20世纪的战争

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希望您喜欢本期节目。

I hope you enjoy the program.

大家好，欢迎来到新一季节目，我们将共同探讨影响这个世纪的重要思想和事件。

Hello, and welcome to a new series of programs in which I hope we'll be looking at some of the ideas and events which have influenced the century.

今天我的嘉宾是作家兼广播人迈克尔·伊格纳季耶夫，他最新著作名为《战士的荣誉》，其撰写的哲学家以赛亚·伯林传记也于本月出版。

My guests today are the writer and broadcaster Michael Ignatieff, whose most recent book was called the warrior's honor and whose biography of Isaiah Berlin, the philosopher, is published this month.

另一位是牛津大学前皇家历史学教授迈克尔·霍华德爵士，他是新版《牛津二十世纪史》的联合主编。

And sir Michael Howard, formerly Regis professor of history at Oxford, who's joint editor of the new Oxford history of the twentieth century.

迈克尔·伊格纳季耶夫，以赛亚·伯林常引用希腊诗人阿基洛科斯的比喻：狐狸知晓许多事，而刺猬精通一件大事。

Michael Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin often used the image of the fox who knows many things and the hedgehog who knows one big thing, an image taken from the Greek poet Archilochos.

你说以赛亚·伯林在四十多岁时发现了他所信仰的重大理念，并将其贯彻于他的政治哲学中。

You said that in his forties, Isaiah Berlin discovered the big thing that he believed in, and he then pursued it in his political philosophy.

那个重大理念是什么？

What was that big thing?

嗯，他一直自视为一只狐狸——四处游走、敏捷闪躲、逃避追捕、通晓百事。

Well, he always thought of himself as a fox, that is who ran around, who darted, who eluded pursuit, who knew many things.

我认为在他四十多岁时，由于前往莫斯科会见诗人阿赫玛托娃，目睹俄国知识分子遭受迫害，钢铁般的意志就此铸就。他意识到自己是个坚定的西方自由主义者，对苏联暴政深恶痛绝。

In his forties, I think as a result of going to Moscow, meeting the poet Akhmatova, seeing how Russian intellectuals were being persecuted, steel entered into him, and he saw that he was a committed Western liberal who loathed Soviet tyranny.

他所领悟的核心要义就是：必须捍卫自由，抵抗那种乌托邦式的极权暴政。

And the one big thing he knew was the defense of liberty against that kind of utopia, that kind of totalitarian tyranny.

更进一步说，他所信仰的自由是赋予人们选择权的自由——自由选择，但永远无法确知是否正确，因此每个选择都必然伴随某种代价。

And then further, that the liberty that he believed in was the liberty of allowing people the chance to make choices, free choices, but choices where you could never be certain that you were right, and therefore the choices that you would make would always involve some kind of loss.

这就是他的核心愿景。

That's the kind of central vision.

这成为他余生捍卫的核心理念，如同刺猬坚守的信念。

That's the hedgehog core of what he came to defend for the rest of his life.

正如你在书中所说，他就像吊床上的狐狸般灵活。

Because as you say in your book, he was a fox in his hammocks.

午餐在华盛顿，晚餐在耶路撒冷，伦敦听歌剧，牛津老学院里与人畅谈。

It was lunch in Washington and dinner in Jerusalem and the opera in London and chatting with people in old cells in Oxford.

这就是他的生活。

It was that life.

但这个关于自由及其背叛的理念终究成为了核心主题，不是吗？

But the this idea became central, the theme of freedom and its betrayal, anyway, wasn't it?

你认为为何他的思想在政治哲学范畴之外也被视为重要？

Why do you think his ideas were thought to be important outside the context of political philosophy?

你觉得它们真的具有重要性吗？

And do you think they have real importance?

它们具有庄重感。

They've gravitas.

它们对当今的人们有意义。

They mean something to people today.

人们确实会践行这些思想。

They that people actually act on them.

他是位自由主义哲学家，而自由主义有各种流派。

He's a liberal philosopher, and there are all kinds of liberalisms out there.

有些自由主义是为自由市场辩护的。

There are liberalisms that are apologists for the free market.

有些自由主义本质上是对个人自由的捍卫。

There are liberalisms that are basically defenses of individual liberty.

我认为他的自由主义与众不同之处在于，他意识到我们的价值观常常相互矛盾。

His liberalism the thing that makes his liberalism different than anybody else's, I think, is his sense that that our values are often in contradiction.

自由将与平等产生矛盾。

Liberty will be in contradiction with equality.

正义将与仁慈发生冲突。

Justice will be in conflict with mercy.

我们此生向往的所有美好事物，无法同时兼得。

All the good things that we want in this life, we can't have at the same time.

我们必须做出选择。

We have to choose.

自由是一种常常需要做出悲剧性选择的状态，无论我们如何抉择，都会有所失去。

Liberty is a state of making often tragic choices in which whatever way we move, we'll lose.

他的自由主义思想中对悲剧性的强调超过其他任何人。

There's more emphasis on tragedy in his liberalism than in anyone else's.

我认为他具有持久影响力的原因在于，他是最直接为多元文化、多种族、多元社会发声的自由主义哲学家——在这些社会中，世俗主义者与宗教人士对立。

The reason that he's got shelf life, the reason that he'll last, I think, is that he's the liberal philosopher who speaks most directly to multicultural, multiethnic, plural societies where you've got secularists versus religious people.

社会主义者与自由主义者对立。

You've got socialists versus liberals.

人们持有的世界观相互冲突，无法通过某种温和共识来调和。

You've got you've got people holding worldviews that are in conflict and can't be squared by some bland consensus.

以赛亚的可贵之处在于，他将自由主义从'社会应是温和共识'的理念中解放出来。

The good thing about Isaiah is that he cuts liberalism loose from the idea that society should be a bland consensus.

当他说'欲望不可过度'时，过度的自由意味着强者践踏弱者的自由，富人剥削穷人的自由等等。

When he says you can't have too much of wanting, too much freedom means the freedom of the strong to trample on the weak and the freedom of the rich to consume the poor and so on.

但这种看似不妥协的妥协方案，虽然被他提出，却很难激发人们的想象力，不是吗？

But this, as it were, uncompromising compromise, which he seems to put forward, is a very difficult thing to make to catch the imagination, isn't it?

我们可以看到马克思的极端主义思想，或是社会达尔文主义的力量。

Where we can see Marx as extremisms, Marx, or the power of social Darwinism.

以赛亚·柏林的理念在我看来既明智又人道，且符合我的人生观。你认为这些理念如何能激发人们的能量和热情，促使他们在政治领域付诸实践？

How do you think that Isaiah Berlin's ideas, which it seems to me are both sensible and humane and right in my in in the way I look at life, how do you think that they can inform people with the energy and excitement to make them act on them in the political world?

因为他是一位政治哲学家。

Because he was a political philosopher.

我确信他们做不到。

I'm sure they can't.

他们不能被简化为口号。

They can't be reduced to slogans.

他们无法提供光明的未来。

They can't they don't offer a bright tomorrow.

他们不承诺能完全且最终战胜生活的困境——我的意思是，这正是要传达的信息。

They don't promise full and final victory against life's difficulties and life's I mean, that's precisely the message.

不存在完全且最终的胜利。

There is no full and final victory.

不仅仅是乌托邦无法实现的问题。

There's it's not merely that utopia isn't attainable.

我敢打赌，乌托邦本身就是个矛盾的概念——你根本无法建立一个让所有人都完全幸福、完全安于现状的社会。

As I bet on the proposition that utopia was a contradiction in terms, that you simply couldn't have a society in which people would be perfectly happy, perfectly reconciled with their situation.

现在

Now

他实际上说过，乌托邦有其价值，不是吗？

He said actually, didn't it, utopias have their value.

没有什么能如此美妙地拓展人类可能性的想象边界，但作为行为指南却可能致命。

Nothing so wonderfully expands the imaginative horizons of human potentialities, but as guides to conduct that can prove literally fatal.

完全正确。

Absolutely.

是啊。

Yeah.

他对这个世纪的总体看法是，这是一个在追求乌托邦过程中几乎自我毁灭的世纪。

And his whole sense of this century was that it was a century that had nearly destroyed itself in its pursuit of utopia.

我认为他因此是个怀疑论者，只要人们想听对乌托邦的怀疑性批判，他就会有人倾听。

I think he's he's therefore a skeptic, someone who will be listened to as long as people want to hear skeptical deflations of utopia.

但你知道，我们在这个世纪里对乌托邦既如此求证又如此易受影响。

But, you know, we've been so proof and so susceptible to utopia in this century.

无法保证不会出现很长时期人们根本不想听以赛亚要说的话。

There's no guarantee there won't be long periods of time where people don't wanna hear what Isaiah has to say at all.

我看到迈克尔·霍华德爵士在点头，我稍后会请教您。

I I can see, sir Michael Howard nodding, and I'm coming to you in a moment.

但在离开之前，迈克尔·伊格纳季耶夫，我还有最后一件事。

But but just one more thing before I leave you, Michael Ignatieff.

在《两种自由概念》中，以赛亚·柏林写道：一百多年前德国诗人海涅曾警告法国人不要低估思想的力量。

In the two concepts of liberty, Isaiah Berlin wrote, over a hundred years ago, the German poet, Heine, warned the French not to underestimate the power of ideas.

哲学概念在教授书斋的宁静中孕育，却可能摧毁整个文明。

Philosophical concepts nurtured in the stillness of a professor's study could destroy civilization.

他接着补充道，如果教授们真能掌握这种致命力量，那么或许只有其他教授——或至少其他思想家——才能解除他们的武装。

Then he added, if professors can truly wield this fatal power, may it not be that only other professors, or at least other thinkers, can alone disarm them.

我们的哲学家们似乎奇怪地未意识到他们活动带来的这些破坏性影响。

Our philosophers seem oddly unaware of these devastating effects of their activities.

这对思想家们是个极高的要求。

That's a very high claim for thinkers.

你认为他的思想论证或证实了这一点吗？

Do you think that he, in his thinking, justified or testified to that?

哦，以赛亚非常、非常自我批判，他会认为那样为自己提出要求实在太高了。

Oh, Isaiah was very, very self critical, and he would have thought that would be putting claims for himself much too high.

如果这就是你的意思，那确实没错。

If that's what you're getting at, it's certainly right.

他认定自己一生都被指责为过度追求成就。

He decided he had a life of being accused of being overachieving.

他还说但愿人们长期高估我。

And he said long may long may I be overestimated.

他从未

He never

认为他对其他哲学家的看法是正确的，那就暂且把他放一边。

think he's right about other philosophers, then leave him aside for a moment.

我只是认为毫无疑问，二十世纪是由思想驱动的。

I just think that his there is absolutely no doubt that the twentieth century has been driven by ideas.

有种反智民粹主义声称知识分子所言所写无关紧要，但二十世纪恰恰印证了某种扭曲的达尔文主义如何渗入欧洲法西斯主义，催生出这种适者生存的意识形态，最终导致了集中营；反之，那些社会主义平等的乌托邦理想，则再次导向了古拉格体系。

There's a kind of anti intellectual populism which says that what intellectuals say and write doesn't matter, but the twentieth century really vindicates the kind of ways in which a kind of bastardized Darwinism, you know, got into European fascism and led to this kind of survival of the fittest ideology that literally led to the concentration camps or conversely these utopias of, you know, socialist equality that led again to the gulag.

我的意思是，他强烈意识到这些现象并非单纯源于人们的暴虐与残忍。

I mean, he had a very strong sense that this stuff didn't arise simply because people are tyrannous and brutal and cruel.

这类集中营式的结局之所以出现，是因为人们信奉某种乌托邦理想。

They these kind of concentration camp endings arise because people believe in certain kind of utopias.

它们被思想工程所驱动，正是这些看似光明的开端，酿成了灾难性的结局。

They're driven by intellectual projects, and it's those that are the catastrophic beginnings, the bright beginnings of these catastrophic ends.

就像迈克尔在你们合著的《牛津历史》中

As Michael had in your you've coeded the Oxford History

二十世纪的。

of the Twentieth Century.

大约有二十多篇不同作者的文章，但你介绍完就离开了。

There are about, two dozen essays by different hands, but you introduce it and go.

但这个乌托邦的理念在最后被达伦多夫采纳，拉尔夫·达伦多夫教授在他的最后一篇文章中，你在序言和引言里也多次谈到这些理念。

But this idea of utopia is picked up by Darendorff at the end, professor Ralph Darendorff in his last essay, and you talk about ideas very much in your prologue and in your introduction.

迈克尔·伊格纳季耶夫刚刚说过，二十世纪是由理念驱动的。

Michael Ignatieff has just said that the twentieth century was driven by ideas.

你同意这个观点吗？

Do you agree with that?

同意。

Yes.

那是一个意识形态的世纪，而我在引言中试图展示的是，随着其他事物的出现，为何会如此。

It was a century of ideologies, And I think what I tried to show in my introduction, as other things came through, is why it should have been.

因为过去三百年的伟大运动始于启蒙时代，人们相信人类已从传统价值观中解放出来——这些价值观根本上基于对上帝的信仰，或由祭司传达的上帝旨意，而祭司的权威又维系着以国王为首的封建贵族统治体系。

It was because the great movement of the last three hundred years has been that which began with the Enlightenment, the belief that mankind had emancipated themselves from traditional values which were based fundamentally on a belief in God, or a God transmitted by priests whose authority was upheld by and upheld that of a landed aristocratic rule with a king at the head of it.

这一切都被十八世纪的百科全书派粉碎了，他们说人类仅凭理性就能生存。

And that all that was smashed by the Encyclopedists of the eighteenth century, they said that man could live by reason alone.

十九世纪，现代化进程席卷了整个西欧。

In the nineteenth century, one saw the modernization process extending over the whole of Western Europe.

我们看到等级森严的农业社会逐渐瓦解，传统宗教信仰逐渐式微，城市社会取代农业社会，平等主义取代等级制度，而第一次世界大战作为终极灾难性结局，彻底摧毁了传承数百年的传统价值观与信仰——这些观念早已潜移默化地深入人心，却无人真正意识到其本质，最终留下一片思想废墟，任人重建与填充。

One saw the gradual disintegration of those hierarchic agrarian societies, of the traditional beliefs of in one kind of religion or another, and the development of urban based societies as opposed to agrarian based societies, egalitarian as opposed to hierarchical, and the elimination with the First World War as the final catastrophic conclusion of the whole of traditional values and beliefs as they had been inherited over the centuries and had been absorbed by peoples without them realizing that that was really it, leaving an absolutely sort of blasted heath on which anybody could come and build and provide ideas.

如果他们不再信仰上帝或国王，还能信仰什么？

If they were no longer going to believe in God or king, what were they going to believe in?

是的。

Yes.

二十世纪对意识形态的信仰，在某种你能明确指出的决定性方面，是否与十四、十五、十六世纪对基督教意识形态的信仰有所不同？

Is the twentieth century's belief in ideology, in some definitive way which you can tell us, different from, say, the fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth century's belief in the ideology of Christianity?

这取决于你如何定义意识形态。

It depends how you do define ideology.

我认为基督教意识形态的不同之处在于它是缓慢渐进发展形成的

I think the difference between the ideology of Christianity is something that that had developed slowly and incrementally over

但它以不同方式发展 它曾自我革新 但

But it developed in a different way it had reinvented itself But

当然，就其本质而言，曾是一种极权主义信仰，后来逐渐文明化，支撑起一个相对静态的社会结构，尽管它也在不同时期支撑过革命运动。

of course, in its way, was a sort of a totalitarian belief, which had become civilized, that it underpinned a pretty static kind of society, although it also underpinned revolutions at various points.

我认为其与二十世纪意识形态的区别在于，后者如同迈克尔·南蒂尔所说，是在创造新乌托邦，这些乌托邦必须通过新型模式、新型强制手段来推行，要废除并摒弃所有改良措施，所有十八、十九世纪逐步建立演化而来的文明要素。

The difference, I think, between that and twentieth century ideologies is that these were inventing new utopias, as Michael Nantier had said, which had to be enforced by new kinds of models, by new kinds of compulsion, with the abolition, the renunciation of all the modifications, all the civilized elements, which had been built in and gradually evolved by the eighteenth and nineteenth century.

为什么你认为我们如果如果你是对的，如果二十世纪是是而且如果你和迈克尔·伊格纳季耶夫我必须一直用全名称呼你们因为我这里有两位迈克尔，但就这样吧。

Why do you think that we if if you're right, if and the twentieth century is is and if you and Michael Ignatieff I have to keep calling you by our full names because I have two Michaels, but there you go.

如果你和迈克尔·伊格纳季耶夫是对的，如果你们关于二十世纪被意识形态特别深刻地标记、特别容易受影响、特别深受其害的观点是正确的，你认为原因何在？

If you and Michael Ignatieff are right, if you're right that the twentieth century has been peculiarly marked, peculiarly susceptible, peculiarly inflicted on by ideologies, Why do you think that is?

是因为意识形态的强大力量吗？

Is it because of the strength of the ideologies?

是因为时代的动荡吗？

Is it because of disruption of the time?

是因为我们自身变得更容易受影响了吗？

Is it because we ourselves have become more susceptible?

你认为这是为什么？

Why do you think it is?

如果确实如此，那原因何在？

If it is so, why is it so?

嗯，正如我所提到的，这是因为所有旧信仰体系都遭到了破坏，即便不是彻底摧毁。

Well, it is because, as I suggested, because of the disruption, if not the actual destruction, of all the older belief systems.

这种情况在那些国家尤为明显，特别是俄罗斯，随后是德国，整个社会实际上已被战争撕裂摧毁。但

And that was particularly so in those countries, particularly Russia, and then later on Germany, where the whole of society had really been torn apart and destroyed by the But have the

例如西班牙的错误信仰体系。

ill belief system, for example, in Spain.

西班牙旧有的天主教信仰体系大体完好，法西斯主义只是叠加其上。

The old belief the Catholic system in Spain was more or less intact, and and fascism was superimposed on it.

因此旧信仰体系依然

So the old belief system still

意味着法西斯主义在西班牙的普遍反动浪潮中只占非常非常小的部分。

meant still fascism was a very, very minor part of the general reaction in Spain.

在西班牙，你看到的本质上是守旧的教权社会，内嵌着极端恶劣的压迫机制，与新兴的世俗社会主义对抗。

In Spain, what you what you get basically is an old fashioned clerical society with a very, very nasty edge built into it, fighting against the new secularist socialism.

意大利同样保留了宗教，德国在很大程度上也是如此。

Italy again maintained its religion, so to a great extent did Germany.

英国作为宗教社会并未走向

Britain was a religious society which didn't go

那个

that

方式，哦，所以因为你无法看见，英国

way, Oh, so because you can't have see, Britain

从未成为一个意识形态社会，很大程度上是因为我们经历了非常温和的变革，与欧洲大陆邻居们的灾难性变革截然不同。

has never become an ideological society, very largely because we have been very, very gently changed, as opposed to the catastrophic changes of our continental neighbors.

如果我们输掉了第一次世界大战，并经历了德国在1920年代遭遇的那种灾难，我绝不会赌我们能保持自由主义社会或避免其他地方发生的那种意识形态对抗。

If we had lost the First World War and been through the kind of catastrophes that Germany went through in the 1920s, I would not put any money on our remaining a liberal society or avoiding the kind of ideological confrontations that happened elsewhere.

真的吗？

Really?

我我倾向于比你更乐观一些。

I'm I'm inclined to be rather more optimistic than you.

希望没有方法可以判断这一点。

I hope there's no way of judging it.

但我想了解一下你对迈克尔·霍华德所说的话有何看法。

But I'd to get an idea of what you say to what Michael Howard has said.

我可以在这里插入另一个问题吗？

Can I infuse another question here?

你认为你所谈论的这些思想，以及迈克尔·哈兹伯格谈到的马克思和达尔文，还有你提到的社会达尔文主义——人们接受这些思想是因为它们本身，主要还是男性在主导，还是因为符合他们的目的？

Do you think that these ideas that you're talking about and and Michael Hardsberg is talking about Marx and and Darwin, and you were talking about social Darwin do you think these ideas that men take on because they're ideas, and it largely is men, or do you think it takes on because it suits their purposes?

你知道，就像穿刺公弗拉德自称基督徒，但本质上他还是那个弗拉德，他想报复童年遭遇，众所周知，但他也想征服敌人，于是实施了穿刺刑。

You know, like Vlad the Impaler said he was a Christian, but basically it was Vlad the Impaler, and he wanted, you know, he wanted to get his own back for what had happened to me as a child, as we all know, but he also wanted to conquer the enemy, and he impaled.

现在...是的，我我我觉得...我们讨论的思想在多大程度上只是锦上添花，而非真正的驱动力？

Now Yes, I I I think Now how much are we talking about ideas just being the cherry on the cake, just not being the drive, really?

邪恶之人本性难移，他们攫取某种思想只因这能助长其恶行。

Vicious, wicked people are vicious and wicked anyway, and they nab an idea because it helps them along.

我认为你可以通过研究列宁这样的人来审视这个问题。

I think you can examine that question by looking at someone like Lenin.

我的意思是，很明显列宁一方面是个真正的知识分子，真正的理论家。

I mean, it's clear that Lenin, on the one hand, was a genuine intellectual, a genuine ideologist.

他在十九世纪九十年代末期，独自一人在大英博物馆里埋头读书、思考多年。

He sat there lonely years in the British Museum in the late eighteen nineties reading books and and having thoughts.

这是列宁的一面，而他同时也是个无情的权力技术专家。

There's that Lenin, and then there's also the Lenin that the ruthless tech technician of power.

我有种感觉，那些意识形态显然只是为这个无情的权力技术专家服务。

And I have a feeling that clearly the ideology simply served the ruthless technician of power.

但我觉得迈克尔爵士关于一战结束后满目疮痍的景象提出了极其重要的观点。

But I think that sir Michael's made a terribly important point about the blasted heath after the end of the First World War.

我的意思是，列宁接管了世界上最大国家之一的政权机构，当时沙皇制度完全崩溃，所有可想象的价值观都彻底瓦解。

I mean, Lenin takes over the apparatus of one of the biggest states in the world in a situation of total devastation, total disintegration of the czarist regime, total disintegration of all conceivable available values.

他右手掌握着国家权力的机制。

He has the mechanisms of state power in the right hand.

左手则握着共产主义的热忱福音。

In the left hand, he has the hot gospel of communism.

将两者结合起来，就形成了一台绝对不可阻挡的机器。

You put the two together, and you've got an absolutely irresistible machine.

我认为除非你让人们有所信仰，否则无法运转那台权力机器。

I don't think you can run that machine, that machine of power, unless you give somebody peep something to believe in.

换句话说，你的意思是不能仅仅用意识形态来粉饰这台机器。

The two, in other words, you can't you're suggesting that that you just use the ideology to kind of cover the machine.

意识形态驱动着这台机器运转。

The ideology makes the machine work.

人们为机器赴死，只因信仰意识形态，这正是二十世纪最可怕之处。

People die for the machine because they believe in the ideology, and that's the truly awful thing about the twentieth century.

我们从未拥有过比这更高效的国家机器。

We've never had a more efficient state machine.

我们从未掌握过比这更高效的统治技术，也从未遭遇过比这更彻底的意识形态。

We've never had more efficient technology of domination, and we've never had more totalizing ideologies.

当这两者结合时，它们几乎在本世纪摧毁了人类种族。

You put the two together and you've got something that damn near destroy the human race in this century.

这就是为什么以赛亚总说，这是有记录以来最糟糕的世纪。

That's why Isaiah always said, you know, this was the worst century in recorded history.

当你问他生平最令他震惊的是什么时，答案仅仅是他竟然活了下来。

And when you asked him what was it that astonished him about his own life, it was simply that he'd survived it.

我认为你需要关注相关个体。

I think you've got to look at individuals concerned.

穿刺者弗拉德——显然你比我更了解他——当时身处某种中世纪式的基督教环境中，他全盘接受神话体系，并以此为框架行事，用其正当化自己的行为，就像这类社会中人们通常所做的那样。

Vlad the Impaler, about whom you're obviously a greater expert than I am, was functioning within a certain kind of medieval type of Christianity, and he took the myth as it was as it was, and functioned within it and used it to justify what he was doing, as as as people normally do in those kinds of societies.

斯大林不也是如此吗？

Didn't Stalin?

斯大林，正如迈克尔·利内蒂所言，我认为他面对的是信仰几乎全面崩塌的境况，于是党在俄国——实际上在纳粹德国也是如此——几乎变成了教会。

Stalin, again, is somebody who I think is dealing with, as Michael Linetti have said, a a situation where all beliefs have virtually disappeared, and the party then does become virtually a church, both in in Russia and and indeed in in in Nazi Germany.

显然，希特勒是狂热信奉自己教条的人，我想希姆莱之流也是如此，还能举出其他许多同类。

Now clearly, Hitler was somebody who fanatically believed in what he preached, and I should think that somebody like Himmler also did, and one can see various others who did.

所以你同意迈克·利格纳彻的观点，但在希特勒的案例中，这种思想是权力的核心要素？

So you're agreeing with Mike Lignature, but in Hitler's case, the idea was integral to the power?

哦，完全如此。

Oh, completely.

而且我要告诉你，如果他既没有这种思想，又无法热情地充当其布道者，并以一种卓越而恐怖的有效方式组织意识形态，他绝不可能达到那样的地位。

And and I'll tell you, but he could never have got where he did if he did not, a, have this idea, and b, was able to act as a sort of an enthusiastic proselytiser for it, and organise the ideology in a brilliant, terrifyingly effective way.

你在

You write about

关于二十世纪的论文集中讨论了战争的社会达尔文主义，并提到民族主义——终极战争是对国家生存适应性的终极考验。

the social Darwinism of war in your essay, in this book of essays about the twentieth century, and you talk about nationalism the ultimate war is the ultimate test of the fitness of nations to survive.

以赛亚·伯林曾大量讨论民族主义并反对它，尽管它涉及四个群体。

Now, Isaiah Berlin talked a great deal about nationalism and was against it, although it was four groups, as it were.

你还提到民族主义似乎在一百年前就已终结，但如今它依然存在：在本世纪末仍是一股力量。

You also remarked that nationalism seemed to have come to an end about a hundred years ago, yet here it is: there's still a power at the end of the century.

能否请你解释，为何在被认为一百年前就该消亡的情况下，民族主义仍如此蓬勃、充满活力且具有破坏性，或许还有积极意义？

Could you tell us why you think, having it having been thought to come to an end a hundred years ago, it's still flourishing and so dynamic and so disruptive, and perhaps also positive?

我们可以探讨这个问题吗？

Can we discuss that?

嗯，我认为民族主义本质相同，但会以不同面貌出现在不同社会形态中。

Well, there are two different I suppose nationalism is the same, wherever it is, but it appears in different guises and different kinds of societies.

对西欧而言，民族主义总体上强化了既有社会政治结构，并被用于此目的。

For Western Europe, on the whole, nationalism reinforced the existing social and political structure and was used to do that.

先前对哈布斯堡王朝或波旁王朝的王朝忠诚，无论具体指向什么，都通过民族主义得到了加强。

What had previously been dynastic loyalties to the House of Heroines Solin or the House of Bourbon, what what whatever it may have been, was reinforced by nationalism.

上帝、国王与国家共同凝聚。

God, king, and country all came together.

若没有国王，仅靠‘祖国’理念就显得不足，但两者效力等同。

And if there wasn't a king, well, it was just too bad to just had La Patrie, and this was equally equally good.

他们正在巩固这些庞大、稳固且现代化的社会。

They were reinforcing these large, solid, modernizing societies.

在东欧，由于缺乏既存的有效统一社会，仅靠对哈布斯堡王朝的忠诚不足以维系帝国完整。

In Eastern Europe, where there was not an effective coherent society already going, the dynastic loyalty to the Habsburg family was not enough to hold the empire together.

当帝国崩溃时，它便分裂成碎片，所有被19世纪民族主义意识形态激发的本土民族主义——那些编纂塞尔维亚、希腊或罗马尼亚历史的历史学家，将方言提升为完整语言的词典编撰者和语言学家（无论是盖尔语还是其他）——都在塑造民族概念。

And when that collapsed, then it fell into little bits, and the all the local nationalisms, which had been encouraged by the nationalist ideology of the nineteenth century, all the historians who were who were devising the history of Serbia and the history of Greece or the history of Romania, all the dictionary writers and the linguists who had been turning what had previous to be local dialects into full languages, Gaelic, whatever it may have been, creating as were the idea of nations.

这些力量随后占据主导，并引发剧烈动荡，因为塞尔维亚人通过否定克罗地亚人来定义自我。

These then took over, and they were intensely disrupted because Serbs defined themselves as being not Croats.

克罗地亚人则通过否定罗马尼亚人或匈牙利人来确立身份。

Croats defined themselves as being not Romanians or not Hungarians.

其结果是，民族主义非但未能凝聚人心，反而成为极具破坏性的力量。

And as a result, you do get nationalism, no, not being a cohesive affair, but being an immensely disruptive affair.

迈克尔·伊格纳季耶夫，

Michael Ignatiev,

以赛亚·柏林对民族主义的观点在我看来难以应用于现实世界。

Isaiah Berlin's views on nationalism, it seems to me, were difficult to employ in the real world.

要知道，人们总是持有各种主张。

Well, you know, people hold propositions.

思想总是根植于生活，与生命紧密相连。

Ideas are always built into a life, anchored in a life.

以赛亚也不例外。

Isaiah was no exception.

以赛亚是犹太人，一名俄罗斯犹太人，他深知反犹主义的滋味，早年就目睹了犹太人与巴勒斯坦人为建国而斗争。

Isaiah was a Jew, a Russian Jew, who'd known what it was like to to to experience antisemitism, who very early in his life saw Jews and Palestine struggling for statehood.

他是唯一真正接纳民族主义的自由派——认真对待它，尊重这种对归属感的渴望。

He's the only liberal to give house room to nationalism really, to to take it seriously, to respect this longing for belonging.

正如你所说，他是唯一不蔑视那些词典编纂者的自由派——那些人渴望创造自己国家的语言与身份认同。

The only one the only liberal not to disdain all those dictionary writers, you were saying, who wanted to create the language of their country and the identity of their country.

他试图在两种难以调和的立场间走钢丝：既信仰自由国家、自由民主与权力制衡，又尊重那些没有自己国家、没有家园、渴望拥有我们视为理所当然的自由国度的人们。

He tried to walk a kind of an a line that is very hard to reconcile between believing in a liberal state, in liberal democracy, in checks and balances, but also having some respect for people who are who have no state of their own, who have no home home of their own, who long to have the the liberal state that we all take for granted.

正因如此，他比几乎所有人都更能理解那些催生民族主义的归属渴望。

That's why he was much more sense sympathetic to the longings for belonging that fuel nationalism than almost anybody else.

问题在于，如此强烈的民族主义激情与自由民主国家能否共存。

The question is whether you can have nationalist passions of this intensity and a liberal democratic state at the same time.

他认为可以，但成功实现的地方寥寥无几。

He thought you could, but there are not many places which have brought this off.

例如他会主张以色列做到了——既是民族主义的成就、犹太复国主义国家，又保持着自由民主。

And he would claim, for example, that Israel brought it off, a nationalist achievement, a Zionist state, that it's also liberal democratic.

许多人认为并非如此。

Lots of people think not so.

嗯。

Mhmm.

迈克尔·赫恩，我能请你谈谈这本二十世纪著作的前言吗？

Michael Hearne, can I bring you to the forward of the book in this twentieth century book?

你说二十世纪是以一种‘希望与恐惧并存的矛盾组合’开始的。

You said that the twentieth century opened with a, quote, paradoxical combination of hope and fear.

难道十九世纪的开端不也是如此吗？

Could you not say the same of the opening of the nineteenth century?

我认为这两个世纪虽然都存在这两种情绪，但都不那么普遍，因为知识分子或精英阶层——无论你怎么称呼他们——规模要小得多，而且在某种程度上影响力也小得多。

I think that neither of those although both those sentiments were there, they were neither of them so widespread, because the intelligentsia, or the elites, or whatever you like to call them, were far smaller, and in a way, I think far less influential.

确实，启蒙运动及其追随者——比如歌德等人——抱有极大的乐观主义，他们认为事物在进步，理性的力量在增强，旧制度正逐渐被摧毁。

Yes, certainly there was enormous optimism on the part of the enlightenment and and and there's the survivors, people like Goethe and others, who were who were indeed still are still around, that things are improving, that the force of reason is becoming stronger, that the old regime is being gradually destroyed.

就我所知——这可能暴露了我对思想史的无知——当时并不存在像二十世纪初那样对未来可能带来的那种恐惧。

I am not aware, and this is probably my ignorance of intellectual history, of the same kind of dread about what the future might bring, that you do get at the beginning of the twentieth century.

这个国家曾对法国革命的后续影响深感恐惧，认为理性导致了暴政、摧毁了人性，如果拿破仑完全不受约束，那么在他们看来，西方国家的未来将面临巨大的思想威胁和自由威胁。

There was great dread in this country about the further effects of the French Revolution, that tyranny that the reason had destroyed humanity, and that were Napoleon to go totally unchecked, then the future of Western, as they saw it, the Western nations would be under great intellectual threat and and threat to their freedom and so on.

嗯，确实存在那种恐惧。

Well, there is certainly that that that kind of of of fear.

或许还存在——因为我不太了解——一种对二十世纪人类发展方式更为存在主义的恐惧。

There may also be, because I'm not aware of it, a rather more existential terror of the way in which mankind was developing in the twentieth century.

相比之下，后者要极端得多。

To that, there is that that is far more extreme.

人们感到整个过去都被否定了，我们从小信仰的一切都不再有效，哲学家、作家、艺术家们都在彻底颠覆传统信仰，天知道人类会因此变成什么样子。

There is there is the sense that the whole of the past has been rubbished, that everything which we have brought up to believe is no longer valid, that the philosophers, the writers, the artists, all these people are tearing up traditional beliefs by their roots, and heaven knows what is going to happen to mankind as a result.

是的，诺曼·斯通在对你书的评论中也提到了这点，他表示赞同。

Yes, that was picked up in a sympathetic review by Norman Stone of your book.

他指出，正如你所说，在本世纪初——一百年前——出现了许多宏大理论：相对论、勋伯格的音乐、弗洛伊德研究梦境并宣称生活的本质就是性与金钱，而人们往往从那以后就过于字面化地理解这些宏大论述。

He did point out that at the end of the as you say, at the beginning of this century, a hundred years ago there was a big theory big ideas: a theory of relativity, there was Schoenberg and music there was Freud who looked at dreams and said that life is about sex and money and people have tended to take that rather literally from then and the huge statement.

他还指出：在本世纪末，我们似乎不再以同样的方式产生宏大的思想。

He also makes the point: at the end of this century, we don't seem to be producing big ideas in the same way.

你是否认为在二十世纪末，那些宏大的思想已经萎缩、消失或从我们指间溜走？

Would you say that at the end of the twentieth century, the big ideas have shrunk or disappeared or slipped through our fingers?

我认为我们现在对宏大思想非常恐惧，因为我们已目睹它们会将我们引向何方。

I think that we are now very frightened of big ideas, that we've seen what big ideas do lead us to.

乌托邦曾是个非常宏大的理念。

Utopia was a very big idea.

如今我倒觉得，我们很庆幸不再有那种会误导我们的宏大思想了。

Now I think that we are rather happy that there are no longer any big ideas of that kind to mislead us.

我们更乐于成为——虽然不完全以以赛亚·柏林的方式——蜷缩在自己已知的单一真理中的刺猬。

We're rather happier to become, not quite in Eisar Berlin's way, we're rather happier to become hedgehogs, sort of huddling down with the one big thing which we know.

那么什么是

And what is the

我们已知的那个单一真理？

one big thing which we know?

大多数人熟知的真理就是关于自己的生活、自己的小天地、自己的人生理念。如今到处都弥漫着一种回归家庭式港湾的强烈渴望，因为我们正惊恐于全球化带来的威胁。

Well, the big thing which most people know is how their own lives, their own little patch, their own ideas of how to live their lives, rather than and and I think there's now everywhere a great desire to go back, as it were, to a kind of domestic type of wound because we are so alarmed at the threats which are being posed to it by the other thing, which is globalisation.

但在你的书中，有些文章指出由于全球化，这种回归已变得比以往任何时候都更不可能。

But in your book, I mean in this, you say, some of the essays are saying that is impossible because of globalisation It of is more impossible than it has ever been.

唉，确实如此。正因如此，人们才以超乎寻常的恐惧紧紧守护着自己的小天地。

Alas, that is true, and that is why people are hanging on to their own little patches with a sort of far greater degree, as it were, of fear than might otherwise be the case.

我认为

I think the

乌托邦时代已经结束，但我确实认为，放眼望去，人们正试图汲取二十世纪的教训——我们最好建立一些防火墙，抵御人类权力的滥用。

age of utopia is over, but I do think that everywhere I look, people are trying to have the one lesson people have drawn from the twentieth century is we better build some firewalls, some protection against human power.

我们必须保护个体。

We gotta protect the individual.

我们必须拥有人权。

We gotta have human rights.

我们必须保护人们免受科学滥用和政治权力滥用的侵害。

We've gotta protect people against the abuse of science and and and the abuse of political power.

这种观念要求我们持有自我限制的意识形态，这些意识形态止步于人类主体，划清界限不再逾越。

The sense that we've got to have self limiting ideologies, ideologies that stop at the human subject, that say this far and no further.

我想再次强调，这正是以赛亚·伯林真正为之奋斗并坚信的理念。

And that I think was, I mean, to to beat my drum again, something that Isaiah Berlin really did fight for and believe.

他相信人类理性的核心在于限制暴力行为，唯有做到这点，我们才能安然度过下个世纪。

He he believed in the idea that the the heart of human reason was to put limits to the exercise of human violence, and if we can do that, we'll make it through the next century, but only if we do.

但正如迈克尔·霍华德在其书中所言，由于核武器的存在，我们必须接受大规模战争永不可能再发生的事实。

But as Michael Howard says in his book, we now have to live with the fact that we can't have a big war again ever because of nuclear because nuclear Well,

要是再爆发大战，我们可就太蠢了。

be not as silly if we had a big war again.

你不是说过我们从不关心吗？

Didn't you say we never care?

是的。

Yes.

但这种温和节制的哲学理念介入权力斗争的想法，恐怕更多是我们的奢望而非现实经验，不是吗？

But the idea of this temporizing, temperate philosophy entering into the power struggle seems to be something that we it's more hope than experience, isn't it?

唉，经历如此坎坷，如今除了希望已所剩无几。

Well, experience has been so unfortunate that there's very little left except hope.

我认为根本问题在于，如何将魏玛柏林这种开明、理性、有教养且自我克制的哲学理念推广为全球性的思想？

I think the basic problem, really, is how can one take this liberal, sensible, cultivated, self limiting philosophy of Weisar Berlin and make it a global idea?

这正是自由主义者们始终在努力尝试的事情。

This is something which liberals do try to do the whole time.

这种尝试尤其体现在人权法、国际法等领域。

And it is the attempt to do this does show itself, in particular human rights law, international law, all those other things.

但要像对乌托邦那样对此类事物产生狂热激情确实很难

But it's very difficult to get as wildly excited about that

那种

sort of

——就像人们对乌托邦所能怀有的热情。

thing as one can about Utopia.

非常感谢迈克尔·霍华德先生（合编《牛津二十世纪史》）和迈克尔·伊格纳季耶夫先生（其以赛亚·柏林传记将于下周出版）。

Well, thank you very much, mister Michael Howard, who's co edited the Oxford history of the twentieth century, and Michael Ignatiev, whose biography of Isaiah Berlin is published next week.

感谢收听。

Thanks for listening.

希望您喜欢本期BBC广播四台的播客节目。

We hope you've enjoyed this Radio four podcast.

您可在bbc.co.uk/radiofour找到数百档关于历史、科学与哲学的节目。

You can find hundreds of other programs about history, science, and philosophy at bbc.co.uk/radiofour.

让TED每日播客为您的日常增添新知——每个工作日为您带来一场全新TED演讲。

Add a little curiosity into your routine with TED Talks Daily, the podcast that brings you a new TED Talk every weekday.

每天只需不到十五分钟，你就能超越新闻头条，了解那些塑造未来的重要理念。

In less than fifteen minutes a day, you'll go beyond the headlines and learn about the big ideas shaping your future.

接下来，我们将探讨人工智能如何改变我们的沟通方式、如何成为更优秀的领导者等内容。

Coming up, how AI will change the way we communicate, how to be a better leader, and more.

每日收听TED演讲，各大播客平台均可获取。

Listen to TED Talks daily wherever you get your podcasts.