，而IBM拥有绝对的企业主导地位。

And remember, we have no enterprise presence, and IBM has all dominant enterprise presence.

那么谁在使用Windows？你们现在是如何向他们销售的？

So who's using Windows, and how are you selling to them at this point?

有意思。

Interesting.

单份销售，一些爱好者和终端用户，有人会说，嘿。

Single copies, some hobbyists and end users, somebody who says, hey.

我真的很想用电子表格，还有企业里的许多用户。

I really wanna use a spreadsheet, And a lot of users in enterprises.

所以并没有通过IT部门。

So it wasn't going through IT.

会有用户用部门经费购买一台PC，再买一份Windows和Excel，比如在当时的一家软件零售商Egghead Software那里购买，然后带进公司使用。

You'd have a user that would buy a PC on the expense account, for the department, buy a copy of Windows, buy a copy of Excel, like at an Egghead Software, it was a software retailer at the time, and bring them in and use them.

之后IT部门开始对此感到不安。

And then IT started to get nervous about that.

我们知道大多数副本——不是大多数，但很多副本最终流向了企业。

We knew most of the copies, not most, but many of the copies were winding up in businesses.

搞什么鬼？

What the hell?

IBM会像踩死一只虫子那样碾压我们。

IBM's gonna stomp us like a bug.

你只是

You just

想当然地认为如果IBM想阻止这件事发生，那就一定会发生。

took as a given assumption that if IBM wants to stamp out this happening, it's gonna happen.

我们哦，是啊。

We Oh, yeah.

如果我们想要未来，就必须和他们合作。

If we want a future, we gotta play with them.

是啊。

Yeah.

这就是为什么我们一直说是在'骑熊'，因为他们会在90年碾压我们并抛弃我们。

That's what that's why we were quote riding the bear the whole time because it they'd stomp us out and they divorce us in '90.

然后我们说，天啊。

And then we say, oh my god.

好吧。

Okay.

所以此时你的业务，尽管规模已达数十亿，是向零售商销售软件拷贝——DOS、Windows、编程语言和应用程序。

So at this point, your business, even though it's, know, billion plus scale, it's selling to retailers to sell software, copies of software, DOS, Windows, languages, apps.

不包括DOS。

Not DOS.

DOS一直是卖给

DOS was always sold to

OEM。

OEM.

是的。

Yeah.

并不总是这样。

Not always.

但绝大部分情况下，可以说它之所以被出售，只是因为你需要一个BIOS。

But so much the lion's share, it's worth saying it was only sold because you needed a BIOS.

记得吗？

Remember?

你需要一个BIOS。

You needed a BIOS.

所以你基本上必须让硬件供应商将BIOS内置到机器里。

So you had to have the hardware vendor build the BIOS into the machine basically.

所以你有了那个OEM业务，

So you've got that, the OEM business, which

当时OEM业务已经是业务中最大的部分了。

was The OEM business already going was the biggest part of the business.

没错。

Yep.

然后我们还有这个零售业务，当时根本没有企业授权的概念。

And then we had this retail business and there was no notion of enterprise licensing.

是啊，你们没有CIO关系，没有企业协议，没有

Yeah, you've got no CIO relationships, no enterprise agreement, no

我们曾与几位首席信息官建立过合作关系。

We had a couple CIO relationships.

空军是Windows的第一个大客户。

The Air Force was the first big Windows customer.

你们的第一个企业客户是政府部门？

Your first enterprise customer was government?

据我回忆，Windows的第一个大客户是美国空军，他们当时购买的是单机版Windows。

Our first big Windows customer, at least as I remember it, was the US Air Force and they were buying single copies of Windows.

说到政府，这个国家实际上有两种政府体系。

When you say government, there's really two governments in this country.

一个是文职政府，另一个是军队体系。

There's government and there's the military.

军队在IT应用方面更加纪律严明且先进。

And the military is a much more disciplined, advanced user of IT.

他们就是做得更好。

They're just better.

相比政府大多数部门，军队的运作更为专业。

They're more professionally run than most parts of government.

所以没错，就是空军。

So, yeah, it was the Air Force.

这么说你们当时只拿到了一点业务，不过

So you got like a little bit, but

是的。

Yeah.

我们当时只有一两个客户，只是为了证明我们确实能服务大客户。

We had like one or two customers just to prove we could actually serve big customers.

据我们理解，你差不多是在离婚发生后才意识到这一点。

As we understand it, you kinda had this realization at this point once the divorce happens.

好吧，我要去研究怎么做到IBM那样，就像你亲自去做一样。

Well, I'm gonna go figure out how to do what IBM does, like you personally.

更准确地说，我们在节目中提到过这点，我很好奇这是否属实——这不是比尔的热衷领域，而你主动请缨说'我去搞定企业销售'。

And to put a finer point on it, the thing that we said on our episode, and I'm curious if it's true or not, is this was not Bill's passion area, and you sorta raised your hand and said, I'll go figure out enterprise sales.

哦，是的。

Oh yeah.

不，不，不。

No, no, no.

这绝对是事实。

That's for sure true.

比尔的热情？听着，比尔在很多领域都有热情。

Bill's passion Look, Bill had passions a lot of places.

但你会说应用软件组和Windows能为应用提供什么——很恰当地说，我认为那是比尔投入大量脑力的地方。

But you'd say the apps group and what Windows could deliver to the apps quite appropriately, I'd say that's where a lot of Bill's brain cycles went.

我还雇用了戴夫·卡特勒。

I'd also hired Dave Cutler.

戴夫·卡特勒曾是数字设备公司VMS操作系统的架构师。

Dave Cutler had been the architect of the VMS operating system for digital equipment.

而我们拥有DOS和Windows系统。

And we had DOS and Windows.

当我们与卡特勒谈及来此时，他说，我可不想在玩具操作系统上工作。

And when we were talking to Cutler about coming here, he says, I don't want to work any toy operating systems.

我不得不对戴夫说，幸好如此，因为我们用的就是个玩具操作系统。

And I had to say to Dave, Good thing because we have a toy operating system.

但戴夫是带我们实现目标的关键人物。

But Dave is the key to getting us there.

我们说，听着，你必须打造一个API像Windows、用户界面也像Windows的操作系统。

We said, Look, you got to build an operating system whose API looks like Windows and whose user interface looks like Windows.

这样开发者能熟悉它并编写应用程序。是的。

So developers can be familiar with it and write apps Yeah.

为了

For

你可能需要做些必要的改动，但它必须是个健壮的操作系统。

And you might make some changes because you have to, but it's got to be a robust operating system.

它必须拥有安全的内核。

It's got to have a secure kernel.

它必须具备所有这些特性。

It's got to have all of these things.

你们当时的产品组合还达不到企业级标准。

The product set that you had wasn't really enterprise grade yet.

不，我们与一家叫3Com的公司签订了关于Land Manager的联合开发协议。

No, we had a joint development agreement, a joint agreement on land manager with a company called 3Com.

那并不全是我们的东西。

It wasn't all our stuff.

我们曾与一家名为Sybase的公司签订开发协议，负责SQL数据库，因为我们试图整合IBM拥有的所有组件，而我们当时一无所有。

We had a development agreement with a company called Sybase to do the SQL database because we're trying to figure out all these pieces IBM would have, and we didn't have any of that.

仅靠操作系统是远远不够的。

An operating system alone is not going to do it.

还需要所有这些其他组件。

Need all these other components.

是啊。

Yeah.

你需要搭建后端基础设施。

You want to have backend infrastructure.

我们在八十年代就开始匆忙应对这个问题。

And we started scrambling on that in the eighties.

因此，如果我们想向商业客户销售产品，就必须构建所有这些基础设施组件。

So we had all these infrastructure pieces that we had to build if we wanted to sell to, I'll say business customers.

我们甚至没考虑过——当人们提到企业时，常会联想到大公司，但若没有这些基础，我们连20人或50人规模的公司都无法服务。

We weren't even thinking about When you say enterprises, sometimes people think very large companies, but we couldn't sell the companies of 20 people without some of this stuff or 50 people.

你谈到

You talk a

现在经常讨论这种'锻炼肌肉'的管理理念。

lot now about this sort of management concept of building muscle.

这就是理念的起源吗？

Is this where this came from?

就像你用的那个比喻——在健身房提前锻炼肌肉，未雨绸缪。

Of, like, that you should always be you used the phrase in the weight room, building muscle ahead of what you need.

你和比尔在八十年代就有这种想法吗？比如，我们需要在计算和商业计算的各个领域建立这种能力？

Were you and Bill thinking this way in the eighties of, like, hey, we need to be building up this muscle across all parts of computing and business computing?

嗯，保罗·艾伦。

Well, Paul Allen.

我是说，保罗才是关键。

I mean, Paul is the key.

保罗是那个让比尔说'我们永远不会成为硬件公司'的人。

Paul is the one who said Bill said, we're never gonna be be a hardware company.

当Altair问世时，第一台真正基于微处理器的电脑出现，保罗就说：'好，让我们编写这些机器将来可能需要的所有软件。'

And when Altair came out, the first real sort of microprocessor based computer, Paul says, Okay, let's write all the software that these things will ever need.

比尔和我在执行层面做了很多工作，但你知道，那才是推动力。

Bill and I had a lot of the execution around that, but, you know, that that was the push.

所以保罗在八十年代初就催我开始组建应用程序团队。

So and Paul was cracking on me in the early eighties to start building an apps group.

加油，史蒂夫。

Come on, Steve.

加油，史蒂夫。

Come on, Steve.

不仅仅是系统。

It's not just systems.

我们还需要应用程序。

We need to have applications also.

任何在微处理器上运行的代码，我们都应该参与其中

Any code that executes on a microprocessor, we should have a player in

那个市场。

that market.

那里有一张VisiCalc电子表格。

And there was a VisiCalc spreadsheet.

拜托，史蒂夫。

Come on, Steve.

文字处理器。

Word processor.

快点，快点，快点。

Come on, come on, come on.

让我们招揽人才。

Let's get the talent.

我们开始行动吧。

Let's get going.

那时我们主要在做大学招聘。

And we were doing mostly college hiring at the time.

然后我们遇到了这个叫西蒙的家伙，他曾在施乐帕克研究中心工作。

And so, And then we met this guy Simone, who'd been at Xerox PARC.

是查尔斯·西蒙尼对吧？

Charles Simone, right?

没错，就是查尔斯·西蒙尼。

Charles Simone, exactly.

我们通过3Com公司的共同朋友认识了他——那人也在帕克工作过——他确实是应用程序业务的第一个领导者，但我们采用了授权模式。

And he came We met him through a mutual friend at three Com Corporation who'd been at PARC and he really was the first leader of the apps business, but we licensed.

我是说，看吧，我们与其他公司的合作方式就像IBM与我们合作那样。

I mean, look, we worked with other people the way IBM worked with us.

我们去找了Sybase和3Com，说让我们一起合作吧。

We went to Sybase and 3Com and let's work together.

那并不完全是一份联合开发协议（JDA），但我们与那些公司的合作方式确实和IBM一样。

It wasn't exactly a JDA, joint development agreement, but we worked with those guys the way IBM worked.

我是说，看吧，现在的类比有点像微软与OpenAI的合作。

I mean, look, the analogy now is a little bit Microsoft working with OpenAI.

当大公司与新创公司合作时，长远来看会如何发展？

When the big company works with the new company, How does that all play out over time?

但我在1984年接手了系统软件部门，那时我们刚开始做这些事情。

But I took over system software in 'eighty four, so that's when we're starting all this stuff.

可以说我当时更偏向企业级业务。

And you could say I was a little bit more enterprise y.

所以，是的，我正在看你为我们制作的这张图表。

So, yeah, I I'm looking at your chart here that you made for us.

你把92到98年标为'腾飞期'，那是在你提到的'企业起步'时代之后。

You've got 92 to 98 titled Liftoff, and that's after the era where you talk about enterprise start.

而你的角色也从上一个时代的操作系统部门转到了销售部门。

And you have your role switching from your role as OS division in the previous era to sales.

不过那时的腾飞主要是在Windows和应用程序方面。

The liftoff there though is mostly on Windows and applications.

真正的腾飞并不在企业级业务上。

The liftoff isn't really enterprise.

我是说，直到2000年代末期才有所改变。

I mean, look, it was not until the late 2000s.

人们会说，你们可能会觉得这很有趣，甚至可能已经知道了。

People would say You guys might find this funny or maybe even know it.

客户会说，你们不是企业级公司。

Customers say, You're not an enterprise company.

你们不是企业级公司。

You're not an enterprise company.

具体到什么时候？

As late as when?

哦，2000年代末。

Oh, late 2000s.

真的吗？

Really?

千真万确。

Absolutely.

千真万确。

Absolutely.

你们达不到企业级标准。

You're not enterprise grade.

你们还没准备好服务企业。

You're not enterprise ready.

哦，我听过这种说法

Oh, I heard that

太多了。

so much.

2005年的时候，对。

In 2005, yeah.

你们当时有Oracle。

You had Oracle out there.

记得吗，那时候还是大型机和迷你计算机的时代，那些设备都是为企业级应用准备的。

Remember, were still mainframes and mini computers and those things were enterprise ready.

IBM当时还有产品。

IBM had product still.

你们那时没有企业级支持。

You didn't have enterprise support.

你知道，我们的授权模式在90年代初需要改进，到了90年代末又得再次调整。

You know, our licensing, had to evolve in the early nineties and then again in the late nineties.

不。

No.

我们当时没有那些东西。

We didn't have those things.

所以不，我们当时还不是企业软件公司。

So, no, we weren't an enterprise software company.

这真有意思。

That's so interesting.

原来你们是这么做的。

That's how you did it.

肯定不是在2005年之前。

Certainly it wasn't before 2005.

那不是我任期刚开始的时候。

It wasn't at the beginning of my tenure.

我们当时还在努力证明自己是一家企业级公司。

We were still trying to prove that we were an enterprise company.

现在我觉得很荒谬的是，微软被完全定性为企业级公司，其实我觉得情况更复杂，但不可否认这是我们的核心优势。

And now I just find it cuckoo that all Microsoft is characterized as is an enterprise company, which I'm not I mean, I think it's more complicated than that, but I'm not going to say that that's not the primary muscle.

这确实是事实。

For sure it is.

但当时的我和公司都铁了心要证明我们是企业级公司。

But me, the company, I mean, was hell bent and determined to prove we were an enterprise company.

为什么会有这种想法？

Why was that?

为什么在92、93、94年那会儿，你们觉得攻占企业市场如此重要？

Why did you feel like this, let's call it 'ninety two, 'ninety three, 'ninety four, why did you feel like it's so important for us to attack that market?

很简单，因为那是IBM能像碾死虫子一样碾压我们的领域。

Easy, because that's where IBM could squish us like a bug.

如果我们不能把产品卖给企业而只能卖给消费者——那时候我们就明白了。

If we couldn't sell our stuff to businesses, only to consumers, We knew that by then.

我们的发展会受限，因为企业需要特定功能，他们不喜欢'去电脑城买几套软件'这种模式。

We'd only get so far because enterprises wanted some features and enterprise don't like, Okay, you can go to computer land and buy a few copies.

而消费市场，我是说在移动时代之前对吧？

And the consumer market, I mean, pre mobile, right?

就像移动互联网之前的消费者市场那样。

So like pre mobile, the consumer market.

互联网出现之前，市场规模很大，但远不及IBM的市场和企业级市场。

Pre Internet, yeah, is big, but, like, it's nowhere near IBM's market and the enterprise market.

按收入来说，确实没有。

By revenue, no.

肯定没有。

For sure not.

我们已经讨论了很多关于产品的话题。

So we've talked a lot about the products.

让我们来谈谈市场推广策略和企业协议这种创新。

Let's talk about the go to market motion and this sort of invention of the enterprise agreement.

你们为企业协议制定了哪些关键支柱？为什么需要这些支柱？

What are the key pillars that you sort of came up with for the enterprise agreement and why did they exist?

好的。

Okay.

我们最初为企业设计的软件定价打包模式并不是企业协议。

Our first sort of software pricing packaging model for the enterprise was not the enterprise agreement.

首先，我们卖给你们的是磁盘。

First, it was, We sold you disks.

其次，我们提出了所谓的'选择许可'概念，你们可以自行复制。

Second, we came up with this notion of what we called select licensing, and you could make your own copies.

你们只需报告销售了多少份拷贝。

You just report how many copies you sold.

听起来这里充满挑战。

Sounds rife with challenges here.

你告诉我们需要多少份，按实际数量付款就行。

You tell us how many copies and just pay us what you did.

企业荣誉体系。

The Enterprise Honor System.

嗯。

Mhmm.

真令人惊讶。

Astonishing.

这包括Windows系统、Office软件，还有

And that's of Windows, that's of Office, that's

那时候Windows通常都是预装在硬件里的。

of Windows typically by then came with the hardware.

所以你们主要走OEM渠道？

So you were mostly using the OEM channel?

Windows系统是的。

For Windows, yeah.

好的。

Okay.

对。

Yeah.

直到今天，升级服务等仍直接面向企业销售，但企业采购的基础电脑都会预装OEM授权的操作系统。

Even to this day, upgrades and stuff are sold direct enterprises, but basic computer that comes to an enterprise would have the operating system licensed to the OEM.

所以我们当时处于，你可以称之为诚信体系的状态，但我们就是无法让人们从我们这里购买光盘或CD。

And so we were on, you can call it the honor system, but we just couldn't make people buy discs from us or CDs from us.

企业不喜欢这样。

Enterprises didn't like that.

所以我们推出了这个叫Select的方案，但Select存在两个问题。

So we had this thing called Select and Select had two problems with it.

第一，很难复制你打印的软件。

Number one, very hard to copy the software you print.

第二个问题是，我们当时在销售升级版和新许可证。

And number two problem, we were selling upgrades and new licenses.

升级版的价格不到新许可证的一半。

Upgrades were less than half the price of new licenses.

这意味着什么？

So what does that mean?

公司正走向一个收入只有现有收入一半的世界。

The company was headed to a world where its revenue was half of its existing revenue.

是啊。

Yeah.

除非你能发展新客户、新用户，所以这是个惊人的...

Unless you're growing new customers, new logos, So a phenomenal

这确实是个棘手的问题。

it was a real problem looking thing.

比尔和我一直梦想着能实现某种经常性收入模式。

And Bill and I, we'd always dreamed of this thing where you get some recurring revenue.

然后我们提出建议：不如采用一种许可证模式，你无需统计打印的许可证数量，只需统计电脑数量。

And then we came up and say, Okay, well, why don't we just do a license that you didn't have to count the number of licenses you printed, just the number of computers.

这让事情变得简单多了。

It made life simpler.

我们决定不再采用'卖新许可证然后天知道什么时候再卖升级版'的方式，而是改为：你签约三年，按机器付费，三年内每年支付相同金额。

And we said, Instead of doing, sell you a new license and then God knows when we would sell you another upgrade or whatever, we'll do something that just says, Hey, look, you sign up for three years, you pay us per machine and you just pay us the same amount of money each year for three years.

这让我们可以巧妙提高升级版的价格。

And it sort of let us jimmy up the price of the upgrade.

是的。

Yeah.

没错。

Yeah.

说来奇怪，你提到会遇到问题，而我们确实解决了管理难题。

Mean, so weirdly you said and you get get problem and we solved the difficulty of administration problem.

这就是企业协议。

And that was the enterprise agreement.

是从一开始就能获得所有产品吗？

And was it from the beginning of you get everything?

不，那是特殊的企业协议。

No, that was a special enterprise agreement.

在三年协议期内，你可以获得所有已授权产品的升级版。

So you got all the upgrades during that three year period to the products you licensed.

但你们还是可以挑选产品，比如'我要Excel'。

But you were still picking and choosing, Oh, I want Excel.

哦，我

Oh, I

希望你能。

want You could.

我们当时在鼓励你购买Office。

We were encouraging you to buy Office.

是的。

Yep.

但我们也有这种'随便用'的许可证。

But we also had this all you can eat license.

我记不清我们当时怎么称呼它了。

I can't remember what we called that.

但基本上就是按员工人数计费，任何人都可以使用我们的任何软件。

But basically then I think you counted the number of employees and you could use any of our software for anybody.

所以我们只是试图让管理越来越简单，确保经常性收入不会随时间下降，升级什么的想用多少用多少。

So we just tried to go simpler and simpler and simpler in the administration, recurring revenue that didn't decline over time and sort of as much as you wanted to eat, the upgrades, everything.

我们确实想要你们现在拥有的这种经常性服务业务，只是当时没有云计算，无法远程交付，但我们已经在朝那个方向走了。

We did want essentially what you have now, which is a recurring services business, but we didn't have the cloud, we weren't delivering things, but we're already on that path.

我想是我们启动了Energizer项目。

I think we started the Energizer.

你们提到了我们和Energizer的合作，那正是我们想接管他们IT部门的案例。

You guys mentioned what we do with Energizer, which is where we wanted to run their IT department.

对。

Right.

他们是这个概念的试点客户，没错。

They were the pilot customer for this concept, Yeah.

是第一个客户。

Were the first customer.

我说服了他们。

I talked them into it.

这超出了企业协议的范围。

This is beyond the enterprise agreement.

这正是我们想运行他们业务的地方，因为我们确实想实现这种经常性收入模式。

This is where we actually want to run their stuff because we did want to get to this recurring revenue thing.

大卫之前提到过这个概念。

And David was referring to this concept earlier.

我们在微软那期节目和Epic那期节目里讨论了很多。

We talked about it a lot on our Microsoft episode and then on our Epic episode.

这种天才想法是：即使你还没准备好使用，你的许可证里也会包含一大堆软件。

This sort of genius idea of you will get included in your license a whole bunch of software even if you're not ready to use it yet.

所以如果你在考虑从其他供应商那里购买不同的软件包——你知道的，他们只做这一个。对。

So if at any point you're considering buying this different software package from this other vendor who's a you know, they just make this one Yep.

然后他们翻看文件时就会说：等等。

And then they look in their paperwork and they're like, wait.

实际上，我们作为现有业务的一部分，可以从微软免费获得这个。

Actually, we get that from Microsoft for free as a part of our the thing we're already doing.

我们就用这个吧。

Let's just do that.

只要你们每年开发大量软件，就能无限地制造越来越多的产品，这样客户在扩展软件需求时就不必另寻他处。

And as long as you're developing a lot of software every year, you can sort of indefinitely just make more and more and more stuff so that your customers don't need to look elsewhere as they expand their software needs.

这是怎么形成的？

How did that come about?

让我们从Office开始说起。

Let's start with Office.

当我们创建Office时，比尔确实推动了整合——我们销售Excel、Word、PowerPoint，然后把它们打包在一起时人们会抱怨。

When we created Office, bill really drove that integrate when we're selling Excel, Word, PowerPoint, and then we put these things together and people would complain.

我们并不总是销售Office套装，因为人们说‘我们的用户不用Excel’。

And we didn't always sell office because people say, Our users don't use Excel.

所以我们不希望包含Excel。

So we don't want Excel included.

好的。

Okay.

我们曾为你们提供过授权选项。

We had a licensing option for you.

但这变得越来越容易。

But it became easier and easier.

当时各个部门的员工总是绕过IT部门操作。

People then departments departments always were end running IT at the time.

至今

Still

直到现在依然如此。

now, Still this day.

所以我们确实卖给你一些你可能用不上的东西。

So we did sell you things that you might not be using.

但这也意味着，如果你想按部门划分，我们已经为你准备好了所有内容。

But it also, if you're trying to The departments, we already got it all for you.

你可能想要不同于这个部门的东西，但我们已为你准备齐全。

You may want something different than this department, but we got it all for you.

这对人们来说很有吸引力。

That was an attractive thing for people.

我还了解到IT人员非常看重的一个保险方面的因素。

And there's an insurance aspect that I learned that IT people really want.

他们想要的是安心无忧。

They want peace of mind.

这是成为企业级服务的一部分意义所在。

That's part of what it means to be an enterprise.

我要确保一切安全无虞。

I want to make sure everything's secure.

我要确保一切管理得当。

I want to make sure that everything is well managed.

我要确保所有费用都已妥善支付。

I want to make sure everything is well paid for.

我要确保出问题时有人可联系。

I want to make sure there's somebody to call if things go wrong.

我要确保我买齐了所有东西。

I want to make sure I bought everything.

我不想显得难堪，无论是因我买贵了还是买的东西有缺陷。

I don't want to look bad because either I paid too much or I have holes in what I bought for people.

所以我这样看待问题，可能随着时间推移我的观点也逐步演变成这样。

So I view this and I probably evolved my view to this over time.

当你出售企业服务时，必须提供安心保障，这就像一份保险单。

When you sell the enterprise, you have to provide peace of mind, which is kind of like an insurance policy.

因此购买超出当前使用量的授权，本质上是一种保险策略。

So buying more than you might be using or some users are using, it's an insurance policy.

软件的边际成本和分销成本都为零。

And software has zero marginal cost and zero distribution cost.

所以如果你需要，我们很乐意多寄几张光盘给你。

So we're happy to mail you a few more disks if you need them.

但那时我们已经不再邮寄光盘了，因为企业协议已经生效。

But we weren't even mailing discs by then because we had the enterprise agreement in place.

在某个阶段，你会触及——我想说是'三位一体'，但实际上远不止三个组件。

So at a certain point along the way, you get to well, I wanna say the holy trinity, but I think there are more than three pieces of this.

但企业级市场的真正杀手锏套装是：Windows系统、Windows服务器、Active Directory、Exchange和Office。

But the real killer suite in enterprises, which is Windows, Windows Server, Active Directory, Exchange, Office.

所有这些软件组件协同运作，支撑着企业的运转。

And all of these pieces of software all work in orchestration to run your enterprise.

明白吗？

You know?

用户通过Outlook处理邮件——Outlook属于Office套件，运行于Windows系统，依赖Exchange服务器，连接Active Directory，还有SQL Server等等，环环相扣。

Your users, they do their email on Outlook, which is part of Office, which runs on Windows, which uses Exchange, which uses Active Directory, is SQL Server, all these things.

达到那个阶段花了多长时间？

How long did it take to get to that point?

这其中投入了什么？在我看来，那才是企业全面发力的时刻。

And what went into where I mean, to my mind, that's when the enterprise is firing on all cylinders here.

好的。

Okay.

这确实伴随着电子邮件的繁荣而来。

So that really comes with email boom.

电子邮件繁荣期是在九十年代末/两千年代初。

An email boom is late nineties slash beginning of two thousands.

因为电子邮件就像是拉动整个行业的马车

Because email is sort of the cart that pulled the

的驱动力。

whole thing.

哦对，不，它才是火车头。

Oh yeah, no, it's the locomotive.

企业需要电子邮件。

Enterprises wanted email.

是的。

Yeah.

当埃森哲成立公司时，我们创办了一家名为Avanade的合资企业，本质上是为了帮助实现'三位一体'——协助安装部署。

When Accenture became a company, we started a joint venture called Avanade to help do essentially the holy trinity, to help install.

因为我们需要支持基础设施和懂得如何搭建服务器、配置电子邮件、完成整套部署的合作伙伴。

Because we needed support infrastructure and partners who knew how to set up the servers, provision, email, put all that in.

我们需要合作伙伴，但自身能力不足。

We needed partners and we didn't have enough capacity.

因此我们与埃森哲共同创立了Avanade，如今已成为一家规模庞大的企业。

And that's why we started this thing, Avanade, which is a big, big company at this stage, with Accenture.

那是在2000年代初期。

And that was in the 2000s.

我后来

I went

加入了埃森哲的董事会。

on the board of Accenture.

但重点在于，向企业推销时可以这样说：比起大卫列举的那堆软件，你们真正需要的是电子邮件系统对吧？

But all this to say, the way you could kind of pitch an enterprise is rather than any of these other value propositions, David listed off a whole bunch of software, you could say, You guys want some email, right?

我们能为贵企业提供最可靠、最稳健的电子邮件解决方案，而且附带所有这些优质配套服务。

We have the most reliable, robust way for your enterprise to adopt email and it's gonna come with all this other great stuff.

所有功能都完美集成在一起。

And everything was nicely integrated.

别忘了，当时需要活动目录来管理文件共享和打印机。

Because remember, you needed active directory to manage file shares, to manage printers.

这个系统其实承担着多种功能。

I mean, it was used for a lot of different things.

所以正如你所说，这些功能确实整合成了一个完整的解决方案。

So it really did all kind of come together as kind of the integrated proposition, like you say.

你们当时还调侃我们把那套系统称为'后台办公'的说法

You guys sort of made fun of the notion that we called all that stuff the back office as if that

很方便。

was convenient.

那次采访被轻视了。

It was trivialized interview

在1960年。

in 1960.

哦，大错特错。

Oh, So wrong.

关于那件事完全错了。

So wrong about that.

你把这当作比尔根本不在乎的信号。

You took that as a signal that Bill just didn't care about this.

哦，完全不对。

Oh, completely not right.

我想称之为后勤部门，因为你需要购买办公室和后勤部门。

I wanted it to call it the back office because you needed to buy the office and the back office.

而用户、消费者看到办公室和后勤部门其实是服务器机房/数据中心里的东西。

And the user, the consumer saw the office and the back office were the things that were in kind of the server roomsdata centers.

但其中很多就是服务器机房。

But a lot of them were server rooms.

如今还是同样的东西，只是云化了。

It's the same thing these days, but cloudized.

好吧。

Alright.

在我们准备这次活动时，有一系列重大问题我们迫切想听听您的看法。

So as we were preparing for this, there was there's a bunch of big questions that we just desperately want your take on.

其中一个重要问题与您最具标志性的时刻有关。

A big one is around one of your most iconic moments.

1999年，那段'开发者，开发者，开发者'的演讲。

1999, the developers, developers, developers speech.

这个视频片段我大概看了二三十遍。

I've probably watched this clip twenty, thirty times.

几乎所有听众都看过这个片段。

Almost everyone listening has seen this clip.

这个片段缺失的是当时微软所处的背景环境，以及那个时代的世界局势，还有您作为公司领导者需要达成的目标。

What is missing from this clip is all the context around Microsoft and what's going on in the world at this time, and what you need to accomplish as a leader of this company.

请帮我们还原那个时代背景，然后理解您为何会以那种方式登台演讲。

Help us set that stage and then understand why you went on stage that way.

嗯，要记住，那时我们还没完全战胜IBM的竞争。

Well, remember, by this time, we're not through our IBM competition.

而且我们现在还要应对Linux的竞争，因为Linux正在与Windows Server抗衡。

And we got Linux competition now on the docket because Linux is competing with Windows Server.

Linux正在与Windows竞争。

Linux is competing with Windows.

还有个叫Open Office的开源办公软件正在与Office竞争。

And there's a thing called Open Office, open source software for Office that's competing with Office.

所以我们当时面临着所有这些挑战。

So we have all these things going on.

我们还没能击败Lotus Notes。

We haven't beat Lotus Notes yet.

而且你们还面临反垄断问题

And you've got antitrust going

持续。

on.

当然，到那时我们也会遇到反垄断问题。

We have antitrust issues, of course, by then.

司法部诉讼的高潮将在这一刻之后的十二个月内发生。

The culmination of the DOJ suit is happening within twelve months of this moment.

没错。

Correct.

但我的意思是，在所有这些竞争中，显然你需要的是能强化你现有优势、为你增值的第三方。

But I mean, it's clear in all these competitions, the thing you need is third parties that reinforce what you've got, add value around what you've got.

我本可以说在你的平台上运行，但如果你愿意，我稍后会讲到什么是平台、什么不是平台，如果你想讨论这个的话。

And I could say run on your platform, but I'll come to that later if you want to, what a platform is and isn't, and if you want to do that.

我觉得这挺有意思的。

It's kind of interesting, I think.

尤其是现在什么东西都被称为平台。

Particularly since everything's called a platform these days.

不过无论如何，

But anyway,

所以——我们在这里稍微岔开一下话题。

so- Let's take an aside here.

请给出你对平台的定义。

Give us your definition of a platform.

你可以称任何可扩展的东西为平台。

You could call it anything that is extensible.

正是这种可扩展性使其成为平台，因为你会让人们扩展你所增加的价值。

And it's the extensibility that makes it a platform because you're going to get people to extend the value you add.

问题是，这也是为什么它很重要，因为应用程序也是平台，而不仅仅是开发者平台。

The question is, and the reason that's important is applications are platforms too, not just developer platforms.

当人们这么说时，他们可能指的是Azure、AWS，或者早期的Windows、Windows Server或Unix，然后是Linux。

When people say that, they might mean Azure, AWS, or in the old days, Windows or Windows Server or Unix, then Linux.

是的，这些都是平台。

Yes, those are platforms.

你可以扩展它们，但你也可以扩展Office。

You extend them, but you also extend Office.

你增加了价值。

You add value.

合作伙伴会接入。

Partners plug in.

他们编写应用程序。

They write applications.

他们使用文件格式。

They use the file formats.

所有这些都属于平台的范畴。

All of this stuff is platform.

我认为微软面临的部分问题是，如果你自视为纯粹的平台公司，首先，平台需要应用程序。

And part of the issue, I think, for Microsoft is if you see yourself as just a platform company, A, platforms need apps.

你希望拥有能在自己平台上运行的最佳第一方应用。

You want to have the top first party app that runs on your platform.

否则你的平台就无法变得出色。

Otherwise your platform can't get good.

Office曾是Windows上最优秀的第一方应用，正是这样才让一切变得出色。

Office was the best first party app on Windows and that's how things get good.

Outlook曾是Exchange上最优秀的第一方应用。

Outlook was the best first party app on exchange.

顺便说一句，曾经还有其他客户端存在。

There were other clients at one point, by the way.

所以除了所谓的'平台'之外，你确实需要应用程序具备可扩展性。

So you really do want extensibility in your apps in addition to your quote platform.

除了所谓的'平台'，你还需要确保拥有第一方应用。

You want to make sure you own first party app in addition to quote platform.

我认为如果宣称'我们只是平台公司'，就可能陷入困境。

And I think you can get stuck in the mud if you say, We're just a platform company.

我认为我们让'我们是平台公司'这种观念深入了企业思维，这远超出我原本的意图。

And I think we got it into our corporate mindset that we were, quote, a platform company, far more than I ever intended.

我的意思是，在2000年代中期到后期，就有人告诉我'我们不能那样做'。

I mean, there were people telling me in the mid to late 2000s, Well, we can't do that.

我们是平台公司。

We're a platform company.

我说，是的，我们可以做到。

I said, Yes, we can do that.

到了2010年，我对自己的无力感感到沮丧，无法让人们摆脱'我们只是一家平台公司'的思维。

And by 2010, was just frustrated with myself and my inability to get people out of the, We're just a platform company.

我认为直到今天，你必须将应用与平台结合起来思考。

And I think to this day, you have to think app with platform.

你必须考虑应用的可扩展性和所谓的'平台'。

You have to think extensibility of the app and the quote platform.

我认为我们当时就被这个问题困住了。

And I think we got caught on that.

也许我一度被它困住了，而我确实也因无法告诉人们公司需要做什么而陷入困境，因为当时人们有着强烈的'我们是平台公司'的文化。

Maybe I got caught on it for a while, and I certainly got caught in my inability to tell people what the company needed to do because people had such a culture then of saying, We're a platform company.

我们是平台。

We're a platform.

所以现在我重新回到'开发者、开发者、开发者'的理念。

And so now I go back to developers, developers, developers.