为何特朗普的血腥策略奏效

这是你需要解读的头条新闻。

It's your headline to unpack.

这是你每周都要跟进的一个故事。

It's your one story to follow week by week.

这是你需要破解的Wordle谜题。

It's your Wordle to work through.

这是你需要追踪的团队动态。

It's your team to track.

这是你探索的三十六小时。这是你需掌握的腌料秘诀。这是你要理清的观点。这是你该升级的床垫。

It's your thirty six hours to explore. It's your marinade to master. It's your opinion to figure out. It's your mattress to upgrade.

今天你要了解去圣母大学还需要准备什么。

It's your day to know what else you need to Notre Dame.

《纽约时报》。这是你理解世界的窗口。更多内容请访问nytimes.com/yourworld。

The New York Times. It's your world to understand. Find out more at nytimes.com/yourworld.

嘿，听众朋友们，我是罗斯。我们将为7月4日假期暂停更新。趁我暂时从播客生活中解放出来庆祝时，我想分享一期引领我们走向这个有趣时代的早期节目。你可能听过，但我认为现在仍值得重温。

Hey, listeners. It's Ross. We're taking a break for the July 4 holiday. So while I celebrate my brief independence from the podcasting life, I'm sharing one of the episodes that started us on the path toward interesting times. You might have heard it before, but I still think it's worth a listen now.

去年11月特朗普胜选后，我不仅想弄懂他如何获胜，更想探究他如何将共和党从一个以白人和中上阶层为主的联盟，改造成更蓝领化、多元种族的政党。早在与好友雷汉·萨拉姆合著的《宏伟新党》一书中，我就倡导过这种转型。在小布什总统任期结束后，我们试图为共和党勾勒新未来，当然未曾料到我们的预言最终会部分地由特朗普实现。在这段对话中，你将听到我们讨论当年的预测，以及我们认为共和党如今的处境——特别是在本周围绕那项未必算得上民粹主义的'又大又美法案'的辩论中。

Back in November, after Donald Trump's victory, I wanted to understand not just how he won, but how he had transformed the Republican Party, turning what had been a mostly white and upper middle class coalition into something much more blue collar and multiracial. I had advocated for that kind of transformation in a book I wrote long ago with my friend, Reihan Salam, called Grand New Party. In the aftermath of George W. Bush's presidency, the two of us tried to envision a new future for the GOP, not knowing, of course, that our prophecy would ultimately be fulfilled, in part at least, by Donald Trump. So in this conversation, you can hear us talk about what we predicted and where we think the GOP has ended up, especially amid this week's debates over the not necessarily populist big beautiful bill.

请尽情收听，《有趣时代》下周回归。这里是《纽约时报》观点栏目，我是罗斯·杜塔特。雷汉，很高兴见到你。

So enjoy, and interesting times will return next week. From New York Times Opinion, I'm Ross Douthat. Raihan, good to see you.

罗斯，能与你共处，我深感荣幸与欣喜。

I am honored and delighted to be with you, Ross.

你是真的感到荣幸吗

Are are you are you honored

并且欣喜若狂地坚定而充满活力。同时，既滑稽又悲哀的是，作为中年父亲，我们只有在共同录制播客时才能相聚。于是我们在此相遇。我们之前正在谈论

and delighted to be firmly, vigorously. And, also, it is funny and sad that we as middle aged dads only get to hang out when we're on a podcast together. So here we are. We were talking

关于这点，正如你所说，这就是中年评论家父亲的生活常态。我们许久未见。你愿意和我一起参加《纽约

about this beforehand that this is the life the life of the middle aged pundit dad, as you say. We haven't seen each other in a while. Would you like to come on a New

时报》的播客节目吗？

York Times podcast with me?

尽管我们确实...我深刻意识到，二十一世纪每个重大政治时刻我们都曾相互交流。当我看选举结果陆续揭晓时，我知道午夜过后，罗斯·杜塔特必定清醒着，我们会实时讨论思考，这真是无比珍贵的馈赠。

Although we do I've I'm struck by the fact that we have spoken to one another every fateful political moment of the twenty first century. And I know that when I'm watching these election results unfold, that after midnight, I do know that Ross Douthat is gonna be awake, and we're gonna talk, and we're gonna think about it in real time, and that is a very precious gift.

没错。魔法就是这样发生的——我独自坐在食物飞溅的厨房里，由我自己造成的飞溅

That's right. That's how the magic happens, me sitting in a, you know, food spattered kitchen, spattered by myself to make

为了把话说清楚。

to make to make it clear.

我不想将食物飞溅归咎于妻儿。让我们回溯时光。是的，我们两千年初在华盛顿特区相识。

I don't wanna blame my wife and children for the the food spattering. So let's go back in time. Yes. We met in the early two thousands in Washington, DC.

那时我们相遇了。

I was met then.

是的。那时确实见过。不，严格来说，我们是在哈佛大学政治研究所举办的一场以比尔·克里斯托尔为主讲的研讨会上相识的，当时我们都是本科生。

Yes. Really met then. No. Technically, we met as undergraduates at a panel held at the Harvard Institute of Politics that featured Bill Crystal

是的。

Yes.

那是在乔治·W·布什总统任期内。所以那时，你作为哈佛本科生应该参与了很多戏剧活动，我记得。

During the George w Bush presidency. So at that point, you were doing a lot of theater as a Harvard undergraduate, I believe.

没错。

That's right.

而我当时在经营保守派报纸。所以我们共同点不多，除了你对听比尔·克里斯托尔的演讲感兴趣。

And I was running the conservative newspaper. So we didn't have a lot in common except that you were, you know, interested in hearing Bill Our

我们的道路交汇了。我认为有一点是我们都通过曲折的路径走向保守主义。你来自那个崇尚自然的基督教世界，有着婴儿潮一代的父母，在世俗环境中成长；而我作为移民之子，在朱利安尼改造过的纽约外围行政区长大，从不同角度接触保守主义，但都与运动保守主义保持一定距离。这是我们早期建立联系的基础。

paths converged. And I think that one thing is that we both came to conservatism through a kind of winding path. Just the fact that you came from this crunchy Christian world, having, you know, parents, boomer parents growing up in this secular milieu. I came to it as a son of immigrants growing up in a an outer borough New York that had been transformed by Giuliani and just coming to conservatism from different angles, but both being at an angle to movement conservatism. And I think that's something we bonded over early on.

是啊。我记得我们当时也像所有年轻记者一样，试图闯出名堂。我们写作的那个时期，华盛顿几乎所有的讨论都围绕外交政策展开——那是9·11事件后、伊拉克战争期间的氛围。我在《大西洋月刊》担任初级编辑时，外交政策几乎吞噬了华盛顿的所有对话，尤其是政治右翼对布什外交政策的高度支持。

Yeah. And as I remember it, we were also, like, young journalists everywhere, sort of trying to make some kind of a name for ourselves. And we were working and writing at a time when almost all writing and arguing being done in Washington DC was writing and arguing about foreign policy. This was the period after September 11, after the invasion of Iraq. I was working as a very junior editor for the Atlantic, and, essentially, foreign policy had subsumed almost all conversation and debate in Washington DC at that time and certainly on the political right where there was obviously a sort of rally around George w Bush's foreign policy.

后来随着伊拉克战争陷入困境，外交政策逐渐失去吸引力。我们或许并非完全有意为之，但确实在尝试开辟新领域——寻找2005到2006年间少有人涉足的议题。最终我们不约而同地聚焦国内政策，这在当时对年轻作家来说是个极其冷门的领域。当然，现在情况完全不同了，国内政策成了热门话题。

And then as that foreign policy sort of soured, as the Iraq war ran into difficulties, and I think we, maybe not completely consciously and deliberately, but we're trying to carve out a somewhat different niche by looking for a set of issues that fewer people were writing about in 2005 or 02/2006. And so we ended up converging, in effect, as writers trying to think through domestic policy, which, again, in that period was an extremely unsexy portfolio for a couple of young writers to have. Indeed. Totally different now, of course, when, you know, domestic policy is very, very hot. You know?

这里有个关键点：我们对国内政策的看法也颇具独特性。你深受基督教民主主义思想吸引，寻求一种现代化的宗教保守主义综合体系，其政策维度不是机械的自由市场主义，而是严肃对待传统价值——如何使传统现代化？而我虽然倾向市场经济，但也密切关注对90年代资本主义的新兴批判，思考哪些值得认真对待。某种程度上，我们也在回应左翼的思想活力。

So one element of this is I think that our views on domestic policy were also a little idiosyncratic. You, I think, were drawn to Christian democratic ideas and the idea that there was a place for a religious conservative synthesis that was modern and where there was a kind of thoughtful policy dimension that was not reflexively free market, but that took the idea of tradition seriously. And what does it mean to modernize a tradition? For me, it was someone who was very, you know, market oriented, but also to someone who was really interested in the idea of emerging critiques of, you know, nineties capitalism and, what should we take seriously, what should we not. And we were also in some ways reacting to interesting intellectual energies on the left.

占领运动时期达到顶峰的不平等问题讨论，其实我们在本科阶段就早有接触。这些思想早已广泛传播。因此我们的智识合作充满活力且愉快——虽然出发点不同，但痴迷于相同的议题。

The kind of inequality obsession that really peaked during the Occupy era was something that you and I had experienced as undergrads and had been around. These ideas were already in in kind of wider currency. So it really was a very dynamic and fun intellectual partnership because we were obsessing over a lot of the same things for very different reasons.

当时正值这样一个时刻，若试图将其置于历史视角下审视，你会看到共和党虽未完全主导但在美国政坛极具影响力，其联盟体系由罗纳德·里根在二十世纪七十年代和八十年代初构建。这部分是对'伟大社会'自由主义思潮的反动，也源于人们对七十年代自由主义诸多败绩的认知——包括恶性通胀、犯罪率攀升以及外交政策疲软之感。由此形成的共和党，众所周知地围绕着社会宗教保守主义、外交鹰派立场和自由市场经济这三者的结合而组织起来。

Well and it was coming at this moment where, to sort of try and put it in historical perspective, you had a Republican Party that had been not completely dominant, but very powerful in American politics with a coalition built in the nineteen seventies and early nineteen eighties by Ronald Reagan that was in part a kind of reaction against great society liberalism and a sense of sort of the failures of liberalism in the nineteen seventies, which included galloping inflation, included rising crime rates, included a sense of foreign policy weakness. And so out of that, you had this Republican Party that was organized famously around some combination of social and religious conservatism, foreign policy hawkishness, and free market economics.

当时人们常说的'三条腿凳子'。

The three stools, as they often said at the time.

三足鼎立或者说三大右翼支柱。

The three legged stool or or the three Right.

不，不是。是三条

No. No. The three

腿的 不是三张分开的凳子。

legged Not three separate stools.

但你看，这个偶然混用的隐喻恰如其分——当我们年轻写作时，这些不同构件似乎已不再严丝合缝。社会世俗化与观念开放使保守派不得不调整策略；而正如你提到的，不仅左翼，中左翼也对美国经济走向提出尖锐批评。小布什在二月当选总统后，就明确试图应对这些变革，对吧？

I mean but that that, you know, that is a serendipitous mixed metaphor because by the time we were young and writing, it seemed like those different pieces maybe didn't necessarily fit together quite as well. There was a sense that the country was secularizing and becoming more socially liberal, so social conservatism had to adapt and rethink things. And then as you mentioned, there was this very strong, not just left wing, but also center left critique of where the American economy was going. And George w Bush, when he was elected president in February, very explicitly tried to address these changes. Right?

这便是所谓'富有同情心的保守主义'理念的起源，距今已有二十五年。

This was where the idea, now twenty five years old, of so called compassionate conservatism came in.

还有'所有权社会'。

And the ownership society.

对。'所有权社会'主张通过政策杠杆打造股票持有者、房产所有者与创业者的社会。这构想随着金融危机——房地产泡沫破裂等——而受挫。但我们某种程度上是在延续'富有同情心的保守主义'的脉络，审视其谬误，探索一个不只懂给富人减税的共和党应该...

Right. The ownership society, the idea that you were going to essentially use different government policies and levers to build a kind of society of independent stock owning, home owning entrepreneurs. And a lot of that sort of concept came to grief with the financial crisis Yes. The real estate bubble bursting, and so on. But in some ways, we were trying to pick up where compassionate conservatism had left off, figure out what it had gotten wrong, and figure out what would a Republican Party that wasn't just doing tax cuts for the rich

真正关切什么？事实上认真对待这些理念并建立正确理论基础，我认为完全正确。因为在小布什第二任期，所谓主流保守派阵营有种论调，认为根本失败在于总统未严格遵循小政府教条——问题出在医保扩张等政策上。但事实上，当时无人真正捍卫'必须对福利国家建立可信方案'这一理念。

be interested in? Actually took these ideas seriously and had the right intellectual foundation for them, I think that's exactly right. Because in the, second term of the Bush presidency, there was this line of argument from, call it, mainstream conservative inc, which was essentially the real failure here is that George w Bush was not sufficiently rigorous in his adherence to small government orthodoxy. The real problem was his, Medicare expansion, etcetera, etcetera. But, actually, there was no one actually defending the idea that, look, you actually have to have a credible, serious approach to the welfare state.

这就是我们观察到的脱节之处。我记得我们并非那种本能信奉国家主义的人。问题很简单：伙计们，我们需要对这个联盟如何获胜及其发展空间保持起码的现实认知，同时也要对美国政治经济有清醒认识——福利国家不会消失。但它能否建立在更坚实的道德规范基础上，并适应经济变革的潮流？因此，我们当时填补的正是这个空白领域，因为确实没人愿意主张‘我们需要革新市场导向的保守主义’，而社会保守派若能把握机会，本可在此发挥关键作用。

And this was the disconnect that we had observed. And we were not, you know, as I recall, we were not people who were, you know, statists by reflex or anything like that. It was just, guys, we need some modicum of realism about how this coalition won and where this coalition has room to grow, and also some realism about American political economy and the fact that the welfare state is not gonna go away. Can it actually rest on a more solid moral normative foundation, and also something that makes sense given the ways in which the economy is changing? So I think that we were filling this missing quadrant because there was actually no one willing to defend the proposition that, we need to modernize a market oriented conservatism, and social conservatives have a really important role to play here if only they seize it.

没错。我们还从选举政治角度进行了框架构建。我们合著的书籍副标题就提到‘共和党赢得工人阶级’的理念，即我们定义中所有种族和族裔的非大学学历美国人。我们的部分论点是，自1970年代后美国政治出现了未完成的重新组合，大量非大学学历选民从民主党联盟转向了共和党联盟。

Right. And we were framing it also in terms of electoral politics. Right? So the subtitle of the book we wrote referenced the idea of Republicans winning the working class, meaning, our definition, noncollege educated Americans of all races and ethnicities. And part of our argument was that there had been, after the nineteen seventies, a kind of unfinished realignment in American politics, where a large group of noncollege educated voters had shifted from the Democratic coalition to the Republican coalition.

这些选民曾被称为‘里根民主党人’。但由于共和党始终未能真正掌握执政之道，他们未能彻底巩固这种重组。正是基于此，我们才在书中勾勒出了相应的政策议程。

These were the voters who got described as Reagan Democrats once upon a time. But that Republicans, because of their inability to quite figure out how to actually run the government, had not been able to fully cement that realignment. And from that, that was where you got basically the policy agenda that we tried to sketch out in the book.

罗斯，我要向听众们说明，我们当时对谁能领导这个联盟有过各种天马行空的想法。虽然揭你老底不太好，但我们讨论过哪些蓝领民粹主义者能打破常规政治——比如具有名人效应、能真正撼动我们眼中那个封闭政治体制的人选。我们考虑过比尔·奥莱利这种长岛中上产阶层但带着蓝领气质的人物，列过不少名字。我最喜欢的罗斯·莱汉合作文章之一就是2007年2月那篇——

And, Ross, I will just note for, our listeners that we had a bunch of wacky ideas regarding who could be the tribune of this coalition. I hate to embarrass you with this, but we talked about who is a blue collar populist who represents, just something outside of conventional politics, who is someone who is a celebrity, who is someone who could actually break the stranglehold of what we saw as a kind of cusseted political establishment. So, you know, we talked about Bill O'Reilly, you know, a Long Island, middle class, upper middle class, but with a blue collar ethos. We had a bunch of different names. And one of my favorite pieces from the Ross Ryhan collabs of that era was, you know, 02/2007.

有篇肯定让你难受的文章：我们为朱利安尼可能的总统竞选撰写了宣言。你作为坚定的反堕胎人士，这个议题对你至关重要。但我们当时构建了一个极具说服力的愿景，几乎预言了未来特朗普竞选的形态——那种能引起工薪阶层和下层中产共鸣的路线。当然，这对我个人而言别具意义。

Something that must have been painful for you, but we wrote our manifesto for what a Giuliani presidential bid could look like. Painful just because you're obviously an ardent pro lifer. This is something that was very important for you. But we came up with, I think, an extremely compelling vision for what a future Trump presidential candidacy could look like in describing something that would resonate with this working class, lower middle class. So, obviously, this was very special to me for biographical reasons.

那时我们就意识到必须实现阶级突破和文化突破。那些假释选民、北方世俗化工薪阶层、多元种族劳工群体——谁能整合他们？我们像疯子般狂热设想着究竟谁有能力打破现状。

But then we already had in mind, there has to be this class break. There has to be this cultural break. The parole voters, the Northern, you know, secularizing working class, the multiracial working class, who brings it in? And we were actively fantasizing like lunatics about who is the person who could actually, break that and change that.

是的。但在我们的幻想与现实碰撞之前，2008至2012年2月这段时间里，我们的理念遭到了全面否定。

Right. But before our fantasies, let's say let's say, collided collided with reality, there was this period when I would say our ideas were completely rejected, which was 2008 to 02/2012.

两千问号问号？

A 2,000 question mark question mark?

对。我

Right. I

想说，虽然我们的理念可能在未来仍会持续被否定，但那段时间尤为特殊。这本书写于小布什总统任期尾声出版时，金融危机爆发，奥巴马当选，共和党内的氛围正如你描述的那样。

mean, the period in which our ideas are rejected may extend indefinitely into the future, but there was a special rejection. So we wrote this book in it came out at the very end of George w Bush's presidency. The financial crisis hit. Barack Obama was elected president, and the mood in the Republican Party picked up on the mood you've already described. Yes.

对吧？这种认为乔治·W·布什唯一问题在于花钱太多、是个大政府保守派的观点盛行一时。这催生了茶党时代——本质上是一场反对救助计划、刺激支出乃至奥巴马医改的有限政府、反赤字运动。可以说，这为共和党辩论定下了基调，但并未完全排斥我们关注的一些理念。

Right? This sense that the only problem with George w Bush was that he spent too much money, that he was a big government conservative, and it ran with that. And this gave us the Tea Party era, which was Yep. Effectively a limited government, anti deficit movement reacting against bailouts, stimulus spending, eventually Obamacare. And that, I would say, set the tone for Republican debates in a way that, you know, it didn't preclude some ideas we were interested in.

我们都有某些议题上存在自由主义倾向与共鸣。但2008年后四年间，共和党的整体氛围是：我们不需要思考如何治理政府，只需反对社会主义并设法削减开支。

We both have issues where we have libertarian impulses and sympathies. But the general mood of the Republican Party for the four years after 2008 was we don't need to think about how to run the government. We just need to stand against socialism and figure out how to cut spending.

我认为茶党运动期间，人们看到的是不满情绪、对奥巴马的反对、疲软经济以及草根能量。表面叙事是茶党的小政府主张，但你我都很清楚——实质并非如此。

And I think the Tea Party moment, what happened is that people saw discontent. They saw opposition to Obama. They saw a weak economy, and they saw this grassroots energy. And the narrative was the Tea Party small government thing. And I think you and I both saw that's not really what's going on here.

另有深层动因存在。这是种不同的不满，而他们完全误判了。在我看来，'全新政党论'比'茶党论'更接近真相。

There's something else happening. There's a different kind of discontent, and these guys are missing it. And I think that the brand new party thesis was closer to being correct than the Tea Party thesis.

没错。不必深究政策细节，我们在书中倡导的理念——福利制度必须建立在尊重、互惠及支持特定有价值的生活习惯基础上——正符合你刚才描述的视角。我们花大量篇幅论证家庭支持政策应降低生养子女难度，同时明确将政府支出与某种责任形式挂钩。

Right. And just, you know, without getting too deep into the policy weeds, the specific ideas that we argued for in the book and have, in different ways, argued for since fit into that perspective you just described, the idea that the welfare state has to be based on respect, reciprocity, and support for certain valuable habits and ways of life. Yes. Right? So we spend a lot of time arguing for family supports that would make it easier to have and rear children, again, with an explicit link between some form of responsibility and whatever way the government was spending money.

这就是我们眼中的中间道路。2012年大选证明，那种纯粹削减政府支出的强硬模式彻底失败。罗姆尼和瑞安虽提出改造医保社保的严肃方案，但公平地说，他们完全缺乏帮助工薪阶层的积极政策愿景。

Right? And that to us was the sort of middle ground. And I think pretty clearly, the more sort of stringent, we're just gonna cut government spending model came to grief in 02/2012. Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan ran on a very sort of well intentioned and serious blueprint for remaking Medicare and Social Security. But they had no, I I think it's fair to say, no positive vision of what government policy, public policy could be doing to help working Americans in that particular moment.

布什时代的积极愿景已信誉扫地（不论是否公允）。但有趣的是，若罗姆尼-瑞安执政，我们本可能结识众多内阁成员甚至施加影响。他们确实对某些理念持开放态度，却因过度谨慎而错失良机。

Bush era positive vision had been discredited, fairly or otherwise. But, what was interesting in that moment is had there been a Romney Ryan administration. Think it's fair to say that we would have known a ton of people in it. We would have maybe even had some modicum of influence, but they were open to some of these things, but they were so risk averse. They were walking on eggshells.

他们未能真正抓住关键机遇，你明白我的意思吗？

They didn't really seize the main chance. You know what I mean?

而且他们害怕——考虑到后续发展简直荒谬——害怕支持任何像大政府的政策会被抨击为'社会主义犀牛'之类。

Well, and they were afraid, and this is sort of comical given what happened next. Right? But they were afraid that if they supported anything that seemed too much like big government Right. That they would be attacked as socialist rhinos and so on. Right?

就像已故的林博曾攻击我们那样（虽然我们不够重要到被持续攻击）。保守派电台圈指责我们背叛原则，只因考虑让政府承担某些职能。这很讽刺，毕竟四年后......

As, you know, none other than the late Rush Limbaugh attacked us. Right. We were not important enough to be consistently attacked, but we were but we were attacked by people in sort of the talk radio sphere Yes. Of conservatism for selling out conservative principles by being willing to contemplate the government doing certain things. And that's amusing because, of course, of what then followed four years later.

而那些理论上坚定信奉自由意志主义小政府理念的整个群体后来怎样了？突然间，其中一些人竟最激进地转向了这种截然不同的愿景。

And what happened to that entire world of people who notionally were committed to this, you know, really hardcore libertarian small state vision. Suddenly, some of those people are the ones who flipped most aggressively to this very different vision.

没错。但最初，共和党政治人物曾有过短暂机会——这些人想某种程度上回归小布什时代的路线——他们主张：我们需要为中产阶级和工人阶级制定政策议程，需要关注家庭政策，需要解决医疗问题。

Right. But first, you had this brief opening for Republican politicians who, again, wanted to sort of go back to where George w Bush started to say, look. We need a middle class, working class policy agenda. We need to look at family policy. We need to look at health care.

我们需要重视教育。当时存在一个更庞大的政策撰稿人群体（我们与之有些关联），他们被称为'改革保守派'或'改革派保守党人'。

We need to look at education. And there was sort of a larger group of policy writers to which we were somewhat attached that got called the reform conservatives or the reformacons.

我对此记忆犹新。

I remember it well.

我们确实在给听众挖掘非常深层的素材。但很明显，当时有种叙事认为：这些改革保守派将影响下一届共和党政府——很可能由杰布·布什或马可·鲁比奥领导——他们会以各种方式现代化共和党，成为类似九十年代比尔·克林顿式的共和党人。但这个剧本随后被现实彻底碾碎。

We're really we're giving listeners the truly deep cuts. But I think pretty clearly, there was sort of a narrative that said, okay. These guys, the reform conservatives, they're going to have influence on the next Republican administration, which will probably be led by someone like Jeb Bush or Marco Rubio, who will modernize the Republican Party in various ways and will be a kind of Republican equivalent of Bill Clinton in the nineteen nineties, something like that. But that story was then completely steamrolled and shattered and everything else by what happened

接下来发生的，就是唐纳德·J·特朗普的崛起。

next, which was The rise of Donald j Trump.

是的。这正是我们稍事休息后要讨论的内容，请继续收听。欢迎回来，我们正讲到共和党近代史上的特朗普篇章。如我们所说，特朗普的出现正是我们描述的那种蓝领民粹倾向的具象化体现——或者说，真是如此吗？

Right. Which is where we're going to turn next after a quick break, so stay with us. And we're back, and we've just arrived at the Trump chapter of recent Republican Party history. And as we were saying, Trump arrived on the scene as the actual embodiment of the blue collar populist tendency that we had been describing. Or was he?

这确实非常...当然，我们会有这种想法——当你看《宏伟新党》原著时，我们确实预见到了类似他的人物，特别是回顾我们当时的讨论时...

It is really, really and, of course, you know, we would think this, but the we anticipated someone very much like him when you look to Grand New Party itself, but certainly when you look at our conversations around that time But we

但我们没有预料到会是他。咱们得说实话。

didn't we didn't anticipate him. Let's let's be fair.

不，绝对没有。

No. No. Absolutely not.

以我们有限的

To our own limited

预见力。关于那个改革保守主义时刻，我想说的是，作为历史爱好者，你我都明白这永远不会仅仅是税收抵免的问题。对吧？它永远不会是纯粹的技术官僚主义。叙事非常重要，同时血性与胆识也同样关键。

foresight. So here's what I'll say about that reform conservative moment is that I think you and I both, just as lovers of history, saw that it's never gonna be just tax credits. Right? It's never gonna be just, you know, pure unadulterated wonkery. Narrative is really important, and also just blood and guts are important.

我指的是公共安全、犯罪这些我们在《全新政党》中探讨过的话题。核心在于——你感到安全吗？你有归属感吗？唐纳德·特朗普最初谈论移民的方式，与杰布·布什截然不同，也不同于那些追求体面的人所持的主流观点。

And by that, I mean, public safety, crime. You know, these are things that we wrote about in grand new party. Just the idea that do you feel safe? Do you belong? Donald Trump, the first thing that he did was talk about immigration in a way that was markedly different from how Jeb Bush talked about immigration, markedly different from the thesis that a lot of people in that, you know, kind of respectability seeking moment have.

我并非在嘲讽。他的关键举措在于建墙等具体政策吗？我认为不完全是。这更像是一种方向性宣言。杰布·布什给人的印象（无论公平与否）是他珍视移民。

And I don't say that derisively. The big thing that he did, was it his specific policy prescriptions about building the wall and what have you? I don't think it was exactly that. It was rather directional. Jeb Bush gave people a sense, fairly or otherwise, that he cherished immigrants.

他娶了移民为妻，重视他们，视他们为美国故事的核心。而一个世代从事蓝领工作的美国人，生活可能充满动荡——在这个叙事里你并非主角。特朗普的论点在于：

He was married to an immigrant, and he valued them. He saw them as really so central to the American story. Whereas a multigenerational blue collar working class American, you know, maybe his life has been a little bit chaotic at the edges. You're not the hero of this story. And I think that Donald Trump made an argument.

他做出了颠覆性的举动，本质上是方向性的宣言：我们要把美国人放在首位。这种思潮在右翼政治中早有端倪，过去十五年间反移民情绪、限制主义以各种形式成为共和党内的强大暗流。虽然偶有火花，但始终未能形成燎原之势。

He did something that was so shattering, but it was basically a directional argument that we decide that we're gonna put Americans first. And it's something that, you know, you could plainly see in the politics of the right, you know, for the previous decade and a half. So anti immigrant and anti immigration sentiment, restrictionist sentiment in various guises had been a really powerful current in Republican politics. And every now and again, there's a flash in the pan. There was someone who had run on this, but, you know, would never penetrate, would never break through.

而特朗普真正把握住了这股力量。再次强调，我认为关键不在具体政策，而在于传递出'我在倾听你们'的信号。移民议题成为众多被忽视关切的缩影——精英阶层不尊重、不认真对待你们的忧虑，而我会。

And Trump is someone who was able to really capitalize on it. And, again, I don't actually think it was necessarily about the policy specifics, but it was, you know, I am listening to you. I am listening to you, and this immigration issue is a synecdoche for a ton of other issues where there are people who are not listening to you. They are not respecting you. They are not taking your concerns here seriously, and I will.

这种姿态极具力量。它同样体现在贸易、中国威胁等议题上——关于精英出卖国家的叙事早已存在，清晰可见。

And I think that was hugely powerful. And, of course, it applied in a bunch of other domains too, you know, with regard to trade, with regard to China, and the threat that it poses. The idea of an elite that is selling out our country. Those themes were there. It was visible.

2012年奥巴马曾矛盾地利用过这些情绪。所以对我来说，最

You know? And and Obama was the one who capitalized them on them in 2012 ambivalently. So that was, to me, what was so

耐人寻味的是追击罗姆尼的企业掠夺和外包行为。确实如此。

fascinating about going after Romney's corporate raiding and Exactly. Outsourcing.

确实。确实如此。

Exactly. Exactly.

对。不。奥巴马在对抗罗姆尼时展现出的某种原始特朗普主义，将其塑造成一种无国界、反爱国资本主义的化身。

Right. No. There was some sort of proto Trumpism in the way that Obama ran against Romney as sort of a an embodiment of borderless, antipatriotic capitalism.

奥巴马时期的特朗普选民并未改变，而是他们周围的联盟结构发生了变化。

The Obama Trump voters didn't change. It's the coalitions that changed around them.

但在我看来，特朗普所拥有的力量，首先，与我们提供的愿景有本质不同。回顾过去，那最终只是一个更强大的叙事。我们原以为我们掌握了这样的故事：政府如何为劳动者、为养家糊口的人挺身而出。我认为这个故事有其力量，本可以帮助鲁迪·朱利安尼在2012年，帮助马可·鲁比奥在2016年，但特朗普以你描述的方式将其放大了。

But to me, that power that Trump had, one, was was substantially different from the vision that we were offering. If you go back, it was, in the end, just a much more powerful story. We thought we had this story about, you know, here's how the government can stand up for people who work, people who raise families, all of these things. I think there was potency in that story and that it would have helped Rudy Giuliani in 02/2012. It would have helped Marco Rubio in 02/2016, but Trump just blew it up bigger in the way that you described.

他将1991年后全球化的推进全部纳入其中，将美国就业岗位外包至中国的现象也囊括进来。

He folded in the entire post 1991 globalization push. He folded in the outsourcing of US jobs to China.

还有国家的种族与人口结构转变。没错。并且，在出生率暴跌及由此产生的深刻代际紧张的背景下，他将这些因素整合在一起。

And the ethnic and demographic transformation of the country. Right. And, you know, in against a backdrop of collapsing birth rates and this deep intergenerational tension that stems from that, he put it together.

对。他整合了这些，但方式上——至少从我在2016年的视角看——常常是恶性的。我记得当时写过专栏，将特朗普主义描述为《宏伟新党》的黑暗镜像版本，他向那些我们希望共和党争取的选民发出呼吁，但不仅范围更广，手法也更煽动。

Right. He he put it together, but he also did did so in a way that, certainly from my perspective in 02/2016, was often malignant. I think I wrote a column at that time describing Trumpism as a kind of dark mirror universe version of grand new party, right, where he was making a pitch to the kind of voters we wanted the Republican Party to make a pitch to. But it wasn't just more sweeping. It was more demagogic.

其中强烈的白人身份政治成分，自由派批评者并未看错。不过我认为左派中许多人低估了经济因素对特朗普吸引力的重要性。他飞遍全国，前往工厂关闭、工作外流的城市，承诺带回好日子。这部分无法从2016年的故事中抹去。但最终，他在选举中并未建立起跨种族的工人阶级共和党联盟。

And there was this strong white identity politics component that sort of liberal critics were not wrong to see in it. Now I think there was always an underestimation, not everywhere on the left, but among many liberals, of how important economics was to Trump's appeal. He was literally flying around the country, going to, you know, cities where factories had closed and where jobs had gone overseas and saying, I will bring back the good times. You you can't write that out of the 2016 story. But in the end, what he did electorally was not in that election to build the panethnic working class Republican Party.

他将白人工人阶级选民对共和党的支持率提升至罗姆尼竞选团队难以想象的高度。在关键摇摆州，他翻转了中西部，赢得了更具选举意义的选票，以非多数普选票赢得大选。但当时从我们的角度看，可以说：特朗普实践了我们曾敦促共和党采取的策略，但其方式明显有毒，且未能构建新的多数联盟。

He boosted the Republican share of white working class voters beyond what the Romney campaign had imagined possible. Competitive states. In the right competitive states, he flipped the Midwest, but he won more electorally important votes, and he won the election without a popular vote majority. But I think it was reasonable to look in that moment from our perspective and say, okay. Trump did a version of what we'd urged on the Republican Party, but there was both something clearly toxic about the way he did it, and it didn't build a new majority.

唐纳德·特朗普在2016年上任时并未获得多数支持。他未完成政治重组，只是强化了共和党联盟中特定工人阶级部分的力量。你认为这是——

Donald Trump didn't come into office in 2016 with majority support. He didn't complete the realignment. He just boosted a particular part of the working class share of the GOP coalition. Do you think that's what do what

确实如此吗？尽管这一切听起来完全正确。这对我们双方来说都是个非常奇怪的时刻，因为首先，在新政党内部，我们实际上就在强调：如果不接受我们的路线，就会出现一个煽动者，利用这种不满情绪，利用所谓保守派精英与潜在保守派多数之间的裂痕。我们当时正以不同方式应对种族变化、移民等问题。

do think? Though, that that all sounds exactly right. This was a very strange moment for both of us because, first of all, in grand new party itself, we literally were saying that, look. If you do not embrace our path, there will be a demagogue, who will capitalize on this discontent, on this rupture between, call it, the conservative elite and the potential conservative majority. We were both in different ways, wrestling with questions of ethnic change, immigration.

回顾我在奥巴马第二任期写的内容，那些现在已成陈词滥调的言论——不是要自夸——但当时因指出拉美裔并不关心特赦问题而遭到猛烈抨击。这根本不是关键。我们讨论的是一种更平衡、理性的移民政策，能够构建一个多元族裔的工薪阶层保守派多数联盟。

I look back at the things I was writing in the second Obama term, and it's just crazy things that are I mean, not to pat ourselves on the back, but things that have now become total cliches, you know, just getting savagely attacked for saying that Hispanics do not care about amnesty. This is not the issue. Just talking about the idea that there is a more balanced, sane approach to immigration that can build a kind of multiethnic, working class conservative majority.

没错。需要澄清的是，我们当时属于移民鹰派——当然是相对于小布什和麦凯恩而言。

Right. Because an important just just to clarify our own perspective. Right? Like, we were immigration hawks Yes. Relative to George w Bush and John McCain.

我们的观点是：加强边境管控，实施某种基于技能的移民政策以限制低技能移民，这既是政策最佳平衡点——既能保持相当规模的移民，又不至于造成过大冲击；同时也如你所说，更能吸引拉美裔选民和许多新移民后代。要知道当时左翼尚未出现全面开放边境的主张，但普遍认为共和党必须在移民政策上大幅左转。

Yes. Our view was that securing the border and having some kind of skills based immigration policy that limited low skilled immigration was, one, the policy sweet spot, the place where you could have substantial immigration, but not at a rate that was sort of too disruptive, but also something that, as you just said, would appeal more to Hispanic voters, to a lot of, you know Exactly. The descendants of recent immigrants than just saying, oh, you know, we're going to legalize everyone who's here and not open the border because the the open borders moment had not yet arrived on the political left. But at at the very least, there was the conventional wisdom was that the Republican Party had to move substantially to the left on immigration.

正是如此。我们当时的论点是：坦率强调同化的重要性，主张移民政策应符合国家利益，承认移民速度或规模存在合理上限——这些观点既正当又不含种族主义。结果看到特朗普在那个节点出现时，感觉就像'天哪，要引发反弹了'。他那种煽动性的移民言论可能会危及我们设想中的联盟构建方案。

Exactly. And our argument was that an emphasis a frank emphasis on the importance of assimilation and the idea that immigration policy should be in the national interest, that there was such a thing as too fast or too many, and that actually it was legitimate and not racist. And then to see Trump in this moment, it almost felt like, oh my gosh. There's gonna be a backlash. He's gonna talk about immigration in this way that is inciting, and it's gonna be something that will jeopardize the formula, the coalition that we had hoped to see.

我们原本有周密计划，但最终事态却以更混乱的方式发生了。

You know, we had a scheme. We had a plan for what it was gonna look like, and then it actually happened in this much more chaotic way.

对。我们设想的剧本是马克·卢比奥这类人物转型为温和的移民限制主义者，同时推行比罗姆尼更亲中产阶级的议程，从而赢得多元族裔的蓝领多数支持。但现实却是特朗普以少数普选票当选，发表了在我看来更阴暗、更极端、也更有害的言论。

Right. Right. I mean, our plan was Marco Rubio, let's say, or someone like him, reinventing himself as a kind of moderate restrictionist on immigration while having a more middle class friendly agenda than Mitt Romney and winning a multiethnic Yes. Blue collar majority on that basis. Instead, we had Trump winning a minority of the popular vote president, making much darker, more sweeping, and, again, in my view, more toxic appeals.

那么核心问题来了：我们如何走到今天这一步？因为到2024年2月，正如开场所说，共和党联盟虽非完全一致，但已近似我们二十年前的构想。而实现这一转变的，恰恰是唐纳德·特朗普。

But so then how this is the core question. How did we get from there to here? Because in 02/2024, as I said at the outset, the Republican coalition looks like not completely, but it looks like the coalition we imagined twenty years ago. But guess what? It was Donald Trump who did it.

所以究竟怎么回事？

So how?

这分两个阶段。首先是特朗普首个总统任期期间，城市郡县支持率显著提升，2016至2020年间拉美裔选民实质性转向——这甚至发生在新冠疫情最严峻时期，当时我们的感官无时无刻不在承受冲击。

There are two phases. One is during the first Trump presidency period. You saw these dramatic gains in urban counties. You saw really material gains among Hispanic voters between 2016 and 2020, and that was in the thick of the COVID crisis. That was in a moment when, you know, as many of our listeners will recall, our senses were being assaulted at all times.

我们认识的许多被激进化的人，那些曾被称为追求体面的保守派，对特朗普态度暧昧。当他们真正转向支持他时——比如卡瓦诺听证会期间，或是觉醒话语初现端倪的阶段——你会看到广大中间偏右群体因不同驱动力而分道扬镳。特朗普确实起到了凝聚作用，但重要的是记住，在他的首个任期内确实发生了某些关键转变。

So many things that radicalized people that we know, people who had been call it, respectability seeking, conservatives were ambivalent about Trump. And when they actually turned, when they embraced him, the Kavanaugh hearings, when you think about the kind of early stages of woke discourse, just there are a lot of things that happened there where you saw this kind of diaspora of folks on the broad center right going in really different directions depending on what it is that animated the most. And Trump was someone who galvanized this. But I think that that's important to remember, that there was something that happened during that first presidency.

但关于这种凝聚效应，我的疑问是：它是否纯粹是消极的？可以说特朗普任期（尤其是后期）至拜登任期初期，在疫情前后这个窗口期，左翼自由派某种程度上重现了七十年代微型危机——这些危机最初促成了里根联盟的形成。比如弗洛伊德事件后的骚乱与城市警力收缩、

But but this is but this is my question about that galvanizing effect, which is, was it purely negative in the sense that you could make a case that what happened in Trump's presidency, especially at the end, and to some extent in Biden's presidency, but really in that sort of pre COVID and COVID window, was that liberalism and the left kind of recreated some of the crises in miniature from the nineteen seventies that had made the Reagan coalition possible in the first place. After the killing of George Floyd, you had riots and sort of a retreat from urban policing.

没错。

Yes.

犯罪率飙升、拜登政府初期不明智的经济刺激方案引发通胀回潮（这种通胀压力自七十年代末以来未曾出现），以及觉醒进步主义中类似七十年代的文化激进主义。虽然不赘述细节，但可以说——

A spike in crime. So crime came back. You had, in the beginning of the Biden administration, a unwise stimulus package and recovery bill that goosed inflation and brought inflation back, which it, you know, hadn't been around since the late nineteen seventies and early nineteen eighties. And then in you had, you know, without litigating all the details Yes. In woke progressivism, a form of cultural radicalism that looked a bit like the cultural radicalism of the nineteen seventies.

是的，所以你

Yes. So you

可以构建这样一个叙事：我们在布什时期的所有论述都基于'七十年代不会重来'的前提，因此共和党需要前瞻性议程。但特朗普任期内可能短暂重现了七十年代场景，使得共和党联盟得以吸纳蓝领拉丁裔等新选民群体，而无需我们预期中的那种议程巨变。你觉得呢？

could tell a story where, basically, everything we were saying in the Bush presidency was premised on the idea that the nineteen seventies weren't coming back, and the Republican Party therefore needed this forward looking agenda. But maybe what happened in Trump's presidency was that briefly the nineteen seventies did come back. Yep. And so the Republican coalition could expand to include blue collar Hispanics and all of these extra voters without having some dramatic shift in agenda of the kind we'd imagined. What what do you think?

这正是我强调特朗普首任与拜登时期差异的原因。宏观来看，首任特朗普时期的关键在于左翼的凝聚与转型——文化机构、精英阶层展现的巨大权力，以及民众'特朗普是唯一制衡力量'的认知。而拜登时期则存在'民主紧急状态'的集体焦虑，

That's one reason I stress these two different periods from the first Trump presidency and then the Biden presidency. So big picture, when you say negative, I do think the first Trump presidency, the real thing that happened was this galvanizing, this coalescing, this transformation of the left. This sense of cohesion, cultural power, cultural institutions, the idea of affluent, educated, but also just high status, high prestige people exerting this incredible power, and the sense that many people had that Trump is the one thing standing against that. So I think that that was one foundation of it. Then you see a Biden presidency where I think there was this view that we are in the midst of a kind of democratic emergency.

这为激进变革提供了正当性：质疑新自由主义、瓦解现有体系、寻求全新道路。2020年时——天啊——

This legitimates, real dramatic change. We need to question neoliberalism. We need to dismantle systems. We need to do something really new and different. You know, in 2020, my gosh.

即便像我这样认可特朗普执政价值的人也必须承认，2020年的白宫确实处于混乱状态。但吊诡的是，面对全社会围剿，他仍在选举中获得了惊人增长。

When you look at the state of the Trump presidency in that moment, I don't think anyone would argue, including those who, you know, see a lot of virtue in that presidency as I do. I think they got some big important things right. But that, you know, it was pretty chaotic in 2020. Right? And then despite that, the massive gains that he made in that, election, against this whole of society effort.

要知道，他确实做到了

You know, he made well, he

相较于2016年，他并未取得巨大优势。他在特定选民群体中获得了显著增长，比如少数族裔选民，同时却失去了郊区选民的支持。对吧？还流失了部分白人工人阶级选票。

didn't make massive gains relative to 2016. He made massive gains with certain set of voters. Again, minority voters, for instance, while losing voters in the suburbs. Right? Losing pieces of the white working class vote.

对吧？所以本质上这是一场交易。

Right? So he essentially It's a a trade.

说得好。很有道理。

It's a good point. It's a good point.

这是一场交换

There was a trade

这个联盟效率较低，但正如你所说，它某种程度上映射了我们过去构想的轮廓。当然，那些坚决反对特朗普的死硬派已脱离联盟。但还有你我熟知的所谓'中右翼守旧派'——他们虽对特朗普现象有所警惕，却因对抗那种整合型进步体制而重新归队。现在核心问题正是你我本世纪以来苦苦思索的：是否存在某种积极主张？能否有真正充满活力、实质性的内容来填补这个真空？

A less efficient coalition, but a coalition that, in a sense, as you're saying, reflected the outlines of what you and I had envisioned in the past. Of course, there are people who are determined, bitter ender, never Trumpers who are gone from the coalition. But then the number of people that you and I both know call them center right normies who are, you know, alarmed in some respects by the Trump phenomenon, but then who found their way back into the coalition as a reaction to that kind of integrated progressive apparatus. And the question now is the question that you and I have been struggling with and thinking through and passionate about for, you know, this century, which is, is there some positive case here? Is there something that is dynamic and real and substantive that can fill this vacuum?

我们难道只能做反左翼的存在吗？真要放任左翼成为唯一动态力量？在《宏伟新党》中我们构想的右翼，本应是文化上富有创造力的动态力量，能提供合乎道德伦理的融合方案，值得拥护推行。但现在...我不确定我们是否还保有这种特质。

Are we something other than merely being anti left? Do we really want the left to be the only dynamic force, or do we want there to be another dynamic force? And what we envision in Grand New Party was the right as a culturally creative dynamic force that was offering this moral ethical synthesis that that actually made sense and that you could kinda champion and carry forward. And that And I don't know if we have that.

但关键是要有具体的经济政策。是的，关于政府征税、支出和监管的政策。对吧？这些政策不仅要赢得工人阶级选票，更要建设更繁荣的美国中产阶级未来。

But but, centrally, that had some very specific economic policies. Yes. Policies for how the government taxes and spends and regulates. Right? That we're supposed to be not just winning working class votes, but building a more prosperous middle class American future.

好，我们先暂停一下。回来后将探讨共和党在特朗普第二任期的发展方向。现在继续，我们分两部分进行。

Alright. Let's take a break there. And when we come back, we'll get into where the Republican Party goes in the second Trump presidency. And we're back. So let's do two things.

先回顾特朗普首个任期，再展望新任期：在他执政初期，是否存在过面向美国中产阶级的前瞻性经济政策议程？

Let's look back at the first Trump presidency and then forward to the new Trump presidency to ask, was there, in the first few years of the Trump era, something that looked like a forward looking economic policy agenda for middle class America?

这方面你我视角或许存在微妙差异。作为权衡取舍的偏执者，我总认为政策组合必须相互协调。比如你可以主张零移民或大幅缩减移民，同时支持自由贸易。那就意味着我们将进口更多草莓等低端劳动密集型商品。

This is an area where I suspect you and I have some subtle differences of perspective. I guess I'm a big trade off obsessive and just the idea that, you know, when you have a package deal, this thing has to fit with this thing. So for example, you could say that I want to have no, immigration or very little immigration or radically reduced immigration, but also I'm gonna embrace trade. And I'm going to say that, okay. That means that we're gonna import more strawberries or we're gonna import more of this or that, things that are low scale labor intensive goods.

而且，你知道，我们会那么做。那是一种方案。或者你可以说你要实行选择性移民政策，并且我们要拥抱贸易。我认为特朗普时期有很多值得探讨的地方，因为当时有这么多局外人加入，他们带着相互冲突的诉求。有些人进来后想着，但愿特朗普对他的贸易议程或与罗姆尼、瑞安主义彻底决裂的想法不是认真的。

And, you know, we'll do that. That's one formula. Or you could say you were gonna have a selective immigration policy, and we're gonna embrace trade. I think that there are a lot of things about that Trump moment because you had all these outsiders who were coming in, and they had conflicting imperatives. There were some people who came in and were like, let's hope that Trump just isn't serious about his trade agenda or about the idea of making a radical break with Romney, Ryanism, or what have you.

我们就姑且观望，看能否保持淡定，指望一切都会好起来，觉得那主要是口头说说而已。另一些人则是真正的后新自由主义者或反新自由主义者。所以他们试图在这个白宫里共存，你知道，今天这个声音占上风，明天那个声音占上风——史蒂夫·班农持一种观点，而史蒂夫·摩尔又持另一种观点。

And let's just kinda see if we can be chill and just kind of hope everything's gonna be fine, and it's largely rhetorical. Then there were other people who were real post neoliberals, anti neoliberals. So they were trying to coexist with one another in this White House where it was, you know, one voice was dominant one day, you know, Steve Bannon had one perspective, and and Steve Moore had a different perspective.

没错。这是个很好的概括方式。对吧？史蒂夫·摩尔，为不了解的人介绍一下，是个长期持右翼立场的经济学家，你知道，他只想搞涓滴经济学，只想减税，认为减税能解决所有人生难题。这么说有点不公平，但也只是稍微有点。

Right. Well, that's a good way to distill it. Right? Steve Moore, for those who don't know, is a long term sort of right wing economist who, you know, just wants side or side economics just wants to cut taxes, and cutting taxes is the solution to all of life's problems. That's slightly unfair, but only slightly.

而史蒂夫·班农，在他最初加入特朗普首届政府时说，我们要搞一场右翼版的新政。我们要在基础设施上投入巨资，通过这种方式重建美国工人阶级。审视特朗普头四年任期，可以说摩尔得到了他想要的，而班农没有。对吧？基础设施计划最后成了笑话。

Steve Bannon, on the other hand, when he initially came in to the first Trump administration, said, you know, we're gonna do a kind of right wing new deal. We're gonna we're gonna spend a ton of money on infrastructure, and we're gonna rebuild the American working class that way. And one way to look at the first four years of Trump is that, you know, Moore got what he wanted and Bannon didn't. Right? Infrastructure Right.

特朗普确实以某种方式减了税，其中包含一些家庭友好条款，包含你我支持的一些理念，但本质上仍是相当传统的共和党式减税。某种程度上，特朗普的创新只是宣称：我们要让经济过热运行。我们不会担心福利支出之类的问题，要通过过热的经济来提高工资，仅此而已。

Became a joke. Trump did cut taxes in a way that included some family friendly provisions, included some ideas that you and I supported, but was still a fairly conventional Republican tax cut. And in a way, the Trump innovation was just to say, we're just gonna run the economy hot. We're not gonna worry about entitlement spending or anything like that, and we're going to raise wages with a hot economy, and that'll be it.

这才是真正的创新。特朗普认识到，将医疗保险和社会保障移出讨论范围会瓦解奥巴马的联盟。这将真正改变局面，让文化议题更加突出。我确实相信财富创造。

That's the real innovation. Trump recognized that taking Medicare and Social Security off the table is something that would shatter the Obama coalition. It would really change things. It would make the cultural issues more salient. I do believe in, wealth creation.

我不太赞成高税收。我认为税收有其作用，但必须与我们想要的向上流动性更大愿景相关联。小布什的所有者社会虽有缺陷，但至少有个理论框架。而特朗普首个任期里，这些根本没有整合起来，没有形成体系。

I am not a huge fan of high taxes. I do believe there's a place for that, but it has to be connected to some larger vision for what it is we want when it comes to upward mobility. And the Bush ownership society, imperfect as it was, there was some thesis there. I think that with the first Trump presidency, it just didn't really come together. It didn't gel.

如果没有新冠疫情，谁知道呢？也许我们会看到不同的局面。展望未来，我认为如果共和党不再是私有财产和财富积累的政党...

And in the absence of COVID, who knows? Maybe we would have seen something different. Going forward, I just think that if the Republican Party is not the party of private property and wealth building

但共和党有可能即将不再是私有财产和财富积累的政党吗？

But is there any chance that the Republican Party is about to not be the party of private property and wealth building?

不，不。我想你是对的，但我确实认为右翼中有些人基本接受了左派关于不平等的理念等等，我认为那是一条死胡同。没错。

No. No. I I think you're right, but I do think that you have some people on the right who basically embrace kind of left ideas about inequality and and what have you, and I think that that's a dead end. Right.

所以这基本上就是划分派别的问题。对吧？存在一种彻底的民粹主义右翼，他们本质上并不认同解决方案，但对过去三十年来美国经济表现所持的批评态度，与左翼如出一辙。是的。对吧？

So there's just just to sort of send out categories. Right? There is a kind of thoroughgoing populist right that is essentially shares not the prescription, but the sort of critique of how the American economy has performed for the last thirty years that you see on the left. Yes. Right?

这种观点认为经济体系根本没有为美国中产阶级服务，因此我们需要一场彻底的改革。而像特朗普实施的大规模关税政策能获得强有力的知识界支持，往往正是源于这一视角。对吧？

That says the economy has just not worked for middle class America, and we need, therefore, a kind of radical overhaul. And to the extent that there is strong kind of intellectual support for, let's say, the huge Trump tariffs, it often comes out of this perspective. Right?

关税在某种程度上只是矛头而已。那些真正严谨深思的人设想着对美国经济进行更宏大的重构，但关税可以说是这种理念的象征。

Tariffs being just the tip of the spear in a way. The really rigorous thoughtful people envision some larger reordering of the American economy, but tariffs are, you know, kind of a symbol of this.

将关税视为开启激进产业政策的入口，其规模可能会超越拜登政府的举措。我个人认为特朗普式关税或许会出现，但我不认为会看到右翼对美国经济进行戏剧性重组。问题其实更具体些——以美国副总统当选人J.

Tariffs as right, as an opening into dramatic industrial policy that presumably would go beyond what the Biden administration did. I personally think we may or may not get Trumpian tariffs. I don't think you're going to see a dramatic right wing restructuring of of the American economy. I think the question is a little narrower than that. So take the vice president-elect of The United States, J.

D·万斯和世界首富埃隆·马斯克为例，他们都与本届政府关系密切。马斯克最初是克林顿派民主党人，从来不是教条的自由主义者。但随着其立场右转，我认为他进入了某种自由派空间——他现在负责领导一个旨在改造联邦政府的委员会。

D. Vance, and the richest man in the world, Elon Musk, who both have, obviously, strong associations with this administration. Musk himself was originally a Clinton Democrat. He was never a doctrinaire libertarian. But as he has moved right, I think he has come to inhabit sort of that libertarian space where he's ended up in charge of a commission that's supposed to figure out how to transform the federal government.

要从联邦支出中削减数万亿美元。没错，这虽不是茶党运动，但与茶党理念有共通之处。而万斯的观点在某些方面完全触及了你所说的深层结构批判——尽管你并不同意这种批判。

Trillions of dollars from federal spending. Yep. It's not the Tea Party, but it it has something in common with with Tea Party ideas there. Right? Whereas the Vance perspective, in certain ways, it goes all the way to the sort of deep structural critique you were talking about that you don't agree with.

但部分原因在于，我认为这更多是基于美国工人阶级需要某些未曾获得的帮扶支持，而传统共和党政策未能提供这些。在我看来，这将成为特朗普政府内部未来的张力所在——我们是回归动态导向的自由主义减政，还是有可能达成某种民粹主义的新综合？

But in part, it's just more based around, I think, the idea that, you know, the working class in America needs certain forms of help and support that it hasn't gotten and that traditional Republican policymaking hasn't delivered. And I I see that as sort of the tension inside the Trump administration going forward. Like, are we returning to a kind of just dynamism oriented, libertarian government cutting, or is there, again, some sort of populist synthesis available?

我的构想是——我想知道你的反应——我们讨论过右翼作为反左翼的定位及其思想空间。我认为最终的治愈之道将是拥抱那些促进人类繁荣的价值观、理念、认知和习惯。指望税收优惠或政府来解决问题是不现实的。我们需要政府在其领域内高效有为，创造让家庭、家族网络或社区得以真正构建的条件。

My vision and I wonder how you react to this. We were talking about this idea of the right as the anti left and what are the ideas that occupy that space. My vision is that the thing that is healing ultimately is going to be the embrace of certain values, ideas, sensibilities, habits that contribute to human flourishing ultimately. The idea that you're gonna look to a tax credit or the idea that you're gonna look to the state to deliver this, it's just not gonna happen. You need the state to be highly effective, capable, and competent within its domain to create the conditions so that we can actually build these, really, families, or networks of families, or community.

这其实是对你所描述不满情绪的多元化解决方案愿景。那种指望政府解决这些问题的幻想，源于极端世俗化和社群生活的崩塌。所以当我思考马斯克时，我的反应是：颂扬建设创造的能量、释放财富创造的理念令人振奋，这些可以是积极健康的。而JD·万斯正在以令人印象深刻、真诚恳切的方式思考——我认为他正在应对那些政府极难解决的难题。

You know, it's a pluralistic vision for what the ultimate solution is gonna look like to this discontent you're describing. And the fantasy of government fixing these things is something that stems from this intense secularization and this kind of collapse of communal life. And so when I think about Musk, I guess my reaction is this seems very exciting, the idea of celebrating the energy of building and creating and the idea of unleashing wealth creation. These kinds of things can be good and healthy. What I see JD is kind of thinking about in a really impressive, earnest, genuine way, I think he's wrestling with problems that are really, really hard for government to solve.

包括我们在内的许多深思者，在早期都曾思考政府能做什么来肯定某些生活方式之类。但这些事情我现在觉得越来越难以处理。反而像改造内华达州乃至火星这类狂想更具可行性。我理想中的特朗普第二任期就应该有这样的大手笔，但愿不会让众人落泪或沦为笑谈。

And I think a lot of thoughtful people, including us in earlier eras, were kind of thinking about, you know, what can government do to kind of affirm certain ways of life or what have you. And that's just that stuff is just I guess I've I've come to find those things less tractable. But what I do find tractable is some of the kind of zany dreams of terraforming Nevada as well as terraforming Mars. You know, just stuff like that. You know, my dream second Trump presidency would take big swings like that and hopefully not have the men in tears and be laughable.

我真心希望能以宏大的创造性思维来思考。我们如何建立一个在其有限领域内高效且充满活力的有限政府？无论是犯罪控制，还是突破性的科学研究，诸如此类。但我认为社会政策的渐进式改革，最终只会创造一种文化，对吧？一种颂扬并让家庭得以繁荣的文化。

I really wanna think in big creative ways. How do we have a limited government that is highly effective and energetic within its limited domain? Whether that's crime control, whether that's breakthrough scientific research, this kind of thing. But I just think that the game of inches of social policy, it's just it's ultimately gonna be creating a culture that Right. Celebrates and allows families to thrive.

没错。所以最终，你反对了我们书中的一些论点，对吧？哦，罗斯。不是完全反对，但这是我们最初的论点，即共和党和保守主义需要在政府运作的细枝末节上投入精力，这种程度是进步派视为理所当然的，并专注于——再次强调——不是大刀阔斧的政策干预，而是精心设计的政策干预，以支持工作和家庭。

Right. So, ultimately, you have turned against some of the arguments in our book. Right? Oh, Ross. Not not turned against precisely, but that that was our our original brief, was that the Republican Party and conservatism needs to be working in the nuts and bolts of government to a degree that progressives take for granted and focused on, again, not sweeping policy interventions, but carefully tailored policy interventions that support work and family.

对吧？而我、我、我确实认为，在你的经历中，目睹特朗普的出现并以他的特朗普风格将这一切一扫而空，然后看着左派卷土重来——

Right? And I I I and I do think that in your arc, the experience of watching Trump come along and sort of sweep all that off the table with his Trumpian style, watching then the left come along

是的。

Yes.

而按照我的说法，他们在某些方面带回了七十年代的风格，这让你重新回到了——不是茶党，而是可以说回到了罗纳德·里根的时代。我认为你现在处于一种里根式的思维空间，即政府支持一些科学和创新的大型项目是好的，但最终，如果美国社会要愈合，那不会是通过政府政策实现的。这并非完全不公平，对吧。

And in my formulation, bring back the nineteen seventies in certain ways, has brought you back around, not not to the Tea Party, but let's say to Ronald Reagan. Like, I think you're in a sort of Reaganite space where it's it's good for the government to, yeah, support some big projects in science and innovation, but, ultimately, if American society is gonna heal, it's not gonna be government policy doing it. That's not entirely unfair. Right.

我确实认为，你知道，记得——

I do think that you know, remember

你背叛了我。

You have betrayed me.

克林顿。希拉里·克林顿，2016年，拜登总统任期，你知道，他们——公平地说——实际上借鉴了这些想法，比如雄心勃勃的儿童税收抵免等等。

Clinton. Hillary Clinton, 2016, the Biden presidency, you know, they were, to their credit, let's be fair to them, they were actually drawing on these ideas, big ambitious child credits and what have you read.

拜登政府确实临时实施了一个版本。是的。最大胆、最雄心勃勃的版本。

Biden administration did do temporarily a version of the yes. The kind of The biggest the most ambitious version.

而且，你知道，有些事情，你知道，某种程度上——而且，你看。我们可以就这个或那个政策的具体细节争论不休。但我认为那让我感到谦卑，不是因为我现在认为，哦，你知道，让我们抛弃儿童税收抵免或其他什么。而是因为这些事情他们尝试过。看看那个儿童税收抵免，只实施了一年。

And and, you know, things that, you know, kind of and, you know, look. You know, we could litigate specifics of this or that policy. But I think that that was humbling for me, not because I, you know, now believe that, oh, you know, let's jettison the child credit or what have you. But just it was humbling, because these are things that they attempted to do. And look at that child credit, one year.

是的，它是否在机制上减少了贫困，并产生了一些积极效果？绝对如此。

Yes, did it mechanically reduce poverty, and did it have some salutary effects? Absolutely.

生育率问题，瑞恩。但你看。但确切地说。即使在边际上也是如此。

Birth rates, Ryan. But look. But exactly. Even on the margin.

嗯，但即便是工人阶级和中下阶层人群，你知道，这是否属于那种需要我们为之奋斗的事情？这是否创造了

Well, but even and also did working class and lower middle class people, you know, was this something that was this very kind of, you know, we we're gonna have to fight for this. Was this something that created

一股浪潮？它并没有产生拜登政府预期的那种政治效应。我同意这点。

a groundswell? It did not it did not have anything like the political effects that the Biden administration expected. I agree.

确实如此。而且我认为'伟大新政党'论点还有另一层含义。它部分带有修正性质，很大程度上是在声明：我们不会瓦解新政时期的福利国家体系。历史上确实存在政府与文化精英协作、为家庭繁荣创造条件的时刻。即便是现在，我也不认为其中有什么具体建议需要摒弃，但我更认同这样一种观点：你我共同期待的那种疗愈，最终必须通过文化变革来实现。

And that's right. And, also, I think there's another element of the grand new party argument. It was partly you know, a lot of it was corrective, and a lot of it was, look, we're not going to dismantle the New Deal era welfare state. There have been moments of actually government, but also a cultural elite can work together to create the conditions for flourishing families. And even now, I don't think there's specific recommendations there that I would jettison, but I certainly am more taken with the idea that the kind of healing that I think you and I both want, that is ultimately gonna have to be cultural change.

顺便说，有些事情政府确实能做。想想撒切尔主义。玛格丽特·撒切尔的理念不仅是自由放任，她领导的保守党政府积极作为，不仅针对政府规模，还针对那些敌视她所认为的家庭兴旺所需活力的民间社会组织、政府官僚体系和教育机构。政府无法直接灌输这些活力美德。

And by the way, are things government can do. I think about Thatcherism. You know, one of Margaret Thatcher's things is that she wasn't just laissez faire. She was running an activist conservative government that wasn't just targeting the size of the state, but it was also targeting civil society organizations, government bureaucracies, and educational establishment that was hostile to what she saw as the vigorous virtues that families needed to thrive. Government could not instill those vigorous virtues.

但政府可以对抗那些削弱践行活力美德者的文化制度力量。这个观点完全正确。这就是右翼的积极行动议程。我认为这不仅关乎犯罪与公共安全，也关乎我们对创业精神和家庭政策的思考。明智的社会政策有其用武之地，但核心在于：金钱能实现什么？与我们希望蓬勃发展的文化力量需要怎样的生长空间？

Government could fight against the cultural institutional forces that were undermining those who manifested the vigorous virtues. I think that that's exactly right. That is an activist agenda for the right. And I think that it relates to certainly crime and public safety, but it also relates to how we think about entrepreneurship and how we think about family policy. So there is a place for smart social policy, but the Lodestar is what can dollars and cents accomplish versus what can creating room for the cultural forces that we wanna see thrive.

所以当我看到马斯克这样的人物时，我是否认为他是个有缺陷的凡人？当然。但他也代表着一股文化力量，我认为这具有疗愈作用。

So, you know, when I see someone like Musk, do I see him as an imperfect and flawed figure? Of course. But, also, he's someone who represents a kind of cultural force, and I see that as healing.

是的。我想说明，通过这样追问你，其实我认同你所展现的部分思想演变。这部分认同源于我认为美国整体经济格局已大不相同

Yeah. And I I wanna say that in prodding you this way, I actually agree with what I take to be part of your evolution. And in part, I agree with it because I think the American economy overall just looks different

确实。

Yes.

2024年的情况与我们早前在金融危机前夕提出这些论点时已大不相同。金融危机前的时期，以及随后美国生活中实际工资停滞的阶段，在低通胀环境下，政府政策有更多积极作为的空间。某种程度上，那个时代催生了特朗普的首次总统任期。而我认为当前这种空间已大幅缩小——通胀的阴影正笼罩着政策激进主义。

In 2024 than it did when we were making a lot of these arguments earlier that we have In the run up to the financial crisis. Run up to the financial crisis, and then there was a period of real wage stagnation in American life in a climate of low inflation where there was room for government policy to be more activist. And that moment, in a way, gave us the first Trump presidency. And I think there's a lot less room for that right now. I think the, you know, the shadow of inflation hangs over policy activism.

确实如此。福利支出的账单即将到期。但更广泛地说，尽管拜登时代的通胀在过去几年很糟糕，但美国经济对工人阶级——我们最关心的核心群体——的表现实际上优于小布什时期的经济。过去十到十五年

Looms. Yep. And the the bill for entitlements is coming due. But then more generally, The US economy, while the Biden era inflation was dreadful for a couple of years, it's actually done better by working class Americans who were the core constituency we were worried about than did the economy of George w Bush. The last ten or fifteen years

没错。

Yes.

对工人阶级而言比我想象的要更好

Have been better for working class Americans than were, I think

工资的'大压缩'现象。确实。

The great compression of wages. Yes.

上层中产专业人士不再与工人阶级拉开差距。考虑到这些趋势，我认为现在公共政策对工人阶级的支持力度确实不必像我们最初讨论这些问题时那般激进。我同意你关于马斯克式活力的最佳版本——那正是最理想形态的自由主义。而最糟糕的自由主义则是那种'只要实现预算平衡，不惜任何代价削减福利'的论调。我过去反对、将来也永远反对这种自由主义。

Upper middle class professionals are no longer pulling away from the working class. So when you look at those forces, I think, yes, I think there's less reason to be quite as activist in public policy in support of the working class relative to when we first started writing about these issues. And I agree with you that in the best version of Muskian dynamism, there is something that is the best kind of libertarianism. The worst kind of libertarianism is just the kind that is you know, we don't care how we cut the programs as long as we get to a balanced budget and so on. I am and always will be against that kind of libertarianism.

最好的自由主义会质问：为什么我们不能拥有自动驾驶汽车？为什么不能登陆火星？正是各类政府监管在阻碍这些进步。因此我对马斯克在这些领域的影响力持谨慎乐观态度。但我不禁思考——或许这正是我们可以达成共识的地方——一个渴望长期执政美国的政治联盟（须知当前两大联盟都未能做到），其核心仍需一套基本经济纲领，向中部美国宣告：'这是我们支持你们的方式，这些是我们为创造增长、公平与机遇，维系美国梦而推行的政策改革。'

The best kind of libertarianism is the kind that says, why shouldn't we have self driving cars, and why shouldn't we go to Mars and all of these things? And there are various forms of government regulation that stand in the way. So I am at least somewhat optimistic about Muskian influence in those areas. But I do still wonder, and maybe this is where we can come to a conclusion, right, is, you know, a political coalition that aspires to run The United States Of America for an extended period of time, something both political coalitions have failed to do, right, still at its heart needs a basic economic agenda that says, here's how we're on your side, Middle America. Here are the policy changes that we wanna make to create growth and create fairness both, to create opportunity, and to sort of sustain the American dream.

但我无法确定。我甚至不认为在可能的特朗普第二任期内，能梳理出堪比里根经济学或罗斯福新政的经济议程——那种能让多数美国人认同的纲领。根本上，特朗普正如你反复强调的，是依靠反左翼情绪构建了这个新近的'准多数'联盟。要使其成为特朗普或其他领导人治下的持久多数，必须向普通选民阐明：'这就是共和党政策的面貌，这就是它对你的助益。'

And I'm not sure. I'm I'm not just not sure. I I don't think that the second Trump presidency that you could sit down and say, here is the Trump economic agenda that is an equivalent of even the Reagan agenda or before that, the Roosevelt agenda that most Americans would recognize. I think fundamentally, Trump has built this new almost majority on, as you keep saying, anti left sentiment. And I think that to actually get to the point where it is a durable majority under Trump or any other figure, you would need to be able to say to the average voter, this is what Republican policy making looks like, and here's how it helps you.

而我认为我们离这个目标还很遥远。最后把发言权交给你。

And I don't know. I don't think we're really close to being there. I'll and I'll give you the last word.

有趣的是，我们开场时讨论的是9·11阴影下如何形成对国内政策的执着。如今审视特朗普任期将面临的政治经济辩论，焦点已转向如何应对中国挑战及中美经济深度捆绑的地缘政治危机。或许未来关键不在于重构美国阶级体系或纠正社会分层的理想，而在于我们如何在准战时经济状态下被迫重塑美国经济——这正是我深夜常思考的问题。此外，这个联盟令我振奋的特质在于其种族构成的演变，这点我们已讨论过。

Well, one strange bookend is that we began by talking about how we came to our obsessions with domestic policy in the shadow of nine eleven. And when you're looking at the political economy debates of this moment and what will unfold in the Trump presidency, it is about another, set of geopolitical crises surrounding how to meet the challenge of China and our deep enmeshment, with China and Chinese economic growth. And it could be that it's not going to be primarily about our dreams for how we reorder the American class system, how we redress American stratification, but rather just how are we forced to remake the American economy in what could be a wartime economy. That's something that I stay up late thinking about a lot. And the other thing I'll say about this coalition that I find interesting and exciting, we've talked about the changing ethnic character of the coalition.

我真正感兴趣的——这也是我们传记分道扬镳之处——在于你所谓的精英主义选民。我对那些强烈反对DEI（多元化、公平与包容）的人、真正关心公共安全与城市混乱的人深感兴趣，这些人的影响力远超其人数规模。特朗普的总统任期会巩固这一群体的支持，还是重振的中左翼能赢回他们？在我看来，这是个极其有趣的问题，与我们讨论的诸多话题交织在一起。

I'm really interested in, and this is where our biographies diverge, in what you might call the meritocracy voters. I'm really interested in these people who really care about opposing DEI, let's say, who really care about public safety, urban chaos, and, who are people who are more important in their influence than their numbers. Will a Trump presidency consolidate support within this group, or will a reinvigorated center left be able to win them back? That to me is a really interesting question that intersects with a lot of what we've been talking about.

好吧，说到这里，我们几乎还没开始考虑特朗普第二任期的可能性。不过话说回来，特朗普的第二任期本身也尚未开始。所以我确信未来我们还有机会重温挥霍青春的日子，雷汉。现在，我只想感谢你的参与。谢谢您，先生。

Well, on that note, we've barely begun to consider the possibilities for a second Trump presidency. But then again, the second Trump presidency itself has not begun. So I'm sure that there will be opportunities for us to relive our misspent youth again again in the future, Reihan. And for now, I just wanna thank you for joining me. Thank you, sir.

本期节目由菲比·莱特、索菲亚·阿尔瓦雷斯·博伊德和安德烈娅·巴塔尼奥斯制作，乔丹娜·霍克曼编辑。事实核查团队包括凯特·辛克莱、玛丽·玛格·洛克和米歇尔·哈里斯。原创音乐由艾萨克·琼斯、索尼娅·埃雷罗、帕特·麦库斯克和阿曼·萨霍塔创作，混音由帕特·麦库斯克和卡罗尔·萨布罗完成。

This episode was produced by Phoebe Lett, Sofia Alvarez Boyd, and Andrea Batanzos. It was edited by Jordana Hokeman. Our fact check team is Kate Sinclair, Mary Marge Locker, and Michelle Harris. Original music by Isaac Jones, Sonia Herrero, Pat McCusker, and Aman Sahota. Mixing by Pat McCusker and Carol Saburo.

听众策略由香农·布斯塔和克里斯蒂娜·萨穆莱夫斯基负责，音频总监是安妮·罗斯·斯特拉瑟。别忘了在YouTube频道《有趣的时代——与罗斯·杜塔特同行》关注我们。

Audience strategy by Shannon Busta and Christina Samuelewski. Our Director of Audio is Annie Rose Strasser. And be sure to follow us on our YouTube channel, Interesting Times with Ross Douthat.