特朗普与美国经济的对决

解放日已过去数月，我们目睹关税政策反复调整，税率时升时降，各类经济政策不断出台推行。令人惊讶的是，美国经济当前虽显脆弱却相对稳定。真正的压力点出现在就业市场。

It has been some months since Liberation Day, and we've seen tariffs come on and off. We've seen them go up and down. We've seen all kinds of other economic policies applied and pushed. And the kind of amazing thing about where the American economy is right now is it it's shaky but pretty stable. The place we're seeing some stress is in the job market.

近期就业数据屡遭下修。这是否意味着经济开始承压？还是说内在韧性能助其渡过难关？与此同时，特朗普政府——尤其是总统本人——表现得对经济前景缺乏信心。就业数据下修后，特朗普盛怒之下解雇劳工统计局局长，换上意识形态更顺从的人选，这令政府数据的未来可靠性蒙上阴影。

You've seen the jobs numbers revised downward for recent months. So is that the beginning of all this really putting pressure on the American economy, or is the underlying resilience and power gonna push it through? Then there is this other thing happening. The administration, president Trump in particular, is not acting like someone with a lot of confidence in where the economy is going. After the jobs numbers were revised down, president Trump, in a seeming fury, fired the head of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, replacing them with a more ideologically compliant, it seems, person calling into question the future reliability of government data.

他还在持续施压美联储降息。政府行为似乎表明他们渴望获得更大经济政策工具控制权，试图左右经济数据流向。这些意味着什么？娜塔莎·萨林是L预算实验室主席兼联合创始人，身兼经济学家与法学教授。

He's also been pressuring the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates. The administration seems to be acting like they think they need more power over the tools of economic policy making, over the flow of economic data. So what is that going to mean? Natasha Surin is president and cofounder of the L Budget Lab. She's an economist and a law professor.

她兼具学界与政府工作经验，其实验室始终紧密追踪这些政策对美国经济的影响。本次访谈录制于8月8日。鉴于特朗普行事风格瞬息万变，我们无法讨论其新任劳工统计局长提名人，但其余部分已清晰勾勒出承受相当压力的经济图景。我的邮箱EzraKleinshow@nytimes.com照常开放。娜塔莎·萨林，欢迎来到节目。

She has experience in academia and in government, and her lab has been very closely tracking the effect of these policies on the American economy. We recorded this conversation on August 8. As always with president Trump, things are moving fast, so we're not able to talk about his new nominee for Bureau of Labor Statistics, but I think the rest of it paints a pretty clear picture of an economy under a fair amount of stress. As always, my email, EzraKleinshow@nytimes.com. Natasha Sarin, welcome to the show.

非常感谢邀请。

Thanks so much for having me.

本届政府上任约七个月，贸易战开打四个月。美国经济现状如何？

So we are about seven months into this presidency, four months since the beginning of the trade wars. How's The US economy doing?

这是个复杂问题——因为我们尚未掌握全貌。特朗普就职前，美国经济表现相当出色，尤其相较于全球疫情复苏进程。通胀曾居高不下，但正回落至美联储2%目标。虽差临门一脚，趋势已然确立。劳动力市场十分强劲，而后特朗普上台。

You know, that's a complicated question because the answer is we don't really quite know yet. The US economy before president Trump took office was doing really quite well, especially relative to the rest of the world with respect to our recovery from the pandemic. So inflation had been very high, but was coming back down to the Fed's 2% target. They had the last mile to go, but they were directionally there. The labor market was quite strong, and then president Trump took office.

当时包括我在内的许多评论者认为，此刻经济最佳 scenario 就是总统不作为。若他愿坐享经济向好之势——这本就是强劲稳健的经济体，何况即将（我们稍后会讨论）迎来AI带来的生产力提升。但事与愿违，解放日以来政府发起的贸易战，旨在重构全球秩序，却成为我们这代人见证过最具通胀性的政策。

And so many commentators at the time, I myself said, kind of the best case scenario for this economy at this moment is literally if the president does nothing. If he takes credit for the direction the economy is going, it is a strong and robust economy, and one that, and I'm sure we'll get to talk about it, is about to get a productivity influx from AI. And then we didn't do precisely that. Instead, what we did, was on Liberation Day, and since there's been a trade war that's been initiated by the president and the administration with the goal of kind of remaking the global order. And the consequences of the trade war are that it's the most inflationary policies we've seen in our lifetimes.

其影响已开始在经济中显现。耶鲁预算实验室估算，家庭年支出将增加约2000美元，通胀压力加剧，劳动力市场也将因既有政策而走弱。

And so, obviously, it's starting to reverberate in the economy. And the Budget Lab at Yale that I run estimates that we're gonna see household prices increase by something like $2,000 a year. We're gonna see inflation uptake, and we're gonna see a weaker labor market as a result of all that's already been done.

作为专业报道者，我必须坦言当前关税状况令人困惑——税率起伏不定，实施也缺乏连贯性。目前实际关税税率究竟如何？与一年前相比有何变化？

I cover this professionally. And I will say that I am a little confused on where the tariffs are at this exact second, that they've gone up and down so many times. They seem to be applied somewhat inconsistently. Where are we? What what what is the effective tariff rate that The US is placing on the rest of the world, and how does it compare to where we were a year ago?

目前实际关税税率约为18%。特朗普总统上任时这一数字约为2.5%，因此出现了非常显著的增长。

So effective tariff rate at the moment is around 18%. Where we were when president Trump took office was around two and a half percent. So that is a very substantial uptick in

人们购买商品的实际关税比例是多少？

effective tariff percentage of the goods that people buy?

这实质上影响人们购买的所有商品，因为它显然影响了约占经济11%的进口商品。但更重要的是，它还会影响与进口商品竞争的国内商品价格。因为如果进口商品价格上涨，与之竞争的国内商品价格也会随之上涨。顺便说，什么才算是真正的国内商品？比如通用或福特销售的汽车，约60%的零部件是进口的，同样面临这些关税。

That affects essentially everything that people buy because it obviously affects imports, which are around 11% for our economy. But importantly, it also affects the prices that people are gonna see for domestic goods that compete with those imports. Because if the price of imports are going up, then the price of domestic goods that compete with them are gonna go up as well. And by the way, those domestic goods often what is even a domestic good? Because if you take a car that, like, GM or Ford is selling, something like 60% of those car parts are imported and then exposed to these tariffs.

因此我们开始看到的是，消费者购买的所有商品价格实际上都在全面上涨。

And so what we're starting to see is we're starting to see these price increases really across the board in essentially everything that consumers are buying.

但服务业不包括在内。

Not services, though.

不包括服务业。正确。重要的是，耐用品是受这些关税影响最严重的领域。耐用品包括家具、服装、消费电子产品等人们购买的商品，而非经济中工人提供的服务。

Not services. Correct. So importantly, yes, durable goods are the most heavily hit sector by these tariffs. And durables are things like furniture, apparel, consumer electronics, like goods that people buy as opposed to services that are provided by workers in the economy.

此前已实施不同程度的关税。我们被告知将会出现严重短缺。我记得有一段时间，Flexport首席执行官到处说，如果查看航运数据，一切都即将崩溃。我们预计亚马逊、沃尔玛会出现价格急剧上涨。但到目前为止，情况似乎比一些更令人担忧的预测要温和。为什么？

There have been varying levels of tariffs already in place. And one thing that we were being told was gonna happen were huge shortages. I remember a period of time when the Flexport CEO was everywhere saying that if you look in the the shipping data, everything was about to break I think we're expecting to see very sharp price increases on Amazon, at Walmart. So far, things have seemed somewhat muted compared to some of the more alarming predictions. Why?

目前价格上涨幅度尚未达到我们模型的预测水平。但需要明确的是，价格确实在上涨。过去六个月的耐用品通胀是自上世纪八十年代以来（除疫情期间外）任何六个月期间的最高水平。不过关键在于，由于知道总统可能依赖关税这一工具，进口商和零售商在解放日前后的几个月里，甚至在关税暂停实施前，就大量囤积了库存。

So you haven't seen price increases that are as high as our models predict at this moment. But you to be clear, you have seen price increases. So durable goods inflation over the last six months was the highest that it has been over any six month period since the nineteen eighties outside of the pandemic. So you are starting to see price increases. But importantly, knowing that tariffs were a tool that the president was likely to lean on, what you had importers and retailers do in the months leading up to Liberation Day and in the months since, frankly, as these tariffs were paused before taking into effect, is bring in a lot of inventory.

因为想法是：如果我们能抢先于关税行动，以关税前税率进口商品，就不必将价格上涨转嫁给消费者，因为我们进口时无需支付关税。最终，像沃尔玛和宝洁这样的公司开始明确表示，库存即将耗尽。进口商和零售商的利润空间不足以消化这些关税成本而不转嫁给消费者。无论是转嫁100%、70%还是50%的关税，不同行业的经济学家会有不同反应，对这些弹性也有诸多争论。但认为这组政策不会导致价格上涨的想法，与经济结构的现实不符，除非这些关税最终以有意义的方式被撤销。

Because the idea is if we can try to front run the tariffs, we can bring in stuff at the pre tariff rate, and then we won't have to pass on price increases to consumers because we wouldn't have had to pay that tariff when we imported. Eventually, and you're starting to see the Walmarts of the world and the Procter and Gamble's kinda telegraph this explicitly, your inventories are going to dry up. There is just not enough space in the margins of those importers and retailers to eat the cost of these tariffs without passing them down to consumers. Whether they're gonna pass down a 100% of the tariff or 70% of the tariff or 50% of the tariff, economists in different sectors are gonna react differently, and economists have a lot of debate about those particular elasticities. But the idea that you aren't going to see price increases from this set of policies, it just doesn't work with respect to the way the economy is structured unless these tariffs are ultimately rolled back in meaningful ways.

解放日后有一段时间，人们对关税公告的规模、范围和独特性感到震惊。后来他们似乎将政策调整为对世界其他地区实施相当统一的关税，而对中国的关税则高得惊人。接着他们暂停了部分对中国的巨额关税，恢复了对世界其他地区的一些关税。现在的结构是怎样的？

So there was a period of time after liberation day. People were so much shocked by the size and scale and idiosyncrasy, I will say, of the tariff announcements there. And then it seemed that they reformulated what they were doing into a fairly flat tariff with the rest of the world, and then an absolutely astonishingly gigantic tariff on China. And then they seem to have paused a bunch of those astonishingly gigantic tariffs on China and brought back some of the tariffs on the rest of the world. What is the structure?

是的。有段时间看起来我们实际上是在与中国打贸易战。没错。你现在还会这么形容我们的行动吗？还是说我们已经从那立场转变了？

Yeah. It it seemed for a while that what we were really doing now was a trade war with China. Yep. Is that still how you would characterize what we're really doing, or or no? We've flipped back from that.

完全不是。这涉及到过去几个月分析这些关税政策时——甚至坦白说在大选期间——我一直纠结的问题。因为大选期间，记得吗，特朗普总统提出的方案与你描述的类似：对世界其他地区维持较低基准关税（约10%），但对中国征收60%关税。核心思路就是全球低税率，唯独对中国高税率。

Deeply not. And this goes to something that I have struggled with as we have been analyzing these tariffs over the course of the last many months, and even frankly, during the election. Because during the election, remember, president Trump was proposing a version of what you're describing, a higher baseline tariff, but a relatively low baseline tariff at around 10% and a 60% China tariff. So the idea was, like, low rate rest of the world, really high rate on China.

当时觉得这很夸张，共和党人士还向我保证他绝对不会实施如此疯狂的政策。

Which seemed like a big deal, and I was assured by people in the Republican Party he was absolutely not gonna do anything that crazy.

没错。

Correct.

而现在我们税率比那还高。

And we're higher than that.

远远超出。不过中国关税还没最终确定，中国方面还...

We are much higher than that. Well, China hasn't landed yet. China hasn't

没最终确定。对。

landed yet. Yeah.

墨西哥也是。所以这些都是悬而未决的大问题。这引出了我始终难以解答的核心困惑：征收关税的确切目的是什么？如何衡量这套全球贸易新秩序的成功？

And neither is Mexico. So, like, big open questions. And all this gets to the question that I have really struggled with and can't quite answer for you now, which is what exactly are the tariffs for? What is the point of the tariffs? How do we measure success for this new ordering of global trade?

如果关税目的是从国家安全角度重新评估中美关系——这极其重要，毕竟他们是我们的战略对手——我们必须联合其他国家，特别是在某些经济领域。这类贸易政策和战略脱钩主张本应获得广泛支持。

If the point of the tariffs were that we need to reassess our relationship with China from a national security perspective. It's incredibly important. They're our adversary. We must ally with the rest of the world, and particularly in certain sectors of the economy. I think you would find, like, pretty broad based support for a version of that type of trade policy and strategic decoupling or some such.

但认为通过对盟友和贸易伙伴征收高关税——大概是想让我们更接近自给自足——来改善关系的做法...

But the idea that the right way to effectuate relationships with our allies and our trading partners is by imposing really high tariff rates on them in an attempt, I guess, to move us closer to autarky. And that's

你是想说什么是自给自足经济？

You wanna say what autark is?

自给自足经济是一种封闭的经济体系。我们完全自给自足，与世界其他地区隔绝。我不太理解也无法准确描述这种做法的目的。但可以明确的是，我国经济增长已经放缓——过去六个月增长率仅为1.2%左右。

Autarky is a closed economy. So we just do everything ourselves and sort of isolate from the rest of the world. I don't quite understand or have the ability to describe for you what the purpose of that sort of exercise is. And I can tell you something that has already happened, which is that growth in our economy has slowed. Over the last six months, our growth rate has been something like 1.2%.

根据去年11月的预测，本应达到这个数字的两倍。这种政策正在对经济产生实质影响：导致增长减速、规模萎缩。这完全符合我们的模型预测，也是经济学家普遍预期这类政策会带来的结果。

It was supposed to be, as of last November when we made projections, basically twice that. So this is having a real effect on the economy. It is slowing it. It is shrinking it. That's exactly what our models predict, and that's exactly what economists, for at large, would expect to happen from these types of policies.

让我们先暂停讨论政策目标。我认为当前尝试的实质并非纯粹经济行为，而是从美国视角重构全球贸易体系——从多边协议（嗯）和相对中立的贸易规则（嗯），转向通过双边协议（无论是与单个国家还是欧盟这类国家集团）充分施展我们的议价优势（嗯），以获取比原有全球贸易体系更有利的条件。

Let let's hold for a minute in this question of what we're trying to achieve. So one thing that I think is being attempted here is not properly understood as economic at all, which is a restructuring of the way global trade works from the American perspective away from fairly neutral rules governed in multilateral Mhmm. Ways and trade deals Mhmm. Towards bilateral deals between America and either individual countries or in the case of the EU, collections of countries Mhmm. In which we fully exert our leverage to get a better deal out of them than we would get from participating in the the preexisting global trading order.

我认为关键案例就是美欧贸易协定（嗯）。政府近期宣布该协议时表现得非常兴奋。这个协议具体内容是什么？

And so I think the big test case here was the EU trade deal. Mhmm. The administration announced that recently. They're very excited about it. What was that deal?

嗯，它对美国经济有利吗？能证明特朗普赢得了全球贸易战吗？你会如何评价这个协议？

Mhmm. Is it good for The US economy? Does it show that Trump is winning the global trade war? How would you describe it?

在讨论美欧协议胜负时，让我难以认同的是现实情况——以该协议为例：特朗普政府初期欧盟进口商品实际关税约1.5%，协议签订后升至15%。虽然确实降低了某些非关税壁垒，也小幅下调了美国对欧出口关税...

The thing that I'm bristling at as you're describing the EU deal and whether we've won or lost is if you look at what practically has happened as a result of let's take that example in particular. Effective tariff rates on imports from the EU were about one and a half percent at the beginning of the Trump administration. They've gone up as a result of the deal to around 15%. But just baseline, it's true that some non tariff barriers went down as a result of this deal. It's true some tariff rates on US exports to Europe went down somewhat as a result of this deal.

但把1.5%的关税提高到15%以上居然被称为美国人的胜利？这概念让我困惑，就像没人会说把商品消费税提高15倍是民众的胜利。协议中虽有欧盟承诺增加军购、石油采购等条款（日美协议等其他协议也类似），但深究起来实质内容寥寥。

But practically speaking, the idea that taking a tariff rate of one and a half percent and turning it into a tariff rate of 15% plus is somehow a win for Americans. I'm just like baffled by the concept because no one would say that if you took the sales tax on certain goods and you increased it 15 fold, that was a win for Americans. But effectively, that's what we've done. And then it's true there's these other provisions that are in the deal that the European Commission agreed to do a certain amount of arms purchases or oil purchases or investment. But if you look under the hood of all that stuff, and it's true vis a vis the Japan deal also, it's true vis a vis all these deals, there's not really much there there.

比如那些他们根本没有管辖权的条款——只是承诺探索各类公司投资或贷款的可能性，从经济角度看实在乏善可陈。

Like, don't even have authority over. These are commitments to explore the possibility of different types of companies investing or different types of loans. It's not really much from an economic vehicle.

特朗普第一任期对中国也这么干过，结果中国根本没兑现投资承诺。

Trump did this with China in the first term, and China just never made the investments.

从未进行过这些投资。顺便说一句，如果你真要投资，那只会增加贸易逆差，而非减少。所以整件事

Never made the investments. And by the way, if you were to make the investments, that would increase trade deficits, not decrease So the whole thing

是——我们不会在这里纠结一致性。对。我们不会强加一个连特朗普政府自身都不遵循的一致性标准。但让我试着从他们的角度辩解一下。我看他们为包括与欧盟在内的贸易协议辩护的方式是这样的：

is We're not gonna get caught up in consistency here. Yeah. We're we're not gonna impose a consistency that the Trump administration does not impose on itself. But but let me try to argue this from their perspective for a minute. The way I've seen them making the case for their trade deals, including with the EU, is look.

我们进入这场谈判。现在我们对他们加征了关税。在许多情况下，他们并未对我们施加同等规模的反制关税。所以要么他们的商品被征税，钱流入美国国库；要么这些商品转而在美国生产，这对美国有利。总之我们不是得到资金就是增加国内生产，双赢。

We got into this negotiation. We have now imposed this tariff on them. They are not imposing, in many of these cases, an equivalently sized reciprocal tariff on us. So there is a tariff on their goods, which either gets paid, which means more money for the US treasury, or there is an incentive for these things to be made in The United States, which is good for The United States. And so either we get money or we get more domestic production, but it's win win.

对。我想部分认可特朗普政府的是：考虑到在这个国家筹集财政收入有多困难——我们可以深入探讨原因——现实是，根据我们的估算，如果这些关税维持当前水平，将为财政带来约3万亿美元收入。在这个财政不可持续、债务与GDP比率增速过快的时代——部分原因在于上月通过的税改法案——能筹集3万亿美元实属壮举。

Yeah. So a piece that I wanna accept and somewhat credit the Trump administration for is if you think about how hard it has been to find ways to raise revenue in this country, and we can talk a lot about why that is. The reality is if you look at our estimates, and if these tariffs stick at these levels, they are going to bring in something like $3,000,000,000,000 to the FISC. In a world where I think we are fiscally unsustainable, debt to GDP is rising much too quickly. And part of the reason for that is the tax bill that was passed last month, but it's rising.

我对关税和'我们赢他们输'论调的不满，不在于关税是税收所以不好。我恰恰持相反观点。问题在于关税是种恶劣的税制，这也是其他国家选择不报复的原因。其恶劣性体现在两点：

Finding ways to raise $3,000,000,000,000 is a feat, and that is just a fact. And my problem with tariffs and my problem with this whole line of we've won and they've lost, it's not that tariffs are a tax and taxes are bad. I actually think quite the opposite. My problem with the tariffs and why I think you have seen these other countries choose not to retaliate is that tariffs are a bad tax. And they're a bad tax for two reasons.

第一，传统税制追求累进性，让高收入者多纳税，中低收入者少纳税。关税却背道而驰。国内反对消费税的论点正是我们不该打击将收入大部分用于消费的中低收入群体。第二，关税最终会拖累经济增长，因为它将经济活动从最高效的领域转移到我们试图通过这种方式保护的领域。或许你能以国家安全为由辩护——

One is they're a bad tax because we traditionally think of the tax code as wanting to make it progressive, such that the people at the top with the greatest ability to pay are paying more, and the people at the bottom in the middle who have the least ability to pay are paying less. Tariffs do the opposite of that. It's been the argument against consumption taxes in this country that actually we don't wanna hit low and middle income people who consume most of what they earn. But the other piece of it that's bad is that tariffs are ultimately a drag on economic growth because they're diverting activity from the most productive sectors in the economy into other sectors of the economy that we're trying to protect in this way and lift up in this way. And maybe you can make an argument for national security reasons or some such.

某些经济领域确实需要这种保护。但这类扭曲会持续拖累经济增长。

There are certain sectors of the economy you wanna do that for. But that type of distortion drags on economic growth.

具体说明一下。比如我们对欧盟加征关税，这会如何扭曲美国经济活动？

Slow that down. Give give an example of what you're talking about. So we put this tariff on the EU. How does that distort US economic activity?

当我们对欧盟大幅加税时，部分论点声称要促进美国制造业。但事实上，其他国家因其经济结构在某些领域具有比较优势，能以更低成本高效完成这些生产。我们擅长其他领域，却非这些。

So we put this tariff on the EU. If we put lots of tariffs on the EU, some of the arguments that are articulated is that we wanna do more manufacturing in The US. It turns out that other countries have comparative advantages in the ways in which their economies are have been structured to be particularly good at those types of activities. And in fact, they do them in a low cost way that is better than the way that we do them. We do other stuff very well, but we don't do that as well.

若建立一种制度，使得利用他国优势的成本更高，就会激励我们本土化生产。但问题在于这缺乏效率——它将本应集中于我们优势领域的资源，转而投入我们并不擅长的领域。这本质上不是良性经济行为。第二个经济层面的挑战是：商品价格上涨会导致消费减少。

If you create a structure where it is more costly to rely on the advantages that other countries have, you are incenting us to try to do more of that domestically. But the issue is it is not efficient. It is taking activity that otherwise is efficient in our economy and concentrations in sectors of stuff that we are quite good at and instead encouraging us to do stuff that we aren't as good at. And that is ultimately not a positive enterprise. It's a second layer of the challenge for us from an economic perspective is because you are making it more expensive to buy goods, people are going to buy fewer goods.

商品需求将会下降。你们会减少购买电视，沙发也会因为价格上涨而买得更少。随之而来的是，这类产品的生产能力和相关投资也将缩减。因此，不仅因为你们在从事某些本就不擅长的活动会拖累经济，还因为整体经济活动减少，进而导致对未来投资的减少。

Demand is gonna go down for stuff. And you're gonna buy fewer TVs. You're gonna buy fewer couches because they're more expensive. As a result of that, the production and investment in those types of capacities is also going to decrease. And so you're going to get a drag not just because you're doing certain types of activities that you're not inherently very good at, but also because there's just less economic activity being done, and as a result of that, less investment in the future.

所以，要判断他们计划是否部分奏效，可以观察国内制造业投资是否出现激增迹象——比如大量资金涌入工厂建设、培训增加、劳动力向制造业岗位转移。我们目前看到这类现象了吗？

So one way you might see if part of their plan is working is if we see evidence of a boom in investment in domestic manufacturing. A lot more money going into factory construction, a lot more training, diversion of workers into manufacturing roles. Are we seeing something like that?

现有数据并未显示已发生显著变化。如果有人主张数据尚未反映这一趋势，可能会说这需要时间过渡。坦白说，更关键的是当前政策条款和参数远未最终确定。对吧？

So the data does not suggest that there has been much of anything that has happened yet. I mean, if you were making the argument that the data isn't telling us that story yet, you would say, maybe, it takes time. And it's not because, frankly, the terms and the parameters here are far from settled. Right?

嗯。

Mhmm.

如果目标真是针对中国，那么将越南和印度作为iPhone的制造中心投资就非常合理——因为它们不是中国。但如果核心是为了美国...

If this was really about China, then investing in Vietnam and India as manufacturing centers for your iPhones makes tons of sense because they're not China. If it's really about The US They

刚对越南加征了19%关税——这是我们最终确定的税率。

just put an I think it's a 19% tariff on Vietnam is where we landed.

印度目前是50%。

50% on India right now.

对吧？印度50%。关税还有政治层面的考量。我们因印度购买俄罗斯石油而对其征收50%关税。

Right? 50% on India. There's also the political dimension of tariffs. Right? We have a 50% tariff on India because it's buying Russian oil.

中国购买更多俄罗斯能源却未被加征。巴西同样被我们课以50%关税...

We didn't put it on China even though they buy more of that Russian energy. We also put a 50% tariff on Brazil

贸易顺差问题。

Trade surplus.

因为他们正在起诉博索纳罗试图发动政变，但我们与国际上试图政变的右翼民族主义者有团结关系，所以不能允许这种情况。这也表明恐怖分子已成为地缘政治博弈的工具。

Because they are prosecuting Bolsonaro for attempting to execute a coup, but we have an international solidarity with right wing nationalists who try to do coups, so you can't have that. So that is also a way in which the the terrorists have become just a tool of geopolitical leverage.

这绝对正确。我除了是经济学家还是法学教授，所以对其中一些法律层面很感兴趣。令我震惊的是，许多关税基于《国际紧急经济权力法》的授权，这本质上是总统在国家安全紧急状态下获得的权力。而声称对盟友广泛征收关税与国家安全有关的论点非常牵强。顺便说一句，特朗普政府提出的论点是贸易逆差异常紧急，需要关注。

That's definitely true. And I'm a law professor in addition to being an economist, and so I'm kind of interested in some of the legal dimensions of all this. And a thing that I'm struck by is that a lot of these tariffs are based on this authority called IEPA, but it's essentially like emergency authority that the president gets in particular national security circumstances. And the argument that somehow broad based tariffs on our allies have something to do with national security is a very hard stretch argument to be made. And by the way, the argument that the Trump administration has made is that the trade deficits are unusual and exigent and require attention.

你根本无法解释为何贸易顺差国家也适用同一授权。这套说辞简直荒谬至极。我怀疑这种不确定性最终将在法庭上见分晓，因为他们是否具备这样的权力根本是未定之数。

How you can then say that countries that have trade surpluses are somehow part of the same authority. It's just like an incredibly difficult set of arguments to make, And I suspect that part of the uncertainty here is gonna ultimately play out in the courts because these are far from settled questions, whether they even have the authority to do what they're doing.

作为法学教授，您近期是否感觉最高法院越来越不愿接受那些传统上基于文本或牵强附会的论点？

Speaking as a law professor, has it been your recent experience that the Supreme Court seems unwilling to countenance arguments that we would have traditionally thought on the level of text or a stretch?

在这方面我其实持乐观态度。让我印象深刻的是，最高法院在一起与美联储无关的免职案中明确表示总统无权解雇美联储主席。法院认为总统可以解雇许多传统上不受政治影响的任期制官员，但美联储例外。老实说，他们为这个例外找的法律依据相当薄弱...

You know, I am an optimist on this dimension for the following reason. I was struck that the supreme court decided in a case about removal that had nothing to do with the federal reserve, to be pretty explicit that the president doesn't have the authority to fire the fed chair. The supreme court has the view that actually the president can fire a lot of officials who previously served particular terms that have traditionally not been subject to political whims, but not in the case of the Federal Reserve. And honestly, it was kind of like a tenuous legal argument how they managed to exempt the

美联储。从那个案例里你隐约感觉到，最高法院既想满足特朗普的要求，又不想看到自己的股票投资长期归零。

Federal Reserve. You slightly get the feeling from that one that the Supreme Court wanted to give Trump what he wanted, but they also didn't wanna see in the long term all their stock investments go to zero.

我认为最高法院现在处境艰难。国会也没有履行应尽的职责。

I think that the supreme court has a hard job at the moment. Doesn't it? Because and you also doing poorly. I think congress isn't doing its job in the way that it should be.

嗯，这倒是事实。

Well, that's also true.

司法程序缓慢审慎，这些案件都需要时间

The judiciary, it's slow, it's measured, it takes time. All these cases are taking time

最高法院赋予特朗普前所未有的权力，尤其是通过影子案卷大量操作，确实令人震惊。

supreme court giving Trump the level of powers and grants of heretofore unknown authority, and particularly doing a fair amount of it through the shadow docket Yeah. Is a little shocking.

我理解你的意思。我所抱有的同情是——作为最高法院一定很艰难。或许我以法学教授的身份发言，因此才有这种同理心。但过去数月一直存在这场辩论：我们是否正处于宪法危机中？即当法院或某法庭对此届政府作出裁决时，他们是否会同意遵守？对吧？

I hear you. The sympathy that I have is it must be hard to be the supreme court. And maybe I'm speaking as a law professor, and that's why I have this sympathy. But there's been all this debate over the course of the last many months about whether or not we're in a constitutional crisis, where if the court says something or a court says something to this administration, are they going to agree to abide by it? Right?

他们并不具备特定的执法权。我认为你看到的是，这个法院对法治怀有相当的尊重，同时也明白自己身处充满挑战的时代。它某种程度上在审慎选择介入点——虽然选择的可能不是你或法院批评者所期待的那些领域，但我注意到他们确实选择了一些关键节点。

They don't have any particular enforcement authority. And I think what you are seeing is this court has a fair deal of respect for the rule of law, but also understands that it is in challenging times. And it's kinda trying to pick spots, And they're picking they might not be picking the spots to the extent that you would like to see them or other critics of the court would like to see them, but I am struck by the fact that they have picked some spots.

对此我比你更悲观些，但让我们回到关税话题。假设未来一年对中国维持15%到20%的基础关税，嗯。那样的世界会是什么景象？对经济意味着什么？

I think I am more pessimistic about this than you are, but I will bring us back to the the tariffs here. Let's say we have a year of, you know, again, 15 to 20% base tariff, percent tariff on China. Mhmm. What does that world look like? What does that world mean for the economy?

实际影响就是经济规模将比没有这套关税体系时更小。我们估算只要这些关税持续，每年GDP将永久性减少0.4个百分点。讨论财政问题和这些政策经济影响的难点在于，往往很难让这些数字对人们产生具象化的意义。0.4个百分点的GDP相当于——杰森·弗曼对此有精辟分析——约每年1500亿美元，也就是每个美国家庭为此多支出约1000美元。

So practically, what it means is it means a smaller economy than you would have had in the world without this set of systems. And our estimates are we're taking about point four percentage points off of GDP annually forever as long as these tariffs are in place. Part of the challenge with talking about fiscal issues and talking about the economic impacts of these policies is it's often hard to make those numbers, like, tangible to people in a way that is meaningful. So point four percentage points of GDP is like the way to think about it, I think, and Jason Furman had a good piece about this, is that's about a $150,000,000,000 a year. That's about a thousand dollars out of every American family's pocket as a result of these tariffs.

坦白说可能更高些，具体取决于对中国关税最终定在50%还是80%。有趣的是，当经济同时发生其他变化时，人们是否会明显察觉每年这1000美元的损失。因此我一直在思考：当前GDP增长已预期放缓，而现有经济增长很大程度上是人工智能资本支出推动的。

Probably a little bit more, frankly, depending on where the China number lands. Is it 50 or is it 80? The piece that is then interesting is how much do people notice that thousand dollars out of their pocket each year if there are other things happening in the economy at the same time. And so a question that I have wondered the answer to is right now GDP growth is set to slow this year. And to the extent there is GDP growth in the economy, it's on the heels of artificial intelligent capital expenditures.

如果AI发展超预期并带来比预估更大的增长贡献，是否会抵消关税造成的损失？这样在孤立评估贸易政策影响时，精确的反事实分析反而变得困难？

If that ends up going better than we expected and contributes more to growth than we anticipated, Is it gonna wash away the loss from the tariffs such that it is actually hard to do the precise counterfactual if you're isolating the impact of the trade policy?

我们稍谈下AI。本打算稍后讨论，但现在切入正合适。我那些Y世代朋友最近争论——或者说我观察到他们在争论——扣除AI因素后我们是否已处于衰退？

Let's talk about AI for a second. Was gonna do this later, but I think we should we should do it here. So one thing that my, y oriented friends have been debating recently, or I've seen them debating is, are we in a recession net AI?

没错。正是如此。

Yeah. Exactly.

那么说'扣除AI后的衰退'究竟意味着什么？你可以查看GDP数据，进行细分。如果剔除所有AI投资，经济确实呈现衰退迹象。但这不是合理的思考方式，因为首先，那些资金在另一个世界里总会流向其他——

And what would it even mean to say we're in a recession net So you can look at GDP numbers. We can break things down. And probably if you pull out all the AI investment, we're sort of recessionary. But that's not really, I think, a reasonable way to think about the economy because one, that money would be doing something else in

领域。完全正确。

that world. Exactly.

其次，这可能是个绝佳的投资机会，最终都会有回报。但关于AI投资的问题是，它可能不会立即见效，甚至可能根本不会带来回报。整个行业可能会出现大量冗余投资，最终只有少数几家能胜出。

And two, maybe it's a great investment. It's all gonna pay off. But the thing about the AI investment is it might not pay off. It might not pay off immediately. There might be a huge amount of redundant investment in an industry that's only gonna have a couple of winners.

嗯。所以这里面确实有些泡沫成分。从某种程度上说，指望短期内从中获得大量收益并不是个完全稳定的选择。

Mhmm. So there there's something a little bit frothy in this Yeah. In a way that makes it a not totally stable place to be expecting a lot of near term revenue from.

完全同意。你怎么...

Totally. How do you

看这个问题？

think about it?

我觉得'不稳定'这个说法都算轻描淡写了。不断有人问我市场到底怎么了？解放日前后市场大跌，现在关税水平虽然恢复到解放日时的三分之二到四分之三，但市场反应却远不及四月份那么剧烈。

I mean, not stable is a bit of an understatement. People keep asking me, what is going on in the market? The market was down around Liberation Day. We're like basically back to, like, between two thirds and three quarters of where the tariffs were at Liberation Day, and the market doesn't seem to be two thirds to three quarters of the reaction that it had in April.

我能补充一点吗？我们节目的资深编辑拉杰·卡尔玛——他现在任职于《大西洋月刊》——最近写了篇关于股市的精彩文章。他指出，多年来总有人说股市是美联储低利率催生的巨大泡沫。

Well, can I add one thing to that? Rajay Karma, my old who's a senior editor on this show and is an out the Atlantic, he had a great piece about the stock market recently. He made this point that there were years when everybody said, oh, the stock market is just a huge bubble based on low Federal Reserve interest rates.

没错。

Yeah.

后来利率大幅上升，股市却涨得更高。所以长期以来很多人预测股市会出现动荡，但它就是持续上涨。不过现在股市严重依赖这七家科技巨头。

And then those interest rates went much higher, and the stock market is yet higher. So there's been a lot of people predicting for a long time instability in the stock market, and it just keeps going up. But it's very heavily built on these seven tech companies.

确实如此。顺便说一句，沃伦·巴菲特就是长期持有大量现金的人之一，正是因为他认为市场估值过高。这个基本面问题在AI热潮之前就存在。而在AI领域，大部分投资都集中在几家巨头身上，说实话它们对整个市场影响巨大。我认为这关系到你提到的稳定性问题——最终结果可能很好，作为乐观主义者我也希望如此。

Well, that and by the way, Warren Buffett is one of the people who for a long time has been holding a lot of money in cash precisely because he thinks that the market is overvalued. And so that piece is true baseline even without what we're witnessing in AI. And then within AI, so much of it is about these particular giants that are really driving a ton of investment and, frankly, are responsible for a lot of the market. And the reason why I think that is important is your sort of stability piece, which is it very well might turn out to be great. And I, optimist, hope that it does.

就像九十年代末那样，计算机化和互联网带来了出乎意料的生产力提升，这是几年前无法预见的。但令人不安的是，这像是经济运作方式和工具类型的根本性重构。另外我们还没讨论——可能也没机会讨论——它究竟会取代工作岗位还是成为辅助工具？

Kind of great the way in the late nineties, you got a ton of unexpected productivity growth that was really about computerization and a bit about the Internet in ways that you couldn't have predicted or anticipated a few years before. But the thing that is nerve racking about it is it's kind of like a fundamental restructuring of the way that the economy is gonna work and the types of tools that we're gonna use. And there's also we haven't we haven't talked about it and might not get to. Is it gonna displace jobs? Is it a compliment?

这是个替代品吗？就像，我们对这些重大结构性问题的答案一无所知。但我们某种程度上是在下注。

Is it a substitute? Like, we don't know the answers to any of these, like, big structural questions. But we're kinda like taking a bet.

一种思考方式是，如果AI取得成功，其回报将体现在人均生产力的巨大飞跃上。嗯。AI实现了我们此前无法做到的事，它实质上模拟了人类劳动者。是的。这某种程度上正是当前宣传的核心主张。

So one way of thinking about it is that if AI pays off, the way it pays off is a massive forward leap Mhmm. In per worker productivity. A massive forward leap in per worker productivity where AI does something we've not really been able to do before, and it functionally simulates human workers. Yeah. Like, that that is in many ways the pitch being made.

其他发明模拟的是人类工具或畜力。对吧？汽车取代了马匹。而AI试图模拟人类。它能像人类一样对话。

Other things have simulated human tools or beast of burden. Right? The the car replaces a horse. This is trying to simulate humans. It talks to like a human.

它能完成人类在电脑上可能完成的工作。当你听Anthropic的Dario Amadei发言时，这些从业者常提到'装满天才的数据中心'或

It does things that human might do on a computer. When you you listen to Dario Amade from Anthropic, he a lot of these people talk about, you know, data centers full of geniuses or

媲美诺贝尔奖得主的智能。

Smart enough in a noble laureate.

远程工作者的替代品。很难想象这种AI愿景如何在不取代劳动者的情况下创造收益。本质上你是在以理论上无限的程度扩大劳动力池。虽然我们尚未到达那个阶段，但很难设想这个赌注成功时这种情况不发生。所以

Drop in remote workers. It is very hard to see how that vision of AI works in a way that actually creates revenue without displacing workers. What you are functionally doing is increasing by a conceptually limitless amount the pool of labor. Now we're not there yet, but there's some it's very hard to imagine the bet paying off without it happening. So

我在某种程度上同意你的观点。如果细究失业率数据，你会发现受AI影响最深的行业领域——无论是青年还是其他群体——失业率并未实际上升。某种意义上，数据并未体现这种关联。而且，像ChatGPT问世这类AI发展的重要节点，也没有引发失业率拐点，无法得出AI与当前失业趋势存在关联的结论。我的切身感受是，AI彻底改变了像我这类职业的培训体系。

I agree with you, I think, to a certain extent. If you look under the hood of the unemployment numbers, you don't actually see unemployment rising among youths or among anyone in the parts of the economy that are most AI exposed. So in some sense, like, it's just not there in the data. And by the way, you also don't see any inflection associated with things like the introduction of ChatTPT or some of the moment inflection points in the AI boom that would draw you to the conclusion that there's somehow this relationship between AI and the broader unemployment trends that we're observing. What I have experienced is AI has fundamentally changed the nature of what it means to train for a job like mine.

过去经济学博士要花大量时间学习编程和调试代码，泡在Stata帮助中心查资料。现在这些都不复存在了。尽管我接受经济学培训的经历并不遥远，但那段时光已恍如隔世。因此我非常认同你的观点：这里的进步或成功必然表现为劳动力从事与以往不同的工作。

Because it used to be that economics PhDs, like, they would spend a lot of time learning how to code and a lot of time learning how to debug their code, and they would be in these, like, Stata help centers, like, looking things up. And none of that is happening anymore. And in fact, that feels like dinosaur times almost even though I don't feel like I'm that far removed from actually training to be an economist. And so I have a lot of sympathy with your view that it kinda must be the case that progress or success here has to look like a kind of different workforce doing different things than it was before.

以你刚举的例子来说，没有岗位流失的版本是这样的：年轻经济学家不必再花时间调试代码固然很好。提供调试工具不会取代他们，就像计算器、笔记本电脑、Adobe Photoshop或ATM机的出现没有取代人类工作者。说到ATM机，这是个有趣的例子——奥巴马常以此为例，后来却发现银行柜员数量反而增加了

So the version where you do not have job displacement, to even just go to the example you just gave, is it's great if all the young economists don't have to spend hours debugging their code. It doesn't displace them to give them a tool that debugs codes anymore than it displaced everyone to create calculators or, you know Laptops. Laptops or Adobe Photoshop or all the different tools ATM. We use. Oh, the ATM is an interesting I always think about the ATM as an interesting example because Obama always used to talk about the ATM as an example, and then it turned out actually we had more bank

这是我最爱举的例子，我正打算提到

It's tellers than my favorite example. I was gonna give it to

你。但后来那崩溃了。

you. But then that collapsed.

是的。确实如此。

Yes. It did.

现在我们有了更少的银行柜员。所以这里存在一个滞后。而且存在一个AI让每个人都变得更高效一些的世界。我能更快完成工作。这样你就能从我这里获得更多产出。

And now we have fewer bank tellers. So there there was a lag. And there's a world where AI just makes everybody a bit more productive. I can get my work done faster. And so you can get more out of me.

嗯。也许这意味着要么你想要更多像我这样的人，因为我们更有价值。或者类似的情况。更多是，我认为要收回投资所需的水平，需要看起来更像是替代的东西。

Mhmm. And maybe that means either you want more people like me because we're more valuable Yeah. Or something. It's more that the level of investment I think to pay off requires something that looks more like replacement.

是的。这很有趣。

Yeah. That's interesting.

所以，我提出的主张并不是说你无法想象一个AI只是让每个人都变得更高效一点的世界。我主张的是，投资的水平看起来并不像人们在为那样的世界做准备。

So the the the claim I'm making is not that you can't imagine a world where AI just makes everybody a little bit more productive. The claim I'm making is that the level of investment doesn't look like people preparing for that world.

一个我们确实会经历一波波失业的版本，我曾想过，这是否会将我们推向凯恩斯主义的方向，比如我们将拥有十五小时的工作周，因为最终所有工作都可以由免费的智能体以自动化方式完成？这对社会意味着什么，这是一个我们尚未真正应对的问题。

A version where we do get waves of displacement, I have wondered, does it move us in the direction of, like, the Keynesian, we're gonna have fifteen hour work weeks because there's gonna be all of this work that can be done ultimately in an automated way by agents that are free? And what does that mean for society is like a question that we just haven't really grappled with.

从这里到那里的过渡是噩梦般的。那可能是个很好的终点，但从此岸到彼岸的过程是个噩梦。

The transition between here and there is nightmarish. That might be a great place to end, but between here and there is a nightmare.

我觉得很多人从中国冲击的文献中吸取了教训

I feel like a lot of people draw the lessons of the China shock literature

嗯。

Mhmm.

这似乎在告诉我们一些关于贸易的事情。确实如此。但我认为它实际上揭示了就业市场和劳动力的现状，以及实践中诸如技能提升、再培训、学徒制这些术语所代表的种种举措实施起来有多么困难。

As telling us something about trade. And it does. But I think it really tells us something about the job market and labor and how difficult actually, like, the words we use, upskilling, retraining, apprenticeship, how hard all of that stuff is in practice.

是啊。我们在这方面做得非常糟糕。

Yeah. We are very bad at doing that.

没错。

Yeah.

我设想过一种未来：某个事件会戳破所谓的AI泡沫，导致人们退缩，就像互联网泡沫时期那样。但这并不意味着AI不再是实用技术。事实上，由此引发的经济衰退时期，正是人们——

A future I have considered is something happens that pops the quote, unquote AI bubble that makes people pull back in the way that the .com boom made people pull back. But that doesn't make AI a non useful technology. And in fact, the recession it causes is the time in which people

正是

in which

企业开始尝试将AI深度整合到运营中替代人力的阶段，这种情形在经济衰退期很常见。这些时期往往是企业围绕新技术进行重组的重要阶段。我不想对此过于悲观，事态可能有多重发展方向，这只是其中一种可能性。

companies begin trying to build AI into their firms at the ground level, replacing people, which is something we often see in recessions. Those are often big periods where firms retool themselves around new technologies. I don't wanna be too doom and gloom about this. It could go many different ways. It just seems like one of the ways it could go.

这个观点非常有趣。我们在财政讨论中也提到过：面对不可持续的债务本质，在这个看似不关心赤字的环境里，最终该如何应对？有人提出，你需要的其实是一场小型财政危机。因为这种危机（无论具体指什么）能集中注意力，促成那些平时难以想象的政策妥协——无论是大幅增加税收还是削减开支。你关于AI的论述某种程度上也类似，你需要一场小型危机。

That's, like, very interesting. I have we talk about it in fiscal too that the nature of our unsustainable debt, how do you deal with it ultimately in a world, in a climate that doesn't feel like it cares that much about deficits? And a thing that people say sometimes is what you want is you want a small fiscal crisis. Because a small fiscal crisis, whatever that means, is going to focus the mind and bring all these policy compromises that you couldn't imagine else whether you're gonna raise a lot of revenue, you're gonna find ways to cut spending. And a little bit what you're saying in AI almost is you want like a small crisis.

因为小型危机能提供空间，让你真正区分哪些是泡沫、哪些是切实可行的技术，并找到这些技术未来的实际应用场景。只是当下，太多巨头都在追逐相似的未来图景。

Because the small crisis is gonna give you the scope to actually weed out what is froth and bubble from what is real and tenable and actually figure out how to deploy a lot of this technology in ways that are ultimately going to be the future of the landscape. It's just right now, there's like a lot of different very large figures chasing a bit the same future.

当前对AI的投资要达到什么效果才算成功？需要多快见效？这些投资者的耐心能持续多久？

What would it mean for the level of investment we're seeing in AI to pay off, and how quickly would it have to happen? Like, how patient are the investors here?

这某种程度上回到了我之前提到的九十年代末生产率繁荣期。当时生产率增长从之前十年的1%左右跃升至3%，这种显著提升实质上是计算机化的成果——人们学会了如何将十五到二十年前开发的技术深度融入企业运营模式。

You know, it goes back a little bit to what I was saying about the late nineties and the productivity boom. In that, the late nineties, you got like productivity growth of around 3% in an economy that for the prior decade had been closer to 1%. So big productivity enhancement. And that productivity enhancement was really about computerization. It was about learning how to take the technologies that had been developed really fifteen, twenty years prior and figuring out how to deploy them in the way that businesses do their work.

我怀疑即使是变革性技术也需要时间才能充分发挥其潜力。事实上，在使用过它之后——我相信你也用过——我们谈论的是那种能让我的工作变得更好的重大变革性技术。我不知道你是否应该预期，但再次声明，这可能是著名的遗言，明年这个时候我们是否会讨论因AI导致劳动力市场出现大量岗位替代。

I suspect that even transformational technologies take time to fully realize their potential. And I do actually think, having used it, as I'm sure you have, we're talking about, like, big transformational technology that's going to make my work better, I don't know whether you should anticipate but again, famous last words, whether you should anticipate next year this time us talking about a ton of displacement in the labor market that's attributable to AI.

但就目前而言——我认为这一点很重要，因为人们一直在听关于年轻工人现状的讨论。劳动力市场常被形容为有点冻结。招聘不多，但裁员也不多。在大学毕业生的数据中，在年轻工人的数据中，我们并未看到AI导致的岗位替代。

But right now and I think this is an important point because people have been hearing these conversations about what's happening with young workers. The labor market people often describe as a little bit frozen. There's not that much hiring, but there's not that much firing either. In the data for college graduates, in the data for young workers, we are not seeing AI displacement.

我们目前没有看到AI替代岗位的证据。我们看到的是很多氛围性的东西。这有点像你描述的情况，但目前数据中并未体现。这种情况以任何方式都尚未发生。

We are not seeing evidence of AI displacement right now. We are seeing a lot of vibes. So that's a little bit what you're describing, but it's not in the data right now. It has not happened in any way.

AI与就业还有另一个维度：AI与工资的关系。如果你采用特朗普政府最常应用于经济的分析——即更多劳动力意味着更低工资。这是他们对移民问题的根本观点。

There's another dimension of AI versus jobs. There's also AI versus wages. So if you take the economic analysis that the Trump administration applies most often to the economy, which is that more labor means lower wages. That is their fundamental view of immigration.

嗯。

Mhmm.

认为更多人口对你不利。即使这些人与大多数美国工人相当不同。对吧？能说英语的工人和不能说的工人差别很大。他们会拉低你的工资。

That more people here is bad for you. Even when they're fairly different than most American workers. Right? It's very different to have a worker who can speak English and a worker who cannot. They are bad for your wages.

对吧？这就是J.D.万斯的想法。这就是唐纳德·特朗普的想法。

Right? That is what J. D. Vance thinks. That is what Donald Trump thinks.

这正在推动相当数量的政府政策。我认为如果你把这个理论应用到AI上——我不确定我会这么做，因为我也不把它应用到移民问题上。是的。但如果你把这个理论应用到AI上，你应该相当担忧。而有趣的是他们似乎不这么看。

That is animating a fair amount of administration policy. I do think that if you apply that theory to AI, and I'm not sure that I do because I also don't apply it to immigration. Yeah. But I think if you apply that theory to AI, you should be quite concerned. And I think it's interesting they don't seem to see it that way.

首先，你不把它应用到移民问题上的原因是这个理论并不成立。对吧？关于这个问题的实证证据非常充分，表明移民或移民涌入这个国家并不会导致本土工资下降。实际上，你提出的是一个版本：难道他们不应该在这些方面担心AI吗？我觉得反过来问：难道他们不应该在这些方面减少对移民的担忧吗？

So it's so first of all, the reason why you don't apply it to immigration is because it is not true. Right? There is just the empirical evidence on this question, and it is vast, is that there is not a decrease in home wages that is associated with immigrants or immigration into this country. And, actually, it's a you're saying one version, which is shouldn't they be worried about AI on these dimensions? I feel like the flip side, shouldn't they be less worried about immigration on these dimensions?

绝对应该减少对移民的担忧。

Should definitely be less worried about immigration.

顺便说一下

And by the way

还有生育率。对吧？

And and births. Right?

生育率。我是说，所以

Births. I mean, so

不。如我所说，本届政府最不擅长的就是保持一致性。但如果你认同他们对移民和工资的看法，奇怪的是你或许不该认同他们对生育率的观点。是的。因为你不希望

No. As I said, consistency is not the strong suit of this administration. But if you have their view of immigrants and wages, you weirdly should probably not have their view of fertility rates. Yes. Because You don't want

更多劳动力。

more labor.

不是你不想要更多劳动力，而是本土劳动力之间的竞争远比本土与外来劳动力之间的竞争激烈得多。

Not you don't want more labor, and there is much more competition Yeah. Between native born labor than between native and foreign born labor.

也许他们对你的论点是——再次声明我不同意这些观点——但可能他们会说我们面临深刻的人口结构挑战（确实如此），作为老龄化社会，你其实希望二十年后有大批新人进入劳动力市场，而不是现在。但这同样说不通。

Maybe their argument to you would be again, I don't agree with any of this, but I'm just trying to maybe the argument would be that we have such deep demographic challenges, which we do. Right? We're an aging population that you actually want a bunch of new kids to enter the labor force in twenty years, but you don't want them now. But again, that doesn't make any sense.

不认为他们会提出这种论点。

Don't think that would make they would make that argument.

我也觉得这毫无道理。事实上，这周我刚和国会预算办公室的人讨论过：当前国家面临的诸多挑战与劳动力供给有关，这你当然清楚。

And I don't think it makes any sense. Right? In fact, by the way, a thing that I was just talking to someone at the congressional budget office about this this week. A bunch of the challenge that we face right now as a country has to do with labor supply. Obviously, you know this.

现有生产力预测显示未来十年增长率约为1.8%，这个相对有限的增长是基于模型假设——未来十年我们会像过去十年那样接收大量移民。如果无法获得这些劳动力供给，这种生产力增长就会落空。

And the productivity estimates that exist would show productivity growth in the next decade, but relatively limited productivity growth, about 1.8% in the next decade. They are on the backs of models that believe that we are going to have a lot of immigration into this country over the course of the next decade like we have in the last decade. And so that productivity growth kind of falls away in a world in which you're not getting this labor supply.

是的。用最简单的方式描述政府试图构建的未来图景：我们面临人口老龄化，出生率持续下降，而他们想将移民压缩到涓涓细流甚至近乎零，同时大规模驱逐外籍劳工。如果长期实施这种政策，从经济结构上看将会非常不利。

Yeah. Just in a very simple way of describing the future that the administration is trying to build. We have an aging population. We have a falling birth rate, and they want to squeeze immigration down to a trickle or near zero while deporting large numbers of workers. And if you held that policy for an extended period of time, that would look just structurally very bad for the economy.

我们将完全丧失生产力

We you would have no productivity

增长。人工智能。

growth. AI.

他们确实需要——这有点像你提到的观点——我们是否正处于一场没有人工智能的经济衰退中？我认为我们对AI押注太大。与此同时，我们还人为制造了贸易不确定性，这种不确定性并不像AI那样具有潜在上升空间，纯粹是风险，纯粹是负面影响。

They really need that's a little bit what it's like your thing about is it are we in an absent AI recession? I think we're banking a lot on AI. Into that, we are also adding this, like, man made uncertainty in trade that doesn't actually have the potential upside that you can get from AI. It's just risk. It's just bad.

我们一直在围绕就业问题打转。现在来谈谈就业市场——最近刚发布了一份就业报告，还引发了关于解雇劳工统计局局长的次要新闻，这个我们稍后再讨论。

We've sort of been circling jobs. Let's talk about the job market. There was a a jobs report that came out very recently. It led to a a sort of secondary story we'll talk about about firing the Right. The head of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

很重要。但在深入之前，这份就业报告究竟揭示了什么？它应该让我们如何看待当前劳动力市场？

Important. But before we get into that, just what did that job report say, and what should it make us think about the labor market?

今年上半年出现了一个矛盾现象：经济正在放缓——根据我们预算实验室的估算，这完全符合预期，毕竟关税税率相比一月份已上涨了七八倍。但与此同时，劳动力市场却表现出惊人韧性。通常经济放缓时，劳动力市场也会随之疲软，企业会减少招聘甚至裁员，因为他们预见到经济收缩。

So over the course first half of this year, there was a bit of a puzzle because the economy was slowing down. And that is because of, again, our estimates at the Budget Lab suggest, that is what you would expect in a world in which you have tariff rates that have gone up seven or eight times relative to what they were in January. But at the same time, the labor market was looking very resilient. And so you'd expect as the economy is slowing that the labor market would be slowing. Fewer firms would be hiring people or even they would be firing people because they're anticipating or they're watching the economy shrink.

就业数据告诉我们，其实并不矛盾——因为这种放缓正在发生。过去几个月，除教育和医疗服务业及少量AI领域外，几乎所有经济部门的招聘都显著停滞。这个事实不应让我们太惊讶，毕竟劳动力市场仍保持强劲，失业率仅略高于4%。

And what the jobs number told us is that, in fact, there is no puzzle because that is happening. Over the course of the last few months, hiring has stalled very significantly in essentially all sectors of the economy outside of education and health services and AI a little bit. And I think that that fact shouldn't be that surprising to us. Again, we still have a pretty strong labor market. Unemployment is still just a tick above 4%.

但确实开始显现出受当前贸易政策压力的迹象。

But it is starting to show the signs of a labor market that is under some pressure from this trade policy.

我认为就业报告中一个有趣的点是分行业观察劳动力市场。正如你提到的，劳动力增长几乎完全来自医疗保健领域。

One of the things I thought was interesting in the jobs report is if you break the labor markets down by sectors. And as you mentioned, the growth in labor was coming from really primarily health care.

医疗保健。

Health care.

彭博社有个数据显示，若剔除医疗保健行业，过去三个月的新增就业数据是这样的：五月减少5.3万岗位，六月减少4.5万岗位，七月减少300个岗位。没错。医疗保健行业本身没问题。

So there's a sign from Bloomberg. Without health care, the last three months of payroll gains look like this. Minus 53,000 jobs in May, minus 45,000 jobs in June, and minus 300 jobs in July. Yep. Now there's nothing wrong with health care jobs.

其中很多都是优质岗位，但这个行业并非经济中的高生产力领域。某种程度上说，它主要是照顾老年人的行业。

Many of them are very good jobs, but it's not a high productivity sector of the economy. It's it's primarily, in a way, caring for older people.

嗯。

Mhmm.

我们当前的发展方向看起来缺乏活力。

It doesn't look very dynamic where we're headed here.

顺便说，医疗保健行业的另一个特点是，它是最不受贸易政策影响的经济领域之一。所以这部分数据其实在暗示：其他经济领域正在承受主要冲击。关税政策已开始显现实质性影响，我预测未来几个月这种趋势会持续显现。

Well and another thing about health care, by the way, is it's one of the sectors of the economy that's least impacted by the trade policy. Right? So in part, I think what it's telling you is that the rest of the economy is, like, really bearing the brunt. Like, the tariffs are really starting to bite. And it is going to continue to show those signs in the months ahead, I predict.

本次就业报告中备受关注的一点是对前两个月数据的较大幅度修正。请解释下什么是数据修正及其原因。

So one of the things that got a lot of attention in this jobs report was the pretty big revisions to the previous couple of months. Just walk me through what revisions are, why they happen.

完全正确。劳工统计局实时采集劳动力市场数据的方式是：抽样调查约三分之一的非农雇主，并要求他们在较短时间内回复——毕竟要保证数据的时效性。这些月度数据会经过样本量调整等处理，力求更具代表性。

Totally. The way that the Bureau of Labor Statistics collects data in real time about the labor market is it surveys about a third of non farm employers. And it gives them a relatively short period of time to respond to that survey because, again, it's trying to be in live time. These are monthly numbers. And they do a bunch of sample size adjustment and, you know, sort of trying to make it more representative of a sample, but that's basically the exercise.

之后通常会进行两次修正。随着更多调查对象回复，数据会相应调整。我知道当总统说五月和六月共下调25.8万就业数据时，这个数字听起来很大。但必须结合背景来看：首先，25.8万仅占劳动力总量的约0.16%，修正幅度其实很小。

And then there are always revisions twice. They revise the numbers as they get more information, more people answer the survey. I know the numbers sound big to people when they hear them and the president says 258,000 jobs or some such were revised. You really need to put the numbers into a ton of context. So first of all, 258,000 jobs revised downward for May and June.

事实上过去二十年间，劳工统计局实时报告的准确性已显著提升——毕竟实时追踪美国经济中的雇佣动态本就不易。真正令人担忧的是：当全球都羡慕美国政府数据采集的先进性时（这堪称数据收集的金标准），我们却在这个时刻...

That is just a tick above point it's about point 16% of the labor force. It is a relatively small revision. And in fact, over the last two decades, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has gotten much more accurate with respect to its reporting in real time, which again is a hard thing to do about the state of hiring and firing in the American economy. The thing that I find really concerning about all of this and this moment is that the rest of the world sits with envy about how good government data collection is in The United States. It is like the gold star of data collecting.

市场、普通民众以及其他国家对数据所代表的意义怀有极大的信任，同时对数据收集方法（如数据如何采集及其传达的信息）保持着高度透明。我担忧的是，数据收集的政治化问题远比已获得的关注更为重大、严峻且令人不安——尽管它已引发大量关注（这是应当的），但理应得到更多重视。从某种意义上说，这并非我们过去几个月所见到的孤立案例。

There is a ton of trust by markets, by regular people, by other countries in what these numbers mean and what they represent. And a ton of transparency with respect to the methodology, like how the data is collected and what it's telling us. I just worry that the politicization of our data collection is like a much bigger and more important and more troubling story than I think it's gotten. It's gotten a ton of attention as it should, but it deserves even more. And it's not an isolated example in some sense of what we've seen in the last few months.

比我更懂这些数据的人告诉我，劳工统计局的局长或其负责人实际上并没有太大——

One thing that people who understand this data better than I do tell me is that the commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics or the the the head of it doesn't actually have that much

从未插手过数据。

Never touches it.

在数据发布前，他们也只是在很短时间内才能看到。这是调查反馈的结果，数据源源不断进来，你甚至能看到原始数字。

In the data. They only see it very shortly before it goes out anyway. It's survey response. It's coming in. You can actually see the raw numbers.

所以一方面，此举并未显著增加操纵数据的机会；另一方面，这一行动的意图以及试图将事物置于某种控制之下的努力非常令人担忧。你是完全将其视为特朗普对某人发火（实则无关紧要），还是认为一年后我们可能无法再信任就业数据？

So on the one hand, the opportunity for monkeying around with this is not so dramatically increased by this move. And on the other hand, the intention Mhmm. Of the move and the effort to sort of bring things under a kind of control is very worrying. How much do you Totally. Take this as just like Donald Trump got mad at somebody, but it doesn't really matter versus in a year, we may not be able to trust the jobs numbers?

希望你是对的。我一直强调，劳工统计局有约2100名员工，但政治任命者仅一人。

I hope that you are right. I've always made the point that BLS has about 2,100 employees and one political appointee.

嗯。

Mhmm.

这名政治任命者本质上只是递送数据信封的人，并不参与数据估算的构建或呈现。显然，此前没有任何迹象需要担忧，因为若存在数据政治化或篡改，大批尽职的公务员早就会离职并警告这些数据不可信。但将经济统计政治化的想法实在令人深感不安，充满反乌托邦和威权主义色彩。比如在阿根廷，当局曾施压要求发布更‘友好’的通胀和贫困估算。

And the political appointee is essentially the person who like delivers the envelope with the numbers. Like, they're not involved in the construction of or in the presentation of these estimates. And there were no signs that there was any reason to be concerned, obviously, because if there were any politicization or monkeying around in the data, you would have legions of dedicated civil servants who would be out the door and telling you that this is, like, not to be trusted. But I think the idea of politicizing economic statistics is so deeply disturbing and dystopian and authoritarian. You know, in Argentina, there was a ton of pressure put to report friendlier inflation and poverty estimates.

最终投资者意识到被欺骗，长期拒绝向阿根廷提供新的国际贷款，因为他们无法信任数据。又如希腊，因瞒报赤字并引发统计学家因坚持真相而遭刑事起诉的公开争论，直接触发主权债务危机。当然，我们既非阿根廷也非希腊，但若开始质疑‘我们相信数字、如实报告数字、可信任数字’这些基本准则，我认为这将是一条极其危险的滑坡。坦率说，我不知道如何消除我们此刻共同感受到的新焦虑。

And ultimately, investors realized that they were being duped and decided that they, for the longest time, would not actually make new international loans to Argentina because they couldn't trust the data. Or in Greece, you literally triggered a sovereign debt crisis on the heels of underreporting deficits and having sort of public arguments that resulted in criminal prosecution for statisticians who tried to present truth. And, obviously, though we are not Argentina and we are not Greece, but I think going in the direction of starting to draw into question some of these, like, fundamental truths that we, like, believe in numbers, we report the numbers, we can trust the numbers. I think it's like a really slippery slope. And frankly, I don't know how you undo the new nervousness that we all seem to be feeling.

数据还可能通过另一种方式贬值：劳工统计局正面临相当严重的人才流失问题。

There's also another way that data can degrade, which is the Bureau of Labor Statistics has seen fairly large attrition.

是20%。

It's 20%.

20%。这正值唐纳德·特朗普和Doge这类人物对行政体系宣战，许多人并不真正愿意为他们效力。想象一下，即便无法造成太大破坏，特朗普若任命某个主要因对特朗普阿谀奉承而闻名的右翼国会议员来掌权，很可能会导致大批优秀人才流失。

20%. This has been amidst Donald Trump and Doge sort of declaring war on the administrative state and plenty of people not really wanting to to work for them. And then you just imagine that Trump puts in charge, even if they can't do all that much damage, just some right wing member of congress who's primarily known for being a licks spittle to Donald Trump. And you might just see a lot of good people leave.

是啊。

Yeah.

而接替者素质会更低，因为劳工统计局的声誉在其需要吸引的群体——那些极度严谨、坚信数据收集与推断的完整性是至高准则的统计学家——心目中已经受损。在一个先进民主或发达社会里，你这样做就是在瓦解人才根基，挫伤士气。任何机构若遭遇这种情况，其产出质量必然下降。

And the people who'd be coming in would be less good because the reputation of the Bureau of Labor Statistics would have degraded to the people who it needs to attract, which is very, very, very literal minded statisticians who believe very heavily that the integrity of data collection and data inference is, like, the highest good Yeah. In an advanced democracy or an advanced society. And what you do is you just begin to break the talent there, and you demoralize it, and you dispirit it. And if you do that to any organization that does anything whatsoever, you will get a worse output. You will get a worse product.

就本案而言，这个产品就是经济数据。

And in this case, the product is economic data.

所以我非常担忧，这种现象已经在整个政府层面初现端倪。特别是劳工统计局，他们的工作信条能让你窥见其员工的职业操守——他们不会告诉你杯子是半空还是半满，而会严谨声明：这个八盎司的杯子装有四盎司液体。这种绝对中立的立场，他们视若生命般坚守。

So I'm so worried about that, and you're already starting to see it happen across government. And particularly with respect to the BLS, like, a sort of statement that they make, which tells you a little bit about the temperament of the people who work there, is they won't tell you whether a glass is half empty or half full. What they'll say is that eight ounce glass has four ounces of liquid in it. So that is the degree to which they do not spin in any direction. And they take that responsibility so immensely seriously.

正是这些将毕生奉献给公共事业的公务员，让政府机构成为值得驻足的地方。劳工统计局已流失大量劳动力，数据收集能力明显下滑。某些地区的价格指数统计工作因人手不足被迫停止，疫情后我提到的调查问卷回复率也持续走低，这很成问题。

And it's one of the things that makes government like a remarkable place to get to spend some time is to be around these civil servants who take so much pride in the work that they do and the contributions that they make to our ecosystem. BLS has already lost a very significant share of the labor force, and its data collection efforts have already degraded. So it's already the case that certain aspects of price indices that they used to collect in certain parts of the country, they don't have the capacity to do that work anymore because they've already suffered. It's also the case that response rates for the survey that I was describing, they've actually gone down post COVID, and that's a problem.

没错。从70%降到40%左右吧？

Yeah. From about 70 to forties. Right?

小企业尤其严重。回复率下降的现状与我们期待提升调查质量的目标背道而驰。讽刺的是，我们一边要求政府改进这些环节，一边却在削减其改善所需的资源与能力。正如拉斯·沃特所言，公务员们每天醒来都如同噩梦——我们正在把政府机构变成人才避之不及的地方。

And particularly for small businesses. So response rates have declined. And so I do think there's, like, some deep irony here, and the survey responses are in a situation where we would like to see improved response rates, and it's something we would like to see the BLS invest in. And yet precisely those aspects of government that we want to improve, we are simultaneously taking away their resources and capacity to improve. We are making them places where civil servants don't want to work because like Russ Vaught promised, every day that they wake up is a nightmare.

这些影响的恶劣程度将超越本届政府任期。那些本可在私营部门获得更高薪酬却坚守政府统计工作、致力于改善国家税收体系的人才，是我们莫大的幸运。而现在我们正以种种方式驱散这些人才，最终只会加剧本届政府正确指出的那些问题。

And so I think these things, they have longer term repercussions beyond this administration. We are so lucky to have people who could get paid much more if they go to the private sector, feel like they're dedicated to government statistics or to improving tax collection in this country. And we're sort of chasing a lot of talent out the door in ways that are really gonna redound and make some of the problems that have rightly been identified by this administration much worse.

这集节目中令我沮丧的事情之一，是唐纳德·特朗普经济委员会主席凯文·哈西特对此决定的背书。作为长期报道华盛顿经济政策的记者，我认识凯文很久了。他一直是华盛顿经济政策圈的核心人物。我认识的那个凯文，甚至包括拜登政府时期的凯文，如果乔·拜登做出这种事，凯文·哈西特和特朗普政府其他人绝对会——理所当然地——暴跳如雷。

Among things that depressed me about this episode, one of the ones that was high up there was Kevin Hassett, the head of Donald Trump's economic council endorsing the decision. And like a lot of reporters who have covered economic policy in Washington for a long time, I've known Kevin a long time. He's very much part of the sort of Washington economic policy community. And the Kevin I knew for many, many years, and I believe the Kevin who existed even during the Biden administration. Like, if Joe Biden had done this, Kevin Hassett and others, frankly, in the Trump administration would have lost their minds correctly.

理所当然地。一方面，我并不认为劳工统计局领导换人会立即对经济统计数据产生多大影响。但最令我不安的是这种无底线的同流合污，因为有些事确实可以施加政治影响。其中有些是公开的重大事件，更多则是隐蔽的小动作。

Correctly. And so on the one hand, I don't really think that the replacement of the BLS lead is gonna change economic statistics that much and then at least in the near term. But it was the bottomlessness of complicity that disturbed me most because there are things that you can politically influence. And some of them are very big and well known and happen in public. Many of them don't happen in public, and they're smaller.

可怕的是这届政府官员似乎毫无底线——身处这个政府就意味着放弃原则。我能想象他们如何自我开脱：唐纳德·特朗普是总统，如果他不喜欢劳工统计局局长，我们就换掉他。

And that there's just no line for people in this administration, that the the nature of being in the administration is that you do not have a line. Is very worrying. And I'm I know I can imagine how you would rationalize it to yourself. Say, Donald Trump is the president. If he doesn't like the Bureau of Labor Statistics Commissioner, like, we get rid of them.

这确实是他的特权。他肯定会找个合适人选接任。但仅仅因为数据不如意就开除官员，这种体制极其恶劣。我们在许多国家都见过这种先例。

That's his prerogative. Right? And he'll I'm sure he'll replace him with someone good. But this world where you fire people because data came out that you don't like, that is a terrible regime. We've seen it in many other countries.

这种体制从未奏效。国会和政府里很多人都心知肚明，但作为合格共和党人的'守则'就是：无论特朗普做什么，你都要起立鼓掌。

It does not work well, and lots of the people in congress, in the administration know it and won't say it because of the rules of being a Republican in good standing or whatever Donald Trump does, you stand up and you clap.

我认为这类决定根本无可辩驳。坦白说，我相信若我在任时遇到这种情况，这条底线就意味着你该辞职了。短视者或许会为即时数据沾沾自喜，但当无人相信这些数据，当一两年后美国经济公信力受损时，他们该扪心自问：值得吗？

I am of the view that it is impossible to defend these types of decisions. And I hope and feel confident, frankly, that if I were ever around them, that this would be the type of line that would mean that you no longer are going to be serving in an administration in this capacity. I understand why if you were so short termist that you are thinking tomorrow, maybe you tell yourself, like, this chart looks cool or these numbers are good. But if no one believes it, and if in a year or two years you've denigrated The US economy, a little bit you have to ask yourself, like, for what?

就我们讨论的案例而言，动机很明确：许多人都觊觎美联储主席之位，凯文·哈西特就是其中之一。反对特朗普就意味着与这个职位无缘。这正好过渡到美联储的话题——特朗普正试图施压的另一个领域。有消息称他可能试图解雇杰罗姆·鲍威尔（虽然如你所说他并无此权限）。

Well, I think in the case we're talking about, I think the for what is there are lot of people who would like to be Fed chair. I think Kevin Asit is one of those people. You're not gonna be Fed chair if you oppose something Donald Trump does. And maybe that's a good bridge to the Fed, which is another place Trump has been attempting to exert some pressure. There was a burst of news that maybe he tried to fire Jerome Powell, which as you noted, he doesn't really have the authority to do.

还有传闻说他可能以美联储总部翻修工程的合同问题指控鲍威尔欺诈——虽然我打赌鲍威尔根本不会过问具体合同细节。风波看似平息了，但鲍威尔的任期2026年就结束。根本原因是特朗普政府迫切希望降息。

Then there was maybe he will accuse him of a form of fraud related to the rehabilitation and refurbishing of the Federal Reserve's headquarters, which as you can imagine, I'm sure Jerome Powell spends a lot of time thinking about the specific contracting decisions being made in that. And it it sort of seems to have blown over. But Powell's term is limited. His term is up in in 2026. And behind this is Donald Trump and the administration really want interest rates to go lower.

嗯。或许我们该先讨论实质问题：他们的诉求合理吗？经济确实在放缓，美联储或许真该降息了。

Mhmm. I guess a good place to start here is, first, just on the merits, are they right? We are seeing the economy slow down some. Maybe the Fed should lower interest rates.

实质问题上，美联储其实面临棘手局面。正如我们开场所说，关税是我们这辈子最具通胀性的政策。所有模型都预测当前关税水平将推高通胀。别忘了美联储刚控制住一轮严重通胀，新的通胀政策就又来了。而且在本期就业报告之前，鉴于劳动力市场强劲，美联储原本持观望态度。在就业强劲且通胀预期上升的情况下，确实没有降息的理由。

On substance, I think the Fed actually has a bit of a hard task ahead of it because they're in a situation where, like, where we started in this conversation, the tariffs are the most inflationary policies of our lifetimes. So every model, our models, everyone else's external models are predicting that inflation is gonna rise as a result of tariffs at these levels. And remember that the Fed just had a very significant bout of inflation that it hadn't even fully managed back down before this next round of inflationary policies kicked in. And until this jobs report, by the way, the Fed was operating with a fair bit of let's wait and see with respect to the economy because the labor market looked quite strong. And so if the labor market is strong and you're anticipating inflation, there are real reasons to think like this is not the environment in which to cut interest rates.

你会发现这个特定话题确实存在讨论空间。美联储在最新就业数据公布前做出了最后一次利率决议。但有两名理事持反对意见，他们的异议解释正是基于此点。他们观察到一些指标显示经济正在放缓，认为美联储是时候降息了。需要说明的是，他们主张的降息幅度约为0.25个百分点。

And you see that there is actually like room for debate on this particular topic. The Fed made its last interest rate decision ahead of the most recent jobs estimates. But you saw two governors dissented and kind of explained their dissent as exactly about this. They were looking at indicators that were suggesting that the economy was slowing down, and they were of the view that it was time for the Federal Reserve to cut rates. I will note their view was to cut rates by something like point 25%.

而总统一直在呼吁降息约3%。

And the president has been calling for a decrease of around 3%.

那幅度可够大的。

Should be a lot.

确实会是个很大的调整。

Which would be a lot.

如果他们真那么做会怎样？我们不妨设想下次会议的情景。

What would happen if they did that? Right? Let let let's imagine next meeting.

对，没错。

Yeah. Yeah.

鲍威尔主席直接宣布降息2%，这会是史上最大幅度的降息吗？

Chair Powell just comes out and says, 2% cut, which would that be the biggest cut in history?

我确信如此。

I'm sure.

影响将非常巨大。

Be huge.

是的。

Yes.

如果他这么做了会怎样？

What would happen if he did it?

美联储设定的利率与影响银行间借贷及向美联储借款的利率之间存在差异。而你我等普通人关心的经济中的利率，如房贷利率、学生贷款利率或小企业贷款利率，与前者并不直接对应。

So there's a difference between the interest rate that the Federal Reserve sets, which is the interest rate that impacts how banks lend to one another and borrow from the Fed. And then there's like interest rates in the economy that you and I and others care about, like your mortgage rate or your student loan rate or your small business loan rate. And there's not a direct translation between those two objects.

但它们之间是有关联的。

But they are connected to each other.

这种关联源于一个共识：当利率下降时，美联储实际上在向我们传递经济走向的信号。但关于'明早醒来联邦基金利率降至1%'的设想有个悖论——若真如此，市场会理解为利率在中期乃至长期必将大幅回升，因为我们将面临严重通胀。结果就是，即便美联储奇迹般地宣布利率应为1%，你的房贷或小企业贷款利率也绝无可能接近这个数字。所以即便美联储真的按总统要求行事，也无法在切实的时间范围内为家庭带来实质经济收益。美国历史上我们曾经历过这种局面。

They're connected to each other because of a belief that when interest rates go down, the Fed, they are telling us a story about the direction the economy is going. But the thing that's perverse about the idea of tomorrow we wake up and the Fed funds rate is 1% is if it was 1%, what the world would understand is that interest rates over some relatively medium term, long term horizon are gonna have to go way back up because we're gonna get a ton of inflation. And the result of that is gonna be that you are actually not going to see translated into your mortgage rate or into your small business loan rate anything like a 1% interest rate, even if magically the Fed turned on and said that's what the interest rate should be. So there's like a perversity in all of this that even if the Federal Reserve did in fact what the president seems to be asking them to do, it wouldn't actually deliver the type of economic benefit in any real horizon that would be meaningful to households. And in fact, the reason I know that is because we have played this game before in The US.

尼克松时期的联储主席阿瑟·伯恩斯在大选前承受巨大压力，被迫说服联邦公开市场委员会大幅降息。结果呢？这类政治化决策导致美国通胀飙升。认为这种操作能对经济产生积极影响的想法实在荒谬。

So Nixon had a Fed chair named Arthur Burns, and he, ahead of a presidential election, put a ton of pressure on Arthur Burns to get the rest of the FOMC to lower interest rates dramatically. And in fact, they did. And what happened as a result of those types of politicized decision making by the Federal Reserve is that we had inflation in this country go up. So the idea that this is somehow going to accomplish anything positive for the economy is, like, silly.

特朗普政府正在玩火：他们既推行拖累经济增长的政策，又实施推高物价的措施。当经济停滞伴随通胀上升，就形成了滞胀。这时美联储进退维谷——降息刺激经济会加剧通胀，加息抑制通胀又会抑制经济。

So the Trump administration is doing something really dangerous, which is they've got a bunch of policies that are slowing down the economy, and a bunch of policies that are pushing prices up in the economy. And if you have a slow economy that's not really adding jobs, not growing that much, and you have inflation going up, well, you have a stagflation. Yes. And then the Fed doesn't really have an obvious move because if it lowers interest rates to speed up the economy, it pushes up prices. If it raises interest rates to bring down inflation, it slows down the economy.

历史上美联储曾通过激进加息打破滞胀，但这会导致经济衰退——特朗普政府显然不愿看到这种结果。当前许多观点认为我们正处于轻度滞胀，若情况恶化：关税传导效应显现，'宏伟法案'加剧通胀，巨额减税透支国家信用...这些因素叠加将使我们陷入难以摆脱的困境。

In the past, it has broken into stagflation by raising interest rates so high, it pushed the economy into a recession, which I also think the Trump administration would prefer to have not happen. But I've heard a lot of people saying that the way to think about the economy right now is we are in a mild stagflation, And that if that continues and gets worse, right, if the things we are talking about here happen, the tariffs begin to pass through even more. The big beautiful bill is highly inflationary. It's putting a huge amount of money on the the national credit card, bunch of tax cuts. That you sort of look around and the conditions are are there for us to get into something that that is pretty tricky to break when we get into it.

我认同这个判断。最近出现的迹象让我想起《白宫风云》里他们讳言'衰退'的情节——虽然我不愿说出'滞胀'这个词，但经济数据确实开始显现滞胀特征...

I think that is true. And I've been saying that we are starting to see I I don't I'm nervous to say it's like the West Wing episode where they won't say recession. Like, I don't wanna say the word stagflation. But stagflationary signals or stagflationary adjacent type of information from

经济学家们对待这个术语就像对待伏地魔的名字。

the economy. Economists don't like something when they treat its name like Voldemort.

没错，我实在说不出口。

Yeah. Exactly. I can't say it.

但甚至都不想提起。就像，

But don't even wanna invoke. Like,

但我要说的是，这场危机并非从天而降。我们并非处于新冠疫情或金融危机中。我们亲手将一个原本蓬勃发展的经济——通胀回落、疫情后实现最强劲复苏——通过一系列本可避免的政策选择，推向了与衰退擦边的境地。更糟的是，我们甚至无法明确说明这些政策究竟想达成什么目标。所以或许这反而该让人稍感希望，因为每当市场动荡或债券市场这个惩戒机制感到不安时，我们确实看到过这类政策的回调。

but I will say that this isn't a crisis that has dropped from the sky. We're not in COVID or even a financial crisis. We have gotten ourselves from economy that was rip roaring just like let it go and inflation coming down to strongest economic recovery out of the pandemic to the s word adjacent by a set of policy choices that have been made that didn't have to be made this way. And ultimately, like, we couldn't even articulate exactly what they are meant to accomplish. And so I guess maybe that should make you a little hopeful because in some sense, when markets have gotten shaky or the bond market with its disciplining device has gotten nervous, you've seen some pullback from those types of policies.

但这同时也让人对当前错误决策的显而易见可避免性感到沮丧。

But it also makes you kind of dismal about the ways in which mistakes are being made that seem so obviously avoidable.

我认为核心问题是：当一个经济体充斥着如此多政策不确定性时，若再遭遇真正难以应对的外部危机——就像后疫情时代通胀冲击那样棘手，或是像互联网泡沫破裂那样引发衰退的危机——会怎样？或许可以说特朗普政府给自己留了不少应对工具，比如降低关税就能成为刺激手段。但即便在相对良好的局面下，这些政策已累积了巨大压力，使人们开始用你的术语讨论‘衰退信号’（即便尚未真正衰退）。在我看来，他们似乎在赌运气。

I think the question it raises is what happens if you have an economy that has this much uncertainty in it, this much weird policy in it, and then you had some kind of external crisis that is actually hard to manage, right, in the way that the inflationary shock was hard to manage in the sort of post pandemic period, in the ways that many of the things that have caused recessions, like the dot com bust was hard to manage. I mean, maybe you can say the Trump administration has given itself a lot of tools to manage it because it could turn down the tariffs, and that would be stimulus. But it has added a lot of stress in a pretty good scenario that has gotten us to a point where people have begun at least talking about, to to use your terminology, recessionary signals, if not a recession. And it seems to me they're hoping for a lot of luck here.

我不想过度悲观——我不认为我们已陷入衰退，也希望确实没有。事实上自解放日以来，市场指标显示衰退概率已有所下降。但不可否认我们确实自酿苦果。情况本可能更糟：你担忧的财政状况恶化可能演变成全面危机，毕竟那个‘宏伟法案’全靠赤字融资，这非常令人忧虑。

Well, you know, I don't wanna be overly pessimistic in that I hope we aren't I don't think we are in a recession. I hope we are not in a recession. The probability of a recession has declined actually since Liberation Day as measured by market indicators. But we have done a lot of self inflicted harm here, and there's no doubt about that. I guess it could be worse because part of what you're worried about is this fiscal situation becoming even more untenable, and eventually you hit a fiscal crisis, and everything was deficit financed in the big beautiful bill, and so that's really concerning.

不过对此的担忧可以稍减，因为关税确实带来了部分收入。另外考虑到AI带来的经济希望（无论能否实现），情况本可能更糟。但以‘情况本可能更糟’作为政策进展的标尺，从经济政策角度看实在诡异。

But you should feel a little bit less bad about that than you would have baseline because it is true that the tariffs are bringing in some revenue. And I guess it could be worse because we talked a lot about AI and the possibility of AI. And absent that sort of hope in the economy and whether or not it actually is realized, things could be worse. But it's kind of a weird place to be from an economic policy perspective to continually be saying, I guess it could be worse as your barometer of progress.

将关税视为BBB减税法案的资金来源很有意思。

It is interesting to think about the tariffs as a pay for for the BBB's tax cuts.

我一直在思考关税收入问题。毕竟十年间约3万亿美元的规模，几乎等同刚通过的法案体量。虽然我不会用关税带来的赤字削减去推行主要惠及富人的减税和削减社保网，但纯从财政角度看...假设到2029年关税持续实施：

I have been thinking a lot about the tariff revenue. Because again, it's like $3,000,000,000,000 over the decade. It's roughly the size of the bill that was just passed. And, you know, I wouldn't have used the deficit reduction from the tariffs to do a bunch of tax cuts that disproportionately benefit the top and social safety net cuts, but, like, just from a fiscal perspective. And you're also in a situation where let's play out the scenario where it's 2029, and these tariffs have been in place for a while.

无论出于何种原因——可能是经济已消化影响，或是经历短暂下滑后因AI等因素回升——只要关税持续，这部分收入就具有一定粘性，对吧？

And for whatever set of reasons that have come, maybe the economy has absorbed them. Maybe there's been a slight downturn, but then an uptick, maybe AI, something. But they're in place. In that universe, I think the revenue is somewhat sticky. Right?

我认为关税非常糟糕，是效率极低的增收方式。但这确实是一笔未经立法程序、仅凭行政令就实施的3万亿美元增税。那么接下来该怎么办？

I think the tariffs are terrible. I think they're a very bad way to raise revenue and a very inefficient way to raise revenue. But they are a $3,000,000,000,000 tax increase that has been essentially not even legislated. It's been sort of sign of a pen put into law. And so where do you go from there?

因为你能把关税转变成类似目的地现金流税的东西吗？比如

Because can you turn the tariffs into something like a destination based cash flow tax? Like

没人知道那是什么。

Nobody knows what that is.

是的。我来解释。我在这里就是为了

Yeah. I'm gonna help. I'm gonna I'm here

做这件事。

to do.

坦白说，你能把关税转变为累进消费税或任何一种消费税吗？

Can you turn the tariffs into a progressive consumption tax or just any kind of consumption tax, frankly?

详细说说看。我在这方面有点怪癖。我热爱累进消费税，就像是罗伯特·弗兰克著作的忠实读者，《经济学人》杂志的粉丝，他几十年来一直痴迷于累进消费税。所以我一直觉得这是个挺有趣的税收结构。

Walk walk me through this. So I am a weirdo about this. I love progressive consumption taxes. I'm like an old devotee of Robert Frank Books, The Economist, who's like a progressive consumption tax obsessive and has been for decades. So I've always thought that's a a kinda interesting tax structure.

消费税的理论是通过对消费征税更多，尤其是对富人，可以促进储蓄和投资，这对国家的长期增长率有好处。首先，你认为我们真的需要这个吗？看起来我们并不缺乏投资。对吧？股市正在蓬勃发展。

So the theory of a consumption tax is by taxing consumption more, particularly among rich people, you get more kinds of saving and investment, which is good for the long term growth rate of a country. So one, do you think we actually need that? It doesn't really seem like we don't have enough investment. Right? The stock market is booming.

另外，是否还有其他我们应该征税的东西，既能增加收入，又能抑制某些行为？比如以碳形式存在的污染，在线赌博。

The other thing is, are there other things we should want to tax both because they raise revenue, but also because they discourage the thing? Pollution in the form of carbon, online gambling.

是的。存在外部性。

Yeah. There are Externalities.

对，经济学家喜欢称之为外部性。你认为像这样的税法中，有没有哪些部分既能筹集大量资金，又能推动我们向更好的方向发展？奥金克洛斯喜欢对数字广告征税的想法，那种利用我们注意力变现的方式。对吧？

Yeah. Externalities, as economists like to put them. Are there parts of a a code like this that you think could raise substantial money, but but also, you know, nudge nudge us in a better direction. Auchincloss likes the idea of taxing digital advertising that that sort of monetizes our attention. Right?

你可以提出很多类似“但是”的观点

You could come up with a lot of things like But

现实情况是，如果你问任何经济学家应对碳排放过量问题的正确工具是什么，他们都会告诉你是碳税。某种渐进式消费税版本的一个好处在于，你可以设想在此基础上附加一个很小的碳费（顺便提一下），然后进行退税等操作。认真思考哪些类型的行为可能需要征税——比如汽水税。对吧？这类我们试图调控的行为。

the reality is if you ask any economist what the right tool is to try to deal with the fact that there are too many carbon emissions, they are going to tell you that it is carbon tax. And one of the sort of benefits of some progressive consumption tax version is you can imagine layering on a very small, by the way, carbon fee to that and rebating it and doing all the stuff. The idea of trying to think seriously about what the types of activities are that you might want to you know, the soda taxes. Right? Those types of activities where we're trying to get Yeah.

让美国再次健康起来。

Make America healthier again.

没错。我认为这里面有很多值得探讨的。这个国家面临真正的财政收入挑战——我们基本上没有征税空间。共和党人宣称永远不对任何人增税。

Yeah. Exactly. I think there's like a lot to that. So there's a real revenue challenge that this country faces, which is that we basically don't have capacity. Republicans have said no tax increases on anyone ever.

而民主党人实际上...我不喜欢用'一方面，另一方面'的说法，因为民主党已经明确未来十年希望对顶层人群征收约3万亿美元的税。但如果你想建立社会保障体系

And Democrats are actually I don't like doing the on the one hand, on the other hand, because Democrats have identified $3,000,000,000,000 ish of tax increases over a decade that they would like to see levied at the top. But if you're trying to have a social safety net

不对收入低于45万美元的人群增税——这种思维方式对税制改革没有好处。

no tax increases on people making under $450,000, which is not a good way to think about the tax code.

确实。政治承诺不是思考税制的正确方式。坦白说，如果你想建立类似其他国家的社会保障体系，他们的征税范围远比年收入40万美元以上人群广泛得多。在这种环境下，关税就像是解决这个问题的变通方案。对吧？

No. I pledges are not a good way to think about the tax code. And frankly, if you're trying to have a social safety net that looks like other countries' social safety nets, they have higher taxes on a much broader swath of the population than people making $400,000 or more. In that environment, if you think about the tariffs, they're kinda like a workaround for this stuff. Right?

因为共和党曾宣称绝对不增税，但这里本质上就有3万亿美元的增税。当我们讨论2029年及关税实施多年后的新世界秩序时，关税已成为重要财政收入来源。顺便说，关税有点像消费税——它们是对进口消费品的征税。虽然不如真正的消费税理想，因为除了增加政府收入，它们还会抬高不受关税影响的国内商品价格。要从关税过渡到我理想中的渐进式消费税，可以借鉴2017年保罗·瑞安议长的方案。

Because, like, it was the case that the Republicans said no tax increases on anyone whatsoever. But here's $3,000,000,000,000 of tax increases essentially, And they're in the system and in the world in which we're talking about 2029 and a new world order where we've had the tariffs in place for years, they have become a revenue source and a meaningful one. And by the way, tariffs are kind of like consumption taxes because they are a tax on a thing that is imported and then consumed. They're not as good as a actual consumption tax because they are going to raise prices for consumers more than they raise revenue for The United States because they are going to also increase the price of domestic goods that aren't hit with the tariffs. The way that you get from a tariff though to something that looks like, in my dream, progressive consumption tax, is you kind of start to follow the playbook of speaker Paul Ryan in 2017.

当时他提出了我称之为'基于目的地的现金流税'（这是我的缩写）。其核心在于：与其在全球体系中界定企业收入的概念和归属地，不如直接征收现金流税——类似其他国家的增值税模式。核心理念是商品在美国销售就在美国纳税，

When he proposed what and I gave you my acronym, the destination based cash flow tax. What it essentially was was that rather than having to figure out what corporate income is and the concept and where does it sit in a worldwide system, he said, let's just do cash flow taxes. Okay? Which is kind of like what other countries do with a VAT. And the concept was that when stuff is sold in The US, it is then taxed in The US.

在海外销售的商品，其现金流自然在海外累积，相应税款也缴纳给海外。这种结构听起来很像关税。当时这个方案获得不少共和党人支持，主要反对声音来自美国零售商——沃尔玛和家得宝这些企业表示：等等，这种新税制将大幅提高消费者购买商品的成本。

And when stuff is sold outside of The US, well, those cash flows accrue outside of The US, and so you pay taxes on it outside of The US. And that kind of structure sounds a lot like a tariff. And the complaint at the time there was a fair bit of support for it at the time among Republicans. The complaint was really the retailers in The US who said, wait. The Walmarts and the Home Depots, you're going to way increase the cost of goods to consumers by this new type of tax.

但关税已经在产生这种效果了。所以我思考的是，你们是否未能将税基转向设计更优的消费税——比2017年版本更好的那种，因为我们当时成功找到了使其累进化的方法。是通过某种与消费税相关的返利机制吗？我不确定。我现在觉得这个构想可能比我原先理解的更具潜力。

But the tariffs are already doing that. And so I wonder whether you don't manage to shift the tax base in the direction of a better designed consumption tax and better than the version I hope in 2017 because we managed to find a way to make it progressive. Is it a rebate to people for their consumption tax adjacent thing? I don't know. I kind of think that there might be more to that idea than I had been grappling with previously.

我们当前所处的现实是：关税正在创造巨额财政收入。因此那个庞大的预算法案——那个宏伟的法案——若孤立来看本会是财政灾难，但实际并未如此糟糕。

So we we are in a world where the tariffs are raising a lot of money. So the big budget bill, big beautiful bill, it is not quite the fiscal disaster we'd have seen if it were just alone.

确实如此。

Yeah. It's true.

所以我们算是进入了一个全新的财政格局。

So we're just kind of in a new world around all that.

作为永恒的乐观主义者，我必须指出：实际上，能发掘出3万亿美元原本无法征收的税源，从财政赤字角度看已是一项成就。

So I am eternally looking for reasons to be optimistic. And the reality is that finding $3,000,000,000,000 of tax revenue that we didn't previously have any way of raising is from a deficit perspective an accomplishment.

设想一下：现在是2029年。如果某位民主党总统对你说：'娜塔莎，我想推行彻底的税制改革，这对经济大有裨益。我们要筹集必要的资金...'

Let me ask you something. Let's say, you know, it's 2029. Yeah. If a democratic president came to you and said, Natasha, I just wanna propose root and branch tax reform in a way that would be really good for the economy. I want to, you know, raise the amount of money we need to raise.

嗯。

Yeah.

'...但我要更健康的经济。税法典是重要杠杆。我要它简洁明了，能让民众理解，具有累进性，并能促进美国经济的长期发展。'

But I want a healthier economy. The the tax code is a huge lever. I want it to be simple. I want it to be explainable to people. I want it to be progressive, and I want it to be good for the long term future of the American economy.

虽然税法很复杂，但用理想化的方式来说，你会建议他们怎么做？

What in like a I know tax codes are complicated, but in a stylized way would you tell them to try to do?

这个问题让我非常欣喜——能畅想这些可能性实在美妙。我认为首先要确立原则：必须筹集充足税收，税制要简洁，税收体系要具备竞争力，同时要最小化经济扭曲。而现行税制这些目标一个都没实现。

It's such a I'm so happy with this question because it would be nice to dream a world in which a lot of this was possible. The way, I guess, you would start is you would start with the principles that we need to raise enough revenue. We want a tax code that is simple, and we want a tax system that is competitive. And we want to minimize distortions in the economy. And right now, we have a tax code that does none of those things.

特别是，我认为你们会关注的是，随着时间的推移，经济变得更加复杂，仅仅是为了利用税法中这种复杂性带来的机会。例如，如果你是一家公司，你需要缴纳企业所得税。但如果你决定以合伙企业或穿透实体的形式构建自己，你会得到一个完全不同的税收结构，因为你的收入是在个人层面征税的，而且说实话，由于你能够描述收入的方式，通常根本不会被有意义地征税。在尝试简化税法之后，我会做的另一件事是，我认为我们国家太富裕了，不应该有这么多孩子生活在贫困中。我在政府工作时意识到的一个有趣的事情，我之前也知道，但在实地以一种有意义的方式看到了，那就是国税局是联邦福利的重要管理者。

And particularly, what you would, I think, be concerned with is the idea that over time what's happened is that the economy has grown more complicated just to take advantage of opportunities that that complexity poses in the tax code. So for example, if you are a corporation, you pay a corporate income tax. But if you decide to structure yourself like a partnership or a pass through, you get a totally different tax structure because your income is taxed at the individual level, and often, frankly, not taxed that meaningfully at all because of the ways in which you're able to characterize it. The other thing I would do after trying to streamline the code is I think we're too rich of a country to have so many children living in poverty. And the interesting thing that I realized when I was in government, and I knew it before, but kinda got to see it on the ground in a meaningful way, is the IRS is a really important administrator of federal benefits.

许多福利是通过税法实施的。其中非常重要的一项是儿童税收抵免。但由于它是通过税法实施的，部分原因是国税局尽管资源非常有限，但在管理事务方面做得相当好，你只有在足够富裕，能够从你的税收中扣除2000或3600美元时（我在政府工作时有时是这样），才能真正获得抵免的全部价值。所以，最贫穷的人从我们的福利制度中得到的帮助最少。这似乎很荒谬。

A lot of them run through the tax code. And a super important one is the child tax credit. But because it runs through the tax code, in part because the IRS is quite good despite having very few resources at administering things, you only really get the full value of the credit if you're rich enough to have $2,000 or $3,600 at times when I was in government to deduct from your taxes. So, like, the poorest people are being helped the least by our benefit system. That seems nuts.

对吧？所以，显然，你应该设计一个系统，让我们能够为那些最需要的人做更多的事情。在这个能够从头开始认真思考税制改革的魔法世界里，我要说的第三件事是，税法中有这么多扭曲，因为恰好有一些特殊利益集团能够在这里获得豁免，或者在那里获得附带权益漏洞，为他们特定的宠物收入或福利类型。我认为我们真的需要找到一种方法，这在广义上是正确的，也是为什么这个练习更像是一个梦想而不是实践。你真的需要找到一种方法来抵制这些选区的影响，因为没有反选区来说不。

Right? So, obviously, it is the case that you should design a system that lets us do more for those who need it most. And the third thing I would say in this sort of magic world of being able to think seriously about tax reform from scratch is that so much of the tax code has been distorted because there happen to be particular interests that are able to get an exemption here or a carried interest loophole there for their particular pet type of income or type of benefit. And I think we really need to find a way, and this is true writ large and is why this exercise is more of a dream than it is in practice. You really have to find a way to push against the impact of those constituencies because there isn't a counter constituency to say, no.

那真的很糟糕。我认为这是一个相当根本的问题。

That's really bad. And I think that's a pretty fundamental problem.

我就说到这里。最后一个问题。你会向观众推荐哪三本书？

I'm gonna leave it there. Always a final question. What are three books you'd recommend to the audience?

这很好，因为我们刚刚在讨论税制改革。今年秋天我在教联邦所得税，我在准备1986年税制改革法案的内容，那是我们认真思考税制改革的时候。《Gucci Gulch的摊牌》是我一直以来最喜欢的书之一，也是一本很好的读物，会让你对这种改革努力的可能性充满希望。我去年刚生了双胞胎，之前告诉过你，所以最近没怎么有时间读闲书。我最近刚拿起《Remarkably Bright Creatures》，这是一个关于一个女人与一只章鱼建立友谊的可爱故事。

It's good because we were just talking about tax reform. I'm teaching federal income tax this fall, and I was prepping around the 1986 tax reform act, which was a time when we thought seriously about tax reform. And Showdown at Gucci Gulch is one of my, like, all time favorites and a great read, and will leave you hopeful for the possibility of this type of reform effort. I also just recently I had twins last year, I was telling you before, and so have been slow to be able to do that much reading for fun of recent. So I just recently picked up Remarkably Bright Creatures, which is this like lovely story about a woman who finds companionship with an octopus.

听起来可能有点疯狂，但在这个感觉越来越孤立的世界里，它给我带来了很多快乐。我也非常喜欢我们之前讨论的经济模型以及我们试图衡量和推导世界真相的方式。迈克尔·刘易斯有一本很棒的书叫《The Undoing Project》，讲述了丹尼·卡尼曼和阿莫斯·特沃斯基之间的关系，但也讲述了该领域演变的方式，我认为这本书非常深刻，也是一个很棒的故事。

And it sounds kind of wild, but it's just a true in a world that's feeling intensely more isolated, it like brought me a lot of joy. And I also really love we talked a little bit about economic models and the ways in which we try to measure and derive truth about the world. There's a great book by Michael Lewis called The Undoing Project that's about the relationship between Danny Kahneman and Amos Tversky, but also the ways in which the field evolved that I think is, like, pretty profound and a great story.

娜塔莎·萨林，非常感谢你。

Natasha Sarin, thank you very much.

非常感谢邀请我。

Thanks so much for having me.

本期《The Israel Clown Show》由罗兰·胡制作。事实核查由米歇尔·哈里斯负责。我们的高级音频工程师是杰夫·盖尔德，附加混音由艾萨克·琼斯和艾哈迈德·萨霍塔完成。我们的执行制作人是克莱尔·戈登。节目的制作团队还包括安妮·高尔文、玛丽·卡西奥内、埃利亚斯·伊斯古伊斯、玛丽娜·金、克里斯汀·林恩、杰克·麦科迪克和简·科贝尔。

This episode of The Israel Clown Show is produced by Roland Hu. Fact checking by Michelle Harris. Our senior audio engineer is Jeff Geld with additional mixing by Isaac Jones and Ahmad Sahota. Our executive producer is Claire Gordon. The show's production team also includes Annie Galvin, Marie Cassione, Elias Isguith, Marina King, Kristen Lynn, Jack McCordick, and Jan Kobel.

原创音乐由Ahmad Sahota、Carol Saburo和Pat McCusker创作。听众策略由Christianity Samaluski和Shannon Busta制定。纽约时报观点音频部门总监是Annie Rose Strawser。特别感谢Catherine Abraham、Skanda Armenath、Kim Clausing、Catherine Ann Edwards、Matthew Klein以及Claudia Som。

Original music by Ahmad Sahota, Carol Saburo, and Pat McCusker. Audience strategy by Christianity Samaluski and Shannon Busta. The director of New York Times opinion audio is Annie Rose Strawser. Special thanks to Catherine Abraham, Skanda Armenath, Kim Clausing, Catherine Ann Edwards, Matthew Klein, and Claudia Som.