1929年与2025年：安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金谈崩盘、泡沫与经验教训

嘿，索金。我刚看完评论，有个问题反复出现：你到底为什么要写这本书？天哪。

Hey, Sorkin. I just went through the comments. The one question keeps coming up over again. Why the are you writing this book? Jesus Christ.

真是个扫兴的家伙。

What a party pooper.

真是个扫兴的家伙。我不知道，老兄。

What a party pooper. I don't know, man.

我不认为...我觉得这本书本应该是...

I don't think I think it's supposed to be the the book's supposed

应该像本沙滩读物。

to be like a beach read.

沙滩读物？

A beach read?

是的。

Yes.

贾马尔，你读过了吗？

Jamal, did you read it?

天啊，没有。我只看了标题，就直接跳过了。你们所有人的都跳过了。

My god. No. I saw the title. I was like, skip. Skip all of you.

好了，亲们。我觉得这又是一次史诗级的讨论。大家都很喜欢这些访谈。我能听他讲上几个小时。绝对的。

Alright, besties. I think that was another epic discussion. People love the interviews. I could hear him talk for hours. Absolutely.

我们一分钟就解决了你们的问题。我们正在给人们提供基础事实数据来支撑你们的观点。你们觉得怎么样？很有趣。太棒了。

We crushed your questions in a minute. We are giving people ground truth data to underwrite your own opinion. What'd you guys think? That was fun. That was great.

查马斯，你一定会喜欢这些人物的。我可不是开玩笑。当时参与其中的那些人，尤其是主角

Chamath, you're you're gonna love these characters. I kid you not. I kid you not. The people who do who are involved in this at that time, like the the main character

完全同意你的观点。说实话，我对这个时期研究很久了。实际上，我觉得你写这本书很棒。内容非常引人入胜。

Totally agree with you. I I am a huge to be honest, I've studied this period for a while. Actually, I think it's great that you wrote this book. I think it's incredibly fascinating.

今天我们和安德鲁·罗斯·索金、查马斯一起带来一期精彩的全员访谈。我们将讨论安德鲁的新书《1929》，重点探讨安德鲁为何研究这段历史、历史给我们的启示，以及当前时代是会重演1929年还是有所不同——正如许多人猜测的那样。安德鲁，感谢你和查马斯一起参与这次讨论。

We're here with with Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chamath and I with another all in interview riveting. Today, we are gonna talk about Andrew's new book 1929 and specifically cover why Andrew got into it, what the history teaches us, and are we looking at another 1929 or something different this day and age as a lot of people may speculate. But, Andrew, thanks for joining Chamath and I to talk about this.

感谢邀请，我很喜欢你的背景图。那确实是1929年10月真实发生的场景，疯狂至极。

Thank you for having me, and I love your your background there. A true image of what was actually happening in October 1929, crazily enough.

没错。而且我记得是用某种AI技术上的色。不过确实很棒。你是怎么想到要研究1929年这个时代，研究1929年股市大崩盘的？毕竟你是个大忙人，每天上电视，到处都能看到你，参加各种会议——这周我还在南加州的一个会议上见到你，接着你又去了另一个会议，然后回到纽约。你真的很忙。

That's right. And it was colorized by some AI or something, I think. But, yeah, great. How and why did you get into this era of 1929, the great stock market crash of nineteen twenty nine? Like, you're a busy guy, you're on TV every day, we see you all over, you're at conferences, I saw you at a conference in Southern California this week, then you're at another conference and you're back in New York, You're very busy.

是什么让你决定要坐下来写一本关于这个时代的书呢？

At what point did you say, hey, I wanna sit down and write a book about this era?

好的，事情是这样的。我之前写过关于2008年金融危机的《大而不倒》。

Okay. So here's what happened to me. So I ran that book Too Big to Fail about the two thousand eight financial crisis.

对。

Right.

之后人们总是会和我深入探讨1929年的事，或者想了解更多关于1929年的细节。大多数人都知道1929年发生了可怕的事情，知道那年有次崩盘，通常认为那就是大萧条或导致了大萧条。但如果你问大多数人——当然你和贾马尔可能属于例外——当时实际参与其中的是哪些人？他们彼此说了什么？谁和谁有私情？

And people used to always say to me after that, they'd get into these like very in-depth conversations about 1929 or they'd wanna know more about 1929. And most people know that something terrible happened in 1929, they know there was a crash in 1929, they oftentimes think it like is the Great Depression or leads to the Great Depression. But, if you were to ever ask most people, now, Jamal and you are maybe in a different category and say, well, who were the people who actually were engaged in this? What were they saying to each other? Who was sleeping with who?

谁在算计谁？当时到底发生了什么？是什么样的诱因和动机导致了那些明显错误的决策？我找不到这些答案。所以大约十年前，我和妻子度假时——我们很书呆子气——就把所有这些书都下载到了Kindle上。

Who was trying to over who? What was actually happening here? And what were the incentives and what were the motivations that led to what clearly were some poor decisions? I couldn't find that. So, I went on a vacation like ten years ago with my wife, very nerdy and I like downloaded all these books to my Kindle.

顺便说一句，关于这个时期确实有些很棒的书。别误会我。但它们缺乏那种以人物驱动的故事性。比如我超爱《贼巢》，也超爱《门口的野蛮人》。

And there's some great books, by the way, about this period. Don't get me wrong. But they didn't have the sort of character driven story. Like, loved Den of Thieves. I loved Barbarians at the Gate.

我喜欢关于人物的故事。

I loved stories about people.

精彩的书，真是精彩的书。你妻子怎么看？

Fabulous books. Fabulous books. What did your wife think

当你们整个假期你都无视她，只顾着在Kindle上看书时，她是什么反应？

when you ignored her the entire vacation you guys were on and were just reading books on your Kindle?

我觉得她可能认为我疯了。但并没有。所以我...我读了这些书，我

I mean, I think she thought I was out of my mind. But no. So I I I read these books, I

当时就在想，好吧。故事在哪里？人物在哪里？在讲到人物之前，你能不能...能不能给人们一个简洁的概述？就像我本来想让你用抖音短视频的篇幅讲讲总体经济问题，然后再谈具体人物。完全没问题。

was like, okay. Where's the story? Where's the where are the people? Before you get to the people, can you can you give people a concise tick like, I was gonna ask you for a TikTok of the overarching economic issues before we get to the sort of the characters. Totally.

是的。因为我觉得你说到重点了——人们以为就是股市下跌那么简单。但其他因素，比如经济生产过剩、利率紧缩、战争债务等等，所有这些都交织在一起，没人能完全理解。

Yeah. Because I think what to your point, which is an important one, people think it was like, okay. Stocks went down. Right. But the other things, like the overproduction of the economy, tightening interest rates, the war debt, like, all of this stuff was just commingled, nobody fully understands that.

你能给大家精确描述一下这个装置、这套系统的设置吗？

Can you maybe give folks a precise representation of the setup, the set

的演进过程？

of progression?

那我们还是从头说起吧。

So let's just go back.

让我们回到1919年，因为我认为那是个关键年份。在1919年前的美国，人们其实不借钱。借钱在当时被视为道德罪恶，人们真的不这么做。到了1919年，通用汽车突然宣布：知道吗？

Even let's go back to 1919 because actually I think that's a critical year. So prior to 1919 in America, people did not really borrow money. It was like a moral sin to to to get credit. Like, people didn't do it. In 1919, General Motors says, you know what?

我们将开始向人们提供贷款，让他们可以买车。这实际上成为美国的一个重要转折点。随后西尔斯百货发现了这个趋势，也宣布要在家电领域推行类似做法。接着有个叫查理·米切尔的银行家，他执掌的国家城市银行（后来成为花旗集团）也说：知道吗？

We're gonna start lending people money so that you can buy a car. And that was actually like a major inflection point in America. Because then Sears Roebuck clocks what's going on and says, okay. We're gonna do this too for appliances. And then a guy named Charlie Mitchell who ran a bank called National City, which becomes Citigroup, says, you know what?

我们可以对股票也这么操作。突然间，经纪行如同雨后春笋般涌现，就像今天我们看到的星巴克那样遍布街头巷尾。你可以走进这些地方，投入1美元，他们就会借给你10美元——当时的疯狂程度就是如此。

We can do this for stocks. So, you know and and all of a sudden brokerage houses are opening up, you know, on the corners of streets the way we see Starbucks today. It's like literally like that. And you could go into one of these places and you could put a buck down and they would literally loan you $10 off of your dollar. I mean, that's how insane things were.

而在

And at the

当时没有任何形式的承销风险。零风险承销。没人明白他们在做什么。

time There no risk underwriting of any kind. Zero risk underwriting. Nobody understood what they were doing.

SEC（美国证券交易委员会）。没有任何监管。早期读到这本书的人说，哦，在你的研究中，你有机会阅读任何公司的招股说明书吗？我当时想，招股说明书？就像，如果他们在街上发传单，那都算你走运。

SEC. There's no regulations. Somebody who who who read this book early said, oh, in your research, did you get a chance to read any of the prospectuses for the companies? I was like, prospectuses? Like, if there was like a leaflet that they handed out on the street, you'd be lucky.

所以根本没有什么招股书。那完全是一个疯狂的时代。别提1929年了。1928年，股市上涨了48%。人们就像查克·普林斯说的那样，音乐响起时大家都在跳舞，甚至没人想过音乐可能会停止——仿佛永远不会停。

So there's not there's nothing. And it's just like a complete go go era. Forget about 1929. In 1928, the stock market went up 48%. So people are just there's just sort of like this it's a little bit of the Chuck Prince when the music's playing, you're dancing and everybody's dancing and nobody's even thinking about the music stopping, kind of like ever.

与此同时，还发生了这些技术变革。我是说，如同我们今天谈论AI一样重大的世代技术变革——无线电。RCA就像是当时的英伟达。人人都想投资RCA，股票代码直接叫'无线电'，因为它被认为将改变世界。另一个与当今相似的关键点是金融民主化的理念。

Now, meanwhile, there's also these technological changes. I mean, huge generational technological changes in the same way I think we're probably talking about like AI today, radio. So, RCA was like the NVIDIA of its time. Everybody wanted into RCA, the stock ticker was radio because it was like the it was like gonna change the world. And and the other big piece of this was also similar to today, this idea of democratizing finance.

就像在说：好吧，精英们已经赚够了钱。现在我们要让所有人都参与进来。不过当时与现在的区别在于，那时还存在疯狂的操纵和内幕交易。就像我说的，根本没有规则，字面意义上的毫无规则。

It was like, okay, the elites have had their way. They've made all the money. We're now gonna let everybody in on the action. Now, the difference between then and now though was there was also like crazy amounts of manipulation, insider trading. As I said, there were no rules, like literally no rules.

没人会因此坐牢，因为根本没有相关禁令

Nobody's going to jail for this stuff because it didn't there wasn't a rule against

顺便说，不仅是个人投资者用保证金过度投资，连银行都拿着储户的钱做多股市。

it. By the way, wasn't just individuals that was investing and overextended with margin, but the banks would take depositors money, and they were going long the stock market.

那些银行，那些银行就是这么干的。顺便说一句，不是某家银行，而是那些普通的传统企业银行。

The the the banks the banks were doing it. By the way, the bank no. The banks regular old corporations.

我是说，你能想象吗，如果事实证明摩根大通和高盛用储户资金做多英伟达？那本质上和当年发生的事如出一辙。

I mean, could you imagine could you imagine if it turned out that, like, JPMorgan and Goldman was going long Nvidia with depositor funds? That's a that's the effective equivalent of what was happening back then too.

当时有企业利用它们的资产负债表

You had p you had corporations taking their balance sheet

对。

Right.

然后实际上将其贷出去，以便

And effectively then loaning it out so that

人们可以去买股票。那是另一件正在发生的事。所以没错。某种程度上，

people could go buy stocks. That was the other thing was happening. So Right. There's a sort of,

就像，这种对投资的推动、生产过剩以及其他种种因素共同造就了这种泡沫化的市场。当时还有美联储。你提到美联储，这是很有意思的一点。那时美联储刚成立不久。

like, just the the push towards investing and and overproduction and and all sorts of other things created this sort of frothy market. And you had a Fed. You mentioned the Fed, is an interesting part of this. There was a Fed. It was new.

始于1913年。他们知道这是一团糟。就像他们不断对自己说的那样，你读了我过去八年所有的日记和笔记。他们知道存在问题。但他们被吓得不敢做他们本应做的事——提高利率，但他们无法像沃尔克那样强硬行事。

Started in 1913. They knew this was a mess. Like, they kept saying to themselves, you read all the diaries and notes that I was in for the last eight years. They knew there was a problem. But they were scared out of their mind about doing what they probably should have done, which is raise interest rates, but they couldn't pull off like a Volker kind of thing.

抱歉。但你能详细说说你提到的关于财富创造的社会传染现象吗？人们觉得精英们已经得逞，现在轮到其他人了。描述一下这个现象，是什么导致了它，又是什么放大了这种社会传染？

Sorry. But can you double click into what you said about the fact that there was a social contagion around wealth creation that people felt like the elites had had their way and now it was everybody else's turn. Just describe that. Like, what had caused that and what amplified that social contagion?

那么‘其他人’指的是谁？是工厂工人吗？因为我们正处于大规模工业建设之后。是因为人们第一次有了储蓄吗？这种现象的根源是什么？

And who and who was everyone else? Were these factory workers? Because we're kind of on the heels of a big industrial build out. So, like, was it the fact folks were had savings for the first time? Like, where is this coming from?

实际上，当时有很多人从农场来到大城市，这是第一次。这是正在发生的重要部分。所以，大部分交易发生在大城市，而不是小城镇。

Well, so what's really happening is you have a lot of folks who are coming from the from farms, frankly, and moving to the big cities for the first time. That's a huge part part of what's happening. So, most of the trading I should say is happening in the big cities. It's not happening, you know, out out in small towns. It's happening in big cities for the most part.

但整个情景是这样的：一旦他们来到大城市，看到有一群富人——谈论不平等时提到的富人群体——他们就想参与其中。顺便说一句，顶层的那些人，比如银行家、投资者和企业家，他们认为这是一个向小人物或普通投资者开放的大好机会。有个叫约翰·拉斯科布的人，可以说是那个时代的埃隆·马斯克。他实际运营过通用汽车，在那里创建了信贷项目，后来变得非常富有，然后进入政界，最终还建造了帝国大厦。

But but that whole sort of scenario, once they're in the big city and they're seeing that there's sort of this wealthy group of people, talk about inequalities, wealthy group of people, and they want in on the action. And also, by the way, the people at the top, meaning the bankers and investors and entrepreneurs are like, we think there's this big opportunity to open this up for the little guy or the ordinary investor. We think this is like a huge opportunity. There was a guy named John Rascab, who's sort of like the Elon Musk of his era. He actually ran General Motors, created the credit program there, then becomes hugely wealthy, then gets into politics, by the way, ends up building the Empire State Building.

但他试图创建几乎可以说是第一只共同基金。因为他认为人们应该能像他一样参与其中。这就是他的整个想法，而且他公开谈论过。有一篇著名的文章叫《每个人都应该富有》，这是他的口号——每个人都应该富有。

But he was trying to create almost like the first mutual fund Mhmm. Because he thought that people should be able to get in on the action the way he did. That was like his whole conceit and he talked about it pretty openly. There was a famous article called everyone ought to be rich. That was his line, everyone ought to be rich.

那也是一个美国梦发生微妙转变的时期，我认为，从霍雷肖·阿尔杰式的励志故事转向了类似彩票的心态。我们能致富吗？整个资本主义的理念会给我们这个大好机会吗？显然，我们今天仍在接受这种观念。

And it also was a time where sort of the American dream shifted a little bit, I think, from sort of a Horatio Alger story a little bit to like a lottery. Can we get rich? Like, can like, the whole idea of capitalism is gonna give us this great opportunity. And I you know, obviously, we're we're adopting that today.

你认为广播在其中起到了作用吗？因为它放大了这些故事，让它们传播得更快，人们开始讲述这些传说，逐渐忘记了霍雷肖·阿尔杰的部分。我还在试图理解，就像

Do you think that radio played a role in that because it amplified these stories and made them go faster and people would just, like, start to tell these tales and folks started to forget the Horatio Alger part. Like, I'm just still trying to understand. Like

我 你有

I You have

农场里的人们，对吧？他们正在接受教育。工业革命正在进行，所以他们搬到了城市。而当时的广播可能就像现在的Instagram。

you have folks on the farms. Right? They're getting educated. The industrial revolution is happening, so they're moving to the city. And the radio then is maybe what Instagram is like now.

你看到拥有财富的人。你看到自己不曾拥有的财富。你渴望得到它。是的。然后有东西进来填补了这个空缺。

You're seeing people with wealth. You're seeing this wealth that you don't have. You aspire to that. Yes. And then something comes in and fills the void.

这就是那种机制吗？

Is that is that kind of the mechanic?

我认为有东西填补了空缺，突然间你有了机会，因为银行或经纪公司将借给你所有这些钱。而且不仅仅是广播作为通讯工具，实际上是整个媒体。所以，这一时期发生的另一件事是，《时代》杂志创刊于1923年，《福布斯》1917年。突然间，查理·米切尔这些CEO们开始登上杂志封面，就像贝比·鲁斯和查尔斯·林德伯格那样。所以，人们甚至对商业的看法也发生了转变。

I think something fills the void and all of a sudden you now have the opportunity because this the the bank or the brokerage houses are gonna lend you all this money. And it's not just radio being the communication device, it's really the media. So, the other thing that was happening during this period, so Time Magazine starts in 1923, Forbes 1917. All of a sudden, Charlie Mitchell, the CEOs are now on the cover of magazines the way Babe Ruth and Charles Lindbergh had been on the cover. So, sort of the the shift in how people even thought about business.

这些人在二十世纪二十年代之前并不出名，但他们变得家喻户晓，每个人都想成为他们那样的人。

None of these guys were, you know, famous before the nineteen twenties, but they became famous and everybody want everybody wanted to be them.

这正是美国所代表的，就是这种工业化进程。对吧？这有点像在说，嘿，我们正在开创一个全新的世界，这些是引领变革的领袖，这些是改变国家的摇滚巨星。我的意思是，这在当时可是件大事，对吧？

This was what America was about, was this industrialization. Right? And this was kind of like, hey. We're pioneering an entirely new world and these are the leaders doing it and these are the rock stars that are transfer transforming this country. Mean, that kind of a big part of what was going on at the time?

完全正确。而且每个人都想

Totally. And everybody wanted

成为摇滚明星。顺便

to be a rock star. By the

说一句，就像现在大家都想成为你，大卫。人人都想成为查马斯或者埃隆。我觉得当时就有这种强烈的愿望。就像，好吧，现在就有这样一个机会。

way, it's the same way everybody wants to be you, David. Everybody wants to be Chamathe or they all wanna be Elon. Like, I think there was a huge thing. Like, okay. And here's this opportunity.

他们不仅被推销这个机会，还被给予这个机会——不仅仅是投资机会，而且我认为其中的保证金机制才是关键中的关键。

And they were being sold the opportunity and given the opportunity not just to invest, but, again, I think that the margin piece of it was such a crucial crucial element.

安德鲁，你觉得这是巧合吗？你现在在2025年出版这本书，但感觉上是不是诡异般地相似？相似到几乎可以把当时的边界条件一对一映射到今天的某些版本？你是不是觉得

Do you think it's a coincidence, Andrew, that now you're you're publishing this book in 2025, but, like, how does it feel, like, eerily similar to you? Like, way too similar where you can almost map one to one those boundary conditions then in some version of that today? Like, is that is that what

有这种感觉？有一点，但我要说这不是我的本意。当我参与这件事时，我只是想重述这个故事，弄清楚这些人是谁。那次和妻子的疯狂假期后，我最终去了贝克图书馆——当时正好在哈佛演讲，走进去后有些空闲时间，就问图书管理员：我能看看这些档案盒吗？

you feel? Little bit, but not I would say that wasn't my intent. Like, when I got involved in this, I just wanted to retell the story and figure out who these guys were. I I ended up after that crazy vacation with my wife, I ended up going to a Baker Library. I happened to be giving a speech at Harvard and I walk in there and I had some time and I asked the librarian, I said, can I see these boxes?

当时掌管摩根大通的托马斯·拉蒙特这个人。我说，我能看看这些箱子里面吗？结果箱子里，他的秘书保存着他与胡佛和罗斯福的电话记录。就像现在大家可能都在和特朗普或特朗普通话一样。我当时简直惊呆了。

This guy Thomas Lamont who ran JPMorgan at the time. And I said, can I look inside these boxes? And inside the boxes, his secretary is keeping transcripts of his phone calls with Hoover and Roosevelt. Like, by the way, same way, like, everybody's probably talking to Trump or Trump today. And I'm like, oh my god.

我从未见过这个。你看到那些对话记录时，我想，好吧。如果能把这些记录用在真实报道中，然后你就能发现——我不知道其他人物是否也有类似的通话记录留存。哇。

I haven't seen it. And you're seeing the conversation and I thought, okay. If you could use those transcripts in an actual story and then you could figure out, I didn't know if other transcripts existed for all the other characters. Yeah. Wow.

你可以完整重现这整个疯狂的局面。但我一开始并没想着要一比一还原。而且我认为这确实不是完全对应的。

You could recreate this whole crazy situation. Right. But I didn't go into it thinking, okay. This is all one to one. And I don't think it is one to one.

我认为当今体系中有很多杠杆效应，但这是另一种类型的杠杆。我愿意相信现在有了SEC（美国证交会），还有其他监管机制。

I think there's a lot of leverage in the system today, but it's a different kind of leverage. I like to believe that there's now an SEC. There's other regulations.

嗯，可以相信。确实有。保罗干得不错，他在那里。

Well, can believe it. There is one. Paul's doing a good job. He's there.

所以我并不是来告诉你我们明天就要完蛋了。我认为当今经济中可能确实有些现象与那个时期相似，希望这里面能有些经验教训。

So I'm not here to tell you that, like, we're going off a cliff tomorrow. I think there's probably some things that are happening in our economy today that do mirror that period, and I hope there's some lessons in here.

但你觉得...你觉得...

But do you think do you think

过去一百年间实施的金融监管条例——其间经历了数个周期，比如2008年后就曾试图建立新的保护性条款来规范金融市场运作——这些措施真的足以改变现状吗？还是说人性总能找到突破口？泡沫、狂热、这种过度繁荣的时刻总会卷土重来。轻松钱。钱。就像...总会存在某种路径，比如有人会说加密货币，前几年还出现过NFT热潮。

the regulations that have been put in place over the past hundred years, and there have been several cycles, one of which happened after o eight, of trying to create new protective provisions around how we operate in our financial markets, have they actually changed things enough, or does the human element always find its way? It always finds its way to frothiness, to frenzies, to these kind of moments of exuberance. Easy money. Money. And this this, like, will there'll always be a path, you know, whether some people might argue crypto tokens, there was an NFT moment a few years ago.

哪里监管阻力最小，人群就会涌向哪里。

Wherever the regulation kind of path of least resistance is, that's where everyone goes.

完全同意。

Totally.

这永远都是不变的真理。

That's always gonna be the case.

这就是人性啊。我们都渴望更多。记得《华尔街2》里有句经典台词——虽然我觉得续集远不如第一部——迈克尔·道格拉斯对希亚·拉博夫说...

That's the human condition. We all want more. You know, there's that great line in, it's it's it's Wall Street two, where I think, Michael Douglas is to Shia LaBeouf. Thought I the second Wall Street was not as good as the first one, by the way. 100%.

他问了句'你的目标数字是多少？'，对方盯着他说'更多'。

Says says something like, what's your number? And he looks at him and he goes, more.

没错。

Right.

然后，那就是

And and that's

那就是人类。那就是人类。

That's humans. That's humans.

那就是人类。更多的意味着我们都在试图弄清楚如何获得更多。嗯。我认为那就是当时发生的事情。在某种程度上，也是现在正在发生的。

And that's humans. And more means we're all trying to figure out how we're gonna get to more. And Mhmm. I think that that was what was going on then. To some degree, it's what's going on now.

我认为

I think

这始终在发生。从未改变。今天并没有什么独特的时刻。也许有某种技术解锁了这种新闻周期，但

what's always going on. It never changes. It's not like there's some unique moment today. Maybe there's technology that's kind of unlocked this kind of news cycle, but

看，其他部分实际上是我至今仍在努力学习的教训。我觉得人们认为‘投机’这个词像是个贬义词。但事实上，在写完这本书和《大而不倒》之后，花了这么多时间报道这些，你会发现你需要投机。投机是创新的孪生兄弟。现实呢？

Look, the other pieces and it's actually a lesson for me that I still grapple with today. I think people think the word speculation is like a dirty word. And the truth is having now written this book and too big to fail and just spending, you know, all this time reporting on all this, you need speculation. Speculation is the twin of innovation. Reality?

这是把

It's putting

你的资本面临风险。

your capital at risk.

没有所谓的

There is no It's

这不是价格发现，而是风险发现。这是创新最艰难的软肋。我完全同意。

price discovery. It's risk discovery. It is the hard underbelly of innovation. I completely agree.

没有投机就没有创新。埃隆·马斯克当初创建特斯拉时，在所有人看来都疯狂至极，正是因为有早期投资者对他进行了投机。

There is no innovation without some speculation. Elon Musk would not have created Tesla and said somebody speculated on him early when it all seemed totally insane.

没错。而且他自己可能也投机过50个最终夭折的想法。这就是风险投资的本质——你投入的资本并不总是金钱。

No. And, also, he's probably speculated himself in 50 different ideas that never saw the light of day. That's what it means. It's like you're investing risk capital. That capital is not always money.

还包括大量时间成本和声誉风险。你要说服他人共同投入一项投机性事业——这正是硅谷的运作方式。

It's a lot of time. It's time and reputation as well. It's convincing other people to come work on something, and you're doing it speculatively. That's what Silicon Valley does.

到此为止

No more

押注未来。

betting on the come.

那么问题就变成了：如何创造一个既能允许投机行为、又能鼓励它，同时不让其失控的环境？对吧？这就像是个根本性问题。

And so then the question becomes, how do you create an environment where you can have speculation? Not just have it, but encourage it, but not let it get out of control. Right? Like, that is the sort of fundamental question.

最终结果是这样的，安德鲁，当大型基金经理、大银行或某些暗池资本亏损时，没人会在意。但当波及消费者、影响到个人时，就会引发保护浪潮。仿佛我们必须保护这个体系，必须保护消费者，因为他们总是被剥削的一方。这样说公平吗？如果你回顾2008年后的情况...

What ends up happening, Andrew, is like no one gives a when a big fund manager or a big bank or some kind of dark pool of capital loses loses money. But when it hits the consumer, when it hits the individual, then there's this rush to protection. It's like we need to protect the system, we need to kind of protect the consumer because they're always the ones that get taken advantage of. Is that kind of fair? And if as you look at what happened coming out of A 100%.

2008年之后。

Out of o eight.

没错。你看，这两方面都可以考量。顺便说，我认为现在正在处理的合格投资者规则是个有趣的案例。对吧？

Yeah. Look. You can look at both of those things. You could look at by the way, I think an interesting one because we're now dealing with it now is the accredited investor rule. So Right.

要知道，这个规则其实可以追溯到1930年代末或1940年。当时的理念是只让富人有机会投资私营企业，因为他们才是我们认为应该准备好承担损失的人，我们不想让普通民众亏钱。而现在到了2025年，很多人都在说：我也要这种机会。记得几年前我和查马斯可能讨论过这个话题——

You know, by the way, that really goes back to '19 late nineteen thirties or 1940. You know, the idea was we only wanted the wealthy to be able to have opportunities to invest in private companies because they were the only ones that we thought should be prepared to lose the money and we didn't want the little guy to lose the money. Here we are now in, you know, 2025 and there's a lot of folks saying, you know, I want I want the access. I want the opportunity. And, you know, sometimes, like, I remember Chamath, you and I probably talked about this years ago.

我记得当时讨论GameStop这类公司时警告过人们'伙计们要小心，可能会出问题'。我对SPAC之类也表达过类似担忧。但人们的反应是：'索金，别说了，你这不是在保护我。'

I remember I'd either talk about, like, GameStop or some of these other companies and tell people, you know, oh, you gotta be careful, guys. This could go wrong. I said that a little bit about spacky stuff and some other things. And people were like, Sorkin, stop it. You're not protecting me.

你在保护那个人。你在保护那个人。这某种程度上是一种

You're protecting the man. You're protecting the man. And it was sort of a

监管俘获。没错。

Regulatory capture. Yeah.

这是个非常有趣的概念。总之，我还没想出一个简洁的答案，但我确实经常思考这个问题。

It's a very interesting concept. So, anyway, I haven't come up with a, you know, a neat answer about that, but I do think about it a lot.

说到你的观点，我认为1940年法案确实是非常复杂的立法，因为快进到今天，我们仍在试图解套，就像把方钉塞进圆孔。整个加密经济都在围绕40法案扭曲变形。这些BDC如此，私募信贷也是如此。

Well, to your point, I think the the forties act, 1940 act, I think it was it's been a very complicated piece of legislation because if you fast forward to today, we're still trying to unwind and fit a square peg into a round hole, if you will. The entire crypto economy contorts itself around the 40 act. Right. All these BDCs contort itself. Private credit contorts itself.

为什么呢？因为目前我们缺乏监管意愿来彻底推翻和替换这些真正过时的立法。

And why? And, well, right now, we don't have the regulatory will to just go and have a wholesale rip and replace of what is really old legislation.

我认为

I think

斯科特 你想谈谈

Scott You wanna talk about

贾马尔，你能简单描述一下《40年代法案》吗？比如里面包含哪些内容？

the Jamal, do you wanna just describe the forties act? Like, what's in it?

嗯，这个法案本质上是为了试图界定什么是证券、允许交易什么、哪些企业可以上市而制定的。在当时的经济认知背景下，这一切都说得通。那时对商品、证券和允许事项的划分相当明确。问题是，正如我们所见，2025年的企业形态过于动态化，根本无法映射到八十年前那些僵化的定义上。更大的问题是，当你试图重写这些规则时，立法意愿不足——正如安德鲁反复强调的，人们对潜在风险的恐惧阻碍了那些我认为可能正确的改革。我认为这会产生非常深远的后果。

Well, it it was basically written as a way to sort of try to delineate what is a security, what is allowed to be traded, what kind of businesses can be public, And at the time, with the understanding that they had of the economy, it all made sense. There was a pretty bright line of here's a commodity, here's a security, and here's what is allowed. The problem is, as we've seen, is that businesses today in 2025 are way too dynamic, and they don't map to the brittle definitions of eighty years ago. The problem is that when you try to go and rewrite those rules, there isn't the legislative will because what Andrew says comes up over and over again, which is the fear of what could go wrong stops people from doing what I think could go right. And that has pretty profound consequences, I think.

某种程度上，当你审视全球金融危机时，可以追溯到1940年代和《40法案》时期人们对监管的反应。储蓄贷款危机是另一个完全没必要发生却发生的例子，因为我们试图以僵化的方式扭曲自身来扩张经济。安德鲁，我想问你一个问题：如果我们回到29年——现在我们已经很清楚背景了——你能解释下主要人物吗？

I think in part, when you look at what happened in GFC, you can pull the string back to to the nineteen forties and the 40 act and people's reaction to to regulations. The savings and loan crisis, that's another one that was absolutely unnecessary but happened because we tried to contort ourselves to expand the economy in ways that were brittle. Andrew, I wanna ask you a question, which is if we go back to the twenty ninth, so we we have a good sense of the the setup. Yeah. Can you explain the big characters and Right.

他们是谁？各自扮演什么角色？

Who they were and the roles that they were playing?

好的。书中有一大堆角色，但我觉得推动故事主线的主要有两个。一个是查理·米切尔，国家城市银行的掌舵人。就知名度而言，他相当于那个时代的杰米·戴蒙——实际上可能更像迈克尔·米尔肯，因为他确实为公众开发了某种信贷形式。

Okay. So, there's there's there's two there's a whole bunch of characters, but I'd say there's two main characters in this book that really drive the storyline. One is Charlie Mitchell, this fellow who runs National City. He is the Jamie Dimon of his time in terms of fame. He might actually be more like Michael Milken because he he really does develop sort of credit for the public.

迈克尔当然也...没错。他们曾称呼查理为'阳光查理'，他当时还是纽约联储的董事。有趣的是，在整个事件中他不断呼吁降低利率。他不仅向投机者和股东放贷，还向全国各地的经纪行提供资金。而华盛顿这边的故事主角，你们可能听说过，叫卡特·格拉斯。

Michael, course, did it Yeah. But he they used to call him Sunshine Charlie and he was on the board of the New York Fed. He was constantly calling for lower interest rates interestingly during all of this. And he was the guy who was not just loaning to speculators and stockholders, he was also loaning money to different brokerage houses across the country. On the other side of the story in Washington is a guy who you probably heard of or know named Carter Glass.

对。卡特·格拉斯相当于他那个时代的伊丽莎白·沃伦，甚至可能是AOC（亚历山德里娅·奥卡西奥-科尔特斯）。

Yeah. Carter Glass was the Elizabeth Warren of his time or maybe even AOC.

AOC。是的。

AOC. Yeah.

顺便说一句，他就像是个种族主义的伊丽莎白·沃伦，考虑到当时那里发生的怪事，这很有趣。总之，他会多年来抨击他所谓的'米切尔主义'。他认为查理·米切尔及其所作所为将从根本上颠覆经济。随着故事发展，他们某种程度上形成了对立。查理做的一件事是公然反抗——或者说至少在某个节点看似反抗——美联储，后者正试图遏制投机行为。

And he would by the way, he was like a a racist Elizabeth Warren, interestingly, given the weird things going on down there at the time. Anyway, he would rail for years about this thing that he described as Mitchellism. He believed that Charlie Mitchell and what Charlie Mitchell was doing was gonna upend the economy effectively. And as the story plays out, they are sort of pitted against each other. One of the things that Charlie does is he defies or at least appears at one point to defy the Federal Reserve, which is trying to clamp down on speculation.

他们没有试图提高利率，而是奇怪地向所有银行发信说：请停止向投机者放贷。银行根本不明白这是什么意思，于是基本上停止向所有人放贷。而查理表示：我们不吃这套，我们要自己开始放贷。

They don't try to raise interest rates. What they weirdly do is they send a letter to all the banks saying, please stop lending to speculators. And the banks don't know what that even means, so they stop lending basically to everybody. And Charlie says, we're not gonna have that. So we're gonna start lending ourselves.

这引发了全新的局面，最终导致他站在国会面前。我不想剧透，但后来他确实因为某些疯狂举动在自己家门口的台阶上被捕。这两个人扮演了重要角色，接着你会看到《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》是如何诞生的——顺便说这很惊人，因为它完全不是你想象的那样。几乎与出于政治原因拆分银行无关（虽然我不想说完全无关），实际上关乎商业利益。意思是说，像大通银行经营者和洛克菲勒家族这些人在幕后动用大银行资金和游说手段，故意整垮摩根大通。

And that sort of creates this whole other dynamic which leads him to end up being in front of Congress. And I don't wanna give away the story, but he does get arrested on the steps of his own home for doing some crazy things later in the story. But those two sort of play a big role and then you get to see how Glass Stibo came about, which by the way is shocking because it is not what you would think at all. It almost has nothing to do I don't wanna say it has nothing to do with breaking the banks apart for like political reasons, but it actually has to do with business reasons. Meaning, was, like, some major bank money and lobbying going on behind the scenes to f over JPMorgan by the guys who are running Chase and the Rockefellers.

所以这很疯狂。整个故事都很疯狂。

So it's it's wild. The story is wild.

我是说...好吧。简单总结一下，《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》，我理解的是，汤米，它基本上将商业银行和投资银行分离。

I mean, there's Okay. So just a summary, but the Glass Steagall, I think, I understand it, but Tommy, basically separates commercial banks and investment banks.

将商业银行与投资银行分离。

Separate separates commercial banks and investment banks.

然后基本上就建立了FDIC（联邦存款保险公司）。

And then sets up the FDIC, basically.

建立了FDIC。没错。当你了解这一切如何拼凑起来时，FDIC这部分，它背后的故事就像是这些法律的...

Sets up the FDIC. Right. Again, when you see how that all came together, the FDIC piece of it, it the the backstory of, like, these laws So

这与其说是源于消费者保护，不如说是游说试图基本上边缘化那个800磅的大猩猩。

it's not it's not coming from consumer protection as much as you're saying lobbying to try to basically, like, marginalize the 800 pound gorilla.

完全正确。完全正确。你会看到的。你将亲眼见证这些人走进白宫，恳求罗斯福这样做。而卡特·格拉斯实际上对此很不满。

Exactly. Exactly. And and you'll see it. You will be in the room with these people literally going in there, sitting in the White House, begging Roosevelt to do this. And and by the Carter Glass is actually unhappy about it.

我找到的信件显示卡特·格拉斯说：'这个法案正在从我手中被夺走，基本上被银行家接管了'，这几乎有点可笑，因为伊丽莎白·沃伦喜欢把这个法案当作某种万能药来引用。

I found letters where Carter Glass is like, this bill is getting taken away from me and is basically being taken over by the bankers, which is almost hilarious because Elizabeth Warren loves to cite this bill as sort of some panacea.

安德鲁，回到现代，观察当前市场时——我不想简单地问你是否看到相似之处——但我们是否处于...我最近常听你提出这个问题，我们是否处于货币泡沫？通胀泡沫？投机泡沫？还是根本没有泡沫？

Andrew, as you look at markets today, just to come back to the modern era, I don't wanna ask you the the simple, like, draw the parallels, but are are we in and and I've heard you ask this question a lot lately, like, are we in a monetary bubble? Are we in an inflationary bubble? Are we in a speculative bubble? Are we in no bubble?

所以我假设我们处于某种泡沫中，只是不知道它何时会破裂。顺便说一句，也不知道破裂的程度会有多大。不一定是1929年那种，可能是1999年，也可能是2008年2月。

So I'm assuming we're in some bubble, and we just don't know when it's gonna pop of some sort. And by the way, don't know how big it's gonna pop either. You don't it doesn't have to be 1929. It could be 1999. It could be 02/2008.

可能比那还要小。我我不确定。我在想是否存在杠杆——我是说，你们讨论的当前这股AI投资热潮。大部分情况下，大企业都在投入真金白银，所以这不是杠杆操作。但看看许多房地产投资、能源投资这类边缘领域，那里确实存在大量杠杆。

It could be smaller than that. I I don't know. Do I think that there's lever I mean, you guys talk about this AI investment phenomenon that's taking place right now. And for the most part, the big corporations are spending real cash, so it's not that's not levered. But you look at a lot of the real estate plays, the energy plays that sort of on the periphery of this, there's a lot of leverage there.

我认为在私人信贷领域，我们目前并不真正清楚所有杠杆藏在哪里。现在，我不认为这些杠杆程度能达到我们讨论的1929年那种10:1的情况，或者甚至2008年次贷危机的水平。但我不确定，当你开始审视某些交易——比如英伟达与OpenAI的合作或AMD的交易——会发现其中存在某种循环性。目前我们可能距离问题爆发还有数年时间。而且话说回来，最终也可能平稳落地。

I think the credit the private credit world, we don't really know where all the leverage lies right now. Now, I don't think that any of that is as leveraged as what we were talking about this like 10 to one situation in 1929 or maybe or even like the subprime situation in 02/2008. But I don't know, at some point, you start to look at some of these, you know, like the NVIDIA OpenAI deal or the AMD deal and there is a little bit of a circular kind of thing going on there for now. And I just don't know where but that could be we could still be years we could still be years away from this. And by the way, it could work out on the other end.

但政府货币财政问题呢？央行货币政策——哦，利率问题，还有当前政府支出的财政问题。如果美元贬值，最终会导致股市指数上涨吗？毕竟我们看到金价涨到每盎司4000美元，美元指数跌至多年来最低水平。这是否意味着因为美元贬值而推高股市？

But what about like government monetary fiscal issues? So central bank monetary policy Oh, interest rates and then the fiscal issue, the government spending right now, ultimately, if you have a devaluation of the dollar, we're seeing gold at $4,000 an ounce. We're seeing the dollar basket trade down. I think one of the worst years we've ever seen this year. Does that ultimately translate into a higher index on the stock market because the dollar is worth less?

我是说，这实际上是否更应该归类为货币或财政问题？

I mean, should you know, could this actually be more of a monetary or fiscal kind of problem

痒。

Itch.

而非投机性质的问题？

Than it is a speculative kind of problem?

按常理确实应该如此，但现实却难以解释。是的，传统经典经济学家会说这些现象本不该同时发生——看看股票价格、黄金价格，还有当前美国国债收益率。按照经典理论，这些指标本不该呈现现在这样的联动关系。所以我实在无法断言。我本以为投资者如今会因各种理由要求更高的债券溢价，但他们并没有。

Well, so you would think it would be, but then explained and so, yes, I think like the traditional the classic economists would say this you know, these things should not be happening at the same time. Meaning, look at the price of equities, at the price of gold, look at the price of, you know, US treasuries right now. It doesn't at least classically, it shouldn't shouldn't line up the way it's lining up right now. So, I I just don't know. I would have thought that the investor class would have wanted to charge us a higher premium for our bonds these days for a whole bunch of reasons, but they don't.

也许这就是生活的相对性，其他国家的情况不如我们，所以我们依然是舞会上最靓的姑娘。

Maybe that's just like life is relative and other countries are, you know, not doing as well, and so we're still the the prettiest girl of the dance.

我认为完全正确。

I think that's exactly right.

但我们从未见过像今天这样大规模的资本印刷。我是说，在和平时期经济扩张的情况下，债务占GDP的7%，这是前所未有的。

But we've never seen so much capital so so much, printing happening as we see today. I mean, the 7% debt to GDP in peacetime with an expanding economy, Never seen that before.

确实。但如果是这样，你会以为我们都会把钱投入比特币或黄金，但我们没有。为什么呢？我也不知道。

Totally. But then if that's the case, you'd think that we'd all have our money in Bitcoin and or gold, but but we don't. Why is that? I don't know.

你是怎么投资的？有人问过你这个问题吗？

How do you invest? Anyone ever ask you that?

大多数人不会问我这个问题，事实上我不能投资个股。鉴于我的职业性质，这是权利的一部分。

Most people don't ask me that and the truth is I'm not allowed to invest in individual stocks. It's actually given what I do for a living, that's part of the Right. Part of the Part

的交易？

of deal?

我必须居住的修道院的一部分。

Part of the the nunnery that I have to live in.

你是

You're the

我在做多指数。我在做多

I'm long the index. Am long

比特币？比特币黄金？

Bitcoin? Bitcoin Gold?

我在做多指数，不。顺便说一句，我希望我能。我思考了很多很多年，现在可能已经改变，但年复一年，我总是——我想查马斯和我讨论过这个——我一直担心购买比特币，因为我不知道，我不想出现在电视或报纸上。

I'm I'm long the indexes and no. I I I by the way, I wish I could. I thought for many many years, it's probably shifted now, But for years upon years, I was always I think Chamath and I have talked about this. I was always worried about buying Bitcoin because I didn't know I I didn't wanna be on TV or in the papers.

我会这么做。我上了CNBC。我知道。我知道。知道。

I I would do it. I came on CNBC. I know. I I know. Know.

我会坐在那里。一枚硬币，200美元。索金会给我看查理·芒格说它是老鼠药的片段。然后他会问，汤姆，你怎么看？我说，我对查理和沃伦怀有极大的敬意，但他们错了。

And I would sit there. A coin, $200. Sorkin would show me a clip of Charlie Munger telling me that it was rat poison. And he would say, Tom, what do you think? And I said, I have tremendous respect for Charlie and Warren, but they're wrong.

我既怀念又悲伤地记得那些时刻，因为我本该听从的。我本该听从的。

I remember those moments fondly and sadly because I should've I should've listened. I should've listened.

不过没关系。看来你的投资组合非常均衡，相当中规中矩。

But so okay. So you have a very balanced kind of portfolio, pretty vanilla down the middle.

超级保守派。但我不会买指数基金。可惜我发不了财。你还记得身为

Super vanilla. But I'm not gonna get index funds. I'm not gonna get rich, unfortunately. Do you remind being

记者身份是否限制了你接触市场？我的意思是，你似乎对市场动态很敏锐，但真正关键的是把握市场参与者的动向对吧。而你却无法采取行动。

a journalist that restricts you from access to the markets? I mean, you you seem to have a good pulse on what's going on, but really what matters in markets is having a pulse on what the actors in the markets are doing Right. And you're not able to to act on it.

我对此心存疑虑。你觉得呢？

I have misgivings about it. How about that?

你就是你节目里的那个角色

You're you're you're the character in your show

是啊。

Yeah.

那种情况就是你掌握了所有内幕消息，却对此无能为力。

That acts where you have all the inside info, but you can't do anything about it.

无能为力。是的，没错。但这就是重点。我明白。

Can't do anything about it. Yeah. Exactly. But that's the point. I get it.

我知道这就是我当初选择的路，所以我...我完全接受。

I I knew that's what I was signing up for, so I'm I'm I'm cool with it.

我是说，你喜欢当记者吗？你喜欢作为旁观者或观察者，而不是参与者吗？你有没有想过，比如，我真的懂市场，真的理解历史的相似性，我对这些很有把握。

Mean, do you like do you like being a journalist? I mean, do you like sitting as a speculator or an observer versus being an actor? I mean, have you ever thought, like, man, I really understand markets. I really understand the parallels to history. I've got a good sense of this.

我觉得我应该扮演一个角色。我想参与其中。我能赚钱。我经常这么想。

I I feel like I should play a role. I wanna play a role. I can make money. I think about that.

这个想法我想了很多年。嗯，完全就是，你知道，我能成为参与者吗？我能发挥作用吗？我经常回到这个念头，也许——可能这种想法不对——但我觉得通过这种方式，我好歹在部分人眼中保持了可信度，也希望能成为对话中有益的一部分，参与了很多事情。或许我也可以直接作为参与者做到这些。

I've I've thought about that for years Uh-huh. Totally about, you know, could I could I be an actor? Could I play a role? And I often go back to the idea and maybe look, maybe this is not the right way to think about it, but I feel like I've managed to have hopefully some semblance of credibility with some people by doing it this way and I'm and I've been able to be hopefully a good part of a conversation and be engaged in a lot of things. Maybe I could do that as as as a sort of a direct actor too.

我不知道。另外我觉得新闻业正在变化。传统主流媒体。我是说，顺便提一句，现在有很多...

I don't know. I also think by the way, journalism seems to be changing. MSM legacy media. Mean, by the way, there's lot of

现在人们开始做播客，

people now start a podcast,

而你

and you

可以做任何你想做的事。所以

could just do whatever you wanna do. So

我不知道。我不知道正确答案是什么。

I don't know. I don't know what the right answer is.

告诉我们今天剧中的角色是谁？演员有哪些？你看到的主要演员是谁？

Tell us who are the characters in the play today? Who are who are the actors? Who are the main actors that you see in

这是个好问题。

That's good question.

是的，主要演员。嗯，我觉得你可能要从几个不同角度来考虑他们。你可以从财务方面、技术方面以及两者交汇处来思考。所以我认为很明显还有政府部分。

Yeah. The main actors. Well, I think you'd probably think about them in a couple different ways. You sort of think about them on the financial side and probably the tech side and where they sort of come together. So I think obviously and then the government piece.

所以，显然，总统、斯科特、霍华德在政府内部负责商业事务。然后，我认为在传统银行业，你可能会说杰米·戴蒙和拉里·芬克可能是最有权势的玩家，但你也会提到布莱恩·阿姆斯特朗。在Coinbase，他可以说是加密货币领域的元老之一。顺便说一句，我要向弗拉德·特涅夫致敬，我认为他在推动金融民主化方面非常直言不讳。他代表了这一点。

So, obviously, the president, Scott, Howard on on the sort of business end of things inside the inside the government. And then, I think in the banking or classic banking world, you'd say that probably Jamie Dimon and Larry Fink are probably the most sort of powerful players in the sort of traditional legacy piece, but then you'd probably give a nod to Brian Armstrong. At Coinbase, he's sort of being one of the sort of OGs in sort of wherever you think crypto goes. By the way, I'd pay hats off to Vlad Tenev who I think has been sort of very outspoken sort of talk about democratizing finance. Like, he sort of represents that.

但然后你告诉我。我是说，我认为萨姆·奥特曼和埃隆，无论你认为AI接下来会走向何方，还有谷歌的那些人。

But then you tell me. I mean, I think Sam Altman and Elon and wherever you think AI is headed next and and the Google guys.

但这很有趣，因为你在说技术，特别是AI，正在发挥关键作用。是的，从根本上来说，似乎是这样。

But it's interesting because you're playing you're saying that technology, particularly AI, is playing a key role in Yes. Fundamentally. It seems like

是的。你认为这是真的吗？

it is. You think you think that's true?

嗯，我问是因为你也在说，通过银行流动的资本，还有一系列其他行业，它们创造了数万亿美元的收入，但在关于经济、全球经济走向、市场走向的讨论中，这些似乎被很大程度上忽略了。现在全是关于AI的，对吧？我是说，我认为这是因为如果你……我想问题是，这是媒体炒作还是真实的经济现象？

Well, I'm asking because you you also I mean, the the capital that's moving through banks, there's a there's a whole another set of industries that generate trillions of dollars of revenue that seem to be largely ignored in the conversation about where the economy, where the global economy is, where it's headed, where markets are headed. It's all about AI, right? I mean, and I I think that's like But that's because if you And and I guess the question is like, is that a media thing or is that like a real economy thing?

我认为这是真实的经济现象，因为我认为如果你排除掉‘七大巨头’，突然间，经济看起来就不一样了。我是说，我不想说我们在飘浮，但你知道，我们要么在……

I think it's a real economy thing because I think if you if you x out the Mag seven Yeah. All of a sudden, the economy does not look nearly the same. Right? It I mean, I don't wanna say we're levitating, but, you know, we're either in

我昨天看到一个数据点，说季度GDP在排除数据中心支出后是持平的。你觉得这听起来对吗？你看到了吗？

I saw I saw a data point yesterday that said the GDP quarterly GDP was, like, flat excluding data center spending. Does that sound right to you? Did you see that?

这绝对是GDP的100到200个基点。

It's definitely a 100 to 200 basis points of GDP.

是的。所以确实如此。假设我们排除AI热潮的影响，你知道，经济实际状况如何？我认为这是个非常现实的问题。我觉得没人关注其他经济领域的原因首先是AI故事更吸引人，但正是这部分我认为——不想说是支撑经济——而是维持着经济运转。

Yeah. So sure. So let's so let's say if you if you x out if you x out the AI boom, where, you know, where do you really stand? I think that's a real real live question. I think the reason why no one's focused on the rest of the economy first of all, the AI story, I think, the more exciting part, but it is what I think is I don't wanna say propping up the economy, but it's keeping the economy

我会换个角度看。我觉得这类比较有些愚蠢，因为在经济的每个阶段都存在资源和资产的动态重新配置。不同时期有不同重点。AI的关键在于，每家公司都在思考如何在AI世界中定位自己？如果它们不投入时间，其生产力很可能会被边际上更高效的新公司所取代。

Well, I would I would flip it on its ear. I don't I think that those comparisons are kind of dumb because at every point in the economy, there are these dynamic reallocation of resources and assets. Things are important at different times. I think the thing with the AI thing is, like, what is every company doing to figure out what they look like in a world of AI? And if they're not gonna spend that amount of time, their productivity is probably going to, on the margin, shrink to a net new company that just does what they do just efficiently and better.

这只是我们在每个重大技术变革时期都见证过的创造性破坏周期。

That's just the cycle of creative destruction we've seen at every point of every meaningful technology.

你认为我们需要在科技和数据中心投资之外更多地讨论这个问题吗？

You think we need to be talking about this much more outside of the sort of, like, tech and data centers and that investment?

是的。我发表过这个观点。所有私募股权大佬的妻子都让丈夫在评论区攻击我。我说过，我创办的软件公司最失败的销售就是面向私募机构的。财富500强和1000强客户都排着队合作。

Yeah. I made this comment. All the private equity wives got their husbands to come in and rail at me in the comments. And I said, you know, the least success I've had at the software company I started has been selling into private equity. It's like I have Fortune 500 and Fortune 1,000 customers lining out the door.

我却连一家私募公司都卖不进去——这可是用AI重写所有软件的颠覆性平台。我觉得它们本应是最积极的客户。这反映出他们完全固步自封。我认为这不是技术决策问题，而是心理障碍。AI的奇特之处就在于它触发了人们的心理不安全感。

I couldn't sell to one single private equity company what is effectively a platform that uses AI to rewrite all your software. And I'm like, but this is the first company that should be in line. And what it goes to is that their heads are firmly in the sand. And I think that's not a a decision on technology, it's a psychological decision. So I think the weird thing with AI is that it pushes people to a place of psychological insecurity.

我认为他们的想法是，我不希望这成为我的问题。我需要等待，将来会有别人来处理。这与互联网泡沫等其他技术发展轨迹截然不同。我们经历的不是那样。在社交或移动泡沫时期，人们总是说，好吧。

And I think that they think, I don't want this to be my problem. I need to just wait this out, and somebody else will deal with it in the future. That's very different than other technology arcs like, you know, in the .com bubble. That's not what we live through. In the social bubble or the mobile bubble, It was always like, okay.

这看起来很有趣。让我们想办法接纳它，利用它。而这次很多人却说，不。我只是在开玩笑。不。

This seems interesting. Let's figure out how to embrace it, take advantage of it. This is the one where many people are like, nope. I'm just kidding. No.

好的。但问题是，1932年到来时，我们国家的失业率达到了25%。

Alright. But here's the question. So, you know, 1932 comes around and we had unemployment in this country of 25%.

25%。是的。

25%. Yeah.

确实很疯狂。

Okay. It was pretty crazy.

是啊。

Yeah.

如果AI繁荣如我们期待的那样成功，以各种方式影响每个行业，以及我们在此讨论的所有事情，那么必须要有巨大的生产力提升，非常巨大，近乎疯狂。而生产力提升往往意味着以其他方式削减成本。这最终很可能会对我国的失业率产生影响。要么做更多事情，要么做不同的事情。

If the AI boom is as successful as I think we're all excited it could be and it affects every industry in every way and all the things we're we're discussing here, there need to be massive productivity gains, like massive, like crazy. And invariably, productivity gains are sort of a euphemism for cutting costs in some other way. And that ultimately probably is gonna have an impact on unemployment in this country. And the quest things. Or do more things.

问题是，究竟是哪一种情况？或者，顺便问一下，是否两者兼而有之？我可能会倾向于...

And the question is which one is it? Or by the way, is it a combination of both? I would I would probably

组合方案。你提升高素质人才的地位，让他们少做苦差事，允许他们专注于更重要的事务。举个例子，我妻子经营一家生命科学企业，有趣的是她看待AI的态度——她说这些技术都在试图向我推销速度。而她表示，我不需要速度。

combo. You high grade people so that they spend less time doing drudgery, and you allow them to work on more important things. Like, I'll give you an example. My wife runs a life sciences business, and what's funny is when she looks at AI, she's like, all of this stuff is trying to sell me speed. And she's like, I don't want speed.

我要的是质量。她说，我不是要明天就制造500种分子，而是要找到针对特定疾病的正确分子，哪怕花上五六年时间也心甘情愿。目前我认为AI还处于新奇玩具阶段，多数应用追求速度，花大价钱只为更快产出劣质成果。最终我们会转向高质量成果，但那需要更多时间。

I want quality. She's like, I'm not trying to make 500 molecules tomorrow. I'm trying to make the right molecule for the right disease, and I'm happy to take five or six years to do it. And right now, I think we're still in the novelty slopware phase of AI where most of it is about speed, and, you know, you're spending a lot of money to try to get crappy outcomes out faster. Eventually, we'll replace that with quality outcomes, and they'll take a lot more time.

我认为这才是真正提升生产力的时刻。回到生命科学领域，这些人想为每个人研发药物。但这绝非朝夕之功，不是输入英文指令就能瞬间从另一端蹦出成果的事情。

And I think that that's when you'll have the real productivity improvements. Back to life sciences, like, these guys wanna get drugs for every person. Right? That's not a tomorrow thing. That's not like type it in in English and all of a sudden pops out the other end.

因此我认为我们必须投入更多时间。当技术发展到那个阶段，才会真正显现价值，那将非常令人振奋。

And so I think we're gonna have to take a lot more time. That's when this stuff becomes really real, and that's gonna be very exciting.

安德鲁，我们是否看到1929年经济大萧条后，美国出现了明显的社会主义倾向？人们说资本主义让我们失望了。你如何看待当今社会主义思潮的兴起，以及认为资本主义辜负了大多数美国人的论点？

Andrew, did we see coming out of the crash of nineteen twenty nine a big move towards socialism in this country saying, hey. Capitalism has failed us. And, you know, how do you kind of speak to the rise of socialism today and the argument that capitalism has failed most Americans?

嗯，确实如此。

Well, yes.

抱歉。再补充一个问题，你认为如果没有1929年的经济崩溃，新政还会是同样的面貌吗？甚至会有新政出台吗？

Sorry. And to add on to that, do you think the New Deal would have looked the same, or would there have even been a New Deal if there hadn't been a crash in '29?

好的。快速回答两点。是的，当时确实有过这样的讨论，但远不如2008年金融危机后那么迅速。我记得当时在祖科蒂公园。

Okay. So two quick answers. Yes. That conversation happened, but not nearly as quickly as it happened, for example, after GFC of two thousand eight. So I remember being down at, like, Zuccotti Park.

华尔街占领华尔街运动，我们现在关于社会主义与资本主义的所有讨论，那些是立刻发生的。而在1929年，这种讨论并未立即出现。部分原因是当时经济乃至市场都处于缓慢衰退状态，经济与市场之间存在脱节。人们忘了在29年，股市实际只下跌了17%。

Wall Street Occupy Wall Street, all of this conversation we're having now about socialism versus capitalism, like that happened immediately. In 1929, that conversation did not happen immediately. Part of the reason it didn't happen is because there was sort of like a slow roll on the economy and even the market. So there was sort of disconnect between the economy and the market. People forget at the '29, the stock market actually was down only 17% by the end.

嗯。所以人们以为市场会回升。确实有过看似复苏的时期。胡佛认为这更像是心理问题，认为市场与经济是分离的。之后他开始犯下一系列错误。

Mhmm. And so people thought it was actually gonna come back. There were times when it actually seemed to be coming back in. And Hoover had this idea that he could it was almost like a psychological problem and that the market and the economy were detached from each other. He then starts making all of these sort of frankly mistakes.

显然，美联储没有向系统注资。胡佛决定增税，通过斯姆特-霍利关税法案。这是他为了争取农民选票承诺的政策，他认为必须兑现承诺。于是出台了一整套政策。

Obviously, the Fed doesn't, flood the system. Hoover decides he wants to raise taxes. He does Smoot Hawley with tariffs. That's something he had pledged to do to try to get farmers to actually vote for him, and he thought that was like a pledge that he had to keep. And so there's a whole sort of set of policies that came into play.

胡佛村这种帐篷营地直到1932年才真正出现。回顾罗斯福胜选原因，其实与经济无关。根据民调，关键是禁酒令问题。

And the Hoovervilles don't show up in these sort of like tented camps sort of things Zuccotti Park. That doesn't happen really till 1932. Mhmm. And when you go back and look at why Roosevelt won, it wasn't actually on the economy. If you go and look at the polls, it was over prohibition.

说来奇怪，当时并未产生那种社会效应。不过众所周知，罗斯福在就职演说中公开谴责银行家。随后新政关闭银行，相当于全国性假日，9000家银行倒闭。

Crazily enough. And so it didn't have that sort of social effect. Having said that, you know, famously, Roosevelt, you know, on his inauguration day goes after the bankers in the inaugural address. And then, of course, the New Deal shuts down the banks, has what was equivalent of national holiday. 9000 banks go out of business.

没错。然后关于资本主义和社会主义的讨论就开始冒头了。

Right. And and then that's sort of when the conversation about capitalism and socialism starts to rear its head.

我认为这是因为在美国历史的那个阶段，我们尚未向普通美国人承诺他们有权或有机会购买房屋、获得大学教育、每年收入递增。正如你指出的，大多数人正从农业经济向工业经济转型，生活中的重大转变曾是：哇，我可以租公寓了。我不必每天在田间劳作12小时从事繁重的体力劳动。我可以真正地生活，步行去杂货店买美味的食物，与人交往，住在这座美妙的城市里。那是在我们做出所有这些承诺之前，我认为正是这些承诺导致了人们最终感到失望的期望，并将一切归咎于资本主义的失败。

I think it's because at that point in American history, we had not yet made the promise to the average American that they have the right or the opportunity to buy a home, to get a college education, to have progressive income every year. As you point out, most folks were transitioning from an agrarian to an industrial economy, and so the big transition in life had been, wow, I can get an apartment. I don't have to work twelve hours a day, grueling physical labor in the fields. I can actually live and walk to a grocery store and get amazing food and meet people and socialize and live in this amazing city. And it was before we had made all of these promises that I think led to these expectations that folks then end up feeling disappointed by, and they blame it all on the failure of capitalism.

我个人观点，如你所知，根本上是政府过度支出和过度承诺的结果，而非让自然市场力量带动所有人进步，我认为这从根本上制造并持续制造了许多不信任和我们面临的问题。

My personal opinion, as you know, is that it's fundamentally a function of overspending by the government and overpromising rather than allowing natural market forces to bring everyone up, which fundamentally I think created and creates a lot of the the the distrust and the the issues we've

除此之外？因为，你知道，你描述的是我常想到的那种《反斗小宝贝》式的美国梦，人们心中那种更像是五十年代风格的梦想，实际上我认为那是二战后特殊时期的产物——当时美国是垄断强国，其他国家都处于困境。这也是工会能够运作的重要原因，很大程度上是因为有一段时间我们是唯一的玩家，所以我们可以对很多东西收取垄断租金，人们可以用白栅栏买房子，养两个孩子，拥有优势。所有这些我们现在称之为梦想的东西。我...你看。

faced on top of that? Because, you know, you're describing what I always think of as sort of the leave it to beaver American dream that people sort of have in their mind, which is really more of like a nineteen fifties style dream and actually was a function I think of a post World War situation where where the where the country was a we were monopoly power, everybody else was out of business. This is also the time like the reason why unions even worked, I would argue for in large part was because there was this period of time where we were the only players in town, so we could we could charge monopoly rents for a lot of things and people could buy a house with a white fence and have two kids and and have an edge. All of those things that we now say are the dream. I'm I'm look.

有些人认为那是历史上的反常现象。我希望不是，但我想说的是，有很多力量共同塑造了那个梦想，但我不认为那是1929年的梦想。

There's some people who think that was an aberration in history. I hope it wasn't, but I'm saying there were a lot of forces at play that created that dream, but I don't think that was the dream in 1929.

是的。你认同雷·达里奥的观点吗？他认为我们正处于一个帝国的末期，一个周期的终点。

Yeah. Do you buy into Ray Ray Dalio's points of view that we're at the end of an empire, end of a cycle?

我希望不是。我希望不是。你看...我认为你看看现在发生的很多事情，尤其是我们的债务水平。我某种程度上认同尼尔·弗格森的世界观，这可能与达里奥的观点相当一致，即当你观察GDP时，开始看国防开支占GDP的比例，至少在历史上存在一个临界点，超过这个点就会出现真正的问题，这往往标志着帝国的终结。

I hope we're not. I hope we're not. You you look. I I think you look at a lot of the things going on right now just with how much debt we have. I I sort of look at the Neil Ferguson view of the world, which maybe lines up pretty directly with with Dalia, which is that when you get, you know, GDP, you start to look at like defense spending as a percentage of GDP, there is this point at which at least historically you have like a real problem, and that sort of has set it created the end of the empire.

我认为这在他的世界观里发生在类似'19年到2040年2月期间。所以或许还有时间扭转局面。我不知道你怎么看？

I think that happens in his view of the world in like '19 in 02/2040. So maybe there's still time to turn it around. I don't know what you what about you?

这是个非常精确的预测，2040年。

It's a very exact forecast, 2040.

你读过那个系列吗？就是阿西莫夫写的关于社会预测能力的系列？抱歉，我完全想不起来了。

You ever read that what's that series, the Asimov series on where they've got this, like, social forecasting capability? Sorry. Totally forgot.

萨金，你认为如果观察GDP在大萧条期间的表现——是的，基本上就像坠入谷底——然后不管我们对新政有何看法，我认为现实是它创造了巨额投资从而扭转了GDP。美国今天是否需要某种版本的新政？我们是否需要与公民达成新的契约？

Sarkin, do you think that if you look at GDP going through the crash Yep. Basically, like, cratered, and then I mean, what whatever we think of the New Deal, I think the the reality is that it it just created an enormous amount of investment that then just turned GDP around. Is there a version of the New Deal that America needs to do today? Is there a new compact we need to have with our citizenry today?

不过这里有两件事同时发生：新政和第二次世界大战。我的意思是，某种程度上你得把它们的支出模式和原因合并来看。

Well but so there's two things that happened, though. There's the New Deal and then World War two. I mean, so, yeah, I think you have to sort of lump them in a way together in terms of the spending profile and why we were spending and and

其实我认为即使在三十年代中期，在我们真正卷入战争前，我们的GDP增速就已经达到8%、9%、10%。我的重点更多是关于新社会契约这个概念，一套新的协议。不知道我们是否触及了问题的核心？

Well, even I think even in the mid thirties, though, like, really before we were engulfed in it, we were we were cranking, like, eight, nine, 10% GDP. My my my point is just more just that idea of a new social compact, a new set of, like, agreements. I don't know. Like, is it we it get a point?

也许我们确实需要。但那会是什么样子？我们又要从哪里筹集资金来实施？这才是真正的问题。而且我们如何能...

Maybe maybe we do. But what does that look like? And and where are we gonna get the money to to spend it? That's the real question. And how can we

我认为弗莱伯格会说——虽然我不想替他发言——协议的重点其实不在于增加支出，而是减少开支，并让人们明白这些权衡取舍是必要的。

I think Freiberg would say well, I'm not gonna put words in Freiberg's mouth is that the agreement is actually not about spending more but actually less and getting folks to understand that these trade offs need to happen.

所以我同意你的观点，也同意大卫的看法。我认为我们必须大幅削减开支，但这又回到了那个核心问题：每个人都想要更多

So I I agree with you and I agree with David on that. Like, I think we have to cut spending in a big way, but this goes back to the more issue, which is The everybody everybody wants

讽刺的是，索金，虽然我多次表达过这个观点，但当我们做出承诺时——当联邦政府及其民选代表当选时——他们说会提供教育并动用联邦开支来实现，承诺让你拥有住房并建立联邦住房贷款计划。所有这些承诺给予'更多'的案例，本质上都是增加政府开支。承诺提供医疗保障后，医疗保险支出就像气球般膨胀，因为这不是真正的自由市场，政府支出总会被钻空子，相关成本也因此虚高，缺乏买卖双方的自然市场力量制约。

irony, Sorkin, and I've shared this point of view many, many times, but I think when we made the promise, when the federal government and people who got elected to represent the population in the federal government got elected, they said, we're gonna give you an education and then we're gonna use federal spending to do that. We're gonna give you access to a home. We're gonna create this federal home loan program. And in all these cases, when there was a promise made on giving you the more, it was all about increasing government spending. We're gonna give you access to health care and then Medicare became kind of this ballooning spending line because in every case, because it's not actually a free market, the government doing the spending gets taken advantage of and all the costs underlying that spending line get inflated because there's no natural market force of buy and sell.

市场上只有买方力量。这就是教育成本、住房价格、医疗支出和药品费用全部暴涨的原因。一旦政府将其作为服务提供，就会彻底扭曲市场，陷入无法挣脱的恶性循环。所以根本性挑战在于，我们必须进行更艰难的对话：不是更多而是更少，我们都要学会接受这点。否则就只能重复历史上的做法：征收财富税，看着经济增长停滞——这些戏码我们已经看过太多次了。

There's only a market force of buy. And that's why education costs have ballooned. That's why housing has ballooned. That's why medical expenses, pharmaceutical drugs have all ballooned because as soon as the government provides that as a service, it completely distorts the market and you can never get out of that free fall. So the fundamental challenge is you have to have the more difficult conversation to your point of it's not more, it's less, and we're all gonna have to kinda deal with that, or you're gonna do the same thing that everyone's done historically, which is wealth taxes and, you know, growth slowed, all the stuff that kind of we've seen many times So

但你现在讨论的其实是政治悖论或挑战：如何让公众接受'减少'的理念？这才是根本问题。我们都知道必须减少开支。

but this is now you're talking about, like, a political it's almost a paradox or a challenge, which is how do you get the public to buy into the idea of less? Right. Right? That is the fundamental question. We all know that we have to spend less.

我同意这点。顺便说，我很庆幸自己或许还能承受这种削减。但问题是，如果你本就不富裕，减少开支意味着...

I I agree with that. And I and by way, I feel blessed that I could probably afford afford it, but to take less. But the question is, you know, if you don't have it, taking less

他们会说：'是啊，你们这些有钱人当然说得轻松。真了不起。混蛋！这对我太不公平了。'

is Yeah. They'll they'll say, yeah. Rich ass like you guys can say that. Good for you. Bull Like, that's not fair to me.

我认为这是一个大问题，那些宣称要减少生活开支、对富人征税的人会立即遭到攻击。这就是达利欧和其他人历史上所争论的，你会看到这些关于社会动荡、公民分裂的概念。顺便说一下，这本书是《基地》系列。我不知道为什么我没想到它。

And I think that's the big issue is the people who would proclaim that would be immediately attacked, like, you live with less. Tax the rich. And that becomes where Dalio and others have argued historically, you see these notions of civil unrest, of civic splits that that that happened. By the way, the book is foundation, the foundation series. I don't know why it didn't come to my mind.

这个想法被称为心理史学，这个人实际上可以预测所有这些社会趋势，因为它们都是可预测的，而且它们都以周期发生。

The the idea is called psycho history where the guy can actually predict all of these social trends because they're all predictable and they all happen in in cycles.

好的。我能再提一件事吗？因为我对此非常好奇。我在关税问题上花了很多时间思考斯姆特-霍利法案。所以我认为有一个合理的论点，即关税现在与国家安全和韧性挂钩，我们可能会在哲学上决定要在美国拥有汽车工业，因为如果你让比亚迪在这个国家销售汽车，我们就不会在这个国家销售汽车，也不会再在这个国家制造汽车。

Okay. Can I just throw one other thing in this? Because I'm so curious about it. And I spent a lot of time thinking about Smoot Hawley in terms of tariffs. So there's an art there's a there's a I think a fair argument that tariffs were now tied to national security, resilience today, and, like, we may decide philosophically you wanna have an automobile industry in The United States because if you let BYD sell cars in this country, we would not sell cars in this country and we wouldn't make cars in this country ever again.

你可能会认为这是一个坏主意，你希望它留在这里。话虽如此，如果我们这样做，我们可能会在十年后花更多的钱购买技术能力较低的汽车，而不是下次我们去欧洲或亚洲度假时乘坐的那些其他汽车。我们应该如何看待这个问题？这对我来说是一个真正的基本问题，关于资本主义，也关于韧性和国家安全。

And you may think that that's a bad idea and you want that to be here. Having said that, if we do this, which we are, we will probably spend more to buy less technologically capable cars ten years from now than the next time we all, you know, if you go on vacation to Europe or Asia get in the back of one of these other cars. And how should we think about that? That to me is like a real fundamental question I see. About about capitalism and also about resilience and national security.

我要向你提出的是，我们应该思考的是，美国人和美国社会如何在面对未来非常艰难的决定时保持最大的选择权？所以如果地缘政治上我们被卷入战争，所有战争都有非常糟糕的后果。我们如何有足够的资源不参与其中？如果你看看过去的几场战争，这些最终都是关于资源的，对吧？

What I would offer to you is the way that we should think about this is how do Americans and American society preserve maximum optionality in the face of very difficult decisions in the future? So if geopolitically we are induced into a war, All wars have tremendously bad consequences. How would we have the wherewithal to not have to be a part of it? If you look at the last number of wars, these are all ultimately over resources. Right?

对。如果你想想资源独立，今天有很多事情美国根本不稳定，因为我们没有资源独立。但如果我们能实现这一点，并且拥有这些基础，我们实际上就不必打仗了。现在可能还有其他原因，人们可能会把我们拖入战争，我理解所有这些，但我认为这是一个非常大的问题。我是否愿意接受一辆不那么好的车，但拥有一个我们控制的国家交通基础设施，不会被别人关闭？

Right. And if you think about resource independence, there are many, many things today where America is just fundamentally unstable because we don't have resource independence. But if we were to get that and then we have the building blocks, we wouldn't actually have to fight a war. Now there may be other reasons and people may pull us into wars, and I I get all of that, but I think that that's a really big question. Would I be okay with a less better car, but having a national transportation infrastructure that we control and cannot be turned off by somebody else?

在边际上，我会说，是的。我可以接受这一点。

On the margins, I would say, yeah. I'd be okay with that.

不过有趣的是，这需要额外付费。对吧？我们得为此多付钱，这可能就是做生意的成本。

And and the interesting part, though, is there's gonna be a premium on that. Right? Like, we're gonna pay more for that, and that may be that may just be the cost of doing business.

当然。这可能就是战略灵活性和选择权的代价。而且如果你想想没有这些会带来什么连锁反应的话

Sure. And that may and that's that may be the cost of strategic flexibility and optionality. And I think if you just think about what the downstream consequences of not having that are

顺便说一句，也许这些成本甚至更高，而且这些成本没有被纳入模型。对吧？

And maybe and by the way, maybe those costs are even higher, and and we and those costs don't get added and they don't get added into the model. Right?

你说得完全正确。这些成本总是更高，因为它们是用人的生命来衡量的。总是更高昂，总是更昂贵。

You're absolutely right. They're they're always higher because they're measured in human lives. It's always higher. It's always more costly.

嗯。安德鲁，你把书的电影版权卖给谁了？电影什么时候上映？

Mhmm. Andrew, who do you sell the movie rights to of your book, and when's the movie coming out?

还没卖出去。我们正在和几个人谈。希望很快能有些消息。

Haven't sold them yet. We're talking to a couple people. Hopefully, we'll have some news on that sometime soon.

因为这听起来是个非常人性化的故事，应该能拍成很棒的戏剧。对吧？

Because it sounds like it's a very people driven story, so it should make for kind of great drama. Right?

哦，完全同意。我是说，我尝试用尽可能电影化的方式写作，虽然本质上不是为电影而写，但受限于必须使用档案、笔记和日记等材料。顺便说一句，这本书看起来挺厚的，但其实正文没那么长——最后有100多页尾注，有些还挺有趣的。

Oh, totally. I mean, I tried to write it I didn't try to write it for film per se, but I tried to write it in a cinematic a way as humanly possible given that I was also constrained by, you know, I had to have archives and notes and diaries. You know, it looks like a long book by the way, folks. It's a little bit shorter because there's a 100 some odd pages of endnotes at the end for those who want to and by the some of the endnotes are kind of fun.

安德鲁，当你创作这些内容并授权时——比如当他们开始赚取数十亿利润的时候——你会强烈干预剧本或电影剧本的创作吗？还是说'这是我的原始素材，你们尽力而为'？你在意演员人选或其他细节吗？还是觉得'授权出去就放手不管了'？

Andrew, when you write these things, do and you then when you license it, for example, like when they started to make billions Yeah. Do you take a strong point of view in how the scripts in that case or the screenplay in this case will be written, or do you kind of say, okay. Here's my source material. You guys do the best you can, and you kind of do you care who the actors are? Do you care about any of that stuff, or do you think it's like, okay, they're licensing it off off on your merry way.

尽力而为吧。

Do the best you can.

说实话，在这个时代，我觉得...

You know, I think actually in this day and age, just

你脑海里肯定有完整的视觉构想吧？肯定有人物形象，有全套画面。那你是怎么做到放手的呢？

terms probably in your mind, right, you have a vision of what this whole thing looks like visually. You probably have faces. Right. You probably you probably have all of this. So, how do you do you let go of that?

或者说，我觉得你其实...

Or Well, I think you have

首先，某种程度上你必须学会放手，因为这行的本质就是如此。在当前的流媒体环境下，这类项目有两种运作方式：要么卖给平台让他们组建团队开发，要么同时敲定演员、导演和编剧整套班子再推进。

first of all, I think you have to let go a little bit at some level because that's just the the nature of the business for better or worse. I think right now in this streaming environment, you know, there's sort of two ways you can go sell projects like this. One is you go sell to a streamer and they go off and they try to develop it. They go find the team that does it. The other approach is, you know, find the actor, maybe a director, maybe the writer all at one time and then walk in with it.

因此，在这种背景下，你可能对其未来有更多发言权。要知道，就目前行业现状而言，好莱坞收购的项目大幅减少，我认为他们更倾向于那种整套方案预先准备好的模式。不过，他们的需求几乎每个月都在变化。

So, in that context, you probably have more of a say in the future of it. You know, right now, just the way the business is, you know, the Hollywood's buying a lot less stuff and I think is more interested in sort of the former version where you show up with the whole thing sort of prepackaged, preplanned. But, you know, it almost changes, you know, by the month in terms of what they want.

嗯。嗯。

Mhmm. Mhmm.

你是自己录制有声书吗？你在朗读——

Are you, doing the audiobook yourself? Are you reading the

是我读的。你们自己也是做音频行业的，所以我得告诉你们，全书共13小时。如果用倍速录制，大概六个半小时就能完成。但实际上我花了差不多三十个小时。

I read it. You guys are in the audio business yourselves. So you I will tell you, I went in it's thirteen hours, though, the book in total. You do it on, you know, double time and you you'll be done in, you know, six and a half hours. But it probably took me like thirty hours.

这确实需要时间。他们确实做了？是我做的。没错，是我完成的。

It takes a while. And they did do it? I did do it. Yeah. I did it.

很有趣。那是——

It was fun. It was

这是你第一次录制有声书吗？

like Your first time was it your first time reading the audiobook?

以前从没读过。当《大而不倒》出版时，我们请了一位英国演员来朗读，我很享受听他读的过程。他为这个项目增添了几分庄重感，你知道的，英国人说话总显得比英国人更聪明？差不多吧。差不多。

Never read it before. When when Too Big to Fail came out, we had a British actor do it, and I enjoyed read I enjoyed listening to him. I he added some gravitas to the to the project because of that, you know, the Brits always sound smarter than British? Pretty much. Pretty much.

差不多。

Pretty much.

好吧。听起来更聪明。

Okay. Sounds smarter.

听起来更聪明。我本想显得更聪明些。比我们聪明。他们确实如此。确实如此。

Sounds smarter. I was going for sounding smarter. Than us. They do. They do.

好的，安德鲁，感谢你加入我们。这次交流太棒了。恭喜你的新书发布。谢谢你的分享，话题覆盖面很广。

Well, Andrew, thanks for joining us. This has been awesome. Congrats on the release of your book. Thanks for chatting. Good broad range

话题很广。我要买一本。我要买。

of topics. I'm buying. I'm buying.

谢谢。

Thank you.

是的，非常感谢你们。要知道，我非常享受这个过程，而且我一直虔诚地聆听你们的节目。所以这真是

Yeah. I appreciate, guys. You know, I I enjoy this so much, and I listen to you guys so religiously. So this is

你是最棒的，兄弟。感谢你这么做。我是说，正如你所言，那是美国历史上一个令人难以置信的时期，但真正了解的人还不够多。我很高兴

You're the best, bro. Thanks for doing it. I mean, it's a it's an incredible period of of American history that, to your point, not enough people really understand. I'm glad

这太有趣了。确实。

you It's so interesting. Yeah.

我觉得那二十年特别有意思，大概是从1928年到1948年期间。

So I find it so interesting. That twenty year period, I would say twenty eight to forty eight.

嗯，你

Well, you.

那段历史包罗万象。谢

It's got everything. Thank

谢你们，伙计们。我很感激。

you, guys. I appreciate it.

我们很快会再聊的。

We'll talk soon.

谢了，兄弟。

Thanks, man.

再见。谢谢。

See you. Thanks.

再见，兄弟。

Bye, man.