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你介意我先问几个问题吗？
Do you mind if I start with a couple of questions?
我的意思是，当然可以。
I mean, for sure.
‘Cheeky’到底是什么意思？
Cheeky means what exactly?
好的。
Okay.
在‘cheeky pint’这个语境中，指的是你本不该喝的那杯啤酒。
In the context of a cheeky pint, this is a pint you're not really meant to be having.
当它变得成熟后，就会开始吸引体制内的人。
And when it becomes established, it starts to attract establishment people.
社交网络，对。
The social network Right.
没错。
Exactly.
从这个意义上说，经济下行尽管令人头疼，但可能是有帮助的。
And in that sense, the downturns, as much of a pain in the butt as they are, are probably are helpful.
你回到银行业，回到咨询业。
You go back to banking, go back to consulting.
是的。
Yes.
萨拉，为什么西海岸比东海岸有更多冒险行为？
Sarah, why is there more risk taking on the West Coast versus the East Coast?
因为就像
Because like
啊，前排。
Ah, the front tier.
它说FOMO导致高信任。
It says FOMO leads to high trust.
这种说法带有一种愤世嫉俗的真相。
That sort of has a cynical truth to it.
第二类错误要糟糕得多。
Category two errors are much, much worse.
顺便说一句，它们会折磨你几十年。
By the way, they torture you for fucking decades.
对吧？
Right?
因为你一路都在读到那些你搞砸了的成功案例。
Because you read about the success cases that you've screwed up all the way up.
所以你只能通过痛苦的方式学习。
And so you you just learn the hard way.
你必须非常开放包容。
Like, you have to be extremely open minded.
我发现人们宁愿忍受任何程度的慢性疼痛，也不愿面对像
I have found people willing to tolerate any level of chronic pain in order to avoid Like
急性疼痛。
acute pain.
为了
In order
避免急性疼痛。
to avoid acute pain.
人们宁愿在五年内慢慢失去，是的。
People would much rather lose slowly over five years Yep.
也不愿进行一场涉及重大改变以停止损失的对话。
Than have the conversation that involves a dramatic change to stop losing.
好的。
Alright.
就是这样。
There you go.
好的。
Alright.
好了，各位。
Alright, guys.
还需要别的吗？
Anyone need anything else?
终于有个真正的爱尔兰调酒师了。
Finally, a legitimately Irish bartender.
我对这些时间安排有问题，因为下午5点，明显是下班后喝啤酒的时间，可以接受。
I have a scheduling issue with these because 5PM, clearly after work pints, acceptable.
下午4点，我不
4PM, I don't
知道，如果你是银行家之类的，下班后可以。
know, after work if you're a banker or whatever.
下午3点半，那你就是在办公室喝酒了。
03:30PM, like, now you're just drinking at the office.
马克·安德森从互联网诞生之初就一直在其中了。
Mark Andreessen has been around the Internet since the very beginning, really.
他是网景公司的联合创始人。
He cofounded Netscape.
他发明了图片标签。
He invented the Image Tag.
他在互联网初期就已现身。
He was there at the beginning.
后来，他共同创立了风险投资巨头安德森·霍洛维茨。
And later, he cofounded the venture capital giant Andreessen Horowitz.
因此，我将与他以及我们的共同朋友查理·松赫斯特进行对话。
So I'll be speaking to him along with our mutual friend, Charlie Songhurst.
干杯。
Cheers.
干杯。
Cheers.
很高兴见到你们。
Good to see you guys.
我可以先问几个问题吗？
Do you mind if I start with a couple of questions?
我
I
我的意思是，当然可以。
mean, sure.
嗯，有几件事。
Well, there's just a couple of things.
作为一个中西部的美国男孩，有几件事。
As a Midwestern American boy, there's just a couple of things.
这可不是我的地盘。
This is not my natural habitat.
好的。
Okay.
‘Cheeky’到底是什么意思？
Cheeky means what exactly?
好的。
Okay.
在‘调皮的一品脱’这个语境下，指的是你本不该喝的那杯啤酒。
In context of a cheeky pint, it is a pint you're not really meant to be having.
所以，如果你本该下班后直接回家，却偷偷和几个同事溜去酒吧，偷偷摸摸地不在工作时间喝酒，那这就是一杯‘调皮的一品脱’。
And so if you were meant to be going home right after work and instead you stole away with a few coworkers, you know, just off the books, aren't meant to be at the pub right now, that would be a cheeky pint.
而关于‘品脱’这件事特别让人困惑的是，欧洲其他所有东西都应该是‘调皮的分升’才对。
And then pint the thing about pint that's just really puzzling is that everything else in Europe is like, you know like, it should be the, like, cheeky deciliter.
我明白了。
I see.
对吧？
Right?
那为什么‘品脱’这个词只用于指酒精饮品，却不用于实际的容量单位呢？
And so why is pint used with reference to alcohol but not with actual measurement?
因为，我的意思是，健力士和酒精整体上都属于一种悠久的传统。
Because, I mean, Guinness and alcohol generally is part of a rich tradition.
健力士的历史可以追溯到18世纪。
Guinness dates from the 1700s.
这正是爱尔兰拥有运河系统的原因。
It's part of why we have the it's the reason we have the canal system in Ireland.
它曾经是爱尔兰最大的公司。
It was, you know, the largest company in Ireland at one point.
通常，历史最悠久的机构是大学和啤酒厂。
Often, the longest tenured institutions are universities and breweries.
你看一下比利时人之类的地方。
And, you know, you look at the Belgians and things like that.
所以我认为，传统在酒精中比在路标中更能延续下去。
And so I think tradition survives better in alcohol than it does in road signs.
好的。
Okay.
我有几个问题，更多问题，但为了这次对话，我会先搁置它们。
I have several questions, more but I will suspend them for the purpose of this conversation.
好的，我喜欢我们正在创造的这种新形式。
Okay, I like this new format that we're inventing.
我想从这里开始，我们这里有各种马克·安德森的纪念品，还有我最喜欢的马克·安德森内容片段之一——你的美乐轻啤广告剧照。
Where I want to start is we have here various bits of Marc Andreessen memorabilia and a still from one of my favorite pieces of Marc Andreessen content, your Miller Lite commercial.
那真是太棒了。
Oh, that was awesome.
直到我重新观看时，才意识到那是和诺姆·麦克唐纳一起拍的。
It was only in a rewatch that I realized it was with Norm MacDonald.
诺姆·麦克唐纳。
Norm MacDonald.
见到他是什么感觉？
What was it like meeting him?
独一无二的人物。
The one and only.
我的经验是，喜剧演员总是有点特别，因为他们职业上就是要搞笑，所以他们在人际交往中刻意搞笑的兴趣其实并不高。
My experience, comedians are always a little bit interesting to meet because they're professionally funny, And so their interest in being, like, interpersonally funny is, like, not that high.
哦。
Oh.
因为我觉得这带来了很大的压力和负担。
Because it's, like, a lot of stress and pressure, I think.
我明白了。
I see.
我的意思是，他天生就很幽默。
I mean, he was very naturally funny.
是的，是的，是的。
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
但他并不总是处于表演状态。
But But he wasn't always on.
他并不总是处于表演状态。
He was not always on.
我的意思是，如果你看这个广告的上下文，你会觉得我们当时好像在世界上最酷的夜总会里。
And I mean, in con I will tell you in context, if you will see the commercial, In context, it looks like we were in, like, the coolest nightclub in the world.
我告诉你，实际上是在白天，位于洛杉矶内陆地区，也就是他们所说的内陆帝国，某个仓库里。
I will tell you, was in the middle of the day, in Los in in inner in inland in what they call the Inland Empire in LA, some in some some warehouse.
而且当时就像
And it was like
并没有看起来那么酷。
It was not as cool as it looked.
外面温度有110华氏度。
It was like a 110 degrees outside.
里面温度高达130华氏度。
It was like 130 degrees inside.
因为会影响音效，所以没有开空调。
There was no air conditioning because it would screw up the sound.
为了制造烟雾缭绕的夜总会效果，他们往里面喷了食用油。
And then to create the Smoky Nightclub effect, they spray vegetable oil in it.
不是水，
Not water,
是食用油。
vegetable oil.
不是水，是植物油，因为必须
Not water, vegetable oil because it has to
哦，必须真正营造出
Oh, it has to, like, actually create
它必须持久停留。
a It has to linger.
必须持久停留。
Has to linger.
导演很棒，他对我这个完全没有相关经验的人非常宽容。
The director was great, and he was tremendously tolerant of me with no actual experience doing anything like that.
但我认为他觉得自己是斯坦利·库布里克，因为我们拍了115到50条镜头。
But, I think he did think he was Stanley Kubrick because we did, like, 115, 50 takes.
他特别沉迷于他的米勒淡啤镜头。
He was really into his Miller Lite action.
是的。
Yeah.
所以，在酷热中熬了六个小时，几乎要晕倒，还被 Vegetable oil 呛到，这可不是
And so, like, hour six of nearly passing out from the heat and choking on vegetable oil was not
我明白了。
I see.
最棒的——哦，还有另一个很了不起的成就：一周后，米勒公司解雇了他们的广告代理公司，我倒希望这能归功于
The most, Oh, and then the other the other great, the other kind of great claim to fame is, it was a week later, Miller fired their ad agency, which I would like think that
那真酷。
I that was cool.
我确实得承认，我对此负有责任，这真的挺搞笑的。
I I bear I bear some responsibility for being That's really funny.
是的。
Yes.
好吧。
Okay.
所以我想和你们深入聊聊、花大量时间讨论的是硅谷的历史。
So the thing I wanna get into you guys about or spend a lot of time on is the history of the Valley.
一个有趣的切入点可能是：你能知道自己身处泡沫中吗？
One interesting place to start might be, can you tell when you're in a bubble?
我的经验是不能。
So my experience is no.
我想补充一点细微差别，我会描述两点。
And the nuance that I would put on that I'll describe two.
第一点是，关于经济学家有一个老说法，我认为这对投资者和创业者也适用：经济学家预测了过去两次泡沫中的九次，或者过去两次崩盘中的九次。
Number one is there's an old line with respect to economists that also applies, I think, to investors and entrepreneurs, which is economists have predicted nine of the last two bubbles or nine of the last two crashes.
因此，这种情况非常普遍。
And so it is extremely common.
这是一个困难的问题，因为人们经常错误地称某物为泡沫。
It's a difficult question because it's extremely common for people to call a bubble.
当他们猜对时，就会多年四处宣扬是自己看出了泡沫。
When they're correct, they will then go around for years claiming that they're the one who called it.
但你通常会发现，这些人其实早在二十年前就开始不断这样说了。
What you find with those people generally is they were calling it continuously for the twenty years earlier.
彼得
Peter
辛格。
Singer.
比如彼得·辛格。
Peter Singer, for example.
或者更早的时候，有个著名的《巴伦周刊》，你知道，《巴伦周刊》还在，但过去曾是极其重要的投资刊物。
Or earlier, there's a famous forgot remember Barron's, know, Barron's, it's still around, but it used to be, like, extremely important, investment publication.
《巴伦周刊》有一位专栏作家，叫艾尔曼、艾尔曼、艾尔曼，他整整四十年写的是同一专栏。
There was a columnist for Barron's, something, Ehlman Ehlman Ehlman, and literally, he wrote the same column for forty years.
你知道，末日到了。
You know, the end is here.
一切都将崩盘。
It's all going to crash.
这都是一个巨大的泡沫。
It's all a giant bubble.
他从大约1975年到2015年，持续不断地写了这篇专栏，具体年份我记不清了。
He wrote that, I think, continuously from, like, I forget the exact year, but from, like, you know, 1975 to, like, you know, 2015.
所以你就会看到这种卡桑德拉式的人物，他们靠这种预言混饭吃。
So you have this, like, kind of Cassandra thing, you know, where they kind of dine out on it.
因此，我通常认为，这类人并不具备预测能力。
And so I find generally that those kinds of people don't have predictive ability.
我再告诉你，世界上最精明的对冲基金经理，如果你查看他们的背景，你会发现，只要他们自认为从事宏观交易，就曾试图根据他们认为明显的泡沫进行交易。
Then I will tell you, like, the most sophisticated hedge fund managers in the world, generally, if you look in their backgrounds, you know, at some point if they thought they were in the macro business, you know, they will have tried to make the trade based on what they view as obviously a bubble.
当时有非常精明的对冲基金投资者。
And there were extremely sophisticated hedge fund investors.
他们在1999年做空科技股，后来意识到自己错了，于2000年转而做多科技股。
They went short tech stocks in the '9 and then, you know, realized they were wrong and then went long tech stocks in 2000.
哦，德鲁克豪斯，你可以在公开场合谈论他，他本人也谈过。
Oh, Druckhouse, you can talked about it in public He's talked about
但还有很多其他例子，比如另一位我不会点名的、如今非常活跃的聪明人，我和他通电话聊过一些事，他听了就笑起来了。
but there are many other Well, there's another guy who I won't name who's very active today, who's very smart, and I was talking him on the phone about stuff, and he started laughing.
他说，他就知道，每当我以为股市要上涨时，它反而下跌，反之亦然。
And he said, he's like, all I know is whenever I think the stock market is gonna go up, it goes down and vice versa.
这可是个投资传奇人物。
And this is like a guy who's like an investing legend.
怎么了，
What's up,
泡沫开始破裂的时候是什么时候？
when the bubbles started to burst?
回过头看，那时明显是
When was it obvious in retrospect that that
不是。
was No.
是
Is
2000年还是2001年？
it 2000, 2001?
你回头看，是不是只到2004年才明显？
Is it only like 2004 when you look back?
比如，什么时候
Like, when does
不是。
No.
所以，那个常说的、但确实正确的说法是：市场总是在忧虑之墙上攀爬。
So so the the the sort of the sort of cliche, which is correct, is the market climbs a wall of worry.
对吧？
Right?
所以，当市场上涨时，每一步都有人恐慌，觉得它马上就要崩盘了。
And so so what happens is when when the market when the market when the market is rising, like, every step of the way, there there's, like, some panic attack going on about, like, it's it's it's it's it's immediately gonna gonna collapse.
然后，市场就会出现回撤。
And then what happens is there are drawdowns.
我相信你们一定会看到的。
And I'm sure you guys will see.
你看那些回撤图表真的非常有趣，因为你
Like, there's the drawdown charts are really fascinating to see because you
1998年亚洲危机时出现过一次大幅回撤。
There's a big one in 1998 with the Asian crisis.
所以我们当时都觉得完了。
So we all thought that was it.
就像我说的，就发生在 exactly 这个时候。
Like, this is exactly where I said it.
是的，1998年确实发生了崩盘。
So, yes, there there was a blowup in '98.
当时出现了国际性危机，还有一家名为LTC的大对冲基金倒闭。
There there was an international crisis, and then there was a collapse of a big hedge fund at the time called LTC.
长期资本管理公司。
Long term capital management.
我最近刚读过那本书。
I read that book recently.
我正在读这本书。
Was reading it.
这是一本绝佳的书。
It's a fantastic book.
是的。
Yeah.
如果你要开对冲基金，千万别叫它‘长期资本’，这真是一个绝佳的教训。
If you if you it it is a great moral it's a great lesson, and do not do not name your hedge fund long term.
我
I
我觉得教训是别在一笔交易上加30倍杠杆。
thought the lesson was don't run 30 times levered on the one trade.
哦，那也是个问题。
Oh, there is that.
还有，别以为学术界的超级明星就一定有直觉。
And also assume that, you know, academic, you know, superstars necessarily have a have a feel.
所以，是的。
So yes.
但像我，我们很多人都这样，就是这样了。
But, like I I a lot of us in, that was it.
就像，IPO就这么结束了。
Like, that's it for IPOs.
结束了。
It's over.
你知道，就这样了。
You know, that's it.
整个体系都要崩塌了。
The whole thing is gonna cave in.
所以每一步都是如此。
So every step of the way.
相反，我们大家都习惯了它不断上涨，因此出现了大量投机行为。
And then conversely, like, we all got so used to it rising that, like, there there was a lot of speculation.
你知道，我认为聪明人当中普遍的看法是，当纳斯达克在2000年3月左右首次下跌时，大家觉得这只是又一个短暂的波动。
You know, I think I would say the median view amongst smart people and, you know, when those Nasdaq first cracked in the sort of around March 2000 was, oh, it's just another one of these momentary blips.
我记得当时的情况是，我们需要看图表，但我的记忆是，从2000年到2005年，市场曾五次明显崩盘。
And the way I remember it, we'd have to look at the chart, but the way I remember it is fundamentally that from 2000, 2005, there were like five discrete moments where it like fell apart.
它一直在持续下跌。
It kept cascading down.
我最喜欢的故事版本是，我们在2000年9月将公司Loud Club上市了。
My favorite version of the story is we took our company, Loud Club, public in September 2000.
在路演期间，我们跑了整整三周。
And while we were on the road we were on the road for three weeks.
就在我们路演期间，纳斯达克指数暴跌了一半。
So while we were on the road, the Nasdaq fell in half.
对吧？
Right?
但那只是那种情况之一。
But that was just like one of those things.
所以，回答你的问题，我会这么说。
And so so to to the answer to your question is, you know, I'll put it this way.
到2003年、2004年，你就知道情况真的很糟了。
By 2003, 2004, you knew that it was really bad.
那么，有哪些迹象呢？
And and and then what what are the indicators?
每个人都知道的迹象就是，多头全部被清仓了。
The the indicator that everybody really knows it is the longs all get fired.
没错。
Yep.
他们亏了钱，然后项目经理们实际上也被解雇了。
They they lose their money and then and then actually get the the PMs actually get terminated.
在那之前，我认为仍然存在大量的不确定性，或者说是一种否认心态。
And until that happens, there's still, I would say, tremendous amounts of, you know, either uncertainty or you could say denial.
2003年是持有互联网股票的绝佳年份之一，因为你在底部买入，随后eBay、雅虎等股票出现了大幅上涨。
One of the great years of owning Internet stocks was 2003 because you get the bottom and then you get this huge uplift, I think, in eBay, Yahoo.
也许是2004年。
Maybe it's 2004.
当然。
Sure.
但在整个时期，风险投资并不好，增长停滞了七年。
But VC wasn't good for that entire period, uptake of seven.
为什么公开市场在2003和2004年表现良好，而风险投资却在2000到2007年间，除了谷歌之外，几乎经历了整整七年的低迷？
Why is it that sort of public markets is good in 'three and 'four, but VC just has sort of almost like a lost seven years ex Google between 2000 and 2007?
我只想说，你可以这样认为。
I would just say, look, you could you could maybe say this.
你可以说，创业生态系统在2003、2004年被彻底摧毁了，创办公司的想法显得荒谬可笑。
You could say the entrepreneurial ecosystem got completely flattened by 'three, 'four, like the idea of starting a company was ludicrous.
明白了。
Got
对。
it.
所以这可能会让潜在的创业者产生太多恐惧。
So So maybe creates too much fear on potential entrepreneurs.
是的，没错。
Yeah, that's right.
然后你看，风险投资人会恐慌。
And then look, VCs panic.
你知道，这么说吧，你在风险投资中犯的最大错误之一，就是真的去关注他们在电视上、特别是财经新闻里说的话。
You know, say this, like one of the cardinal sins you get into adventure is you're actually paying attention to what they're saying on TV, in particular on the financial news.
所以当纳斯达克崩盘时，你很难不被这种心理影响，很难保持对投资的热情。
So it's like, the NASDAQ, you know, cracks, it's very hard to keep yourself out of that psychology and to be, like, enthusiastic about making an investment.
但当然，如果你是个风险投资人，作为VC最理性的做法是继续。
But of course, if you're a VC, the rational thing to do if you're a VC is to keep.
所以弗雷德·威尔逊是最初真正向我解释这一点的人，他说，你看，他的版本是：泡沫破裂，一切都很随机、疯狂，我们永远搞不懂整个局面，然后你就被这种心理裹挟了。
So Fred Wilson's the guy who kind of really walked me through this originally, he said, look, his version of this would be, yeah, like bubbles bust, like it's all random and crazy and we never know what's going on in the whole thing and you get wrapped up in the psychology.
因此，他一贯的准则就是，用一套有纪律的、机械化的流程来控制投资节奏和退出节奏。
And so his rule of thumb always was you have a disciplined mechanical process for the pace of investment and also for the pace of exits.
你绝不能偏离它。
And you don't deviate from it.
很多这样的合理化理由恰恰是为了让你在人人都恐慌时继续投资，这真的很有趣，你在股市中就能看到这一点。
A lot of that justification would be precisely so that you keep investing at the Everybody's it's so funny, and you see this in the stock market.
人人都说，哦，低买高卖。
Everybody says, oh, know, buy low, sell high.
人人都自诩为泡沫专家。
Everybody's an expert in bubbles.
人人都读过相关书籍，全都懂。
Everybody's read the books, the whole thing.
但当市场崩盘时，这其实真的很有趣，因为那时充满了负面情绪。
But like when the market has caved in, it is just Well, it's actually really funny because it's like negativity.
简直压倒性地，你们都是傻子。
It's like just overwhelmingly, you people are idiots.
这整个事情太蠢了。
Like, this whole thing is stupid.
它永远不会恢复了。
It's never gonna recover.
对此有18种宏观解释。
There's 18 macro explanations for that.
会恢复的。
Gonna recover.
然后实际上，在真正的底部，我发现人们完全不再谈论它了。
And then actually, at the real bottom, the other thing I found is people just completely stopped talking about it.
是的。
Yes.
就像，关于初创公司的这种想法。
Like, it just the idea of, like, startups.
加密货币市场是研究
Crypto markets are a case study in
它就像从未存在过一样。
the It's same of the three just like it never even existed.
是的。
Yeah.
这就像是你绝不会在晚宴上提起的事情。
It's just like it's it's like the thing you would never bring up at a dinner party.
这或许就是你的观点。
And can maybe be your point.
2003年到2004年，互联网创业公司就是这种情况——只要有可能，你根本不会提起它。
That's what happened with Internet startups in 2003, 2004, which is you you would not talk about it if you could possibly avoid it.
所以某种程度上，2003年互联网创业公司的社会地位，类似于2020年的加密货币。
So in some ways, the social status of Internet startups in o three is similar to crypto in, 2020.
是的。
Yeah.
那时候有个特别流行的笑话，说的是九十年代末两大风投创业趋势：所谓的互联网公司，分为B2C（企业对消费者）和B2B（企业对企业）。
So there there the great the great kind of joke of that time was the the the great the two great kind of VC trends startup trends of of the late nineties were so called, you know, Internet companies, but B2C, business to consumer, and then B2B business to business.
但到了2003年，大家开玩笑说，B2B意思是回到银行业，B2C意思是回到咨询业，所以，这反过来也解释了为什么你会特别喜欢这个说法。
And by 2003, the line was B2B meant back to banking and B2C meant And back to consulting, so, like Oh, and then this in turn is why you'll enjoy this a great deal.
这正是为什么哈佛和斯坦福商学院毕业生的就业选择成为绝佳指标的原因。
This in turn is why the employment decisions of graduating Harvard and Stanford Business School students are such a great indicator.
这可能是所有指标中最好的，能反映市场动态，因为如果他们进入科技行业，说明市场被高估了。
Possibly the best indicator of all of what's happening in the market because they go into tech, the market's overblown.
而如果他们转向银行业或咨询业，那就是进行风险投资的好时机。
And if they go into banking consulting, it's a great time to make VC investments.
这可能是我所见过的最可靠的指标，原因就在于社会地位的因素。
And that maybe has been the best indicator I've seen the whole time because of the social status aspects.
是的。
Yes.
对。
Right.
我认为你所描述的是，你认为自己无法做出宏观判断，所以你只能决定在数十年的时间跨度内，哪些领域是值得投资的，比如科技初创企业、加密货币、美国活力，或者选一条路，然后定期定额投入。
I think what you're describing is you don't think you're capable of making macro calls, so you just have to decide what are sensible areas to be investing in over multi decade time horizons, tech startups generally, crypto, you know, American Dynamis and Pick Your Lane, and then you dollar cast average into them.
然后有时会出现泡沫，比如2021年的加密货币时刻。
And then sometimes there'll be bubbles, like there'll be crypto twenty twenty one moments.
但这没关系，因为如果你把同样的钱投入这些领域——粗略估算，但每年都能持续投入，那么赢家带来的回报将远超那些所有资产都可能被低估的年份。
But that's fine because if you put the same dollars into these areas I mean, rough numbers, but kind of consistently put dollars into these areas each year, the winners will more than make up for the years where everything was hopefully undervalued.
这基本上就是你的框架吗？
Is that basically your framework on this?
我认为这基本是对的。
I would say that's mostly true.
我要修正的是，这其实并不是美元成本平均法。
What I would modify that is it's actually not dollar cost averaging.
如果你在股票市场这么做，那确实是美元成本平均法。
Like, if you're doing it the stock market, it's dollar cost averaging.
但如果你在风投领域这么做，那就不是美元成本平均法。
If you're doing it in venture, it's not dollar cost averaging.
原因是，如果你做出了正确的风投投资，你投入多少钱根本无关紧要。
The reason is because if you make the right venture investment, it doesn't matter how much money you put in.
回报潜力实在太巨大了。
The upside is so great.
如果你做出了错误的风险投资，就会赔掉所有钱。
And if you make the wrong venture investment, you lose all the money.
等等，这真的是
Wait, is that actually
真的吗？
true?
这是
Is that
而贝特尔施因的100，想想看，
And Bertelschines 100, think,
会是30,000倍。
would be 30,000 x.
什么？抱歉，你说什么？
What's that, sorry?
安迪·贝特尔施因投了1100美元到谷歌，获得了30,000倍的回报。
Andy Bertelschein's $1,100 ks, 100 into Google would have been 30,000 x.
这能支付很多其他的费用
That pays for a lot of other
在风险投资中，事实证明，投入的资金数额几乎与任何事情都无关，你并不是在试图寻找，等等，还有另一件事。
In venture capital, just turns out that the amount of money invested has almost nothing to do with anything, you're not trying Well, here's another thing.
你从不去折扣店冒险投资。
You never adventure around a bargain shop.
从来，从来都不会。
Like, ever, ever.
不会。
No.
我同意这一点。
I agree with that.
而且，
And,
你需要做的其实是，我想，对你说的话稍作修改就是：你需要持续投资。
What like, you you need to do is So, I guess the way would just modify what you said is just you need to keep investing.
是的。
Yes.
是的。
Yes.
危险不在于投资太便宜或太贵。
The danger is not investing too cheap or too dear.
真正的危险是完全停止投资。
The danger is literally stopping.
当然。
Sure.
但是，莎拉，当我提到美元成本平均法时，指的是你投入的固定金额。
But, Sarah, when I was saying dollar cost averaging, it was the fixed amount of money that you deploy.
因为我认为人们出问题的方式是：2021年来了，他们筹集了一笔巨额基金，而这笔基金的回报非常差。
Because I think the way people get into trouble is 2021 comes along and they raise some giant fund, and that one has very poor returns.
但如果你每年投资一亿美元，那么你的表现会相当不错。
But if you, like, invest $100,000,000 each year, then you'll do pretty well.
你也可以这么说，最聪明的有限合伙人，比如大卫·斯文森，他被认为是另类资产组合管理中最聪明的人之一，写过一本书，书中详细探讨了这一点，他反复强调：对于风险投资，你真的必须从长远角度去审视。
And you could also say this, the smartest LPs so David Swenson, who was considered to be the smartest portfolio manager for illiquid portfolios, wrote a book where he goes through the following, and he talked about this a lot, which basically is, for something like venture, you really got to look at it.
你不能仅凭某个瞬间、某一只基金或某个单一领域来理性评估风险投资。
You cannot rationally evaluate venture based on a single moment in time, a single fund, a single sector, any of that stuff.
你必须在一个足够长的时间跨度内观察，以消除诸如……嗯，证据……等特定因素的影响。
You have to basically look at it over a long enough period of time where you wash out the specific effects of, you know, what Well, the proof
这一点的证据在于，任何一家风投公司内部不同基金之间的表现波动都极其剧烈。
of that is the inter vintage volatility in any given VC is incredible.
没错。
Right.
正是如此。
That's right.
这表明，其中很大一部分纯粹是……是的。
Like, which shows, like, so much of it is just Yeah.
一家优秀的风投公司会有一些15倍回报的基金，也有一些，比如，
A tough VC firm will have some 15x funds and some, like,
两三个。
two or three.
这太棒了。
It's fantastic
因为谷歌成立于1999年，正值泡沫高峰期。
because Google's founded in 'ninety nine, so at the height of a bubble.
Meta成立于2004年，处于低谷期。
Meta's founded 2004 at the bottom.
对。
Right.
没错。
That's right.
没有任何模式与宏观因素相关。
There's no pattern that ties to macro.
这看起来几乎是随机的。
It's just it appears to be almost stochastic.
你就是无法预测。
You just can't predict.
你只能持续去做
You've just got to keep doing
是的，完全正确。
Yeah, that's exactly right.
而这就是我认为风险投资的核心真相：它实际上是为那些拥有二三十年、四十年甚至五十年时间视野的人准备的。
And that's the I would say that's sort of the core fundamental kind of truth of venture, is really it's something for people with a twenty, thirty, forty, fifty year time horizon.
你必须穿越整个周期。
You have to get across You have to get all the way across the cycles.
因为如果作为有限合伙人，一旦遇到表现糟糕的基金就撤资，而这恰恰是你应该进场的时候。
Because what happens otherwise, if you're an LP, what happens is the minute you have a fund that's terrible, pull out, and that's precisely when you should have been going in.
有限合伙人这边的行为模式，和风险投资人这边是一样的。
It's the same behavior on the LP side that you see on the VC side.
因此，聪明的有限合伙人的共同点是，当他们决定投资一家风险投资基金时，他们是在决定长期投资这家基金，未来五到六年。
And so the smart LPs, what they all have in common is when they're making a decision to invest in a venture fund, they're making a decision to invest in that fund for the next five or So six
对于风投来说，拥有优质的有限合伙人有多大优势？
how much of an advantage for a VC is having good LPs?
非常大。
Extremely.
非常、非常、非常大。
Extremely, extremely, extremely.
而且，这一点非常可预测。
And what again, this is very predictable.
每次市场火热时，新的有限合伙人都会涌入。
What happens is every time the market is hot, new LPs show up and pile in.
而当市场下滑时，他们就会撤出。
And then when the market declines, they back out.
因此，那些拥有理解斯宾塞模式的风投的公司，能够长期维持并持续在低迷期进行投资。
And so the firms that have the VCs who understand the Spencer model are able to sustain over time and able to continue to invest in the downturn.
风投们知道，每个牛市中都有大量新成立的风投基金，其资金基本来自这些‘游客式’的有限合伙人。
The VCs, you know, many new VC funds are raised in every bull market from basically tourist LPs.
这些游客型有限合伙人非常稳定地容易撤资。
Those tourist LPs are extremely reliably prone to pull out.
所以显然，这引出了
So obviously, that leads to the
一个大问题，即风险投资人自身对创业公司结果的因果影响有多大？
big question, which is how causal are the VCs themselves to the outcomes of the companies?
就像，这是
Like, it's
一个非常重要的问题。
the big, big question.
我对此有一个理论，一个间接的理论，但我绝对不应该让创业者来回答这个问题，但他确实犯了一个极其重大的战略错误。
I have a theory on it, I have an indirect theory on it, but I definitely should not let an entrepreneur answer this question, but just made an incredible strategic incredible strategic mistake.
没错。
Exactly.
一切就是从这里开始走下坡路的，瑞安·雷辛。
This is where it all went south, Ryan Racine.
我的意思是
I mean
你已经能从他脸上看出来了。
You can see the look on his face already.
一方面，风险投资机构本身影响巨大，因为Stripe在相当长一段时间内实际上并不盈利，而我认为这才是建设Stripe的正确方式。
One, presumably, VC itself is very impactful because Stripe was just, as a practical matter, not profitable for quite a few years, and I think that was the correct way to build Stripe.
所以，像许多公司一样，你先开发大量技术。
And so you like many companies, you build a bunch of tech.
特别是Stripe，你开发了大量技术，然后企业开始采用，开始增长。
And Stripe in particular, you build a bunch of tech, and businesses start adopting it, they start growing.
所以你实际上有两条滞后曲线。
So you've, like, two lagged curves.
一条是你必须先构建所有东西，然后企业才开始使用。
One is you have to build all the stuff, then businesses start using it.
然后这些企业自身也开始增长。
And then those businesses grow themselves.
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而且，你知道，我们刚刚请了Shopify的Toby来。
And, you know, we just had, you know, Toby from from Shopify here.
你看，Shopify现在是Stripe上的一个庞大业务，但他们在2012年刚和我们合作时可不是这样。
Like, you know, Shopify is now a massive business on Stripe, they weren't when they started working with us in in 2012.
所以这就像经典的研发模式：现在投入工作，未来才获得经济回报。
And so it's just the classic r and d thing of you, like, do work now for economic payoff later.
我认为这种模式在科技行业通常很有效。
And I think that that tends to work well in tech.
至于具体的风投，我觉得我得谈谈硅谷那种高信任文化。
And then with specific VCs, it feels like the so I wanna talk about kind of the Silicon Valley high trust thing.
风投充当了一种高效的匹配机制，将像我这样的新手创始人与经验丰富的高管连接起来。
VCs act as a very efficient matching algorithm between neophyte founders, such as myself, and experienced executives.
因此，你拥有一个不可思议的人才引擎。
And so you have this, like, incredible talent engine.
我觉得，奇怪的是，人们常常忽略了这一点：某种程度上，这根本不是关于钱的问题。
And I think in a weird way, people often miss the it's like, it's not about the money at some level.
人们忽略了关键在于要在极短时间内组建一支团队来完成这件艰难的事。
People miss that it's about putting together a team in a very short order to go do this hard thing.
我认为风险投资人在这一点上实际上起到了非常关键的作用。
And I think VCs are actually pretty instrumental in that.
我从天使投资人的角度来补充一下。
I'll bag in from the Angel perspective.
一家公司表现如何，最强烈的关联因素就是其A轮投资方在风险投资人层级中的声望高低。
The single strongest correlation of how a company will perform is which how high status a VC does a Series A is within the stack ranking of VCs.
遗憾的是，这比我自己选择或其他任何我能找到的变量都更具预测性。
It is far more predictive, sadly, than, you know, my own selection or any other variable I can find.
这几乎是决定性的。
It's almost deterministic.
是的。
Yeah.
当然，部分原因在于顶级风投能带来最好的结果，部分也是一种自我实现的预言。
And look, some of that is because the top tier VCs can get the best results, And some of that self fulfilling prophecy.
所以，作为双方的亲历者，约翰，我来分析一下你刚才说的。
So here's my analysis, having been on both sides of the table, you know, John, mapping what you said.
我的分析基本上是这样的：如果你从机械的角度来看初创公司，它本质上需要进入一个循环，在这个循环中，它会不断积累越来越多的资源。
My analysis basically is that, like, if you think about mechanically what's happening with a startup, startup needs to basically get into a loop in which it's accruing more and more resources as it goes.
这些资源包括合格的高管、技术员工、未来的后续融资、积极的品牌势头、公众认知、客户、收入、以及在政府中的影响力——所有这些资源都是你作为企业取得成功所必需的。
And those resources are qualified executives, technical employees, future downstream financing, positive brand momentum, public perception, customers, revenue, throw weight in the government, like all of these resources you need to be able to succeed as a business.
因此，这就像是一个雪球从山坡上滚下的现象：你要么是一个不断滚下山坡、沿途不断积累资源、并逐渐扩大规模、范围和力量的雪球，要么就不是。
So there's a snowball rolling down the hill phenomenon which is you're either a snowball rolling down the hill, picking up resources as you go, gaining size and scale and scope and power as you go, or you're not.
而你只是停留在山顶上的一片雪花，根本动弹不得。
And you're kind of stuck at the top of the hill as a snowflake and you're just not going anywhere.
所以问题来了，你该如何进入这种资源聚集的良性循环呢？
And so the question is kind of how do you get into this kind of aggregation of resources thing?
经济学家把这种处于权力顶端的事物称作什么？
Economists call this, what's the term for the things that are at the high end of the power?
优先附着。
Preferential attachment.
是的。
Yeah.
什么是公司的一种吸引手段？
What is A sort of baiting of companies
这是马太效应。
It's the Matthew principle.
这是来自《圣经》的马太效应，意思是，有更多的人会得到更多，而没有的人就连现有的也会失去。
It's a Matthew principle from the Bible which is, you know, to to for he who has a lot will get more and he he doesn't.
所以当一家公司获得势头时，你常听到‘势头’这个词，这意味着你接下来需要的资源会更愿意投入到你的公司，而不是别人的公司。
And so when a company gets like momentum, you hear about momentum, when a company gets momentum, what it means is the next resource that you need is preferentially willing to attach to your thing as opposed to somebody else.
这就是推动权力锁定的机械过程，所以。
That's the mechanical process that drives the power lock So
这就提出了一个鸡生蛋还是蛋生鸡的问题：是产品创造了公司，还是公司聚集了足够的资源来创造产品？
it creates a chicken and egg question, which is, does the product create the company, or does the company gather enough resources to create the product?
是的。
Yeah.
所以，这是其中一部分。
So, that's part of it.
但再次强调，要打造产品，往往不仅仅是一个流程。
But again, to create the product, it's not just like, you know, it's often not just a process.
你还需要去和工程师们一起工作，对吧？
It's also like, okay, you've to go with the engineers, right?
然后你必须真正地去体验这个产品。
And then you've got to actually, like, feel the product.
举个例子，你需要顶尖的安全工程师。
To give you an example, you've to have top end security engineers.
顶尖的安全工程师数量是有限的。
There are only so many top end security engineers.
他们想在哪里工作？
Where do they want to work?
他们想在顶尖的公司工作。
They want to work at the top companies.
如果你是一个全新的初创公司，你如何让他们相信你将成为一家顶尖公司？
If you're a brand new startup, how do you convince them that you're going be a top company?
你从顶级风投那里融资。
You raise money from a top tier VC.
所以这种情况一再发生。
So that happens over and over again.
我通俗地讲，作为创始人的经验是：顶级风投在初创公司或许值得信赖但尚未获得信任的时刻，提供了一种信誉的过桥贷款。
The prosaic way that I put it is, you know, my experience as a founder is a A top tier VC is a bridge loan of credibility at a point in when the startup maybe deserves it but just doesn't have it yet.
这种信誉以人员、资金和品牌的形式被兑现。
And that credibility is harvested in the form of primarily personnel, money, and brand.
而这三样东西在初期竟然变得极其重要。
And and those three things turned out to be, like, really important in the beginning.
我们这里谈论的是硅谷生态系统，你提到了安迪·贝克托尔海姆对谷歌的投资。
We're talking about the Silicon Valley ecosystem here, and you referenced Andy Bechtorsheim and his investment in Google.
关于这个故事，我觉得有趣的一点是，他只是给他们开了一张100万美元的支票。
One One thing that I find funny about that story is that's the case where he just wrote a 100 check to them.
他实际上给谷歌公司开了一张100美元的支票，尽管那时他们还没有成立公司，我想他可能是开着他的保时捷离开，说：‘给你们吧。’
He actually wrote a 100 check to Google Inc, even though they didn't have a company, and I think he'd, like, gotten his Porsche and drove off, he was like, here you go.
但当时没有任何条款。
But there was no terms.
什么都没有。
There was no nothing.
这显然为他带来了非常好的结果。
And that obviously worked out really well for him.
但这并不罕见。
But that's not unusual.
我听过其他类似的故事，我想我们自己也收到过这样的支票，同样是说：‘你回头告诉我条款吧。’
I've heard other story I think we even got some check like that where, again, it was just like, tell me the terms later.
硅谷的信任度非常高。
And Silicon Valley is very high trust.
这种情况是怎么形成的？
How did that come about?
让我告诉你，这个故事真的很棒。
Let me tell you that, know, that story is is a great story.
确实如此。
That is true.
我想说，这个故事还有另一部分，就是那些在A轮投资中拒绝了谷歌的风险投资公司。
I I would say there is another part of that story, which is the venture firms that turned down Google in the series A.
对。
Right.
这是另一个完全不同的方面，也许我们该谈谈，对吧？
Which is whole other side of things that maybe we should talk about, right?
因为回过头来看，一切似乎都显而易见。
Because in retrospect, it all looks obvious.
但在当时，并不确定，
Like, at the time, it's not Sure,
但当时并不明显。
but it wasn't obvious.
并不明显。
Not obvious.
也许这印证了你的说法，即这绝对不明显。
Maybe that reinforces what you're saying, which is it's definitely not obvious.
听我说，坦率地说，你对这件事可以有各种理论，做各种事情，夸赞每个人有多棒。
Look, I think it's just, quite frankly, you could have all kinds of theories about this, do all kinds of things, talking about how wonderful everybody is.
我认为现实情况是，任何在硅谷待过一段时间的人都有过这样的经历，通常是以伤疤的形式：有个穿着T恤的年轻人，带着一个疯狂的想法，你心想，好吧，不错。
I think the practical reality is anybody who's been in the Valley for a while has had the experience, typically in the form of scar tissue, where there was some kid in a T shirt with some crazy idea, you were like, okay, that's great.
数据指标都支持他。
The metrics are on it.
哦，那些意外。
Oh, the upsets.
对，对，对。
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
是啊，你拍拍他们的头，他们就走了，然后，你知道的，他们转身就成功了。
Yeah, you pat them on the head, they go off on their way, and then, you know, they turn around.
五年后，结果发现，哦，那是马克·扎克伯格。
Five years later, it turns out, oops, you know, that was Mark Zuckerberg.
你知道，
You know,
操，我曾经有过我的时刻，我有过我的机会。
shit, like, I had my moment, I had my chance.
错过正确时机的问题在于，记住，这是类别问题，好吧，那就是
The problem with missing right, remember, it's category Okay, that's
如此
such a
一种根本性的东西。
ventral thing.
错失恐惧症带来高度信任。
FOMO leads to high trust.
那种
That sort of
这背后有一种愤世嫉俗的真相
has a cynical truth to
是的。
it.
没错。
Like, yeah.
如果你只是干坐着，是的。
If you sit around yeah.
这涉及到第一类错误和第二类错误的区别。
Like, it goes to category one versus category two error.
再说一遍，这又回到了经济学问题：如果安迪的钱被偷了，他只损失十万美元；但如果他判断正确，就能获得三十倍的回报。
Again, it goes back to the economics, which is Andy's $100,000 if he, you know, got stolen, he only loses 100,000 If he gets it right, he makes the 30,000 x return.
所以随着时间推移，你会明白，第二类错误要糟糕得多。
And so there's this thing that they what what you learn over time is the category two errors are much much worse.
而且顺便说一句，这些错误会折磨你整整几十年。
And they torch by the way, they torture you for fucking decades.
对吧？
Right?
因为你读到的都是那些你一路搞砸的成功案例。
Because you read about the success cases that you've screwed up all the way up.
所以你只能通过惨痛教训明白，你必须对人保持极度开放的心态。我这里有个坦白：
And so you just learn the hard way, like, you have to be extremely open minded for people I have a confession here, which is
我在CVC之后对创业者说的话是：别试图说服他们你会成功。
what I tell entrepreneurs after CVC, I say, look, don't try and convince them you're gonna be successful.
你只需要让他们害怕，未来二十年他们可能会后悔这个决定。
Just try and create a fear that there's this possibility for the next twenty years they might regret this.
没关系。
It's okay.
那种他们错过的、近乎十亿美元的机会。
Sort of past personal billion that they missed.
当公司破产时，至少事情就结束了。
When the when the company goes bankrupt, at least it ends.
是的。
Yeah.
就像，结束了。
Like, it's over.
就像，痛苦结束了。
Like, the pain is over.
当你把公司带向成功时，痛苦是永恒的。
When you pass the company to succeed, the pain is forever.
就像做空的不对称性。
Like the asymmetry of shorting.
你某种程度上是在做空创业者。
You're kind of shorting the entrepreneur.
哦，是的。
Oh, yes.
绝对如此。
Absolutely.
一百倍？这只是一个可怕的错误。
A 100 It's just a horrible mistake.
因此，结果是，这种状况带来了一种不可思议的可能性和极大的乐观感，以一种非常积极的方式——你必须极度开放地接受这样一个想法：你随时可能遇到下一个伟大的事物。
And so as a consequence, there's just this what thing of like it leads to is this incredible sense of possibility and incredible sense of optimism, right, in a very positive way, is which like you just need to be extremely open to the idea that you're gonna run into the next big thing at any moment.
你真的想要主动出击，从因果报应的角度来说，你希望自己能成为其中的一部分。
And you really wanna put and as say, karmically, wanna really put yourself out there to be part of that.
我认为这是对的，但我觉得这可能是另一回事。
I think that's true, but I think that's maybe a different thing.
你描述的是，成功可能来自任何地方。
You're describing that kind of success can come from anywhere.
成功中存在巨大的不对称性：公司可能增长一万倍，但它们的下跌幅度却不可能超过当前价值的一倍。
There's a big asymmetry in success where companies can you know, 10,000 x, whereas they can't go down by more than kind of one x from their present position.
但似乎商业文化，甚至超越了初创公司变得庞大的事实，尤其具有高度的信任感。
But it just it seems like particularly the business culture and even kind of moving outside the fact that startups get really big is particularly high trust.
因此，所有的投资都基于握手达成，人们只需握手约定某事会发生，并相信一切都会顺利进行。
So you have all of investing happens based on handshakes, and, you know, people can just shake hands on this is gonna happen and trust that everything happens there.
即使在收购公司时，我们通常也会在高层面上与创始人就条款达成一致，可能只有一两页的条款清单。
Even when it comes to, when we buy companies, we generally agree with the founders at a high level of the terms, and there might be kind of a single page or a two page term sheet.
当然，之后会进行大量的尽职调查，但不会像东海岸那种私募股权流程那样，每个人都想耍花招，律师根本不可信，你刚把他们请来就怀疑他们。
And, obviously, lots of due diligence will happen after that, but it won't be the kind of East Coast, you know, process, private equity process after that where everyone's trying to pull a fast one, and you can't trust the lawyers as fast as you can throw them.
所以在我看来，所有参与者之间似乎存在着一种特别的高信任关系。
So there's it seems to me there's a particular kind of high trust relationship in how all the actors work with each other
我本来想问马克，为什么东海岸和欧洲没能像硅谷那样发展起来，而你有底特律，但韩国和日本却复制了它。
I about gonna ask Mark why the East Coast and why Europe hasn't Chennai to Silicon Valley, whereas, like, you you have Detroit, but then Korea and Japan copies it.
我认为也许他其实已经回答了这个问题，那就是也许因为他们没有经历过那上万倍的回报，所以还没有建立起对错失机会的恐惧。
And I think maybe he's actually already answered the question, which is maybe because I haven't had those 10,000 exo turns, they haven't instilled the fear of FOMO.
而正是对错失机会的恐惧，才迫使你必须对一个新人抱有信任的赌注。
And it's the fear of FOMO that means you've got to sort of take a trusting bet on a new person.
也许这就是造就高信任生态系统的核心所在。
And maybe that's the sort of that's the kernel that creates a high trust ecosystem.
是的。
Yeah.
也许我可以补充一点，我觉得你可能是对的，我的回答有点过于愤世嫉俗了。
And maybe just to add, know, I think maybe you're right that I'm being a little bit too cynical in my answer.
而且你也希望自己的声誉能延续到未来，因为这是一个关系紧密的社群。
It's also that you want your reputation to project into the And future, so if you have a reputation, right, it's a fairly close knit community.
如果你以乐于助人、积极正面、富有建设性并能创造价值而闻名，那么这种声誉会带来好处，因为那些你帮助过的人，未来会把你介绍给更多人，甚至……
If you have a reputation for being helpful and being positive and constructive and value add, then, you know, that plays well because then that person, you know, the person you've done something nice for, is going to introduce you to other people in the future and even It's
这是一场重复进行的游戏。
a very repeat game.
对，没错。
Right, right.
这简直就是终极的重复博弈。
It's like the ultimate repeating game.
是的。
Yeah.
所以这就是其中的关键。
And so there's that.
另一方面，你们刚才隐约提到的，我认为非常重要的一点是，这并不是零和游戏。
Then, look, think the other side of it that you guys kind of alluded to, but I think is very important, which is it's not zero sum.
当我跟我在好莱坞的朋友聊天时——那里离这儿不远，也是一个独立的创业生态系统——如果你跟好莱坞的任何人交谈，他们会说：天哪，这简直是个鲨鱼池。
When I talk to my friends in Hollywood, which is not that far away, and is its own entrepreneurial ecosystem, you know, if you talk to anybody in Hollywood, they're like, oh my god, this is a shark tank.
如果你的朋友没在你胸口捅你一刀，你就该庆幸了。
You're lucky if your friends knife you in the chest.
通常他们只是，你知道的，在背后下手。
Generally, they just, you know, it's in the back.
这是一直在发生的事。
Constant thing.
原因在于，至少根据我的分析，像电影这样的行业，可分配的资源是固定的。
The reason is because there's just a at least my analysis, there's a fixed amount of money to be spent and made in movies, for example.
如果我的电影获得立项，就意味着你的电影没戏了。
And if my movie gets greenlit, it means yours doesn't.
所以，即使我们是亲密的朋友，我们也会尽可能地互相拆台。
And so even if we're close friends, like, we're gonna undermine each other as much as possible.
而在科技领域，至少从历史上看，你有一种乘数效应的生成性模式，它不断扩张。
Whereas in tech, at least, you know, historically, you have this multiplicative kind of generative thing where where it keeps expanding.
那么，为什么其他地方都没能建立起这样的生态系统呢？
So why else why did nowhere else manage to get that ecosystem going?
如果你回顾过去五十年的历史，这其实是一种艺术。
It's art if you look at the history of this sort of last fifty years,
其中一个会浮现出来的故事是，科技几乎成了硅谷或至少是西海岸的垄断现象，这种独特性前所未有。
one of the stories that will come out is the utter uniqueness that tech almost became a Silicon Valley or at least a West Coast monopoly.
没错。
Yep.
在任何其他行业，都没有类似的先例。
Like, there's no precedent for that in any other industry.
嗯，我认为我们又回到了那种状态。
Well, I think we're back to that.
没错。
Exactly.
我认为你实际上已经在数据中看到了这一点。
I think you see this in the data, actually, already.
人工智能正在将科技重新整合为地球上仅有的两个地方，而西方只有一个。
It's AI was reconsolidating, know, tech into basically two places on Earth and only one in the West.
你知道，工业经济的一部分就具有这种动态。
You know, part of the industrial economy had that dynamic.
那是什么？
What is it?
因此，过去三十年里，来自美国其他城市的官员络绎不绝地来到这里。
So there have been a long parade of officials from other cities in The U.
美。
S.
还有来自其他国家的人，过去三十年里都来到过硅谷。
And from other countries who have come to the Valley in the last thirty years.
我见过其中许多人。
I've met with many of them.
他们都问了这个问题。
They all asked that question.
我这样回答：你需要一系列要素，而且必须全部具备。
I answered as follows, which is there are a set of things that you need all in combination.
然后，通常在这一点上，他们的表情会变得沮丧，说：‘如果我们一样都做不到怎么办？’
And then they usually, at that point, they get a stricken look on their face and they say, Well, what if we can't do any of those things?
那如果我们建一个非常
So What if we build a really
线性城市呢？
linear city?
没错。
Exactly.
但实际上，令人惊讶的是，有这么多人——我从不希望贬低别人，因为人们应该努力让这些事情实现，我也为他们的努力感到自豪。
Well, actually, you know, it's surprising the number of people, and I'm always I don't want to badmouth people because people should try to make these things work and I'm proud of them for trying.
但真的，有很多人觉得，只要建对了建筑，事情就会发生。
But, like, literally, the number where it's like, Wow, if we just built the right buildings, know, this would happen.
这其实相当常见。
Like, that's actually fairly common.
任何去过硅谷的人
And anybody who's been to Silicon Valley
他知道关键在于埃尔卡米诺实尔大道。
knows the key to it is on El Camino Real.
不是建筑物。
It's not the buildings.
这绝对不是建筑的问题。
It is definitely not the buildings.
是的。
Yeah.
所以我认为这是一种公式，也是一系列要素的组合。
So I think it's a formula and I think it's a list of things.
就像做蛋糕一样。
And it's like making a cake.
所有这些都必须放进蛋糕里。
They all have to be in the cake.
我认为最好的描述方式是，这是一组与稳定、成熟和法治相关的事物。
The best way I think I can describe it is it's a set of things that have to do with stability and maturity and rule of law.
所以你需要绝对的合同法。
So you need like absolute contract law.
你需要流动性强、规模大的资本市场。
You need liquid deep capital markets.
你需要各个领域的专家，他们真的拥有丰富的会计和其他方面的实际经验。
You need like, you know, expert specialists in all these different areas that really have like real experience accounting and, you know, everything else.
因此，这是一种成熟和深度，而这些正是新兴市场国家所欠缺的。
And so there's like a maturity and a depth and it's that stuff that like developing developing market countries struggle with.
但与此同时，你还需要西部荒野的精神。
But at the same time, you need the Wild West.
你需要冒险精神、疯狂劲头和承担风险的意愿，如果有人失败了
And you need the spirit of adventure and the craziness and the willingness to take risks, and if somebody fails
这就是东海岸错过的吗？
And that's what the East Coast missed?
这就是东海岸错过的，也是欧洲没有的，对吧？
And that's what the East Coast missed, and that's what Europe doesn't right?
至少当我跟东海岸的朋友或欧洲的朋友交谈时，他们会说：‘我们做不到。’
At least when I talk to my friends on the East Coast or my friends in Europe, what it Well, we can't do it.
我不能承担这种职业风险。
I can't take that kind of career risk.
这太疯狂了。
Like, that's crazy.
你知道，在很多国家和文化中，如果你冒了这样的风险却失败了，那真是个大问题。
You know, and look, in a lot of countries and in a lot of cultures, you know, if you, like, take a risk like that and it doesn't work, like, it's a real problem.
对不起。
I'm sorry.
为什么西海岸比东海岸更有冒险精神？
Why is there more risk taking on the West Coast versus the East Coast?
因为，就像
Because, like
边疆。
the frontier.
没有既定的等级制度。
There's no established hierarchies.
曾经有边疆。
There was there was The frontier.
边疆。
The frontier.
这是边疆。
It's frontier.
这是边疆。
It's the frontier.
它在泰勒。
It's in Taylor.
这全看那个谁的名字吗？
It's all in what's his name?
就是那个边疆 guy，我本来想说像是《焚城》里的
The one's the frontier guy from, like I was gonna say it's bonfire of the
虚荣心也是。
vanities too.
你去加入高盛这样的公司吧。
You go join, like, Goldman Sachs.
你会加入麦肯锡。
You would join McKinsey.
你会加入现有的机构，在东海岸往上爬。
There's you would join existing institutions and go up them on the East Coast.
这些在西海岸根本就不存在。
Those just didn't exist on the West Coast.
你实际上面对的是一个拥有五到七十万人口的国家，我不知道具体有多难。
You effectively had a country of 50 to 70 I don't know how hard.
比如，有富国银行。
Like, there was Wells Fargo.
还有很多机构，你知道的，你
There was you know, there's lots of institutions, you know, that you
但它们是它们是
But could were they were they
足够有声望，以至于能留住年轻人才吗？
prestigious enough that they sort of, that they trapped young talent?
换个说法，为什么斯坦福的表现远优于哈佛和麻省理工？
Another way to say this is, why did sort of Stanford do so much better than Hafman and MIT?
因为显然输入的质量是一样的。
Because obviously the input quality is the same.
所以，他们所处的环境一定有什么因素造成了差异。
So there has to be something in the place they're sitting that creates a difference.
我认为有一种开拓精神。
I I think there's a frontier spirit.
我是认真的。
Mean, I really do.
所以，就像……
So, like,
但你总是对其他地方的文化解释持怀疑态度。
But you're always skeptical of cultural explanations in other places.
显然存在一种人才聚集效应。
There's clearly a talent aggregation effect.
就像，显然在硅谷内部发生着一种人才聚集效应。
Like, there's clearly a talent aggregation effect that takes place inside The U.
我的意思是，看看吧，硅谷的大多数杰出人才并不是在硅谷长大的。
I mean, look, most of the great people in Silicon Valley did not grow up in Silicon Valley.
我妻子是在帕洛阿尔托长大的。
My wife grew up here in Palo Alto.
我开玩笑说，她是本地人。
I tease, I called her a townie.
对吧？
Right?
顺便说一下，她比我多三个学位，所以这绝对不是地位问题。
By the way, she has three more degrees than I do, so it's definitely not a status thing.
但大多数人都是外来者。
But most people are imports.
被源源不断地吸引到整个地区，因此这无疑是一个人才选拔和吸引力中心，这是其中很重要的一部分。
Get imported all through the entire rest and of the around the rest of the And so it's definitely a selector, you know, an attraction point for talent, and that's a big part of it.
但你看，如果你追溯历史，每一个阶段，硅谷和好莱坞之所以成为今天的样子，绝非偶然，因为参与其中的人们一直向西迁移，直到被太平洋 literally 阻止。
But look, I think if you trace the history, like, every step like, it's not an accident that both Silicon Valley and Hollywood are the places that they are because the people involved went west as far as they could before they were literally stopped by the Pacific Ocean.
对吧？
Right?
这可以说是国家向西扩张过程中最终的筛选机制，吸引的都是最倾向于冒险、如你所说追求独立和自主的人。
Like, it was the ultimate selector in the build out of the country to the people who were the most oriented towards risk and, to your point, independence and doing their own thing.
在1850年的淘金热时期，旧金山就是这一现象的中心，情况也是如此。
And that was true in the gold, you know, gold rush days in 1850 where San Francisco was ground zero for that.
今天也是如此。
It's equally true today.
好莱坞也是如此。
Hollywood is the exact same thing.
好莱坞的情况其实很有趣，因为他们想让我离得那么远，其中一个原因是为了逃避托马斯·爱迪生的专利执法者。
And Hollywood's case is actually funny because one of the reasons they wanted me to get so far away is they were trying to evade Thomas Edison's patent enforcers.
因为托马斯·爱迪生拥有电影摄像机的专利，而最初的创业者根本不想为此付费。
Because Thomas Edison owned the patent for the film cameras and the original entrepreneurs had no desire at all to pay for that.
然后爱迪生会雇佣平克顿侦探去捣毁电影拍摄现场。
And then Edison would hire the Pinkertons to come bust up the movie sets.
对吧？
Right?
但你明白我的意思吗？
And so but but you see what I'm saying?
叛逆的、反叛的、特立独行的
Rogue, renegade, iconoclastic
你有没有发现，有些人没搬走，不是因为那座城市像伦敦那样有吸引力
Do you that certain people didn't move because it wasn't a fun city that had hit the scale of London on
哦，当然。
Oh, a 100.
是的。
Yeah.
不。
No.
听我说，我们所有人都有很多朋友在纽约和伦敦，他们都说：‘哇。’
Look, we we have we all have lots of friends in New York and in London, and they're they're they're all just like, wow.
比如，我在纽约的朋友会说，你只要让他们喝上两品脱这种酒，他们就会说：他们真的不明白为什么没人住在纽约。
Like, you know, my friends in New York, they're like, I don't know if you get, like, two pints of this into them, they'll be like, they they literally don't understand why anybody doesn't live in New York.
我的意思是，我想他们会告诉你，早上九点在
Well, mean, I think they'll tell you that at 9AM on the
星期一早上，你得让艾弗里进入那种状态。
Monday morning, and you need to get Avery into that.
这非常
That is a very
好，它是
good It's
《纽约客》的封面。
a New Yorker cover.
我本来想是的。
I was trying to yes.
我本来想，我会
Was trying I'm be
去一个采矿营地。
get and a mining camp.
你得学会搬到采矿营地去。
You have to learn to move to the mining camp.
我觉得是这样。
I think so.
然后，你知道，你就会陷入这种危险。
And then, you know, you get and then this gets into the danger.
这就像回到银行业，回到咨询行业。
This is like the back to banking, back to consulting thing.
危险在很多方面在于它变得体制化了。
Danger in a lot of ways is it becomes established.
当它变得体制化后，就开始吸引体制内的人。
And when it becomes established, it starts to attract establishment people.
社交网络的问题。
The social network problem.
对，没错。
Right, exactly.
从这个意义上说，经济下行虽然令人头疼，但你可能
And in that sense, the downturns, as much of a pain in the butt as they are, You probably
回到银行业，回到咨询行业。
go back to banking, go back to consulting.
是的。
Yes.
剩下的只有那些人，顺便说一下，我1993年刚到的时候，硅谷就是这样。
And the only people who are left and by the way, this was Silicon Valley when I arrived in 'ninety three.
这种情况已经发生过了。
This had happened.
然后到了2004年，正如我们讨论的，硅谷变成了清空所有追求地位的人的地方。
And then this was Silicon Valley in 2004, as we discussed, which is you flush all the status seekers.
清空所有游客。
You flush all the tourists.
这就像火灾的燃料管理。
It's like fuel management for fire.
对。
Right.
没错。
Exactly.
百分之百。
A 100%.
你清除了杂草。
You clear out the brush.
你看，这种情况能持续多久？
Now look, how long can this last?
我不知道。
I don't know.
你知道，我们生活在一个国家，至少在过去六年里，一直有很强的停滞倾向。
You know, we're in a country that, you know, has has, you know, at least certainly over the last six years has had a strong tendency towards stagnation.
我认为，让这一切持续下去的原因，就是这些新的平台、技术上的新范式转变。
The thing that has kept this whole thing going, I think, is just that there are these new platforms, these new paradigm shifts in technology.
每个人都喜欢用国防公司来解释硅谷。
Everyone loves the defense company explanation for Silicon Valley.
有多少
How much
的一部分。
of it.
那是其中一部分。
That's part of it.
哦，所以史蒂夫·布兰克，是的。
Oh, so Steve Blank yeah.
史蒂夫·布兰克对这段历史做了最完整的还原。
So Steve Blank has done the best reconstruction of this.
典型的硅谷历史通常追溯到20世纪50年代的惠普，以及60年代的芯片公司。
The typical Silicon Valley history goes back to, like, the 1950s with HP and then 1960s with the chip companies.
但真正的历史，我认为他提出了非常有说服力的观点。
But the real history I he he I think he makes a very compelling case.
真正的历史其实是20世纪20年代、30年代的国防科技初创企业。
The real history was actually defense tech startups in the, like, 1920s, 1930s.
如果你去桑尼维尔一带看看，仍然能发现那些遗留的痕迹。
And you still see remnants of that if you, like, around, you know, Sunnyvale.
莱斯阿姆斯。
Las Ames.
莱斯阿姆斯。
Las Ames.
阿姆斯。
Ames.
你知道，这个地方曾经是早期雷达、导弹制导系统以及各种航空电子设备的发源地——我记不清具体细节了，但这些创新都是在大约一百年前以同样的方式诞生的。
You know, this is the place where, like, you know, early I forget the exact thing, but, like, early radar and early, like, you know, missile guidance systems and all that stuff, avionics, a lot of that was innovated here in the exact same way, that was, like, a hundred years ago.
如果你
If you
如果能回到过去，你能做A/B测试吗？
could go back, could you AB test it?
有没有办法让苏格兰硅谷，或者当时波士顿走廊的某个名称，取得成功？
Is there any way you could have made Silicon Glen, or whatever the Boston Corridor was called, successful?
但他们确实成功了。
Well, they did.
并保持其成功，与硅谷相比。
And keep it successful versus the Valley.
这就是问题所在。
That's the problem.
比如，在某个时间点，它本可以走向另一条路吗？还是在五十年代就已经注定了？
Like, was there a point where it could have gone the other way, or was it sort of inevitable for the fifties?
比如在1970年，它还能有两种可能吗？
Like, in 1970, could it go both ways still?
当我1993年来到硅谷时，我认为可以说硅谷和波士顿当时几乎不分上下。
So when I arrived in The Valley in '93, I think I would fair to say The Valley and Boston were probably considered neck and neck.
哦。
Oh.
差不多各占一半。
Sort of half and half.
在波士顿，你知道，这些现在几乎被遗忘了，但还有迪克、迪吉多。
In Boston, you know, these are kind of forgotten now, but Deck, Deck Digital.
那是一家规模巨大、极其重要的公司。
It was like a huge extremely important company.
阿什顿·泰特，我认为是文字处理软件的发明者，就在那里。
Ashton Tate, the inventor of the word processor, I think, there.
莲花公司也在那里，一、二、三，都在那里。
Lotus was there, one, two, three, was there.
后来几年，你还有一些其他伟大的公司，比如EMC，还有其他的。
And then you had, you know, later years, you know, other great companies, EMC, you know, and others.
还有一本非常棒的书叫《新机器的灵魂》，这是有史以来最伟大的创业书籍之一，讲的是八十年代末一家波士顿超级计算机公司的事。
And then there's a great book called Soul of a New Machine, which is one of the great all time startup books, which is about a supercomputer company in Boston in the late eighties.
这真是一本极其出色的文学作品，真实地讲述了创业的故事。
It was just extremely excellent, like, literary literary book, and it really tells the story of a of a startup.
它也讲述了那个时代和地点的波士顿。
It was it also tells the story of Boston in that time and place.
所以当时有很多前沿的超级计算技术都在那里。
So a lot of, like, leading edge supercomputing stuff was there.
顺便说一下，Thinking Machines 那家最初的超级计算机公司也在那里。
By the way, Thinking Machines was there, the original, you know, supercomputer company.
最初的 Thinking Machines。
The original Thinking Machines.
最初的 Thinking。
The original Thinking.
没错。
Exactly.
是的。
Yeah.
所以 Denny Hill 是那家公司，可以说是今天我们所理解的大规模 AI 网格、云计算等技术的先驱。
So Denny Hill is the the massively sort of the company that's the forerunner of what we think of today as, like, large scale AI grid, you know, cloud stuff was there.
还有，MIT 当然也在那里，培养了大量聪明才智的人才。
And so, and look, MIT, you know, MIT was there and and and was a tremendous, you know, generated huge numbers of smart people.
所以，这一切长期以来都运作得非常好。
And so the so the it it worked really well for a long time.
然后在九十年代中期，它分开了。
And then basically in the mid nineties, it separated.
然后，波士顿的人会说，有两个关键节点，他们会认为最后一击可能是当马克·扎克伯格无法为Facebook筹集到核心资金，不得不离开并前往西部。
And then, you know, people in Boston will say that, again, two two points in, they'll say that the final blow was probably when Mark Zuckerberg could not raise central capital for Facebook, and had to leave and come come come come West.
这是一个有意义的信号吗？
That was a meaningful signal?
那可以说是最后的……
That was sort of the last that was sort of the
你没把那当作标志吗？
last You didn't call that the marker.
就是说，好吧。
Was just like, okay.
如果我们连这件事都做不成，顺便说一下，反事实地讲，如果他留在波士顿，也许那里会诞生一个完全不同的生态系统，而这个系统现在并不存在。
If we if we couldn't do that one and then by the way, the the you know, had in the counterfactual, had he stayed in Boston, maybe there would be an entirely new, you know, ecosystem there that doesn't exist Yeah.
所以我认为，它曾经确实运作了一段时间。
So I I think basically it worked for a while.
而这正是我关注前沿精神的原因。
And again, this is why I locked in on Frontier Spirit.
所以波士顿拥有的是我们之前谈到的所有稳定性因素。
So what Boston has is all of the stability aspects we were
正在讨论。
talking about.
如果他们没有同样的前沿精神，结果就回到了优先附着机制。
If they just didn't have the same Frontier Spirit and it just turned out that Right back to preferential attachment.
结果，麻省理工学院最聪明的人偏偏想来这里。
It just turned out on the margin, the smartest people from MIT wanted to come here.
嗯。
Mhmm.
而这基本上就是全部了。
And that was basically it.
如果这就是生态系统迁移的方式，那么关于公司也存在同样的问题。
If that's how you move ecosystems, sort of same question about companies.
哪家公司本可以成为万亿级企业，却没能实现，而你只需最少的改动就能让它达到万亿？
What's the company that could have been a trillion that didn't, that you would have to change the least to make it a trillion.
你知道，他们只是缺少了一位关键高管。
You know, they get that one exec.
他们只是卷入了一起诉讼。
They get that one lawsuit.
结果就完全不同了。
It just goes differently.
我的意思是，这样的例子有很多很多，最经典的例子是一家叫数字研究公司的企业，它本该成为微软。
I mean, there's many, many, many I mean, the all time story of that is a company called Digital Research, which should have been Microsoft.
没错。
Yeah.
还有一个著名的故事，我可以完整讲讲，请听我说。
And there's a famous, I can tell the whole Please.
哦，对的。
Oh, yeah.
好的。
Okay.
好的。
Okay.
这个故事大致如下。
So the story roughly goes as follows.
这在书里有记载，但大致是这样的：比尔·盖茨和保罗·艾伦最初在阿尔伯克基开了一家小软件公司，就在《绝命毒师》剧情发生的地方附近，我猜是这样，后来他们搬到了西雅图。
It's in the books, but it roughly goes as follows, which is, so Bill Gates and Paul Allen had this little software company, originally in Albuquerque, down the street Better Call Saul, I I imagine, which they moved to Seattle.
他们早期在开发计算机的编程工具。
And they were building very early they were building programming tools for for computers.
所以我小时候第一次用微软的产品时，用的是Microsoft Basic。
And so when I first used Microsoft as a kid, it was Microsoft basic.
他们当时是一家编译器公司或解释器公司，而不是操作系统公司。
They were they were a compiler company, or an interpreter company, not a not a not an OS company.
然后，从1976年到1982年左右，个人电脑浪潮兴起，出现了许多像猫狗一样杂乱无章的早期PC，他们把Basic解释器卖给了所有这些公司，这就是他们起步的方式。
So, you know, and then there was this PC wave with all these, like, know, basically these sort of, you know, cat and dog kind of early PCs from like '76 to '82, and they basically sold the basic interpreter to all those companies, and that's how they got going.
但他们并不做操作系统业务。
But they weren't in the operating system business.
然后IBM决定，众所周知地进入PC市场，而且比尔·盖茨的母亲和IBM的首席执行官有联系，他们同在董事会，结果IBM团队来到西雅图，购买了微软Basic的授权——当时大家都这么做。
And then IBM decided, know, famously to enter the PC business, And, you know, and then there was a network connection with Bill Gates' mother and the CEO of IBM, and they were on a board together, and it resulted in the IBM team, you know, coming out and going up to Seattle and buying a license to Microsoft Basic, which is what everybody did in those days.
然后IBM团队问比尔·盖茨：我们应该用什么操作系统？
And then the IBM team asked Bill Gates, like, what operating should we use?
他回答说：哦，当时PC的标准操作系统叫CP/M，这在当时是真的。
And he's like, oh, well, the standard operating system for PCs is called CPM, which at the time was true.
它是早期商业PC的标准操作系统。
It was the standard operating system for early business PCs.
他们问：那谁生产这个系统？
And they said, well, who makes that?
他说：有个叫数字研究公司的公司，在加利福尼亚的圣克鲁兹。
And he said, well, there's a company called Digital Research down in Santa Cruz in California.
有个叫加里·基尔代尔的人，你们该去见见他。
There's this guy Gary Kildall, you you should go see him.
那时，他与数字研究公司之间存在着这种协同关系。
And this was the synergistic relationship that he had with Digital Research at that time.
所以传说中，IBM团队——大约二十个穿着蓝色西装的律师——登上了飞机，前往圣克鲁斯。
So the story goes, IBM team, which is, you know, like 20 lawyers in blue suits, like, get on a plane, go to Santa Cruz.
他们来到办公室，与加里·基尔代尔会面，讨论CPM的授权事宜。
They show up at the office to meet with Gary Kildall, discuss licensing CPM.
而加里·基尔代尔作为一个喜欢自由的人，决定不去参加这次会议。
And Gary Kildall, being a Frontier like person, decided not to come to the meeting.
他那天更愿意去飞行，约翰。
Decided he'd rather go flying that day, John.
我确实如此。
I do.
对你们中的某个人来说，这是很合理的事情。
It's a reasonable thing to one of you.
于是他让自己的妻子——公司的总法律顾问——来谈判保密协议。
And instead had his wife, who was the company's general counsel, negotiate the NDA.
ABM公司以律师众多而闻名，而他的妻子并非律师，也不愿签署保密协议，当天的谈判无果而终。
ABM was famous for its lawyers, and the wife was not the lawyer was not about to sign the NDA, and the day ended inconclusively.
IBM团队觉得：‘这太荒谬了。’
And the IBM team was like, alright, this is ridiculous.
于是他们返回了西雅图。
And they went back up to Seattle.
他们告诉盖茨：‘如果你找不到操作系统，那解释器的交易就黄了。’
And they told Gates, if you can't find us an operating system, the deal the for the interpreter is off.
比尔说：‘给我几天时间。’
And Bill said, give me a few days.
比尔 literally 走到街对面，找到一位名叫蒂姆·帕特森的独立开发者，以五万美元的固定费用买下了当时被称为QDOS（快速粗糙的操作系统）的系统——这正是DOS的真正前身。
And Bill literally went down the street to an independent developer named Tim Patterson, licensed what at the time was called a QDOS, quick and dirty operating system, which is the true name of DOS, for a 50,000 flat fee.
然后他转手将它卖给了IBM，从而创造了MS-DOS。
Turned around and sold it to IBM that created MS DOS.
这个故事的讽刺之处在于，三十年后，加里·基尔代尔在酒吧斗殴中被刺身亡。
The kicker to the story is, you know, thirty years later, Gary Kildall was knifed to death in a bar fight.
天啊。
Oh my god.
是的。
Yes.
哦，天啊。
Oh, god.
对不起。
Sorry.
对不起。
Sorry.
这就像翻页一样。
That's like a page turn.
我不想去打扰整个房间，但就像，它本该知道，再次，反事实地，谁知道呢，谁知道呢，谁知道呢，但你
I didn't want to bring the room But, like, it should have like, know, again, counterfactual and who knows, who knows, who knows, but, like, you
知道，但我觉得，不，很难说数字研究公司会成长为一家万亿美元的公司，因为比尔·盖茨有着极其敏锐的商业直觉，我的意思是，显然，IBM操作系统时刻是最关键的时刻，但微软历史上还有其他几个关键时刻，他们把握住了方向。
know But I think, no, it seems hard to argue that digital research would have become a trillion dollar company because Bill Gates had such a killer commercial instinct that there were I mean, obviously, the IBM OS moment was the biggest moment, but there were several other moments in Microsoft's history where they steered things.
而且，如果他们拿到了IBM的OS订单，也不意味着你就能突然变成一家巨头公司。
And it doesn't feel like if they get the IBM OS pick, then it just, you magically become a giant company.
哦，不，不，你绝对不可能因为这个就突然变成巨头公司。
Oh, no, no, definitely you don't magically become the giant company.
但再说一遍，这又回到了优先附着的问题。
But again, this goes back to preferential attachment.
谁拿到了IBM的订单。
Whoever got that IBM.
是的。
Yeah.
谁拿到了IBM的订单。
Whoever got that IBM.
他们当时在课堂上就有IBM的业务。
They had IBM deals in class.
很难想象当时IBM有多重要。
It's impossible to remember how important IBM was at that time.
是的。
Yes.
在八十年代中期，IBM的市值占整个科技行业市值的80%。
IBM in the mid eighties was 80% of the market capitalization of the entire tech industry.
嗯。
Mhmm.
他们简直就是绝对的巨头。
Like, they were the absolute gorilla.
是的。
Yes.
是的。
Yes.
顺便说一下，IBM PC以及后来由此衍生出的兼容机，彻底标准化了整个行业。
And and and by the way, the IBM PC stand you know, and and then the clones ultimately that that that came out of it, like, completely standardized the the the industry.
但在此之前所有的PC公司都消失了。
But, like, all of the PC companies from before that went away.
是啊。
Yeah.
这对其他所有人来说简直就是灭顶之灾。
Like, was an extinction level event for everybody else.
所以，如果他没拿到这笔交易，微软是否能继续生存下去都很难说。
And so whoever got that deal had he not gotten that deal, it's not even clear Microsoft would have stayed in business.
不过，话又说回来，他当然功不可没。
No, no, having said that, he gets obviously credit for everything.
现在有一种趋势：如果你去到科技的最前沿，那些人往往非常特立独行，缺乏责任感。
There is a trend where, if you go to the absolute cutting edge of tech, they're so sort of wilderness people that they don't have the conscientiousness.
没错。
Correct.
他们选择去飞行，而不是来参加会议。
That's They, you go flying instead of turning up to the meetings.
没错。
That's right.
而且这几乎像是出现了第二代人，他们前往前沿领域，但又有足够的责任感去建立制度，这些公司最终成为了巨头。
And it's almost like you get a second generation who go to the frontier but are conscientious enough to institution build, and those become the super big companies.
是的。
Yeah.
顺便说一下，戴尔也是那个时期另一个经典案例。
By the way, Dell's Dell's the the another classic case data from that same time.
戴尔电脑是在同一时期成立的。
Dell Computer was founded at the same time.
当时有大约400家IBM兼容机公司，实际上都在倒闭的过程中。
Was, like, 400 IBM clone companies at that time that were actually in the process of going under.
大多数公司只是名存实亡。
Most of them just, like, paperized.
这是后来的事了。
This is later.
那是五年后，对吧？在80年代末的行业低谷期。
It's like five years later, right, during the down cycle in the late '80s.
就在那时，迈克尔·戴尔在宿舍里决定进入个人电脑行业。
And that was around the time that Michael Dell in his dorm room decided to go to the PC business.
没错，正是这样。
And that's exactly right.
他就是那种类型的代表。
He was a version of that.
他比之前进入PC行业的那些冒险家更有系统性思维。
He was a more systematic thinker than the wildcatters who had been in Is the PC industry before
甲骨文是怎么在数据库领域胜出的？
that how Oracle wins in databases?
那时候有很多数据库公司。
There's a ton of database companies back then.
是的，我认为甲骨文的情况有点不同。
Yeah, I think Oracle was a somewhat different story.
我觉得这更像是纯粹的激进策略所致。
Think it might have been more of a story of just raw aggression.
拉里一直对日本武士文化非常着迷，我认为这并不是一个错误。
Larry was always very into Japanese samurai culture, and I don't think that a misstep.
向前看，为什么所有谷歌之前的互联网公司都没有存活下来？
Moving forward in time, why did none of the pre Google Internet companies survive?
比如Cosmic Sight、AltaVista、AOL、雅虎。
Like, Cosmic Sight, AltaVista, AOL, Yahoo.
一个都没有。
None
它们都没能存活下来。
of them.
所以我认为你需要回溯到当时与现在的差异。
So I think that you need to really rewind back to the differences between then and now.
关于这一点，我想说几点。
And I would just say a couple of things on that.
第一，那个时期的整个互联网泡沫，不管你怎么称呼它，持续了大约四年。
One is, like, the whole Internet boom bubble, whatever you call it, of that period was basically four years.
那基本上就是四年起起落落。
It was basically four years in and out.
比如，你刚才提到的那些公司，大部分是在1994年我公司起步的时候。
Those, like, for example, those companies you just mentioned for the most part, my company got going in 'ninety four.
那些公司真正兴起是在1996年。
Those companies really got going in 'ninety six.
到了2000年左右，那简直就是核冬天。
By 2000, like that, you know, was nuclear winter.
所以这整整就是四年的时间。
And so it was a four year period.
当时的商业模式要么根本不存在，要么是全新的。
The business models either didn't exist or were brand new.
我们可以花很多时间讨论这一点。
We could spend a lot of time on that.
但如今你所熟知的那些大型公司的商业模式，在当时根本不存在。
But like all the business models that you have today that, like, have these big mega companies, like, those business models didn't exist.
那时候，大部分还是打包软件，所以很难建立起像今天这样的持久型企业。
Like, it was still mostly just packaged software in those And so it was really hard to build the kind of enduring business that you see today.
然后我想说第三个是市场太小了。
And then I would say the third is the market was so small.
所以到1999年，整个互联网相关市场的总规模最多也就五千万人左右。
So the total market size in, like, 1999 for Internet anything was, like, 50,000,000 people total max, maybe.
也许吧。
Maybe.
其中一半的人还在用拨号上网，那根本就算不上真正的网络连接。
Half of those people were on dial up, which, you know, only barely counted.
顺便说一句，那时候主要是AOL，而它对互联网的支持也极其有限，按我们现在的标准来看。
By the way, that was, like, mostly AOL, which only barely had Internet support, the way we understand it.
没错。
Yep.
对吧？
Right?
你知道，他们那时候有个浏览器，但跟现在你用的完全不一样。
You know, they they had a browser, it wasn't like what you're used to.
然后，当时的电脑超级慢，调制解调器也很慢。
And then, know, the PCs were super slow, the modems were slow.
而且，那时候大多数人上网的常态是，晚上在家书桌前拨号连上一小时左右。
And and that was still, like, the the median Internet experience in those days was you dial in for maybe an hour at night from your desk at home.
没错。
Yep.
顺便说一句，就连那些已经接入互联网的企业，也都在竭尽全力阻止员工使用它。
And then businesses, by the way, were just like even businesses that had Internet, you know, connectivity were doing everything we could to prevent their employees from using it.
好吧。
Alright.
那这边呢？
How about over here?
大家？
Everyone?
好的。
Alright.
嗯。
Yeah.
好的。
Alright.
好了。
There we go.
好的。
Alright.
非常好。
Very good.
大家还需要别的吗？
Anyone need anything else?
终于。
Finally.
终于来了一位真正的爱尔兰人。
Finally a real Irish.
一位名副其实的爱尔兰调酒师。
A legitimately Irish bartender.
需要续杯吗？
Need a refill?
那太好了。
That would be fantastic.
非常感谢。
Thank you very much.
好吧。
Alright.
太棒了。
Outstanding.
所以，与现在相比，那只是一个非常早期的原始时代。
So it was just it was a very early crude time as compared to now.
所以还有另一个问题，通常你会对加密货币或企业SaaS有一些看涨和看跌的观点。
So there's another question that leads to, which is normally you get some bull and bear cases on, like, crypto defense or enterprise SaaS.
AI似乎很独特，因为关于它为何重要的明确看跌观点非常少。
AI seems unique in that there's very little in terms of articulate bear cases about why it matters.
事实上，大多数看跌观点恰恰走向了另一个极端，认为它会毁灭世界之类的东西。
In fact, most of the bear cases go the other way, that it's it's gonna destroy the world or something like this.
在互联网泡沫时期，有没有人提出过明确的看跌观点？
Were there articulate bear cases on the Internet during the bubble?
哦，我的意思是，当然有。
Oh, I mean, yeah.
我的意思是，最初的看跌观点就是：没人能从中赚到钱。
I mean, well, the original bear case was just nobody's ever gonna make any money.
这太荒谬了。
Like, this is ridiculous.
然后还出现了大量说法，认为互联网只会带来网络犯罪、色情、垃圾邮件、欺诈和滥用。
And then there was just a huge onslaught of this is just gonna be cybercrime and, you know, porn and spam and fraud and abuse.
这有点类似于AI的类似情况。
Sort of in the similar sort of equivalent AI.
每一种新技术都会引发一种道德恐慌，认为它会毁掉社会。
Every new technology has a moral panic that it's going ruin society.
这是一种消费
It's a consumer
技术。
technology.
然后你看，当时就是这样，你用一下产品，心想：这真是个笑话，根本行不通。
And then look, it was just like this, you know, and then you just use the product and be like, this is a joke, it doesn't really work.
你看，图片加载要花多长时间。
Like, you know, look at how long it takes images to load.
真的会有人把信用卡信息输进去吗？
Is anybody really gonna put their credit card in?
所以当时我也不知道用‘看空’这个词是否准确，但确实存在极大的怀疑。
Like like so there was I don't if bear case is the right term, there was massive skepticism.
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