里德·哈斯廷斯 - 打造奈飞 - [像最佳投资者一样投资，第453期]

如果你能做到这一点，就像微软股东和董事会对萨提亚·纳德拉所做的那样，那么企业就会腾飞。

And if you get that right, as say Microsoft shareholders or board did with Satya Nadella, then the business takes off.

相比之下，世界上所有的建议都无足轻重。

And all the advice in the world doesn't matter compared to that.

如果你在董事会中，不要以你是否提出了建议来衡量自己。

If you're on a board, don't measure yourself by did you give a suggestion?

而应以你是否越来越为那极小的可能性做好准备——即你不得不采取重大行动。

Measure yourself by did you get more and more prepared for the small chance that you will have to take big action.

这就像消防员不断训练、不断演练，却希望永远不要发生火灾。

And so it's a lot like a firefighter who drills and drills and drills and hopes that there's never a fire.

当你为自己的企业挑选充当这一保险层的人时，你会看重哪些特质？

When selecting for people that would be that insurance layer for your own business, what did you select for?

因为很多董事会里都挤满了像你这样头衔显赫的人，他们作为董事的名字能为公司官网增光添彩，这似乎成了选人的标准，而不是真正能做好保险层工作的人。

Because a lot of these boards are full of very fancy people like you that are great names to have on a, you know, website as a board of directors and that seems to be a selection criteria versus like this person's actually gonna be good at this insurance layer thing.

你是如何挑选董事会成员的？

How did you select board members?

是的。

Yeah.

我选择那些我相信在危机中能保持明智的人，我们称之为极端的关怀责任。

People who I believe will be wise in a crisis, we call it extreme duty of care.

关怀责任是董事的职责之一，我们进一步强调，他们必须真正了解公司的情况。

So duty of care is one of the responsibilities of a director, and we amp it up that they really have to know what's going on.

我们要求董事参加管理层会议，以便观察事情的进展，亲眼看到事情是如何运作的。

We ask directors to come to management meetings so they can watch what's going on, watch the sausage being made.

再次强调，这并不是为了让他们直接创造价值，而是为了让他们获得充分的信息。

Again, not so they're adding value, but so they're highly informed.

因此，我们寻找那些在危机中能保持明智的人。

And so we look for people who are wise in crisis.

所以，董事会的面试过程会涉及这类问题：告诉我你经历过哪些商业危机，以及如果类似情况发生，他们能否做出明智的决策。

And so a board interview process would be those kinds of things tell me about different business crises that have happened and in case that happens that they would be wise.

当你全职经营公司时，你花在系统构建和业务思考上的时间，占了多少比例，而不是那些边际性的战略举措？

How much of your time when you were running the business full time was systems structuring and thinking around the business versus like the marginal, you know, strategic initiative or something?

我从不喜欢在日历上专门预留时间来思考企业文化。

I never like booked hours on my calendar to think about the culture.

你最终只是试图改进事物，观察哪些方面做得好、哪些方面不好，并做出观察。

You end up just trying to make things better and then watching what's going well and what's not and making observations.

举个例子。

Here's an example.

从大约2004年开始，我们实行了薪酬公开制度。

So from maybe 2004 on, we had open compensation.

基本上，公司前100到500名员工可以看到全公司的所有薪酬信息。

So, basically, the top 100 or 500 people of the company could see all the comp throughout the company.

这样做的理由是，他们可以确保类似职位的人薪酬相近，并且由于数据对所有人公开，能增强对性别及其他潜在歧视性维度的信任。

And the rationale was then they could keep like similar people in a similar vein and there would be more trust around gender, around other dimensions that could be discriminatory because the data was all out for everyone to see.

这些确实都成立，但同时也引发了许多琐碎的竞争。

That was all true, but it also created a lot of petty rivalries.

我赚了非常多的钱。

I make a huge amount of money.

另一个人赚得更多，还多了一万美元。

This other person makes a huge amount plus $10,000 more.

所以这变得相当分散注意力。

And and so it got pretty distracting.

最终，我们在大约十年后，2016或2017年，向副总裁们提出了这个问题，他们决定取消这一制度，不再让所有人可见，而是回归传统做法：只让直属下属及其团队可见，而不是整个公司。

And ultimately, we put it to a question of the VPs about 10 later, twenty sixteen, seventeen, and they decided to take it away from themselves and from everybody else and do the traditional, you know, your direct reports and their teams, but not the whole company.

所以，我会说这是一次关于人性的实验，结果明确地走向了更少特立独行的方向，但最终运作得更好了一些。

So I would say that was an experiment in human nature, which got resolved pretty decisively to be less maverick y, but it ended up working a little better.

所以，我们再次以实验的态度对待事物。

So, again, we would take on an experimental view on things.

这是个很好的例子，因为它让我们明白，我们并不是天才。

And that's a good example because then you can see, like, we're not geniuses.

我们只是愿意质疑事物并去尝试。

We're just willing to question things and try them.

因此，我们实行了薪酬公开制度多年，后来决定其净成本是负面的。

So we did open comp for a number of years and then decided that its net costs were negative.

另一个让我一直对Netflix感到好奇的战略问题是，你们如何决定在原创内容上投入多少资金。

Another strategic question that always fascinated me about Netflix was how you determined how much to spend on originals and original content.

尽可能多。

As much as we possibly could.

再多说说这里的核心计算或思考方式吧。

Say more about just the core calculus or thinking there.

我敢肯定，会有一些导演愿意接受你们无限的资金来制作作品。

I'm sure there would be some directors that would accept an unlimited amount of your money to make something.

每部剧集能花多少钱？

There's how much on any one show?

是的。

Yeah.

这是个不同的问题。

That's a different question.

是的。

Yeah.

但从总预算来看，我们总是尽力把钱投入到其中，希望打造出下一个伟大的韩流《恶魔猎人》。

But in terms of the total budget, we would always try to shovel money into that on the hopes of creating the great next k pop demon hunters.

至于单个剧集，问题在于，根据我们所看到的，这部剧有多大可能成为爆款？

In terms of any one show, then the question is, what's the likelihood based on what we've seen that this is gonna be big?

而且这也是一个竞争激烈的市场。

And it's also a competitive market.

我们最早推出的原创剧集之一，帮助我们建立声誉的是《纸牌屋》，当时我们不得不从HBO手中竞购下来。

In the very first original series that we had that helped make our reputation was House of Cards, and we had to bid that away from HBO.

所以在Media Rights Capital制作期间，HBO和我们都在出价，而那时我们还只是个DVD公司。

So as Media Rights Capital was making it, they had bids both from HBO and us, and we were not we were a DVD company.

明白吗？

Okay?

所以我们不得不比HBO出更高的价格，而他们最终选择了我们。

So we had to overpay relative to HBO, and then they went with us.

我们必须大幅加价，因为你知道，这风险太大了。

And we had to overpay by a bunch because, you know, it's a it's a lot of risk.

然后他们制作出了一部极棒的剧集。

And then they came through and made a fantastic show.

从此我们便全力投入原创内容。

And then we were off to the races and original content.

简单来说，这是否就像投资风险资本组合一样？你希望下很多注，不确定哪一个会成为‘K-pop恶魔猎人’，但关键在于，你必须拥有一个主导性的、庞大的IP？

And is the simple way to think about it almost like one would think about a venture capital portfolio or something that you wanna make lots of bets and you don't know exactly which one's gonna be k pop demon hunters, but that there being a k pop demon hunters is the thing that matters that you have some dominant massive franchise?

确实如此。

Very much so.

但这与风险投资类似，如果每一轮融资都是1亿美元，而且只有这一轮。

But it's similar to venture capital if every a round were a 100,000,000 and there was just an a round.

因此，通常只有一轮资金用于制作完成。

So it tends to be pretty much a single round to fund the construction.

你确实会获得续集和其他选项权。

You do get sequels and other things you have option rights to.

但这正是与风险投资最大的不同。

But that would be the big difference from venture.

你的财务团队并不是在重大错误上亏钱。

Your finance team isn't losing money on big mistakes.

而是在一千个无人关注的小决定中悄悄流失。

It's leaking through a thousand tiny decisions nobody's watching.

Ramp 在支出发生前就设置了管控措施。

Ramp puts guardrails on spending before it happens.

实时限额。

Real time limits.

自动规则。

Automatic rules.

零应急处理。

Zero firefighting.

前往 ramp.com/invest 试用。

Try it at ramp.com/invest.

每家投资公司都是独特的，通用型人工智能无法理解你的流程。

Every investment firm is unique and generic AI doesn't understand your process.

Rogo 做到了。

Rogo does.

它是一个专为华尔街打造的AI平台，与您的数据相连，理解您的流程，并产生实际成果。

It's an AI platform built specifically for Wall Street, connected to your data, understanding your process, and producing real outputs.

了解更多，请访问 rogo.ai/invest。

Check them out at rogo.ai/invest.

从 OpenAI 到 Cursor 再到 Perplexity，最优秀的AI和软件公司都使用 WorkOS 在一夜之间实现企业级准备，而非耗时数月。

The best AI and software companies, from OpenAI to Cursor to Perplexity, use WorkOS to become enterprise ready overnight, not in months.

访问 workos.com，跳过枯燥的基础设施工作，专注于您的产品。

Visit workos.com to skip the unglamorous infrastructure work and focus on your product.

如果从内容组合的角度来看，除了这些，还有哪些关于企业内部对话的内容会让人感到意外，尤其是在组合早期发展阶段？

If you think about the portfolio of content, what else would surprise people about the conversations happening inside the business, especially in the early days of developing that portfolio?

在扩展过程中，哪些因素对您至关重要？我的意思是，现在有太多因素了，但在早期，您显然在做选择，这就像纸牌屋，而不是别的东西，而且存在权衡。

The considerations that mattered to you as you expanded it, I mean now it's so many things but in the early days, you know, you're obviously making choices, it's house of cards, it's not something else and there's trade offs.

哪些关于决策过程的对话，会让人对您最终选择的组合感到惊讶？

What would surprise people about the conversations that led to the portfolio that you ultimately chose?

对我们来说，一切围绕着强化品牌展开，试图弄清楚品牌应该是什么。

I mean everything for us was around reinforcing the brand, trying to figure out what should the brand be.

因此，有线电视网络由于必然性只能是窄众品牌，因为它们只有一个有线频道位置。

So the cable networks by necessity were narrow brands because they got one cable slot.

所以FX和Hallmark虽然都在做不同类型的内容，但品牌定位决定了内容类型，而这本质上非常小众，因为只有一个频道位置。

And so FX and Hallmark were both interesting doing different types of content, but the handle on the brand gave you the type of content which was inherently pretty niche because it had one network slot.

我们做的却是拥有所有频道位置的东西。

We were doing something that had all the network slots.

因此，我们花了大量时间思考：我们希望多少节目是Hallmark风格的、柔和的、轻松的、浪漫的、让人感觉良好的内容，多少是FX风格的、前卫的、暴力的、黑暗的，多少是喜剧中心频道的风格。

And so then we spent a lot of time thinking about how much of the programming do we want to be hallmark, soft, easy, romantic stories, feel good versus FX and be sort of cutting edge and violent and dark versus Comedy Central.

我们相对于行业的主要问题是，我们拥有如此广泛的内容选择。

Our main issue relative to the industry was that we had this incredible breadth of content to choose from.

对于任何一部新电影或剧集，除非它完全平庸，否则相比其他作品，变量实在太多了。

And on any new film or series, unless it's completely derivative, there's just so many variables compared to other things.

因此，最终你只能进行资产配置，即多少投入喜剧，多少投入剧情。

So it ends up you can do asset allocation, which is how much in comedy, how much in drama.

但在选片方面，最终靠的是直觉和人们的判断力，我们提拔那些屡次做出正确判断、拥有我们称之为‘绝佳品味’的人，而他们拥有的不止是品味。

But in terms of the stock picking, it ended up being intuition and people's judgment, and then we promoted those people with great judgment who got this right again and again and had, we call it a great taste, but they had more than taste.

他们还具备判断力，比如知道演员是否能表现到位，作品是否能在各种层面顺利成型。

They had taste in judgment about, know, would the people deliver, would this come together in all kinds of ways.

所以最终变成了靠人来挑选。

So it became just people picking.

然后就要思考每个领域该投入多少资金。

And so then it's trying to figure out how much money to put in each area.

而这些领域的负责人会自行决定如何最有效地使用这些资金。

And then the people in those areas would figure out how to best spend it.

当然，商业模式的另一面在于，内容的固定成本不变，而订阅用户基数不断增长，可以分摊这些成本。

The other side of the equation of course is the beauty of the business model is fixed cost for a piece of content and then a growing subscriber base across which to spread those costs.

但这要求你必须扩大订阅用户群体。

But that requires that you grow the subscriber base.

这两者是如何相互关联的？

How did those two interrelate?

你们从内容的固定投入中学到了什么，什么样的投入能带来出色、稳定且高增长的订阅用户？

Like what did you learn about what sorts of fixed spend on content would create great and reliable and high subscriber growth?

我喜欢微软和Facebook的商业模式，因为当时它们基本上只有一款主要产品，或者最多两款高度相关的产品。

What I loved about Microsoft and Facebook's business is they, at that point, basically had one big product or you know, maybe two highly related ones.

然后目标就是把这款产品做到营收500亿美元。

And then it was grow those products to be, you know, 50,000,000,000 in revenue on a product.

当我创办Netflix时，我想，幸运的是，我们可以把它做成一个真正庞大的产品，因为娱乐是一个极其庞大的市场。

When I started Netflix, I was like, well, thankfully, we can do this as, you know, one really big product because entertainment is an extremely large market.

基本上，地球上每个人都以不同方式观看电视，而观看故事是人类根深蒂固的需求。

Basically, every human on the planet watches television to varying degrees, but it's a deeply human thing to watch stories.

所以问题就变成了：我们能抓住其中多大比例的市场？

And so then the question is, okay, what percent of that could we capture?

即使到今天，Netflix在美国电视市场中的份额也大约是10%。

Even today, Netflix is about 10% of US television.

所以我们还有很长的路要走，而在国际市场上，份额通常更低。

So we've got a long way to go, and internationally, it's less than that generally.

因此，关于如何思考用户增长，我们知道，如果我们能制作出更好的电视内容，降低成本并提升点播体验，就会有巨大的市场空间。

So plenty of in terms of how do we think about subscriber growth, we knew that if we could produce better television, make it lower cost and more enjoyable being on demand, that there would be a huge market for it.

所以，当时我们的增长主要受限于产品品质——我们能制作出什么样的节目。

So it was kinda constrained on essentially product quality, what kind of shows do we have.

而现在，流媒体服务已经近乎完美，各竞争对手之间几乎没有差异。

And now the streaming is kind of flawless and not differentiated between competitors.

但过去十年里，我们的表现远优于同行。

But for a decade, we did it much better than our peers.

那另外的90%是指传统电视，还是也包括像在手机上观看YouTube这样的内容？

That other 90%, is that defined as just traditional television, or does that include, like, YouTube watched on

不是。

No.

YouTube约占12%，涵盖了体育、电子游戏以及电视屏幕的所有其他用途。

YouTube is about 12%, includes everything sports, video gaming, its uses of the television screen.

我的意思是，我们在手机端也面临竞争，但那里的份额非常小。

I mean, we compete for time on mobile phones too, but we're very small there.

这不是一个主要的使用场景。

It's not a big use case.

而电视方面，我们是一个重要的使用场景，但即便如此，占比仍不到10%。

And television, we're a big use case, but still, really, it's under 10%.

如果你认为这个百分比对Netflix的业务很重要，那么你觉得你与YouTube竞争的前沿或领域是什么？

If you think about that percentage as an important thing for Netflix the business, what are the competitive frontiers or fields on which you feel like you're competing against something like YouTube?

与有线电视或网络节目之类的东西相比，这种竞争更容易想象。

It's more easy to imagine versus cable or network shows or something like this.

但与YouTube这种纯粹的用户生成内容平台相比，你会这样看待竞争吗？即我们与它们竞争，因此我们需要采取某些措施来取胜？

But versus something like YouTube that's sort of a pure UGC platform, do you think about it that way, like we are competing against them and therefore we wanna do certain things to win?

它们在增长，我们也在增长，而传统的线性电视正在萎缩。

Well, they're growing and we're growing and traditional linear is shrinking.

所以你说得对，我们主要都是与传统电视竞争。

So you're right that mostly we both compete with linear TV.

但我们确实担心YouTube，因为它构成了一种替代性威胁。

But we do worry about YouTube because it's sort of a substitution threat.

随着AI创作者的发展，情况是否会变得越来越好，占据人们越来越多的时间，这就是用户生成内容的世界。

Does it get better and better with AI creators, and it just becomes more and more of people's time, and that's the user generated world.

但这其实并不是用户生成的内容。

And it's not really user generated.

这是按风险制作的。

It's on spec.

也就是说，有一些非常专业的创作者为YouTube制作内容，但他们事先拿不到报酬。

That is, there are some very professional people who make content for YouTube, but they don't get paid on it in advance.

然后他们上传内容，看看能获得多少广告收入。

Then they put it up and they see what kind of ad revenues they get.

而我们的做法是，提前为节目注资，这给了创作者更大的预算，他们不必冒险制作，这才是商业模式上最大的不同。

So in our case, you know, we prefund the programs, which gives them a bigger budget, they don't have to do it on spec, and that's really the biggest difference in the business model.

但最终，我们是否要制作像刚刚上映、斩获多项大奖、上个月成为排名第一的纪录片《完美的邻居》这样的内容？

But it's ultimately, do we produce content like the perfect neighbors documentary that just came out, won all these awards, and it's been the number one documentary this last month.

像这样富有创意、视角新颖的内容，或者像今年夏天大热的K-pop《恶魔猎人》？

You know, clever, fresh perspective content like that or K pop Demon Hunters, which was our hit this summer.

所以，关键是能够创造出这些热门作品。

So, know, it's ability to create those hits.

那股魔力是什么？

What is that magic?

像泰德这样的人，以及那些能够长期稳定参与打造这些热门作品的人，他们之间有什么共同点？

Like, what is shared amongst the people like Ted and others that have been able to reliably and consistently be a part of creating those big hits over time?

要是能可靠且稳定就好了。

If only it were reliable and consistent.

K-pop 可能是我们制作的第三十部动画电影了。

K pop was probably our thirtieth animated film.

所以这完全不可靠，也不稳定。

So it's not at all reliable and consistent.

没错。

No.

这更像艺术，需要看到反主流的视角和故事是什么。

It is a lot more like that of art and seeing the contrarian edge and what's the story.

我的意思是，想象一下《K-pop恶魔猎人》的提案。

I mean, imagine the pitch for k pop demon hunters.

对吧？

Right?

你知道的？

You know?

所以它并不符合一套固定的公式。

So it doesn't fit a set of formulas.

因此，从这个角度看，它确实很像风险投资，少数公司会带来不成比例的回报。

So in that way, it is a lot like venture and also that a few of the companies will generate outsized returns.

你认为AI对奈飞业务最有趣的影响会是什么？

What do you think will be the most interesting impacts of AI on the Netflix business specifically?

这可能指的是内容制作的成本，也可能指的是服务本身。

And this could mean from the perspective of cost to create the content, it could mean for the service.

当你思考这项技术的原始能力时，你的想法是什么？

Where does your mind go as you think about the raw capabilities of of the technology?

视觉特效是一个有很多工作流程可以自动化的领域。

Well, visual effects is one where there's a lot of that workflow that can be automated.

但在剧本阶段或提案阶段识别出‘K-pop恶魔猎人’这样的概念——这是价值创造最大的部分——我们需要支持哪些东西，这将是一个遥远的技能。

But in terms of like recognizing a k pop demon hunters at a script stage or pitch stage, which is the biggest value creator, you know, which things do we back, that will be a far distant skill.

最终，人工智能可能会吞噬一切，并在所有方面都超越人类。

So eventually, AI might eat up everything and be better than humans on everything.

但就序列而言，要把人工智能看作并不特别倾向于进行长篇角色塑造，公司也不以此为目标。

But, you know, in terms of the sequencing, so think of AI as not particularly incented and the companies are not to do long form character development.

但在某个时刻，它们可能会开始做这件事并专注于此。

But at some point, they may do that and focus on that.

然后，人工智能将赢得布克奖，创作出世界上最优秀的小说。

And then the AIs will be winning the Booker Prize and doing the best fiction of the world.

请记住，我们只关心那些被写出来的故事中顶尖的百分之零点一。

And remember, we're only interested in like the top point o o o 1% of the stories that get written.

所以仅仅写一个故事，我的意思是，有一百万个电影专业的学生。

So simply writing a story, I mean, there's a million film students.

我们可以直接去找他们。

We could just go to them.

所以问题在于找到一个真正独特、非凡的作品，并及早识别出它。

So the issue is trying to find one that's really unusual, extraordinary, and recognizing that one early.

所以我认为，在AI影响到这一点之前，它已经产生了许多其他影响。

So I think AI will have had a lot of other effects before it hits us on that.

你能想象到节目形式或格式上的创新吗？

Can you imagine kinds of innovation in the form factors or formats of shows?

比如，我们现在似乎有几种类型，你知道的，有剧集、纪录片、全长电影。

Like it seems like we've got a couple, you know, there's the show, there's the documentary, there's the full length feature movie.

你能想象出越来越多不同类型的形式开始涌现吗？

Can you imagine lots of different kinds of form factors starting to proliferate?

让我们退一步，从反主流思维的角度来思考。

Well let's step back a second and think about contrarian thinking generally.

你很喜欢反主流思维，对吧？

So you love contrarian thinking, right?

但你必须记住，反直觉的思维方式大多数时候是错的。

But you probably need to remember that contrarian thinking most of the time is wrong.

而偶尔它是对的，那时你就能获得巨大的回报。

And once in a while it's right, and that's when you get the big reward.

但你得承认，大多数时候反直觉的思维方式是错的，而常规思维才是对的。

But you have to say most of the time contrarian thinking is wrong and the conventional thinking is right.

所以，以形式为例，人们一直在尝试思考多结局、自定义故事、短视频、Quibi这类形式。

So for example, on formats, people have been trying to think about multi ending design your own story, short form, quibi.

各种各样的形式都有。

There's all kinds of things.

对吧？

Right?

而电影时长在一小时半到三小时之间作为叙事形式，一直非常稳固，就像小说、短篇故事或电视剧那样持久。

And the enduring aspect of a film at one and a half to three hours as a story has stayed strong like the enduring form of a novel or the short story or the TV series.

所以这些形式触及了某种人性本质，而其他形式则不然，比如电子游戏就是一种完全不同的媒介。

So these things are tapping into something human that other things so you've got video gaming as a a different modality, and that's quite a bit different.

但像大多数你能够互动的电视剧混合形式，市场规模都一直很小。

But like most of the hybrids between TV series that you kind of interact with have been very small markets.

这并不意味着我们最终不会创造出一种完全不同的新艺术形式，但我认为这不像‘选择你的冒险’那样简单。

It doesn't mean we won't eventually come up with a new art form that's quite different, but I don't think it's as easy as choose your own adventure.

我们在看电视时处于被动放松模式，我们主要希望有人给我们讲个故事。

We're in lean back mode with TV, and we mostly wanted to tell us a story.

如果你想想小孩子，两岁的孩子，一半时间会说‘爸爸，给我讲故事’，另一半时间则是‘爸爸，陪我玩’。

And if you think of young kids, two year olds, half of the time they're like, daddy, read me a story, and half of the time it's daddy, play with me.

这两种是截然不同的模式。

And these like are two different modalities that are different.

一种是被动的，我再说一遍，我认为这非常符合生物学本能，是我们被自然选择塑造出来的，另一种则是高度主动的。

One is passive and I mean I again, I think it's very biological and we're selected for it and one's very active.

一种变成了电视，另一种则变成了电子游戏。

One of those becomes TV and another becomes video gaming.

我也对Netflix的技术基础和背后的故事——这种业务中看不见的部分——非常着迷。

I'm also fascinated by the technology backbone and story behind Netflix, this sort of invisible part of the business.

每个人都理所当然地认为，只要按一下按钮，就能看到这么美好的东西出现。

Everyone just takes for granted they can hit a button and have this beautiful thing pop up.

但我知道，背后其实进行了大量的建设工作。

But I know there's quite a lot of building that happened behind the scenes.

你能讲讲Netflix的这一部分故事吗？——为了让我们所享受的一切成为可能，在基础设施和技术上付出了怎样的努力？

Can you tell that part of the Netflix story of what it took infrastructure wise and technology wise to make what we all enjoy possible?

这一直是一种相当高的进入门槛。

Well, it's always been a sort of medium barrier to entry.

我想，首先是通过DVD，我们拥有令人难以置信的分类和发货设备，以及与邮政系统的整合。

I would say, first with DVDs, and we had incredible sorting and shipping machines and postal integration.

我曾经花大量时间研究各种聚碳酸酯塑料，哪些会碎，哪些不会碎。

And I used to spend all this time on types of polycarbonate plastics that break and don't break.

我们当时在工厂里 impress 人们，我们最大的问题就是确保DVD在运输过程中不会破裂或受损。

And we were impressing plants and the biggest issue we had was that the DVD would get to you without cracking or shipping or being damaged.

它必须准时送达。

It was on time.

邮递员不会偷走它。

The postal carriers didn't steal it.

所以为了每天稳定地寄出一百万个红色信封，就像联邦快递那样，需要大量的机械设备。

So there was like a huge amount of machinery to shipping a million red envelopes a day consistently FedEx style.

对吧？

Right?

然后，将数据流传输给用户的技术机制也颇具挑战性。

And then certainly streaming the mechanics of getting the bits to people was challenging.

我们最早在2007年上线。

We first launched in 2007.

在接下来的十五年里，互联网带宽不足，我们必须进行大量巧妙的工程设计。

And for probably fifteen years, the Internet was underpowered and you had to do a lot of clever engineering things.

但如今，有大约一百家公司都在进行流媒体服务。

But for the most part, there's a 100 companies that stream now.

消费者其实很难分辨它们之间的区别。

Consumers can't particularly tell a difference between them.

所以我会说，这现在已经成为了基础系统的一部分，并且实现了商品化。

So I would say that's now just become part of the base systems and commoditized.

独特之处仍然在于能够进行AI推荐，以及深入的深度学习。

What's unique is still being able to do the AI recommendations, all the deep learning on.

奈飞上有上千部你可能会喜欢的内容，但你在什么时候最想看哪一部呢？

There's a thousand things on Netflix you would enjoy, which one would you enjoy most at what time?

这仍然是技术创新的重要领域。

That's still a big area of tech innovation.

游戏方面，我们正试图推动不同类型的游戏，并探索游戏业务，除了电视剧和电影之外。

The gaming is we're trying to push in a different types of games and figure out gaming in addition to TV series and films.

那为什么要做游戏呢？

Why do gaming at all?

既然你在核心业务上这么出色，而且还有很大的扩展空间，目前你才占10%，为什么还要涉足游戏呢？

Like if you're so good at the core thing, and there's room for scale, still, you're only 10%, why bother with gaming?

我们以前只做电影，后来扩展到了电视剧，非常庆幸做了这个决定，接着又拓展到了非 scripted 内容，比如《爱是盲目的》。

We used to just be movies, and then we expanded the TV series, and we're really glad we did that, and then we expanded into unscripted content, know, Love is Blind.

所以我们一直在拓展新的领域，游戏只是另一个娱乐类别。

So we've always been expanding in new categories, and gaming is just another category of entertainment.

因此，我们在电视上做了一些很酷的东西，让你的手机充当遥控器，虽然延迟较高，但非常适合派对模式类游戏，在这种社交互动中非常有趣。

And so we've got some cool stuff going on the TV where your phone is the remote control, which has higher latency but it's easy for party mode type games and it's really fun on these sort of social interactions.

你怎么知道什么时候该继续押注某件事，以及要多久才坚持下去？

How do you know when to keep betting on something and how long term to be behind something?

游戏就是一个很好的例子。

Like gaming is a great example.

我肯定你们尝试过一些最终没有成功、后来停止了的事情。

I'm sure there's examples of things you tried that didn't ultimately work that you stopped doing.

当然。

Sure.

那我们来谈一个这样的例子。

Well, let's do one of those.

如果你看一下2006年1月的《纽约时报》，就会发现当时推出了Netflix Friends。

If you look at the New York Times, January 2006, there was a launch of Netflix Friends.

这是朋友之间分享电影和观看内容的功能。

So this was friend to friend sharing about films and what you were watching.

那时Facebook还只在哈佛大学流行。

Facebook was still just at Harvard.

然后我们为此工作了两三年。

And then we worked for two or three years on that.

我们能让人们分享吗？

Could we get people sharing?

你们挑选了哪些DVD？

What DVDs were you picking?

你们能互相赠送吗？

Could you give each other?

我们尝试了不同的权限设置。

We tried different permission schemes.

后来Facebook开始做这种整合，你知道的，他们做了照片分享，你可以通过Facebook分享。

Then Facebook started doing that whole integration, you know, where they did photos and you could share via Facebook.

所以我们说，好吧，这就是问题所在。

So then we said, okay, that's the problem.

你不想自己搭建一个网络，所以我们全都通过Facebook分享吧。

You don't wanna set up your own network, and so let's all share via Facebook.

但那样也没好多少。

And then that didn't work any better.

然后我们尝试了一两种其他方案，但大概花了整整八年时间，这也正是我加入Facebook董事会的原因之一——试图更深入地理解社交将如何发展。

Then we tried one or two other variants, but it was probably eight solid years, and that's part of what got me on the Facebook board, which is trying to figure out more of this, how is social going to be?

最终，这个问题可能是由TikTok解决的。

And ultimately, that probably got solved by TikTok.

你如何看待TikTok？

How do you think about TikTok?

你对它有什么印象？

What are your impressions of it?

它就像以前的有线电视，你换台，只是麻木地换台，想找点东西看。

It's like old cable used to be, and you'd change channels and you'd just be there numb changing channels, looking for something to watch.

但事实上，总是不断有新事物的领导者出现。

But really, it was the head of the new thing constantly.

所以这触及了乐趣的那部分。

So it's hitting that part of enjoyment.

作为一项商业运作，它非常有创意且非常有效，但我会说，这不是我想花大量时间去做的事情。

Very creative as a business and all of that and very effective, but I would say not a thing I wanna spend a lot of time on.

当你担任CEO时，我想知道你是如何思考创造和维持商业实力的，这会带来自由现金流，进而影响自由现金流的配置。

When you were CEO, I'm curious how you thought about generating and keeping business power, which leads to free cash flow and then allocation of free cash flow.

这些似乎非常重要，尤其是在你已经实现了产品市场契合、开始增长并变得庞大之后。

Those seem to be, know, especially once you've got product market fit and you're growing and you're huge, those are really important things.

你花多少时间静下心来思考，我们的实力究竟来自哪里？

How much would you sit down and think about where does our power come from?

是规模吗？

Is it scale?

还是某种垄断性资源？

Is it some other cornered resource?

是一些不同的因素吗？

Is it some set of different things?

并指导决策以增强优势。

And guide the decisions to get more power.

这方面在你心中占多大比重？

How much was that like specifically on your mind?

优势就是指高于市场水平的利润率。

Power is a way of saying above market margins.

理论上，我们所有人都能获得大约6%的边际收益，但要获得高于这个水平的收益，是因为竞争对手难以复制你的做法，从而你能获得高于市场水平的利润率。

So the theory is that we can all earn a marginal rate of maybe 6%, but to earn above that is because it's hard for competitors to do what you do, and then you can get an above market margin.

所以我们确实花了很多时间思考这个问题。

So we definitely spend time thinking about that.

我们应该独家授权还是非独家授权我们的内容，以及在电视等领域的合作方式。

Which things should we license our content exclusively, non exclusively, our deals on televisions and those kinds of things.

他们常常想向我们征税。

They would often want to tax us.

所以，一个典型的电视制造商认为：Netflix，你们赚了很多钱。

So a typical television maker thinks, well, Netflix, you're making a lot of money.

所以，如果我把你们的应用放在电视上，我也想要30%的分成，就像苹果那样。

So if I'm putting the app on the TV, I want 30% like Apple gets.

好的。

Okay.

因此，围绕这个问题经常发生争执。

So there would be battles over that.

而所谓的权力，本质上是指：他们能否在没有Netflix的情况下销售电视？或者，如果索尼电视没有Netflix应用，我们会失去多少会员？

And then power was essentially, could they sell a TV without Netflix or could we how many members would we lose if Sony televisions, for example, didn't have the Netflix app.

这就是这种情况如何运作的一个例子。

So that's an example of of how that worked out.

亚马逊和贝佐斯以持续将资本重新投入业务、不断创造更多客户利益而闻名，Netflix当然也这样做。

Amazon and Bezos very famously for constantly reallocating capital back into the business to keep generating more customer benefit which obviously Netflix has done as well.

你们是如何思考公司生命周期中何时应该更多地收割利润、支付股息、回购股票这类事情的？

How did you think or would you think about the point in the company's life cycle to do more harvesting, to pay dividends, to buy back shares, to do this sort of thing?

我只是很好奇，你是如何思考你所生成资本的配置工具箱的，也就是你可以用这些资本做些什么。

And just, I'm so curious how you thought through like the capital allocators toolkit of the things that you could do with the capital that you're generating.

在大多数企业中，这非常重要，比如建造更多的仓库之类的。

Well, in most businesses, that's highly material, you know, building a lot more warehouses or something.

但老实说，对于Netflix来说，资本配置非常少。

But honestly, for Netflix, there's very little capital allocation.

只有总的预算和每部剧的预算。

There's the total budget and per show.

但我们最热门的剧集，比如《怪奇物语》，全年观看量还不到1%。

But the biggest shows we have, like Stranger Things, were less than 1% of viewing in a year.

所以我们有极低的集中度，预算分散在大量项目上。

So we have extreme non concentration and lots of different budgets and spread.

几乎没有长期性质的资本性支出。

There was very little CapEx of any long term nature.

利润率几乎接近自由现金流，我们一直用它来做股票回购，而不是积累起来。

Margins were pretty close to free cash flow, and then we just have always done buybacks with it rather than build it up.

相关的紧张点可能是盈利能力和何时实现盈利。

Probably the related tension was how profitable, how soon.

这并不仅仅是一个现金流问题，本质上是一个损益利润率的问题。

It wasn't a strictly cash one, essentially a p and l margin question.

我们决定的是，相对于利润率在35%到40%之间的有线电视，我们要保持较低的利润率，以便将更高比例的收入投入内容制作，从而在我们的收入水平下获得比以往更好的内容。

And what we decided is let's have low margins relative to cable, which ran at like 35, 40% margins so that we can invest a higher percentage of revenue into the content to have better content for our revenue level than we would otherwise.

这成为了我们经营业务的基本准则，至今他们仍在沿用。

And that became the fundamental lens that we ran the business and they still run it today.

你怎么知道是时候不再担任全职CEO了？

How did you know when it was time to leave being full time CEO?

因为格雷格和泰德已经准备好了。

Because Greg and Ted were ready.

我至少培养了他们十年，我觉得在新冠疫情结束后，他们已经准备就绪了；除非我打算再待十年去培养另一批人接班，否则这就是最佳时机。

I've been developing them for at least a decade and I felt like coming out of COVID, they were ready and then unless I was gonna be around for another decade and train a different set of people to take over, this was the time.

所以这完全是出于他们的准备就绪。

So it was really driven from them.

自从他们接手后，股价翻了三倍，而且他们表现得极其出色。

And since they took over, they've tripled the stock and, you know, they've done incredibly well.

随着您的业务增长，Vanta 会随之扩展，自动化合规流程，并为您提供安全与风险的单一信息源。

As your business grows, Vanta scales with you, automating compliance and giving you a single source of truth for security and risk.

了解更多，请访问 vanta.com/invest。

Learn more at vanta.com/invest.

Ridgeline 正在重新定义资产管理技术，成为真正的合作伙伴，而不仅仅是软件供应商。

Ridgeline is redefining asset management technology as a true partner, not just a software vendor.

他们已帮助多家公司实现五倍规模增长，推动更快的发展、更智能的运营和竞争优势。

They've helped firms 5x in scale, enabling faster growth, smarter operations, and a competitive edge.

访问 ridgelineapps.com，了解他们能为您的公司带来哪些突破。

Visit ridgelineapps.com to see what they can unlock for your firm.

我们迄今为止讨论的这些理念，如何应用到像您在 Powder Mountain 所做的完全不同的领域呢？

How does something like the set of ideas we've talked about so far translate to a totally different domain like what you're doing with Powder Mountain?

这看起来几乎在各个方面都是一个截然不同的项目。

Like it seems it's such a wildly different project in almost every way that I can imagine.

这非常非常不同。

It's very very different.

有多少可以直接迁移，又有多少需要因为项目性质的不同而被舍弃？

How much directly translates and how much needs to be left behind given the different nature of the project?

Powder Mountain 是位于犹他州的一座滑雪场和房地产开发项目，曾陷入困境。

So Powder Mountain is a ski mountain and real estate development that fell on hard times in Utah.

原来的运营者资金耗尽，因此许多项目都未能完成。

So the original people running it ran out of money, so they never finished a lot of the project.

我们恰好在那里有一栋房子。

We happen to have a house there.

我非常喜欢这个地方。

I love the place.

这里的自然美景简直令人惊叹。

It's, you know, natural beauty is insane.

它占地一万英亩。

It's 10,000 acres.

因此，在从Netflix退休后，我决定接管它，进行投资并实现转型。

And so after retiring from Netflix, I decided to take control of it and invest in it and do a turnaround.

于是，我们需要重建团队，重建愿景。

And so then it's rebuilding the staff, rebuilding the vision.

我认为，90%以上的 talent density（人才密度）、无规则的规则，整个模式都取得了极好的效果。

And I would say 90 plus percent of talent density, no rules rules, the whole model has worked extremely well.

以及快速行动的能力、招聘顶尖人才并让他们放手去做，每个人都充满创造力。

And the ability to move fast, hire incredible people, have them do things, It's everyone being very creative.

我认为，人才密度模式带来的痛苦是值得的，我。

And I would say the talent density model has been worth the pain, I.

呃。

E.

人员流动，而且在整个公司培养出了一群出色的领导者。

The turnover, and has created an amazing set of leaders throughout the company.

从一开始，你是如何规划和确立原始愿景的？

How did you approach it from the beginning in terms of the original vision and plan?

所以这是一个你介入并收购的困境资产，你是如何确定最初愿景的？然后执行的第一步是什么？

So it's a distressed asset that you go in and buy, how do you determine the initial vision and then what were the first couple steps to execute against it?

这是一系列获得控制权的交易。

It was a series of transactions to gain control.

花了六个月时间收购了公司大部分股份，从而获得控制权。

So it took six months to buy out a majority of the company, of the shareholders to have control.

每个人都希望这位亿万富翁支付高价，而我明确告诉他们，如果我不介入，这家公司可能会崩溃。

Everyone wants the billionaire to pay a lot and being clear with them that this thing could collapse if I don't come in.

这是第一阶段。

That was stage one.

第二阶段是弄清楚：这座山很棒，但如果其中一半变成私有，比如黄石俱乐部，而另一半保持上市，就能实现双赢——他们可以分担运营成本，提高效率，同时在公共部分打造一个非常不拥挤的度假村，从而解决滑雪行业长期存在的客流过载问题。

Then stage two was figuring out, okay, this is a great mountain, but if half of it were private, like Yellowstone Club, and half stayed public as it was, then it could be a real win win where they share operating costs and are more efficient, and we can then have a very uncrowded resort on the public side, which gets to something that's gone on in the ski industry, which is high crowds.

这样就能与之竞争。

So it gets to compete with that.

而在私有部分，则是建设一个由650户滑雪爱好者组成的社区，他们能拥有一个专属的巨型滑雪场，规模堪比黑山或瓦尔，仅供这600户家庭使用。

And then on the private side, it's building a 650 home community of ski lovers where they get their basically their own enormous ski resort the size of Heavenly or Vale just for the 600 homes.

所以这相当壮观。

So it's pretty spectacular.

关于推动滑雪业务的因素，除了房地产之外，你在研究其历史过程中发现的最重要变量或考虑因素是什么？

In terms of what drives the ski business, what aside from the real estate stuff, what are the most important variables or considerations that you've you've figured out in your studying of its history?

是的。

Yeah.

就参与人数和滑雪次数而言，滑雪的规模只有高尔夫的八分之一到十分之一。

Skiing is about one eighth or one tenth as big as golf in terms of number of people and playing.

我很希望缩小这一差距。

So I'd love to close some of that gap.

你知道，虽然很冷，但滑雪非常家庭导向，能让人 outdoors 和朋友在缆车上社交。

You know, it's cold, but it's very family oriented to get outdoors and social with your friends on the lift.

它具备一些类似的特性。

It's got some of those same properties.

有趣的是，美国有25,000个高尔夫球场，其中约20%，即4,000个，是私人高尔夫球场。

Interesting that there are 25,000 golf courses in The US, and about 20%, 4,000, are private golf courses.

私人高尔夫球场能让你获得更好的开球时间、舒适的会所氛围、社交机会，还能结识朋友。

And private golf courses, you get better tee times, the nice clubhouse atmosphere, social, you get to know people.

私人滑雪也是如此。

And that's really what it is for private skiing also.

美国大约有500个滑雪场，而不是25,000个高尔夫球场，但其中只有三个是私人的。

There's about 500 ski areas instead of 25,000, but only three are private.

黄石俱乐部、瓦萨奇海滩牧场和鲍德里。

Yellowstone Club, Wasatch Beach Ranch, and Powder.

因此，与高尔夫相比，这个市场非常未被充分开发。

So it's very underserved market relative to golf.

对你来说，最有趣的是什么？

What's most fun about it to you?

整个项目？

The whole project?

因为它非常偏向右脑。

That it's very right brain.

奈飞的一切都非常具有战略性和逻辑性，而且有很多强大的竞争对手。

Everything at Netflix was very strategic, logical, a lot of big competitors.

在滑雪领域，竞争对手之间非常合作。

In skiing, the competitors are very cooperative.

我认为这是因为你们之间相隔二十或三十英里，所以氛围更加融洽，也更具美感。

It's I think because you have 20 or 30 miles between you and so it's a lot more collegial and it's aesthetic.

我们取得的重大成就之一，就是为粉山打造了艺术景观。

The big wins we've done have been building up the art to Powder Mountain.

因此，这里有大量户外大地艺术，滑雪时穿过它们美不胜收。

So there's got a lot of outdoor land art that's incredibly beautiful to ski through.

所以，如果你有幸去过位于曼哈顿北部的风暴王艺术中心

So if you've had the good fortune to go to Storm King North Of Manhattan

太美了。

It's beautiful.

是的。

Yeah.

好的。

Okay.

想象一下在滑雪山上拥有风暴之王的景观。

So think of Storm King on a ski mountain.

滑雪

Skiing

在其中穿行，滑雪穿过它。

through And skiing through it.

跟我讲讲这一部分。

Tell me about that part of it.

那么，你是如何构想出这个想法的？又是如何执行的？

So how did you conceive of that and how did you execute it?

比如，你是怎么做到的，是的。

Like how do you Yeah.

人们如何获得像风暴之王这样的艺术作品？

How does one acquire Storm King like art?

关键是概念部分，我们想要打造一个滑雪场，并且实现差异化。

It's the conceptual parts, the key, which is we want to have a ski resort and to differentiate.

那么，夏天我们能做什么呢？

So what are we gonna do in summer?

你可以搞高空滑索和山地自行车，但这些都已经被人反复做过了。

Well, you could do zip lines and mountain biking, but it's like it's all been done over and over.

坦白说，这些活动刺激性强，但和房地产销售的匹配度并不高。

And frankly, it's high adrenaline and it's like, okay, but it's not that great a match for real estate sales.

但最重要的是，这些都太常规了，早就有人做过。

But most importantly, it's conventional, it's been done.

那么，什么是有趣、可扩展、很棒但还没人做过的呢？那就是艺术部分。

So what's, like, interesting and scalable and fantastic but hasn't been done, and that's the art part.

我以前去过风暴之王，但风暴之王占地600英亩。

And, you know, I'd been to Storm King, but Storm King is a level 600 acres.

所以它并不是在山上，而是户外雕塑，极其壮观。

So it's not like in a mountain, but it is outdoor sculpture and incredibly stunning.

所以，再次强调，这种综合思维促使我们尝试在山上实现这一构想。

So, again, it was that synthesis to then trying to do that on a mountain.

接着我们引入了策展人，推动项目开展，如今已有数十件作品入驻，还有更多即将到来。

Then it was building in the curators and getting the work going, and now we've got dozens of pieces already in and a lot more coming.

这一侧正逐渐成为我们夏秋体验的核心。

That side's really coming together as the heart of our summer fall experience.

你为什么决定将如此多的时间投入到教育这一领域？

How did you decide to focus so much on education as one of the buckets of your time?

我们谈到了鲍威尔山，但教育、特许学校等占据了你大量时间和慈善投入。

We talked about Powder Mountain, but education, charter schools, etcetera, is a huge chunk of your time and and philanthropy as well.

是什么吸引了你关注这个领域？

What was it about that sector that drew you?

我也很好奇，想听听你对这个领域存在问题的看法。

And I'm just curious for you to riff on the problems that you see in the space.

是的。

Yeah.

这很有趣。

It's interesting.

我大约三分之一的时间都花在了粉末山，因为那里让我感到快乐。

I I spend probably a third of my time on Powder Mountain because it's a joy.

在教育方面，我曾经是一名高中数学老师。

And then on the education side, I was a high school math teacher.

这是我大学毕业后的第一份工作。

It's my first job out of college.

因此，我一直以来都关心K-12教育，并在过去二十五年里在这一领域做了大量慈善工作。

And so I've always cared about k 12, and I've done a lot of philanthropy in that sector over the last twenty five years.

而新出现的重大方向是人工智能，因此很容易将这些结合起来，思考我们该如何应用人工智能。

And then the new big thing is AI, so it's easy to then put those together and how are we gonna apply AI.

核心愿景——正如你之前的嘉宾关于Alpha学校所清晰阐述的——是孩子们应该接受个性化教学，而不是由老师站在讲台上对全班授课。

The core vision, and it's super well articulated by your prior guest around Alpha School, is kids should be taught individually as opposed to having a teacher stand in front of a class and lecture to them.

这种以教师为中心、站在讲台上的工业化教学模式，我们需要用个性化辅导来取代它。

And that that industrial model of the teacher, the sage on a stage, we call it, needs to be replaced with individualized tutoring.

在人工智能出现之前，个性化辅导每年每个孩子的费用高达十万美元，普通人根本负担不起。

And prior to AI, individualized tutoring would cost you a $100,000 a year per kid, so out of reach of everyone.

现在有了软件，我们可以实现个性化教学，教师的角色则更像社会工作者，主要帮助学生进行讨论、社交和情感学习，处理更多人性化和情感层面的因素。

And so now with software, software, we we can can have individualized instruction, and the teachers become more like social workers where they're helping on discussion, social emotional learning, a lot of the more human and emotional factors.

但知识传授——比如美国内战的根源、如何做分数运算——正逐渐由软件承担，而且越快越好，因为这样能实现全球化普及，孩子们也能学得更多。

But the content transfer, what were the roots of the civil war, how to do fractions, that's all becoming software and hopefully as quickly as possible because then it's very global and because kids will learn more.

你认为我们最应该做什么来加速这一进程？

What do you think we can do to speed that up the most?

由于学校体系受监管，事物进展缓慢，这可能需要几十年时间。

It could take decades because of the regulated nature of schools, things move slowly.

我们能做些什么来加速这一进程？

What could we do that could speed that up?

它专注于那些真正帮助孩子更好学习的应用程序。

It's focused on apps that really help kids learn more.

它帮助家长认识到，他们都心存疑问：当AI到来时，我的孩子在六岁或十六岁时，未来职场会怎样？

It's helping parents see that they all wonder, hey, with AI coming when my kid's six or 16, what's gonna happen to them in the workplace?

他们需要比以往更多、更好的技能。

And they need more and better skills than ever.

而且，你知道，每个16岁的孩子都在用AI学习东西。

And, you know, every 16 year old is learning things on AI anyway.

所以要让他们更专注于这一点，而不是传统的课堂。

So it's having them be more focused on that and less on traditional classrooms.

当你想到课堂时，我们在K-12和大学里都使用它。

When you think about classrooms, we use it in k 12, we use it in college.

但在职场中，我们却再也不用了。

And then like in the workplace, we never use it again.

你学了这么多课堂知识，却在你的职业生涯中毫无用处。

You did all this classroom learning, and it has like no bearing in your working life.

因此，这实际上大大减少了孩子们在课堂上度过的时间比例。

And so, again, it's really driving the percentage of kids' time that's not in classroom.

正如乔所说，它帮助孩子们真正爱上学校，因为他们会继续热爱学习。

And as Joe says, it's helping kids really love school because then they'll continue to love learning.

而课堂的枯燥与挫败感正是问题的核心。

And the classroom and the boredom and frustration of that is at the heart of it.

我很好奇，当你从广泛的角度思考未来时，你对世界有着独特的视野。

I'm curious as you think about the future just broadly across all your interests, you've got a cool purview on the world.

你对未来的最大担忧和最大期待是什么？

What most worries you and what most excites you about the future?

我属于Anthropic阵营，认为讨论负面问题是有益的，不是因为我们认为它们一定会发生，而是因为如果我们坦诚地讨论它们，就能降低它们发生的可能性。

I'm part of the anthropic camp where it's good to talk about the negatives, not because we think they're gonna happen, but because we'll lower the chance of them happening if we're honest and talk about them.

所以我认为，关于AI的末日论或乌托邦论并没有太大意义。

So I don't think the AI boomer and doomer thing is that useful.

我认为我们都应该承认，AI确实存在一些相当重大的风险，但这些风险并非决定性的，人类或许能够通过利用AI在全球范围内提升生活质量，获得巨大的收益。

I think we all want to acknowledge there's some pretty significant risks, but they're not dispositive and that we humans may be able to capture tremendous benefit by harnessing AI for higher quality of life on a global basis.

我支持人类，致力于实现这一目标。

I'm on team human for making that happen.

但我想说，未来五十年最大的变数，就在于我们在这方面能做得有多好。

But I would say that's the biggest, you know, swing factor of the next fifty years is how well we do that.

你认为最大的风险是什么？

What do you think the biggest risks are?

短期风险包括失业、社会动荡和冲突。

Well, the near term risks are unemployment causes, societal chaos and strife.

如果你面临大规模失业，可能会出现激进政客承诺消除人工智能，从而导致社会不稳定。

So if you were to get a lot of unemployment, then you might get radical politicians promising to get rid of AI and that destabilizes society.

还有我们与例如中国之间的长期权力竞争。

There's the long term power competition between us and say China.

战争会不会变成谁生产更多的机器人？

And then, you know, is war become how many robots do you produce?

如果由于不信任，我们双方都不得不花大量资金在这上面，那将是很不幸的，一种新的冷战会吞噬大量的GDP增长。

And, you know, it'd be unfortunate if we both end up having to spend a bunch of money on that because of distrust, kind of a new cold war would soak up a lot of GDP growth.

而好处方面，我们将能够治愈疾病。

And the benefit side would be that we cure disease.

我们将获得核聚变，带来大量低成本能源。

We get nuclear fusion with huge amounts of low cost energy.

人类不需要工作那么多，也许根本不需要工作。

Humans don't have to work as much, maybe not at all.

他们可以去做一些事情，比如学习下棋，学习玩各种游戏。

They get to do things like learn chess and learn how to play all kinds of games.

你会为了乐趣而学习生物学，就像今天你学习下棋一样。

You learn biology for fun, like you learn chess today.

因此，自动化这一切并将其提升到下一个水平，有着巨大的好处。

So there's tremendous upside to automating a lot of this and taking it to the next level.

关键在于让人类始终作为这些成果的受益者。

It's just keeping humans on top as the beneficiary of them.

我对每次访谈的传统结束问题是相同的。

My traditional closing question for every interview is the same.

有人对你做过最善良的事是什么？

What is the kindest thing that anyone's ever done for you?

三十年前，我在一家初创公司工作。

Thirty years ago, I worked at a startup.

我当时是一名一线工程师，28岁，经常通宵工作。

I was a frontline engineer, 28, so I'm doing all nighters all the time.

我桌上总是散落着一堆咖啡杯。

I used to have coffee cups spread around my desk.

过几天就会变得又脏又乱，保洁员偶尔会来把它们全部清理掉，然后我再进来。

And over a couple days, it would get kinda ugly and messy and janitor every now and then would clean them all, and I'd come in.

他们清理咖啡杯的时候，我并没有太在意。

They'd be cleaning mugs, and I didn't think about it that much.

有一天早上，我醒得特别早。

One morning, woke up early.

那时候，你必须去办公室，因为电脑都在那里。

In in those days, you had to go in the office because of the computers were there.

你没法把电脑带回家。

You couldn't take them home.

所以我在凌晨4点35分去了办公室，走进去，去了洗手间，结果发现我的CEO正在洗咖啡杯。

So I went into the office at 04:35 in the morning, walked in, went into the bathroom, and there was my CEO washing coffee cups.

我看着他，心想：巴里，那些是我的杯子吗？

And I looked at him and I was like, Barry, are those my cups?

他说：是啊。

And he said, yeah.

我说：你一整年都在洗我的杯子？

And I said, have you been washing my cups all year?

他说：是啊。

And he said, yeah.

我说：为什么？

And I said, why?

他说：你为我们做了这么多，这是我唯一能为你做的事。

And he said, you do so much for us, and this is the one thing I could do for you.

我被他的谦逊、关怀和你问题中的善意深深打动了。

And I was just very moved, about his humility and his caring, kindness in your question.

于是我心想：天啊，我愿意追随这个人到天涯海角。

And so I felt like, god, I'll follow this guy to the ends of the earth.

哇。

Wow.

而这些简单的举动。

And so simple gestures.

天哪。

Holy cow.

精彩的故事。

Great story.

完美的结尾。

Amazing place to close.

非常感谢你抽出时间。

Thank you so much for your time.

我也很荣幸，帕特里克。

Real pleasure, Patrick.

如果你喜欢这一集，请访问 joincolossus.com，那里有本播客的所有集数，并附有精心编辑的文本。

If you enjoyed this episode, visit joincolossus.com where you'll find every episode of this podcast complete with hand edited transcripts.

你还可以订阅《Colossus Review》，这是我们每季度推出的印刷版、数字版和私人音频出版物，内容深入剖析我们最钦佩的创始人、投资者和公司。

You can also subscribe to Colossus Review, our quarterly print, digital, and private audio publication featuring in-depth profiles of the founders, investors, and companies that we admire most.

了解更多，请访问 joincolossus.com/subscribe。

Learn more at joincolossus.com/subscribe.

你知道微小的优势如何随着时间积累吗？

You know how small advantages compound over time?

这在投资中如此，在经营公司时也同样成立。

That's true in investing, and just as true in how you run your company.

你的支出体系就是你的资本配置策略。

Your spending system is your capital allocation strategy.

Ramp 默认就让这一切变得更智能。

Ramp makes it smarter by default.

更好的数据，更明智的决策，长期来看更优的经济回报。

Better data, better decisions, better economics over time.

立即前往 ramp.com/invest 了解详情。

See how at ramp.com/invest.

随着您的业务增长，Vanta 会随之扩展，自动化合规流程，并为您提供安全与风险的单一信息源。

As your business grows, Vanta scales with you, automating compliance and giving you a single source of truth for security and risk.

了解更多，请访问 vanta.com/invest。

Learn more at vanta.com/invest.

每家投资公司都是独特的，通用型人工智能无法理解您的流程。

Every investment firm is unique, and generic AI doesn't understand your process.

Rogo 可以。

Rogo does.

它是一个专为华尔街打造的 AI 平台，与您的数据相连，理解您的流程，并生成实际成果。

It's an AI platform built specifically for Wall Street, connected to your data, understanding your process, and producing real outputs.

了解更多，请访问 rogo.ai/invest。

Check them out at rogo.ai/invest.

从 OpenAI 到 Cursor 再到 Perplexity，最优秀的 AI 和软件公司都使用 WorkOS 在一夜之间实现企业级准备，而非耗时数月。

The best AI and software companies, from OpenAI to cursor to perplexity, use WorkOS to become enterprise ready overnight, not in months.

访问 workos.com，跳过枯燥的基础设施工作，专注于您的产品。

Visit workos.com to skip the unglamorous infrastructure work and focus on your product.

Ridgeline 正在重新定义资产管理技术，成为真正的合作伙伴，而不仅仅是软件供应商。

Ridgeline is redefining asset management technology as a true partner, not just a software vendor.

他们已帮助多家公司实现五倍规模增长，推动更快的发展、更智能的运营和竞争优势。

They've helped firms 5x in scale, enabling faster growth, smarter operations, and a competitive edge.

访问 ridgelineapps.com，了解他们能为您的公司带来哪些突破。

Visit ridgelineapps.com to see what they can unlock for your firm.