标题：畅谈你的书：反AI投资组合

今天的《动物精神谈投资》节目由阿克拉资本管理公司为您呈现。

Today's Animal Spirits Talk Your Book is brought to you by Accra Capital Management.

请访问accracapital.com了解更多关于阿克拉焦点ETF的信息。

Go to accracapital.com to learn more about the new Accra Focus ETF.

股票代码是a k r e。

That's ticker a k r e.

这也是公司名称的拼写方式。

That's how you spell the name of the firm too.

网址是accracapital.com。

That's accracapital.com.

欢迎收听《动物精神》，一档关于市场、生活和投资的节目。

Welcome to animal spirits, a show about markets, life, and investing.

跟随迈克尔·巴特尼克和本·卡尔森，一起聊聊他们正在阅读、写作和观看的内容。

Join Michael Batnick and Ben Carlson as they talk about what they're reading, writing, and watching.

迈克尔和本表达的所有观点仅代表其个人意见，并不反映Ritholt财富管理公司的观点。

All opinions expressed by Michael and Ben are solely their own opinion and do not reflect the opinion of Ritholt Wealth Management.

本播客仅供信息参考，不应作为任何投资决策依据。

This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon for any investment decisions.

Ritholt财富管理公司的客户可能持有本播客讨论的证券头寸。

Clients of Ritholt Wealth Management may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast.

欢迎收听迈克尔和本主持的《动物精神》节目。

Welcome to Animal Spirits with Michael and Ben.

在今天的节目中，我们将与约翰·内夫对话。

On today's show, we speak with John Neff.

我们之前曾与他交流过。

We've spoken to him before.

他是Ocre资本管理公司的投资组合经理兼首席投资官。

He's a portfolio manager and CIO from Ocre Capital Management.

您可能之前听说过查克·奥克雷。

You may have heard of Chuck Ocre before.

他是巴菲特的门徒。

He's a Buffett disciple.

这样说公平吗？

Is that fair to say?

集中投资组合，老派投资者，我总是觉得与这些对世界有不同看法的投资组合经理交谈非常有趣。

Concentrated portfolios, old school investor, and I always find it fascinating to talk to these portfolio managers who just have a different way of looking at the world.

一个集中的投资组合。

A concentrated portfolio.

很多时候这类投资者并不关注'科技七巨头'。

A lot of times these kinds of investors are not focused on the Mag-seven.

那不是那种集中方式，所以Acre的投资组合更多是金融类股票，但他们的换手率极低。

It's not that type of concentration, so Acre, their portfolio was more filled with financials, but they have very low turnover.

他们典型的持有期是十年以上，而大多数个人投资者没有足够的勇气持有一只股票十年，所以当我看到机构级别的投资组合经理这样做时，尤其是当他们管理着数十亿美元时，我觉得非常有趣。

Their typical hold period is ten plus years, and most individual investors don't have the intestinal fortitude to hold a stock for ten years, so I find it really interesting when an institutional level portfolio manager does, especially when they're managing billions of dollars.

因此他们对这些公司进行了深入的研究。

So they do huge deep dives into these companies.

他们是那种买入并持有并持续跟踪的投资者。

They're, you know, buy and hold and keep checking in investors.

你觉得这像是一个濒临消失的类型吗？

Does this seem like sort of a dying breed to you?

是的。

Yes.

我认为是这样，对吗？

I think it's right?

确实如此。

It is.

不。

No.

我要说这个类型已经消亡了。

I would say it's dead it's breed.

好吧。

Okay.

而且我——我非常欣赏他们的做法。

And I I love I love what they're doing.

我认为如果你要聘请主动型基金经理，就应该找一个有坚定信念的经理。

I think that if you are going to pay an active manager, you wanna pay in a manager with conviction.

我从未见过这样的投资组合。

And I've never seen a portfolio like this.

是有16个标的吗？

Is there 16 names?

是的。

Yeah.

这就是它被称为聚焦基金的原因。

It's it's very it's called the focus fund for a reason.

约翰在电话会议中我最喜欢的一句话是：我们有买入目标。

My favorite quote that John said on the call was, we have buy targets.

我们没有卖出目标。

We have no sell targets.

没错。

Right.

是的。

Yeah.

那很有意思。

That was interesting.

而且他们长期表现一直能跟上标普500指数。

And they've done a good job of keeping up with the S and P 500 over the long term.

我问他的是：现在是否是战胜市场最具挑战性的时期？

And what I said, and I asked him, is this the most challenging period to ever beat the market?

他说，我认为很可能就是这样，尤其是那个市场。

And he said, I I think it probably is, especially that market.

他们在不持有英伟达、苹果和微软这些大型科技股的情况下，依然表现不错。

And they've done a good job keeping up without owning NVIDIA and Apple and Microsoft and these big tech names.

这令人震惊。

It's astonishing.

是的。

Yeah.

不。

No.

这次对话很有趣。

This this was a fun one.

我们很少有机会与传奇投资集团进行这样的对话。

We don't have too many conversations like this with a legendary investment group.

希望您喜欢我们与约翰的对话。

So I hope you enjoy our conversation with John.

约翰，欢迎来到节目。

John, welcome to the show.

谢谢，本。

Thank you, Ben.

好的。

All right.

你的Acre Focus基金已经运作很长时间了。

So you have your Acre Focus Fund that's been around for a long time.

你们的基准是标普500指数，这就是你们的对标目标吗？

And the benchmark is the S and P 500, That's your that's your bogey?

是的。

Yes.

你认为标普500是最难战胜的基准指数吗？

Do you think that the S and P 500 is the hardest benchmark to beat?

我认为过去五到十年间，从结构上几乎不可能战胜它。

I think over the last five to ten years, it's it's almost been structurally impossible to beat.

对。

Right.

我我我认为如果你要挑战市场的话，现在是最艰难的时期之一。

I I I think this is one of the hardest times to beat if you're calling that the market.

我认为这可能是实际尝试跑赢市场最困难的阶段和周期之一。

I think this probably is one of the hardest periods and cycles to actually try to beat the market.

这这就是我的感觉。

That's that's kind of my feeling.

不，我同意。

No, agree.

我是说，我们并不回避这种比较。

I mean, we're not shying away from the comparison.

我们需要以它为基准来衡量自己。

We need to benchmark ourselves.

但与此同时，当七只股票占据了过去五到十年指数回报的一半，约占指数总市值的33%到35%时，这个指数本身已经变成了一个高度集中的动量赌注。

But at the same time, when seven names account for half the index return over the last five to ten years, constitute about 33 to 35% of the total market cap of the index, the index has become itself a very concentrated momentum bet.

这种趋势在过去五到十年间极大地有利于指数表现，以至于我认为，一个试图平衡业绩管理、研究流程和估值考量的主动型基金经理会面临极大困难。

And that's worked in the favor of the index over the last five to ten years to an extent that I think an active manager that is trying to sort of manage performance and balance what they're looking at in terms of their own research process and concern over valuations, it makes it very difficult.

所以我们当下所处的时代，我在想未来一两年或五年后回望时，是否会觉得我们已经达到了指数化投资理论的顶峰。

So we're dealing at a time right now, I wonder if we'll look back a year or two, five from now and wonder whether or not we sort of reached the the pinnacle of sort of the the indexing argument.

我正在看三年期的回报数据。

I'm looking at a three year return basis.

考虑到你们对'神奇七巨头'零持仓——至少前十大持仓中没有，你们能保持同步已是了不起的成绩。

And considering that you guys have no exposure to the max seven, at least in your top 10, you did an incredible job even keeping pace.

现在图表上的趋势线在夏末出现了急剧断裂，我很想听听你的看法。

Now there has been a sharp break in the lines on the chart that happened in, the end of the summer, which which I'm curious to get your take on.

我们稍后会讨论这个非常有趣的发展。

We'll talk about that, a really fascinating development.

但本开场时提到你们在这个行业已经很久了。

But Ben opened the conversation saying that you guys have been around for a while.

查克·霍克里，传奇投资人，集中持仓，纪律严明的投资方法，我们稍后会深入探讨。

Chuck Hockrey, legendary investor, concentrated positions, disciplined approach, we're gonna get into.

我想迟到总比不到好。

I guess better late than never.

现在已经是2025年了。

It's 2025.

你们终于推出了ETF。

You guys you guys launched an ETF.

为什么花了这么长时间？

What took so long?

是的。

Yeah.

事实上，这次发行实际上是将我们长期运作的单一共同基金进行了转换。

Well, in fact, the launch was actually the conversion of our of our long standing, single mutual fund.

所以我们并没有推出新产品，而是将现有规模最大的产品进行了转换。

So what that did, so we didn't launch a new product, we converted our largest existing product.

基本上就是原封不动地完成了转换。

Did that essentially right in place.

我们认为这对投资者来说是巨大的利好，因为ETF结构——我想您和大多数听众都知道——具有税收优势，可以通过实物赎回机制来调整持仓，而不必通过卖出持仓来产生可能需要纳税的实际收益，然后再进行分配。

And that's a tremendous boon, we think, for our investors because the ETF structure, I think, as you and most of your listeners know, is a tax advantaged one because you can use a redemption in kind process to move in and out of positions as opposed to selling positions and generating potentially realized taxable gains, which you then have to distribute.

作为ETF，我们能够以更高的税收效率来管理本就极具税收优势的投资策略。

And as an ETF, we can, we can manage, what is already a very tax efficient strategy, even more tax efficiently.

但像我们这样持仓高度集中且坚持长期投资，换手率通常在4%到10%之间

But when you're as concentrated as we are and as long term as we are, and our turnover is typically somewhere in the 4% to 10%

对于一个管理规模100亿美元的基金来说，这个换手率是闻所未闻的。

range in Unheard beginning for a $10,000,000,000 fund.

我是说，非常罕见，应该说不是闻所未闻，但确实非常罕见。

I mean, very rare, should say, not unheard of, but very rare.

所以我们持有头寸，如果我们完成了我们宣称要做的工作，我们将拥有大量未实现的潜在收益。

So we're holding positions and if we're doing the job that we purport to do, we're going to have significant embedded unrealized gains.

因此，对于我们这样高度集中且换手率极低的策略来说，ETF结构的优势对我们而言更为重要，因为如果操作得当，我们的策略会带来显著的未实现收益。

So with a strategy like ours that is as concentrated as it is and as low turnover as it is, the the benefits of the ETF structure weigh even more for us because our strategy is brings with it, if it's done correctly, significant unrealized gains.

这正是我们长期复利增长的来源。

That's what we're compounding over time.

因此，现在新进入基金的投资者无需继承这些潜在的税务负担，我们认为这对未来的投资者来说是件大好事。

And so the fact that we can now, new investors into the fund don't have to inherit that embedded tax liability is a great thing, we think, for for our investors moving forward.

你们这么低的换手率意味着你们持有这些股票的平均时间大概是，我不知道，七年以上之类的。

Your turnover being that low means that you're holding these stocks, for an average period of, I don't know, seven plus years or something.

我不知道具体数字是多少，但在你们...

I don't know what the actual number is, but in your

可能在10到15年之间。

Probably 10 to 15.

10到好的。

10 to okay.

所以在你的演示中，你们列举了一些投资案例，并标注了首次投资的日期。

So in in your in your presentation, you have you have some examples of some investments, and you have you listed when the first investment was made.

比如穆迪公司是2012年投资的，Constellation软件是2014年，还有万事达卡。

And so Moody's, you said you made in 2012, Constellation Software was in 2014, and you have Mastercard.

首次投资始于2010年初。

First investment began in early twenty ten.

我认为对多数投资者而言，最困难的事情之一是长期持有并判断：这个故事是否已经改变？

I think one of the harder things for most investors to do is to hold onto something and to know, like, has this story changed?

我很好奇你们实际持有标的的决策流程是怎样的。

And I'm curious what your process is for actually holding something.

我觉得买卖操作很容易，难的是持续持有并穿越周期，同时准确识别基本面或叙事逻辑的变化时机？

I think it's way easier to buy and sell something than it is to hold and just kind of sit through the cycles and understand when something has changed or when the story or narratives change?

你们的风控流程如何进化才能做到稳坐钓鱼台，让这些股票自然增值？

Like, how do you how does your process evolve enough that you can just sit on your hands and and let these stocks run?

本，我认为这个观点非常棒，这也是我经常说的。

Ben, I think that's a really great point, and it's something I say all the time.

我同意你的看法。

I I do agree with you.

我觉得买入容易，卖出也容易。

I think I think it's easier to easy to buy, and it's easy to sell.

而真正困难的是持有。

And the and and the harder thing to do is to hold.

本质上，指导我们的是我们根据这个三足凳理念来讨论我们的流程，这是我们的创始人查克·奥克里在1989年公司创立时就提出的概念，即试图将资本集中在那些三足协同运作的企业上。

And, essentially, what informs it is is we we talk about our process according to this three legged stool notion, you know, something that Chuck Okri, our founder, talked about at the inception of the firm in 1989, which is this notion of trying to concentrate capital in businesses that have all three of these legs of the stool working in concert together.

第一足是企业的质量，我们真正指的是竞争优势有多强大和持久，以及我们能否理解它。

The first leg being the quality of the business, and what we really mean there is how formidable and durable is the competitive advantage, and can we understand it?

我们稍后会回到理解的重要性上。

We'll come back to the important of under importance of understanding.

然后是管理企业的人员素质。

And then there's the caliber of the people managing the business.

所以第一支柱是业务，第二支柱是人才。

So it's business first leg, people second leg.

管理团队的素质如何？

What is the caliber quality of the management team?

公司的文化是怎样的？

What is the culture of the company?

激励机制是什么？

What are the incentives?

它们是否合理匹配？

Are they properly aligned?

管理层如何对待股东？

How does management behave in relation to shareholders?

而第三个支柱，也是非常重要的一个，就是再投资。

And the third leg of the stool, which is a really important one is reinvestment.

业务、人才、再投资构成了三支柱，其中再投资支柱指的是你拥有这个能产生大量自由现金流的优秀企业。

So business people reinvestment, and that third leg of the stool, that reinvestment leg really refers to you have this great business that's generating all this free cash flow.

管理团队如何对再投资选项进行排序、优先级划分并执行？

How does the management team rank order and prioritize and execute against the reinvestment menu?

而再投资选项对于任何企业来说都是相同的五个项目。

And the reinvestment menu is the same five items for any business you ever care to look at.

你可以通过损益表或资本追加进行有机再投资。

You can reinvest organically through the p and l or through capital additions.

你可以进行收购。

You can make acquisitions.

你可以偿还债务。

You can pay down your debt.

你可以回购股票，或者支付股息。

You can buy back your stock, or you can pay a dividend.

就是这五个选项。

Those are the five items.

这对每家企业来说都是一样的。

It's the same for every single business.

传统观点认为，我们在商学院或大众财经媒体上常听到的是：分红好，收购不好。

And what conventional wisdom, what we often hear in business schools or in the popular financial press is dividends, good, acquisitions, bad.

但人们总是忘记参考伯克希尔·哈撒韦自1965年以来的投资范例——从再投资角度来看。

But everyone always forgets to look at the example set, you know, since 1965 of Berkshire Hathaway from a from a reinvestment perspective.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦从未支付过股息。

Berkshire Hathaway has never paid a dividend.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦持续进行收购，并专注于通过损益表和资本追加进行有机再投资，因此实现了惊人的复合增长率。

Berkshire Hathaway has been a serial acquirer and is focused on organic reinvestment through the P and L and through capital additions, and so has compounded at this incredible rate.

而这正是我们所追寻的。

And that's what we're looking for.

正因如此，我们也需要深入了解管理团队。

We want to understand so that's why we have to know the management teams as well.

他们如何看待这个再投资选项清单？如何确定优先级并执行？

How do they think about this reinvestment menu, prioritize, execute against it?

因此从我们持股企业的角度，我们寻求的是专注于有机增长和收购的再投资策略。

So what we're looking for from the standpoint of of the businesses we own is this reinvestment that focuses on organic and acquisitions.

所以看看我们今天的投资组合，我们持有在某些特定领域进行系列收购的公司，如Constellation Software、Roper Technologies或Topicus。

So if you look at our portfolio today, we own companies that are serial acquirers in some particular niche, Constellation Software, Roper Technologies, or Topicus.

正是由于这种系列收购的思维方式，它们能够以更高的回报率配置更多资本，从而更快地实现复利增长。

And as a result of that serial acquisition mindset, they're able to put to work more capital at a higher rate of return and so compound faster.

而这正是我们想要持有的。

And that's what we're looking to to own.

优秀的业务、优秀的人才、优秀的再投资。

Great business, great people, great reinvestment.

最后，我们不想支付过高的价格。

And finally, we don't want to pay too much.

所以当我们找到一个企业时，本，它实际上结合了所有这些要素——这在理论上极易描述但在实践中极难寻觅——我们就想深入了解它。

So when we find a business, Ben, that actually combines all of those things, which is extremely easy to describe and very hard to find and practice, we want to get to know it really well.

我们希望从这些标准维度来理解它。

We want to understand it across those criteria.

因此，使我们能够长期持有股票的原因，正是基于这些认知以及我们按照这三项标准对企业进行的持续跟踪。

And so what enables us to hold the stock for a long period of time is that knowledge and us tracking the business across those three criteria.

只要竞争优势依然稳固，管理层行为得当，再投资机会与能力持续存在，我们就会继续持有这家企业。

As long as the competitive advantage remains intact, the people are behaving well, the reinvestment opportunity and acumen continue to be in place, we're gonna hold the business.

这正是我们花费最多时间持续监控的方面。

And that's what we spend most of our time monitoring.

本提到了长期持有一项投资的困难性。

Ben mentioned the difficulty of of holding on to an investment.

当我查看你们的持仓时，我突然想起这件事。

I'm I'm reminded as as I'm looking at your holdings.

上次你们做客节目时，对万事达卡的分析极具说服力，我当即买入，但大概只持有了七个月。

The last time we had you on, you made such a compelling case for Mastercard that I bought it, and I probably held it for seven months.

说句公道话——

Now credit to me.

我确实赚了笔可观的利润，但万事达卡本应是值得长期持有的优质企业，可惜我现在已不再持有。

I think I turned the nice profit, but but Mastercard is a is a secular compounder that I probably should still be holding, but I don't.

现在三足鼎立（指投资三原则）缺一不可，每个要素都至关重要。

So one of the one of the legs of the stools now there's only three of them, so they all play a critical role.

如果其中任何一个变得不稳定，整个凳子就会倒塌。

And if any of them get wobbly, the stool's gonna fall over.

我认为目前真正受到冲击的是商业领域，整体而言。

One of the ones that I think is really under, attack right now is business, just generally speaking.

人就是人。

People are people.

管理层就是管理层。

Management is what it is.

我认为纪律性投资相当直接了当，尽管这些都不容易。

Disciplinary investment, I think, is pretty straightforward, although not none of these are easy.

但商业部分，当我们面临AI应用带来的巨大不确定性时，价值将如何积累？

But the business part of it, when we've got so much uncertainty with AI adoption, where does value accrue?

我的意思是，你不能没有观点，尤其是在像你这样集中持有16家公司的投资组合中。

I mean, you can't not have a view, especially in a portfolio like yours, which is concentrated in 16 holdings.

你必须对这将如何影响万事达卡、布鲁克菲尔德和KKR等全球企业有一定的看法。

You have to have some sort of view on how this is going to impact the Mastercards and and Brookfields and KKRs of the world.

是的。

Yeah.

不，迈克尔。

No, Michael.

这是个很好的观点。

It's a great point.

而且，你也提到了，我们最近几个月经历的剧烈转折。

And, we've had, you you mentioned, you know, sort of the the sharp break we've had in the last few months.

我认为这很大程度上要归因于我们部分公司（尤其是软件公司）当前面临的一种叙事——正如我们在最近半年度电话会议上提到的，Marc Andreessen在2012年曾说软件正在吞噬世界。

I would attribute a fair amount of that to this narrative that some of our companies, particularly our software companies, are sort of laboring under, which is this notion that AI, in fact, I, we said on our recent semiannual call, you know, Marc Andreessen, I think, in 2012 said software is eating the world.

而现在投资者心中的疑问是：AI是否正在吞噬软件？

And the question now, I think, in investors' minds is, is AI eating software?

于是这成为了核心问题，你可以看到整个软件行业都出现了显著的估值压缩，包括我们持有的部分公司。

And so that that's become kind of the question, and you've seen significant multiple compression across the software universe, including some of our holdings.

而我们认为，人们显然高估了AI对我们持有的许多业务的颠覆性影响。

And the question in our mind, I think that that people are overstating the disruption the disruptive effect of on on a a lot of the businesses that we own, certainly.

人们常做的一件事是——我年纪够大还记得，我的职业生涯其实始于九十年代末。

And one of the things that people do, and I'm I'm I'm old enough to remember, you know, my my career really began in the late nineties.

我记得当时目睹了互联网和这个不断膨胀的泡沫。

And I remember, watching, you know, the Internet and, this expanding bubble.

我要做的一个类比是，将今天与九十年代末相比——在九十年代末，人们认为美国在线(AOL)就是互联网的全部。

And one of the things that I the analogies I will draw to, you know, sort of, you know, from today back to the late nineteen nineties is that in the late nineteen nineties, people thought AOL was the Internet.

确实如此。

It was.

就人们的日常体验或初次接触而言，它曾经是，但其实从来都不是。

In in in terms of people's daily experience or introduction to, it it was, but it never was.

它只是一家互联网服务提供商。

It was an Internet service provider.

当我们处于某种技术变革的风口浪尖时——毫无疑问这是颠覆性技术、一场变革性的热潮——人们总是急于册封行业领袖。

And what what tends to happen when we're sort of at the cusp of, you know, no argument, no question, you know, transformative technology, a a transformative, you you know, boom, people are in a rush to anoint the leaders.

但人们往往对机遇的本质极度短视，对谁是真正的领军者以及如何维持领导地位也缺乏远见。

But people tend to be awfully myopic about what what the opportunity is and tend to be awfully myopic about what, you know, the leaders leaders, who they are, and what's going to sustain that leadership.

所以在今天，很多人心目中的AI就是芯片和大语言模型。

And so today, what AI is in the in the minds of a lot of people are chips and large language models.

那就是AI。

That's AI.

所以本质上就是英伟达和ChatGPT。

So it's NVIDIA and it's ChatGPT, essentially.

而我们认为今天被忽视的是，这些由ChatGPT等提供的AI工具虽然非常强大，但能为已经具备某些特质的公司创造最大价值。

And what we think is being missed today is that these AI tools provided by ChatGPT and others are very powerful, but they're going to add the most value to companies that already possess certain characteristics.

这些特质包括客户亲密度、生态系统主导权和专有数据。

And those characteristics include customer intimacy, ecosystem dominance, and proprietary data.

如果你看看我们的持仓，这正是我们持有的资产。

And if you look at our holdings, that's what we own.

所以我总是以彭博社为例，这是金融服务业很多人使用的一个工具和产品。

So and I always use the example of, you know, Bloomberg is an interesting example, which is a tool and a product a lot of a lot of folks in the financial services industry use.

而人们可能只使用了他们彭博终端0.1%的功能。

And people maybe use point 1% of the capacity of their Bloomberg.

为什么？

Why?

因为整个架构、整个系统是以这种怪异而古老的方式设计的，你必须使用不直观的提示才能跳转到特定页面查看你想要的信息。

Because the whole architecture the whole system is architected in this bizarre, ancient way where you have to go use unintuitive prompts to go to a specific page to see what, you know, the information you want to find.

想想人工智能和自然语言处理能为这样一个系统带来什么改变——它拥有所有这些惊人的数据和分析能力，但现在可以对接数千家供应商提供的自然语言处理功能，从而释放彭博系统的价值。

And you think about what an AI and natural language processing can do to a system like that that has all this amazing data and analytic capabilities, but now can go to thousands of providers to provide natural language processing capability to unlock the value in that Bloomberg system.

因此我们认为，专有数据、客户亲密度和生态系统主导地位的价值在人工智能时代会变得更加珍贵，但当前的主流叙事并非如此。

So the value of proprietary data, customer intimacy, and ecosystem dominance become even more valuable, we would argue, in an AI world, and that's not the narrative today.

如今，人工智能就等于芯片和大语言模型。

Today, AI is all chips and large language models.

外界普遍认为大语言模型本质上代表了一种'按按钮就能创造所有软件'的机会。

And the the belief out there that large language models represent essentially a push of the button opportunity to create all your software.

因为我们总听说可以用这些大语言模型来编程，这会如何影响软件用户数量，又会如何影响程序员数量。

Because we hear about, well, you can code with these large language models, and look what that's going to do to the number of human users for software and look what's gonna do the number of programmers.

我们首先就不相信'按个按钮就能让软件开发变成DIY'这种说法。

We don't believe, number one, you can just press a button and software becomes a DIY proposition.

这是第一点。

That's number one.

第二点是，这些工具及其提供的效率，将由我们持有的那些具备客户亲密度、生态系统主导地位和专有数据的公司最充分地利用。

And number two, the tools and the efficiency that those, tools provide are gonna be best utilized by the companies we own that have that customer intimacy, ecosystem dominance, proprietary data.

所以，约翰，我们之前提到的那个中断——顺便说一句，回答得很棒。

So, John, the the the break that we and great answer, by the way.

我们在夏末讨论的那个中断并非无解之谜。

The break that we spoke about earlier towards the end of the summer, it's not a mystery.

我的意思是，你最大的持仓之一Constellation Software就是这类正遭受冲击的公司之一。

I mean, one of your largest holdings, Constellation Software, is one of these companies that is under assault.

至少市场舆论是这样认为的。

At least the narrative is.

股价正遭受冲击。

The price is under assault.

当然，不仅仅是Constellation。

And it's not just Constellation, of course.

还有其他巨头，比如Salesforce和Adobe，这些企业我相信你都再熟悉不过了。

It's other giants like Salesforce and Adobe, businesses that I'm sure you are intimately familiar with.

所以我猜你在这场我们正在经历的市场叙事转变中看到了机会？

So I'm guessing that you see opportunity during this market narrative shift that we're experiencing right now?

是的。

Yeah.

我们确实看到了。

We do.

而且我认为这里面有些有趣的案例。

And and I think that there's some interesting examples there.

Salesforce是一家横向软件公司。

So so Salesforce is a horizontal software company.

Adobe是创意软件平台。

Adobe is a creative software platform.

而Constellation则是由大约一千家小型垂直市场软件公司组成的。

And then Constellation is a rough is is comprised of roughly a thousand small vertical market software companies.

我认为AI对这三类企业的影响各有不同。

And I think the answer to AI is a little different across those three things.

我认为横向软件状况良好，但由于不基于客户亲密度，理论上比垂直市场软件更容易受到AI颠覆的影响。

I think horizontal software is in good shape, but horizontal software, because it's not based on customer intimacy, is theoretically a little more exposed than I would argue vertical market software is to sort of the AI disruption.

话虽如此，我认为像Salesforce这样的横向软件公司没问题。

That said, I think horizontal software companies like Salesforce are fine.

Adobe可能情况不同，因为Adobe属于创意领域。

Adobe might be a different question because Adobe is a creative thing.

我认为这正是summary>这正是大型语言模型和图像生成器最容易触及的低垂果实。

And I think that's what a lot of the the the the sort of the immediate low hanging fruit for these large language models, these image generators.

我们做了件有趣的事——在半年度电话会议上详细讨论了AI叙事对我们近期持仓的影响。

We made, this is kind of a funny thing because we talked a lot on our semiannual call about this AI narrative, having weighed on our holdings of late.

实际上我让几位朋友用AI在几秒钟内创作了一首独特的股市主题乡村音乐歌曲。

We actually had I had some friends of mine create a unique stock market themed, country music song created entirely in seconds on AI.

质量比我预想的要好。

Better than I would argue.

我不是乡村音乐的粉丝。

I'm not a country music fan.

比99%的乡村音乐歌曲都要好，几秒钟就创作完成，听起来令人惊叹。

Better than I would argue than 99% of country music songs and created in seconds and amazing sounding.

就像，你会以为这是电台播放的歌曲。

Like, you would think it was being played on the radio.

而这类创意能力，我认为正在被AI、大语言模型以及这些图像生成器、音乐生成器等工具真正加速发展。

And that kind of creative, capabilities, I think, are being really accelerated, let's say, by AI and LLM and these image generators, music generators, and things like that.

这让我觉得Adobe有点可怕。

That would make Adobe a little more frightening to me.

所以我们真正关注的是那些垂直市场应用，它们基于客户亲密度、生态系统主导地位和专有数据进行竞争。

So where we are really focused is on those vertical market applications where you you compete on the basis of customer intimacy, ecosystem dominance, and proprietary data.

而且，Michael，你提到了万事达卡。

And, Michael, you mentioned Mastercard.

万事达卡从九十年代就开始使用并开创AI技术，那时候还叫机器学习。

Mastercard has been using and pioneering AI back, you know, to the nineties, back when it was called machine learning.

这就是为什么你能前往西非，走进一家从未去过的商店，刷卡并在微秒内获得授权完成交易。

There's a reason why you can you can travel to, you know, West Africa, go into a a store you've never been in and swipe your card and be authorized to make that purchase, in microseconds.

要知道，这一切没有人工智能是不可能实现的。

You know, that all that doesn't happen without AI.

因此万事达卡及其安全系统、数据资源——包括行为数据、购买数据、交易数据——所有这些都持续为这个日益强大的AI引擎提供养分。

So Mastercard and the security and the data and the the the the behavioral data, the purchasing data, the transaction data, all that all that feeds this incredible AI engine that just gets more and more powerful over time.

这正是技术创新的历史规律。

This this is the history of technological innovation.

只不过市场总会出现过激或不足的反应。

It's just that there are over and under reactions.

对吧？

Right?

多数情况下是反应过度。

Mostly overreactions.

除了人们可能对科技七巨头的估值过高之外，你认为当前还有哪些领域的过度反应会在未来两五年十年内显现，最终让人们回首时恍然大悟？

But other than just people maybe taking the valuations of the mag seven too high, where else are you seeing overreactions right now that you think play out in two, five, ten years that people are gonna look back on and go, oh, of course, that was obvious.

我们为什么没这么做？

Why didn't we do this?

嗯，我想我之前提到过，可以类比互联网泡沫，但我觉得这会很有趣。

Well, I think I think I mentioned, you know, some some analogies to the Internet bubble, but I also think it'll be interesting.

我并不是在预测什么，但一些大型AI公司正在做出巨额支出承诺。

I'm not predicting it per se, but there are some awfully large spending commitments being made by some of these large AI players.

根据我上次看到的数据（再次声明不是针对OpenAI和ChatGPT），他们已承诺投入1.4万亿美元用于数据中心、芯片等建设。

So at last count that I saw and, again, I'm not trying to pick on, you know, OpenAI and ChatGPT, but, you know, last count, they had committed to $1,400,000,000,000 of spending, you know, at at data centers, on chips, etcetera.

目前还没人把这笔支出称为债务。

No one's calling that debt right now.

因此在某些方面，这可能类似于我们之前见过的电信投资泡沫。

And in some respects, therefore, it it becomes kind of analogous maybe to some of the telecom boom bubble that we saw as well.

我忘了那家定调的公司名字，但它在90年代末以10倍估值被收购——每投入1美元光纤资本支出，就能获得10倍回报。

And I forget the name of the company that that sort of set the tone for this, but essentially got taken out in the late nineties at 10 times you know, for for every dollar of CapEx they spent on fiber, they got taken out at 10 times that.

这引发了大规模铺设光纤的热潮，其容量至今仍未完全消化。

And that sort of set off this massive stampede to sort of deploy fiber, the capacity of which we still haven't.

要知道，那些埋在地下超过二十五年的光纤至今仍无法带来可观的经济回报。

You know, people still can't make a great economic return on fiber that's been in the ground, you know, for for twenty five or more years.

那么这里是否存在某种类比——从经济回报可行性的角度来看待当前的部分投资？

And so is there an analogy there, you know, to some of the spending here, you know, from the standpoint of the viability of an economic return?

这些数字太庞大了。

These are huge numbers.

所以我认为这再次说明——这只是个问题，而非答案。

So, you know, I think that's just again, that's just a question, not an answer.

确实。

Yeah.

嗯，这是市场正在努力应对的问题。

Well, it's it's it's a question that the market is grappling with.

他们眼睁睁看着这些万亿市值的公司市值波动剧烈——这边刚涨1000亿，那边就跌3000亿。

They just see these these trillion dollar companies just swinging around $100,000,000,000 market gap here up to the upside and then $300,000,000,000 to the downside.

现在存在巨大的不确定性。

There is a lot of uncertainty.

这反映在股价上，因为我们正试图理解未来。

And you see it in the stock price because we're trying to make sense of the future.

每天我们都会重新审视并说：不。

And every day we show up again and say, nope.

今天不一样。

Different today.

不。

Nope.

明天又不同。

Different tomorrow.

所以，显然，我心中的终极问题是：超大规模企业及其资金投入承诺将何去何从？

So, yeah, obviously, the question, the ultimate question in my mind is what happens to the hyperscaler and the commitments on the money they're going to spend?

现在转向你投资组合中的一些金融公司，这部分占比非常大。

Shifting gears to some of the financial companies that are in your portfolio, which is a huge part of your portfolio.

其中超过50%是金融类资产。

Over 50% of of it is in financials.

我们提到了万事达卡。

We mentioned Mastercard.

你们还有一些大型的——我甚至不用强调'大型'，因为这些全都是大仓位。

You've also got a large I I don't even have to say large because they're all large positions.

你们还持有Visa，但我想谈谈布鲁克菲尔德和KKR，因为本和我在节目中经常讨论私募股权行业及其发展。

You also own Visa, but I wanna talk about Brookfield and KKR because Ben and I spend a lot of time on our shows talking about the private equity industry, the build out.

顺便说一句，这些数据基础设施运营商在这两家公司中占据了很大比重。

By the way, are data infrastructure players, sort of the large exposure there between these two.

普遍的说法是机构投资者——我在做概括——

The prevailing story is that the institutional investors I'm generalizing.

机构投资者几十年来一直在配置这些私人资产，现在基本上已经满额了。

Institutional investors have been allocating to these private assets for decades, and they are basically full.

他们平均配置比例在30%到40%左右，不会再重复过去二十年的配置策略。

They're on average at 30 to 40% give or take, and they're not going to repeat their allocation of the last twenty years.

这种情况不会发生。

It's it's not happening.

他们已经满仓了。

They're full.

好的。

Okay.

这很好地过渡到财富渠道——普通邻家百万富翁对这些私募资产的实际敞口几乎为零。

Great segue to the wealth channel where the average millionaire next door has effectively zero exposure to these private assets.

从他们的角度来看，这种转变是可以理解的。

The pivot from their point of view is understandable.

这个机会就不那么确定了。

The opportunity is is less certain.

那还能给我们剩下什么？

What's going to be left for us?

随着越来越多资金进入这个领域，财富管理者的回报率会降低，不过无所谓了。

The wealth the wealth managers, as more and more capital comes into the space, I would assume that returns get lower, but whatever.

我不想开始胡扯了。

I don't wanna start rambling.

你对这两个巨头及其所在领域的发展有何看法？

What what's your take on what's going on with these two behemoths and and the field?

嗯。

Yeah.

我们认为这个领域存在一些长期利好因素，无论是从机构配置角度，还是财富渠道逐渐开放的角度来看。

Well, we think it you know, it's there are some secular tailwinds to the space in terms of institutional allocations, in terms of the wealth channel, you know, kind of starting to open up.

以目前合理的渗透率计算，这个财富渠道基本上意味着另类投资领域的资产管理规模将翻倍。

That wealth channel essentially represents at sort of a seeming reasonable level of penetration, essentially a doubling of the AUM that the that the alt space currently has.

因此这里存在巨大机遇。

So there's a big opportunity there.

我认为关键在于如何设计出对个人投资者友好的投资结构。

I think there's some real issues with how do you make that a palatable structure for the individual investor.

这里有个很有意思的转折点。

One of the things kind of an interesting segue there.

KKR和布鲁克菲尔德与那些推出零售产品的同行相比有个显著区别——这也是我们投资这些企业时看重其人员和文化的原因——他们不会把劣质交易推给零售渠道。

One of the things that that that distinguishes KKR and Brookfield in that space versus some of the other folks who have made a retail offering, and this again goes back to the people and the culture aspect of why we own some of these businesses is that there's no adverse selection of deals offered to the retail channel.

他们与所有机构投资者享有同等权益。

They are peripassu with all the institutional investors.

在其他地方、其他公司，你会发现提供给零售投资者的产品，从交易质量角度看往往是剩余资产。

Other places, other firms you're seeing in terms of what gets offered to the retail investor, it's sort of what's left over from a from a deal quality perspective.

因此，我认为这再次印证了这些机构人员行为模式和企业文化的特点。

So, again, I think that's an instructive insight into, you know, sort of the behavior of the people and sort of the cultures there.

但我们认为，这两家公司的做法确实有很多值得称道之处。

But we think that, you know, that there is a great deal to be said for what these two companies are doing.

我们想提到的另一点是，布鲁克菲尔德和KKR都具有再投资和复利思维。

One of the other things that we would mention is that you back to the reinvestment, you have a compounding mentality at Brookfield and KKR.

事实上，我们最初投资KKR时，正值他们从上市合伙制企业转型为C型公司。

In fact, when we first bought KKR, it was on the heels of them converting from a publicly traded partnership structure to a c corp.

他们完成了

They made that

转型。

transition.

哦，

Oh,

我一时想不起来，应该是2015年。

I'm blanking on the it was a 2015.

好的。

I Okay.

我得回去查一下，迈克尔。

I'd have to go back and look, Michael.

我不太确定具体日期。

I I'm not exactly sure of the date.

我得回头查证一下，不过那是很久以前的事了。

I'd have to look back that that back up, but it was a while ago.

他们这样做完全是为了保留收益并进行再投资，而不是把所有利润都作为股息返还给投资者。

And they did that entirely to be able to retain earnings and reinvest instead of having to dividend everything back out to their investors.

这种复利思维再次体现——他们是少数真正研究过伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司范例的企业之一，他们认为整个基金结构的传统设计要求我们在五、七、九年后出售所有业务。

And so that compounding mindset, again, one of the few companies that's really studied the example set by Berkshire Hathaway, they said, well, the whole fund structure is traditionally conceived, requires that we sell all the businesses after five, seven, nine years.

那么，如果我们想无限期持有某些资产在资产负债表上呢？

Well, what if we want to hold on to some indefinitely on our balance sheet?

这就是如今KKR战略控股部分的故事——随着他们目前持有的18到20家公司（约20%至30%的少数股权）将永久持有，这些公司的集体股息将从两年前的约600万美元增长至未来两三年内的10亿美元，全部体现在KKR的资产负债表上。

And so that's the strategic holdings component of the KKR story today, which is going to go from, as these companies have sort of they they own 18 or 20 companies today, 20 ish to 30% sort of minority stakes held in perpetuity where the dividends from those companies collectively are going from about $6,000,000 as of two years ago or so to a billion dollars in the next two to three years, all on the balance sheet at KKR.

因此我们认为这些公司之间存在差异。

So we think that there's a difference among these companies.

尽管它们都受益于某些长期顺风，但在复利思维、复利结构以及吸引我们持有它们的企业文化理念上存在不同。

Although they all enjoy certain secular tailwinds, there's a difference in compounding mindset, compounding structure, and sort of a cultural mindset that that attracts us to the ones we own.

有意思的是，几周前公开市场对私募市场的反应——当部分不良贷款消息开始泄露时，从外部视角看，我理解这种担忧。

Public market shifted on private markets interestingly, a couple of weeks ago as news started to leak out about some of the loans gone bad, which from an outsider's point of view, I understand the concern.

你应该先质疑再调查。

You should first ask questions later.

我认为这是过度反应，但我完全理解人们为何会过度反应。

I think it was an overreaction, and I understand exactly why people overreacted.

我并非对其中风险一无所知。

I'm not, like, naive to the risks there.

但当像KKR这样的公司因为某些可能并非100%真实或也并非100%虚假的叙事而市值缩水三分之一时

But when a company like KKR loses a third of its value, again, due to some narratives that might not be a 100% true or might not be they may not a 100% false.

你会对这种情况采取行动吗？

Do you act on something like that?

比如，你有多快会重新投入资金？

Like, how quick are you to put money back to work?

嗯，我们对我们持有的所有资产都有买入目标价

Well, we have buy targets on everything we own.

对我们持有的任何资产都没有卖出目标价

We have sell targets on nothing that we own.

所以我们清楚应该在什么价位买入KKR、布鲁克菲尔德或其他我们持有或关注的资产

So we know where we want to buy KKR or Brookfield or anything else that we own or are looking at.

而这些估值机会很少出现，因为它们必须是真正具有投机性的，并且需要大幅折价反映负面消息

And those valuations tend to come around seldom because they have to be truly sort of opportunistic and have to discount a fair amount of bad news.

我会

What I would

我们达到了吗，还是还没那么极端？

say Did we get did we get there, or was it not quite that extreme?

正在接近那个程度。

It was getting there.

正在接近那个程度。

It was getting there.

确实如此。

Definitely.

而且你知道，KKR在1.15美元左右的区间看起来相当有吸引力，确实很有吸引力。

And we, you know, sort of in that $1.15 range for KKRs looking pretty attractive, would look pretty attractive.

现在发生的情况是有些，你知道，看。

What what's happening a little bit right now is that there have been some, you know and look.

我们对所有可能性都有所顾虑，你知道，那些可能发生的情况。

We we we have the we have the concerns for all the potentialities, you know, that that you can have.

但市场上有一些对私人信贷的担忧，这个领域最近增长非常迅速。

But there's been some concern in some sort of looking to private credit today, has grown very rapidly.