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《与泰勒对话》由乔治梅森大学莫卡特斯中心制作，旨在弥合学术思想与现实问题之间的鸿沟。
One: Conversations with Tyler is produced by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, bridging the gap between academic ideas and real world problems.
了解更多信息，请访问mercadis.org。
Learn more at mercadis.org.
如需获取每期对话的完整文字稿（含实用链接），请访问conversationswithtyler.com。
For a full transcript of every conversation, enhanced with helpful links, visit conversationswithtyler.com.
大家好。
Hello, everyone.
今天和我对话的是乔治·塞尔金。
Today, I'm chatting with George Selgin.
这是《与泰勒对话》的其中一集，但我们在加图研究所进行录制。
This is an episode of Conversations with Tyler, but we're holding it at the Cato Institute.
乔治曾为加图研究所工作。
George has worked for Cato.
我是长期合作伙伴。
I'm a longtime associate.
我仍在他们的顾问委员会任职。
I'm still on their advisory board.
感谢卡托研究所作为东道主，我们很荣幸能在此相聚。
I thank Cato, our host, and we're both honored to be here.
我与乔治相识已逾四十载，这让我感到十分惊讶。
I've known George well over forty years, which I find stunning.
最初是通过他关于自由银行体系的研究知道他的，当时他还在纽约大学读研究生，而我住在附近。
I first learned of him through his work on free banking, and he was at NYU as a grad student, and I live nearby.
长期以来我们一直进行着富有成效的讨论，但从未录制过任何内容。
He and I have had fruitful discussions for a long time, but we've never taped anything.
他新出版了著作《新政与复苏的承诺：1933-1947》。
He has a new book out called The New Deal and the Promise of Recovery, nineteen thirty three-nineteen forty seven.
这是该主题最出色的著作，我很自豪地说我已读完乔治所有的书，它们都绝对值得一读。
It is the best book on its topic, and I am proud to announce I have read all of George's books, and they are all definitely worth reading.
乔治，欢迎你。
George, welcome.
谢谢你，泰勒。
Thank you, Tyler.
很高兴能再次来到卡托研究所，有机会与你进行这场对话。
It's very pleased to be back here at Cato and have a chance to have this conversation with you.
第一个问题。
First question.
如果有人试图用尽可能简单的一句话来概括：新政中哪些措施真正发挥了作用？
If someone tried to sum up in as simple a sentence as possible, what in the New Deal mattered?
他们会说：黄金重新定价对经济复苏帮助很大，而《国家工业复兴法》对复苏造成了相当程度的阻碍。
And they said, well, revaluing gold helped recovery a lot, and the NIRA hurt recovery a fair amount.
这是他们能给出的最佳简要总结吗？
Is that the best quick summary they could produce?
关于整个新政
Of the whole thing
还是关于整个...（你掌握了真相）
or Of the whole my you have the truth.
你的书就是真相，对吧？
Your book is the truth, right?
不是。
No.
我说不是，因为遗漏的一个重要真相是，新政为实现复苏所没有采取的措施。
I say no because a big part of the truth that that leaves out is what the New Deal didn't do to achieve recovery.
而且这让很多人感到惊讶，但它几乎没有运用财政或货币刺激手段。
And and this surprises many people to hear, but it made very little use of fiscal or monetary stimulus.
所以我要补充的是，无论新政的意图是什么，它都不等同于现代意义上的经济刺激计划。
So I would add that, that the New Deal, whatever it was up to, did not amount to a modern style program of economic stimulus.
但如你所知，自1933年我们重新调整黄金价值后，制造业产出增长率达到了7%到8%，直到后来因一些通缩压力而搞砸。
But once we revalue gold, as you know, starting in 1933, you have manufacturing output growth rates of 7% to 8% until we screw it up later on with some disinflationary pressures.
我们本可以做得有多好呢？
Like, how much better could we have done?
这样的表现难道不算相当不错吗？
Like, wasn't that a pretty good performance?
表现确实不错，但持续时间并不长。
It was pretty good, but it didn't last very long.
事实上，新政推行者们当时就预见到这种局面难以持久。
In fact, the new dealers kind of knew that it wouldn't last very long.
这背后有几个原因。
And there are a couple of reasons why.
首先，产出激增与人们对《国家工业复兴法》即将生效的预期有关——这是早期新政措施之一。
First of all, there was a big burst of output that was connected to the expectation that the NRA, the National Recovery Administration, was going to be coming into effect because it was one of the early New Deal measures.
该法案旨在通过价格管制人为抬高物价。
And it was going to artificially raise prices through controls.
这种繁荣本质上只是制造商们抢在成本上升前囤积原料、增加库存的投机行为。
So there was a kind of boom that was based only on manufacturers' desires to jump the gun and buy inputs and produce inventory before their own costs went up.
这就是部分原因。
So that was part of the story.
当然，当经济从大萧条最严重的银行危机中走出时，银行体系本身的稳定自然会带来快速增长。
Of course, when you're coming out from the deepest depths of a depression with a banking crisis and all that, you would expect a rather rapid growth to follow from the stabilization of the banking situation itself.
因此我不想否认新政初期那几个月确实取得了进展，也不想否认新政推行者为此应得大部分赞誉，但这种局面未能持续。
So I don't want to deny that there was a genuine progress during those early months of the New Deal, And I don't want to deny that New Dealers deserve credit for much of it, but it didn't last.
当然，我们都知道它没有持续下去。
Of course, we all know it didn't last.
过了最初阶段后，当国家复兴署及相关价格管控计划开始实施时，情况就开始急剧放缓。
Beyond that first period, once the NRA and associated programs for price controls kicked in, things started to slow down very rapidly.
而此后维持进展（尽管速度较慢）的主要因素，是欧洲黄金开始大量涌入。
And what kept the progress going after that, though at a slower rate, was mostly gold starting to rush in from Europe.
最初只是因为货币贬值才匆忙涌入。
And it was rushing in only initially because of devaluation.
但之后，主要是由于对希特勒掌权后果的担忧以及战争爆发的可能性才匆忙涌入。
But after that, it was mostly rushing in because of fears of the consequences of Hitler coming to power and possibility of war breaking out.
这就是新政初期的故事。
That's the story of the early phase of the New Deal.
一个良好的开端，但持续时间并不长，除了来自国外的无意帮助所产生的影响。
A good start that didn't last that long except as a result of help from abroad that was quite unintentional help.
重新评估黄金价格是刺激经济的最佳方式吗？
Was revaluing the gold price the best way of reflating the economy?
因为当时有很多提议，而且你们也关闭了国内黄金市场。
Because there are many proposals at the time, and you shut down the domestic gold market as well.
有没有可能做得更好？
Could it have been done better?
是的。
Yes.
本可以做得更好。
It could have been done better.
我认为当时应该立即让美元贬值。
I think that what it should have happened was immediate devaluation of the dollar.
但罗斯福的做法是——因为当罗斯福上任时已经很明显，原有的金本位制至少必须暂停，因为纽约的银行基本上已经耗尽了黄金储备。
Instead, what Roosevelt because it it was clear by the time Roosevelt took office, the gold standard as it had been had to be at least suspended because the New York banks had run out of gold essentially.
所以那件事其实没有太多选择余地。
So that was not something there was much choice about.
那么问题就变成了：好吧，我们接下来要怎么做？
Then the question was, okay, what are we gonna do going forward?
正如我所说，我认为他们应该做的就是计划让美元贬值，尽快完成这一过程。
As I said, what I think they should have done was to just plan on a devaluation of the dollar, get it over with as quickly as possible.
在暂停黄金支付之前，你不能宣布这个计划，因为那只会加剧对黄金的挤兑。
You don't you don't announce that plan before you've suspended gold payments because it's just gonna make the run on gold worse.
但一旦暂停支付，你就可以继续推进贬值计划。
But once you've suspended, then you can go ahead and proceed with the devaluation.
罗斯福所做的是基于一个名叫乔治·沃伦的人提出的荒谬理论，实施了长达数月的疯狂黄金购买计划，此人当时颇具影响力。
What Roosevelt did was to engage in this crazy gold purchase program for quite a few months based on a harebrained theory by a fellow named George Warren, who was very influential.
他们随意操纵黄金价格。
And they toyed with the price of gold.
该理论认为，如果提高黄金价格，其他物价就会开始上涨。
The theory was that if you raise the price of gold, other prices will start going up.
但这并未发生。
Didn't happen.
最终，经过数月后，整体物价几乎没有任何上涨。
Eventually, after many months, general prices had hardly risen at all.
最后，罗斯福为美元选定了一个估值，确认后付诸实施，情况才开始好转。
Finally, Roosevelt picked a value for the dollar, property valuation, confirmed it, put it into effect, and at that point things started to improve.
这本应是当初就该采取的做法。
So that's what should have happened.
顺便说一句，现在正是讨论这个问题的好时机。
By the way, this is as good a time as any dimension.
这正是凯恩斯会建议且确实建议过的方案。
This is what Keynes would have recommended and did recommend.
他指责并批评罗斯福反而采纳了沃伦的理论。
He scolded or criticized Roosevelt for following Warren's theories instead.
我认为在这个问题上，以及许多其他方面，凯恩斯关于应对大萧条的建议实际上非常明智。
And I think that on this and many other scores, Keynes' advice about dealing with the depression was actually very sound.
有个误解是罗斯福遵循了这些建议，但事实上多数时候他并未采纳。
The myth is that Roosevelt was following it when in fact most of the time he wasn't.
我们快速浏览一下新政的一些政策。
Let's do a rapid fire look at some New Deal policies.
我会提到政策内容。
I'll mention the policy.
给我一个快速回答。
Give me a quick answer.
是有助于复苏、还是阻碍复苏，以及原因。
Helped recovery, hurt recovery, and why.
好的。
Okay.
准备好了吗？
Ready?
是的。
Yeah.
1932年的《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》。
Glass Steagall Act of 1932.
嗯，这项法案有两种定义。
Well, that act has two definitions.
它可以指整个立法，其中包含多个组成部分。
It can refer to the whole legislation, which had several components.
也可以仅指将投资银行与商业银行分离的那个更著名的部分。
It can also refer just to the more famous part that separated investment from commercial banking.
这就是如今人们提到《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》时通常会想到的内容。
That's what people think about these days when they think about Glass Steagall.
所以我将针对第二种情况回答问题
So I'll answer the question for that second
当然。
Sure.
《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》的意义。
Meaning of Glass Steagall.
答案是它对经济复苏完全无关紧要，因为商业银行参与投资银行业务并不是导致大萧条的因素。
And the answer is it was totally irrelevant for recovery because the involvement of commercial banks and investment banking had was not a factor that contributed to the depression.
所以废除它也无助于结束大萧条。
So ending it wasn't gonna help end the depression.
复兴金融公司。
Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
是帮助还是损害？
Helped or hurt?
主要是损害。
Mostly it hurt.
怎么损害的？
How?
它最初是胡佛的计划，基本理念是通过向银行提供贷款帮助它们维持或恢复偿付能力。
Well, it started out as Hoover's plan, and the basic idea was that it was going to lend to banks and help them become or stay solvent.
但起初银行非常不情愿。
But at first, the banks were very reluctant.
嗯，我应该先退一步讲。
Well, I should step back a bit.
最初，该计划下的贷款金额非常有限，后来到了某个阶段，国会要求RFC在发放贷款前必须披露其贷款对象是哪些银行。
At first, the amount of lending that went on under the program was very limited, And then at a certain point, congress made the RFC divulge who it was lending which banks it was lending to ahead of making loans.
于是银行变得非常不愿意参与该计划。
And then the banks became very reluctant to take part in the program.
但原则上，银行资本重组是个好主意还是坏主意？
But in principle, was recapitalizing the banks a good idea or a bad idea?
银行资本重组与向银行放贷是不同的。
So recapitalizing the banks was different from lending to them.
那是后来的一个计划，而且确实奏效了。
And that was a later program, and that worked.
我认为那起到了帮助作用。
I think that helped.
当时RFC实际上是购买了银行的股份，从而直接通过这种方式提高银行资本，而非向其放贷。
That was when the RFC actually bought shares in the banks and so raised their capital directly that way instead of lending to them.
我认为资本重组计划是RFC采取的有效措施之一，也是为数不多通过稳定银行体系、让更多银行得以重新开业从而帮助结束大萧条的举措。
And I think that the recapitalization program was one of the good things, one of the only things about that the RFC did that helped end the Great Depression by stabilizing the banking system and allowing more banks to reopen.
因此我认为这是一个成功的计划。
So I would rate that a successful program.
但需要说明的是，RFC做了很多事情并发展成为一个庞大的机构——新政时期最大的机构，就整体而言，它的失败多于成功。
But with the qualifier that the RFC did many things and grew into a vast agency, the biggest agency of the New Deal, as such, it had more failures than successes.
《农业调整法案》。
Agricultural Adjustment Act.
好还是坏？
Good or bad?
不好。
Bad.
为什么？
Why?
因为首先，它背后的理论就不太站得住脚。
Because the theory behind it, first of all, wasn't very sound.
当时的想法是通过对食品加工商征税来提高农民（实际上是农场主）的收入，认为农场主会有更高的——我现在用的术语在当时并不流行——边际消费倾向，比被征税的人群更高，因此总体上会增加消费支出。
The idea was that we're gonna tax food processors and do that to raise the income of farmers, of really farm owners, and, that the farm owners will have a higher I'm now using language that wasn't current at the time, but will have a higher marginal propensity to consume than than the people being taxed, and therefore, there'll be more spending overall.
这个理论从一开始就相当值得怀疑。
It was a rather doubtful theory to begin with.
当然，这些农民被支付报酬去做的事情是减少产量，耕种更少的作物，并销毁农作物和牲畜，目的是通过减少供应来提高价格，而不仅仅是依靠总需求的增长。
And, of course, what these farmers were being paid to do was to produce less output, to farm fewer crops and to destroy crops and livestock with the aim of raising their prices through supply reduction and not just by getting aggregate demand to grow.
因此，这个微弱的总需求组成部分根本不足以产生重要影响。
So you had this feeble aggregate demand component, which just wasn't effective enough to matter.
然后还有这种不利的供应效应，虽然重要但并没有带来理想的结果。
And then you had this adverse supply effect, which was important but wasn't doing something desirable.
因此，关于《农业调整法案》对整体复苏影响的研究并未显示任何效果——它是否产生微小影响还是毫无作用存在很大争议。
So the studies of the AAA's effect on recovery overall don't show any it's quite controversial whether it had a small effect or none at all.
我认为很可能毫无作用。
I think it probably had none.
这是个棘手的问题。
Here's a tricky one.
1933年《银行法案》。
Banking Act of 1933.
是的。
Yeah.
这很棘手，因为那是另一个问题。
That's tricky because that that's another one.
银行法案包含多个组成部分，其中最著名的是存款保险。
There there are several components to the banking act, and the most well known is deposit insurance.
这可能是唯一值得讨论的部分。
It's probably the only one worth talking about.
存款保险在复苏中的作用在很多方面都被误解了。
And the role of deposit insurance in the recovery is misunderstood in a lot of ways.
一个被误解的方面是罗斯福在其中扮演的角色，因为他实际上一直反对存款保险这一银行法案的组成部分，直到最后一刻才妥协，因为他明白要么必须放弃整个法案，而如果他试图行使否决权，否决很可能会被推翻。
One thing that's misunderstood is Roosevelt's part in it, because he actually opposed deposit insurance, that component of the Banking Act, until the eleventh hour, and he only finally gave in because he could see that any he'd either have to scrap the whole bill, and if he did try to do that with a veto, he'd probably have the veto overridden.
所以他最终签署了法案，然后又把功劳揽在自己身上，声称这是他的主意等等。
So he he finally signed it, and then he took credit as he you know, this is my idea and all that.
这就是一个被误解的地方。
So that's one thing that's misunderstood.
另一方面，存款保险只是众多因素之一，它通过阻止人们挤兑银行来帮助稳定银行体系。
The other is that deposit insurance was only one of many factors that helped stabilize the banking system by discouraging people from running on the banks.
因此它促进了银行系统的重新开放，这对经济复苏至关重要，但作用没有人们想象的那么大。
And so it contributed to the reopening of the banking system, which was crucial to recovery, but not as much as people think.
但你要说这是好事吗？
But you're gonna say good?
我要说它是好事，因为除了长期后果（道德风险等）外，它并没有造成伤害。
I'm gonna say good in the sense that apart from long run consequences, moral hazard and all that, it did not hurt.
所以我认为它是好事，但帮助不大，因为还有其他因素在促使人们把钱存回银行或留在银行方面发挥了更大作用。
So I'm gonna say good, but it didn't help that much because there were other factors that played a much bigger role in getting people to put their money back in the banks or keep it there.
我们可以谈谈那些因素。
So we could talk about those.
存款保险的重要性远不及其他措施。
Deposit insurance was much less important than other things.
1935年的《联邦储备法》，该法案某种程度上让美联储获得了半独立地位。
Federal Reserve Act of 1935, which kind of made the Fed semi independent.
对吧？
Right?
是的。
Yes.
1935年的《银行法》将美联储的集中控制权交给了华盛顿的官僚们。
The Federal Reserve that was Banking Act of 1935 gave the Federal Reserve its concentrated, the concentrated control of the Federal Reserve to, bureaucrats in Washington.
所以，如果你想称之为好消息的话，这项法案意味着现在的新政派FDR能对货币政策施加更大影响。
And so the good news, if you wanna call it that, with that act was that now FDR, the new dealer, could exert a lot more influence over monetary policy.
坏消息是他们并没有利用这一点。
The bad news is they didn't take any advantage of that.
马里纳·埃克尔斯被任命为美联储主席（我们现在这样称呼），我认为就是从那时起他们首次被称为主席而非行长。
Mariner Eccles was appointed as we now call him chair of the Fed, and I think that's when they first became known as the chair rather than the governor.
但他是个货币保守派——他不相信货币刺激政策。
But he was a monetary conservative in the sense he didn't believe in monetary stimulus.
他是个大力支持财政刺激的人，但现在却掌管着美联储。
He was a big fiscal stimulus guy, but he's now in charge of the Fed.
在埃克尔任期内，美联储没有实施积极的财政刺激政策。
There was no Federal Reserve active fiscal stimulus under Edkel's watch.
如果你查看美联储信贷，包括公开市场操作，会发现是一条平线。
You if you look at Federal Reserve credit, including open market purchases, it's a flat line.
所以没错，现在华盛顿掌权了。
And so, yes, now Washington's in charge.
是的，他们不必担心让这12家银行合作——这就像放羊一样困难——但也没有利用这一点来推行扩张性货币政策。
Yes, they don't have to worry about getting these 12 banks to cooperate, which is like herding cats, but no effort was made to take advantage of that to pursue an expansionary monetary policy.
假设你是1932、33年的独裁者，乔治。
Let's say you're a dictator, George, in nineteen thirty two, thirty three.
你可以随心所欲地行事。
You can do what you want, freehand.
在财政政策方面，你会怎么做？
With fiscal policy, what would you have done?
我会加大支出。
I would have spent more.
花在什么上？
On what?
花在赤字上。
On deficits.
嗯，这就是当时财政政策面临的挑战。
Well, that's the challenge with fiscal policy back then.
如今，他们似乎从不缺乏花钱的点子。
Today, they don't seem to be short of ideas for spending money somehow.
但在那个年代，他们确实缺乏想法。
In those days, they they were short of ideas.
事实上，罗斯福在其整个执政期间都是财政保守派。
In fact, Roosevelt was a fiscal conservative throughout his years.
罗斯福最初谈到大规模支出计划时曾说：'你们打算把这些钱都花在什么地方？'
Roosevelt at at first said, regard to big spending plans, what are you gonna spend it all on?
他说的确实有道理。
And he he he had a point.
所以我会更倾向于支持财政刺激，只要他们能想出花钱的项目，我可能会建议Ix更慷慨地花钱，不必担心浪费。
So I would have favored more fiscal stimulus to the extent that they could come up with stuff to spend it on, and I might have told Ix to to spend money a little bit more generously and not be worried about wasting it.
但我想说，我会更重视货币政策，当时没有充分利用它，因为我认为相比财政政策，货币政策更能有效解决需求不足的问题，毕竟大量花钱既困难又可能造成财政刺激带来的潜在浪费。
But I wanna say, I would have put more emphasis on monetary policy, which wasn't taken advantage of, because I think it would have been much more capable of addressing the problem of a lack of demand than fiscal policy given the difficulty involved of spending a lot of money and the the potential waste that fiscal policy, fiscal stimulus can involve.
而且税收基本上翻了三倍。
And taxes were basically tripled.
对吧？
Right?
你会那样做吗？
Would you have done that?
不会。
No.
不会。
No.
当然不会。
Certainly not.
税收，保持不变。
Taxes, kept them the same.
什么？
What?
你是个独裁者。
You're a dictator.
我会废除一些更具倒退性的税种，这些税种当时被严重依赖，比如1932年通过的消费税——当然是由胡佛政府通过的，但它们被罗斯福政府保留甚至扩大了。
I would have gotten rid of some of the more regressive taxes, which they were relying on heavily, starting with the 1932 excise taxes that were passed, of course, by the Hoover administration, but they were maintained and even expanded by the Roosevelt administration.
罗斯福推行了一些旨在向富人征税的税种。
Roosevelt had some taxes that, you know, were meant to soak the rich.
这些税种备受关注，但实际上绝非主要的财政收入来源。
They get a lot of attention, but they were in fact not the main sources of revenue by any means.
政府为平衡预算所依赖的大部分税种——罗斯福政府一直在努力平衡预算——其实相当进步，主要落在了低收入人群身上。
Most of the taxes that the administration was relying on in its effort to balance the budget, which it kept trying to do, this is the Roosevelt administration, most of them were quite progressive, falling on lower income people.
我肯定会取消部分这类税种。
And I would certainly have rolled back some of those taxes.
我认为财政赤字在当时完全不是不合适的。
I I don't think fiscal I don't think fiscal deficits were at all inappropriate at this time.
但再次强调，我会更侧重于货币政策而非财政政策，只有在货币政策似乎无法奏效时才会诉诸财政刺激。
But again, I would have placed more emphasis on monetary policy than on fiscal and resorted to fiscal stimulus to the extent that monetary policy didn't seem to be able to cut it.
作为大萧条的成因或潜在成因之一，斯姆特-霍利关税法案的影响程度如何？是微乎其微还是相当显著？
Just as a cause or potential cause of the Great Depression, did Smoot Hawley matter at all, a tiny amount, significant?
朱迪·万尼斯基是在胡编乱造吗？
Is Jude Wanisky just making this up?
请告诉我们。
Tell us.
关于斯姆特-霍利关税法案，我倾向于参考道格·欧文的研究成果，我认为他是这个领域的权威专家。
Well, on Smoot Hawley, my tendency is to defer to the research of Doug Irwin, who I consider to be the great expert on this subject.
道格绝非自由贸易的批评者，更谈不上反对者。
And Doug is by no means a critic, let alone an opponent, of free trade.
他对斯姆特-霍利关税法案持非常批判的态度。
He's very critical of Smoot Hawley.
然而即便是道格也认为，斯姆特-霍利关税法案只是大萧条中的一个次要因素。
Yet even Doug says that his opinion is that Smoot Hawley was a small factor in the Great Depression.
如果他这么说，我倾向于同意，尽管我必须承认我在这方面没有做过独立研究。
If he says that, I'm inclined to agree, though I have to say I haven't done any independent research on this.
这纯粹是因为我倾向于在这个问题上遵从那位特定权威的意见。
It's just simply a matter of my inclination to defer to that particular authority on this question.
如果斯姆特-霍利法案的影响很小或微乎其微，甚至可能毫无影响，我们是否也该认为政策不确定性同样影响甚微？
If Smoot Hawley was small or very small or maybe nothing, should we also conclude that policy uncertainty was small?
因为我们这里看到的是一个确定性的政策。
Cause here we saw a policy come with certainty.
DI知道它非常糟糕。
We know it was very bad.
那么为什么政策不确定性如此重要？
So why is policy uncertainty such a big deal?
嗯，我认为一个确定的政策可能影响有限，原因很明显——它可能并非那种会产生诸多可预见后果的政策。
Well, I think that a policy that's certain can have a small effect for obvious reasons that it might not be a policy that has all that many consequences that are predictable.
换句话说，在《斯姆特-霍利关税法》通过前，了解情况的道格·欧文可能会说：是的
In other words, Doug Irwin before Smoot Hawley was passed, knowing what's going on, might have said, yes.
这只会产生很小的影响。
This is gonna have small consequences.
如果我们假设——这个假设有点牵强——人们都像道格·欧文一样聪明，他们本可以预见到政策，但仍不会预期它产生重大影响。
If we assume, and this is a stretch, that people are as smart as Doug Erwin, they would have might have anticipated the policy and still not expected it to have big effects.
制度不确定性则完全是另一回事，因为问题不在于你预见到政策并预知其后果，而在于你根本不知道接下来会发生什么。
Regime uncertainty is a whole different matter because the problem there is not that you anticipate a policy and anticipate its consequences, but that you just don't know what the heck's coming.
从投资者的角度来看，这是件大事，因为投资者首先想知道的是他们能否获得投资回报。
Now from investments, from the point of view of investors, that's a huge thing Because the first thing investors wanna know is whether they're gonna reap the benefits of their investments.
如果这个问题的答案取决于对未来政策的大致了解，而你连这点都做不到，你就会选择观望。
And if the answer to that question depends on having a rough idea about what policies are gonna be in the future, and you don't have even that, you're going to hold back.
我认为需要记住的是，复苏的主要问题不在于消费。
And I think that bearing in mind now, the big problem with recovery was not about consumption.
消费相对容易启动。
That's relatively easy to get going.
问题出在投资支出上，这部分已经完全崩溃了。
It was about investment spending, which had totally collapsed.
整个二十世纪三十年代几乎没有净投资。
There was hardly any net investment for the whole nineteen thirties.
因此，任何阻碍商人投资的因素，包括不确定性——这确实会产生影响——都将阻碍经济复苏。
So anything that is discouraging businessmen from investing, including uncertainty, which can definitely do it, is going to be standing in the way of recovery.
我认为这是三十年代经济复苏的一大障碍。
And I believe this was a big barrier to recovery during the thirties.
为什么有时被称为第二次大萧条的1937-38年经济衰退如此严重？
Why was the second Great Depression, as it's sometimes called, in 1937, '38 so severe?
这是个非常好的问题。
That's a really good question.
现在你提到了第一个让我有点困惑的问题，因为它确实非常戏剧性。
And now you've come to the first one that kind of stumps me because it was it was so dramatic.
它来得太突然了。
It's so sudden.
当时有一系列因素共同导致了这一结果。
And it's there were a bunch of factors that contributed to it.
我认为，对此问题的最佳解释是，众多诱发因素同时作用，形成了一场糟糕政策的‘完美风暴’。
And I think that my the best answer to the question is that there were so many operative causes all coming together at once, a sort of perfect storm of bad policies.
在货币政策方面，两个不同的决策方同时采取了行动，而他们之间似乎缺乏良好的协调。
On the monetary policy side, two things were done at the same time by different actors who didn't seem to be coordinating very well.
首先，要记得从欧洲流入的黄金是三十年代需求扩张的主要推动力。
First, remember that gold flowing in from Europe that was the main driving factor in expanding demand in the thirties.
然而，他们开始担忧通货膨胀的问题。
Well, they they started worrying about inflation.
哦，我们会有过多的货币——在当时情况下这种担忧近乎荒谬，但确实如此。
Oh, we're gonna have too much, which was kind of crazy under the circumstances, but it's true.
因此，美联储开始将准备金率翻倍。
And as a result, at the Fed, they started doubling reserve requirements.
他们分三步实施了这一政策。
They did it in three steps.
单就这一点而言，可能造成的危害并不大。
And that in itself may not have done that much harm.
关于其影响程度存在争议。
There's controversy about how much it mattered.
但与此同时，财政部开始对黄金流入进行冲销操作。
But at the same time at the treasury, they started sterilizing the gold inflows.
也就是说，他们采取的措施阻止了当时直接流入财政部的黄金影响银行体系的准备金规模。
That is, they took steps that prevented the inflow of gold, which went directly to the treasury at this time, from influencing the amount of reserves in the banking system.
因此即使财政部获得更多黄金，准备金也没有增加。
So the reserves didn't go up even though the treasury was getting more gold.
而就在这些货币紧缩措施实施的同时，1937-38年的经济萧条爆发了。
And it was exactly coincident with all this monetary restraint that you had the outbreak of the thirty seven, thirty eight depression.
但这还不是全部。
But that's not all.
当时还存在财政紧缩政策。
There was fiscal constraint as well.
到了37年，他们突然认为通胀可能构成威胁，同时也觉得经济复苏近在咫尺，几乎就要实现。
Coming up towards '37, they decided that along with thinking that the inflation was a potential becoming a threat all of a sudden, they're thinking as well that the recovery is just about around the corner, that they're almost there.
因为到37年时，情况开始明显好转。
Because by '37, things are starting to look a lot better.
于是他们在这期间多次尝试平衡预算，最终采取了财政紧缩措施。
So they, in one of many efforts to balance the budget during this time, they resorted to fiscal retrenchment.
因此当时实施了财政政策收紧。
So you had a tightening of fiscal policy.
我认为为何会出现如此严重衰退的最佳解释是，货币和财政紧缩政策同时发生形成了合力。
I think the best answer to the question of how come you had such a severe decline is that you had this conjunction of monetary and fiscal tightening all happening at the same time.
哪位经济学家关于新政政策的著作在当时看来最具前瞻性？
Who's the economist whose writings on New Deal policy come out looking the best from that time?
嗯，我打算提到凯恩斯，部分原因是为了在座各位中引发争议。
Well, I'm I'm going to mention Keynes partly just to be controversial with with this audience.
但凯恩斯在三十年代写的有些文章确实很糟糕。
But there's some articles by Keynes in the thirties that are just terrible.
他关于保护主义的文章，以及在《通论》中呼吁将投资国有化的主张。
His piece on protectionism, his call in the general theory to nationalize investment.
那些
Those
都是些相当糟糕的建议，尽管他在某些事情上确实看得很准。
are some pretty bad recommendations, even though he got some things quite right.
我只讨论凯恩斯直接针对美国大萧条和新政发表的言论。
I'm only talking about what Keynes had to say directly about the American depression and the New Deal.
所以我们让他把目光转向大西洋彼岸时显得理智些。
So we made him sane when he turned his neck across the Atlantic.
是的。
Yes.
在很大程度上确实如此。
To some considerable extent.
老实说，我并非故意挑衅，但必须指出凯恩斯直接给罗斯福的建议——无论是通过公开信函，还是在他与罗斯福唯一的那次会面中所提出的——关于美国应如何应对萧条并寻求出路的建议，都是非常明智的。
I I honestly not just to be provocative, will say that the things Keynes had to say to Roosevelt directly, sometimes through letters publicly published, and also in his meeting with Roosevelt, and so far as we know about it, his one one meeting, Keynes' advice on how The US should deal with the depression and try to get out was very sound.
我给你举几个例子。
I'll give you a few examples.
他非常担忧不确定性，特别是政权不确定性，尤其是罗斯福倾向于攻击商人甚至推行直接旨在惩罚他们的政策。
He was very concerned about uncertainty, regime uncertainty, and specifically with Roosevelt's tendency to attack businessmen and even pursue policies that were directly aimed at punishing them.
他或多或少告诉他们，虽然不是原话，但意思是他应该收敛些。
And he told them more or less, you know, it's not in so many words, but, you know, that he ought to back off.
现在不是时候。
This was not the time.
同样，他说新政在改革与复苏的优先顺序上令人困惑或本末倒置。
Similarly, he said that the, New Deal was confusing or getting priorities wrong about reform versus recovery.
听着，也许你正在实施的某些改革会有良好的长期效果，但现在不是时候。
So look, maybe some of these reforms that you're implementing will have good long run results, but this is not the time.
你应该专注于复苏，部分原因是改革动摇了商界人士，再次使他们难以重拾信心。
You should be concentrating on recovery, partly because reform shook up businessmen and made it again, hard for them to regain their confidence.
顺便说一句，关于动物精神的整个讨论，其实就是我们现在更常说的政权不确定性。
The whole discussion of animal spirits, by the way, is all about what we now more often call regime uncertainty.
最后，凯恩斯猛烈抨击了一些最糟糕的新政政策。
Finally, Keynes attacked very strenuously some of the worst New Deal policies.
他对黄金购买计划嗤之以鼻，称这是个非常糟糕的主意，而他是对的。
The gold purchase program, he ridiculed and said, this was just a very bad idea, and he was right.
此外，他对国家复兴总署及其价格管制措施也持极度批评态度。
And also the NRA, he he was extremely critical of the National Recovery Administration and its price controls.
而且他对此直言不讳。
And he was he didn't, you know, mince words about it.
凯恩斯建议的另一项重要事项是罗斯福应该增加支出。
The only other thing, the other important thing that Keynes recommended was that Roosevelt spend more.
而这正是保守派和自由主义者会与他产生分歧的地方。
And that, you know, that's where the conservatives and libertarians would have a beef with him.
但无论你对财政刺激有何看法，如果罗斯福当时大幅增加支出的话...
But if if Roosevelt had spent a lot more, whatever you think about fiscal stimulus.
对吧？
Right?
如果他当初这么做，而不是实施他和新政派实际采取的那些措施，我认为结果无疑会更好，因为向经济注入更多资金可能会带来负面影响。
If he'd done that instead of the things he and the other new dealers actually did, there's no doubt in my mind that it would have been better because pouring more money into the economy may have adverse consequences.
但远不及那些令人恐慌的改革、高度累退的税收、价格管制之类措施造成的危害。
But nothing like some of the scary reforms and highly regressive taxes and price controls and that sort of thing had.
你可能知道约翰·弗林写过一本书。
There's a book you may know by John Flynn.
书名叫《As We Go Marching》，他论证新政正在给美国带来某种半法西斯式的计划经济。
It was called As We Go Marching, And he argued the New Deal was bringing a kind of semi fascistic planning to The United States.
弗林的观点有多准确？
How correct was Flynn?
这本书的论点经得起检验吗？
How does that book hold up?
是夸大其词还是超前预见？
Exaggeration or a profit before his time?
还是
Or
我认为，关于凯恩斯是法西斯还是社会主义者——抱歉，我是说罗斯福是法西斯还是社会主义者——这个问题经常被提起。
I think, you know, this question about Keynes being a fascist or a soc I mean, sorry, FDR being a fascist or a socialist comes up a lot.
一切都是相对的。
Everything is relative.
如果你仔细观察罗斯福在三十年代的行为，当他最倾向于某些政策时，确实对墨索里尼及其在埃塞俄比亚事件前在意大利的所作所为抱有某种真诚的同情。
If you look closely at FDR's actions during the thirties, when he's most inclined there is some genuine sympathy with Mussolini and what he's doing in Italy before Ethiopia and all that.
对吧？
Right?
而且这种观点很普遍。
And it was widespread.
这并不是新政支持者独有的看法。
This wasn't a peculiarity of the new dealers.
当时很多人都认为墨索里尼让火车准点运行之类的。
This was just what many people thought that Mussolini was getting the trains to run on time and all that.
但最重要的是，罗斯福始终在提防那些更准确应被称为法西斯分子和社会主义者的人，比如休伊·朗和汤森德。
But more than anything, FDR was always looking over his shoulder at the people who might more accurately have been described as fascists and socialists, people like Huey Long and Townsend.
在朗的案例中，这些人明显威胁要发起可能阻止罗斯福连任的竞选活动。
There were all these people who were threatening, in Long's case, very obviously, to, mount campaigns that might keep FDR from being reelected.
很大程度上正是为了抵御这些攻击，他才窃取了他们许多法西斯主义的声势——可以这么说。
And it was largely in an attempt to fend off these attacks that he stole a lot of their fascist thunder to call it that.
但他考虑的是连任所需的条件。
But he was thinking about what was needed to get reelected.
这里的关键在于有一个不容忽视的反事实：当时周围还有更社会主义化和法西斯化的人正在获得大量关注和支持。
And the point here is that there's a counterfactual that mustn't be overlooked, which is that there were more socialistic and fascistic people around who were gaining a lot of attention and support.
因此或许他的新政必须被视为一种妥协，不是全面倒向那些极端，而是向主张更激进威权政府的人提供某种标准操作程序。
So maybe his was the New Deal has to be seen as a kind of compromise, not the all an all out move toward those extremes, but a sort of a SOP being provided to the advocates of more aggressive authoritarian government.
所以如果你把他——罗斯福——和那些人比较，他看起来就没那么糟糕。
So if you compare him, FDR, to those folks, he doesn't look so bad.
当然，如果把他和理想的古典自由主义总统相比，他看起来就像个法西斯分子。
Of course, if you compare him to an ideal classical liberal president, he looks like a fascist.
但问题在于当时的政治风向如何，一个试图连任的人能够逃避什么，或者说他必须做出哪些妥协？
But, again, the question is where were the politics pointing at the time, and what what could a person trying to get reelected get away with, or what did he have to what compromises did he have to make?
奥地利经济学家为何在20世纪30年代的诊断中表现不佳，或者你会质疑这个前提吗？
And why did the Austrian economists underperform in their diagnoses of the nineteen thirties, or would you challenge that premise?
我认为奥地利学派的问题，在哈耶克的案例中最为明显，在于他们的政策建议并不一定与其理论保持一致。
The problem with the Austrians, I think, and here it's most clear in Hayek's case, is that their policy recommendations were not necessarily consistent with their theories.
哈耶克在理论上最终认同了这样的观点：至少必须维持经济中的支出水平，或者用凯恩斯的术语来说就是保持总需求，或在需求崩溃时将其恢复。
Hayek, in theory, came around to the view that at very least, you had to maintain the level of spending or what Keynes would call aggregate demand in an economy or get it back up when it has collapsed.
对吧？
Right?
稳定货币存量与其流通速度的乘积。
Stabilize the product of the money stock and its velocity.
对吧？
Right?
这在哈耶克的《价格与生产》及其他著作中都有阐述，他在这方面论述得很到位。
This is in Prices and Production and other works by Hayek, and he's very good on that.
但另一方面，他似乎倾向于将1930年代初英国（或许比美国更甚）的经济崩溃视为打击工会的机遇，更决心让这种破坏持续下去，同时还热衷于维持金本位制，无论是否与稳定支出相协调。
On the other hand, he seems to have been inclined to see the collapse of the early 1930s in Britain as well, perhaps more so than in The US, as an opportunity to break the trade unions, and was more determined to let that damage continue and also was keen on keeping the gold standard, whether it was consistent with stabilizing spending or not.
因此，实践建议（主张紧缩政策、维持金本位等）与至少哈耶克版本的奥地利理论之间存在这些不一致性，后者认为如果要避免经济问题，就必须维持经济支出的稳定性。
So there were these inconsistencies between the practical recommendations, which were for austerity, for keeping the gold standard, etcetera, and with at least Hayek's version of the Austrian theory, which said you must maintain stability of spending in the economy if you're not going to have trouble.
那么早期芝加哥学派表现如何？
And how did the early Chicago school do?
亨利·西蒙斯、雅各布·维纳这些人呢？
Henry Simons, Jacob Viner?
首先，整个芝加哥学派并非如现今所描绘的那般是财政保守主义者。
The Chicago school as a whole, first of all, was not they were not the fiscal conservatives that they're now made out to be.
他们在大萧条期间率先倡导大规模公共工程以应对危机，这一立场甚至早于凯恩斯。
They took the lead well ahead of Keynes in pushing for big public works to counter the Great Depression.
他们中许多人签署了相关请愿书，并且长期以来一直在为此主张发声。
Many of them signed a petition to that effect, and, they were had been arguing for it for some time.
在认识到政府可以通过公共工程刺激需求方面，他们绝非落后者。
So they certainly were not laggards in the sense of recognizing that the government could help stimulate demand through public works.
但在其他方面...当然，费雪严格来说并不算芝加哥学派成员。
But on other scores, well, Fisher Fisher, of course, wasn't really Chicago.
他是耶鲁大学的。
He was Yale.
他算是芝加哥经济学派的荣誉成员，但当时是极具影响力的经济学家。
He's kind of an honorary shock Chicago economist, but he was a highly influential economist at the time.
费雪支持管理纸币制度，实际上就是我们今天实行的这种。
Fisher was for a managed fiat dollar, what we have today in effect.
从这个意义上说，可以说他非常有远见。
And in that sense, could say it was very forward looking.
但他想废除金本位制。
But he wanted to get rid of the gold standard.
我认为当时很多芝加哥经济学家都对此表示赞同。
There were a lot of Chicago economists, I think, who were sympathetic with that.
西蒙斯想废除部分准备金银行制度。
Simons wanted to do away with fractional reserve banking.
我认为这是应对银行危机非常糟糕的方式，如果深究危机背后的真正原因，你会发现问题出在糟糕的监管制度而非部分准备金银行本身。
I think that was a very bad way to respond to the banking crisis, which if you looked at it's what was really behind it, you find that bad regulations rather than fractional reserve banking per se were the problems.
西蒙只需向北看看加拿大就能明白，拥有部分准备金银行并不意味着必然会发生银行业崩溃。
And Simon only had to look north to Canada to see that you didn't have to have a banking collapse just because you had fractional reserve banks.
我给芝加哥学派的人打了不同的分数，因为他们对这些问题的看法各不相同。
I give the Chicago people different grades according to the different persons because they all had different views about these things.
但我要说的是，他们都不是凯恩斯在《通论》中 caricature 的那种头脑简单的古典经济学家。
But what I would say is true of all of them is that they were not the simple minded classical economists that Keynes caricatures in The General Theory.
现在你提到了银行业问题。
Now you mentioned the banking issue.
我清楚地记得1980年代，许多人向我坚称日本、德国拥有这些全能银行体系，资本充足率很高，集中度也相当高。
I remember well the 1980s when many people insisted to me that Japan, Germany, they had these systems of universal banking, quite well capitalized, pretty highly concentrated.
这被认为优于分散化的美国体系，后者时不时就会出现资不抵债的情况。
It was supposed to be better than the decentralized American system, which every now and then would go insolvent.
存款保险基金也会出现问题。
There'd be problems with the deposit insurance funds.
人们经常听到关于北方加拿大银行业的说法。
One hears frequently claims about Canadian banking to the north.
嗯，他们允许所有这些分行银行业务。
Well, they allow all this branch banking.
你们只有几家大型银行。
You only have a few large banks.
它们从未倒闭过。
They never go under.
但从2025年的视角来看，当美国显然拥有世界上最优秀的资本市场时，这些市场非常分散。
But from the vantage point of 2025, when America clearly has by far the best capital markets in the world, They're very decentralized.
银行规模正变得越来越小，仅占整体的15%到20%。
Banks are just becoming smaller and smaller, 15 to 20% of the whole.
我们当初没有转向那种高度集中的模式——尽管当时那样做本可以带来稳定——真的做错了吗？
Did we really do so bad not to move to that highly centralized model even though it would have been stabilizing at the time?
广义上说，有两件事可能破坏银行体系。
Well, two things can undermine a banking system, broadly speaking.
一是银行尽其所能实现多元化和强化自身，而允许设立分行等措施正是为此目的。
One is to the best they can to diversify and strengthen themselves, And that's what letting banks branch and that sort of thing were about.
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1933年之前，美国政府主要通过限制银行的经营自由来破坏银行体系的稳定性，对其业务施加了极其有害的限制。
Until 1933, the US government mainly undermined the stability of its banking system by limiting the freedom of what banks could do, but imposing very harmful restrictions on their activities.
令人困惑的是，如今情况已完全改变，但政府仍难辞其咎的事实却未改变。
Now what's confusing is that the situation has totally changed, but not the fact that the government is still to blame.
我的意思是，现在我们允许银行开设分支机构。
And what I mean is that now we allow branch banking.
我们允许银行开展许多过去不能做的业务，其中很多业务本身我认为是好的。
We allow banks to do a lot of things that they couldn't do before, many of which I think are good in themselves.
但自1933年以来，我们建立了庞大的存款担保体系，从而引发了严重的道德风险问题。
But since 1933, we have created a vast system of deposit guarantees and so have introduced a huge moral hazard problem.
关键在于：
Now here's the thing.
在没有担保时本应完全值得追求的自由，在有担保后就变得危险了。
Things that would have been utterly desirable freedoms in the absence of guarantees become dangerous when you have those guarantees.
因为银行可能会利用担保来滥用这些自由，他们知道自己在追求利润时所承担的风险会有兜底保护。
Because then the banks might take advantage of the guarantees to abuse these freedoms because they see that they're they'll be protected on the downside from the risks they take in pursuit of profits.
因此我们从一个原本自由且需要更多自由的体系转变了，因为当时不存在那些会助长滥用自由的担保机制，而现在同样的自由却未必是好事，因为担保机制扭曲了银行面临的激励机制。
So we've gone from a system where freedom would have been and was desirable, more freedom, because the guarantees that would have encouraged its abuse, that freedom's abuse, weren't present to a system where the same freedoms are not necessarily a good thing because guarantees have corrupted the incentives that banks face.
假设我们没有实施或保留存款保险制度，而是进入一个由五六家大银行主导、小型银行寥寥无几的世界。
Say we hadn't had or hadn't kept deposit insurance, and we move forward into a world where there's five or six big banks, not many small banks.
银行的资本充足率达到40%。
Banks are capitalized at 40%.
资本成本更高。
The cost of capital is higher.
这对国家来说真的更好吗？
Is that really better for this country?
我不认为那种集中会更好，但我们要谨慎。
I don't think that that kind of concentration would have been better, but let's be careful.
那种集中不仅仅是允许银行开设分支机构的结果。
That kind of concentration wasn't just a consequence of letting banks branch.
在加拿大，我有一篇关于这个的文章，在加拿大他们有严格的准入要求。
In Canada, I have an article about this, in Canada, they they had strict entry requirements.
因此实际情况是，尤其是从二十世纪二十年代开始，加拿大银行数量减少，而当局不允许成立任何新银行。
So what happened is that, especially starting in the nineteen twenties, the number of Canadian banks shrank and the authorities wouldn't allow any new ones to be formed.
所以这不仅仅是银行分支自由化——允许银行开设分支机构——导致了所有这些整合。
So you didn't just it wasn't just branch banking, the freedom for banks to branch, that resulted in all this consolidation.
这是由监管施加的绝对准入限制造成的。
It was absolute entry restrictions that were imposed by regulation.
我认为真正需要思考的问题是：如果允许银行自由整合、开设分支或自主联合，但同时没有任何担保（没有'大而不倒'政策——这本身就会推动大量整合），银行体系会是什么样子？
And I think that the question one really wants to ask is, what would a banking system look like if you let banks be free to consolidate and branch and group or whatever on their own, but you also had no guarantees, no too big to fail, which of course drives a lot of consolidation itself.
对吧？
Right?
也没有绝对的准入限制。
And no absolute entry restrictions.
对吗？
Right?
准入自由。
Freedom of entry.
我认为你不会看到像现在加拿大和其他一些地方那样高度集中的银行体系。
I don't think you would have so concentrated a banking system as we've seen now in Canada and some other places.
而且我认为仍然会有小型银行的生存空间，因为小银行有其专业特色。
And I also think there would be room for some small banks still, because small banks have their specialties.
所以在大规模分支银行之外，我认为还会存在一些小银行的存活。
So among the big branch banks, I think you would also have survival of some small banks.
那如果你的主要需求是存款安全
That's If the main thing you want is security for your deposit
嗯
Mhmm.
接入支付系统。
Access to the payment system.
而且由于我们的宪法，国会实际上无法预先承诺不救助大银行，无论你我多么希望他们能做到。
And because of our constitution, Congress cannot really pre commit to no big bank bailouts, however much you or I might want them to.
他们做不到，对吧？
They can't, right?
我们的制度中蕴含着主权原则。
There's sovereignty embedded in our institutions.
即使表面看似自由放任，我还是会把钱继续存在大银行，因为事后我估计它们会被救助，而小银行可能不会，最终我们会剩下五、六家主导银行——这样或许更好，但我认为实际上也不会形成真正竞争。
I would just keep on putting my money in a big bank, even under what might nominally appear to be laissez faire, because I would figure ex post, they'll be bailed out, the smaller banks maybe not, and we'd end up with five or six dominant banks, which maybe that would be better, but I don't think it would actually be truly competitive either.
是的。
Yeah.
如果问题是：我是否希望我们能够生活在一个政府能可信地承诺不救助大银行的世界？
If the question is, do I wish we could have a world where where the government could credibly commit to not bailing out big banks?
那么我的回答当然是：这正是我的愿望。
Then my answer would be, of course, that is my wish.
但我同意你的观点。
But I agree with you.
最终可能无法彻底避免这种情况。
It may not be possible to ultimately prevent this.
当大型银行倒闭时，要求救助的呼声实在太强烈了。
The clamor for rescues is so great when a major bank fails.
对此我也没有答案。
And I don't have an answer to that.
真的没有。
I really don't.
但我认为这个问题依然重要，它仍然值得思考。
I think though it remains important, the question still is important.
如果没有这种政府干预，银行体系会是什么样子？
What would a banking system look like if we didn't have this kind of government interference?
它能良好运转吗？
How well would it work?
因为如今很多经济学家到处宣扬政府必须救助大银行、小银行。
Because what we have today is a lot of economists running around saying that we have to have governments bailing out, big banks, small banks.
只要他们站在救助这边，我的愿望当然永远无法实现。
And so as long as they're on the side of these bailouts, my wish, of course, is never gonna become true.
如果我们有机会设置一些实质性障碍来阻止政府救助大银行——前提是没有那么多经济学家反对设置这些障碍。
And if there's a chance that we could put some barriers, meaningful barriers to government bailouts of big banks in place if we didn't have a lot of economists saying we shouldn't have such barrier.
我还有一些关于宏观经济的更普遍问题要问你。
I have some more general questions about macro for you.
货币数量论是被高估还是低估了？
The quantity theory of money, overrated or underrated?
被严重误解了。
Badly misunderstood.
正确的版本是什么？
What's the correct version?
并告诉我们现在数据中是否还能体现出来。
And tell us if it shows up in the data these days.
正确的版本——也就是我的版本——是说通货膨胀率大致可以用某种货币总量（比如M2）的增长率来近似表示。
The correct version, which is to say my version, is is that the the rate of inflation is roughly approximated by the rate of growth of some monetary aggregate, say m two.
但如果我们用回归分析来验证这个理论，美联储的人已经做到脸色发青了，结果并不理想。
But if we run that in regressions, which people at the Fed do till they're blue in the face, not doesn't go very well.
确实不理想。
No.
没错。
That's right.
我不认为这是正确的，但我只是想阐明我认为该理论的正确表述应该是什么。
I don't think it's true, but I'm just trying to clarify what I think the theory what the proper statement of it is.
从可靠性角度来说，它并不成立。
Now it's not true in the sense of being reliable.
但如果你纵观整个历史记录，确实存在某种值得注意的相关性。
But if you look at the really broad record, there certainly is some correlation out there worth bearing in mind.
问题当然在于金融创新和监管创新。
The problem, of course, is financial innovation, regulatory innovation.
问题是，所有这些因素都可能极大地改变任何特定货币指标与通胀指标之间的实际关系。
Problem, All these things change and can change dramatically the actual relationship between any given monetary measure and any given inflation measure.
但你不认为这些因素只会产生水平效应变化，而增量变化仍会符合货币数量论吗？
But wouldn't you think those would have the level effect changes, and the deltas still would look like the quantity theory?
但事实并非如此。
But they don't.
这对我来说是谜题的重要部分。
This is, for me, a big part of the puzzle.
你知道，法规变化相当缓慢，所以这可能会使货币乘数不同，或流通速度不同，或哪个货币总量指标更重要变得不同。
You know, regulations change pretty slowly, So that might make the money multiplier different or velocity different or which monetary aggregate matters different.
但在边际上，我预期会看到更多符合货币数量论的关系。
But at the margin, I would expect to see more quantity theory relations than I do.
嗯，可能是因为这个理论本身就不够完善。
Well, that could be that the theory is just not that good.
你知道吗？
You know?
但我们所有人都
But we've all
读过米尔顿·弗里德曼和大卫·库姆的著作。
read Milton Friedman and David Kuhm.
这个理论听起来相当不错。
The theory sounds pretty good.
大家都在教授这个理论。
All teach it.
这个理论到底有什么问题？
What what's what's wrong with the theory?
别忘了，除了监管创新和金融创新之外，还有更基础的因素——对实际货币余额的需求，它可能因各种原因随时发生变化。
Well, don't forget that on top of regulatory innovation and financial innovation, you have something much more fundamental, which is the demand for real money balances, which can change at any time for all sorts of reasons.
数量理论在其严格版本中预设了一个前提：货币流通速度是恒定或非常稳定的值，但事实并非如此。
The quantity theory is premised in its stricter version on the assumption that velocity is a constant or very stable value, and it isn't.
这就是我能
That's all I can
为数量理论做的全部了。
do to the quantity theory more true.
所以如果M2大幅上升，你会认为这会加速货币流通速度。
So if m two goes up a lot, you would think that accelerates velocity.
你会看到不成比例的影响。
You would get a disproportionate effect.
但实际上，你经常看到M2大幅上升，而价格却像是
But in fact, you often see m two go up quite a bit, and prices are like,
是的。
Yeah.
嗯，如果M2的变化率...其实价格变化率在变化，那将成为影响流通速度变化的因素。
Well, if the rate of change of m two well, really, rate of change of prices is changing, that it will be a factor changing velocity.
你说得对。
And you're right.
这是正相关关系。
It's a positive relationship.
然而，流通速度会因各种其他原因而变化。
However, velocity changes for all kinds of other reasons.
基本假设认为流通速度与货币增长无关或无论出于何种原因都保持稳定，这一假设经常被违背。
And so the assumption, the basic assumption that velocity is is independent of the monetary growth or is stable for whatever reason is often violated.
我个人从来都不是货币数量论的严格支持者，所以我觉得没有太大义务去捍卫它。
I've never been a strict proponent of the quantity theory myself, so I don't feel too obliged to try to defend it.
但我必须说，在八九十年代我教授这门课程时，曾向学生展示过M2增长率与通货膨胀率之间的一些粗略相关性数据，那是一张多国图表，你知道的，就是那种常见的对角线分布。数据点排列得相当整齐，你可以查看单个国家的统计数据，就能看出这种关系。
But I must say that I taught when I was teaching this stuff quite a few years in the eighties and nineties, I presented to students some rough correlation data for m two growth rates and rates of inflation, a chart for a bunch of countries, you know, with the usual diagonal, And they all lined up pretty well, and you could look at statistics for one country, and you could see the relationship.
虽然相关性不强，但这种关系确实存在，并且持续了很长时间。
It wasn't tight, but it was there, and it was there for a long time.
自从我当年教书以来，情况已经发生了很大变化。
Lot has changed since I was teaching back then.
我确信如果现在更新那些图表，我可能得讲一堂完全不同的课了。
And I'm sure that if I updated those charts, I might have to give a different lecture.
但在米尔顿·弗里德曼等人强调它的那个年代，这个理论确实有其价值。
But there was something to it at the time when people like Milton Friedman were emphasizing it.
这个现象确实在数据中存在了一段时间，我认为值得持续关注。
It was definitely something that had been in the data for some time, and, and I think it was worth tracking.
顺便说一句，我补充一下，2008年后这些规律都失效了，因为我们现在的体系中货币基础与整体信贷宽松度关系不大，一切都与利率、准备金这类因素相关。
By the way, I should add, since 2008, all bets are off on this stuff because we now have a system where the monetary base doesn't necessarily have much to do with the overall ease of credit, and it's all about the interest rate and reserves and that sort of thing.
因此自2008年以来，货币数量理论可能比以往更值得怀疑了。
So the quantity theory is probably even more doubtful since 2008 than it was before.
所谓'独立央行'的概念，是被高估还是低估了？
The notion of independent central banks, which I put in quotation marks, overrated or underrated?
我认为这是当前的一个问题。
I would say It's an issue today.
对吧？
Right?
是的。
Yes.
这非常困难。
It's very hard.
嗯，我能回答这个问题的最佳方式，就是重复我在其他场合多次说过的话：正因为我们的中央银行——美联储并不十分独立，我们才需要认真维护它所剩无几的独立性。
Well, the best way I can answer it, that question, is by saying what I have said several times in other forums, that it's precisely because our central bank, the Fed, is not very independent that we need to take seriously the preservation of what little independence it does have.
基于这个立场，我不知道该说它的独立性是被高估还是低估了。从某种意义上说它被高估了，因为实际独立性并不多。
So given that position, I don't know whether I should say it's independence is overrated or underrated because there's a sense in which it's it's overrated because there isn't that much of it.
但当人们说'完全不用担心失去独立性'时，它又被低估了。
But it's underrated to the extent that people say, well, let's not worry about losing at all.
考虑到黄金的商品需求往往相当不稳定，近期的罪魁祸首主要是中国人民银行，我们还能在任何一个国家实行金本位吗？即使像美国这样的大国，还是说这已经完全不可能了？
Given that the commodity demands for gold are often quite unstable, in recent times, it would be the Central Bank of China as a major culprit, Can we have any kind of gold standard at all in one country, even a big country like The US, or is that just out?
在我看来，这已经不可能了。
As far as I'm concerned, it's out.
不可能了。
It's out.
这已经不可能很久了。
It's been out for a long time.
是的。
Yeah.
如果没有金本位，我们还能实行自由银行制度吗？
If there's no gold standard, can we have free banking at all?
能。
Yes.
绝对可以。
Absolutely.
而且自由银行发行的是以美元为支撑的票据。
And it's free banks issuing things backed by US dollars.
没错。
That's right.
但最终还是由美联储掌控。
But it's still ultimately controlled by the Fed.
是的。
Yes.
确实如此。
It is.
美联储也必须改革。
You have to reform the Fed too.
必须改革货币政策才能解决这个问题。
You have to reform monetary policy to solve that problem.
那么2025年，你打算如何改革美联储？
And 2025, how do you reform the Fed?
你说了算，乔治独裁者。
You're in charge, dictator George.
告诉我们。
Tell us.
嗯，我是主张稳定名义GDP的人。
Well, I'm an NGDP stabilizing person.
我长期以来一直如此。
I have been for a long time.
顺便说一句，我的第一本关于银行标准的书，提出了冻结货币基础、法定货币的构想或理想方案。
And by the way, my first my first book, the criteria for banking, it puts forward a proposal or an ideal of a frozen monetary base, fiat money.
这不是金本位制，书中论证理想情况下应该稳定支出。
It's not a gold standard, and it argues that ideally you wanna stabilize spending.
并且分析了这个体系的实施效果。
And it looks at how well the system does that.
所以我从来不是回归金本位的拥护者，我一直理解自由银行可以建立在法定货币标准之上。
So I've never been a return to gold advocate, and I've always understood that free banking could be based on a fiat monetary standard.
然而必须理解的是，在法定货币标准下实行自由银行制度，实际上已经解决了诸多问题，因为我认为银行的自由运作能大幅增强银行体系的稳健性，降低金融危机风险。
What what has to be understood, though, is that you if you have free banking with a fiat monetary standard, then you have solved problems because I think the freedom of the banks creates a lot of greater robustness in the banking system and less risk of financial crises.
请注意，这里的自由必须包含不实施救助政策。
Mind you, freedom has to here include no bailouts.
对吧？
Right?
你仍需处理狭义上的货币政策问题，即货币基础本身如何由中央管理机构调控。
You still have to deal with monetary policy in the narrow sense of how the monetary base itself is managed by the central authorities.
在书中，我建议冻结货币基础，这就像将美元转化为一定数量的比特币。
In the book, I recommended freezing the base, which would be like turning the dollar into so many Bitcoins.
但一个不那么激进、不那么极端的提议会是弗里德曼式的方案。
But a less dramatic, less drastic proposal would be a Friedman type proposal.
我认为弗里德曼在八十年代在这方面的观点非常出色。
And I I think Friedman in the eighties was fantastic on this stuff.
他曾说用计算机取代联邦公开市场委员会，并编程让计算机仅产生足够的货币基础增长，或选择利率以确保最终有足够资金维持名义支出稳定，但不超过这个限度。
You know, he said replace the FOMC with a computer and program the computer so that you just get enough increase in the monetary base or you choose interest rates such that you end up with enough money to keep nominal spending stable, but not more than that.
我有时会提到一个‘守夜人美联储’的概念。
I sometimes talk about a night watchman Fed.
你知道，其实不需要联邦公开市场委员会做任何决策。
You know, you don't have to have the FOMC doing anything.
只需要在里面放一台大型计算机，再配个守夜人确保没人能进去篡改程序。
You just have a big computer in there and a night watchman who makes sure nobody can go in there and tamper with it.
这就是我理想中的改革方案。
That's my ideal reform.
有多少国家应该实行美元化？
How many countries should dollarize?
天哪。
Oh gosh.
更少
Fewer
请给出具体数字。
Exact number, please.
更少。
Fewer.
38。
38.
比史蒂夫·汉克认为的要少。
Fewer than Steve Hanke thinks.
可能只有少数国家应该这样做。
A small number probably should.
具体数量取决于其中有多少国家已证明自己完全无法做到财政自律，无法管理浮动或挂钩汇率而不引发恶性通胀或招致投机性攻击。
And the number depends on how many of them have proven themselves utterly incapable of fiscal restraint and of managing, floating either floating or pegged exchange rates without either hyperinflation or inviting speculative attacks on
听起来对我来说像是很多国家。
That sounds like a lot of countries to me.
光是加勒比地区加起来就够多了，对吧？
Just add up the Caribbean right It's
这个数字比过去大，而且似乎一直在增长。
a larger number than it used to be, and it seems to be getting bigger all the time.
阿根廷是这里最大的问号，因为它是一个非常大的经济体。
Argentina is the big question mark here because it's a very big economy.
通常，你不会考虑让这样的经济体成为美元化的候选对象。
Normally, you would not consider such an economy a candidate for dollarization.
但如果一个经济体尽管规模庞大，却长期在所有其他可能的货币安排上屡屡失败，那么是时候认真考虑美元化这一替代方案，并评估它是否属于两害相权取其轻。
But if you have a long if the economy, despite being big, has a long enough track record of failing with all the other possible arrangements, it's time to take the dollarization alternative seriously and ask whether it's the lesser of evils.
因为这不会很理想。
Because it's not gonna be great.
让一个大经济体绑定美国的货币政策并非完美方案。
It's not gonna be perfect to have a big economy bound to The US monetary policy.
当然，如果美国货币政策本身出现问题，情况只会更糟。
And, of course, it's not gonna be any better if it's gonna be worse if US monetary policy itself is bad.
这就是美元化的固有风险——你的货币体系不会比美元本身更优越。
And that's always a risk of dollarization is you're not gonna be any better off than the dollar itself as a as a a monetary system.
但重申一次，如果你本身就是个烂摊子，关键问题在于：哪种情况会更糟糕？
So but but, again, if you're a basket case, the relevant question is what's gonna be worse?
什么样的制度危害最小？
What's gonna be the least harmful system?
我实在无法认同许多经济学家的做法——他们在处理这类问题时，总是搬出黑板经济学那一套。
I really object to what I'm afraid is large numbers of economists who when addressing questions like this, they go to their blackboard economics.
他们的做法是：假设一个完美运作的央行加上浮动汇率制就能实现各种目标，然后拿这个理想模型与美元化做比较。
And what they do is they say, well, you know, a perfectly managed central bank with a floating exchange rate can do this, that, and the other thing, and now let's compare it to dollarization.
天啊。
Oh my.
美元化当然相形见绌。
Dollarization's inferior.
这种比较对我们讨论的这类国家来说完全文不对题。
That kind of comparison is utterly irrelevant for countries of the sorts we've been talking about.
当然，如果你认真研究这些国家的历史表现，评估它们实施浮动汇率制或挂钩汇率的可能性，仍可能得出这些方案优于美元化的结论。
Now it may still be the case that if you take seriously their records and how they're likely to manage a floating exchange rate or a peg, you might still conclude that one of those is better than dollarization.
但至少应该基于这些国家财政与货币历史的真实记录来做出正确比较。
But at least you should make the right comparison based on the reality of of those countries' fiscal and monetary records.
就在华盛顿特区，我们谈话的此刻，正围绕《天才法案》展开一场大辩论：是否应允许稳定币支付利息？
Right now in DC, as we speak, there's a big debate under the Genius Act, should stablecoins be allowed to pay interest?
银行业游说团体表示反对。
And the banking lobby says no.
这将从银行抽走过多的资源，实际上可能导致它们资不抵债、流动性枯竭，最终需要纾困救助。
It will drain too many resources from banks, and in fact, they could end up insolvent, illiquid, a bailout would be needed.
既然银行管理常常如此糟糕——我是说，确实如此对吧？
Since banks are so often poorly managed, I mean, they right?
我们是否应该允许稳定币支付利息？
And should we allow interest payments on stablecoins?
这难道不会演变成针对正规银行体系的一种监管套利吗？
Doesn't that just become a kind of regulatory arbitrage against the banking system proper?
我们该如何应对这种转型？
How do we handle the transition?
嗯，我对任何行业提出的‘不要允许x因为它会伤害我们行业’这类论调的第一反应就是如此。
Well, my immediate reaction to any argument from any industry that says, don't do don't allow x because it'll hurt our industry is so.
因为
Because
但这事我们俩都脱不了干系。
But where you and I are on the hook for this.
或者你已经搬去西班牙了。
Or you you've moved to Spain.
也许你现在不是了，但你应该还是美国纳税人吧？
Maybe you're not anymore, but you're probably still a US taxpayer.
对吧？
Right?
我是。
I am.
所以，没错。
So, yeah.
你确实...是的。
You're on You're Yeah.
它会烧掉我的护照。
It'll burn my passport.
但不，我认为如果稳定币真的成功了，它们将在某种程度上与银行竞争，而一些银行会因此败下阵来。
But no, I think that if, of course, stablecoins, if they succeed at all, are going to be competing to some extent with banks, and some banks are gonna lose to that extent.
这本身不能成为对稳定币施加任何限制的理由。
That in itself can't be an argument for imposing any kind of restrictions on stablecoins.
必须是银行遭受的损害会让我们整体更糟，尽管人们正从稳定币中获益。
It has to be the case that the damage banks suffer somehow is going to make us worse off even though people are benefiting from the stablecoins instead.
假设为了讨论，我们可以设想一个稳定币行业能提供我们从银行获得的一切需求。
If we could envision just for the sake of argument, a stablecoin industry that gives us all everything we want that we used to get from banks.
那么我们完全可以彻底摒弃银行。
So we do dispense with banks altogether.
那又怎样？
Well, so what?
这就像用汽车取代马匹和马车一样。
It's it's like replacing horses and buggies with automobiles.
因此必须存在某种第三方效应或其他理由，我们才能说‘最好不要让他们这么做’。
So there has to be some kind of third party effect or something that's appealed to before we can say, oh, well, we better not let them do this.
而我尚未看到关于这类后果的有力论证。
And I haven't seen very good arguments about such consequences.
我确实看到一些证据表明稳定币管理非常糟糕，因为其中一些已经酿成灾难。
I do see arguments to the effect evidence to the effect that stablecoins have been very badly managed because some of them have been disasters.
这意味着我们需要采取措施确保稳定币本身受到良好监管。
That means we do need to do things to make sure stablecoins are themselves well regulated.
但这并不意味着我们这样做是为了帮助银行。
But it doesn't follow that we're doing this because we wanna help the banks.
我们这样做是为了确保这个行业本身具有相当的可靠性。
We're doing it because we wanna make sure we have an industry that's itself in itself reasonably reliable.
接下来进入最后一个环节，我们来谈谈乔治·塞尔金的生产函数。
For our final segment, we move to the George Selgin production function.
乔治，拥有100头驴是什么感觉？
George, what is it like owning 100 donkeys?
是的。
Yes.
我养了100头驴，不过目前才养了一年。
I I own a 100 donkeys, but so far only for a year.
我是自愿的。
So I I volunteered.
在西班牙我住的地方附近有个驴保护区。
There's a there's a donkey reservation, near where I live in Spain.
我发现了这个地方，而且我喜欢驴。
I found out about it, and I like donkeys.
于是我就去了那里，是一对夫妇经营了大概三十五年，主要靠自掏腰包维持，为了让驴群延续下去，特别是安达卢西亚驴。
So I went down there, and it's a husband and wife who have been doing this for thirty five years or something, mostly out of their own pockets to try to keep the donkey population going and specifically the Andalusian donkeys.
所以我自愿去那里帮忙。
And so I volunteered to help out there.
其实还谈不上帮忙，我就是在那儿转转，搬搬干草什么的，偶尔也割割玉米。
It's not help yet, but I hang around and, you know, move hay and things like that, cut cut corn.
在网站上，我想进行捐赠。
On the website, I wanted to make a donation.
网站上写着，20欧元可以领养一头驴一年。
And on the website, it said that for €20, you could adopt a donkey for a year.
所以我汇了2000欧元并附了张纸条：100头驴。
So I sent in €2,000 and put a note on it, 100 donkeys.
所以我现在拥有100头驴。
So I now own a 100 donkeys.
唯一的问题是那是个部分储备制的驴场。
The only problem is that that's a fractional reserve, donkey place.
实际上他们只有30头驴。
So they own turns out they only have 30 donkeys.
如果我现在要挤兑的话，他们会破产的。
I I I if I were to stage a run right now, they'd they'd go broke.
西班牙的驴能产生什么积极的社会外部效应？
What's the positive social externality from donkeys in Spain?
如果你曾与驴子相处过，你会发现它们简直就是行走的正外部性集合体。
Well, if you've ever hung around a donkey or donkeys, you'll find that they are just nothing but walking ex positive externalities.
它们绝对可爱，是非常非常友善的动物。
They're absolutely lovely, very, very amicable animals.
它们会走过来用鼻子轻蹭你之类的。
They come and nuzzle you and all that.
正因如此，人们实际上会用它们进行心理治疗。
And they actually use them for therapy for this reason.
不过与治疗犬不同，你不能把驴子带进医院。
Now you can't unlike therapy dogs, you can't bring the donkey into the hospital.
所以人们会来到驴子保护区。
So people come down to the donkey reserve.
病人们——他们会带患者去那里和驴子相处，这对精神病患或重伤康复者等人群有非常好的疗效。
Patients, they bring patients down there to hang around the donkeys, and it has really good effects, psychological patients or people who are recovering from serious injuries and all that.
所以我不会讨论自己可能存在的问题，但无论什么问题，和这些驴子相处都有帮助，而我还能免费享受这一切。
So I'm I'm not gonna discuss what my possible problems are, But whatever they are, it's helping to hang around these donkeys, and I get it for nothing.
嗯，也不是完全无偿的。
Well, not for nothing.
这个嘛，我确实也做些工作。
Well, I I do some work.
是啊。
Yeah.
我是做些工作的。
I do some work.
现在你可以随意质疑这个问题的前提。
Now feel free to challenge the premise of this question.
但你会怎么说，随着时间的推移，你在哪些方面变得不那么自由意志主义了？
But what would you say is the most important way that over time you've become less libertarian?
你知道，这个问题的部分答案，我得说，我一开始就没那么自由意志主义。
You know, part of the answer to that, I have to say, I was never that libertarian to begin with.
我是通过拉里的书接触到货币理论的，所以我在货币问题上变得自由意志主义，主要是通过质疑：我们真的需要这么多政府干预和货币吗？
I got into the money stuff with Larry's book and all, and so I became libertarian on money by virtue of of asking the question, well, do we need this much government and money?
并得出结论认为我们不需要。
And coming to the conclusion that we don't.
由于大多数人认为货币是最需要政府监管的东西，人们自然认为如果我在货币问题上持自由意志主义立场，那我一定在所有方面都是个彻底的自由放任主义者。
Now since most people think money is the thing that above all has to be regulated by governments, people naturally assume that if I'm libertarian on on money, I must be a hardcore laissez faire guy all around.
但实际上，我对很多经济政策问题并没有强烈观点，因为我...我只是不假装自己懂得足够多。
But in fact, I don't hold strong opinions about a lot of economic policy issues because I I I just don't I don't pretend to know enough.
但你的货币观点中包含了很多政府干预。
But your money views have a lot of government in them.
所以不存在金本位制。
So there's no gold standard.
这是政府发行的纸币。
It's a government paper currency.
这是政府运营的计算机系统。
It's a government run computer.
是的。
Yeah.
即使在那里。
Even there.
确实如此。
That's true.
但这一点从一开始就是如此。
But that was true from the beginning too.
就像我在第一本书里说的，我认为你无法...你知道，与其说是我喜欢金本位制。
Like I said in my first book, I assume you can't you know, it's not so much I I like the gold standard.
我认为一战前的金本位制非常了不起。
I thought the prewar pre World War one gold standard was amazing.
这是我们拥有过的最好的货币体系。
It's the best monetary system we've had.
即便它并非总是表现完美——以美国为例，我们曾经历过危机，但如果你深入研究，会发现那主要是由于这些国家（尤其是美国和英国）特定的国内法规导致了诸多问题。
If it didn't always look great as was the case in The United States, for example, where we had crisis, if you do the research, you'll see that that was because of specific DOM regulations in those countries that had a lot of problems, mainly The US and England.
总之，金本位制虽好，但我不认为我们能把这个精灵重新塞回瓶子里了。
So, anyway, a gold standard was great, but I don't think you can get that genie back in the bottle.
我只是觉得这不可能。
I just think it's impossible.
最明显的原因是，一旦政府参与金本位，一旦有了中央银行，如果它违背承诺（当然所有曾与金本位挂钩的央行都这么做过），就无法再建立可信的黄金兑换承诺。
For the most obvious reason is once governments are involved in the gold standard, once you have a central bank, then if it breaks its commitment, which, of course, they all have, all the ones that once were tied to the gold standard, then they can't establish a credible commitment again to have convertibility into gold.
我的总结是：如果明天美联储说'好吧'。
The way I sum it up is if tomorrow the Federal Reserve said, okay.
你可以用这么多美元兑换这么多盎司黄金——明智的公众（包括我自己）明天就会去把黄金兑现以防万一。
You can have so many ounces of gold for every, you know, so many dollars, a wise public, I myself included, would go tomorrow and take the gold just in case.
对吧？
Right?
然后这个体系就会终结。
And that would be the end of it.
所以我认为无法重建？
So I don't think you can I don't think you can recreate?
问题在于你会说'好吧'。
The problem is you'll say, well, okay.
但我们并不一定需要中央银行。
But we don't have to have a central bank.
但从某种意义上说，改变货币标准就像试图改变行车方向一样。
But you do in the sense that switching monetary standards is like trying to switch which side of the road you drive on.
需要有人来协调推动这件事，因为人们不会自发完成这种转变。
You need somebody to coordinate it to make it happen because people don't do it all by themselves.
这就是为什么比特币虽然可能具备各种优势，但至今未能成为普遍流通媒介的原因。
That's why we're not all that's why Bitcoin isn't taking off as a general medium of exchange, whatever its virtues might be, for example.
所以我们面临这个网络效应问题。
So we have this network problem.
如果政府不主动建立金本位制度，我们不太可能自发转向金本位。
If the government doesn't deliberately create a gold standard, it's unlikely that we'll spontaneously go there.
但如果政府真的主动建立金本位制度，我们又不太可能信任它。
But if the government did deliberately create a gold standard, it's unlikely we would trust it.
这并不是我对金本位制度的主要质疑。
That's not my big problem with the gold standard.
在我们进入观众提问环节前还有最后两个问题。
Last two questions before we go to audience questions.
首先，生活在安达卢西亚，你最大的惊喜是什么？
First, living in Andalusia, what's been your biggest surprise?
最大的惊喜是那里的人们。
The biggest surprise has been the people.
那里的人们简直可爱极了。
The people are just absolutely lovely.
你知道，我是一个人去的。
You know, you go there when alone.
我在那里没有家人什么的。
I don't have family or anything.
所以人们从一开始就表现得真心关心你，这种感觉太棒了。
So having people act like they really care about you just from the get go was wonderful.
我给你讲两个小故事。
I'll just tell you two quick stories.
一件事是我刚到那里时就牙疼了。
One is I I had a toothache early on.
于是我去看了当地的一位牙医。
So I go to a local dentist.
长话短说因为时间有限，我前后去了这位牙医那里大约六次才把问题解决。
And to make it make it short because we don't have a lot of time, I ended up making about six visits to this dentist to try to get this thing straightened out.
他们最后不得不拔掉一颗牙并装上牙冠。
They finally had to pull a tooth and put a crown.
而且他们直到装上牙冠后才肯收我的钱，之后他们收了一部分费用。
And they wouldn't take my money till the till they put the crown in, then they took some money.
我一直问他们我该付多少钱？
I kept saying I said, how much do I owe you?
他们说，哦，下次再说吧别担心。
They said, oh, don't worry about it next time.
就是这位牙医。
And it's this dentist.
对吧？
Right?
另一个是邮递员。
And the other one is the postman.
邮递员来送包裹。
The postman come to deliver packages.
当我不在家时，会接到一个焦急的电话说，喂。
And when I'm not home, I get a frantic phone call and say, yeah.
我有个包裹要给你。
I have a package for you.
我该怎么办？
What do I do?
你不在家。
You're not here.
我该放哪儿？
Where can I put it?
你什么时候回来？
When are you coming back?
你知道，他们真的很担心。
You know, they're really worried.
这些人不一定是我认识的。
And these aren't necessarily people I know.
对吧？
Right?
可能是我之前从未接触过的邮递员。
They could be a postman I've never dealt with before.
可爱的人们。
Lovely people.
绝对可爱的人们。
Absolutely lovely people.
所以，这是最大的惊喜，幸运的是个积极的惊喜。
So, that's been the biggest surprise, fortunately positive surprise.
最后一个问题。
Final question.
既然你现在西班牙语很流利了，除了驴之外，你接下来想了解什么？
Now that you're fluent in Spanish, other than donkeys, what will you learn about next?
哦，这是特指西班牙相关的吗？
Oh, that has to do specifically with Spain?
是的。
Yes.
或者西班牙语相关的。
Or the Spanish language.
也可以是拉丁美洲。
It could be Latin America.
可能是萨拉曼卡，任何相关的内容。
It could be Salamanca, anything.
没错。
Yeah.
天啊。
Gosh.
这是个好问题。
That's a good question.
我不知道。
I don't know.
通常我选择学习的内容只与个人兴趣有关。
I usually what I take on has to do with just an interest.
这与对语言本身的兴趣无关。
It's unrelated to the interest in the language itself.
但我得说我一直非常渴望在西班牙多旅行。
But I'll only say I've been very keen on traveling more in Spain.
而且我想乘坐——现在很多国家都有豪华列车。
And I want to take, they have luxury trains now in many, many countries.
我想你坐过王公快车吧？
I think you've, have you been on the Maharaja Express?
不，从来没有。
No, Never.
我想体验那趟列车，但西班牙有几条豪华列车线路，我都想去尝试。
I want to do that one, but Spain has a couple of them, and I want to do those.
也许我会学到很多铁路术语，并把它们加入我的西班牙语词汇库。
So maybe I'll learn a lot of railroad lingo and add that to my Spanish vocabulary.
但我所有的西班牙语都是因为不得不学才掌握的。
But all my Spanish is a result of having to had to learn it.
我买了一套公寓，还得找人装修。
I bought an apartment, and I had to have it fixed up.
所以我掌握的词汇主要是关于管道、油漆、抹灰这类东西的。
So I my vocabulary is really good on things like plumbing and painting and plaster and stuff like that.
再次推荐乔治的书《False Dawn》，这是该主题下最优秀的著作。
Again, a plug for George's book, False Dawn, the very best book on its topic.
恭喜你，乔治，非常感谢。
Congratulations, George, and thank you very much.
哦，谢谢你，汤姆。
Oh, thank you, Tom.
有问题吗？
Questions?
我会叫你的。
I will call on you.
不要发表演讲。
No speeches.
如果你开始演讲，我会打断你，并将你从录音中删除。
If you start a speech, I will interrupt you, and you will be expunged from the tape.
请。
Please.
乔治，欧元区对相关国家来说是净利好、净负面，还是与他们的前景无关？
George, the Eurozone, net positive for the countries involved, net negative, or irrelevant to their prospects?
我认为欧元区是个好坏参半的事物。
I think that I think the the Eurozone is a mixed bag.
一方面，你们拥有这种共同货币，我认为这本身是件好事，但同时也伴随着所有的监管包袱。
The on the one hand, you have this common currency, which I think is itself a good thing, but you have all the regulatory baggage that goes along with it.
我将间接且不完整地回答这个问题，回顾上世纪九十年代，当时我在九十年代初曾为立陶宛的货币改革提供建议。
I'll answer indirectly and incompletely by saying back in the nineteen nineties, when I was early nineteen nineties, I was advising Lithuanian currency reform.
那正是他们刚刚从苏联共和国独立出来的时候。
This was when they just broken free over just breaking free from the Soviet Republic.
而且我还为《纽约时报》写过一篇文章。
And I wrote an article for the New York Times.
请记住，当时还没有欧元货币。
Remember, there's no euro currency at this time.
这是九十年代初，距离欧元正式推出还有不到十年时间。
This is early nineties, and so it's not quite ten years before the euro was introduced.
当时已经有欧元债券了。
There are euro bonds.
我当时建议他们应该建立一个由欧元债券支持的货币局，在欧元正式出现前就发行欧元。
And I said what they should do is set up a currency board backed by euro bonds and issue euros before there were any euros.
如果足够多的国家采用这种欧元货币，那将会非常有益。
That kind of euro currency would have been very good if enough countries had done it.
但我认为各国正深受欧元区官僚体制之苦，不仅是共同的货币政策——我觉得货币政策本身或许尚可忍受。
But I think countries are suffering from the bureaucracy that goes hand in hand with being in the eurozone, not just the common monetary policy, which I think itself might be bearable enough.
这就是我对这件事的看法。
So that's my thoughts about that.
我对英国决定脱离欧元区一直持矛盾态度。
I was very ambivalent about Britain's decision to break out of the eurozone.
我至今仍怀疑他们是否因此获得了更好的处境。
I still have my doubts whether they're they've made themselves better off by doing so.
我知道这么说很危险，但我确实没有非常强烈的感觉，当时也不认为这个举动会对英国有利。
I know that's a dangerous thing to say, but I just don't have a very, very strong feelings, and I didn't have them at the time that that move would prove to Britain's benefit.
不过你可以告诉我是否应该持有更坚定的观点。
But you can tell me more about whether I should have more confident views.
下一个问题。
Next question.
乔治，如果没有二战，美国经济在四十年代及以后会怎样。
George, The US economy in the forties and beyond were it not for World War two.
如果没有三十年代大萧条后的战争，我们预期会看到什么情况？
What what would we expect had there not been the war with the depression of the thirties?
我在书中论证的观点——当然也是我所相信的——是我们可能仍会陷入困境。
So what I argue in in the book and, of course, what I believe is that we would still be we might still be in trouble.
战争确实帮助结束了美国的大萧条，但不仅仅是通过人们通常认为的方式。
The war did help end The US Depression, but not just in the way that people normally think.
普遍观点认为，我们终于开始实施财政刺激政策了。
What the common view is, well, we started finally doing fiscal stimulus and how.
这推动了支出增长，从而让我们摆脱了大萧条。
And that got the spending going, and that got us out of the depression.
这个简单解释的问题在于：支出的大幅增长结束了。
The problem with that simple explanation is that the big boost in spending ended.
战时支出或各级政府总支出占GDP的比例，在战后迅速回落到接近1939年的水平。
Wartime spending or overall government spending, all levels of government, as a percent of GDP fell back down almost to where they were in 1939 after the war ended, and that happened very quickly.
与此同时，所有士兵都回来了，当时逐渐掌权的凯恩斯主义者们预言将出现大萧条。
And all the soldiers are coming back, and the Keynesians now who are kind of getting in the saddle are predicting a major depression.
但战争还带来了其他影响，这就是为什么大萧条并未发生，而我们最终迎来了大规模投资热潮。
But the war did something else, and that's why that major depression didn't happen, and we ended up with a big investment boom.
这种影响就是政府对待企业的态度发生了转变——从新政时期的敌视转变为过度亲密的合作，这为军工复合体埋下了种子。
And that something else was to change the attitude of government towards business from the hostility it exhibited during the New Deal to, if anything, cozy co overly cozy cooperation that was planting the seeds for the military industrial complex.
因此当战争结束时，商界人士不再悲观，而是信心倍增；政府也不再敌对，转而采取支持态度。
And so by the time the war ends, businessmen, instead of being pessimistic, have got their confidence built up big time, and the government, instead of being hostile, is is favorable.
于是你看到这场巨大的投资热潮弥补了战时开支的缩减，这才是经济复苏的真正关键。
And so you get this immense investment boom that makes up for the shrinkage in wartime spending, and that's the real key to recovery.
所以如果没有战争，这一切可能就不会发生。
So that's what might not have happened if there hadn't been a war.
我们可能会面临更持久的制度不确定性或制度敌意问题。
We might have had a more lasting regime uncertainty problem or regime hostility problem.
当然，这里的反事实推演很粗糙，因为我们不知道当时会是谁当选。
Of course, the counterfactual here is raw because we don't know who would have been elected.
而且，你知道，罗斯福显然已经去世，无论如何，杜鲁门接替了他的位置。
And, you know, Roosevelt obviously died, and somebody, Truman, have taken his place one way or the other.
杜鲁门的态度与他不同。
And Truman's attitudes were different from his.
但至少可以说，通过促成政府与企业间态度的转变——甚至在罗斯福仍在任时——战争在这方面产生了非常积极的长期影响。
But at least I can say that by changing, helping to bring about the change in attitude, government business attitude, even before, even while FDR was still in office, in that respect, the war made a very positive long run difference.
前排有问题。
Question in the front.
提问者。
Sender.
请讲。
Yes.
乔治，你大力支持生产率标准，即随着生产率增长加速，价格水平会温和下降。
George, you're a big champion of the productivity norm where you'd have the price level gently fall as productivity growth accelerated.
如果我们真的迎来人工智能的繁荣，你认为政策制定者会允许这种由生产率驱动的通缩出现吗？还是他们会过于畏惧？
If we happen upon an AI true boom, do you actually see a world where policymakers would allow this type of productivity driven deflation to emerge, or would they be too afraid of it?
我最推崇的政策理念——即商品单位生产成本下降时价格也应随之下降——是一个长期理想状态，因为我认为无法直接实施这种政策，毕竟人们已对价格和成本的趋势形成了预期。
My favorite policy or my ideal about prices falling as unit costs of production of goods falls is is a long run ideal in that I don't think you can just jump into that policy because people now have expectations about trends and prices and costs.
所以必须逐步推进这种政策转变。
So you'd have to gradually work into this.
需要循序渐进地实施允许价格实际下降的政策。
You'd gradually work towards a policy where prices often actually are allowed to fall.
但你认为当今美联储或任何其他央行已准备好开始推行此类政策吗？
Do I think that they the people at the Fed or any other central bank in the world today are ready to start heading towards such a policy?
我认为没有。
I don't.
我觉得还远未达到。
I don't.
我们甚至还需要很长时间才能说服他们放弃设定正通胀率的目标。
I think we we still have a long way to go just to convince them that they shouldn't be targeting a positive inflation rate.
因此，在至少就名义收入稳定性达成共识之前，我们仍无法实现这种转变。
And so, you know, until we've moved away from that, at least move towards some kind of agreement on nominal income stability.
只有到那时，如果生产力持续提升，才有可能开始讨论允许价格长期呈下降趋势。
Only then will it be possible to start talking about allowing a long run downward trend in prices if productivity continues to improve.
是的。
Yes.
在前排。
In the front row.
感谢这本精彩的书。
Thank you for the wonderful book.
我的问题是，你认为技术创新是三十年代经济复苏的关键因素吗？
My question is, do you think technical innovation was the important part of the story in the recovery in the thirties?
反过来问，工资过高或不允许下调，是否在维持那种替代劳动力的创新方式中起到了重要作用？
And reversing this question, do wages that were too, like, sort of too high or weren't allowed to go down important part in maintaining that innovation in sort of labor displacing, labor supplanting ways?
嗯，二十世纪三十年代确实有很多技术创新。
Well, there was a lot of technical innovation in the nineteen thirties.
亚历山大·菲尔德对此有过相当精辟的论述。
Alexander Field has, written quite eloquently about it.
但那种创新意味着经济体的生产可能性正在扩大。
But what that innovation meant was that the production possibilities of the economy were expanding.
如果从产出的角度来解读，归根结底就是说潜在产出在三十年代期间是增长的。
But if you interpret that in terms of output, what it boils down to is saying that potential output's growing during the thirties.
问题当然在于，萧条不仅仅是与之前相比产出水平较低。
The problem, of course, is depression is not just a low level of output compared to some previous amount.
它是通过实际产出与潜在产出之间的差距来衡量的。
It's measured by the gap between actual output and potential output.
因此，假设大萧条期间实际产出没有增长而潜在产出在增长，那么萧条实际上是在恶化而非改善。
So if actual output was let's just assume actual output wasn't increasing during the Great Depression and potential output was, the depression was getting worse, not not better.
当然，实际情况是产出在33年后开始复苏。
Now, of course, what really happened was output started to recover after '33.
但由于潜在产出增长迅速，从缩小产出缺口的角度看，真正的复苏并不像绝对产出恢复所显示的那么显著。
But if that as that potential output was growing rapidly, the real recovery in the sense of reduction in the output gap was less impressive than the recovery of absolute output may suggest.
因此某种程度上说，生产率提高的事实使得萧条状况比单纯看产出进展所显示的更为严峻。
So there's a sense in which the fact that productivity was improving makes the depression worse than it might seem if you just look at what the progress of output was.
然后你后面将是最后一个问题。
And then behind you will be the last question.
目前来说，关于美联储独立性的整个辩论，以及更广泛的关于联邦政府机构独立性的讨论，以及它们是否应归入行政部门管辖，现在最高法院正在审理相关案件。
Currently speaking, there's, like, the whole debate over, like, the Fed's independence, and, also, it's in a broader general debate about the independence of agencies in the federal government and being brought under the executive, and right now there's a Supreme Court case going on.
让我们假设最坏的情况，最高法院裁定所有独立机构都归行政部门管辖。
Let's assume in a worst case scenario, the Supreme Court rules that all independent agencies come under the executive.
在某种程度上，这会让例如美联储试图实施名义GDP目标框架等事情变得复杂。
In a way, that kind of complicates like for example the Fed trying to implement like an NGDP framework.
在你看来，货币政策在这种全新的、一切都由行政部门掌控的体制下是如何实施的？
In your own opinion, how does monetary policy get conducted under such, you know, a totally new regime in which everything is under the executive?
谢谢。
Thanks.
嗯，它是根据行政部门的利益来实施的，不幸的是，就我们目前所知，这种利益往往倾向于非常宽松的货币政策。
Well, it gets conducted according to the interests of the executive, which unfortunately, as far as we can tell right now, tends to be one that favors very easy monetary policy.
我认为这种政策比符合美联储当前目标或合理的名义GDP目标的政策更为宽松。
I think easier policy than would be consistent either with the Fed's present target or with a reasonable nominal GDP target.
我认为普遍情况是，无论是国会控制还是行政控制，在实践中都会导致财政对货币政策的主导，即政府官员希望在不增加税收的情况下增加支出的财政考量，将鼓励比宏观经济稳定所需更为宽松的货币政策。
I think it's generally the case that both Congress, both congressional control and executive control are going to turn in practice into fiscal dominance of monetary policy, where the fiscal considerations, that is the desire of the government officials to be able to spend more without taxing more, is going to encourage easier monetary policy than is consistent with macroeconomic stability.
这就是为什么我认为美联储至少需要尽可能保持独立于政府两个分支。
And that's why I think at least as much independence as you can get of the Fed from both branches of government is necessary.
我、我、我希望看到名义GDP目标制得以实施。
I I I would like to see NGDP targeting happen.
我认为美联储官员对此考虑不足，但我宁愿继续尝试说服他们，也不愿冒险接受一个由行政部门控制的美联储，因为我对改变这样一个美联储的行为方向几乎不抱希望。
I think Fed officials have not been very good about considering it, but I would rather continue to try to convince them than take my chances with an executive controlled Federal Reserve, which I think would have, I'd have even less hope of converting such a Fed into doing the right thing.
还剩两分钟。
Two minutes left.
最后一个问题。
Last question.
无论以何种标准衡量，阿根廷的人均收入都位居拉丁美洲前列。
No matter how you measure it, Argentina has one of the top per capita incomes in Latin America.
拥有独立中央银行且经济美元化的国家，其人均收入均低于阿根廷。
Countries with independent central banks with dollarized economies have lower per capita income than Argentina.
我的简单问题是，这对国家财富意味着什么？
My simple question is, what does that say about the wealth of nations?
也许这说明那些非常贫穷的国家认为最好实行美元化，以免变得更穷。
Maybe it says that countries that are very poor decided that they had better dollarize so don't get any poorer.
谢谢大家的到来。
Thank you all for coming.
谢谢你，乔治。
Thank you, George.
谢谢。
Thank you.
感谢收听《与泰勒对话》。
Thanks for listening to Conversations with Tyler.
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You can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app.
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If you like this podcast, please consider giving us a rating and leaving a review.
这有助于其他听众发现这个节目。
This helps other listeners find the show.
在推特上，我是TylerCowen，节目账号是cowenconvos。
On Twitter, I'm TylerCowen, and the show is cowenconvos.
下次见，请继续收听和学习。
Until next time, please keep listening and learning.
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