安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金谈股市崩盘如何重创美国

你好，我是卡罗琳·赫普克，为您介绍彭博社的全新股票异动报告。有太多大牌公司和股票需要关注，而我们的股票异动报告是了解每日哪些个股波动最大的最佳方式。股票异动报告包含简短的音频报道，时长五分钟以内，全天直接推送到您的播客订阅中。

Hello. I'm Caroline Hepker introducing you to the new stock movers report from Bloomberg. There are so many big names and equities to keep track of, and our stock movers report is the best way to find out which individual names are making the biggest moves every day. Stock movers consists of short audio reports. They're five minutes or less delivered right to your podcast feed throughout the day.

我们将为您带来当日股市最大赢家和输家的对话解析，并解读推动这些涨跌的新闻和数据。每日收听数次，掌握股市动态及其背后原因。只需在Spotify、Apple Podcasts或您常用的播客平台搜索“股票异动”。获取由彭博全球3000名记者和分析师团队提供的实时股票新闻与数据支持。请在您收听播客的平台订阅股票异动报告。

We'll bring you conversations on the day's biggest winners and losers in equity markets and explain the news and the data that's driving those gains and losses. Listen a couple of times throughout the day to find out what's moving equities and why. Just search for stock movers on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or anywhere you listen. Get the latest stock news and data backed by reporting from Bloomberg's 3,000 journalists and analysts across the globe. Subscribe to stock movers wherever you get your podcasts.

彭博音频工作室。播客。广播。新闻。

Bloomberg Audio Studios. Podcasts. Radio. News.

大家好，欢迎收听新一期的《Odd Lots》播客。我是吉尔·韦森塔尔。

Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. I'm Jill Weisenthal.

我是特蕾西·阿拉维。

And I'm Tracy Allaway.

特蕾西，这是我们近期多期节目反复出现的主题——当下这个时代，交易和投机已成为文化的一部分。我们知道股票在上涨，许多资产都在升值，但这与成为流行文化现象是两回事，而现在它确实成了流行文化。

Tracy, it's been a theme in a lot of our episodes lately, but we are in an age where trading and speculation it's just part of the culture. We know that stocks are up. We know that a lot of things are up, but that's different than it being part of pop culture, which it is now.

这是一种线条文化。人们时刻关注着行情走势线。

It's a culture of lines. Lines People going watch the lines.

真的觉得，如果你走在街上或地铁里，看到一个男人低头盯着手机，很可能他正在看比特币

Really think that if you're walking down the street or on the subway and you see a guy staring down his phone, there's a good chance that he's looking at a Bitcoin

比特币图表，不是吗

A Bitcoin chart, don't

你觉得呢？在任何时候？

you think? Any given moment?

嗯，这是比特币的特点之一。它波动性太大了。实际上有东西可看，有点像娱乐因素。但当然，当出现这种投机活动时，每个人都开始担心什么时候会结束？

Well, was one of the things about Bitcoin. It was so volatile. There was actually something to watch. There was like an entertainment factor. But of course, when you get this kind of speculative activity, everyone starts worrying about when's it going to end?

什么时候 什么时候

When's it When's

会崩盘？我有一个理论，没有人喜欢泡沫。基本上，如果有泡沫，就有两派人。嗯哼。一派是真的很懊恼自己错过了，另一派是真的很焦虑自己会错过顶部，实际上很少有人处于那种觉得‘哦，这真的很棒’的阵营。

to the crash? I have this theory that nobody likes bubbles. And that basically, if there is a bubble, there's two camps of people. Mhmm. One camp that is really upset that they're missing out on it, and one camp that is really anxious that they're gonna miss the top, and that there are actually very few people in the camp where it's like, oh, this is, like, really good.

我真的很开心。我真的很放松。

I'm really happy. I'm really relaxed.

那些准确把握时机的人想必对自己相当满意吧。

Who nailed the timing are pretty pleased with themselves, I assume.

而且这样的人大概有五个左右。你懂吧？这就是问题所在。事后总有人会说，我在高点抛掉了，感觉真好。

And there's, like, five of those people. You know? Like, that's the problem. Afterwards, somebody's like, I sold the top. I feel good.

是啊，完全同意。好吧，那么说说著名的崩盘。著名的崩盘。著名的崩盘。

Yeah, absolutely. Okay. So famous crashes. Famous crashes. Famous crashes.

我对互联网时代记忆犹新。但我们要讨论的那个市场环境我就不太记得了。

Remember the .com era very well. I don't remember the market environment we're going to talk about.

1920年代？不会吧？你完全不记得了？真替你感到羞愧。

The 1920s? No. You have no memory of that? Shame on you.

我对1929年印象不深。虽然读过约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷思的名著《大崩盘》，但现在有本新书讲述了1929年股市狂潮与崩盘的历史。我们将采访该书作者，这位让我激动不已的对话对象，其成就与敬业精神令我们所有人自愧不如。我们将与独一无二的安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金对话——《纽约时报》DealBook专栏创始人、《亿万》联合制作人、CNBC《Squawk Box》联合主持人。我刚刚借吉姆·克莱默开了个玩笑，假装从没听说过这个电视台。

I don't remember 1929 very well. I did read John Kenneth Galbraith's famous book, The Great Crash, but there is a new book out on the great stock market boom and then crash of nineteen twenty nine. We are going to be speaking with the author, someone I'm thrilled to talk to, someone whose accomplishments and work ethic puts us all to shame. We're gonna be speaking with the one and only Andrew Ross Sorkin, founder of DealBook at New York Times, co creator of Billions, cohost of some Squawk Box, CNBC. I made that joke via Jim Cramer on as if I'd never heard the network.

现在推出新作《1929：史上最大崩盘内幕及其如何重创一个国家》。安德鲁，非常感谢您做客OddLots节目。非常荣幸能邀请到您。

Now the author of nineteen twenty nine, Inside the Greatest Crash in History and How It Shattered a Nation. Andrew, thank you so much for coming on OddLots. Thrilled to have you here.

谢谢邀请。我感觉自己像个长期听众，第一次打电话进来。

Thank you for having me. I feel like I'm a longtime listener, first time caller.

太棒了。

Amazing.

谢谢。

Thank you.

所以这不是第一次有人写1929年了，加尔布雷思的书可能直到现在都是最……

So this isn't the first time 1929 has been written about, the Galbraith book it's probably like that was up until now, probably the most

著名的。那是本很棒的书，对吧？是的。

famous That was a great book. Right? Yeah.

是什么促使你回过头去写一本关于这个时期的书呢？

What was the impulse to go back and write a book about this period of time?

说实话，大约十年前，我写了《大到不能倒》。人们以前常问我，因为我写过关于2008年金融危机的书，他们会问我关于1929年的问题。但事实上我并没有真正的答案，因为我只是大概知道，就像今天大多数公众一样，知道当时发生了很糟糕的事情。然后我读了加尔布雷思的书。

To be honest with you, it was about ten years ago. I'd written Too Big to Fail. People used to ask me, because I'd written about the financial crisis of They'd two thousand and ask me questions about 1929. And the truth was I didn't really have answers because I sort of knew, I think, like most of the public today, that something pretty bad happened. Then I had read the Galbraith book.

但除此之外，我缺乏细节。说实话，我去度了个假。那就像是个书呆子式的度假方式。我下载了一些关于1929年的书到Kindle上，还带了几本纸质书，我大致翻阅了一遍。

But sort of beyond that, I was lacking details. And I honestly, I went on a vacation. It was like a nerdy vacation thing to do. I downloaded some books to Kindle, and I brought some more with me, all about 1929. I sort of poured through them.

然后我心想，为什么我不能从内心深处理解这些人物？比如，他们彼此说了什么？他们的动机是什么？他们的利益驱动是什么？谁和谁有染？

And I thought to myself, why can't I understand who the characters are, like the at a visceral level? Like, what were they saying to each other? What were their motivations? What were their incentives? Who was sleeping with who?

到底发生了什么？而且，你知道，我从小就喜欢迈克尔·刘易斯或吉姆·斯图尔特写的《贼巢》那样的书。

What was really happening here? And, you know, I grew up sort of loving books like that were written by Michael Lewis or Jim Stewart with Den of Thieves.

你提到了《难忘之夜》

You mentioned A Night to Remember

或者《泰坦尼克号的难忘之夜》就是一个很好的例子，这本书真的让事情感觉更人性化。

or A Night to Remember with the Titanic was a great example of a book that really sort of made things feel human.

对。

Right.

所以我想，你知道吗？有没有人，也许就是我，能不能为1920年代也做到这一点？事实上，我不确定我能。我认为这件事花了这么长时间的原因之一就是我一直都不确定。当我刚开始研究时，实际上，我去拜访的许多档案管理员都说，安德鲁，我们读过《太大而不能倒》。那种细枝末节的细节，太难找了。

And so, thought, you know what? Could somebody, and maybe it was me, do that And to 1920 the truth is, I wasn't sure I could. One of the reasons I think this took so long is was the entire time I wasn't sure. And when I first started it actually, I mean, started doing the research, many of the archivists that I went to visit with were like, Andrew, we've read Too Big to Fail. That kind of granular detail, it's just too hard to find.

顺便说一句，显然所有人都已去世，所以没有人可以采访。因此，你只能依赖信件、笔记、备忘录和记录稿。事实上，并没有两三个主要档案库可以让你去挖掘。所以，这变成了一个奇怪的长达数年的项目，将这些拼图碎片拼凑起来。

And by the way, all the people are dead obviously, so there's nobody to interview. So, you're really reliant on letters and notes and memos and transcripts. And the truth is, there wasn't like two or three or four major archives you could sort of go excavate. And so, this turned into this sort of bizarre, years long project of putting these puzzle pieces together.

我只能想象你为这本书做了多少档案研究。书中充满了细节、个性和大量的纹理。有没有哪个角色在这本书中特别突出？我读过关于查尔斯·米切尔的资料。他有点像反派，但到了最后，你的看法变得更加微妙。

I can only imagine how much archival research you had to do for this book. It is very filled with texture and personality and lots and lots of details. Is there a particular character that kind of stuck out to you in this book? I've read about Charles Mitchell. He's sort of the villain, but then towards the end of it, you have sort of more nuanced opinion.

所以我认为有几个角色。事实上，我还要说另一件事，因为我知道我们今天可能会谈到。

So I think there's a couple characters. And the truth is, I would also say one other thing because I know we'll probably end up talking about today.

是的。

Yeah.

就像今天的现代一样。当我开始写这本书时，我甚至没有想到今天。我真正想的是那时。我没有想到我是

Like modern day today. When I started writing this book, I never even thought about today. I was thinking really about then. I didn't think I was

因为如果这是今年的热门话题，那你真是选对了主题。但无论如何，

because if this is the top this year, you nailed the topic. But anyway,

但继续，所以当我研究这个时，这些角色对我来说，比如查理·米切尔，他经营了一家叫国民城市银行的银行，后来成为花旗集团，在我看来，他与他之间有相似之处，他实际上发明了现代信贷，让个人可以去购买股票。我的意思是，在我看来，当时他可能像今天的杰米·戴蒙一样有名。在某些方面，他可能是他那个时代的迈克尔·米尔肯。他甚至可能像雷曼兄弟的迪克·福尔德那样的角色。所以我对查理·米切尔很着迷，而他实际上是最难写的角色之一，因为真的没有档案。

But keep the so but as I was working on this, these characters to me like Charlie Mitchell, who ran a bank called National City which becomes Citigroup, parallels to me between him, he effectively invented sort of modern credit for lending, if you will, individuals to go and buy stock. I mean, to me, back then he would have been as famous as a Jamie Dimon of today. He might have been the Michael Milken of his time in certain ways. He might have been even like a Dick Fold kind of character from Lehman Brothers. So I was fascinated with Charlie Mitchell, and he was actually one of the hardest characters to really write because there really is no archive.

他没有保留自己的笔记。这实际上依赖于找到他参与的其他信件和档案。他曾是纽约联邦储备银行的董事，我第一次获得了那些美联储会议的记录，这确实为项目奠定了基础。我对约翰·拉斯科布着迷，对我来说，他就像是1920年代的埃隆·马斯克。他无处不在，无时不在，是哲学家国王，帮助运营通用汽车，真正在通用汽车创造了信贷，这彻底改变了美国。

He didn't keep his own notes. It was really dependent on actually finding other archives of letters and things that he participated in. He was on the board of the New York Fed, and I was able to get the minutes from those Fed meetings for the first time, and that really actually sort of grounded the project. I became fascinated by John Rascob, who, to me, is like Elon Musk in the 1920s. He was everywhere, all the time, philosopher king, helped run General Motors, really created credit at General Motors, which really changed America.

那实际上是人们首次开始使用信贷的时候。他继续炒股，涉足政治。他甚至试图以一种类似马斯克的方式破坏胡佛的声誉。然后他去建造了当时相当于太空船的帝国大厦。同时，我不知道他是否因此受到赞誉，但他在某种程度上确实提出了至少是倡导了五天工作制的想法。人们忘记了那时是六天工作制。

That's actually when people started taking on credit for the first time. Goes on to play the market, goes on to get involved in politics. He actually tried to undermine Hoover's reputation in sort of a musky kind of way, if you will. And then goes to build what was then the equivalent of a spaceship in the Empire State Building. And meanwhile, I don't know if he gets credit for it, but he really did, to some degree, come up with the idea at least, or became an advocate for a five day work week in People forget that it was six days back then.

他认为这将带来经济繁荣，因为人们会有

He thought it would be an economic boon, because people would have

出去花钱。

go and spend your money.

他们会去花钱。他们会买车。必须去玩，他们会有时间去各处，做各种事情。所以我觉得他非常迷人。最后一个人是卡特·格拉斯。卡特·格拉斯对我来说是

They'll go spend money. They'll buy cars. Have to go play they'll have time to go places, do all sorts So I thought he was fascinating. And then the last person, Carter Glass. Carter Glass to me Of

以格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案闻名。

Glass Stiegel fame.

以格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案闻名。他是弗吉尼亚州的参议员。顺便说一句，他帮助起草了导致美联储成立的法案。但他是他那个时代的伊丽莎白·沃伦。他多年来一直猛烈抨击一种叫做米切尔主义的东西，以及查理·米切尔和系统中债务与杠杆的创造将会摧毁它的观点。

Of Glass Stiegel fame. He was a senator in Virginia. By the way, helped create the bill that led to the creation of the Federal Reserve. But he was the Elizabeth Warren of his time. And he used to rail for years about this thing called Mitchellism And this idea that Charlie Mitchell and the creation of debt and leverage in the system was what was going to undo it.

加尔布雷思的书里谈了很多关于，我想想，它们叫什么来着？那是在共同基金之前。它们被称为什么？信托吗？

The Galbraith book talks a lot about the I guess, what are they? It was before mutual funds. What were they called? The trusts?

投资信托。

Investment trusts.

投资信托。但你的书里也大量讨论了这种零售杠杆的概念，基本上就是你描述的那样。你还提到他们会说，好吧，我们已经教会了人们可以通过保证金或信贷购买汽车或洗碗机。为什么股票不行呢？看起来他们确实在很大程度上将这种初露头角的消费观念移植了过来，就像是，没错，我们把它搬过来用吧。

The investment trust. But your book talks a lot about this idea of like retail leverage, basically, which is what you described. And you talk about they would say, okay, we've taught people that they can buy a car on margin or a car on credit or a dishwasher. Why not a stock? And it seems like they really trans a lot of people in industry really sort of transported this consumer notion that was nascent and just like, yeah, let's port it over.

我当时没有意识到这一点。我的意思是，经纪公司就像星巴克一样在街角遍地开花。在纽约

I didn't appreciate that back then. I mean, brokerages were springing up on the corners of streets the way they're like Starbucks Yeah. In New

真的很有趣。我总是在想这些实体场所，或者，比如，游轮上的经纪公司。就像是，走进去玩玩市场不是很有趣吗？

York really fun. I always think about these physical or, like, the brokerage on a a cruise. It's like, wouldn't it be fun to just walk in and play the market?

你提到了酒店里的休息室，女性专属的股票交易休息室，你知道，我现在会很乐意去那种地方。倒不一定非得是女性专属，但就是有个地方

You mentioned lounges in, hotels, women only stock trading lounges, which, you know, I would go for those nowadays. They don't have to be women only, but just a place

在那里你可以观看，但接下来的是，你走进去，给他们一美元，他们真的会借给你十美元。我的意思是，这就是我们这里讨论的情况。所以，当市场上涨时，这真的就像是免费的钱。我认为这是这种情况第一次真正发生。所以人们并没有完全意识到所有可能发生的事情，这么说吧。

where you you can watch with the next though is you would show up and you could give them a dollar and they would literally lend you 10. I mean, that's what we're talking about here. And so, when the market was going up, it really was like free money. And I think this was the first time this was ever really happening. And so people didn't fully appreciate all the things that were possible, let's just say.

这与当今还有一个相似之处，那就是股市很大程度上由人工智能驱动。对吧？当人们谈论人工智能的市场机遇时，它基本上是无上限的。它覆盖整个世界，就像是整个商业领域。

There's another parallel with today, which is a lot of the stock market being driven by AI. Right? And when people talk about the market opportunity in AI, it's basically uncapped. It's the entire world. It's like all of business.

而在20世纪20年代，人们说股票会上涨，因为全世界都在投资美国。

And in the 1920s, people were saying stocks were going to go up because the entire world was buying into The US.

我认为这非常正确。我其实要特别指出当时的一个科技故事，那就是无线电。无线电。它的股票代码是RADIO，公司是RCA。

I think that's very true. I would actually specifically point actually to a technology story back then, which was Radio. Radio. The ticker symbol was radio. The company was RCA.

顺便说一下，他们不仅拥有无线电技术，还拥有电视的专利。那就是当时的英伟达。我的意思是，那是那个时代的迷因股，因为人们都在投资这个我们都将体验的未来。他们并没有错，但难题在于，我记得经拆股调整后，股价在顶峰时达到了大约530多美元，而到1932年，它跌到了大约3美元。

They also, by the way, not only had the technology for radio, they had the patents for television. And that was the Nvidia. I mean, that was the meme stock of that era because people were buying into this future that we were all going to experience. And they wouldn't have been wrong, The by the conundrum is, I think the stock split adjusted at the peak was like got to 530 some odd dollars, and by 1932, it was like $3.

所以，有一件事我，你知道，显然，当提到无线电就想到RCA时，你会觉得，哦，它是当时的英伟达。英伟达赚了很多钱，而且每年赚得更多。不知道这能持续多久，因为其中一部分是他们投资的公司又回头来购买英伟达的产品。暂且不谈这个

So So one thing I was you know, obviously, when radio comes to RCA, you're like, oh, it's the NVIDIA of the time. NVIDIA makes a ton of money and it makes more money every year. Don't know how sustainable that is because some of that is them investing in companies which come back and buy NVIDIA. Setting that aside

供应商融资。

Vendor financing.

RCA当时是赚了很多钱，还是主要是对未来的兴奋？我们有20年代无线电的财务数据吗？

Was RCA making a ton of money or was it mostly excitement about the future? Do we have radio's financials from the 20s?

坏消息是我们没有。事实上，前几天有人问我，你有没有看过这些股票的发售说明书？我说，发售说明书？他们连宣传单页都几乎没有。我的意思是，就算他们有东西，也就是些随手散发的传单而已。

The bad news is we don't. In fact, somebody said to me the other day, did you ever get a chance to look at the prospectuses of these stocks? And I said, Prospectuses? They hardly had leaflets. I mean, and that's if they had anything, there literally would be leaflets that they would hand

你知道它们的市盈率是多少吗？市盈率

Do know their PE ratios going? The PE

很难获取真实信息。重申一下，这是在SEC（美国证券交易委员会）成立之前。那时的规则、监管和披露要求完全不像今天这样完善。

ratio It was is very hard to get real information. Again, this is pre the creation of the SEC. The kind of rules and regulations and just disclosures just didn't exist in the same way that they do today.

那你是不是偶尔会收到邮寄来的股息支票？你实际上有什么样的获取途径？

So would you just get like a check-in the mail for a dividend every once in a while? Like, what access did you actually have?

据我了解，你会收到邮寄的支票。实际上，很多时候并不会寄到家里。你得亲自去经纪行。有些情况下，他们会替你保管，有时会进行再投资或者记在账上。但具体如何处理股息，何时能拿到，我不太清楚细节。

So my understanding is that you would get a check-in the mail. In fact, oftentimes they wouldn't come in the mail. You'd actually go to the brokerage house itself. And in some cases, they would keep that for you and sometimes either reinvest it or keep it on like a ledger, if you will. But I don't know the specifics exactly of how you would deal with your dividend when and if you got it.

书中我很喜欢的一点是，你讲述了世界历史上各种人物如何沉迷于美国股市的故事。比如温斯顿·丘吉尔，早年间访美时，就对保证金交易非常着迷。想想看，他们可能会谈论格劳乔·马克思的保证金交易——格劳乔

One thing I really like in the book is all these different characters from world history, you telling the story of them getting really obsessed with The US stock market. So Winston Churchill, on an early trip to The United States, gets really into margin trading. Think they could talk about Groucho margin Groucho

保证金交易，对我来说也是个很大的惊喜。

margin me, was also like a great surprise.

那也不是我读到过的事情。

That was also not something I had read about.

我完全不知道温斯顿·丘吉尔出现在纽约。实际上，他在这之前就已经到过美国，但1929年10月在纽约时，他确实亲临证券交易所参观，当时这一切正在发生。他完全沉迷于交易，试图赚钱。当然，他最终像其他人一样亏了钱。

I had no idea that Winston Churchill shows up in New York. Actually, shows up in The US even before this, but in New York in October 1929, was actually down on the floor of the stock exchange visiting while this was all happening. He was totally engrossed in trading. He was trying to make money. He ends up losing money, of course, like everybody else.

市场彻底崩盘的那天晚上，他最终和所有主要银行家共进晚餐。同样地，我也不知道这件事，但你知道，格劳乔·马克思当时住在长岛。其实我不该说他住在长岛，据他儿子说，他基本上每天都泡在经纪行里试图挽回损失。最终当保证金追缴通知来临时，他不得不抵押房子来支付。

He ends up going to a dinner with all the leading bankers the night that the market completely and utterly tanks. And similarly, I didn't know about it either, but, you know, Groucho Marx was living in Long Island. And basically, I shouldn't say he was living in Long Island, but he would according to his son, he was really living at a brokerage house trying to retape every day. And he ends up having to mortgage his home to pay for the margin calls when they called.

《IVF颠覆：KindBody的故事》——一档关于承诺彻底改变生育护理的公司的播客。它像科技初创公司一样快速成长。虽然KindBody确实帮助女性组建了家庭，但也留下了一连串幻想破灭和愤怒的患者。

Introducing IVF disrupted, the KindBody story, a podcast about a company that promised to revolutionize fertility care. It grew like a tech startup. While KindBody did help women start families, it also left behind a stream of disillusioned and angry patients.

你以为自己终于找对了人，其实并没有。

You think you're finally, like, in the right hands. You're just not.

请收听《IVF颠覆：KindBody的故事》，可在iHeartRadio应用、Apple播客或任何你

Listen to IVF Disrupted, the Kindbody story on the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you

获取播客的地方收听。确实有人赚到了钱。回到我们开场时说的，虽然很少有人能赚钱，但有些人确实赚得了惊人的财富。你能谈谈杰西·利弗莫尔吗？

get your podcasts. Some people did make money. Going back to our intro, very few people managed to make money, but, some of them did in spectacular amounts. Can you talk a a little bit about Jesse Livermore?

伟大的杰西·利弗莫尔。关于杰西·利弗莫尔已经有很多著述。杰西·利弗莫尔是这本书中的一个角色。当然，我不知道是否应该为那些不了解结局的人剧透，但杰西·利弗莫尔最终于1941年在谢丽荷兰酒店开枪自杀。当时有很多人目睹

The great Jesse Livermore. There's been a lot written about Jesse Livermore. Jesse Livermore's a character in this book. Of course, I don't know if we should give away the ending for those who don't know, but Jesse Livermore ultimately shoots himself in the head in 1941 over at the Sherry Netherlands. There's lot of people watching

在这本书里开枪自杀

Shooting themselves in the head in this book.

书中有很多开枪、跳窗和其他事件。但你知道，杰西是个做空者，他在崩盘期间取得了惊人的成功。但事实是，他在20年代部分时期非常成功，但在27、28和29年的大部分时间里其实相当失败，因为市场持续上涨，他几乎破产。然后他在29年重新入市，赚了大约1亿多美元。但当然，像所有这类情感极其复杂的人一样，他最终很快又失去了这一切

There's a lot of shooting, jumping out windows, and other things. But, you know, Jesse was a short seller, and he was spectacularly successful in the crash itself. The truth was, though, he had been super successful in parts of the 20s and then was actually quite a failure in most of '27 and '28 and '29 because the market kept going up and he was almost out of business. And then he goes back in, in the '9, and makes something like $100,000,000 plus. But of course, like I think any of these sort of super emotionally complicated people, he ultimately loses it, I mean, quickly.

然后，你知道，又赚了一点，又亏了一点，再赚一点，最后却失去了一切

And then, you know, makes makes a little bit more, loses a little bit more, makes a little bit more and then loses, well, everything.

你说当你开始写这本书时，那是十年前的事了，所以并不是试图与当下做对比。尽管时机可能——如今很多人会说事情非常疯狂。我一直对此很好奇，因为当我阅读任何历史时，大脑总会不由自主地寻找相似之处。至少对我来说，就像'哦，这就像这个，这就像那个'。当你撰写历史的过程中，你有什么机制来避免过度类比诱惑吗？

You said that when you started this book, you know, you started a decade ago, so it was not about some attempt to make a parallel today. Even though the timing may things are very crazy these days, many people would say. I've always been curious about this because when I read history of any sort, the brain can't help but try to find parallels to the I think, at least for me, it's like, Oh, this is just like this. This is just like this. When you're doing the process of writing history, do you have any mechanisms in place to avoid the temptation to overdraw parallels?

因为这一定非常诱人——寻找那些感觉突出且与今天相似细节。这是当时的英伟达。这是当时的凯西·伍德。这是当时的某某某

Because that must be incredibly tempting to find the details that feel salient and similar today. This is the NVIDIA of the time. This is the Kathy Wood of the time. This is the whatever.

可以说是，也可以说不是。我认为直到两年前，当我接近完成时，同时也意识到当下正在发生什么，这些相似之处开始显得更加清晰和接近。实际上，三四年前感觉还没有这么相似，奇怪的是。但突然间，你开始看到他们在1929年 literally 进行的这些辩论——关于是否提高或降低利率，以及他们打算如何试图在纽约联邦储备银行内结束投机活动

So yes and no. I think it wasn't until two years ago when I was getting closer to being finished. And also sort of recognizing what was happening in the moment today, and the parallels started to seem clearer and closer. So, three and four years ago, actually, it didn't feel as similar, oddly enough. But all of a sudden, you're starting to see these debates that they're having in literally the 1929 about whether to raise or lower interest rates and how they're going to try to end speculation within the New York Fed.

在某种程度上，他们周围的政治压力，你会开始对自己说，嗯，这似乎有点……我最近听到很多关于这个的讨论。所以，我有点犹豫是否要过度强调这一点。是的。但我也意识到，我想象读者在阅读时可能会思考其中的一些事情。我们做出的一个特别决定，我记得和我的编辑进行了很多辩论，那就是我们绝不想在书中打断读者，把你从1929年拉出来，然后说，嘿，顺便说一下，这有点像那个，或者这有点像那个。

And to some degree, the political pressures that are around them, and you start to say to yourself, Well, that seems kind of I've been hearing a lot about that. So, I hesitated to sort of overdo it. Yeah. But I also was cognizant that I imagined readers who were reading it might think about some of these things. And one of the decisions we made in particular, I remember having lots of debates with my editor about was nowhere in the book did we ever want to stop the reader and take you out of 1929 and say, hey, by the way, this is kind of like that or this is kind of like that.

一些读者可能会自己看到这些相似之处或不同之处。有些人可能永远不会看到。有些人可能会想出完全不同的相似之处。老实说，我会很喜欢那样。

Some readers may see these parallels or different things themselves. Some may never see them. And some may come up with completely different parallels. And I would love that, frankly.

我有一个相似之处。好的。崩盘后不久发生的一件事是斯姆特-霍利关税法案。

I have a parallel. Okay. Something that happened slightly after the crash is Smoot Hawley.

对吧？

Right?

关税。今天，我们在特朗普政府领导下，面临着非常广泛、普遍的关税。

The tariffs. Today, we are in the Trump administration with very broad, widespread tariffs.

我最初写那部分的时候，可没料到会有这个。

That wasn't on my bingo card when I was writing that originally.

我很好奇，你认为随后的大萧条在多大程度上应归因于这类经济政策，而不是股市崩盘本身？

I'm curious, how much of the subsequent Great Depression would you attribute to those sorts of economic policies versus the stock market crash itself?

因此，我认为实际上在崩盘之后出现了许多糟糕的决策和连锁反应，这些才是真正导致我们陷入大萧条的原因。所以，我把这次崩盘看作是引发一系列事件的第一张多米诺骨牌，而这本书的前半部分主要就是关于崩盘本身，这些事件是构成大萧条的必要因素。当你想到所有糟糕的决策时，关税政策就是其中之一。当时的财政部长安德鲁·梅隆实际上在说，让这些资本家自食其果。他们是在投机。

So I actually think there was a lot of bad decisions and dominoes that came after the crash itself that really is what put us into the Great Depression. So I look at the crash, and really only the first half of this book is about the crash itself, as sort of the first domino of a series of things that were sort of the necessary ingredients to create the Depression. When you think about all of the bad decisions, the tariffs are one of those decisions. The idea that Andrew Mellon, who was our Treasury Secretary, who was effectively saying, Let these capitalists eat it. Were speculating.

让他们受苦吧。你知道，考虑到美联储当时确实做得很少，几乎袖手旁观，我认为很大程度上是因为美联储作为一个非常新的机构，人们忘了它成立于1913年，他们意识到了政治压力。如果他们被看到，他们不可能像沃尔克那样采取行动。他们知道存在投机行为。没错。

Let them suffer. You know, when you think about the fact that the Fed really did very little at the time and almost sat on their hands, in large part, I would argue, because the Fed was such a new institution, people forget it was born in 1913, that they were cognizant of the political pressures. If they were seen, they couldn't have pulled off a Volker like move. They knew there was speculation. Right.

但如果他们当时说，好吧，我们真的要提高利率，顺便说一句，这并不是说我们会失业。我认为他们实际上担心可能连美联储都不会存在了。所以，我认为所有这些不同的事情在某种程度上汇聚在了一起。我们谈到了金本位制。我的意思是，发生了一系列事件，最终导致9000家银行倒闭，失业率达到25%。

But if they had said, Okay, we're going to really just raise interest rates, by the way, it wasn't that we're going lose their jobs. I think they actually feared that maybe there wouldn't be a Fed. So, I think there was sort of a confluence of all of these different things. We talked about the gold standard. I mean, there's sort of a series of things that take place that lead eventually to 9,000 banks going out of business and unemployment at 25%.

说到美联储，这很有趣，因为如今有很多问题，比如我们在关注金融状况，关注实体经济等等。有趣的是，也许美联储在遏制投机方面做得不够，或者在某个时候没有采取足够措施来对抗经济下滑，但他们当时非常关注保证金贷款利率，将其视为工具箱中的主要工具之一。

It's interesting, speaking of the Fed, because these days there's all this question of like, we're looking at financial conditions, we're looking at real economy, etcetera. It's interesting how maybe the Fed didn't do enough to curb speculation or maybe at some point didn't do enough to counteract the downturn, but they were very keyed into the rate on margin lending as one of their main tools that they had in their toolkit.

所以，这是他们的大工具，或者说是他们认为的工具。然而，他们并没有真正使用它。因此，在1929年发生了一场引人入胜的辩论，当时他们坐在那里说，投机太多了。我们需要结束投机。我们该怎么做？

So, was their big tool or what they thought was their tool. However, they didn't really use it. And so, you had this sort of fascinating debate happening in the 1929, when they're sitting there saying, there's too much speculation. We need to end the speculation. How do we do that?

嗯，他们最终做出的决定实际上是向银行发出信件，说请停止向投机者贷款。

Well, the decision they came to effectively was to send out letters to banks saying, please stop lending to speculators.

道德劝说，对吧？

Moral suasion, right?

对此，银行家们说，你在说什么？你如何定义什么是投机者？什么不是？一些银行非常害怕，以至于实际上停止了贷款。这本身就是一个问题。

To which the bankers said, what are you talking about? How are you define what a speculator is? What isn't one? Some of the banks were so scared that they effectively stopped lending. That unto itself was a problem.

然后还有像查理·米切尔这样的人，顺便说一句，在那个时刻你会把他比作唐纳德·特朗普，他说，实际上请降低利率。所以我认为有一种迷人的动态你可以看到上演。再次强调，这些是一些细节。我不认为我理解了真正导致这一切的实质。

And then you had people like Charlie Mitchell, who, by the way, in that moment you would have compared to Donald Trump, saying, actually lower interest rates, please. So I think there was this sort of fascinating dynamic that you could sort of see play out. Again, these are some of the details. I don't think I understood the texture of what really led to all of this.

说到美联储，还有另一个相似之处。这可能有点牵强或延伸，但我感觉如今人们认为美联储可以为任何问题想出任何解决方案，对吧？我们看到他们推出了大量不同的计划，无论是公司信贷还是回购国债之类的。在1920年代，有一种感觉是美国已经战胜了繁荣-萧条周期，对吧？

There's another parallel speaking of the Fed. This might be pressing it or stretching it a little bit, but I get the sense that nowadays people feel that the Fed can come up with any solution to any problem. Right? We've seen them roll out tons and tons of different programs, whether it's for corporate credit or repo treasuries, that sort of thing. In the 1920s, there was a sense that America had beaten the boom bust cycle, right?

因为之前还有另一次崩盘，那是1907年。

Because there was another crash previously, which was 1907.

看，再次，我认为这是那种情况之一，因为1907年的经历——顺便说一下，那次是由J.P.摩根把一群银行家困在一个房间里直到他们想出办法来有效解决的——导致了一种过度自信的感觉。不仅仅是过度自信，而是某种人，某个群体的人，如果你愿意这么说的话，认为只要把合适的人聚在一个房间里，我们就能解决任何问题。托马斯·拉蒙特在此期间实际上在运营摩根大通。

Look, again, I think this is one of those things where, because of the 1907 experience, which by the way was solved effectively by J. P. Morgan taking a bunch of bankers and trapping them in a room until they could figure out what they were gonna do, led to a sort of sense of overconfidence. And not just overconfidence, a sense among certain men, men of a certain group, if you will, that if you could just put the right people in a room together, we could solve anything. Thomas Lamont was effectively running JPMorgan during this period.

J.P.摩根本人已经去世。他的儿子杰克名义上是CEO，但实际上是托马斯在运营事务。他是那种信徒之一。但我认为1929年以及市场上发生的事情离他们太远了，他们意识到最终他们无能为力，而且他们直到为时已晚才知道这一点。

JPMorgan himself had died. His son Jack was the CEO in name, but really Thomas was running things. And he was one of those kind of believers. But I think that 1929 and what happened in the markets just got so far away from them that they realized that there was nothing ultimately in the end they could do, and they didn't know that until it was too late.

所以1907年， literally 在我们崩盘的一百年前，即大金融危机，导致了所有这些过度自信，认为政府拥有无穷无尽的工具来阻止任何事情，然后我们到了你是'19

So 1907, literally a hundred years before our crash, the great financial crisis, that leading to all of this overconfidence that there is just an endless series of tools that the government has to stop anything, and then we get to You're the '19

你自己做一个平行对比怎么样

making your own parallel How

难道你不会吗？大脑就是这么运作的。我甚至不是在争论存在平行关系。我只是认为大脑自然会看到这些东西，我们无法避免。

do you not? Do you That's what the brain does. I'm not even arguing there's a parallel. I just think that the brain naturally sees these things and we can't avoid it.

顺便说一下，现在是'25年，所以我们还有四年时间。

By the way, we're in '25, so we still have four years.

四年，还有四年。我要...不。这不是财务建议，但四年时间，我要试着赚钱。等等，也许这个...我要问你点事。

Four four years. I'm gonna no. This is not financial advice, but four years, I'm try and make my money. Wait. Maybe this I'm gonna ask you something.

我不知道有没有...你可能甚至不想回答。这可能会成为Netflix上一部很好的电影或电视剧。哦，是的。

I don't know if there's you may not even wanna answer. This could be, like, a really good movie or TV show on Netflix. Oh, yeah.

是的。我觉得这很有镀金时代的感觉。

Yes. I thought it's very Gilded Age.

确实很有镀金时代的感觉。是的。我也有过这个想法。你能给我们透露点消息吗？

It's very Gilded Age. Yeah. I had that thought too. You gonna can you give us a little news here?

我没什么消息要告诉你。你知道，很幸运地

I don't have any news for you. You know, happily

《亿万》的联合创作者。

Co creator of Billions.

幸运的是，最近好莱坞有一群人一直在联系，而且正在进行一些对话。

Happily, there's a bunch of folks in Hollywood who've been reaching out recently, and and there's some conversations going on.

但是好吧。

But Okay.

没有消息，你知道，就是那种需要祈祷顺利的事情。

No news, and I you know, one of those of those cross your fingers kind of thing.

我们可以正式表示我们认为这会是一部好剧。

We could officially say that we think it would be a good show.

我们想要客串演出。

We want cameos.

是的。我们想要客串演出。

Yeah. We want cameos.

我们可以安排。特蕾西，这是一部年代剧，所以我们必须

We we can organize that. Tracy, this is a period piece, so we're gonna have to

我喜欢这个主意。是的。特蕾西可以扮演那个常驻的占星家。是阿尔冈昆酒店吗？他喜欢根据

I love it. Yes. Tracy could be the astrologer that hangs out. Was it was it the Algonquin hotel? He loves stock tips based The on

广场酒店。

Plaza Hotel.

给我们讲讲那个。

Tell us about that.

所以你说的是伊万杰琳·亚当斯。

So you're talking about Evangelina Adams.

是的。告诉我们

Yeah. Tell us

关于她是一位占星家，而且是一位在当时被各类金融人士极为严肃对待的占星家。JP摩根本人在去世前就以拜访她而闻名。她在卡内基音乐厅设有办公室，还会坐在广场酒店里，人们会前来与她交谈拜访。她还有一份通讯简报。顺便提一下，有趣的是，在1929年10月市场崩盘期间——人们并不总是意识到，崩盘其实是持续了好几天才发生的。

about She was an astrologer and an astrologer who was taken shockingly seriously at that time by all sorts of financiers. Before he died, JP Morgan himself was famous for going to visit with her. She had an office in Carnegie Hall, and she would literally sit inside the Plaza Hotel, and people would come up and talk to her to visit with. She had a newsletter. And then in, by the way, interestingly, in October 1929, as the market is crashing, and people don't always appreciate, the crash really happened over several days.

那不仅仅是一个糟糕的日子。她会举办这些几乎像降神会一样的活动，人们会来到她的办公室，那时她不再进行一对一咨询，因为来的人群规模太大了。

It was not just one bad day. She would have these almost like seances where people would come to her office, and she wasn't doing one on ones at that point because there was the groups were so big.

她是在召唤动物精神。

She was summoning the animal spirits.

是的。她当然是在祈祷股价上涨。有趣的是，她因为股市繁荣获得了许多赞誉，因为在1929年，我想就在九月的劳动节之后，一名记者打电话问她星象显示了什么，她告诉所有人市场将会上涨。

Yes. And she was praying for, of course, for higher stock prices. Interestingly, she got a lot of credit for the stock market boom because in the '29, I think right after Labor Day in September, a reporter called her and asked her what was in the stars, of course, and she told everybody that the market was going to go up.

是的。你在书中还写了另一件事，这可能又是一个潜在的相似之处，我想是当时技术所扮演的角色。我想到近期的银行业危机，迷你戏剧，不管你怎么称呼它，关于银行健康状况的谣言在社交媒体和私人聊天群组中传播得非常非常快。有些人认为这加剧了许多问题。在1929年的崩盘中，信息传播的速度有多快？股价下跌在交易所反映出来并传达给其他人的速度又是多快？

Yeah. There's another thing that you write about in your book, which again, could be a potential parallel, which is, I guess, the role of technology back then. And I'm thinking about the recent banking crisis, mini drama, whatever you wanna call it, where rumors about the health of the bank flew around really, really quickly on social media and in private chat groups and things like that. And some people thought that contributed to a lot of the problems. In the nineteen twenty nine crash, how quickly did information disseminate and how quickly were the share price drops actually reflected on the exchanges and communicated to other people?

极其缓慢。所以1929年的一大技术问题是，所谓的“大黑板”——纽约证券交易所——常常会滞后 literally 几个小时。因此，你可能看着黑板以为你知道比分，如果你愿意这么说，知道股票的价格，但它实际上可能已经滞后了几个小时。这还是指你本人就在交易所场内的情况。

Glacially. So one of the big technological problems in 1929 was that the, quote unquote, big board, the New York Stock Exchange, would often fall behind literally by hours. So, you could be looking at the board thinking that you know what the score is, if you will, what the prices of the stock is. But it would literally be hours off. And that's if you're physically on the floor of the exchange.

场内的人随后会打电话给全国各地的经纪行，甚至纽约上城，告诉他们这些数字。所以他们的数字已经过时得无可救药。当你看到1929年10月那些著名的照片，华尔街街道上成千上万的人，之所以有那么多人在街上，是因为人们亲自去了那里，因为他们想亲眼看看他们的投资到底发生了什么。因为你没法打电话给某人，没有应用程序可看，这本身就是一个真正的困境。顺便说一句，且不论在一些船上发生的事情，你知道，人们还在船上进行交易。

The folks on the floor were then calling all the brokerage houses around the country and even uptown in New York to tell them what the numbers were. So their numbers were hopelessly out of date. And when you see pictures of, you know, thousands of people on the streets of Wall Street, those famous pictures in October 1929, the reason there were so many people in the streets, people had gone down there physically because they wanted to see what was actually happening to their investments. Because you couldn't call somebody, there was no app to look at, and that unto itself created a real dilemma. Putting aside what was going on, by the way, on some of these boats, you know, people were trading on boats.

那些人大概花了半天到一天的时间。

Those guys were, you know, half a day a day.

他们正在派信鸽传信去

They're sending pigeon carriers to

嗯，获取杰西·利弗莫尔的最新股票信息，比如，他有自己的电话线路。对吧？他有点像他

Well, get the latest stock Jesse Livermore, like, he had his own phone lines. Right? He was sort of like He

就是那个城堡。

was the Citadel.

我本来想说他就是肯·格里芬，在宿舍里架设卫星，或者像后来那些试图通过微波塔获得更快交易所线路的人一样。他用电话线路做到了这一点。

I was literally gonna say he was the Ken Griffin setting up a satellite in his dorm or any one of these people who later on tried to get a faster line to the exchange with microwave towers. He did that with phone lines.

他用电话线路做到了，并且他还有自己的人实际在交易大厅，然后打电话把报价报回他的办公室，这样他就能比别人获得更好的信息。

He did with phone lines and his own people literally down on the floor that were then calling in the bids back to his office so that he would have better information than other people.

电话线路就是当时的林迪延迟。

Phone lines were the Lindy latency of the time.

是的，他们确实是。

Yeah. They were.

我就是这么说的。

That's what I say.

我是卡罗尔·马瑟。

I'm Carol Masser.

我是蒂姆·斯特内维克，邀请您加入我们的彭博商业周刊每日播客。

And I'm Tim Stenevek inviting you to join us for the Bloomberg Businessweek daily podcast.

现在，我们每天为您带来杂志的报道，帮助全球领导者保持领先。

Now every day, we are bringing you reporting from the magazine that helps global leaders stay ahead.

我们深入洞察那些塑造当今复杂经济格局的人物、公司和趋势。

We've got insight on the people, the companies, and trends that are shaping today's complex economy.

没错，蒂姆。我们全面覆盖全球商业、金融、科技新闻，所有内容都是实时发生的，并且我们对美国市场收盘有完整的报道。可以说，基本上，只要是影响金融市场、影响趋势和流行叙事的事情，我们都会跟进

That's right, Tim. We're all over global business, finance, tech news, all as it is happening in real time, and we've got complete coverage of The US market close. Gotta say, basically, if it impacts financial markets, if it's impacting trends and narratives that are out there, we are on

它。

it.

我们做这件事也乐在其中。《彭博商业周刊》还通过与我们的专家嘉宾对话，为您带来头条新闻背后的深度分析。

We also have a lot of fun doing it. Bloomberg Businessweek also brings you the analysis behind the headlines through conversations with our expert guests.

而我们

And we

在每个工作日都进行现场直播，然后在我们每日的播客中为您带来最精彩的分析。

are doing this all live each weekday, and then we bring you the best analysis in our daily podcast.

请在 YouTube、Apple、Spotify 或您收听播客的任何其他平台搜索《彭博商业周刊》。

Search for Bloomberg Businessweek on YouTube, Apple, Spotify, or anywhere else you listen.

下班回家的路上不妨收听一下，补上您在白天错过的精彩对话。

Check it out on your way home from work to catch up on the conversations that you missed during the business day.

而在周末，则可以收听它来获取您整个工作周的完整总结。

And on the weekend, check it out for a complete wrap up of your business week.

这里是彭博商业周刊每日播客。我是卡罗尔·马瑟。

That's the Bloomberg Businessweek daily podcast. I'm Carol Masser.

我是蒂姆·斯塔尼维克。请立即在您获取播客的平台订阅我们。

And I'm Tim Stanivek. Subscribe today wherever you get your podcasts.

好的。另一个相似之处。我直接说出来吧

Okay. Another parallel. I'm just gonna throw out

一个停顿。

a pause.

我喜欢这个。

I love it.

你可以同意或不同意。

And you can agree or disagree.

那时候的安德鲁·罗斯·索金是谁？

Who was the Andrew Ross Sorkin of the time?

哦，有了。当时有像安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金那样的人物吗？

Oh, there we go. Was there an Andrew Ross Sorkin of the time?

嗯，当时有一位亚历山大·诺伊斯是《纽约时报》的商业编辑。嗯哼。他是个相当受尊敬的人。所以，我觉得那样应该没问题。那就好。

Well, there was an Alexander Noyes was the business editor of The New York Times. Uh-huh. And he was a pretty respected guy. So, I think that would have been Okay. So, that's good.

我会接受那个。好的。有趣的是，有一位记者，就是

Would I would would take that. Alright. Interestingly, there was a a reporter Which is

很多时候并不是这样。

not lots of the time.

沃尔特·李普曼。

Walter Lippman.

哦，你知道吗，我下载了一本沃尔特

Oh, you know, I've downloaded a Walter

李普曼的书。沃尔特·李普曼是一位非常有趣的记者，因为他非常内行。他与摩根大通的托马斯·拉蒙特关系非常密切。有些人后来甚至当时可能都会说，关系太近了。

Lippman book. So Walter Lippman was a very interesting journalist because he was he was very insidy. He had a very close relationship with Thomas Lamont at JPMorgan. Some people might have said back then afterwards, too close.

好的。那不是

Okay. That's not

我们。不过后来他确实转身了，实际上，在大量这些事情曝光后，他确实开始追究他们。所以，不知道。但还有一点我应该说，我们作为一个群体，也就是记者们，并没有给自己增光添彩，部分原因是这些人中有很多都被实际收买了，比如用现金。我是说，这简直是操纵。

us. He then turned around, though, actually, after a lot of these things emerged and sort of really went after them. So, don't know. There But was a the other thing I should say, we as a group, meaning the journalistas, did not cover ourselves in glory, in part because a lot of these people were being paid off physically, like with cash. I mean, talk about manipulation.

当时没有内幕交易法。是的。人们真的会直接走到记者面前，别说请他们吃饭了。他们会说，这是钱，请写篇文章说某某股票明天肯定会涨，因为有些传闻。

There were no insider trading laws. Yeah. People were literally going up to reporters, forget about taking them out to dinner. They were saying, here's money and please write an article saying such and such stock is bound to move higher tomorrow because some rumor.

好的。所以另一个相似之处。继续说吧。现在人们谈论人工智能，你会看到这些图表，我总是说所有不同的人工智能公司之间有一种近乎乱伦的关系，某某公司从这家公司购买，然后又贷款给那家公司，一切似乎都形成了一个闭环。当你想到1929年的崩盘时，很多情况是企业发行股票是为了借钱，为了投资更多的股票。

Okay. So another parallel. Just keep going. People talk about AI nowadays, and you see these charts of these sort of I always say it's an incestuous relationship between all the different AI companies where so and so is buying from this company, and then they're lending to this company and it all kind of comes full circle. When you think about the nineteen twenty nine crash, a lot of it was businesses issuing stock in order to borrow money, in order to invest in more stocks.

那里有什么相似之处吗，那种自我——

Any similarities there, that sort of self I

我认为是

think it's

非常。循环

very much. Circular

嗯，如果你考虑这些投资信托，有很多投资信托变成了层层杠杆的叠加，它们就像俄罗斯套娃一样，你甚至不知道里面到底是什么。不过，我觉得目前还不能完全这样看待AI公司，尽管某些类型的交易和供应商融资安排可能确实应该引起质疑。但你其实可以看看加密货币领域，比如策略集团（Strategy Group）就是个有趣的例子，策略集团其实就是一个投资信托，本质上就是如此。

Well, if you think about these investment trusts, there were so many investment trusts that turned into sort of leverage upon leverage, they were like Russian dolls of and you didn't really even know what was inside of them. I don't know if I can look at fully at the AI companies like that just yet, though I think there are probably certain types of deals and vendor financing sort of arrangements that should be raising questions. But you could look at the world of crypto, actually. You could look at, you know, Strategy Group is an interesting mean, strategy is like an investment trust. That's actually what it is.

很多新兴的信托其实就是这样的。问题是

A lot of these trusts that are emerging, that's what they are. The question

这部分是以前的微策略（MicroStrategy），对于没太关注的人来说。是的。对于

portion This is erstwhile micro strategy, for people who haven't been paying attention Yeah. To the

以前的微策略，迈克尔·塞勒（Michael Saylor）。所以这些业务有相似之处。再次强调，我不想告诉你策略集团就是一个1929年风格的投资信托本身。我不确定。

Formerly MicroStrategy, Michael Saylor. So there are these businesses that have similarities. Again, I don't want to tell you that strategy is a 1929 style investment trust per se. I don't know.

我在开场白里说过。是的。你好像有所有这些关联。你还在做DealBook。还有其他一堆事情。比如，到底是什么

I said in the intro Yeah. You're like, have all these affiliations. You're still doing deal book. All of this other stuff. Like, what is

老兄，我们一起长大的。

Dude, grew up together.

我们 不。你就像 不。不。不。你到底是因为你还在做所有这些事。

We No. You're like No. No. No. What is your because you're still doing all of that.

我已经，比如说，削减了一大堆事情。我不再做电视节目了，等等。那么，你的日程是怎样的？

I've, like, paired back a bunch of stuff. I don't do TV anymore, etcetera. Like, What is your date?

我以前总是和你一起醒来，我以前会，

What's I used to wake up with you and I used to,

但后来我停止了，因为我累了而你没有。所以我想知道的是，告诉我你最近一天是怎么过的？你在忙些什么？

but then I stopped because I got tired and you didn't. So what I want to know is tell me about what's a day like for you these days? What are you up to?

所以我通常大约4:30左右醒来。我通常会做一些交易手册内容的最后一遍检查，直到大约5:10左右。哦，哇。

So I wake up usually around 04:30 ish. I usually do sort of the final pass on some deal book stuff till call it 05:10 ish. Oh, wow.

所以你直接就坐到电脑前了？

So you just go straight to the computer?

你等着起来就去。哦，是的。直接。没有没有。是的。

You wait up and go. Oh, yeah. Straight. There's no there's no. Yes.

不。闹钟一响，起来，起来，起来。然后我做Squawk Box节目，通常还在修改交易手册的内容，直到大约九点，通常都是坚持到最后。经常会上Morning Joe节目，可能在那里聊点经济学。然后回到交易手册的世界，规划第二天的通讯内容。

No. When the alarm goes off, up, up, up. And then I do squawk box, oftentimes still fixing things in deal book up And until the bitter that usually goes till about nine. Often go on to Morning Joe, maybe talk a little economics there. And then get back into deal book land as we plan out the next day's newsletter.

然后在所有这些事情之间，还要尝试写作，我有三个孩子，还要参与其他项目和事情。这是忙碌的一天，通常要到...

And then in between all of that, try to write this and, I have three kids and get involved in other projects and things. It's a busy day that doesn't typically end What till the end of the

你几点睡觉？

time do you go to bed?

我尽量去睡觉。我尽量在9:30前...

I try to go to bed. I try by 09:30. If I can be

那很合理。我可以在...

That's reasonable. I can be in

9:30前上床睡觉，这样可行。是的。如果拖到十点或10:15或之后任何时间...

bed by 09:30, this can work. Yeah. If if it gets to ten or 10:15 or anytime after that Yeah.

那第二天就会很艰难。

That's gonna be a rough day the next day.

第二天就不是个好日子。

The next day is not a good day.

好的。嗯，你以拥有广泛人脉而闻名，认识很多人。你最近听到什么消息？不需要指名道姓，但有什么风声？

Okay. Well, one of the things you're known for is, you know, you have a lot of access. You know a lot of people. What are you hearing right now? You don't have to name names, But what are you hearing?

关于市场的普遍看法，以及特朗普政府政策可能产生的影响。

General opinions about the market and maybe the influence of policy from the Trump administration.

哦，天哪。就我所知，目前没有哪位CEO对特朗普政府本身特别满意。我认识的大多数CEO都对特朗普政府的一些做法感到相当困扰。通常你不会听到这种声音，除了像肯·格里芬这样的人可能公开表达过某些观点，但在其他问题上当然会有所保留。话虽如此，我认为他们喜欢放松监管的理念。

Oh, goodness. So I don't know any CEO right now that is particularly thrilled with the Trump administration per se. I think that most CEOs I know are quite troubled by things that the Trump administration is doing. You won't normally hear that, with the exception of maybe Ken Griffin or somebody like that who's been somewhat public about some things, but of course, sort of modulated on others. Having said that, I think they love the idea of deregulation.

顺便说一句，我认为金融界人士喜欢特朗普正在做的某些事情，甚至包括财报方面。我认识的大多数CEO都说，我不想一年发布四次财报，改成两次就行。这正在形成一股风潮。在我看来，这与20世纪20年代有相似之处，我们当时谈论的是金融民主化，

I think the folks in finance, by the way, love the idea of some of the things that Trump is doing, even when it comes to things like, you know, earnings reports. You know, most CEOs I know say, I don't want to have to do earnings, you know, four times a year, I'll do that twice. You have a whole movement afoot. And by the this to me is a parallel. 1920s, we talked about democratizing finance, that

就像是

was like

一个重大概念。现在，这种将私募信贷、私募股权和风险投资纳入退休账户以及半流动性基金等的金融民主化理念，在我看来非常像1929年的情况。所以，确实有人喜欢这样，但我认为底层仍存在某种不安。

a big concept. Now, this whole idea of democratizing finance in the context of putting private credit and private equity and venture capital inside your retirement accounts and these sort of semi liquid funds and things, that's very 1929ish to me. So, I do think there are people who like that, but I think there's still this sort of underlying agita.

你能再多谈谈'国家分裂'这部分吗？这是什么意思？我们知道当时出现了大萧条。当一切结束时，是否曾威胁到国家的分裂？

Can you talk actually a little bit more about this shattered a nation part of it? Like, what does it mean? I mean, there was a big downturn. We all know about the Great Depression. Did it threaten to rip apart the country when it all ended?

嗯，所以我认为它最终确实几乎撕裂了这个国家，但我认为也许更强烈地撕裂了一代人的心理。我在书中没有讲述这个故事，因为我不确定是否合适，但我会告诉你。我的祖父当时11岁，他已在1929年去世。他的兄弟是个信差，1929年10月就在那里。

Well, so I think it ultimately did come close to ripping apart the country, but I think even maybe more powerfully ripped apart generationally a psyche. So I don't tell the story in the book because I didn't know if it was appropriate, but I'll tell it to you. My grandfather was 11 years old. He's no longer alive in 1929. His brother was a messenger boy, and he was down there in October 1929.

他过去常讲这个故事，当时他在帮他兄弟的忙，亲眼看到有人从窗户跳下去。他一直活到91岁，但一生中从未买过一股股票。债券可以，但绝不碰股票。他总是说，安德鲁，这整个股市的东西，嗯，不适合我们。

He used to tell this story, and he was helping his brother, and he watched somebody jump out of a window. And he lived till he was 91 years old, and he never bought a share of stock in his entire life. Bots and bonds, never stock. And he would always say, Andrew, this whole stock market thing Yeah. Not for us.

太冒险了。是的。

Too risky. Yeah.

所以，当我说粉碎一个国家时，我的意思是，我认为它在某种程度上确实几乎粉碎了一个国家的心理。它接近内战吗？没有。

And so, I when I say shattering a nation, I mean, I think it did, to some degree, come close to shattering the psyche of a nation. Did it come close to a civil war? No.

是的。

Yeah.

但显然，美国失业率达到25%，有棚户区，也就是所谓的胡佛村，就在中央公园里，离这里只有几个街区，然后在许多其他地方情况更糟，我认为对一代人来说，感觉就像国家破碎了。

But clearly, the idea of unemployment being 25% in America, that there were shanty towns, otherwise known as Hoovervilles, literally in Central Park, it was just a couple blocks from here, and then, you know, worse in so many other places, I think for a generation of people, it felt like a shattered nation.

是的。你在书中没有真正涉及1930年代之后的内容。但感觉确实花了很长时间才重建，我猜是对股市的信任。零售投资者大量涌入股市似乎直到1960年代才真正开始。

Yeah. You don't really go beyond the 1930s in the book. But it does feel like it took a very long time to rebuild, I guess, trust in the stock market. We didn't really see retail dive in a lot until, I guess, the 1960s, something

1960年代，没错。我认为是这样的。这在一定程度上反映了代际差异。你看，这本书没有涉及的另一部分是第二次世界大战及其后发生的所有事情，但实际上我认为，正是第二次世界大战最终导致了某种程度的繁荣重现——至少在美国是这样，显然市场也繁荣起来。我认为人们开始重新进入市场的原因是因为市场持续上涨，人们开始像往常一样看待市场。

1960s, like yeah. I think that's right. Think that goes a little bit to the sort of generational divide. Look, the other piece of this is the book doesn't go into, you know, World War II and all the things that happened after that, but that's actually, I think, coming out of World War II is what ultimately led to sort of the boom again, to the extent we had one in The US and obviously the market's boom. And the reason why people, I think, started to get back in the market was because the market kept going up and people started to look at the market like they always do.

当他们觉得火车要离站而自己还没上车时，就会想着我必须赶上这班车。

And when they think that the train is leaving the station and they're not on the train, they think I got to get on the train.

完全回到你之前说的。有趣的是这些CEO并没有真正畅所欲言，而一月份整件事就像是'终于可以自由发言了。我们可以再次交谈了。可以说出所有我们一直隐藏的事情了'。这有点糟糕，不是吗？

Totally back to something you said before. It's interesting that these CEOs don't really speak their mind when the whole thing in January was like, Finally, free speech. We can talk again. We can say all the things that we've been hiding. It's kind of messed up, isn't it?

你看，你认为应该实现真正的言论自由，让人们能够举手发言。

Look, you think that there should be real free speech taking place and that people could raise their hand.

对言论持开放态度。

A liberal attitude towards speech.

但我认为现在的问题是：代价是什么？有些人看到华盛顿正在发生的某些事情会说，我不喜欢正在发生的事。但如果我现在举手，如果今天举手，举手的利弊各是什么？我认为他们审视后会说，实际上几乎没有什么好处，因为此刻真正发生改变的可能性很小。也许等到选举或中期选举或其他时候会不同，我不确定。

But I think right now, the view is what's the trade off? I think there are people who look at certain things happening in Washington and say, I don't like what's happening. If I raise my hand now, if I raise my hand today, what is the upside for raising my hand and what is the downside for raising my hand? I think they look and say, there's very little upside actually, because the chance of real change in this moment right now is unlikely. Maybe when we get to an election or midterms or other things, I don't know.

而负面后果的可能性很高。我的意思是，从我们看到政府对待律师事务所、大学的方式，到派拉蒙CBS事件，以及入股英特尔等事情来看。我认为如果你今天是企业领导者，这会对你如何开展工作产生实际影响。每个企业领导者几乎都不得不变成政治家。

And the chance of, you know, on the downside is high. I mean, I think that between what we've seen the administration do to law firms, to universities, the whole Paramount CBS story, taking stakes in Intel and other things. I mean, think there's real implications if you're a business leader today about how you approach your job. Every business leader is almost have to become a politician.

是的。好吧。这是一个非常新闻化、经典、老套的问题。我有点不好意思，但你也是记者，所以别怪我。不。

Yeah. All right. This is a very journalistic, classic, cliche question. I feel kind of bad, but you're another journalist, so don't judge me. No.

如果可以的话，我想问，从1929年大崩盘中你能吸取一个教训，并真正向政治家、政策制定者、监管者、商界人士或任何人强调，那会是什么？

If you could, I guess, take away one lesson from the nineteen twenty nine crash and really emphasize it to politicians, policymakers, regulators, business people, whoever, what would it be?

每一次金融危机都源于一件事，那就是系统中的杠杆。过度的杠杆。实际上，你可以有投机者和所有你能想象的坏演员在舞台上做尽坏事。但正是杠杆使其失控。因此，你需要设置防护栏来防止这种情况。

Every financial crisis is a function of one thing, is leverage in the system. Too much leverage. You actually can have speculators and all the bad actors you want doing all the bad things you can imagine on stage. But it's the leverage that tips it over. And as a result, you need to have guardrails to prevent that.

因为人性的本质就是想要更多。对吧？这就是我讨厌说的投资者阶层。自我监管的想法非常非常困难。人们不会自我约束，他们就是不会。

Because the human condition is to want more. Right? That's what the investor class I hate to say it. The idea of self regulation is very, very difficult. People do not regulate themselves, they just don't.

所以，我们需要格外小心，尤其是在所有这些新产品被开发出来，以及其他我们不知道杠杆在哪里的情况下。对我来说，这将是最大的教训。而我担心的是，我们现在正处在一个时刻，实际上，其中一些防护栏几乎是被有意拆除的。

And so, we just need to be super careful, especially when there are all these kind of new products being developed and other things we don't know where the leverage That to me would be the single biggest thing. And my fear is we're living in a moment right now, actually, where some of those guardrails are almost purposely being taken away.

好吧，我们还有四年时间，直到1929年大崩盘一百周年。安德鲁·奥索金，非常高兴终于能在播客中邀请到你。这本书是一个很好的机会。真的很棒。

Well, we have four years between for until the hundred year anniversary of the nineteen twenty nine crash. Andrew Osorkin, so thrilled to finally have you on the podcast. The book is a great opportunity. It's really great.

我非常感谢

I really appreciate

它就在这里。你做了这件事真棒。大家应该都会非常印象深刻，都应该来看看。这是很棒的历史，我希望它能拍成电视剧。

it being here. Cool that you did this. Everyone should be very impressed, everyone should check it out. It's great history, and I hope it becomes a TV show.

谢谢。我希望我希望我能在1929年2月回到这里，如果

Thank you. I hope I hope I can come back here in 02/1929, if

不是更多。

not a more.

当然。然后是二十三号。是的。好的。

For sure. And then twenty third. Yeah. Alright.

那太棒了。我很感激。

That was fantastic. I appreciate it.

谢谢，亚历克斯。

Thanks, Alex.

非常感谢你。

Thank you so much.

特雷西，那真是太有趣了。我热爱泡沫历史。我们过去做过很多关于泡沫的节目。它们总是非常有趣。

Tracy, that was a lot of fun. I love bubble history. We used to do tons more episodes on bubbles. They're always really fun.

嗯，你

Well, you

知道这里提到了佛罗里达土地泡沫。

know the Florida land bubble gets mentioned in here.

我们做过很多关于那个的节目。现在这个真的很酷。我喜欢所有的流行文化元素，温斯顿·丘吉尔、格劳乔·马克斯。

We did a bunch of episodes on that. And now this is really cool. I love all the pop culture elements, the Winston Churchill, the Groucho Marx.

它只是一个

It's just a

真的，这是一个极其丰富的故事。这是一段极其丰富的历史片段。

really it's an incredibly rich story. It's incredibly rich piece of history.

是的。而且很有趣。你无法避免思考其中的相似之处。真的无法避免。我什么时候能看到我的日本异国兔子泡沫节目？

Yeah. And it is funny. You can't avoid thinking about the parallels. You really can't. When am I getting my Japanese exotic rabbit bubble episode?

等等。有没有或者任何时候。那是个泡沫吗？我之前不知道这个。

Wait. Is there or anytime. Was that a bubble? I didn't know about that one.

显然是的。还有绵羊。我也想研究新英格兰的绵羊泡沫。我想研究所有动物泡沫。

Apparently. And sheep. I wanna do New England sheep too. I wanna do all the animal bubbles.

我们来做吧。把它们都做了。好吧。有蝙蝠粪泡沫。我们还没做过关于它的节目。但另外一点是，我认为，你知道，2007年2月、2008年2月，那次大金融危机，那就像一个债务泡沫。

Let's do it. Let's do them all. Alright. There's the bat the guano bubble. We've never done an episode on But the one other thing too is I think, like, you know, 02/2007, 02/2008, the great financial crisis, that was like a debt bubble.

对吧？有一堆资产预期能全额偿还，但最终只偿还了90美分之类的，然后人们恐慌了，就发生了银行危机。

Right? There were a bunch of assets that were expected to pay back at a dollar on the dollar, and they paid back at 90¢ or whatever, and then people panicked and there was a bank.

但仍然有大量信贷与之挂钩。

But there was still a lot of credit tied to it.

肯定有杠杆作用。

There definitely the leverage.

债务被用作抵押品来

The debt was being used as collateral for

它。债务被用作抵押品。但现在看来，这感觉就像是一个股票故事。这是一个人人都想接触到任何事物的右尾，人人都想获得大丰收，等等。这让我想起了1929年的那种感觉，不同于某种房地产泡沫的概念。

it. The debt was being used as collateral. But it was right now, it just feels like it's a stock story. It's a it's a things everyone wants access to the right tail of whatever, and everyone wants the big score, etcetera. And that's what sort of 1929 reminds me of this idea, like, different than a sort of, like, housing bubble.

就是这种想法，人人都想要那些右尾的结果，包括温斯顿·丘吉尔和格劳乔·马克思。

Just this idea, like, everyone wants those right tail outcomes, including Winston Churchill and Groucho Marx.

嗯，你知道那些悲观主义者总是推特的图表是保证金债务图表。对吧？而且，我对此有所怀疑，因为保证金债务图表基本上在股票上涨时也会上升，但它现在处于历史新高。

Well, you know the chart that that doomers always tweet is the margin debt chart. Right? And, you know, I have doubts about that because the margin debt chart goes up when stocks go up basically, but it is at record highs.

总之，大家绝对应该看看这本书。

Anyway, people should definitely check out this book.

好的。我们就到这里吧？

Alright. Shall we leave it there?

就到这里吧。

Let's leave it there.

这是《全思播客》的又一期节目。我是特蕾西·阿拉维。你可以在特蕾西·阿拉维关注我。

This has been another episode of the All Thoughts Podcast. I'm Tracy Allaway. You can follow me at Tracy Allaway.

我是吉尔·维森塔尔。你可以在Stalwart关注我。关注我们的制作人卡门·罗德里格斯（Carmen Armen）、达希尔·贝内特（Dashbot）和凯尔·布鲁克斯（Kale Brooks）。更多《Odd Lots》内容，请访问bloomberg.com/oddlots。我们有每日通讯和所有剧集，你可以在我们的Discord（discord.gg/oddlots）中全天候讨论所有这些话题。

And I'm Jill Wiesenthal. You can follow me at Stalwart. Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Armen, Dashiell Bennett at Dashbot, and Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks. For more Odd Lots content, go to bloomberg.com/oddlots. We have a daily newsletter and all of our episodes, You can chat about all of these topics twenty four seven in our Discord, discord.gg/oddlots.

如果你喜欢《Odd Lots》，喜欢我们谈论二十世纪二十年代的崩盘，那么请在你最喜欢的播客平台上给我们留下正面评价。记住，如果你是彭博订阅用户，可以完全无广告收听我们所有剧集。你只需在苹果播客上找到彭博频道并按照那里的指示操作即可。感谢收听。

And if you enjoy Odd Lots, if you like it when we talk about the crash of the nineteen twenties, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad free. All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening.

在我们的新播客《每个人的生意》中，我们讨论与每个人都相关的商业新闻。

In our new podcast, everybody's business, we talk about the business news that concerns everybody.

我是彭博商业周刊的史黛西·巴尼克·史密斯。

From Bloomberg Businessweek, I'm Stacy Banik Smith.

我是马克斯·查夫金。

And I'm Max Chafkin.

每周，我们解读主街、华尔街和所有街道上发生的事情。摔角狂热已经席卷了美国经济。

Each week, we unpack what is happening on Main Street and Wall Street and all the streets. WrestleMania has taken over The US economy.

高管们在领英上写的诗。

The poetry that executives write on LinkedIn.

我们被低估的故事中蕴含着一丝真正的魔力

A little actual magic in our underrated story

这是音乐行业有史以来最伟大的营销活动。

of the great marketing campaign the music business has ever seen.

我决定问问大家对取消一分钱硬币的看法。无论您从哪里收听播客，都能听到各行各业的见解。

I decided to ask people how they felt about the penny going away. Listen to everybody's business wherever you get your podcasts.