奥弗拉·马吉多尔谈认知主义与道德模糊性

这里是《哲学点滴》，我是大卫·埃德蒙兹。还有我，奈杰尔·沃伯顿。《哲学点滴》可在www.philosophybites.com上收听。如果一个人慢慢失去头发，我们应该在什么时候说他秃顶了？模糊性的棘手问题在哲学中众所周知，但通常不会在道德背景下讨论。

This is Philosophy Bites with me David Edmunds. And me Nigel Warburton. Philosophy Bites is available at www.philosophybites.com. If a man slowly loses his hair, at what point should we say he's bald? The tricky issue of vagueness is well known in philosophy, but it's not normally discussed in the context of morality.

牛津大学的奥弗拉·马加多尔表示，这也适用于此处。本期《哲学点滴》是与模糊性和伦理学联合制作，这是一个由欧盟委员会资助、瑞典乌普萨拉大学负责的研究项目。

Ophrah Magadore of Oxford University says it applies here too. This episode of Philosophy Bites is made in association with vagueness and ethics, a research project funded by the European Commission and based at Uppsala University in Sweden.

奥弗拉·马吉多尔，欢迎来到《哲学点滴》。

Ofra Magidore, welcome to Philosophy Bites.

你好。

Hi.

我们要讨论的话题是认知主义与道德模糊性。让我们先从模糊性开始。认知主义本身也不明显，但你在这个语境下所说的模糊性是什么意思？

The topic we're gonna talk about is epistemicism and moral vagueness. Let's start with the vagueness. Epistemicism isn't obvious either, but what do you mean by vagueness in this context?

好的。我们以“高”这个词为例。我们知道身高一米的人肯定不算高，两米的人肯定算高。但中间有很多身高，比如一米八五的人呢？

Okay. So let's take a word like tall. So we know that someone who's one meters in height is definitely not tall, and someone who's two meters in height is definitely tall. But there are lots of heights in the middle. Like, you know, what about someone who's one meter eighty five?

这真的很难判断。他们似乎不算明显的高，也不算明显的不高。似乎我们无法通过获取更多信息来决定他们是否算高。正是这类情况让我们认为像“高”这样的词是模糊的。

It's really hard to tell. They don't seem to be clearly tall. They don't seem to be clearly not tall. It doesn't seem like there's any further information we could find out about them to decide whether they're tall or not tall. So this is the kind of case that makes us think that words like tall are vague.

他们存在边界案例，那些处于中间地带的情况确实难以判断，无法明确决定他们是否属于高个子。

They have borderline cases, cases in the middle where it's really hard to tell and it's not clear what would determine whether they're tall or not.

实际上即使是高矮，如果你在小人国或者幼儿园里，一个台地也可能算高的。

Actually even with tall, a mesa could be tall if you were in Lilliput or if you're in a, I don't know, in a kindergarten.

是的。这是个非常好的观点。所以这里确实有点复杂，对吧？我刚才在讨论高矮问题时有些过于简化了。

Yes. So that's an excellent point. So there is a bit of a complication here. Right? So I was a little bit over simplifying things when I was just talking about Tal.

也许我们需要明确具体采用'高'的哪种定义或解读。但有趣的是，即使我们限定在某个特定语境下，比如讨论这个幼儿园里的高个子，我们仍然无法确切知道要多高才算高，即便在这个非常具体的语境中。

So maybe we need to hone down which particular meaning of Tal or reading of Tal we need. But what's interesting is that even if we focus on one context, even if we talk about tall for someone in this particular kindergarten, we still don't know exactly what height you need to be to count as tall even in that very special context.

没错，如果我们让高个子站在房间一边，矮个子站在另一边，大致上能分对，但总会有些人可能不知道该站哪边。

Yeah so if we ask the tall people to line up on one side of the room and the short people on the other we get it roughly right but they're going to be some people who won't know which way to go probably.

正是如此。我们甚至不知道该如何正确指导他们分组。

Exactly. We won't even know how to instruct them to do it correctly.

那么从逻辑角度来看，我们是否应该接受这些所谓模糊概念的存在？它们没有精确的界限，一个人高或矮之间存在灰色地带。我们有很多表示这种模糊性的概念和说法。

So should we just accept that from a logical point of view, we just have these concepts which we call vague, and they don't have a precise cutoff where somebody's tall or short is a sort of gray area in the middle. We have all these notions of gray areas and similar phrases to denote that kind of vagueness.

好的，这是个非常精彩的问题，它巧妙地引向了我们标题中的另一个词——认知主义。确实，一些关于模糊性的观点认为，从这些案例中我们应吸取的教训是：对于所有中间难判的案例，根本不存在事实真相。并不是说这个人既不高也不矮。明白吗？问题在于这与我们从经典逻辑和数学中所知的一切相冲突。

Okay, so that's a really excellent question and it's sort of very helpful segue into the other word in our title epistemicism. So certainly some views of vagueness think the lesson we should learn from these cases is that for all these difficult cases in the middle there's just no fact of the matter. It's not that the person is neither tall nor not tall. Okay? The problem with that is that that conflict with everything we know from classical logic and mathematics.

因此，认知主义是一种处理模糊性的观点，它选择以不同方式应对这些案例。它主张，即便存在这种模糊现象，我们也不应改动常规逻辑与数学理论中的任何内容。如果在逻辑中我们普遍认同，对于任何命题P，要么P为真，要么非P为真——这一原则甚至适用于托马斯这样的案例，适用于那些边界模糊的案例，比如身高一米八五却难以判定是否算高的人——在这些情况下，我们仍应认为存在事实判定：这个人要么高，要么不高。

So epistemicism is a view of vagueness that wants to take a different route to handling these cases. Okay? It wants to say, even given this phenomena of vagueness, we shouldn't tinker with anything in our normal theories of logic and mathematics. If in general in logic, we know that for any statement P, either P is true or not P is true that's going to be the case even for these cases like Thomas and even for these borderline cases even for that person who's sort of one meter eighty five and we're not sure if they're tall or not we should still think in these cases that there's a fact of the matter. The person is either tall or not tall.

他们要么确实高，要么确实不高。这意味着现实中存在一个精确的临界点，一个明确数值划分了不高者与高者之间的界限。

It's either true that they're tall or false that they're tall. This is going to mean that there's a sharp cutoff point. In reality there's a precise number such that that defines the boundary between the people who are not tall and the people who are tall.

对于逻辑领域外的人而言，这或许像是本末倒置，因为世界似乎充满各种模糊概念。而你们却说逻辑决定一切——由于我们相信每个命题非真即假，那么关于模糊概念的命题也必然如此。

Now somebody who's not in the realm of logic might see this as a tail wagging the dog because the world seems to have all kinds of vague concepts in it And you're saying logic determines everything that because we have this belief that every statement is either true or false, then it must be the case that any statement about a vague idea must be true or false.

是的，这正是该观点。它或许不够直观，但换个角度看，它实际上可能是默认立场。这只是普通逻辑规则与数学规则的必然推论——在思考这些模糊概念之前，我们对此并无太大争议。你指出的另一点，也是有些人感到困扰的原因，在于认知主义听起来不像是在解释模糊性，而是在消除模糊性。

Yes. So that is the view. It's maybe not the most intuitive view, but in other ways, if you think about it, it might be actually the default view. This is just what follows from the ordinary rules of logic and the ordinary rules of mathematics that up until thinking about these vague concepts we accepted fairly uncontroversially. The other thing I think you're pointing to, which is why some people might find this very troubling, is that it might sound like this view of epistemicism isn't really a theory of vagueness but a theory that does away with vagueness.

这是否正是你感到不安的部分原因？

Is that maybe part of what you're finding troubling here?

没错，完全如此。因为世界显然存在模糊概念，而你们作为逻辑学家却在抗拒这一点。

Yeah. Absolutely. Because it seems that the world has vague concepts and then you're resisting that because you're a logician.

好的。那么我认为非常关键的是要理解，认识论者所做的并非否认模糊性的存在或边界案例的存在，而是对模糊性的本质提出了不同的解释。明白吗？如果有一种关于模糊性的理论认为，成为这些边界案例的关键在于不存在事实依据或真值，那么认识论者的观点听起来可能像是在否认模糊性，但这并非认识论者所接受的模糊性定义。

Okay. Good. So I think it's really important to understand that what the epistemacist is doing is not denying that there is vagueness or that there are borderline cases they're giving a different account of what it takes to be vague Okay? So if you had one theory of vagueness you could have is to say what what is crucial to being one of these borderline cases is that there is no fact of the matter or there's no truth value. If you had that view, then it may sound like the epistemicist is saying that there is no vagueness, but that's not the sort of interpretation of what vagueness is that the epistemicist want to accept.

他们想要说明的是，模糊与非模糊词语之间的区别，并不在于是否存在明确的界限或事实依据。他们希望用不同的标准来划分这种区别。

They want to say that the distinction between vague and non vague words, it's not to do whether there is a sharp cutoff point or there is a fact of the matter. They want to draw the distinction in different terms.

能否简洁地概括这种关于模糊性的立场？认识论者会如何定义模糊性？

Could you succinctly characterize that position on vagueness what would an epistemicist say vagueness is

用一句话来说，认识论认为模糊性是一种独特的无知状态。尽管像'高'这样的词语实际上存在明确的界限，但认识论的另一关键要素在于我们不知道这个界限在哪里。事实上，我们无法知道这个界限。因此我们在原则上对这种明确界限是无知的，而这种对明确界限的特定无知正是模糊性的特征。模糊性。

I would say in one sentence epistemicism says that vagueness is a distinctive kind of ignorance. Although words like tall, they in fact have a sharp cutoff point, the crucial other component of epistemicism is that we don't know what this cutoff point is. And in fact, we can't know what it is. So we're in principle ignorant of this sharp cutoff point, and that specific kind of ignorance about sharp cutoff points is the thing that characterizes vagueness. Vagueness.

模糊性的核心要素不在于真值，而在于认知。它关乎我们所知或未知的内容。

The central component of vagueness isn't about truth values, it's about knowledge. It's about what we know or don't know.

好的。那么这种理论如何应用于道德判断这类事物？道德判断本身就存在争议。关于是非对错通常存在多种不同观点，不过总体而言，我们都倾向于认为谋杀是错误的。

Okay. So how does that play out for something like a moral judgment? Moral judgments are controversial. There are lots of different opinions usually about which things are right and wrong, though. On the whole, we tend to think that murder is wrong.

大多数酷刑也是如此，但存在许多我们称之为灰色地带的领域。比如人们对受孕后某个时期堕胎是否道德存在分歧，这就是存在灰色地带的案例。那么这种模糊性概念如何与这类道德问题相关联呢？

Most torture but there are lots of areas which we would talk about as gray areas, People who differ over whether abortion at a certain time after conception is morally acceptable, that would be a case where there'd be gray areas. So how does this concept of vagueness relate to those sorts of moral questions?

好的。你已经指出了一个我们注意到的现象，不仅是像'高'或'秃'这类词语显得模糊，我们在伦理讨论中使用的词汇，比如'应该做什么'、'被允许做什么'，似乎也具有这种模糊性特征。你提到了堕胎案例，这正是一个经典例证。假设我们认同在受孕后极早期阶段堕胎是允许的——我知道并非所有听众都认同这一点。

Good. So you've already pointed to one thing we're noticing here which is it's not just words like tall or bald that seem to be vague but it looks like also the kinds of words that we use in ethical discourse, words like what you ought to do, what you're permitted to do, they also seem to have these characteristics of vagueness. So you mentioned the case of abortion, and this is a classic case to demonstrate this. So suppose you accept that at a very early stage immediately after conception, is permissible to abort a fetus. I know not all of our listeners accept that.

如果不认同，我们可以换其他例子。但为了讨论方便，姑且这么假设。我认为多数人会同意，在妊娠晚期除非特殊情况，堕胎是不被允许的。但就像'TAL'案例一样，中间存在大量难以判定是否被允许的灰色地带。

If they don't, we could just use another example. But just for the purposes of discussion, let's assume that. I think most of us think at a very late stage of pregnancy unless they're very special circumstances. It's not permissible to abort a fetus but just like our case with TAL there seem to be a lot of cases in the middle where it's very hard to know whether it's permissible and not permissible.

某种程度上，这与法律形成对比——法律往往非常精确且带有些武断性。它会明确规定一个精确的临界点，越过即属违法。

So in a way, that's a contrast with the law, which tends to be very precise and somewhat arbitrary, it seems. It says there is a precise cutoff point beyond which this is illegal.

是啊，法律这点很有趣对吧？即便法律可能...我不确定它是否精确到那种程度。逻辑推导出的明确分界线会精确到纳秒级别，但即便是法律中相当武断的裁决，也不会承认如此精确的临界点。

Yeah. It's interesting about the law. Right? Because even the law might I don't know if it specifies it up to a precision. Right?

逻辑要求的明确分界点会精确到纳秒级。所以即便考虑到法律中相当武断的裁决，它们也不会承认像这样精确的明确分界点。

The sharp cutoff points that we get from logic are gonna say that there is a precise point up to the nanosecond. So even when you think of fairly arbitrary decisions of the law, they're not gonna go as far as admitting sharp cutoff points as precise as this.

我勉强能理解'某人是否算高'存在精确临界点这个概念——在荷兰算高的人在中国可能不算，但总有个精确标准。可道德案例中这种标准该如何运作呢？

I can just about make sense of the idea that there is an actual precise cutoff point for whether somebody's tall or not. Whether somebody's tall in The Netherlands is gonna be different from whether someone's tall in China, but there's a precise cutoff point. I can just about accept that. How would it work for moral cases?

这确实很有意思。有些理由可能让你认为认知主义理论更适用于道德案例，也有些理由显示它可能不太适合道德概念。我们先说说为什么认知主义可能很适合道德案例——假设我们接受一种较强的道德实在论立场。

That's really interesting. Right? So there are some reasons you might think the moral case is actually better for this epistemicist view, works better with it and some reasons you might think is worse for the case of moral concept. Let's start with why you might think epistemicism actually works quite well for these moral cases. Well, let's assume we accept a fairly strong form of moral realism.

因此我们认为道德陈述可以是真实的，并且它们的真实性不仅仅是因为我们认为或声称它们为真。世界上存在着真正根本的事实——道德事实，这些事实决定了道德陈述的真伪。对吧？这种观点与认知主义相当契合。就拿这个处于临界状态的胎儿来说。

So we think moral statements they can be true and they're true not just because of we think they're true or we say they're true. There's the really fundamental facts, moral facts in the world that make moral statements true or not. Right? That kind of view fits quite well with epistemicism. So take our fetus that is in this very borderline situation.

对于道德实在论者而言，很自然地会认为这不是一个随意的选择。这是个极其严肃而困难的问题。如果我们堕掉这个胎儿，可能正在做错事。我们的行为对错必须存在一个事实依据。

For a moral realist, it feels very natural maybe to think that's not an arbitrary choice. This is a really serious difficult question. If we abort this fetus, we might be doing something wrong. There has to be a fact of the matter whether what we did is right or wrong.

所以我能理解如果有人这样想——虽然我不信这个——但如果存在一个赋予我们道德准则的上帝，那么这个上帝可能会给出非常精确的道德规范。只是我们尚未准确推算出临界点的精确位置，但真理确实存在。它就像刻在石板上一样确凿。

So I could see if somebody thought, I don't believe this, but if if there were God who gave us moral rules, then that God might give us very precise moral rules. It's just we haven't quite worked out at the right level of precision where the cutoff points are, but there is a truth in the matter then. It's written in stone somewhere.

正是如此。这种观点可能很好地契合了认知主义的这一主张：确实存在事实依据，而且你不必认为是上帝赋予了我们道德准则。你可以认为存在独立的道德现实，存在道德事实——这种观点对许多人很有吸引力。

Exactly. That's a kind of view that you might think works well with this component of epistemicism that says there really is a fact of the matter and you don't have to think it's God that gave us the moral rules right you might think there's just moral reality There are moral facts, which is a view I think that is attractive to a lot of people.

我知道有些人在普遍意义上接受认知模糊性作为处理模糊问题的方法，但特别在道德领域对此存疑。你能就此谈谈吗？

Now I know some people who accept epistemic vagueness as an approach to vagueness generally have a problem with it in the area of morality specifically. Could you say something about that?

好的。我认为人们持有两种截然不同的理由：即使你总体上认同认知主义，当试图将其应用于道德概念时仍会遇到困难。其一与认知主义的核心主张有关——这些明确的界限存在我们无法知晓的真理。有人提出这样的担忧：道德真理本应指导我们的行为。

Yes. So there are two very different kinds of reasons I think people have thought even if you like epistemicism in general, it has some trouble when we try to apply to the case of moral concept. Okay? So one kind of problem that people have raised, it has to do with the fact that according to epistemicism, these sharp cutoff there are truths that we don't and can't know. Some people have had the following worry: Look, moral truths are things that are supposed to guide our action.

假设这个处于模糊地带的胎儿刚好超过临界点。事实上我们不该堕胎，但这个判断如此接近边界线。根据认知主义者的观点，我们无法知道自己是否越界。你可能会觉得这是个非常诡异的案例。

And if it turns out take this fetus in this sort of borderline area, suppose they're just over the cutoff. Okay? So in fact, we ought not to abort this fetus, but this is so close to the cutoff. This is one of these borderline areas where according to the epistemacist, we can't know that we're just over the cutoff. You might think this is a really weird case.

对吧？道德真理告诉我们不应堕胎，但我们同样无法确定这就是道德真理所要求的。你可以将其视为一种'应当意味着能够'问题的变体。对吧？其逻辑在于，如果我们应当做某事，嗯哼，那么我们就有能力做到。

Right? The moral truth tells us we ought not to abort the fetus, but it we also can't know that this is what the moral truth tells us to do. You can think of it as a version of the odd implies can problem. Right? The thought is if there's something we ought to do, uh-huh, then we can do it.

你可能会认为，能够做到某事的部分前提是能够知道自己应当去做。

And you might think part of being able to do it is being able to know that you ought to do it.

你会如何回应这个观点？

How would you reply to that?

是的。需要说明的是，这其实不仅是认知主义特有的问题。某种程度上，任何承认道德模糊性的观点都会面临这个问题——因为在几乎所有关于模糊性的理论中，这些边界案例里你都无法确知。你既无法确定不应堕胎，也无法确定堕胎是被允许的。认知主义唯一的不同在于它认为存在客观事实。

Yes. So one thing to say is that this actually isn't a specific problem just for epistemicism. In a way it's a problem for any view that thinks there's moral vagueness because pretty much on any theory of vagueness on these borderline cases you can't know. You can't know that you ought not to abort the fetus and you can't know that it's permissible to abort the fetus. The only difference with epistemicism is that there's also this fact of the matter.

但单纯声称不存在客观事实，并不能真正解决行为指导的问题。对吧？当我试图做决定时，如果模糊性理论告诉我：我们既不说允许你这样做，也不说不允许你这样做——那我依然处于理论无法真正指导行动的困境中。

But just saying there isn't a fact of the matter doesn't really solve the problem in terms of being action guiding. Right? If I'm trying to decide what to do and the theory of vagueness tells me, well, we're not saying it's permissible for you to do this. We're also not saying it's not permissible for you to do it. Then I'm still stuck with the theory not really helping to guide my action.

所以这反而可能是种安慰，因为无论怎样你都不会有问题。

So it could be quite reassuring because you're gonna be okay either way.

没错。虽然很容易认为这就是这些观点的立场，但实际上并非如此。对吧？并不是说'你不应当堕胎'。你可能会想：哦，太好了。

Yes. So I think it's tempting to think that this is what these views say, but in fact I think that's not what they say. Right? So it's not the case that you ought not to abort the fetus. You might think, oh, great.

这意味着我被允许终止妊娠。但当然，按照这些观点，你被允许终止妊娠的说法也不成立。对吧？所以这个观点并非告诉你两种选择都可行，它实际上没有给出任何明确指引。

This means I'm permitted to abort the fetus. But of course, on these views, it's also not true that you're permitted to abort the fetus. Right? So it's not that the view tells you that you're okay either way. It just doesn't really tell you anything.

它既没有说你做得对，也没有说你做得不对。

It's not saying that you're okay and it's not saying that you're not okay.

你提到的针对这种理解模糊道德概念方法的第二个反对意见是什么？

What about the second objection that you mentioned there is to this approach to understanding moral concepts, vague moral concepts?

好的。第二个问题相当有趣，要理解它，我们需要更深入地探讨认知主义运作的细节。我说过认知主义者认为，在模糊情况下，你会对这些明确的界限点存在无知，而这种无知在模糊性案例中有其特殊原因或类型。因此我们需要深入探讨的是：这种解释是什么？你为何会无知？

Okay. So the second issue is quite interesting, and to understand it, we have to delve a little bit deeper into the fine details of how epistemicism works. So I said that epistemicists say that in cases of vagus, you are ignorant of these sharp cut off points and there's a very specific reason or kind of ignorance that is special in the cases of vagueness. So the bit we need to delve a bit deeper into is what is this explanation? Why are you ignorant?

这种特殊的无知类型是什么？为此，让我们讨论认知主义最著名捍卫者蒂莫西·威廉姆森提出的最突出答案。威廉姆森大致有这样的观点：我们使用词语的方式将决定其含义。以'高'这个词为例，这个特定发音或书写形式本身并无特殊之处。

And what is this special kind of ignorance? So to do that, let's talk about the one most prominent answer to this question by the most prominent defender of epistemicism, which is Timothy Williamson. Williamson has roughly the following idea. It starts with the thought that how we use words is going to determine what they mean. If you think about the word tall there's nothing special about this specific set of sounds or this specific thing we write.

同样的发音，如果有个社群完全以不同方式使用'tall'这个词——每当人们看到猫时就发'tall'的音——那么'tall'可能指代'是猫'的属性而非'高'的属性。这对所有词语都成立。但根据该理论，有趣之处在于：在精确词语和模糊词语中，我们所指含义对使用方式的敏感度存在差异。以'质数'这个精确的数学概念为例，我们所指的这个特定数学属性确实取决于使用方式，但并非完全依赖精确用法。我们可以设想许多社群以类似方式使用'质数'，它仍会指向'是质数'的数学属性。

Very same sounds If we had a community that used the word tall in a completely different way and used it, the sound is tall whenever people saw cats, is tall might have picked out the property of being a cat and not the property of being tall. Okay so that's true of all words however here's the interesting thing according to this theory there's a difference between how sensitive what we mean is to our use in cases of non fake words and in cases of vague words. So the thought is take a precise word like is prime, the mathematical concept of being a prime number. The thought is, of fact that we mean by that this particular mathematical property depends on how we use it, but it doesn't depend on exactly how we use it. We can think of lots of communities that used is prime roughly the way we do and it's really gonna pick up the mathematical property of being prime.

对吧？如果更多孩子在数学课上误认为9是质数并说出'9是质数'，'质数'这个词仍会指向相同的数学属性。该理论认为，像'高'这样的模糊词语特殊之处在于它们对使用方式高度敏感，具有所谓的语义可塑性。这意味着如果我们观察多个使用方式仅有细微差异的社群，它们会指向略有不同的属性。假设我们使用这个词的方式最终指向具有明确界限（比如1.813米）的属性，那么另一个使用方式稍有不同的社群可能用它指代1.812米。

Right? If a few more children mistakenly in their math class thought that nine is prime and uttered the sentence nine is prime, the word prime would still pick out the same familiar mathematical property. What's special according to this theory about vague words like is tall is that they are very highly sensitive to how we use They have this property that we can call semantic plasticity. And what semantic plasticity means is that if we look at a bunch of different communities that use the word only very slightly differently, they're gonna pick up a slightly different property. So if it turns out that the way we use the word ends up picking up a property with a sharp cutoff point say 1.813 meters maybe a different community that used it a little bit differently would mean by it 1.812 meters.

我们所需的最后一个基础构件是，这种语义可塑性正是解释为何我们无法知晓这些明确分界点的关键。粗略而言，其核心观点在于我们对这些差异不够敏感。由于这些可塑性，我们缺乏能够精确追踪这些使用事实如何决定这些特定分界点的信念，因此我们无法获知这些明确的分界线。

And the final building block we need is that this kind of semantic plasticity is the key to explaining why we can't know these sharp cutoff points. And very roughly the thought is we're not sensitive enough to these differences. We don't have beliefs that can track the exact way in which these use facts determine these very specific sharp cutoff points because of these plasticities we lack the knowledge for the sharp cutoff points.

那么这是否意味着道德术语具有高度的这种可塑性？

And then is the claim that moral terms have a lot of this plasticity about them.

正是如此。现在我们终于触及第二个问题的核心。第二个问题与道德术语具有这种极端可塑性的主张有关。简单回顾一下我们目前的进展：认知主义者试图用语义可塑性来解释模糊性。因此，若要将认知主义应用于道德术语，就必须承认这些道德术语也具有极端的语义可塑性。

Exactly. So now we finally get to what the crux of the second problem is. The second problem has to do with this claim that moral terms have this extreme plasticity. So just to recap where we got to so far, the epistemicist wants to explain vagueness in terms of semantic plasticity. So if you want to apply epistemicism to the case of moral terms, then you're also going to have to say that these moral terms have this extreme semantic plasticity.

让我们设想我们的语言社群。我们日常使用诸如'允许'之类的词汇进行各种表述。假设我们最终选定某个特定属性。而另一个社群使用的词汇听起来与我们完全相同，功能也极为相似。

Let's think of our community. So we go around. We make all these different utterances using the word permissible for example. Let's suppose we end up picking out a particular property. Then there's this other community that goes around using a word that sounds just like ours and has very very similar function.

他们以非常相似但不完全一致的方式使用该词，结果他们选定的属性略有不同。回到胎儿这个有趣的案例：假设当我们使用'允许'一词时，实际上（虽然我们不知道）精确的分界点是允许堕胎直至胎儿存活n分钟。若胎儿存活n减一分钟，堕胎就是被允许的。假设我们有个存活n减一分钟的胎儿，我说允许堕胎，那么我所说就是真实的。

They use it in a very similar but not quite exactly the same way and it turns out they pick out a slightly different property. And we can see the difference in going back to our interesting case of the fetus. Suppose that as we use the term permissible, it turns out we don't know this but it turns out that the exact cutoff points were permitted to abort the fetus exactly up to when the fetus is n minutes old. If we have a fetus that n minus one minutes old it's fine we're permitted to abort it. If we let's take our features that is n minus one minutes old I go around saying that I'm permitted to abort it and I'm saying something true.

现在看那个使用'允许'一词略有差异的社群成员，他们选定的属性稍有不同——只允许堕胎至n减两分钟的胎儿。这里出现了非常怪异的现象：当他们说允许堕胎时，实际上是在说假话。仅仅因为我们使用'允许'一词的细微差异，导致当我说堕胎被允许时是真实的，而他们说出同样句子时却是虚假的。我认为这个观点尤其令道德实在论者感到困扰。

Now look at the person in that other community that uses the word permissible permissible slightly differently and say they pick up a slightly different property one where you're only permitted to abort the fetus up to n minus two minutes. Here's a really weird thing that's going on When they say that you are permitted to abort this fetus, they're saying something false. So just because we're using the word permissible slightly differently, it turns out that when I say it's permissible to abort the fetus, I'm saying something true. When they utter the sentence, it's permissible to abort the fetus, they're saying something false. This, I think, has been a thought that people have found very troubling, especially people who accept a kind of moral realism.

那么从这一切中，我们是否应该得出某种对道德实在论的归谬——即作为道德实在论者必须进行思维体操才能自圆其说？

So is the conclusion that we should draw from all this a kind of reductio of moral realism that you have to do mental gymnastics to survive as a moral realist.

我认为这里有几件事需要说明。但先说一点。尽管我发表了关于两个群体的演讲，且表面看来情况令人担忧，但仔细想想，这个情景其实并不必然与道德实在论相冲突。请记住，在我的假设中，当我说‘允许堕掉这个胎儿’时，我说的是真话；而另一个群体的人说同样的话时，他们说的却是假话。但别忘了，按照这种观点，我们对‘允许’一词的理解并不完全相同。

There are, I think, several things to say here. But here's one. It's not even though I made this speech about the two communities and the fact that it looks troubling, when you think about it, it's not at all clear this scenario actually conflicts with moral realism. Remember in my scenario I said that when I utter the sentence it's permitted to abort this fetus I'm saying something true and when someone in this other community utters it they're saying something false. But remember on this view we don't mean exactly the same thing by the word permitted.

所以这并不完全构成对道德实在论的挑战。表面或许如此——看似道德真理取决于我们群体如何使用术语，但他们并非真正与我持相反观点。对吧？他们表达的并非同一主张。

So this isn't exactly a conflict with moral realism. It might look like it. It might look like what's morally true depends on how our community is using the terms, but they're not really disagreeing with me. Right? They're not making the same claim.

当他们说‘允许堕掉胎儿’时，这句话在他们口中含义略有不同。

When they say you are permitted to abort the fetus, that sentence in their mouth means something a little bit different.

但这听起来像是相对主义——你在暗示这对他们为真，而对我为真。对他们可允许的事对我却不可允许，反之亦然。

But that then sounds like relativism where you're saying that, well, it's true for them and this is true for me. It's permissible for them but impermissible for me or vice versa.

问得好。这是个常见误解。表面看来像道德相对主义，实则不然。道德相对主义认为存在一个命题，对我为真却对你们为假。但这里并非如此。

Good. So this is a really common misunderstanding. So it might sound like this is a form of moral relativism but it isn't. So moral relativism would think that there's actually a claim, a proposition such that it's true for me but false for you. This isn't the case here.

明白吗？这里的情况是：存在一个句子，一组特定发音，对我表达真理，对你们却表达谬误。就像英语中‘2+2=4’的发音，碰巧在法语里同样的发音却表示‘2+2=5’。当英语使用者说这句话时，他们表达‘2+2=4’的真理；而法语使用者发出相同声音时，却在表达‘2+2=5’的谬误——这显然不是数学相对主义。

Right? The case here is that there's a sentence, there's a certain set of sounds that say something true for me and say something false for you. So you can imagine a sentence where the same sounds in English they mean that two plus two equals four but maybe the very same sounds just accidentally turn out to also be a sentence in French where in French that sentence says that two plus two equals five. So that would be a sentence that when an English speaker says it, they're expressing the claim that two plus two equals four and they're saying something true. When a French speaker says those very same sounds, they're expressing the claim that two plus two equals five and they're saying something false, that wouldn't be relativism about mathematics.

这只是两种语言中词语含义存在微妙差异的案例。

That would just be a case where the words are being used in our two languages to mean something slightly different.

那么，为什么这会对道德领域的模糊性处理方法构成问题呢？

So why does that present a problem for the approach to vagueness in the moral realm?

所以我认为在如何将这一理论应用于道德术语上存在一些难题。设想两个对‘允许’有细微不同理解的社群：一个判定堕胎是允许的，另一个则判定堕胎不被允许。在各自的语言体系内，他们都在陈述真实。

So I think there is a bit of a problem for how to apply this to moral terms. Okay so think of our two communities that use permissible slightly differently. We saw one of them judges that it's permissible to abort the fetus. The other judges that it's not permissible to abort the fetus. Each of them in their own language is saying something true.

因此他们使用的是略有差异的语言体系。正如之前所说，这并非某种道德相对主义。但对于严肃的道德实在论者而言，这仍是个问题——因为双方使用的术语都涉及道德判断，他们用‘允许’做出的声明可被视为道德表态。于是我们面临的是两种不同属性的并存。

So they're speaking slightly different languages. It's not, as we said before, that we get some kind of moral relativism. But you might think for a very serious moral realist, that's still a problem because both of the terms they're using are a kind of moral judgment. They're using permissible to make pronouncements that we might think of as moral. So what we're getting here is that there are two different properties.

既有我们语言中的‘允许性’，也存在他们社群使用的另一种属性（可称之为‘允许性*’）。现在我们就有了两种道德属性：允许性与允许性*。虽然这不直接抵触道德实在论，但实在论者可能不愿接受存在大量相似道德属性的观点。真正的道德实在论者应当认为只存在唯一的‘允许性’，社会运作中不存在其他功能相似的邻近属性。

There's the permissibility as it's used in our language, and there's this other property you can call it permissibility star that's used in their community. And now we have two moral properties permissibility and permissibility star. And you might think that doesn't directly clash with moral realism, but you might think that's not a nice thing for a moral realist to think that there are many, many different moral or moral like properties that we could be using. If you're a serious moral realist, you should think there's just permissibility. There are no other similar properties in the vicinity that play a very similar role in our society.

或许这是道德实在论的普遍困境。纵观历史，类似‘允许性’的概念显然具有这种特征——1960年代加利福尼亚的允许标准与1890年代伦敦的标准就截然不同。

Maybe this is just a general problem with moral realism, but across history, the concept like permissibility does obviously seem to have that kind of feature. Nineteen sixties California permissibility is very different from 1890s London permissibility.

我认为严肃的道德实在论者会否认这种观点。他们会主张历史上许多社会对‘何为允许’的判断是错误的，并非‘允许性’在其语言中含义不同——这个概念的涵义始终如一，只是有些人对允许性的认知错误，而另一些人的认知正确。

I think serious moral realists are going to think that's not correct. They're going to think that many, many societies along history wrong about what was permissible and what wasn't. It wasn't that permissibility meant something different in their language. Meant the same thing all along. It's just that some people had beliefs about permissibility that were wrong and some people had beliefs about permissibility that are correct.

那么，拒绝道德模糊性意味着什么？

So what would it mean to reject moral vagueness?

好的。在我们之前的讨论中，我们假设道德术语是模糊的，因为我们注意到像堕胎这样的案例——胎儿刚形成一分钟时允许堕胎，而39周时则不允许。但在这之间的所有案例中，我们似乎毫无头绪，甚至不清楚还能收集哪些事实来判断是否可以堕胎。不过我们需要谨慎些，因为这些看似无知的案例虽然与其他模糊案例相似，但并非所有我们不知道答案的问题都属于模糊性问题。数学领域就是个例子，这个被公认为毫无模糊性的领域就能说明这一点。

Okay. So earlier in our discussion, we just assumed that moral terms are vague because we noticed cases like this case of the abortion where when the fetus was one minute old, we were permitted to abort it, and when it was 39 old, we were not permitted. But there were all these cases in the middle where it seemed like we have no idea and it's not even clear what further facts we could gather to find out whether we can abort it. But we need to be a little bit careful here because although these cases of ignorance they look similar to other cases of vagueness, not all cases where we don't know the answer to a question are cases of vagueness. One way to see that is in the case of mathematics, the one domain where everyone thinks there is no vagueness at all.

我们使用极其精确的语言。但即便在使用如此精确语言的数学领域，仍存在未解之谜。有些问题我们确实不知道答案，也许永远找不到解答，也许不清楚还需要发现哪些事实才能解决这些问题。

We use very very precise language. But even in mathematics where we use very precise language there are open questions in mathematics. There are questions where we really don't know the answer to them. Maybe we will never find out the answers. Maybe we don't know what further facts that are out there to find out in order to resolve this question.

有些问题就是极其难以解决的。我们完全不知道如何回答，而这种无知与模糊现象毫无关联。因此对于这些道德案例，一种观点认为我们不知道答案并非因为它们模糊，而是因为它们本身就是难题。你同意这种最后的看法吗？

Cases of questions that are just very very difficult to resolve. We have no idea how to answer them and the reason we don't know how to answer them has nothing at all to do with the phenomena of vagueness. So one option about these moral cases is to just think we don't know the answer to these questions but that's not because they are vague but just because they are very hard questions. So do you agree with that last way

看待事物的方式？你认为至少存在这种可能性吗——即确实存在道德事实，只是我们不知道它们，而这完全与模糊性无关？

of seeing things? Do you think that it's at least possible that there are moral facts? It's just that we don't know them, and it's not due to vagueness at all.

是的。我认为这种解决三难困境的方式很有吸引力，至少这是我们应当认真探索的方向，而我认为迄今为止的文献对此尚未充分探讨。

Yes. I think there's something very attractive about that way of resolving this trilemma, or at least this is one direction that we should very seriously explore and I think hasn't been sufficiently explored in the literature up to now.

奥弗莱恩·马吉多尔，非常感谢你。

Ofrain Magidore, thank you very much.

谢谢。

Thank you.

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