2025年最佳5强：第1名：霍华德·马克斯

本周，我们继续盘点2025年最受欢迎的节目，揭晓前三名。

This week, we continue our countdown of the most popular episodes of 2025 with the top three.

2025年最受欢迎的节目是来自橡树资本的传奇人物霍华德·马克斯。

And the most popular episode of 2025 is the legend Howard Marks from Oak Tree.

我等了一段时间才邀请霍华德做客节目，以便捕捉到他的一份备忘录特别引起我注意的时刻。

I waited a while to have Howard on the show to capture a moment where one of his memos particularly caught my eye.

那是在今年早些时候，他写下《给我点信用》的时候。

That happened when he wrote, Gimme credit, earlier this year.

我们深入探讨了他对私人信贷增长对投资者影响的看法。

We dive into his thoughts on the implications of the growth of private credit for investors.

就此，我希望你们带着满腔热情冲向今年的终点，并在跨年倒计时结束后，带着对新一年的 renewed excitement、抱负和活力重新出发。

And with that, I hope you sprint to the finish line of the year with all the gusto in your soul and come out on the other side of the ball drop with renewed excitement, aspirations and energy for the year ahead.

你好。

Hello.

我是泰德·塞迪斯，欢迎收听《资本配置者》。

I'm Ted Seides, and this is Capital Allocators.

这个节目是对资本配置背后的人与过程的开放性探讨。

This show is an open exploration of the people and process behind capital allocation.

通过与金融领域的领导者对话，我们了解这些掌握资源钥匙的人如何分配他们的时间和资本。

Through conversations with leaders in the money game, we learn how these holders of the keys to the kingdom allocate their time and their capital.

您可以在 capitalallocators.com 加入我们的邮件列表并获取高级内容。

You can join our mailing list and access premium content at capitalallocators.com.

TED 和播客嘉宾表达的所有观点均为他们个人的观点，不代表资本配置者或其公司的立场。

All opinions expressed by TED and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of capital allocators or their firms.

本播客仅用于信息目的，不应作为投资决策的依据。

This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions.

资本配置者或播客嘉宾的客户可能持有本播客中讨论的证券头寸。

Clients of capital allocators or podcast guests may maintain positions in securities discussed on this podcast.

今天节目的嘉宾是霍华德·马克斯，一位著名的投资思想家，同时也是全球领先投资公司橡树资本管理公司的联合创始人兼联席董事长，该公司主要管理约2000亿美元的信贷投资，多数股权由布鲁克菲尔德资产管理公司持有。

My guest on today's show is Howard Marks, a renowned investment thinker and the cofounder and cochairman of Oaktree Capital Management, a leading global investment firm overseeing $200,000,000,000 primarily in credit investments that's majority owned by Brookfield Asset Management.

我们的对话涵盖了霍华德从金融生涯早期到当前对信贷市场演变的深刻见解。

Our conversation covers Howard's journey from his early days in finance to his current insights on the evolving credit landscape.

我们深入探讨了他最新备忘录《给我信用》中的主题，分析投资者情绪的摆动、私人信贷的兴起及其对投资者的影响。

We dive into themes from his latest memo, Give Me Credit, exploring the pendulum swings in investor sentiment, the rise of private credit, and implications for investors.

我们还讨论了私募股权的动态变化、资产管理公司并购的趋势，以及作为上市公司的日常生活。

We also discussed the changing dynamics of private equity, the trend of asset manager M and A, and life as a public company.

在我们的对话中，霍华德分享了关于风险管理、市场周期和成功投资的永恒智慧。

Throughout our conversation, Howard shares his timeless wisdom on risk management, market cycles, and the enduring principles of successful investing.

在进入访谈之前，投资者关系专业人士，这一期是专为你们准备的。

Before we get to the interview, investor relations pros, this one's for you.

我们面向投资者关系和业务发展专业人士的下一期资本配置者大学课程现已开放注册，将于七月在纽约市举行。

Registration is open for our next cohort of Capital Allocators University for investor relations and business development professionals, happening in New York City on July.

更棒的是，我们在阵亡将士纪念日之前提供早鸟优惠折扣。

Even better, we're offering an early bird discount for registrations before Memorial Day.

我们的第一期课程非常精彩。

Our first cohort was a total blast.

资本募集者之间很少有机会聚在一起，交流最佳实践并分享共同的挑战。

It's rare that capital raisers spend time with each other, discussing best practices and sharing common challenges.

今年，我们邀请了一群行业顶尖专家，分享他们的最佳见解，帮助您提升竞争力。

This year, we're bringing together a powerhouse lineup of industry pros to share their best ideas and help you sharpen your edge.

前往 capitalallocators.com/university 了解更多信息并预订您的席位。

Head to capitalallocators.com/university to learn more and save your spot.

期待七月与您相见。

Hope to see you in July.

《资本配置者》由 AlphaSense 赞助播出。

Capital Allocators is brought to you by AlphaSense.

AlphaSense 连接并加速您研究流程的每一个环节，我很高兴他们今年成为我们的首席赞助商。

Alphasense connects and accelerates every element of your research process, and I'm excited they chose to be our lead sponsor this year.

投资中最困难的部分之一，就是能在他人之前洞察到变化趋势。

One of the hardest parts of investing is seeing what's shifting before everyone else does.

几十年来，只有最大的对冲基金才能负担得起大规模的渠道调研项目，以在财报发布前发现转折点，领先市场共识。

For decades, only the largest hedge funds could afford extensive channel research programs to spot inflection points before earnings and stay ahead of consensus.

但如今，渠道调研已不再是奢侈品，而成了基本要求。

But channel checks are no longer the luxury they once were, they've become table stakes.

这就是AlphaSense的用武之地。

And that's where AlphaSense comes in.

AlphaSense正在重新定义渠道调研。

AlphaSense is redefining channel research.

AlphaSense的渠道调研通过整合价值链各环节运营者的访谈，提供持续更新的需求、定价和竞争动态视角。

AlphaSense channel checks deliver a continuously refreshed view of demand, pricing, and competitive dynamics powered by interviews with operators across the value chain.

每月成千上万次一致的渠道对话，帮助投资者在财报或市场共识出现之前数周就发现转折点。

Thousands of consistent channel conversations every month help investors spot inflection points weeks before they show up in earnings or consensus estimates.

最棒的是什么？

And the best part?

这些专有的渠道调研直接集成到AlphaSense的研究平台中，该平台已被全球75%的顶级对冲基金信赖，可访问超过5亿个优质信息源，包括公司文件、券商研究报告、新闻、行业期刊以及超过24万份专家访谈记录。

These proprietary channel checks integrate directly into Alfasense's research platform, which is trusted by 75% of the world's top hedge funds with access to over 500,000,000 premium sources, from company filings and broker research to news, trade journals, and more than 240,000 expert call transcripts.

这种背景信息将原始信号转化为坚定信念。

That context turns raw signal into conviction.

率先洞察者胜出，其余人紧随其后。

The first to see wins, the rest follow.

立即前往 alphasense.com/capital 亲自体验。

Check it out for yourself at alphasense.com/capital.

Capital Allocators 还由 SRS Acquium 赞助。

Capital Allocators is also brought to you by SRS Acquium.

想确保您的并购流程不再停留在过去吗？

Wanna make sure your M and A processes aren't stuck in the past?

不如与一家近二十年来一直定义并购未来的企业合作。

Partner with a company that's been defining the future of deal making for nearly two decades instead.

在并购创新方面，SRS Acquium 重塑了交易完成的方式，优化流程以实现最高效率和最少麻烦。

When it comes to M and A innovation, SRS Acquium has reshaped the way that deals get done, streamlining processes for maximum efficiency and minimum headaches.

专业股东代表、在线并购支付、数字股东征集——SRS Acquium 开创了这些服务，并持续树立变革性创新的标杆。

Professional shareholder representation, online M and A payments, digital stockholder solicitation, SRS Acquium pioneered each and continues to set the bar for game changing innovation.

告别支离破碎的交易管理时代，与 SRS Acquium 一起定义您的未来，这是开展交易最明智的方式。

So leave the days of disjointed deal management behind and define your future with SRS Acquium, the smartest way to run a deal.

了解更多，请访问 srsac.quiocom。

Learn more at srsac.quiocom.

请欣赏我与霍华德·马克斯的对话。

Please enjoy my conversation with Howard Marks.

霍华德，非常感谢你参与这次对话。

Howard, thanks so much for doing this.

很高兴能来到这里，泰德。

Pleasure to be here, Ted.

我希望能带你回到过去。

I'd love you to take me back.

我知道你是在皇后区长大的，但我想听听，你觉得童年中哪段经历对你如今的成就影响最大？

I know you grew up in Queens, but would love to hear what part of your childhood would you say has most impacted where you've come since?

这很难说。

Well, it's hard to say.

首先，我的父母很聪明，持家有道，虽然他们没受过高等教育，都没上过大学，但仍是优秀的公民。

Number one, my parents were intelligent and kept a good home, not educated, neither went to college, but still good citizens.

我上的公立学校，那时我觉得能获得良好的教育。

I went to the public schools at a time when I feel you could get a good education.

我认为我为上大学做好了充分准备，尽管当时我们是三班倒，教室非常拥挤。

I think I got good preparation for college, even though we were on triple session and very crowded.

但我有丰富的课程选择，其中包括商业法和会计，我选了这些课并非常享受，这为我指明了职业方向。

But I had a great choice of courses, and that included business law and accounting, which I took and really enjoyed, so that set me on my career direction.

但我想提到的另一点是，我做了一个区分。

But the other thing that I want to mention is that I make a distinction.

我的父母在大萧条时期已经是成年人，不是在大萧条期间活着，而是作为成年人经历了大萧条，这意味着你必须出生于1910年之前，而我的父母正是如此。

My parents were adults during the depression, Not alive during the depression, adults during the depression, which meant you had to be born, I would say, before 1910, and mine were.

如果父母在大萧条时期已是成年人，他们就会受到创伤，你会从小听到这样的话：不要把所有鸡蛋放在一个篮子里，要为不测之日存钱。

If your parents were adults during the depression, they were traumatized, and you grew up hearing things like, Don't put all your eggs in one basket and save for a rainy day.

我认为，仅这一点就足以让我成为一个相当谨慎的人。

I think if nothing else, that may be a rather, I would say, cautious person.

你最初是怎么对金融产生兴趣的？

How'd you first get interested in finance?

是高中时的会计课。

It was the accounting course in high school.

这真的非常吸引我。

It really appealed to me.

我原打算成为一名会计师，这正是我父亲的职业。

I figured I'd become an accountant, which is what my father was by trade.

于是我申请了沃顿商学院，我的会计教授帮助我被录取了。

So I applied to Wharton and my accounting professor helped me get in.

到了沃顿之后，我想我转到了金融专业，因为我觉得更有趣，就这样定了。

Once at Wharton, I guess I switched my major to finance, which I found more interesting, and that was that.

在你的职业生涯中，你从股票起步，后来转向固定收益，早期在市场结构方面学到的最重要经验有哪些？

As you go through your career and you started in equities, turned to fixed income, what were some of the most important lessons that you learned in those early years about the structure of the markets?

我于1969年9月开始工作。

I started work in September 1969.

当时银行以及我们所称的货币中心银行都是‘漂亮五十’的投资者，这意味着它们几乎只购买美国50家被认为最好、增长最快的公司的股票。

The bank and the rest of what we called the money center banks were nifty 50 investors, which meant they bought almost exclusively the stocks of the 50, what they considered the 50 best and fastest growing companies in America.

这是一场严重的狂热，一个泡沫。

This was a serious mania, a bubble.

当时的主流观点认为，这些公司如此优秀，以至于不可能发生任何坏事，好到任何价格都不算高。

The ruling dicta, where these were companies that were so good, nothing bad could happen, and so good that no price was too high.

因此，我学到的真正教训是，总有一个价格是太高了。

So, the real lesson I learned was that there's always a price that's too high.

如果从我入职那天起持有这些股票五年，即使是在那些伟大的公司里，你也会损失约95%的资金。

If you held the stocks for five years from the day I got there, you lost about 95% of your money in great companies.

有些公司其实并不那么出色，但当时人们却认为它们很伟大。

Well, some weren't so great, but what were believed to be great.

所以我学到的教训是：重要的不是你买了什么，而是你付了多少钱。

So the lesson I learned was it's not what you buy, it's what you pay.

成功的投资不在于购买好的东西，而在于以合适的价格购买东西。

Successful investing is not a matter of buying good things, but buying things well.

随着时间推移，我逐渐形成了一种信念：没有任何资产好到不会被高估并变得危险，也很少有资产坏到如果足够便宜，就不能成为好投资。

As time passed, I rounded that into a belief that there is no asset so good that it can't become overpriced and dangerous, and very few assets which are so bad that if it's cheap enough, it can't be a good idea.

这真正概括了我此后所有的投资理念。

That really has summarized what I've done since then.

今年早些时候，我写了一份备忘录，谈到了从股权部门调到固定收益部门的事。

I wrote a memo earlier this year, I talked about moving from the equity department to the fixed income department.

如果用最委婉的方式说，我其实是被流放到了债券部门，当时那里就像是西伯利亚，因为我与‘漂亮五十’策略有关，而那个策略失败得一塌糊涂。

I would actually say in the nicest possible way, I was banished to the bond department, which was Siberia at that time, because I was associated with the Nifty 50 strategy, which went so badly.

我越来越清楚自己有多幸运，因为现在我正在研究美国一些最糟糕的公司。

It's coming more and more into focus how lucky I was because now I'm studying some of the worst companies in America.

1978年，我被要求创立花旗银行的高收益债券基金，据我所知，这是第一家由主流金融机构推出的高收益债券基金。

I was asked to start Citibank's high yield bond fund in 1978, and it was the first high yield bond fund from a mainstream financial institution, as far as I know.

但尽管评级很低，我现在却能稳定而安全地赚钱。

But despite the low ratings, now I'm making money steadily and safely.

这确实非常了不起。

And it was quite remarkable.

到了债券部门，你会发现办公桌上放着一个小小的塑料盒子，上面有按键，如果你输入票息率、到期日和价格，然后按下‘计算’键，它就会告诉你持有至到期的收益率。

You get to the bond department, there's this little plastic box sitting on your desk with keys, and if you punch in the coupon rate, the maturity date, and the price, and you push go, it tells you what your return will be if you hold it to maturity.

而当你购买股票、私募股权或房产时，却没有一个按钮能告诉你预期回报是多少。

Now, when you buy a stock or a private equity investment or a building, there's no button you can push to find out what the return is going to be.

我只是觉得固定收益要简单得多。

I just thought that fixed income was so much easier.

当我开始购买高收益债券时，到期收益率是12.25%。

When I started buying high yield bonds, the yield to maturity was 12.25.

这比你在标普指数上平均能获得的收益还要好，而且是合同约定的。

That's better than you can do in the S and P on average, contractually.

这对我来说真是令人耳目一新。

So it was really eye opening for me.

你因为你的备忘录而变得非常有名。

You've become super well known for your memos.

在我们深入探讨我最近这篇关于信贷的备忘录之前，你写这些备忘录的流程是什么？

Before we get into this most recent one on credit that I'm excited to explore, What's your process for writing these memos?

我只需要有一个想法，但我经常冒出一些值得写下来的想法。

I just have to get an idea, but I get ideas all the time, of something that's worth writing about.

这可能是新闻中的某个事件，很多想法来自与客户的讨论，因为他们的提问告诉我他们关心什么，而我想对此做出回应。

It might be something in the news, and a lot of them come from discussions with clients because their questions tell me what's on their minds, and I want to be responsive to that.

如果我能找到一种方法来回答他们的问题，而且这很有帮助，那么我就有了写备忘录的起点。

If I can figure out a way to answer their questions, which is helpful, then I got the start of a memo.

信用备忘录就是这样产生的，但这种情况经常发生。

That's what happened with the credit memo, but it happens very often.

不过，并不总是这样。

Now, it's not always that.

例如，我写过一些关于宏观主题的备忘录，比如风险、周期性、杠杆等，这些并不是源于客户的问题，而是因为我觉得自己有东西可以补充。

For example, I've written memos on big picture topics like risk and cyclicality and leverage and things like that, which did not stem from questions, but that was just because I thought I had something to add.

最基本的是，我必须觉得我有东西可写，而别人还没写过或讨论过，或者我看到了与别人不同的视角。

The basic thing is I have to think I have something to write, which not everybody else has been writing or talking about, or I have to see something differently from everybody else.

我最不想做的，就是发一篇说‘我也是’的备忘录。

The last thing I wanna do is put out a memo that says me too.

你怎么看待写作能力与投资能力之间的关系？

How do you think about the relationship with writing well and investing well?

这对我有效。

It works for me.

我不认为它必须对每个人都有效。

I don't think it has to work for everybody.

可能有些人连一句话都写不好，却能做出很好的投资。

There's probably people who can't put together a sentence who can make good investments.

有人给我写信说，你把复杂的东西讲清楚了。

People write me and they say you made something complex clear.

我总是觉得这是因为我的思维很有逻辑性。

I always think it's because my brain is logical.

我主要依靠左脑，即逻辑、善于表达、线性思考。

I operate largely on the left side, logical, literate, linear.

这可以帮助你投资，但我只是不认为它至关重要。

That can help you invest, but I just don't think it's essential.

成为优秀投资者的方式有很多，但逻辑性，我认为对我有用。

There are lots of ways to be a good investor, but the logicality, I think, works for me.

当你早期进入高收益市场时，那时市场还很初级，而在这段时期，企业获得信贷的方式、高收益市场以及结构化信贷经历了几次重大变化，越来越多地转向私募信贷，我非常想听听你对这些结构性变化及其对你思维影响的看法。

When you started out relatively early on in the high yield markets when they were fairly nascent, and we've had a few pretty significant changes over your time in the way credit got provided to companies, turned to high yield and different cycles of structured credit, increasingly private credit, and would just love to get your thoughts on those structural changes and the impact they've had on your thinking.

你说得对。

You're quite right.

我刚开始的时候，这还刚刚起步。

When I started, it was actually the beginning.

1976年，我认为一家没有投资级评级的公司是不可能发行债券的。

In 1976, I think it was impossible for a company without an investment grade rating to issue a bond.

到了1977年、1978年，这才成为可能。

And in '77, '78 is when it became possible.

有几个人提出，不管评级如何，只要债券的利息足够高以补偿风险，就可能是一个不错的投资。

A few people had the idea that regardless of the rating, if the bond paid enough interest to compensate for the risk, it might be a good investment.

当时，这个市场很小。

So, at the time, it was a small universe.

我想我1978年开始介入时，未偿债券总额大约是25亿美元。

I think when I started, picked it up in '8, I think it was $2,500,000,000 of bonds outstanding.

那就是全部了。

That was the whole thing.

它们并不是优秀的企业，杠杆率比投资级公司高得多，但你可能会发现它们的现金流具有某种持续性，这使它们具备信用价值。

They were not great companies, they were more levered than an investment grade company would be, but you might find some recurring aspect to the cash flows, which makes them credit worthy.

你说得对，确实发生了变化。

And you're right, there's been changes.

最大的变化是杠杆收购业务的兴起，这一业务在1984到1985年间迅速发展。

The biggest change was the blossoming of the LBO business, which really came on big in 'eighty four-'five.

杠杆收购业务可以通过5000万美元的资本收购一家十亿美元的公司，借入95%的资金。

The LBO business, leveraged buyouts could be done if you had 50,000,000 of capital, you could buy a billion dollar company, you could borrow 95% of the money.

这意味着规模较小的公司可以收购更大的公司，或者个人可以收购十亿美元规模的企业。

That meant that lesser companies could buy bigger companies, or individuals could buy billion dollar companies.

这使得大量公司成为收购目标。

It put a lot of companies in play.

这一趋势在80年代中期迅速发展。

That really blossomed in the mid-80s.

1991年，我们遭遇了第一次危机，许多80年代著名的杠杆收购企业纷纷破产。

In 1991, we had our first crisis, and many of the prominent LBOs of the 80s went under.

梅西百货、联邦国民抵押贷款协会、美国石膏公司，RJ奥纳维斯科是最大的收购案之一，它几乎倒闭，但最终没有。

Macy's Federated National Gypsum, US Gypsum, that's RJ Ornavisco was the biggest of the buyouts, it almost went under, but not quite.

所以，这改变了局面，使得收购融资变得困难。

So, that changed things, it made it hard to get the capital for buyouts.

杠杆收购业务实际上不得不重新定位，现在你不再听到‘杠杆收购’这个说法，取而代之的是‘私募股权’。

The leveraged buyout business actually had to reinvent itself, and you don't hear the term LBO business anymore, now you hear private equity.

那么，他们为什么要改名呢？

Well, why did they change the name?

因为如果叫杠杆收购，没人愿意做，毕竟结果太糟糕了。

Because nobody would do it if you called it leveraged buyouts because the results had been so bad.

另一点是，现在你无法再获得95%的融资，最多只能借到75%，所以一个拥有五千万美元的人只能收购两亿美元的公司，而不是十亿美元的公司。

The other thing is now you couldn't get 95% financing, you could only get 75% financing, so a guy with 50,000,000 could not buy a billion dollar company, only a $200,000,000 company.

这是一个巨大的变化。

That was a big change.

因此，数十亿美元规模的公司不再成为收购目标，行业转而采用买进并整合的滚动收购模式。

So, the multi billion dollar companies were no longer in play, and the industry practiced buy and build roll ups.

在90年代中期到晚期，我们见证了高级贷款业务的兴起。

In the mid to late 90s, we had the inception of the senior loan business.

起初是银行发放贷款，然后是高收益债券的发行，接着人们开始发行高级贷款，在某种程度上取代了银行的角色。

First, it was banks making loans, then it was high yield bonds being issued, then people began to issue senior loans, which took the place of the banks to some extent.

与高收益债券不同，这些高级贷款是浮动利率的，并且具有相当良好的契约条款，就像任何一位优秀银行家所要求的那样。

Unlike high yield bonds, those were floating rate and had pretty good covenants, like any good banker would request.

因此，我们见证了杠杆贷款市场的兴起。

So, we had the inception of the leveraged loan market.

随后，2001年和2002年科技泡沫破裂，标普指数出现了自大萧条以来的首次三年下滑。

Then we had the tech bubble burst in 2001 and '2, first three year decline in the S and P since the Great Depression.

人们几乎对股票市场失去了兴趣。

People lost interest in the stock market, pretty much.

美联储降息以应对经济低迷，人们也对债券市场失去了兴趣。

The Fed took rates down to fight the swoon, and people lost interest in the bond market.

那么，如果你既不想要股票，也不想要债券，你还想要什么？

Well, if you don't want stocks and you don't want bonds, what do you want?

好吧，我们换点别的。

Well, let's have something else.

那我们叫它什么好呢？

Well, what can we call it?

我们就叫它另类投资吧。

Let's call it alternatives.

于是，另类投资业务开始增长，他们尝试了对冲基金，但当对冲基金规模过大后，大多数就不再表现良好了，于是人们转而关注私募股权。

So, you had the growth of the alternative investment business, and they tried hedge funds, but when the hedge funds got too big, they stopped performing, most of them, and then people fastened on private equity.

大约在2005或2006年，私募股权基金首次兴起。

And around 'five or 'six, that's when private equity funds first started.

它们的规模突破了100亿美元，人们都热衷于参与这些基金。

They crossed the $10,000,000,000 line, and people were eager to do those.

我想说，从2005或2006年到2022年，私募股权被奉为我所说的‘万能药’，一种稳赚不赔的策略。

I would say from 'six or 'five to 'twenty two, private equity was really knighted as what I call the silver bullet, the can't miss strategy.

随后我们在2008、2009年遭遇了全球金融危机，银行受到惩戒，损失了一部分资本，监管更加严格，被劝阻从事高风险行为，这促使在2011或2012年诞生了私募信贷市场，如今其规模已超过1万亿美元。

Then we had the global financial crisis in 'eight, 'nine, the banks were chastened, lost some of their capital, were more tightly regulated, were discouraged from risk taking, and that led in 2011 or 'twelve to the creation of the private credit market, which is now over 1,000,000,000,001 half.

在2007年，我认为规模达到了一万亿美元的四分之一，因此在十七年间增长了六倍以上。

In 'seven, I think it was a quarter of 1,000,000,000,000, so it's up more than 6x in seventeen years.

但这本质上是高级贷款，只是以私人方式发行，没有注册、证交会监管等保障。

But this is the equivalent of senior loans, but issued privately without the benefit of registration, SEC, oversight, etcetera.

这就引出了我们目前的状况。

And that leads us to where we are now.

所以这就是整个发展历程。

So that's the travelogue.

因此，当你描述不同的周期时，我们今天所处的私人信贷市场，以及你刚刚撰写的这份备忘录，你该如何开始思考投资者应如何权衡其中的机会与潜在风险？

So as you describe different forms of cycles, where we sit today with private credit, and you've just written this memo about this, how do you start thinking about how investors should consider both the opportunity and the potential risk?

当然，风险是机会的另一面。

Well, of course, the risk is the flip side of the opportunity.

根据我的经验，你可以追溯这个叙事：总会有一些时候，没人愿意做某件事。

In my experience, and you can trace the narrative, you get the times when nobody wants to do something.

我绝不会用十英尺长的杆子去碰它。

I wouldn't touch that with the 10 foot pole.

通常，如果你愿意做，而别人都不愿意，你就能拿到一个不错的交易。

Usually, if you're willing to do it and nobody else is, you can get a pretty good deal.

我很幸运，因为那是在1978年的高收益债券，后来一位叫布鲁斯·卡什的人来找我，想和我合作，成立了困境债务基金。

I was lucky because that was high yield bonds in 'seventy eight, then I was approached by a guy named Bruce Karsh who wanted to partner with me and started Distressed Debt Fund.

我想那时我们还在TCW，我认为我们从一家金融机构发起了最早的一批困境债务基金之一，甚至在1998年进入了新兴市场股票。

I think we were at TCW at that time, and I think we started one of the very first distressed debt funds from a financial institution, even emerging market stocks in 'ninety eight, which we went into.

正如我所说，如果你做别人不愿意做的事，通常能拿到不错的交易。

As I say, if you do things nobody else wants to do, you can usually get a good deal.

但最终，其他人会发现这是个好主意，于是蜂拥而至，变得越来越流行。

But then eventually, other people figure out that it's a good idea, they flock in, it becomes more popular.

然后，像所有事情一样，它会被过度炒作。

And then of course, like everything, it gets overdone.

接着机会就消失了，留下的只有风险。

Then the opportunity is gone and all you have left is risk.

所以这就像钟摆的摆动。

So it's the swing of a pendulum.

这种现象非常明显。

It's very pronounced.

这是我1991年写的第二份备忘录的主题。

It was the subject of my second memo, which was written in 1991.

我称之为钟摆。

I called it the pendulum.

我认为这份备忘录被创意地命名为《第二季度表现》。

I think the memo was creatively titled Second Quarter Performance.

但对我来说，如果你关注短期甚至中期，这是最重要的维度。

But to me, if you're interested in the short or even the medium term, this is the most important dimension.

他们是喜欢还是讨厌它们？

Do they like them or do they hate them?

巴菲特简洁地总结为：先是创新者，然后是模仿者，最后是傻瓜。

Buffett puts it very succinctly, first the innovator, then the imitator, then the idiot.

用几个字来概括就是：智者在开始时做的事，愚者在结束时才做。

The way to sum that up in just a few words is that what the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end.

那么，在这个连续体上，我们现在处于什么位置？

So where are we on that continuum?

答案是，在早期，私人信贷尚未被发现、未被宣传、不受欢迎，但它因为低利率环境而流行起来：有趣的是，这些贷款仅支付约6%的利息，但通过私人基金，经理人可以通过杠杆方案将回报提升至约9%。

And the answer is, in the early years, private credit was undiscovered, unheralded, unpopular, but it caught on because in a low interest rate environment, these loans interestingly, they only paid about 6%, but with a private fund, the manager can deliver you a leveraged solution and get the return up to about nine.

因此，在2009年至2021年的低利率环境下，这种模式非常受欢迎。

And so, the low interest rate environment of 'nine to 'twenty one, this was very popular.

许多经理人进入这一领域，许多客户投入资金，许多公司借款，正如我所说，市场规模从2007年的2500亿美元增长到今天的约1.5万亿美元。

A lot of managers went in, a lot of clients put money in, a lot of companies borrowed, and as I say, it went from $250,000,000,000 in 'seven to a trillion and a half or so today.

我认为，‘未被发现’和‘不受欢迎’的阶段已经结束了。

And I would say that the aspect of being undiscovered and unloved is over.

如果你谨慎操作，这是一项合理的投资，但我认为它并非一种特殊策略。

It's a reasonable thing to do if you do it carefully, but I don't think it's a special strategy.

它只是定价合理而已。

It's just fairly priced.

那么问题来了：你是否谨慎操作？

And then the question is, do you do it carefully?

你是采取激进策略，迅速吸金并快速投入以扩大资产管理规模，还是耐心坚持信贷标准，从而放慢增长速度？

Do you do it aggressively so that you can hoover up money and put it to work fast and grow your AUM, or do you do it patiently and insist on credit standards which slows your growth.

而这，当然是一个持续存在的问题。

And that, of course, is one of the consistent questions.

在当前的承销标准中，你看到市场倾向如何？信贷标准恶化到了什么程度？

What are you seeing in current underwriting standards of how far the pendulum has swung towards lots and lots of interest in deteriorating of underwriting standards?

这并不是便宜货。

It's not a bargain.

如果市场情绪从厌恶转向喜爱，那它就不再是滞销的廉价品了。

It's not languishing cheap if the pendulum swings from hate them to love them.

我认为，信贷标准目前处于偏宽松到不严格的一端，但还不算太严重。

I would say that where the credit standards are on the somewhat to the undemanding side, not terribly.

在2005、2006、2007年，我们之所以基本避开这些市场，是因为那时资金随意发放给任何有需求的人，用途不限。

In 'five, 'six, 'seven, the reason we knew to pretty much avoid the markets in most regards was that they were just giving money away to anybody who wanted it for any purpose.

当时的信贷标准极低。

Standards were extremely low.

我不认为今天是这种情况。

I don't think that's the case today.

标准略低。

Standards are lowish.

这仍然带来一个大问题，因为如果你坚持高标准，而别人标准更低，他们就能为同一笔交易出更高的价。

That still presents a big problem, because if you want to apply high standards and somebody else has lower standards, then they can bid more for a given deal.

把它想象成一幅画的拍卖。

Think of it as an auction for a painting.

你只想每平方英寸出1000美元，但别人想出2000美元每平方英寸，你就拿不到它。

You want to pay $1,000 per square inch, but somebody else wants to pay $2,000 a square inch, you're not going to get it.

投资也是如此。

That's the same with investing.

我在二月写了一篇备忘录，名为《竞相到底》。

I wrote a memo in February called The Race to the Bottom.

我说，竞赛已经开始了。

I said the race is on.

太多人拥有太多资金，且急于投入，坏事就会发生。

Too many people have too much money and they're too eager to put it to work, bad things happen.

所以今天确实如此，但我认为今天还不算糟糕。

So it's on today, but I don't think it's terrible today.

只是今天的市场稍微慷慨了一点。

It's just the markets are a little bit generous today.

当你看到越来越多的人愿意为一幅你认为只值一千美元的画出价两千美元时，你和你的团队如何努力保持纪律？

How do you and your team go about trying to ensure that you maintain your discipline when you see more and more people willing to pay $2,000 for the painting you think is worth a thousand?

你只需不断强调风险控制的重要性。

You just constantly go on and on about the importance of risk control.

我们有一套投资理念，从创立之初就写了下来。

We have an investment philosophy which we wrote down when we started.

4月10日将是我们的三十周年纪念日。

April 10 will be our thirtieth anniversary.

我们是在1995年成立的。

We started in '95.

我们清楚自己相信什么，以及如何认为资金应该被管理，也清楚我们希望如何运作资金。

We knew what we believed in and how we believed money should be run and how we wanted to run money.

因此，我们写下了一套投资理念，涵盖了我们将要做的所有事情，它包含六个原则。

So, we wrote out an investment philosophy which covered everything we would do, and it has six tenets.

第一条指出，最重要的事情是风险控制。

The first says that the most important thing is risk control.

我认为，这正是专业人士的标志——不是不承担风险，而是明智地承担风险。

I think that's the mark of a professional, not that you don't take risks, but you take them intelligently.

第二条是一致性。

The second is consistency.

我们的客户不希望我们从业绩分布的顶端滑到底端，我们自己也不希望如此。

Our clients don't want us going from the top of the distribution to the bottom, and neither do we.

第三条是那些尚未被充分挖掘、并非人人都了解一切的低效市场。

The third is less efficient markets that haven't been thoroughly picked over, where not everybody knows everything and understands everything.

第四条是专业化。

Number four, specialization.

我们不试图做所有事情，而是专注于做好有限的几件事。

We don't try to do everything, just we try to do a limited number of things well.

第五是不依赖宏观预测，第六是不依赖市场择时。

Number five, non reliance on macro forecasting, and number six, non reliance on market timing.

但第一条，风险控制。

But the first one, risk control.

这确实是关键。

That's really the key.

在橡树溪工作的人经常被反复灌输这一点。

People who work at Oak Creek get battered with this all the time.

我把自己描述为首席文化官（CCO）。

I describe myself as the CCO, the chief culture officer.

当我撰写备忘录时，目的不只是对外传达。

And when I write the memos, it's not just for outside consumption.

当这些理念融入文化中时，就不必刻意强调了。

When it's in the water, you don't have to do it overtly.

每天，这种文化都在潜移默化中得到强化。

It's just insidious every day that the culture is reinforced.

我认为，没有人会来到橡树资本，是想玩花哨的技巧。

I think that people don't come to Oaktree who want to try trick shots.

没有人会来到橡树资本，认为只要承担大量风险并碰巧成功，就是通往成功的途径。

Nobody comes to Oaktree thinking that if they take a bunch of risk and they get lucky, that's the route to success.

事实上，我们有一个座右铭，它深深植根于我们的投资理念：只要避开失败者，赢家自然会脱颖而出。

In fact, we have this motto, which is embedded in our investment philosophy, if we avoid the losers, the winners take care of themselves.

这是我们的官方座右铭，也是看待固定收益的正确方式。

That's our official motto, and that's the right way to think about fixed income.

格雷厄姆和多德曾说，固定收益是一门负艺术。

Graham and Dodd said that fixed income is a negative art.

我对这句话感到被冒犯。

I took insult at that.

你为什么贬低我的职业生涯？

Why are you denigrating my career?

你为什么这么愤世嫉俗？

Why are you so cynical?

然后我明白了他们想表达的意思。

And then I realized what they were saying.

如果有100只高收益债券，都是9%的票息，假设我们已知其中90只会兑付，10只不会兑付，那么具体买哪90只并不重要，因为它们都支付9%的利息。

If there are 100 high yield bonds outstanding, and they're all 9% bonds, and let's say for the sake of argument that we know that 90 of the 100 will pay and 10 won't pay, it doesn't matter which of the 90 we buy, because they all pay 9%.

你可以买其中一只、十只，或者我们买全部90只，你的回报率都是100%。

You can buy one of them, 10 of them, we can buy all 90, you get 100%.

唯一重要的是不要买入那10只会违约的债券。

The only thing that matters is not buying the 10 that don't pay.

所以，你提升业绩的关键不在于买了什么，而在于排除了什么，这就是所谓的‘负艺术’，证毕。

So, you improve your performance not by what you buy, by what you exclude, QED, negative art.

我们一直反复向我们的信用分析师强调这一点。

We just bang on this all the time with our credit analysts.

我们并不试图寻找明天的明星债券、升级标的或收购目标。

We don't try to find tomorrow's shining star or upgrade or take over candidate.

我们只是努力找出那些会还钱的，排除那些不会还钱的。

We just try to find the ones that'll pay and exclude the ones that won't.

随着私人信贷市场兴趣和活动的激增，我想知道你如何看待私人信贷与公共信贷之间的区别和相似之处。

With this explosion of interest and activity in the private credit markets, I'm curious how you think about the distinctions and the similarities between private credit and public credit.

从理论上讲，这是同一个问题。

In theory, it's the same question.

如果我借钱给这家公司，他们会还我吗？

If I lend this company money, will they pay me back?

但主要区别在于，当然，如果你购买了私人信贷后改变主意，你不应该指望能把它卖出去。正如我的合伙人谢尔登·斯通——他和我共事四十二年了，曾是我花旗银行的第一位分析师——所说：铅笔没有橡皮擦，我认为这是一个非常重要的概念。

But the big differences are that, of course, if you buy a private credit and you change your mind, you shouldn't be able to expect to sell it, As my partner, Sheldon Stone, who's been with me for forty two years now, he was my first analyst at Citibank, he says, There's no eraser on the pencil, which is I think a very important concept.

然后还有市值计价的问题，它们是否进行市值计价，以及是否准确地进行市值计价？

And then there's the question of marketing to market, and do they get mark to market, and do they get mark to market accurately?

这取决于你怎么理解‘准确’的含义。

It depends on what you think accurately means.

看看股票价格每天上下波动1%或2%。

Look at stock prices up and down 1% or 2% every day.

这准确地反映了某个情绪波动者愿意交易的价格，但并不能准确反映公司的实际价值。

That accurately tells you what some manic depressive is willing to trade at, but it doesn't accurately tell you what the company is worth.

当你对私人信贷进行市值重估时，Ted，你该怎么做呢？

When you mark a private credit to market, which are you supposed to do, Ted?

你是应该根据公司的信誉和偿债能力来定价，还是应该根据心理波动来定价？

Are you supposed to market at a price which reflects the company's credibility and creditworthiness, or are you supposed to market at a price which reflects the psychological swings?

我认为这一点其实并不明确。

I think it's actually unclear.

但无论如何，私人信贷和其他私人资产并不会像反映心理波动那样进行市值重估。

But anyway, private credit and other private assets do not mark to market in the sense of reflecting the swings of psychology.

当你经历一段艰难时期，高收益债券下跌10%，而私人信贷只下跌2%时，我认为这就是原因。

When you go through a tough period and high yield bonds are down 10% and private credit's down 2%, I think that's the explanation.

哪一个才是正确的？

Which one of those is right?

很难说。

Hard to say.

这取决于你如何定义‘正确’。

Depends on your definition of right.

但我知道的是，如果你进入这样一个时期，你的高收益债券下跌了10%，而你的私人信贷只下跌了2%，然后当这个时期结束、市场复苏时，高收益债券可能从90涨到100，你赚了11%，而私人信贷可能从98涨到100，你只赚了2%。

But the only thing I know is that if you go into such a period, and your high yield bonds are down 10%, and your private credit is down 2%, and then you come out of that period and you have a recovery, maybe the high yield bonds will go from 90 to 100, and you'll make 11%, and maybe the private credit will go from 98 to 100, and you'll make 2%.

所以在我们的行业里，简单来说，如果没有下跌，你就不太可能有上涨。

So, the easy thing to say in our business is without the downs, you're unlikely to have the ups.

然后还有一系列问题，关于在养老基金或捐赠基金投资组合中持有不主动按市价估值的资产，这究竟意味着什么？

Then there's all the questions of what does it mean to have an asset in a pension or endowment portfolio that doesn't quote actively mark to mark?

接着还有一大堆问题：当我们最终迎来经济衰退时——我假设我们还没完全摆脱这种习惯——这些资产会发生什么？

Then there's a whole bunch of questions about when we finally have a recession, which I assume we haven't been completely broken of that habit, what will happen with these holdings?

管理者会不会拖延和假装？也就是说，当一笔债券到期时，借款人说‘我付不起，我要违约’，而你却说‘没关系，再拖一年吧’。

Will the managers extend and pretend, that is to say, when a bond comes due, somebody says, I can't pay you, I'm going to default, and you say, well, it's okay, take another year.

这叫做‘拖延与假装’，你继续把这笔资产记在账上，估值可能仍是98左右，假装它仍然良好。

That's called the extended pretend, you keep it on your books at maybe 98 or something like that, and you make believe it's good.

也许这一年里情况好转了，对方能还钱，也许并没有。

Maybe things get better in that year and they can pay you or maybe not.

在这种情况下，过去一年中的估值很可能出现了错误标记。

And then in that case, it was probably mismarked for the intervening year.

这会带来什么影响？

What are the implications of that?

关于私募信贷，重要的结构性问题就是我一直在讨论的流动性、公允价值计量，以及你是否在某个时刻被迫直面信用现实？

The important structural things about private credit are the things that I've been discussing, liquidity, mark to market, and are you compelled to face reality with regard to the credit at some point in time?

当你坐在投资委员会中，人们讨论私募信贷时，你对投资者应该如何思考这些棘手问题有何看法？

When you're sitting on an investment committee and people are talking about private credit, what are your views about how investors should think about these challenging issues?

这些基金的管理者非常喜欢不用公允价值计量，因为在市场低迷、报纸头条充满负面新闻的时候，他们不必去向机构的财务主管报告‘我们下跌了10%’。

Well, the people who run these funds pretty much like the fact that they don't mark to market because then in the bad times, when the headlines in the papers are so negative, they don't have to go to the treasurer of the organization and say we're down 10%.

他们可以说：‘太好了，我们只下跌了2%。’

They can say, oh, great news, we're only down 2%.

这确实是现实，但关键是，你不应该欺骗自己。

So it's just reality, but the point is you shouldn't deceive yourself.

如果它们的估值是98，你就不应觉得自己已经承受了全部损失。

If they're at 98, you should not feel that you've taken the full pain.

从某种意义上说，这是一个非常有趣的问题，泰德，我很高兴你正在探讨它。

In a way, it's a really interesting question, Ted, and I'm glad you're exploring it.

这有点像我们小时候常说的那个老问题。

It kind of relates to the old question we used to say when we were kids.

如果一棵树在森林里倒下，而没有人听到，它是否发出了声音？

If a tree falls in the forest and there's nobody there to hear it, did it make noise?

噪音是声波撞击你的耳朵。

Noise is sound waves hitting your ear.

如果没有人听到，也许它并没有发出声音。

If there's no people there to hear it, maybe it didn't make noise.

同样地，如果没有公开市场来定价，而你忽视了心理波动，这有什么不对吗？

Likewise, if there's no public market to price things at and you ignore the psychological swings, is there anything wrong with that?

我在信用备忘录中写道，在公开市场，无论是股票市场还是债券市场，你都可以实现同样的效果。

I wrote in the credit memo that in the public markets, stock market, bond market, you can accomplish the same thing.

只要别看报纸就行了。

Just don't read the paper.

如果你从经纪人那里收到对账单，就把它扔进抽屉里。

If you get your statement from the broker, just throw it in the drawer.

然后你会说，幸好我的东西没跌，因为你没打开信封。

And then you say, well, I'm glad my stuff didn't go down because you didn't open the envelope.

但从某种意义上说，私人信贷投资者正是这样做的。

But that's in a way what private credit investors are doing.

当对账单不是来自基金，而是来自经济时，他们也不打开信封。

When the statement comes, not from the fund, but from the economy, they don't open the envelope.

他们说，太好了，我的投资没下跌。

And they say, Boy, I'm glad my stuff didn't go down.

你认为当大量资金持续涌入这个领域时，会发生什么？

What do you think happens when there is so much money that continues to come into the space?

至少从 headline 来看，我们还没有经历违约周期，但公司确实时不时会遇到问题。

We haven't, at least on a headline basis, had a default cycle, but companies are certainly having problems from time to time.

这种情况会如何发展？

How does this play out?

我们还会看到违约周期吗？

Are we gonna see a default cycle again?

我小时候，人们管这个问题叫六十四美元的问题。

When I was a boy, that's what we used to call the $64 question.

后来通货膨胀了，就成了六万四千美元的问题。

Then with inflation, it became the $64,000 question.

你还记得那个节目吗？

You remember, show.

但我认为总有一天我们会经历另一次衰退。

But I think we'll have another recession someday.

我认为，像经济这样由人驱动的系统，周期性是不可避免的，因为总会经历过度乐观，然后迎来修正。

I think cyclicality in a person driven thing like the economy can't be avoided because you have excessive optimism and then corrections.

所以我认为我们会经历另一次衰退。

So I think we'll have another recession.

我认为当衰退来临时，一些公司会面临更大压力，那时问题就来了：它们会违约吗？

I think when we have a recession, it'll get harder on some companies, And then the question is, will they default?

我推测在公共债券市场中，他们可以进来要求进行债务置换，把问题推迟，而他们通常都能成功。

I would assume so in the public bond market, they can come in and ask for an exchange to push the problem down the road, and they often get it.

当我们进行谢尔登·斯通所说的补救性置换时，我们会将其标记为违约。

When we do what Sheldon Stone called a remedial exchange, we mark that down as default.

那么当企业去找贷款方说‘我们无法按时还款’时，私人信贷市场会发生什么？

And then what's going to happen in the private credit market when the companies go to the loan holders and say, look, we can't pay you on time.

而贷款方说：‘没关系，你是个很棒的人，我觉得你太棒了，再拖一年吧。’

And the loan holder says, that's fine, you're a great guy, think you're terrific, take another year.

如果再过一年他们还是还不了款，会发生什么？

And then what happens if they can't pay after another year?

让我先说清楚一件事。

Let me just put one thing on the table.

如果橡树资本在一家公司同时持有公共债券和私人信贷两种投资，而该公司在困难时期遇到问题，公共债券的估值从面值跌至80，而负责私人业务的估值人员却说：‘我觉得它不值98。’

What happens if Oaktree has two investments in a company, public bonds and private credit, and the company has some difficulties in a tough period, and the public bond gets marked down from par to 80, and the valuation guy who works on the private side says, well, I think it's not worth 98.

那么你就对同一家公司有了两笔贷款，一笔估值80，另一笔估值98。

Then you have two loans to the same company, one at 80, one at 98.

这样可以吗？

Is that okay?

这些是一些尚未解决的更深层次的问题。

These are some of these deeper questions that have yet to be resolved.

顺便说一下，美国证券交易委员会并不关注这些事情，因为这些都是私人投资，不要求准确性。

And by the way, the SEC doesn't look at these things because these are private investments, so they don't require accuracy.

基金的投资者大多对不准确持宽容态度，因为正如我所说，他们不必向高层报告这些问题。

And the investors in the fund are mostly happy without accuracy because as I said, they don't have to report problems to their higher ups.

所以，我们真的不知道会发生什么。

So, we don't really know what's going to happen.

我认为，这才是关键。

That's the key, I think.

如果这些资产是被那些存续期为十年的基金购买的，而问题恰好在第十年爆发，基金无法筹集资金进行清算并向投资者返还资金，只能拖延数年，那会怎样？

What if these things were bought in funds that have a ten year life, and stuff hits the fan right around year ten, and they can't raise the money to liquidate the fund and give the investors their money back, and it stretches on a couple of years.

那时会发生什么？

What will happen then?

我们就是不知道。

We just don't know.

巴菲特一直说得最好。

Buffett says it best all the time.

他说，只有当潮水退去时，你才能看出谁在裸泳。

He says, it's only when the tide goes out that you find out who's swimming naked.

所以现在，我们不知道谁在裸泳。

So right now, we don't know who's swimming naked.

我们不知道潮水退去时会是什么样子。

We don't know what it's gonna look like when the tide goes out.

很多这种情况都与私募股权密切相关，而你已经看到了资本形成和私募股权的放缓，但私人信贷仍有大量资金流入。

A lot of this is very tied into private equity, and you've had the beginning of slowdown in capital formation and private equity while you still have significant inflows into private credit.

我们很想听听你对私募股权与所有信贷状况的看法。

We'd love to get your thoughts on situation in private equity as compared to all credit.

我认为这是一个大话题。

I think that's a big topic.