从总统到被告：针对马杜罗的法律诉讼

我们正生活在充满变数的时代，一个历史的转折点。

We are living in interesting times, a turning point in history.

我们是在步入一个黑暗的威权时代，还是即将迎来技术的黄金时代，或是末日来临？

Are we entering a dark authoritarian era, or are we on the brink of a technological golden age or the apocalypse?

没人真正知道，但我正试图找出答案。

No one really knows, but I'm trying to find out.

来自《纽约时报》观点版，我是罗斯·多萨特，在我的节目《有趣的时代》中，我正与塑造这一全新世界秩序的思想家和领袖们一同探索这个奇异的新世界。

From New York Times Opinion, I'm Ross Douthat, and on my show, Interesting Times, I'm exploring this strange new world order with the thinkers and leaders giving it shape.

无论你在何处收听播客，都请关注本节目。

Follow it wherever you get your podcasts.

这是一个寒冷的星期天下午，我站在布鲁克林日落公园的联邦拘留中心前，令人难以置信的是，委内瑞拉总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗和他的妻子本周末在加拉加斯被美军惊人俘获后，今晨就醒在了这里。

So it is a frigid Sunday afternoon, and I'm standing in front of the Metropolitan Detention Center in Sunset Park, Brooklyn, which improbably is where Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro and his wife woke up this morning after their stunning capture by American troops in Caracas over the weekend.

这真是一幅超现实的场景，因为这位曾统治一个拥有约三千万人口的拉美大国长达十二年的绝对独裁者。

And it's this truly surreal scene because after twelve years as the all powerful dictator of a major Latin American country, a country with something like 30,000,000 citizens.

马杜罗如今却身处这座高速公路旁的监狱里，离我家只有几分钟路程，离最近的好市多超市也只有几个街区。

Maduro has ended up in this jail next to the highway a few minutes from my apartment and a couple blocks from the nearest Costco.

从他几天前的身份到如今的境况，这种反差实在太大了。

It's just such a juxtaposition from what he was just a few days ago to what he is now.

据我们所知，马杜罗至少会一直被关押在拘留中心，直到他被提审，我们预计最早会在周一早上在曼哈顿进行。

And as best we can tell, Maduro is gonna remain in this detention center at least until he is arraigned, we think as early as Monday morning in Manhattan.

到那时，美国政府将正式对他提出指控，而马杜罗的未来将突然交到一位美国法官和美国陪审团手中。

And it's at that point that the US government is gonna present its charges against him, and Maduro's future will suddenly be in the hands of an American judge and an American jury.

来自《纽约时报》，我是迈克尔·比尔巴罗。

From The New York Times, I'm Michael Bilbaro.

这是《每日新闻》。

This is The Daily.

今天，我们探讨针对尼古拉斯·马杜罗的法律案件，以及逮捕他的非凡行动是否可能削弱这一案件的合法性。

Today, the legal case against Nicolas Maduro and whether the lawfulness of the extraordinary operation to capture him could undermine that case.

我与我的同事查理·萨维奇进行了交谈，他为《纽约时报》撰写有关国家安全和法律政策的内容。

I spoke with my colleague, Charlie Savage, who writes about national security and legal policy for the Times.

今天是1月5日，星期一。

It's Monday, January 5.

查理，感谢你在周日抽出时间接受我们的采访。

Charlie, thank you for making time for us on a Sunday.

非常感谢。

Appreciate it.

不客气。

My pleasure.

为了帮助听众了解背景，我们特别在周日制作了一期《每日新闻》，详细报道了导致尼古拉斯·马杜罗被捕并被关押在布鲁克林的整个军事行动，那里离这里并不远。

Just to orient folks, we made a special Sunday episode of The Daily that detailed the entire military operation that resulted in Nicolas Vaduro's capture and his current detainment in Brooklyn, not that far from here.

查理，我们想和你讨论的是，这一非凡状况引发的所有法律问题，以及随着案件进入法院系统、 presumably 进入马杜罗的审判后，可能会持续引发的法律争议。

What we wanna talk with you about, Charlie, are all the legal questions that this entire extraordinary situation has raised and will probably keep raising as this case moves to the court system into presumably a trial of Maduro.

但我想先从军事行动本身说起，以及为执行这一行动所依据的法律理由，目前是否存在或不存在类似的法律先例。

But I wanna start with the military operation itself and the legal rationale that was used to justify carrying it out, what kind of legal precedent exists or doesn't for undertaking it.

特朗普政府提出的论点是，这是一次为逮捕被指控违反美国法律的人而进行的军事行动，我们在周日的节目中简要提到了这一点。

The argument that the Trump administration has put forward, and we briefly touched on this in our Sunday episode, is that this was a military operation in support of an arrest of somebody charged with breaking US law.

这是否使其具有合法性？

Does that make it lawful?

很抱歉，这个问题没有简单的答案。

So I'm sorry to say that there is not a simple answer to this.

原因是存在两种不同的法律。

And the reason is there's two different kinds of law.

有国内法。

There's domestic law.

还有国际法，某种行为在一种层面上可能是合法的，但在另一种层面上却是非法的。

There's international law, something that could be lawful on one level and illegal on the other level.

它们彼此独立运作。

They operate independently of each other.

更糟糕的是，有时它们还会相互交叉影响。

And then even worse than that, sometimes they bleed into each other.

因此，简单来说，这很可能违反了国际法。

So here, just to provide an overview, this was probably illegal as a matter of international law.

为什么？

Why?

《联合国宪章》规定，未经他国同意、自卫理由或联合国安理会授权，任何国家不得在他国主权领土上使用武力。

The United Nations Charter makes it illegal for a country to use force in another country's sovereign territory without its consent, a self defense rationale, or the permission of the UN Security Council.

这些条件都不具备。

None of which were present.

这些都不

None of

在这里都不存在。

these are present here.

这是一次逮捕行动。

This was an arrest operation.

因此，从国际法的角度看，这可能是非法的。

So probably illegal as a matter of international law.

从纯粹的国内法角度看，这可能是合法的。

As a matter of pure domestic law, probably legal.

联邦调查局和缉毒局有权逮捕面临指控的人。

The FBI, the DEA has the ability to go arrest people who are facing charges.

国会明确授权其采取此类行动。

It has affirmative authority from Congress to do that.

法律条文并未规定这种权力止步于美国边境。

Statutes don't say that that authority stops at the edge of The United States.

军队可以协助执法部门执行逮捕人员的职权。

Military can provide support to law enforcement in carrying out its authority to arrest people.

因此，从国内法角度来看，这可能是合法的。

So maybe that's okay on a domestic law level.

但为了补充最后一点，还有一个问题：联合国宪章将此行为定为国际法上的非法行为，而该宪章在美国是经批准的条约吗？

But just to add the final twist, there's the question of, well, what about the fact that the UN Charter that makes it illegal as an international law matter is a ratified treaty in The United States?

宪法规定，经批准的条约是国家的最高法律。

And the constitution says ratified treaties are the supreme law of the land.

没错。

Right.

从国内宪法法的角度来看，这是否属于非法行为，因为特朗普有宪法义务遵守联合国宪章？

As a matter of domestic constitutional law, was this unlawful because Trump had a constitutional duty to obey the UN Charter?

因此，你必须理清这个混乱，才能理解这项非凡的行动。

And so this is the mess you have to sort through to make sense of this extraordinary operation.

在这里，美国法律和地缘政治历史上的一个先例至关重要，它能帮助我们理解本周刚刚发生的事情。

And here, a precedent in American law and geopolitical history is important as a guidepost to sorting through what just happened this week.

晚上好。

Good evening.

今晚，数千名美国士兵在巴拿马占据关键位置，他们于今早发动袭击，旨在推翻独裁将军诺列加。

Thousands of American troops are tonight holding key positions in Panama after launching an attack early this morning to oust the dictator general Noriega.

这一先例是1989年乔治·H.

And that precedent is the nineteen eighty nine invasion of Panama by the George H.

W.

W.

布什政府为逮捕曼努埃尔·诺列加而入侵巴拿马的行动，诺列加和马杜罗一样，都是该国领导人，当时面临美国的毒品走私指控。

Bush administration for the purpose of arresting Manuel Noriega, who, like Maduro, was a leader of that country facing drug trafficking charges back in The United States.

诺列加将军因与毒品相关的指控被起诉，总统已尽一切努力，通过相关机构的谈判和平解决这一局势。

General Noriega is under indictment for drug related charges, and the president has made every effort peacefully to resolve the situation through negotiations under the auspices.

诺列加将军已不再掌权。

General Noriega is no longer in power.

他不再掌控政府机构或长期以来用来残害巴拿马人民的镇压力量。

He no longer commands the instruments of government or the forces of repression that he's used for so long to brutalize the Panamanian people.

嗯，

Well,

请解释一下，当时美国总统是如何基于涉及国内和国际法的复杂法律问题，为入侵巴拿马逮捕诺列加的行为进行辩护的？

just explain how the US president at the time justified entering a foreign country, Panama, to arrest Noriega based on that thicket of complex legal questions surrounding domestic and international law?

我认为，很少有人认为1989年美国对巴拿马的入侵在国际法上是合法的。

Well, I don't think very many people think that the nineteen eighty nine invasion of Panama was legal as a matter of international law.

在过去半小时内，联合国大会通过了一项决议，谴责美国对巴拿马的干预。

In the last half hour, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted a resolution deploring The United States intervention in Panama.

联合国大会以压倒性多数裁定其为非法。

It was declared unlawful overwhelmingly by the United Nations General Assembly.

联合国安理会多数成员投票谴责这一行动，但美国当然否决了该决议。

A majority of the UN Security Council voted to condemn it, but The United States, of course, vetoed that resolution.

因此，巴拿马入侵明显违反了国际法，但乔治·H·W·布什总统却逃脱了惩罚。

So to the extent that the Panama invasion fairly clearly violated international law, president George h w Bush got away with it.

没有人能以任何有效的方式说：你不能这么做。

There was no one to say, you can't do this in any effective way.

所以对当时布什来说，更棘手的问题是：国内法如何规定？

So the trickier question for Bush back in the day was what about domestic law?

1989年，司法部法律事务办公室对此问题进行了审查，当时该办公室由一位名叫比尔·巴尔的年轻律师领导，他日后曾成为布什的司法部长，并在特朗普任内再次担任司法部长。

And what happened back in 1989 was that the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel took a look at this issue, and it was then run by a young lawyer named Bill Barr, who can someday become attorney general for Bush, and then reprise that role as attorney general for Trump.

年轻的比尔·巴尔对行政权力持有非常宽泛的看法，他撰写了一份备忘录，称总统依据宪法拥有固有权力，可以派遣联邦调查局前往海外执行逮捕逃犯的任务，并且宪法赋予总统基本可以凌驾于国际法之上的权力。

Young Bill Barr had a very expansive view of executive power, and he wrote a memo that said that the president had inherent power under the constitution to dispatch the FBI, in that case, abroad to carry out its mission of arresting people who were fugitives from charges, and the constitution empowered the president essentially to override international law.

至少从国内宪法法的角度来看，违反国际法是可以接受的。

It was okay to violate international law, at least as a matter of domestic constitutional law.

巴尔的这份备忘录一经公布便引发了巨大争议。

And that memo by Barr was very controversial when it came out.

它受到了许多法律学者的批评。

It's been criticized by many legal scholars.

我认为巴尔在分析已批准条约是否属于总统有责任确保其忠实执行的法律类型时，他的方法是错误的。

I think Barr was wrong about his approach to analyzing whether or not a ratified treaty is the kind of law that the president has a duty to see his faithfully executed.

但这是1989年的推理方式，我认为可以合理假设，这个周末的推理也大概如此。

But that was the reasoning in 1989, and I think it's safe to assume that's probably what the reasoning was for this weekend as well.

好的。

Okay.

因此，我们应该这样看待这次行动的合法性：它在国际法下似乎非法，而在国内法下则存在法律争议。

So that's how we should think about the legality of the operation, which seems illegal under international law and is the subject of legally contested debate under domestic law.

我想转到行动过程中发生了什么。

I wanna turn to what happened during the operation.

我们知道，在马杜罗被捕和撤离过程中，至少有40名委内瑞拉人丧生，其中一些是平民。

We know that at least 40 Venezuelans, some number of them civilians, were killed during Maduro's capture and extraction.

这只是一个初步统计，数字可能还会大幅上升。

And that's just a preliminary count likely to go up perhaps by a lot.

在追捕类似我们刚刚目睹的逮捕行动中，杀害外国公民和士兵是否合法？

Is killing foreign citizens and soldiers in pursuit of an arrest like the one we just witnessed, is that legal?

在这种情况下使用致命武力的考量是什么？

What are the calculations around using lethal force in a situation like this?

嗯，再次强调，从国际法的角度来看，美国军队的入侵几乎肯定是非法的。

Well, again, as a matter of international law, the incursion by American forces was illegal to begin with, almost certainly.

嗯。

Mhmm.

从国内法的角度来看，有什么授权可以对委内瑞拉进行轰炸？

From a matter of domestic law, what's the authority to blow things up in Venezuela?

这本来就是一个逮捕行动。

Well, this is already an arrest operation.

根据鲁比奥似乎向参议员迈克·李发表的一些评论，迈克·李在事件发生当晚就说：这怎么可能合法？

And from some comments that Rubio evidently made to senator Mike Lee, Mike Lee, overnight when this was happening, he was like, well, how could this possibly be legal?

我等着听一个理论，解释军队如何能在没有获得……

I I await the theory of how the military can go in without a Mhmm.

国会授权的情况下进入委内瑞拉。

Authorization from Congress.

然后鲁比奥给他打了电话，李报告了鲁比奥的说法，而李基本上感到满意。

Then Rubio calls him and Lee reports what Rubio said, and Lee is basically satisfied.

听起来他们的做法是炸毁防空系统，以保护直升机搭载的撤离小组将要经过的通道。

And what it sounds like is they were blowing up air defenses to protect the corridor where the helicopters with the extraction team were gonna pass through.

后来，参谋长联席会议主席丹·凯恩将军表示，有人向直升机开火，他们进行了还击。

And then also later on, general Dan Cain, the chairman of the joint chief said some people shot at the helicopters, and they returned fire.

对。

Right.

这些都属于自卫和保护行为。

So these are forms of self defense and protection.

自十九世纪末以来，一直存在一系列案例或主张，认为总统依据宪法拥有固有权力，无需国会通过法律即可保护联邦特工、联邦机构及其执行的联邦职能。

There's a long standing line of cases or claims going back to the late nineteenth century surrounding the idea that the president has inherent power under the constitution, no need for a statute from congress to protect federal agents, federal institutions carrying out federal functions.

我们最近在关于特朗普派遣军队进入洛杉矶的争议中，就看到了这种所谓‘固有保护权’的援引，当时军队被派去是为了保护移民与海关执法局特工免受抗议者攻击。

We actually saw this invocation of the inherent protective power, as it's called, recently in court filings around the dispute about Trump sending troops into Los Angeles because they were being sent in in the name of protecting ICE agents from protesters.

此外，当你部署军事单位时，大家都普遍认为，如果有人向他们开火，他们可以开火自卫。

Also, when you deploy military units, everyone basically agrees they if someone shoots them, they can shoot back to defend themselves.

这被称为单位自卫。

That's called unit self defense.

因此，单位自卫和保护性权力将成为解释此次行动中炸毁目标和致人死亡行为在国内法下合法性的依据。

And so that would be both unit self defense and a protective power would be the argument for why blowing things up and killing people as part of this operation was lawful as a matter of Domestic.

美国国内法。

US domestic law.

因此，无论初始行动在国际法下是否合法，一旦部队面临危险，就存在国内法上的理由支持其以自卫为由进行反击，即使这意味着杀死他人。

So no matter the legality of the initial action under international law, once the troops are in jeopardy, there is a domestic legal rationale for fighting back, using self defense even if that means killing people.

没错。

Exactly.

好的。

Okay.

那么，接下来的问题是，特朗普政府在尼古拉斯·马杜罗被捕后，有何权力来控制委内瑞拉？

So then there is the question of what authority the Trump administration has to control Venezuela now that Nicolas Maduro has been arrested.

马杜罗被捕后，特朗普在新闻发布会上明确表示，美国将寻求掌控委内瑞拉。

Trump, during his news conference after Maduro's arrest, quite explicitly said that The US will seek to run Venezuela.

他没有具体说明这将如何运作，但他说美国将寻求这样做。

He didn't say exactly how that would work, but he said that The US would seek to do this.

美国是否有法律依据以任何方式试图控制委内瑞拉？

Does The US have legal grounds for in any way trying to run Venezuela?

对。

Right.

如果这只是特朗普在告诉委内瑞拉副总统该做什么，并且他成功地胁迫她顺从，那么法律在这个时候就真的无关紧要了。

So if this is just Trump telling the vice president of Venezuela what to do, and he's successful in coercing her to comply, law doesn't really have anything to do with it at that point.

对。

Right.

他只是在欺凌她，而且奏效了。

He's just bullying her and it's working.

所以真正的问题是，如果她犹豫并抵抗到特朗普白宫想要更直接介入、真正接管政权的地步，

So the real question is if she balks and, you know, resists complying to the point that the Trump White House wants to intervene more directly and actually take the reins.

它能这么做吗？

Can it?

很难看出这如何能合法。

And it's very hard to see how that would be lawful.

我们回到诺列加和巴拿马的情况，当时有没有提出过这个问题？

Just to go back to Noriega and to Panama, did this question come up back then?

美国在逮捕诺列加后，是否试图控制巴拿马？

Did The US seek to control Panama after arresting Noriega?

当时在巴拿马发生的情况是，1989年初曾举行过一次选举，候选人分别由诺列加支持和反对派支持。

So what happened in Panama is there had been an election earlier in 1989 between a candidate that was backed by Noriega and a opposition candidate.

反对派候选人名叫吉列尔莫·恩达拉，他很可能赢得了选举，但诺列加却宣布选举结果无效，并派暴徒殴打他。

And the opposition candidate, his name was Guillermo Indara, probably won, but then Noriega just nullified the results and had some thugs go beat him up.

晚上好。

Good evening.

今天巴拿马发生暴力事件，亲诺列加势力袭击了反对派领导人及其追随者。

Violence in Panama today as pro Noriega forces attacked opposition leaders and their followers.

因此，当美国介入并逮捕诺列加时，就在当晚立即宣誓就任恩达拉为巴拿马的实际总统。

So when The US came in and grabbed Noriega, they immediately, like that same night, swore in Indara as the actual president of Panama.

是在美国军事基地宣誓就职的。

Was sworn in on a US military base.

哇。

Wow.

这表明美军在当时发生的事件中发挥了重要作用，但做决定的还是他。

So that shows you that the US military had a strong hand in what was happening, but he was the one making the decisions.

乔治·布什并没有声称要直接统治巴拿马。

George Bush was not purporting to just run Panama.

因此，这可能成为特朗普在这里的一个模式。

So that potentially could be a model for Trump here.

这可能是一个模式，但你知道，这时你就进入了使委内瑞拉与巴拿马不同的实际问题，这些问题为我们在讨论的法律问题增添了额外的复杂性。

It could be a model, but, you you know, this is where you get into the practical issues that make Venezuela different than Panama that act as sort of an overlay to these legal issues we're discussing.

你知道，巴拿马是个小国，美国在那里有一个主要基地。

You know, Panama is a small country, and The US had a major base there.

这与设想统治委内瑞拉相比要容易得多，委内瑞拉人口多得多，地域广阔得多，而美国根本没有任何军事存在。

It was not as daunting a task as thinking about running Venezuela, vastly more populous, vastly more geographically sprawling country where The US has no military presence to begin with.

委内瑞拉军队仍然在那儿。

Venezuelan military is still there.

政府也还在那儿。

The government is still there.

他们必须派遣大规模地面部队，这些部队 presumably 需要先与人交战，才能有机会支持一位新宣誓就职的委内瑞拉临时总统。

They would have to go in with major ground forces that would presumably need to fight people before they'd be in a position to provide support to a newly sworn in alternative president of Venezuela.

这与1989年巴拿马的情况远非同一回事。

This is not nearly as simple a situation as Panama was in 1989.

好的。

Okay.

我认为这把我们带到了针对马杜罗本人的法律案件上。

I think that brings us to the legal case against Maduro himself.

我想问题是，他的逮捕方式及其合法性，特别是现在所称的违反国际法的行为，是否会影响美国法官是否允许针对他的指控成立？

And I guess the question is, does the manner of his arrest and the legality of it, especially what is now being described as the violation of international law in particular, Does that have any bearing on whether a US judge will let the charges against him stand?

这会不会让马杜罗在任何审判之前就逃脱惩罚？

Could that end up getting Maduro off the hook before there's any kind of a trial?

大概不会。

Probably not.

我敢肯定他的律师会提出这个问题，因为他们会提出每一个问题。

I'm sure that his lawyers will raise this issue because they'll raise every issue.

但即使马杜罗及其辩护团队能够有力地证明，根据国际法，他的逮捕是非法的。

But even if it were the case that Maduro and his defense team could make out a strong case that his arrest was unlawful as a matter of international law.

很可能，美国法院会说，这无关紧要，他们仍然有管辖权继续根据这项起诉书对他进行审判。

Probably, courts in The US would say that is irrelevant and that they still have jurisdiction to proceed with trying him on this indictment.

关键在于被告是否出现在法庭上，而不是他是如何到达那里的。

The idea is what matters is the defendant's presence before the court and not how he got there.

这就是为什么我们应该仔细审视针对马杜罗的案件，因为根据你所说的，这些指控似乎会得以维持。

Which is why we should take a really close look at the case against Maduro because that sounds from what you're saying, it's very much going to stand.

我们将在广告后立即进行这一部分。

And we're gonna do that right after the break.

我是乔纳森·斯旺。

I'm Jonathan Swan.

我是《纽约时报》的白宫记者。

I'm a White House reporter for The New York Times.

我对我们的工作持一种相当务实的看法。

I have a pretty unsentimental view of what we do.

我们记者的职责是挖掘那些有权势的人不希望公开的信息，带你们进入你们本无法进入的场所，了解塑造我们国家的一些重大决策是如何做出的，然后 painstakingly 地回访消息来源、核对公开文件，确保信息准确无误。

Our job as reporters is to dig out information that powerful people don't want published, to take you into rooms that you would not otherwise have access to, to understand how some of the big decisions shaping our country are being made, and then painstakingly to go back and check with sources, check with public documents, make sure the information is correct.

这不是你可以外包给人工智能的事情。

This is not something you can outsource to AI.

没有任何机器人能走进情况室，去弄清楚那里究竟说了什么。

There's no robot that can go and talk to someone who is in the situation room and find out what was really said.

为了获得那些非公开的、真正原创的信息，我们需要依赖人类消息源，而这确实需要记者去完成。

In order to get actually original information that's not public that requires human sources, we actually need journalists to do that.

所以，正如你可能从这番长篇大论中察觉到的，我恳请你们考虑订阅《纽约时报》。

So as you may have gathered from this long riff, I'm asking you to consider subscribing to The New York Times.

独立新闻至关重要，没有你们的支持，我们根本无法继续下去。

Independent journalism is important, and without you, we simply can't do it.

所以，查理，既然我们知道针对马杜罗的指控很可能不会因为他的逮捕方式而被法官驳回。

So, Charlie, now that we know that the charges against Maduro are quite likely to not be tossed out by a judge based on the manner in which he was arrested.

让我们谈谈美国对他提出的法律指控。

Let's talk about the legal case that The US is making against him.

这正是逮捕并拘留他在美国的理由，但这并不会成为起诉他的依据。

That was the rationale for arresting him and for detaining him in The US, and that's not gonna be the basis for prosecuting him.

我们了解哪些情况？

What do we know?

马杜罗最初在2020年初，特朗普政府第一任期时，在纽约被起诉，罪名是一项复杂且长期存在的可卡因贩运阴谋指控。

Well, Maduro was originally indicted in early twenty twenty during the first Trump administration in New York on a complicated, long running allegation of a cocaine trafficking conspiracy.

指控称，他和起诉书中提到的其他人多年来与邻国哥伦比亚的马克思主义反叛组织FARC合作，将可卡因运往美国及其他地区，而他深度参与了这一活动。

The idea was that he and others who were named in that indictment had for years worked with the FARC, the Marxist rebel group in neighboring Colombia, to funnel cocaine towards The United States and elsewhere, and he was intimately involved in this.

对。

Right.

指控的核心并非仅仅是他放任此事发生，而是他本人深度卷入其中。

The claim being not that he simply let this happen, but that he was himself deeply deeply involved in it.

是的。

Yes.

他积极与哥伦比亚革命武装力量合谋，将可卡因作为一种武器大量输入美国，并针对这些指控提出了多项罪名。

He was an active participant conspiring with the FARC to flood The United States with cocaine as a weapon, essentially, and a variety of charges were attached to those allegations.

在周六清晨将其逮捕后，司法部公布了一份替代性起诉书，取代了之前的那份起诉书。

And after the seizure of him early Saturday, the Justice Department unveiled a superseding indictment so that replaces that earlier one Mhmm.

修改了一些被告，增加了一些新内容，但仍然将马杜罗作为核心，指控他长期参与可卡因贩运阴谋。

Changed around some of the defendants, added some stories, but keeps Maduro at the heart of what it still alleges is a years long cocaine trafficking conspiracy.

谈谈这份替代性起诉书中列出的证据，以支持马杜罗积极参与这一国际毒品贩运阴谋的指控。

And talk about the evidence that this superseding indictment lays out to support this claim that Maduro is an active participant in this international drug trafficking conspiracy.

这份起诉书非常长，有30页。

So this is a very long indictment, 30 pages.

这并不是一份简略的文件。

This is not a bare bones.

这里列出了一些指控。

Here's some charges.

法庭上见。

See you in court.

这是一种所谓的‘叙述性起诉书’，检察官通过这份文件讲述一个故事，其中提到了具体发生的行为。

It's what is sometimes called a speaking indictment where the prosecutors are using this filing to tell a story, and it talks about specific acts that have happened.

包括在墨西哥缴获一批可卡因、在巴黎缴获另一批，以及马杜罗与其他人的具体对话。

The seizure of a cocaine shipment in Mexico, seizure of one in Paris, specific conversations Maduro and others had.

它还提到具体支付的贿赂，包括给他的妻子的贿赂——这一点是在第二次起诉中新增的。

It talks about specific bribes that were handed over, including to his wife, which was something that was added for the second one.

嗯。

Mhmm.

我们并不清楚这些阴谋的具体证据来源，但这里有很多具体、切实的事件。

So we don't know specifically where all of these examples of a conspiracy are coming from, but there's a lot of concrete tangible episodes here.

这不是模糊抽象的指控。

This is not vague abstract charges.

因此，这表明他们多年来积累了一整套证据，其中必然包括愿意合作的证人，如果开庭，这些证人将出庭作证，说‘我亲眼看到马杜罗说了这话’，‘我亲眼看到他在场，目睹了他做这件事’。

And so what that tells you is that they have built over the years a body of evidence that must include cooperating witnesses who will presumably, if there is a trial, come on for the prosecution and say, saw Maduro say this, and I saw was there in the room when he did that.

事实上，2020年起诉书中最初的两人后来被抓获并达成了认罪协议，一人在2023年，另一人去年。

In fact, two of the original people who were in the 2020 indictment were later captured and reached plea deals, one in 2023 and one last year.

所以我认为可以安全地说，作为认罪协议的一部分，他们必须配合。

So I think that it's safe to say that they, as part of the plea deal, would have to cooperate.

但重点是，这里有很多材料，正在展开一个故事，如果检察官能提供充分证据支持，这将就是审判的样貌。

But the point is that there's a lot of material here, and there's a story that's unfolding here that if the prosecutors have the goods to back it, would be what the trial would look like.

那么，鉴于此，我们该如何看待马杜罗可能的辩护策略呢？

Well, given that, how should we think about what Maduro's defense may be here?

我想先说明一点，我明白我们现在还处于非常早期的阶段。

And I wanna stipulate, I understand how early we are in the process.

马杜罗刚刚被带到美国。

Maduro just got brought to The United States.

他可能还没有律师，或者刚刚见到自己的律师。

He may not have a lawyer or just met with his lawyer.

但我们能预期什么？尤其是考虑到诺列加案的先例，一个外国领导人可能会为自己辩护，反驳这份起诉书中的指控？

But what might we expect, especially given the Noriega precedent that the leader of a foreign country might argue on his own behalf against what's in this indictment?

我们从诺列加案中看到的最重要的一点，似乎极有可能在这里重演，那就是豁免权的问题。

Well, the most important thing that we saw in the Noriega case that seems extremely likely to recur here is the question of immunity.

国家领导人享有被称为外国国家元首豁免权的东西，这是国际法中一个古老的准则，即一个国家的主权者不能被另一个国家拉上法庭、拘留或起诉。

Leaders of countries have something called foreign head of state immunity, and this is an ancient part of international law that this the sovereign of one country can't be dragged into court, detained, prosecuted in another country.

诺列加曾说：嘿。

And Noriega said, hey.

我是巴拿马的国家元首，但最终一名地区法院法官驳回了这一主张，上诉法院维持了这一裁决，因此诺列加在这点上败诉了。

I was the head of state in Panama, and eventually, a district court judge rejected that claim, and an appeals court upheld that ruling, and so Noriega lost on it.

我肯定他们会这么做。

I'm sure Mhmm.

马杜罗和他的辩护团队会再次提出这一主张，而且他的情况比诺列加更有利。

Maduro and his defense team will raise it again, and he's got a stronger case than Noriega did.

为什么？

Why?

首先，诺列加在政治上并非真正合法的巴拿马国家元首。

Well, for one thing, Noriega wasn't really, in any politically legitimate way, the head of state in Panama.

他是一名军事官员，通过政变上台，实际上在幕后操控局势，但巴拿马宪法规定国家应由民选总统领导。

He was a military officer who had just taken over in essentially a coup and was running things behind the scenes, but Panama had a constitution that said it was supposed to have a president who was elected.

因此，布什表示，他不承认此人是巴拿马的合法领导人，而巴拿马宪法也没有任何条款说明他为何能成为国家元首。

And so Bush said, I don't recognize this guy as the legitimate leader of Panama, and the Panamanian constitution didn't have anything to say about why he could possibly be the head of state.

在我看来，特朗普政府正在提出类似的论点，即在阿夫多的案例中，他并非委内瑞拉的合法领导人。

It it strikes me that the Trump administration is making a similar argument, which is that in the case of Adoro, he is not in there telling the legitimate leader of Venezuela.

他们声称，他是通过舞弊选举上台的，因此不应担任总统。

He was brought to power in a fraudulent election, they claim, and therefore shouldn't be the president.

没错。

Correct.

2018年和2024年委内瑞拉的选举中都存在大量舞弊行为。

There was a lot of fraud in the twenty eighteen election in Venezuela and the twenty twenty four election in Venezuela.

在这两次选举中，马杜罗都被宣布为胜者，而外部观察员则认为，这并非一次公正的选举。

In both cases, Maduro is the declared winner, and outside observers are like, that was not a clean election.

嗯。

Mhmm.

2019年，特朗普政府撤回了对马杜罗作为委内瑞拉合法总统的正式承认。

The Trump administration in 2019 withdrew official recognition of Maduro as the legitimate president of Venezuela.

乔·拜登在2024年或2025年初也采取了同样的做法。

Joe Biden in 2024 or early twenty twenty five does the same.

他说：我不承认你为这次选举的胜者。

He said, I'm not recognizing you as the winner of this election.

你不是合法的胜者。

You are not the legitimate winner.

实际上，反对派候选人赢得了这次选举。

The opposition candidate actually won this.

对。

Right.

然而，委内瑞拉的执政机构仍承认他是总统。

Nevertheless, the governing structures in Venezuela do recognize him as such.

他确实声称自己是总统。

He does purport to be the president.

他确实在2013年赢得了一次选举，当时美国也承认他是总统。

He did win an election in 2013, and The United States did recognize him as the president at the time.

因此，这使他在主张国家元首豁免权方面，比诺列加拥有更强有力的地位。

And so that just puts him in a much stronger position to make head of state immunity claims than Noriega ever was.

所以我相信，在马杜罗的案件进入审判前，这一点肯定会引发激烈的法律争议。

So I'm sure that this is something that will be litigated heavily before Maduro's case could ever go to trial.

我想知道，特朗普总统在马杜罗被捕前后所说所做的一些事情，是否会加剧美国对他提起诉讼的复杂性。

I wonder if some of the things that president Trump has said and done before and around the arrest of Maduro are gonna at all complicate The US case against him.

让我举两个例子。

And let me give you two examples.

第一个是，总统曾公开强调，马杜罗的被捕将为美国企业打开委内瑞拉市场。

The first is that the president has very publicly emphasized that Maduro's arrest is gonna be opening Venezuela up to American business.

事实上，你可以说，他在公开演讲中对马杜罗下台后委内瑞拉的经济机遇的强调，超过了对毒品走私指控的强调。

In fact, you could argue that he's put more emphasis on the economic opportunities in a Maduro free Venezuela than he has put on drug trafficking charges in his public speeches.

这重要吗？

Does that matter at all?

这会削弱总统的案件吗？

Does that undermine the president's case?

此外，特朗普总统赦免了被美国定罪的重大毒品贩运罪犯、前洪都拉斯总统，这一事实会影响本案吗？

And for that matter, does the fact that president Trump pardoned the former president of Honduras who was convicted in The US of major drug trafficking charges influence this case at all?

因为这表明，就特朗普而言，他在执行美国的毒品政策时非常选择性？

Because it suggests that when it comes to Trump, he's very selective in enforcing America's drug policies?

所以我认为，这既非常重要，又完全无关。

So I think it it both matters a lot, and it matters not at all.

它对我们观察正在发生的事情、试图从现实政治的角度理解最近事件的真相，以及历史将如何评价派兵进入委内瑞拉抓捕马杜罗的决定，至关重要。

It matters a lot for us watching what's happening, trying to understand what's really going on in a realpolitik account of recent events and how history will think about the decision to send forces into Venezuela to grab Maduro.

显然，委内瑞拉的石油是特朗普考虑并公开谈论过的问题。

Clearly, Venezuelan oil was something Trump was thinking about and talking openly about.

没错。

Right.

在一个没有这类自然资源、也没有这种历史的国家，同样的情况会发生吗？

In a country that didn't have those kinds of natural resource and didn't have this kind of history, would the same situation have played out?

你如何理解特朗普在十二月赦免了被美国指控参与毒品贩运阴谋的洪都拉斯前总统？

How do you make sense of Trump in December pardoning the former president of Honduras convicted of a drug trafficking conspiracy here in The United States?

同样的指控现在也针对马杜罗，但他却说我们必须坚决打击马杜罗。

Exactly the same charges against Maduro now, and yet saying it's really important we gotta go after Maduro.

除非存在超越这个人是否参与毒品贩运阴谋的其他动机和地缘政治利益，否则这种做法毫无道理。

It makes no sense unless there's ulterior motives and geopolitical interests that are bigger than was this particular guy involved in a drug trafficking conspiracy.

没错。

Right.

这些能否成为马杜罗辩护的一部分？这正是我好奇的地方。

Can any of this become part of Maduro's defense is basically what I'm curious about.

我确信，如果马杜罗的辩护团队像任何有能力的辩护团队那样行事，他们会把所有能想到的东西都抛出来，而我们刚才讨论的原因正好为这项指控提供了明显的报复性选择性起诉辩护理由。

I'm sure that if Maduro's defense team does what and you would expect any competent defense team to do, they will throw everything they can against the wall, and some kind of vindictive selective prosecution challenge to the indictment is sitting right there for the reasons we've just discussed.

嗯。

Mhmm.

我非常怀疑这会奏效。

I'm very doubtful that will work.

总统在涉及地缘政治影响、远远超出执法范畴的案件中所发表的言论，我认为法院很可能会认定其与该指控是否基于证据无关。

What is said around a case by a president, especially when there's geopolitical implications, things that go way beyond law enforcement, is I think likely to be found by the court to be just irrelevant to whether or not this indictment of him is based on evidence Mhmm.

他确实实施了这些行为，但这并不意味着辩护方不会提出这些论点，也不会因此耗费大量时间、产生大量法律简报和引发一些头条新闻。

That he'd committed these acts, but that doesn't mean that it won't be something that a defense raises and that will consume a lot of time and create legal briefs and some headlines along the way.

明白了。

Understood.

查理，提醒我们一下，诺列加在巴拿马被捕后，针对他的指控最终结果如何？

Charlie, just remind us what ultimately ends up happening with Noriega and the charges against him after he was captured and arrested in Panama.

所以他提出了各种这类挑战，其中一些我们在这里已经提到过。

So he brought all these sorts of challenges, some of which we've touched on here.

但最终，他在迈阿密由陪审团裁定，十项指控中有八项成立，此后余生都在监狱中度过。

But ultimately, he was convicted on by a jury in Miami of eight of the 10 counts against him, and he spent the rest of his life in prison.

那么，我们是否应该将诺列加的定罪视为对比尔·巴尔法律观点的证实——即真正重要的是国际法之外的东西？

So should we think about Noriega's conviction as validating Bill Barr's legal argument that what really matters is not international law?

如果马杜罗被定罪，我们是否也应得出同样的结论：法院实际上两次认可了这种军事行动？

And if Maduro is found guilty, should we come to the same conclusion that the courts are validating this kind of military operation perhaps twice?

迈克尔，我只是不认为这是看待这个问题的正确方式。

I I just don't think that's the right way to think about it, Michael.

法院并没有审理美国进入他国主权领土所涉嫌违反国际法的问题。

The courts are not addressing the alleged violation of international law that The United States committed by going into another country's sovereign territory.

法院只关注针对这位特定被告的刑事案件和指控。

The courts are only looking at the criminal case and allegations against this particular defendant.

但我也要说，现在就断言这会像1989年那样发展还为时过早。

But, also, I would say, it's pretty early to say, well, this is gonna play out like it did in 1989.

嗯。

Mhmm.

委内瑞拉接下来会发生什么还有待观察。

And what's gonna happen now in Venezuela is yet to be seen.

说到我们还不知道会发生什么，如果马杜罗被判无罪呢？

Well, to the point about us not knowing what's gonna happen here, what if Maduro is found not guilty?

美国会把他送回委内瑞拉吗？

Does The US just return him to Venezuela?

所以，如果他没有达成任何认罪协议，而是走上法庭，陪审团裁定他无罪，那么就没有理由继续关押他。

So in a situation which he doesn't strike some kind of plea deal, goes to trial, a jury acquits him, there's no authority to keep holding him.

因此，他们必须放他走。

So they would have to let him go.

对。

Right.

如果这种情况发生，很可能在马杜罗不再是委内瑞拉领导人之前，已经过去了相当长的一段时间。

And if that happens, presumably, some meaningful amount of time will have passed during which Maduro is not the leader of Venezuela anymore.

也许这个国家已经向前发展了。

Perhaps the country moves on.

这个国家的政治已经摆脱了马杜罗。

Its politics move on from Maduro.

在这种情况下，特朗普政府虽然可能在法庭上未能胜诉，但仍然完全可以实现取代马杜罗作为国家领导人、彻底改变委内瑞拉与美国及美国企业关系的首要目标？

In which case, Trump administration might not prevail in court, but they could still very much accomplish the overriding goal of replacing Maduro as the country's leader and changing Venezuela's entire relationship to The US and to American business?

嗯，我认为这很可能发生。

Well, I I do think that that's likely.

我的意思是，历史已经发生了。

I mean, the history has happened now.

即使马杜罗被无罪释放，他也已经被 physically 移出委内瑞拉。

Maduro is physically removed from Venezuela even in a scenario in which he is acquitted.

那还是很久以后的事了。

That's a long time from now.

这不会是下周甚至明年就会发生的事。

This is not gonna be something that happens next week or even next year.

我们已经讨论过审判前必须解决的各种问题，比如豁免权主张等等。

We've talked about all kinds of stuff that's gonna have to be litigated before there can be a trial, immunity claims and so forth.

这些争议最终会上诉到最高法院，而我认为，无论这个案件最终如何解决，特朗普那时可能已经不是总统了。

That's gonna have to go up to the Supreme Court, And I don't think Trump will even still be president when whatever happens in this case is over.

因此，在此期间，很难想象马杜罗即使被无罪释放，还会回到委内瑞拉并继续担任总统。

And so in the meantime, it's hard to see a scenario in which Maduro, even if acquitted, goes back to Venezuela and is still president.

这似乎已经不可逆转了。

This seems irreversible.

好吧，查理，

Well, Charlie,

非常感谢。

thank you very much.

我们很感激。

We appreciate it.

谢谢。

Thank you.

周日，美国和委内瑞拉继续就美国在委内瑞拉未来中的作用公开争执。

On Sunday, The United States and Venezuela continued to publicly wrangle over the role of The United States in Venezuela's future.

在迈阿密，国务卿马可·卢比奥提出了一项旨在胁迫委内瑞拉领导人而非治理该国的计划，特朗普总统则通过似乎威胁委内瑞拉临时总统德尔西·罗德里格斯的方式支持了这一计划。

In Miami, secretary of state Marco Rubio outlined a plan to coerce Venezuela's leaders rather than govern the country, a plan president Trump reinforced with what appeared to be a threat against Venezuela's interim president, Delsy Rodriguez.

在接受《大西洋》杂志采访时，特朗普表示：‘如果她不做正确的事，她将付出非常沉重的代价，可能比马杜罗还大。’

In an interview with The Atlantic magazine, Trump said, quote, if she doesn't do what's right, she's going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro.

与此同时，在加拉加斯，罗德里格斯采取了和解的语气，她在一份声明中表示，她寻求与美国的合作与共存。

Meanwhile, in Caracas, Rodriguez struck a conciliatory tone, saying in a statement that she sought cooperation and coexistence with The United States.

她写道，我们的人民和我们的地区值得和平与对话，而非战争。

Our people and our region, she wrote, deserve peace and dialogue, not war.

我们马上回来。

We'll be right back.

以下是今天您需要了解的其他内容。

Here's what else you need to know today.

上周末，国会民主党人抱怨称，尽管他们一再要求获得关于该任务的机密简报，但他们仍被蒙在鼓里，不了解在委内瑞拉的军事行动。

Over the weekend, congressional Democrats complained that they were still being kept in the dark about the military operation in Venezuela despite their demands for classified briefings about the mission.

白宫官员声称，由于该行动是为了支持逮捕而非入侵委内瑞拉，因此他们无需在事前或事后与国会协商。

White House officials claimed that because the operation was in support of an arrest and not an invasion of Venezuela, they were not obligated to consult with Congress either beforehand or afterhand.

但这一说法遭到了议员们的抗议，例如康涅狄格州众议员吉姆·海恩斯，他是众议院情报委员会的首席议员。

But that claim drew protest from lawmakers like representative Jim Hines of Connecticut, the ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee.

已经过去二十四个小时了。

It's been more than twenty four hours.

有人向你通报过政府方面的信息吗？

Have you been briefed by anybody in the administration?

还是没接到电话。

Still haven't gotten a phone call.

听好了。

Look.

这是一贯的做法，更是这一届政府完全无视美国国会的典型例证。

This is a long pattern and a particularly egregious example of a pattern of this administration not given a hoot about the United States Congress.

顺便说一下，

Which, by the way

本期节目由里基·内韦茨基和妮娜·菲尔德曼制作。

Today's episode was produced by Ricky Nevetsky and Nina Feldman.

由迈克尔·贝努瓦和帕特里夏·威尔恩斯编辑。

It was edited by Michael Benoit and Patricia Willens.

配乐由马里昂·洛扎诺、阿丽西亚巴·伊图布、丹·鲍威尔和罗文·伊米斯托创作，音频工程由克里斯·伍德负责。

Contains music by Marion Lozano, Aliciaba Itub, Dan Powell, and Rowan Eemisto, and was engineered by Chris Wood.

以上就是今日节目全部内容。

That's it for the daily.

我是迈克尔·洛巴罗。

I'm Michael Lobarro.

明天见。

See you tomorrow.