安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金：1929年的回响与每次危机背后的杠杆作用

杰米·戴蒙有句名言广为流传。2009年2月，他女儿回家问道：‘爸爸，什么是金融危机？’他回答：‘每七八年就会发生一次的事。每七八年，人们就会失去理智。他们总以为这次不一样，但最终总会出现某种形式的调整。’

Jamie Dimon famously has this great line. His daughter came home, this is actually back in 02/2009, and says, daddy, what's a financial crisis? And he says, something that happens every seven or eight years. Every seven or eight years, people lose their head. People believe this time is different and invariably there is some form of a correction.

有时调整是深刻而痛苦的。有时我们称之为崩盘，有时叫恐慌。1929年那次，我们最终称之为大萧条。更关键的问题是——可惜我认为目前我们尚无答案——金融体系中的实际杠杆率究竟有多高。

Sometimes the correction is deep and painful. Sometimes we call it a crash. Sometimes we call it a panic. 1929, we ultimately called it depression. The bigger question, and I don't think we know the answer right now unfortunately, is how much leverage is really in the system.

在我看来，每次危机爆发的导火索都是杠杆。这就是那根火柴。我们不知道杠杆藏在哪里，因为如今大量杠杆存在于私募信贷领域。这正是事态可能变得棘手的地方。事实上，至少在美国，当个职业乐观主义者远比当职业悲观主义者或怀疑论者划算得多。

So to me, the match that lights the fire of every crisis is the leverage. That is the match. We don't know where the leverage lies because so much of it lives in private credit today. And so that's where things could get hairy. Look, the truth is it has paid to be, at least in The United States, a professional optimist much more than it's ever been paid to be a professional Cassandra or skeptic.

因为在过去一百年里，即便经历过大萧条和2008年危机，投资于市场——甚至在一定程度上进行投机——也比把钱藏在床垫下要明智得多。

Because over the last hundred years, even with the depression that we had then and even with the the crisis two thousand eight, you would have been way better off being in the market invested and to some degree even speculating than you would have if you had your money under the mattress.

欢迎收听《投资大师》播客，我是威尔弗雷德·弗罗斯特。在这里我们颂扬并学习全球最杰出投资者和商业领袖的成功经验，为听众朋友们提供竞争优势。请注意，本播客内容均不构成直接财务建议，详情可参阅节目备注。今天的嘉宾是我亲爱的朋友兼同事，作为CNBC《财经论谈》美国版的主持人——虽然在我看来这是他众多荣誉中最耀眼的一项，但远非唯一成就。

Welcome to the Master Investor podcast with me, Wilfred Frost, where we celebrate and learn from the success of the greatest investors and business leaders in the world, giving you, our listeners, the edge. Please remember that nothing you hear in the Master Investor podcast should be considered direct financial advice. More on that in our show notes if you wanna refer to them. My guest today is a dear friend and colleague as the anchor of CNBC's Squawk Box in The US. And while that tops the list, in my opinion, of his many accolades, it's far from the only one.

他是《纽约时报》商业版块DealBook的创始人兼编辑，也是《亿万》等剧集的制片人。他撰写了或许是关于十五年前全球金融危机最重要的著作《大而不倒》，带读者亲历那场金融危机的演变过程。如今他又推出新作《1929：史上最大崩盘内幕及其如何重创一个国家》。我说的当然是安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金。

He's the founder and editor of DealBook, the business section in the New York Times, and he's the producer of shows like Billions. He's author of perhaps the most important book on the global financial crisis of fifteen years ago called Too Big to Fail. It took you inside the room, the unfolding nature of that financial crisis. And now he's the author of a new book too, 1929, Inside the Greatest crash in history and how it shattered a nation. I am, of course, talking about Andrew Ross Sorkin.

安德鲁，很高兴见到你，欢迎来到《投资大师》播客。

Andrew, great to see you, and welcome to the Master Investor podcast.

谢谢邀请。我感觉自己刚跨越大洋而来。见到你真是太棒了。

Thank you for having me. I feel like I just came across the pond. This is so great to see you.

你是今早才新鲜抵达的。

You landed fresh this morning.

今早才新鲜出炉的。新鲜程度不好说。走着瞧吧。你会考验我的。

Fresh fresh this morning. I don't know how fresh. We'll see. You'll you'll test me.

嗯，你看上去精神焕发，能邀请到你真是太好了。衷心祝贺你的新书发行。已经上市几周了，四周吧，销量非常火爆。

Well, you're looking very fresh, and it is so good to have you with us. Enormous congratulations on the book. It's been out for a couple of weeks. Four weeks. It's flying off the shelves.

书评反响极佳。我就知道我会喜欢这本书，它完全对我的胃口。我热爱《大而不倒》，但事实上我更为之倾倒，因为从中获益良多。虽然我对这场危机本就有深入了解，但阅读过程依然让人紧张得坐立不安。

The reviews have been terrific. I I knew I was gonna like it. It was right up my street. I loved Too Big to Fail, but I really did, in fact, adore it because I learned a lot. It wasn't actually a crash I I knew huge amounts about, but it was proper edge of your seat kind of reading.

从这点来说它就像本小说。而且写作过程非常非常快速轻松对吧？你只花了几个星期反复修改了几遍。

It was it was like a novel in that regard. And it was very very quick and easy to write. Right? It took you a couple of couple of passes over a few weeks.

听起来你只读了几遍就完成了，但我可是花了差不多八年时间才——

Just a couple it it sounds like it took you just a couple of passes to read it, but it took me about eight years to

这份手稿就是关键所在。

This write is the thing.

八年。是的，大概吧。我想我真正开始是在2016年，接近17年初。考虑到我手头还有其他事务，期间确实有过多次停顿，疫情更是雪上加霜，但这无疑造成了严重影响。

Eight years. Yeah. About. I think I started in really the '16, early seventeen. Now there were given all the other things that I do, there were definite pauses along the way and the pandemic did not help, but it definitely took a toll.

但我们之前讨论过这个问题。耗时这么久的原因在于你总是精益求精地准备，但这次是为了尝试让读者身临其境——就像你在《大而不倒》中营造的那种扣人心弦的叙事风格。

But we've spoken about this before. The reason it took you so long, you're always meticulous in your preparation, but it was to try and get to that take you inside the room Right. Edge of your seat type style that you did with Too Big to Fail.

这个项目最困难的是所有当事人都已离世。没人能接受采访。因此要获取能让读者身临其境的细节，必须查阅大量笔记、信件、日记、备忘录、 transcripts 和各种资料。事实上，这些材料分散在几十个不同的档案库中，不像历史学家常遇到的那种集中式档案——可以一次性挖掘。我需要跑遍数十家图书馆、博物馆，联系相关人物的家属获取未公开的回忆录，最终甚至说服纽约联储公开了那个时期的董事会会议记录。

The hardest part about this project was everybody is dead. So there's nobody to call. And so to get to the sort of granular kind of detail so I can put the reader in the room required really going through notes and letters and diaries and memos and all sorts of transcripts and other kinds of materials. And the truth is that it didn't really exist in one or two or three or even four archives that you could just go mine the way I think oftentimes an historian might, you know, find an archive and then sort of really just excavate it. In this case, it required going to several dozen different libraries and museums and reaching out to family members of some of the characters and getting unpublished memoirs and ultimately actually getting the New York Fed to release to me their board minutes from that period.

这些记录从未公开过，我们为此争执了很久——包括律师试图对96年前的会议记录进行部分涂黑处理。

They'd never been released and we we had a bit of a brouhaha over that for some time, including the lawyers trying to redact parts of the minutes ninety six years later.

哇，天哪，我完全不知道这段插曲。但无论如何，你不仅还原了细节，更让文字跃然纸上。有太多角度可以探讨了，我想先从纽约证券交易所开始——

Wow. God, I I didn't know that. But I mean either way, the detail is there and you've made it sing off the page in a in a fantastic way. So many different aspects to get to. What the area I wanna start with is the New York Stock Exchange.

嗯。我过去常在那里主持节目。你显然是在纳斯达克录制的。最近看到你在纽交所敲钟——那个地方的能量感一直让我着迷。

Mhmm. And I used to host my show there. You host yours from from the Nasdaq, obviously. I saw you rang the bell in New York Stock Exchange recently. I mean I mean, I've always loved the energy of the place.

在那里主持节目真是莫大的荣幸，但这还比不上当年所有交易都集中在一个地方进行时的盛况。

Presenting a show there was a was a real privilege, but it doesn't touch what the energy would have been like back in the day where where literally all trading took place in that one location.

天哪。顺便说一句，我在纽约证券交易所敲钟时带着的儿子问我：'这里现在到底还做什么？'就是主持收盘钟声。这很有趣，因为我正试图向他解释交易所的发展历程，描述它过去的样子——那时每笔交易都实打实地在交易大厅进行。有个被称为'专业交易员'的真人负责某只股票，交易员们会接听全国各地经纪公司的电话，然后向这些专业交易员下达买卖股票的指令。

Oh goodness. I mean, by the way, my son who was with me at the New York Stock Exchange when I rang the bell asked me what is exactly that they still do here? Present closing bell. And and it was interesting because I was trying to explain to him how the exchange had grown up and what it used to be like and the idea that every single trade physically happened on the floor. There was a physical human that was called the specialist that ran a stock and that then traders would literally be taking phone calls from brokerages all around the country, taking those and then making orders effectively to those specialists to buy and sell those stocks.

所以当你看到那些人尖叫的画面时，他们确实是在为买卖股票而呐喊。更早之前还有个所谓的'路边市场'，我了解到这个名字源于交易实际是在街边进行的。这个市场独立于交易所之外存在。

And so when you saw those images of people screaming, they were screaming to buy and sell and that was it. That was real. In fact, the other piece of all this before even that was something called the curb market, which I learned is called the curb market because it happens on the curb physically on the street. And there was a market that existed as well outside of the exchange.

太神奇了，我都不知道这些。我还了解到纽约证券交易所过去周六会开放半天，这在我看来简直疯狂。周末还需要交易。

Amazing stuff. I didn't know that. And the other thing I learned is that the New York Stock Exchange used to be open on a Saturday for half a day. That seems like madness to me. Need it on weekends.

我记得以前每周六上午都营业，直到中午。这是上世纪二十年代的事。有趣的是，当时有个叫约翰·拉斯科布的人——堪称那个时代的埃隆·马斯克，既是哲学家又是企业家——他在通用汽车赚了第一桶金，做了许多非凡之事，最终建造了帝国大厦。1929年11月，他提出美国应该实行五天工作制。

Used to be open on a Saturday every morning, I believe till noon. It was open back this is in the nineteen twenties. And interestingly, a guy named John Rascob, who really was sort of the Elon Musk of his time, sort of a philosopher king, entrepreneur. He had made a small fortune in General Motors and did all sorts of extraordinary things, ultimately builds the Empire State Building. But he had this idea in actually November 1929 that America should move to a five day work week.

他并非单纯想让人们有更多娱乐时间，而是认为这能刺激消费经济。有了双休日，人们会购买更多汽车用于周末出行，购买园艺工具、各式服装等。完全不同的世界，但我们今天在伦敦和纽约生活的很多方面，其实都发源于二十世纪二十年代。

And it wasn't because he thought that people should have more time just for fun, it was because he thought it would actually increase the consumer economy. If you had two days over the weekend, people would buy more cars because they'd be able to go places on the weekends, they'd buy gardening equipment, they'd buy different kinds of outfits, all sorts of things. So a completely different world. But a lot of the world that we all live in today, both here in in London and in New York, actually think was born in the nineteen twenties.

用这种理由取消周六交易真的很有意思，完全出乎意料。我想花点时间聊聊崩盘前的背景——读你的书时让我震惊的是，二十年代的人们在没有现代技术的情况下，居然能a)交易股票b)使用杠杆。他们怎么能在午餐时间买卖股票呢？当时人们确实就这么做的。

It's really interesting that that that's the rationale for for for getting rid of satire trade is almost the opposite of what you would have expected. I I wanna spend a little bit of time before the crash happened to sort of set the scene because it was crazy to me reading your your book, the extent to which people back in the nineteen twenties, before the technology that that we have today that allows you to do things at the touch of a button, were a, trading stocks and b, doing so with leverage. I I mean, how was it possible that people could buy and sell a share in their lunch break, which they were doing back then?

首先要知道的是，在我开始写这本书之前，我都没有意识到这一点：至少在1919年之前的美国，我想世界其他地方也是，举债或贷款被视为道德上的罪恶。我的意思是，正经人根本不会做这种事。直到通用汽车为了卖更多车，这种贷款才成为常态。实际上是这个叫约翰·拉斯科特的人说，如果我们借钱给人们，他们就会买更多车，事实确实如此。然后西尔斯罗巴克等公司纷纷效仿，华尔街见状也表示我们也能这么干。

Well, the first thing to to know which I didn't appreciate till I started working on the book is prior to 1919 at least in America and I think in other parts of the world too, taking on leverage or getting a loan was considered a moral sin. I mean you just did not do such a thing. That was not what a proper person was doing. And it was only actually that because of General Motors who was trying to sell more cars that such loans became part of the norm, meaning and actually it was this guy John Rascot who said if we loan people money then they'll buy more cars and that was true. And then you saw companies like Sears Roebuck and other companies do the same and then Wall Street said okay, we see what's happening, we can do this too.

于是纽约城里、伦敦这里乃至世界各地都涌现出许多经纪行。

And as a result brokerages emerge all over the city in New York and here in London and all over the world.

但有些开在酒店大堂之类的地方。

But in places like hotel lobbies.

比如广场酒店有个著名的橡树厅酒吧，1929年被大经纪商EF Hutton取代。有趣的是，EF Hutton的老板当时就住在海湖庄园。那时经纪行可是热门行当。

Hotel lobbies. So in the Plaza Hotel there's a famous bar called The Oak Room which was actually replaced in 1929 by EF Hutton which was one of the big brokerage houses. And in fact EF Hutton, interestingly, the man lived in Mar A Lago. That was his home back in 1929. And so brokerages were the thing.

你走进去，放下一美元，他们就能借你十美元，通常是十倍杠杆炒股。虽然实际上需要抵押房产或其他担保物，但由于这是新鲜事物，当时大多数美国人并不真正明白自己可能失去什么，承担着多大风险。

You would walk in, you could put down a dollar and they would loan you $10 It was often a 10 to one bet on a stock. Now the truth is you did have to hand over your home or some form of collateral, but back then because it was such a new phenomenon most Americans didn't really understand what they were potentially giving up and what the risks they were taking.

这正是我想重点讨论的。因为到二十年代末，相比今天我们知道简街、比尔·阿克曼等对冲基金和千禧年、城堡都在使用巨额杠杆，这没问题。但我认为大多数美国人——英国人肯定没有——不会用杠杆操作401k账户，更像是买入持有股票，涨跌10%就是盈亏。而二十年代末的普通美国人

And and this is just what I wanted to dwell on because by the late nineteen twenties, you know, to today, you know, we know that Jane Street and Bill Ackman and and other hedge funds, Millennium and and and Citadel are using huge amounts of leverage and and that's fine. But but I don't think most Americans, certainly not Brits, are trading their four zero one k's with leverage. It's more like you buy and hold a stock and if it goes up 10% or down 10%, those are your gains or losses. Whereas by late nineteen twenties, the average American

没错。

Yes.

当时股市杠杆率极高，这是个问题。我们稍后会与现今做比较。但就这个意义而言，我认为现在的风险比那时要小。

Was heavily levered into the stock market because that is an issue. We'll come to the comparisons to today. But I think in that sense, there's less risk today than there was then.

我认为当今股市本身风险小得多，因为现在你可能买的是两倍、三倍杠杆的ETF基金。不过加密货币领域可能不同，比特币有20倍甚至50倍杠杆的期权产品。但1920年代股市的情况与现在截然不同，当时杠杆操作极其普遍。

I think in the stock market itself today, there's a lot less risk because, you know, maybe you're buying you know, one of these levered ETFs which but it's it's two to one, three to one, something like that. Probably by the way in crypto, it may be different. So you there's some option products where you know, for Bitcoin you can buy it at 20 you know, 20 times leverage, 50 times leverage. But for the most part, what was happening in the 1920s is very different than what's happening now in the stock market. But it was super widespread.

我的意思是当时人人都在用杠杆，这就是为什么市场开始动摇时，情况会如此糟糕——不仅股价下跌20%、30%、40%，你还要承担十倍于本金的债务。

I mean everybody was using leverage and that's really why things tumbled the way they did because when the market did begin to falter, it wasn't just that the equity prices were going down twenty, thirty, 40%. It was that you were on the hook not just for it but for 10 times it.

嗯。正如你所描述的，这展现了当时人们疯狂抛售时的歇斯底里。在大西洋航行的邮轮上，人们互相踩踏就为了把卖单传到经纪公司——这点我们稍后再详谈。

Mhmm. And and it then shows you described this that the sort of hysteria when people were trying to get out. It was on cruise ships crossing the Atlantic. They were trampling over each other to try and get their sell orders into the brokerage, which which we'll come to in a moment.

最疯狂的是，我们都看过那些照片——纽交所外面围着成千上万的人。多年来我看着这些照片却不明就里，其实他们聚集在那里是因为想弄清楚自己的钱到底怎么了。

The the craziest part about it, you know, sometimes we all see these images. You've seen the pictures of people down at the New York Stock Exchange on the not on the floor. I'm talking about outside the building. You've seen these thousands of people that are just outside. The reason I didn't know this.

我是说，他们真的无法获知实时股价。部分原因是技术限制，交易所内的报价牌经常延迟四五个小时，下午三点看到的可能是早上的价格。

I think for years I'd look at these pictures, and I didn't really understand what's happening. The reason they were all there was because they were trying to figure out what was happening to their money. I mean, physically, like they literally couldn't find out what the prices were, what was happening. And part of it was a technology issue, in fact, because the stock prices that were on the boards even inside the exchange were often, you know, four or five hours late. So you could be looking at a price that was, you know, what the price was in the morning at 03:00 in the afternoon.

更糟的是，如果你在船上，或是在第五大道的经纪行查询股价，信息可能更加滞后。正因如此，惊恐万分的投资者才会亲自跑到交易所。

And even worse, if you were on a boat or even if you were at a brokerage house trying to find out the ticker price, you know, even uptown on 5th Avenue, you were potentially even even farther behind. And that's why they had physically gone down there because they were so scared.

是啊，真不可思议。人们居然在船上交易，这太神奇了。你会觉得那时候不该有这种情况。要是放在今天，用手机就能搞定。

Yeah. Amazing. Amazing that people were even trying to trade on a boat. You just you just think that wouldn't have been the case back then. Maybe today it would be with your phone.

在我们讨论崩盘本身之前，还有一点让我印象深刻。你写到胡佛总统时提到，他是首位认识到大众市场巨大力量的总统。

Just before we get to the crash itself, one other sort of snapshot that that jumped out to me of the time back then. You wrote this about president Hoover, and you said he was the first president to recognize the awesome power of the mass market.

嗯。

Mhmm.

你指的是广播对吧？是的。因为在那个年代的政治活动或其他场合，人们会聚集在市政厅或大型场地。而他发现如果能对着麦克风好好演讲，声音就能传得更远。我在研究这段历史时就在想，你有没有突然意识到——

And and you're referring to to radio. Yes. Because back then in political campaigns or others, you know, people would get a lot of people showing up in a town hall or a bigger venue. And he learned that actually if he articulated that speech well for the microphone, it could go much further afield. I I just wonder when you were kind of researching that, did you snapshot and think, do you know what?

特朗普总统不也类似吗？他是真正掌握社交媒体力量的第一人。

President Trump's not dissimilar, the first person to really harness the power of social media?

噢，我觉得今昔对比实在太相似了。他显然深谙社交媒体，也懂电视媒体。我是说，他真的很擅长用迷人的方式推销。不过胡佛的不同之处在于，他懂得如何利用广播和自己的声音赢得选举。但当崩盘发生后，他却难以重新唤起公众的共鸣。

Oh, I think the parallels between then and now are are so similar. And he clearly understood social media, he understands TV. I mean, he really knows how to sell in a in a fascinating way. What is what may be different by the way about Hoover is that Hoover understood how to use the radio and understood how to use his voice to get himself elected. He actually struggled when the once the crash happened to really be able to capture the imagination of the public.

说实话，他长期失去了民心，因为他不知道如何重新赢得支持，总以为能靠空谈说服民众——比如声称崩盘并非真正的崩盘，更像是心理问题，还认为金融市场和实体经济的状况是两码事。而实际上大多数美国人都在说：总统先生，您根本不明白真实情况。

And for so long frankly sort of lost the public because he didn't understand how to recapture them and thought he could convince them by sort of jawboning and telling them that, you know, the crash was actually not the crash and it was almost a psychological problem and that, you know, what was happening in the markets and what was happening in the real economy were different things, were separate. And in fact, most Americans were saying, mister president, I don't think you understand what's really going on here.

特朗普总统对市场的言论，当然，此刻正在发挥作用。

President Trump's comments, of course, towards the market work at the moment.

是的。

Yes.

我们正处于历史高点，但我们拭目以待。接下来我真正感兴趣的是比较当时和现在的差异，因为我们正走向崩盘。但中央银行和政府，尤其是中央银行，对华尔街持有相当明确的负面和批评态度。我认为金融危机后，'太大而不能倒'这个概念很好地体现了这一点，显然当时存在反华尔街议程，这里的银行也是如此。但我认为这种情绪已经过去了。

We're at all time highs, but we'll we'll see. Next kinda area I'm really interested in kind of comparing the difference then and now as we lead into the crash. But central banks and the government as well, but central banks in particular, kind of looked at Wall Street with quite a clear negativity and criticism. And I think after the financial crisis, know, too big to fail, which captures so well, you know, clearly there was an anti Wall Street agenda, same with banks here. But I think it's kind of passed.

我不认为它像你描述的那么明显，即中央银行确实相当激烈地批评华尔街，这导致他们在情况真正开始恶化时决定不介入提供帮助。

And I don't think it was as pronounced as what you describe in this, which is that central banks really kind of criticized Wall Street quite aggressively and that led to them deciding not to step in to help when things really started to turn south.

嗯，关于美联储有一个非常有趣的事情值得思考，然后我们可以谈谈欧洲和英国这里的中央银行。但当时发生的一件事是，美国的美联储非常新。它成立于1913年。如果你阅读一些董事会成员的日记，他们非常担心当时的政治，谈论美联储的独立性，他们非常担心如果事实上他们提高利率以试图扼杀所有投机行为，会在国会面前受到质疑。他们担心投机行为。

Well, there's a fascinating sort of thing to think about with the Federal Reserve in The US and then we can talk about the Central Bank actually here here in Europe and in The UK in particular. But one of the things that was happening was the Federal Reserve in The US was so new. It was born in 1913. And so they, if you read the diaries of some of the board members, they were so concerned about the politics of the moment, talk about Fed independence, they were so concerned about, you know, getting hold up in front of Congress if in fact they had raised interest rates to try to snuff out all the speculation. They were worried about the speculation.

他们不喜欢投机。如果可以的话，他们想结束它。但他们非常担心，如果利率提高太多，可能会颠覆整个经济，因此，你知道，他们会受到指责。同样，一旦崩盘发生，有一点，你知道，资本主义就是资本主义。如果你赢了，你就赢了。

They did not like the speculation. They wanted to end it if they could. But they were so concerned that if they raised interest rates too much that they could topple the entire economy and therefore, you know, they would they would be blamed. And then similarly, once the crash happened, there was a little bit of a, you know, capitalism is capitalism. If you win, you win.

如果你输了，你就输了，我们就让人们输。这也是当时胡佛总统的财政部长安德鲁·梅隆的观点。因此，美联储内部确实有很多人在这一时期实际上袖手旁观，最终没有做我们现在都学到的教训，那就是当你遇到危机时，假设你无法在前期阻止它，后期的解决方案就是向系统注入大量资金。通常这在政治上是不受欢迎的，因为你是在救助银行和你认为是纵火犯的人，同时向银行系统注入大量资金。顺便说一下，当时还有金本位制，这也使得这一做法非常困难，事实上有一种政治观点认为不应该放弃金本位制，这可能也是一个错误。

If you lose, you lose and we'll just let people lose. That was also the view of Andrew Mellon who happened to be the Treasury Secretary to President Hoover at the time. So there really was a lot of people within the Fed effectively sitting on their hands during this period and ultimately didn't do what I think we all have now learned is the lesson, which is when you have a crisis, assuming you can't catch it on the front end, the answer on the back end is to flood the system with money. Oftentimes it's politically unpalatable because you're bailing out banks and people that you think of the arsonists and also flooding the banking system with money. Back then, by the way, there was a gold standard which also made that very difficult to do and in fact there was sort of a political view about not getting off the gold standard and that was probably also a mistake.

是的。就在那个关键时刻——1929年10月24日，那是个血腥的抛售日。那个黑色星期四。让我们还原当时的情景：时任摩根大通负责人的托马斯·拉蒙特召集了一批资深银行家，由于央行没有采取行动，他们共同承诺购买价值1200亿美元的37只受创最严重的权重股。

Yeah. And and in that absolute key moment, 10/24/1929, it was a a bloodbath day of selling. You you Thursday. You recapture the moment where Thomas Lamont was was running JPMorgan at the time. He gathered a group of senior bankers who, because the central bank wasn't acting, together commit to buy a $120,000,000,000 worth of the 37 biggest heaviest hit stocks.

显然这并未奏效。我的问题是：当时央行能否阻止这场危机？这是个无法验证的假设。但你认为如果他们出手，是否真能具备足够火力来应对？要知道1200亿对银行来说...

Obviously, it didn't work. My question for you is, could the central bank have stopped the crisis then? I mean, it's a counterfactual we can't really explore. But do you think if they had, they would have had enough firepower to act in a way that, you know, 120,000,000,000 for banks

不确定他们能否阻止1929年10月至11月的崩盘。我认为部分措施本应是向银行系统注资，这或许能阻止市场进一步恶化。更有可能的是，如果美联储在1930、1931、1932年随着多米诺骨牌接连倒下时介入，或许能避免最终导致1932年25%失业率、1933年9000家银行倒闭的局面。总体来看，在10月当月他们或许能稍微遏制势头，但不太可能阻止大规模调整。从你提到的10月24日到11月13日，市场累计下跌了约48%。

know if they could have prevented the crash of in October and November of of twenty nine. I think part of it would have been infusing the banking system with money, which probably would have helped the the market from faltering further. I think what more likely the Fed could have done is in 1930, in 1931, in 1932 as as the dominoes continued to fall that that perhaps they could have stepped in and prevented what ultimately turned out to be 25% unemployment by nineteen thirty two, nine thousand banks going out of business by 1933. So I think if you sort of in the whole, in October itself, they probably could have stemmed the tide somewhat, but they probably could not have prevented a massive correction. Between October 24 that you're talking about and effectively November 13, the market dropped I believe by about 48% all in at that point.

有趣的是股市表现——这个发现连我自己研究时都感到惊讶。1929年股市实际仅下跌17%。但真相是，由于大多数人杠杆过高，在下跌过程中血本无归，更无力在低位回补——因为那时他们已失去房产，抵押了房屋，一无所有。

Interestingly, the stock market and this is something I think will surprise people including myself as I was working on it. The stock market was only down 17% at the 1929. But the truth is most people, because they had been so leveraged, lost everything during the fall and couldn't actually reinvest money to actually capture any of the upside because at this point they've lost their home, they're mortgaging their house, they've got nothing.

所以说到1929年10月那个时期，显然就是巅峰时刻。我们即将谈到随后几年接踵而至的经济衰退和大萧条。但那个十月，黑色星期一、黑色星期二，疯狂抛售的日子。你在书中补充的细节令人着迷，值得读者反复品味。我想多谈谈当时伦敦的金融地位。

So that October period, October '29, obviously the peak. We're we're gonna come to the recession, the the depression that followed in in the years afterwards. But but October, Black Monday, Black Tuesday, crazy crazy days of of selling. And again, the color you bring in the book is is fascinating for people to refer to. I wanna dwell a little bit on London's position then.

嗯。我认为那是非常强大的金融中心。你提到英格兰银行行长蒙塔古·诺曼——多响亮的名字啊，不是吗？他在通过加息手段刺破泡沫时发挥了作用。此举吸引了资本流动，而英格兰银行的体量足以让它在那场风波中扮演重要角色。

Mhmm. I think very, very powerful financial center. You talk of a moment where the Bank of England governor Montague Norman, which is a great name Isn't it a great name? Played a played a role in bursting the bubble a little bit when he hiked Bank of England rates. And it pulled capital and and the Bank of England was significant enough that that it played a role in that.

但从英国视角最让我印象深刻的部分，是温斯顿·丘吉尔

But the bit that jumps out to me from the British perspective is Winston Churchill

是的。

Yes.

当时正在美国巡演的人。

Who was on a tour of The US at the time.

天啊。对我来说，这是作为描写这段历史的作者最伟大的时刻之一。

My goodness. This to me was one of the great moments as as an author of writing about this period.

对。好的。我很喜欢，我要为你铺垫一下，因为我完全同意。显然，他只是为了给大家设定场景，显然，那时他还没有成为首相，但他曾任战争大臣、内政大臣和财政大臣。他当时正在美国进行巡演。

Right. Okay. I love I'm gonna set it up for you because I completely agree. He obviously just to set the scene for everyone, obviously, wasn't yet hadn't been prime minister yet, but he'd been minister of war, been home secretary, been chancellor. He was traveling The US for for a tour of The US.

而且

And

顺便说一句，去美国巡演是因为他没有钱，基本上是通过一系列讲座试图赚回一些钱。他以为自己从政时已经失去了所有财产，后来又染上了投机买股的狂热。

By the way, a tour of The US because he had no money and he was basically on a lecture series trying to make some of the money back that he he didn't have because he thought that he lost all his money while he was a politician and then buys gets you know, catches the speculative bug of buying stocks.

所以这就是我想让你捕捉的。他这一切都非常具有丘吉尔的特色。他被描绘成有点赌徒气质的那种莽撞性格，你知道的，损失了很多钱。是的。仍然在巡演，与最有权势的人共进晚餐，大量饮酒

So so this this is what I want you to capture. He's he it's all of this is Churchill fantastically. He gets drawn in as a bit of a sort of gambler type, you know, gung ho character, loses a lot of money Yes. Still is touring and having dinners and drinking a lot with the most powerful people

他们都很喜欢他。

And they love him.

尽管他在这个过程中损失了大量金钱，却在这个过程中爱上了美国资本主义。真是绝妙。

Although he loses a lot of money in this process, he falls for American capitalism in the process. Brilliant.

所以最有趣的有两点。一是他碰巧就在纽约证券交易所现场，亲眼目睹了崩盘的发生；然后还有一场为他举办的盛大晚宴，书中所有主要人物都齐聚一堂，作为作者和说书人。这简直是个神奇的时刻。但后来当他离开美国时——顺便说一句，他以为自己看到有人在崩盘后跳窗自杀（这一切都是从他住的广场酒店房间里看到的）——他在记录美国经历时写道，他最终认为美国式的资本主义，这种关于投机和韧性的理念是如此强大，甚至是他希望英国也能拥有的。

So the most interesting thing about this is two things. One is he happens to actually be on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange as literally the crash is taking place and then there's this spectacular dinner that's held for him where all of the major characters in the book happen to come together as a as an author, a storyteller. It's just sort of a magical moment. Yeah. But later on as he's leaving The US having watched somebody he thinks jump out of a window by the way after after the crash which he watches from his own room in the Plaza Hotel, he writes about his experience in The US and says that he ultimately believes that The US form of capitalism, this idea around speculation, this idea of resilience is so strong and it's actually something he wishes that, you know, The UK had.

我找到了原话。让我读一下这些你在研究中发现的、他在疯狂巅峰时期写的信中的内容。尽管损失惨重，他说自己对美国人对黄金未来的坚定信念印象深刻。他还说英国人（引用原话）'最好能了解美国投机机器内在的诚信与力量。它不是为防止危机而建，而是为度过危机而生。'

I've got the quotes. Let me read these because these jumped out to me that you found in your research in a letter that he wrote whilst he was there in the peak of the craziness. Despite losing lots of money, he said he was impressed by America's unshakable faith in a golden future. And he said Englishmen, quote, would do well to acquaint themselves with the inherent probity and strength of the American speculative machine. It's not built to prevent crises, but to survive them.

而他刚刚损失了一大笔财富。刚刚损失了一大笔财富。而且他说得没错。嗯。显然接下来的几年对美国来说很糟糕，但它总能反弹回来。

And he just lost a fortune. Just lost a fortune. And and that was right. Mhmm. I mean, clearly the following years were terrible for America, but it always bounces back.

你看，这个

Look, the

事实是——这很有趣，因为最近几周我经常谈论这本书，人们总会问：我们是不是要迎来崩盘了？而我说，确实很有可能，但在美国，做一个职业乐观主义者远比做一个职业卡珊德拉或怀疑论者划算得多。因为在过去一百年里，即使经历了大萧条和2008年的危机，把钱投入市场甚至适度投机，也远比把钱藏在床垫下要明智得多。

truth is and it's interesting because I've been talking a lot about this book over the past couple weeks and people inherently say, are we about to have a crash? And I and I say it very well may be that we will, But it has paid to be at least in The United States a professional optimist much more than it's ever been paid to be a professional Cassandra or skeptic. Because over the last hundred years, even with the depression that we had then and even with the crisis two thousand and eight, you would have been way better off being in the market invested and to some degree even speculating than you would have if you had your money under the mattress.

再次提醒，本播客内容均不构成财务建议。接下来这部分建议你仔细听，因为我认为我们会提供——或者说安德鲁可能会提供——另一种观点。安德鲁，这让我想到书中我认为最精辟的引述，就是你写的这段：像二十年代那样持续繁荣的时期，往往催生集体幻觉。

And again, a reminder that nothing you hear in this podcast should be considered financial advice. And you should listen to this part that's coming up because I think we'll we'll give or Andrew might give the the other point of view. So this then brings me, Andrew, to what I think is the quote of the book. And this is what you wrote. Long uninterrupted booms like the one in the nineteen twenties produce a collective delusion.

乐观主义会变成毒品或宗教，或是两者的结合体，在热门内幕消息、千载难逢交易、杀手级推销话术和 irresistible 口号的推波助澜下，人们会丧失风险评估能力，分不清好主意和馊主意。你引述里提到二十年代，是否也在暗指当下的二十年代？

Optimism becomes a drug or a religion or some combination of both, propelled along by a culture of hot tips, once of a kind deals, killer sales pitches, and irresistible slogans, people lose their ability to calculate risk and distinguish between good ideas and a bad one. You say the nineteen twenties in that quote. Could you be saying the twenty twenties?

当然。我觉得这是人性使然。每过十年、二十年总会上演类似桥段。杰米·戴蒙有句名言——其实不算名言，是2008年左右他女儿回家问'爸爸什么是金融危机'时，他回答说'每七八年就会发生一次的事'。

Sure. I mean, think this is human nature. I think every every ten years, twenty years, whatever. Look, Jamie Dimon famously has this great line where he and it's not really a line his daughter came home, this is actually back in 2008 or 02/09 and says, Daddy, what's a financial crisis? And he says, Something that happens every seven or eight years.

确实如此，每隔七八年人们就会失去理智。他们总以为'这次不一样'，但最终总会出现某种形式的调整。有时是深度痛苦的调整，有时我们称之为崩盘，有时叫恐慌。

Well, so yes, every seven or eight years people lose their head. People believe this time is different and invariably there is some form of a correction. Sometimes the correction is deep and painful. Sometimes we call it a crash. Sometimes we call it a panic.

1929年那次我们最终称之为大萧条——顺便说这个术语是胡佛总统定义的，他觉得'萧条'比'恐慌'更得体。

In 1929 we ultimately called it depression. That was a phrase by the way interestingly termed and defined by President Hoover who actually stopped calling it a panic because he thought the word depression was better.

这又回到你之前的观点，他的决策并不总是明智。让我们快速看看当下形势：过去两年我过早看空，现在人人都在讨论泡沫，这种共识反而意味着行情可能还有空间——当所有人都在喊'小心为上'时。

Comes back to your earlier point, he didn't always connect that well. So let's have a quick snapshot on today in in in that sense because I've I've been bearish for the last couple of years too early. Obviously, now I feel like everyone's talking about this being a bubble, which almost certainly suggests it's got further to go at least if we're all saying, oh gosh, you gotta be careful.

很可能是这样，这正是复杂之处。美林创始人查尔斯·梅里尔曾在1928年警告客户离场，从某种角度看他是对的，但1928年到1929年9月间股市又涨了90%。所以当卡桑德拉预言危机是一回事，精准择时完全是另一回事。

It likely does and that's the complicated part. Know, Charles Merrill who had founded Merrill Lynch famously told a lot of his clients in 1928 get out of the market. And Charles Merrill would have been sort of right but probably a lot wrong in that between the 1928 and September 1929, the stock market went up 90%. And so, you know, timing being the Cassandra and sort of calling it is one thing. Timing it is really another.

当人们不断问我们是否处于泡沫中时，这种讨论往往会持续很长时间。我记得2004年就有关于美国房地产泡沫的封面报道，我也参与了其中。当时我很多考虑买房的朋友都说要再等等，等到2005年再说。

And when people are saying are we in a bubble, are we in a bubble, oftentimes it can extend out great periods. I remember in 2004 there was big cover stories that I was part of about real estate bubbles in The United States. And I remember a whole bunch of friends of mine who were thinking about buying a home. They said, oh, we're gonna wait. We'll wait till 2005.

是啊，是啊。

Yeah, yeah.

结果到了2005年，房价又涨了15%。于是他们说那就等到2006年吧。这时房价已经涨了30%。最终你会突然意识到：天啊，列车已经开走了。

2005, the market's then up, you know, 15%. You know what? We're gonna wait 2006. Now the market's up 30%. At some point the problem is you say to yourself, oh my goodness, the train has left the station.

如果现在不上车，就永远赶不上了。但往往就在这种时候，危机就爆发了。

If I don't get on the train, I'll never get in. But it's usually right then when the problem hits.

关于市场时机难以把握这点，我建议听众回顾两周前我们与霍华德·马克斯的对谈，他对此有专业见解。至于今昔对比，很多人认为如果现在是泡沫，更像1999年。因为都是科技驱动——如今是AI，当年是互联网。

Well, in in terms of that impossibility of timing the market, I refer people back to our episode two weeks ago with Howard Marks who talks about that with great expertise. In terms of the comparisons today and then, I think understandably a lot of people think if today's a bubble, it's more similar to 1999 Right. Because it's sort of tech driven. Mhmm. Today on AI, then on the Internet.

而2008年更多人将其与1929年相提并论，因为都集中在金融体系。显然1929年导致了大萧条，而2008年至少注入了足够流动性使经济缓慢复苏。我想探讨的是：当前若泡沫破裂，是否会因债务规模（之前说过债务主要在政府而非散户）像1929年那样引发大萧条？我记得您在书中指出，1929年后大萧条的关键原因正是人们的过度负债。

And that many people compared 2008 much more to potentially being like 1929 because it's more centered on the financial system. And obviously, 1929 led to the Great Depression, whereas in 2008, they kind of at least poured enough liquidity into the system that there was a slow recovery to to follow. The area that I want to explore with you is whether actually today could be like 1929 in the way that if we do have a bubble bursting, could it trigger a Great Depression, an extended recession because of the amount of debt? Debt we said earlier is not so much in retail traders, but it's in governments. And and that was one of the key problems, think I'm right in saying from your book after the bubble burst in 1929 for why there was a Great Depression because people were so indebted Right.

而且他们的资产价值暴跌。

And their asset value fell.

嗯。所以我也属于1999年那一派。从科技泡沫等方面来看，情况非常相似，某种程度上几乎是不加节制的过度支出，你会认为这种情况需要进行某种调整。更大的问题——遗憾的是我认为我们现在还不知道答案——是系统中到底存在多少杠杆。对我来说，每次危机的导火索都是杠杆。

Mhmm. So I too am in the sort of 1999 camp. It looks a lot more like that in terms of the tech bubble and the like and overspending almost indiscriminate spending to some degree and you'd think that there would be a correction of sorts with that. The bigger question and I don't think we know the answer right now unfortunately is how much leverage is really in the system. So to me the thing the match that lights the fire of every crisis is the leverage.

那就是导火索。只要杠杆率不高，你可以为所欲为。很难出现明显的恐慌。我们不知道的是，在这种AI建设热潮中——顺便说一句，我们现在正经历的这种狂热时刻与20年代末非常相似，都是新技术层出不穷——我们不知道杠杆藏在哪里，因为如今大量杠杆存在于私募信贷中。过去我们还能通过银行系统了解他们放贷了多少。

That is the match. You can do all the crazy things you want as long as there's not enough leverage. It's hard to have a demonstrable panic. What we don't know is in this sort of AI build out against this again, by the way, we're sort of living through this euphoric moment very similar to the late 20s in terms of all the new technologies that are happening then We don't know where the leverage lies because so much of it lives in private credit today. So it used to be that we knew within the banking system, you know, how much they were loaning out.

现在我们真的不知道了。我们也不清楚私募信贷市场与银行系统的关联程度。有些私募信贷基金实际上是由银行提供杠杆的，意味着他们欠银行钱，有些还拥有银行的流动性支持。所以这些联系是存在的。最令人担忧的是最后一点：本·伯南克在普林斯顿的毕业论文研究了大萧条，他发现危机来临时该怎么办？

Now we don't really know. We also don't really know how connected the private credit markets are to the banking system. So some of these private credit funds are actually leveraged by the banks meaning they owe money back to the banks and some of them have liquidity lines to the banks as well. So there there are these connections. And then the the last piece which makes it perhaps the most concerning is Ben Bernanke did his thesis at Princeton on the Great Depression and learned that when you have a crisis what do you do?

就是向系统注入大量资金。这正是他在2008年后采取的措施。如果今天我们如法炮制，可能会更复杂，因为政府债务已经如此庞大，到时候债券市场和投资者阶层可能会举手说：抱歉，我们喜欢你们美国/欧洲，但除非你们支付更高利率来补偿风险，否则我们不会再借钱。我们还没完全算清这笔账。

You flood the system with money. And that's what he did after 2008. So if we were to do such a thing today it might be more complicated because we have such enormous government debt that at some point you would think that the bond market and investor class would raise their hand and say excuse me, we like you folks in The United States over here or we like you folks in Europe over here. But we're only going to lend you money at a much higher rate because we need you to pass for the risk. And we haven't really figured out all of all of that math yet.

所以这就是可能出现问题的环节。

And so that's where things could get

棘手。相比1929年，现在唯一积极——或者说没那么消极——的因素是你刚才提到的：我们不再实行金本位制。

hairy. The one positive or perhaps less of a negative today compared to 1929, you briefly touched on it earlier, is that we're not on the gold standard.

我们有很多不同。我们不再实行金本位。顺便说一句，美国现在有证监会，有各种内幕交易之类的规定。1929年发生的那些如今会被视为非法的把戏，在当时都是合法的。

We're not there's a lot of things. We're not on the gold standard. By the way, in The US there's an SEC. By the way, over here there are all sorts of rules around insider trading and the like. By the way, there's all sorts of shenanigans going on in 1929 that would be considered illegal today that were not illegal then.

银行有资本要求。1929年时根本没有银行监管。所以我认为我们已经吸取了一些教训。当然不是说我们不会遭遇崩盘或恐慌之类的情况，但要说我们会陷入那种持续十五、二十年的萧条，虽然我不想断言这完全不可能，但真要发生也得是截然不同的形式。

There are bank capital requirements. There were no bank cap there were no bank regulations back in 1929. So I'd like to think that we've learned some lessons. Again, not to say we can't have a crash or a panic or something of the sort, but the idea that we would create a sort of you know fifteen, twenty year depression, I don't want to say it's off the table, but it would have to manifest itself in a very different way.

这个视角真的非常非常有意思。我想深入谈谈书中的几个角色。我们提到了赫伯特·胡佛，你提到了拉斯基，还谈及了时任财政部长的安德鲁·梅隆。我们也简单讨论了执掌摩根大通的托马斯·拉蒙特。那查尔斯·米切尔呢？

Really really really interesting that perspective. I wanna dwell on a couple of these characters in the book. We mentioned Herbert Hoover, you mentioned Rakskin, Andrew Mellon you've touched on who was the the treasury secretary. You touched we touched a little bit on Thomas Lamont of who's running JPMorgan. What about Charles Mitchell?

因为他是书中的重要角色。我在另一次媒体采访中听你把他比作那个时代的杰米·戴蒙。他执掌国民城市银行（你可以说这家银行经历多次变迁，与今天的花旗集团有些渊源）。但他和杰米·戴蒙有个巨大区别，对吧？我无法想象查尔斯·米切尔会说出'我要保持堡垒般的资产负债表'这种话。

Because he he's a massive character in the book. I've heard you in a different press interview referred to him as sort of the Jamie Dimon of his day. He ran National Citibank, which you could sort of argue that there's been a lot of changes, has some some continuation into Citi today. But there's a big difference to Jamie Dimon, is there not? In that I don't think you'd ever hear Charles Mitchell saying, I have a fortress balance sheet that I want to maintain.

不，不会。我当时把他比作杰米·戴蒙，是指他的名气相当。他是1920年代会上杂志封面的银行家，就是那种风云人物。

No. No. I I would I think when I referred to him in the context of of being like he was as famous as Jamie Dimon. He was he was the banker who would be on the cover of magazines in the nineteen twenties. He was that guy.

从英雄到恶棍的转变。

Hero to villain as well.

确实是英雄变恶棍。其实我觉得他更类似迈克尔·米尔肯——说来奇怪，因为米尔肯同样通过垃圾债券等方式用债务改造了信贷市场。他曾极负盛名，最终却被视为恶棍。所以在很多方面，我会把他归入米尔肯这类，但拥有杰米·戴蒙级别的名气。

Hero to villain. I actually think he's more akin to a Michael Milken oddly enough because Michael Milken transformed also using debt the credit markets through junk bonds and the like. He was as famous as ever and ultimately was considered a villain. So in many ways I would put him more in the milking category with the level of fame of a Jamie Dimon.

可别让杰米听到我们这样把他比作恶棍。不过我想说的是，这本书里有许多令人惊叹的角色——在阅读前我完全不了解他们。

We shouldn't let Jamie hear us describing him as as a villain in that regard. But I guess the point I'm getting to on this is there are some amazing characters in this, which I didn't know about before reading the book.

我迷上了查理·米切尔，因为他真正彻底改变了整个行业。人们通过信贷购买股票这一理念几乎就是他的发明，而且他确实在全国范围内推广了这一做法。当时他即将成为美国最大的银行，并试图超越伦敦的银行，成为全球最大。

I became enamored with Charlie Mitchell because he really he really transformed the whole industry. The whole idea that people were buying stock on credit was really almost his invention and he really popularized that around the whole country. And he was about to he was the largest bank in The US and was trying to become the largest bank in the world to overtake the London banks in fact.

你知道吗？我想再谈谈杰米·戴蒙，因为我确信我听过他说过这样的话，无论是在接受你或我的采访中，还是在CNBC其他节目里。但我始终不确定这个观点的确切来源。

It's do you know what? One other just dwelling on Jamie Dimon for a moment because I am sure I have heard him say this, whether it's in an interview with you or me or or elsewhere on CNBC over the years. And I'm not I never sure where where it came from.

好的。

Okay.

但你书中提到摩根大通的创始人皮尔庞特·摩根——是的，他1913年去世。所以他不是你书中的核心人物，但你多次提及他。显然他将品格视为交易中最重要的考量因素。

But you write about JPMorgan, the original Yep. Who who died in 1913. So he's not a central character of your book, but but you refer back to him a bit. And he apparently rated character above all else Yes. When considering doing a deal.

正是这种理念明显影响了戴蒙以及当今其他商业领袖。

That's the sort of rhetoric that's clearly influenced Diamond today and some other business leaders as well.

哦，我认为很多商界领袖都会谈论品格，但杰米是少数真正践行的人。在所有银行领袖中——甚至可能更广泛的商界领袖中，我对他怀有极高的敬意，因为他确实比其他任何人都更重视并践行这一点。他与查理·米切尔不同，他真正以品格理念来对待整个世界。他极少犯下重大失误。

Oh, I think that there's a lot of business leaders that that talk about character. I think that Jamie is one of the few that actually lives it. I I do have of all of the the bank leaders and and maybe even among business leaders more broadly, I I have such high regard for him because I I do think that he thinks about that and cares about that more than anything. And he's not like Charlie Mitchell in that he really approaches the entire world around around that idea of character. It's very few and far between where he has totally, you know, made a major misstep on Gone Wrong.

而当失误发生时，他通常是第一个坦诚承认并公开说明情况的人。

And when he has, he's usually the first to fess up about it and say, you know, I I want I want everyone to know what happened here.

安德鲁，我想稍微回顾一下你的事迹，我们差不多该做个总结了。在你幸运采访过的CNBC和DealBook大会上那些非凡人物中——我知道大会很快又要举办了——哪位受访者对你作为领导者的影响最大？还有谁是你至今仍未采访到的？

So I wanna bring it back a bit to to you, Andrew, we kind of start to to conclude. He's one of the characters extraordinary list of characters you've been lucky enough to interview on CNBC, in your deal book conference, which I know is coming up again soon. Who has had the biggest impact on you as as a leader that you've interviewed, and who has still proven elusive?

仍未采访到的？

Proven elusive?

你还没采访到但很想邀请的是谁？

Who haven't you got yet that you wanna get?

嗯，有一个人我一直...我认识她，也一直在寻找合适的时机。我无比钦佩奥普拉·温弗瑞，部分原因是她做的...我甚至不能说她在做和我们相同的事，因为她是以另一种近乎神奇的方式在运作。她已成为一位不可思议的企业家，对吧？我一直想采访她。很幸运我现在认识她了，这些年来我们有过一些交集，但至今还没能说服她坐下来接受专访。

Well, one person I've always I I I know her and I've I've I've tried to find the the right moment for it. I've always admired Oprah Winfrey enormously in part because she does I can't even say that she does what we do because I think she does it in this other almost magical way. And she's become this unbelievable entrepreneur, right? I've always wanted to interview her. I've I've been blessed now to know her and to over the years and we've done some things over the time, but I've I've yet to corral her to sit down.

她是女王。她是当之无愧的女王。

The queen. She's the queen of all Yeah.

那我得说，请务必安排那次采访，我非常期待

And I well, look, please book that interview. I'd love

观看。我还在努力争取中。

to watch it. I got I'm still working on it.

我知道。好吧，如果有人能成功完成这件事，我我我相信你能做到。《大而不倒》这本书，可以说彻底改变了你的事业。当时一切进展得非常顺利。是的。

I know. Well, if anyone can get it over the line, I I I believe you can. The book Too Big to Fail, I think it's fair to say transformed your career. It was going incredibly well. Yep.

但它让事业进入了新的阶段。对吧？

But it it kicked it into a new gear. Fair?

完全正确。说实话，这也是我这次写这本书时如此害怕的主要原因之一。

It's totally fair. And to be honest with you, it's one of the reasons I think I was actually so scared to write this book overall this time.

因为它会被拿来和那本书比较。

Because it's gonna be compared to that book.

因为我们可能会被比较。我是说，我觉得我写这本书有两个原因。其一，我我我一直没写这本书是因为害怕。其二，我觉得我用某种方式写这本书，几乎是为了向自己证明我能做到，因为我记得那本书出版时，敲敲木头，感觉就像抓住了闪电，这种事可遇不可求。你会问自己：那真是我写的吗？也许是运气，也许是时机。

Because we could be compared I mean, I think I was writing this book for two reasons. One, I I think I was not writing this book for a while because I was scared. And I think I was writing this book in a certain way to almost prove to myself that I could because I think I remember when that book came out, you know, knock on wood it it almost it felt like lightning in a bottle and you never know. You say to yourself, did I do that? Maybe it's luck, maybe the timing.

所以对我来说，写这本书既是写作上的挑战，也是情感上的挑战。听你这么说很有意思，

So I think for me writing this book was almost as much of an emotional challenge as it was a writing challenge. Well, that's fascinating to hear you say

因为你一直都是我们这个领域的巨人，听到你表达这种紧张情绪让我很惊讶

because you've always just been, you know, a titan of of our of our field, and I'm amazed to hear you express that that nervousness

当然。我是说，当然。当然。你怎么可能不呢？

to Of course. I mean, of course. Of course. How could you not?

嗯，你显然已经知道这一点，因为我知道这本书已经畅销了，但但但但非常值得去做，因为完全没有必要紧张。这本书更广泛的遗产是什么呢？我是说，它并不是试图警告人们这可能即将发生。它

Well, you you obviously already know this because I know it's flown off the shelves, but but but but well worth having done because there was no no need to be nervous. What what about the legacy of the book more widely? I mean, it's not trying to be a warning to people that this could be around the corner. It's

不。不。不。事实上，当我开始写这本书时，完全没想到会有这些相似之处。是的。某种程度上是逐渐浮现的

No. No. No. In fact, when I began the book, had no idea there'd be these parallels Yeah. Sort of emerged as

时机完美。

time was perfect.

我在写作时，你知道，与其说这是一个警告，不如说我认为这是一个关于历史的教训，希望是防止历史重演的一次尝试，并不是说它明天就会发生，而是给人们一个机会看看过去发生了什么，无论是1929年还是2008年，也许我们所有人都需要多一点谦逊，包括我自己，对未来少一点确定性。

I was writing, you know, it's not so much a warning as it is I think a lesson just about history and hopefully an attempt to prevent history from happening again, not to say that it'll happen tomorrow, but to sort of offer people an opportunity to see what's happened in the past whether it's in 1929 or 2008 and maybe have a little bit more all of us we need including myself a little more humility and maybe a little less certainty about what's gonna happen next.

除此之外，这是一本引人入胜的书。我毫不怀疑人们会争相购买电视和电影版权，就像他们对你其他作品如《大而不倒》和《亿万》所做的那样。恭喜你出版了这本书。最后，安德鲁，我想问，我们经常在结束时问投资者，最好的投资建议是什么？我想知道我们能否问你，作为一名作家、记者、电视主持人，你对我们听众最重要的职业建议是什么，如果你不介意分享的话？

Well, on top of that, it's a thrilling read. I have no doubt people will be banging down the door for the for the TV and film rights as they have done with with your other Too Big to Fail with Billions and and the like. So congrats on the book. To wrap things up, Andrew, I wanted to ask, you know, we we often ask as we wrap up investors, what's the the greatest piece of investing advice? I I wonder if we can ask you as as an author, as a as a journalist, as a TV presenter, what's your overriding piece of career advice for our listeners if you don't mind sharing it?

很多年前，当我刚加入《财经论谈》时，有个人告诉我——我可能不该提他的名字——他看出了我的急躁。我当时非常急躁，现在依然如此。我是个非常没耐心的人。他说，安德鲁，你知道三个T吗？我说，什么？不知道。

So many years ago when I actually just joined Squawk Bunks, I was told by somebody who I probably shouldn't mention my name and he could see the impatience in me. I had enormous still have it. I'm a very impatient person. And he said, Andrew, do you know the three t's? I said, what if no.

我不知道三个T指的是什么。他说过，事情需要时间。记住这三个T：Things take time（事情需要时间）。尽管我性子急，但我还是尽量以自己的方式记住这一点。

I don't know what the three t's are. And he said, things take time. Remember the three T's. Things take time. And I try in my own way, as impatient as I am, to to remember that.

事情确实需要时间。你可以尝试稍微加快进度，但耐心也有其价值。

Things do take time. You can try to accelerate them a little bit, but patience there's a value to patience too.

嗯，八年时间写一本书确实够有耐心的。非常值得。1929年那本书现在已经全面上市了。我强烈推荐。安德鲁，非常感谢你今天抽空参加《投资大师》播客的录制。

Well, eight years is a patient period of time to write a book of it. It was well worth it. 1929 is out everywhere now. I highly recommend it. And, Andrew, thank you so much for your time on the Master Investor podcast today.

谢谢。这是我的荣幸。很高兴能和你交流。

Thank you. This is such a privilege. It's great to be with you.

以上就是安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金在《投资大师》播客中的分享。再次提醒，播客中提到的任何内容都不应被视为直接的投资建议。如需了解更多，请参考我们的节目说明。下周播客中，我们将采访摩根士丹利的首席策略师迈克·威尔逊。非常期待这次对话。

That was Andrew Ross Sorkin on the Master Investor podcast. A reminder once again, nothing you've heard in the podcast be considered direct financial advice. More on that in our show notes if you'd like to refer to them. Next week on the podcast, we'll be talking to Morgan Stanley's top strategist, Mike Wilson. Very much looking forward to that conversation.

《投资大师》播客由Paradine Productions和Master Investor Podcast Limited联合Birdline Media制作。如果您喜欢本节目，请在YouTube订阅或在播客平台点击关注，这样就能在新节目发布时自动收到通知。再次感谢安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金。

The master investor podcast is produced by Paradine Productions and Master Investor Podcast Limited in association with Birdline Media. If you've enjoyed the podcast, please do subscribe on YouTube or click follow on your podcast platform, and then you'll be automatically notified each time a new episode drops. For now, though, our thanks once again to Andrew Ross Sorkin.

谢谢。

Thank you.