芒克对话安德鲁·科因：特朗普的硬实力主义疏远盟友并开创破坏性先例

这使美国陷入孤立，它会发现单靠自己的军事力量是不够的。

It is isolating America, and and it will find that its military power on its own is not enough.

嗯。

Mhmm.

如果你与整个世界为敌，你很快就会意识到美国力量的局限。

If you have the whole world against you, you're gonna discover the limits of American power pretty quickly.

欢迎来到蒙克对话，嘉宾是安德鲁·科恩。

Welcome to the Monk Dialogues with Andrew Coyne.

我是蒙克辩论的主席罗杰·格里菲斯，今天在演播室邀请到了记者兼畅销书作家安德鲁·科恩。

I'm Roger Griffith, chair of the Monk debates, joined in studio by journalist and bestselling author Andrew Coyne.

安德鲁，祝你2026年快乐。

Andrew, happy 2026.

很高兴与你在一起。

Nice to be with you.

这一年一开始就很轰动，安德鲁，我想起去年秋天我们2025年的对话，那时我们觉得有一只鞋即将落地，特朗普政府内部正酝酿着某种动态。

The year started off with a bang, and I think back, Andrew, to our conversations in 2025 last, fall where we felt that, a shoe was to drop, that there were dynamics within the Trump administration.

发布了那份国家安全战略文件。

There was the release of that national, security strategy document.

这些话似乎必须以非常具体和明确的方式付诸实施，尤其是在本周入侵委内瑞拉的背景下。

Those words seem, Andrew, have they not to be put into action in a very concrete and explicit way in the context of, this week's invasion of Venezuela.

你如何评价过去72小时的重要性？

How do you rate the significance of the last seventy two hours?

这可能意义重大。

It's potentially huge.

我认为人们需要谨慎，虽然现在说这个为时已晚，但不要急于在印刷品或网络上对正在发生的事情做出即时分析。

I think people need to be careful about not, it's far too late to say this, but but not rushing into print or online with instant analyses of what is going on.

还有很多事情尚未确定。

Much is still to be determined.

当然，我认为人们应该警惕将过多的全球战略或地缘政治分析归因于特朗普政府，尤其是归因于特朗普本人。

Certainly, I think people should be wary of attributing too much global strategy, geopolitical analysis to the Trump administration, certainly to Trump himself.

根据我的经验，应用于特朗普的奥卡姆剃刀原则是：在一切其他解释之前，优先选择最愚蠢、最卑劣的解释。

In my experience, Occam's razor as it applies to Trump is you should prefer the stupidest and most venal possible explanation, before all else.

通常情况下，人们不会这么说，但当你面对这里所涉及的大量证据时。

And ordinarily, one would not say that, but when you are dealing with the abundance of evidence, involved here.

所以对我来说，你看到有人试图说，嗯，这里和古巴有什么游戏。

So to me, I mean, you see people trying to say, well, there's some game here with Cuba.

这不过是给古巴敲个警钟，或者是一个庞大的计划，旨在警告中国、伊朗和俄罗斯，剥夺它们的附庸国，但这些说法在我看来都不符合特朗普思维方式的事实模式。

This is meant to be a sort of a a knock on the door of Cuba, or this is a a large scheme to warn off China and and Iran and Russia and to deprive them of a client state, or, you know, none of which I think really fit the fact pattern of how Trump thinks.

当然，我认为这与恢复民主毫无关系。

Certainly, I don't think it's anything to do with restoring democracy.

我们现在都知道了。

I think we know that now.

有少数人匆忙上网欢呼委内瑞拉自由的到来，而他们本该更清楚这一点。

A few people rushed online to hail the advent of freedom in Venezuela who should have known better.

他们基本上只是换了个面孔，维持着同一个政权。

They're basically just sticking with the same regime but with a different face on it.

我对这真的与毒品有关持怀疑态度。

I would be skeptical it has anything to do with drugs, really.

这可能与石油有关，但并非基于任何严肃或连贯的理由。

It may have something to do with oil, but not in any serious or coherent basis.

我们可以深入探讨这一点。

We can get into that.

但在我看来，我所见过的最合理的解释是：第一，他看到尼古拉斯·马杜罗以一种挑衅的方式跳舞，感到被冒犯了。

But it seems to me the most plausible explanations I've seen is, a, he saw Nicolas Maduro dancing in a provocative way and felt offended by that.

第二，委内瑞拉的民主领袖马查多获得了诺贝尔和平奖，而他却没有，他对此很在意。

B, Machado, the democratic leader in in in Venezuela, won the Nobel Peace Prize, and he didn't, and he was about that.

第三，他和普京可能在2019年达成过某种协议。

C, he and Putin may have done some deal in back in 2019.

美国外交政策分析师菲奥娜·希尔认为，这一点有说服力。

Fiona Hill, The US foreign policy analyst analyst, I think, has argued persuasively.

事实上，有确凿证据表明，特朗普和普京曾达成某种协议：普京退出西半球，特朗普退出乌克兰。

In fact, there are receipts on this that Trump and Putin cooked up some sort of thing where Putin would stay out of the Western Hemisphere, Trump would stay out of Ukraine.

我们拭目以待这是否会成真。

We'll see whether that pans out.

对我来说，这些解释比什么宏大的宇宙阴谋更合理。

These to me are the more plausible explanations than that there's some giant cosmological scheme.

我不得不说，他身边的一些狂热分子可能有不同的野心，或许觉得自己能当业余的地缘战略家。

I will say probably some of the fanatics around him may have differing ambitions and and may feel they can play at being amateur geostrategists.

如果他们能提供任何迹象，说明他们在第一天之后打算做什么，这些说法会更有说服力，也更令人鼓舞。

That would be a lot more persuasive and a lot more encouraging if they had give any evidence of any clue of what they're gonna do after day one of this.

嗯。

Mhmm.

我认为特朗普觉得这会很有趣、很戏剧化、很刺激，而这正是驱动他的一个重要因素。

I think Trump was persuaded this would be fun and dramatic, and exciting, which is a big part of what animates him as well.

但如果你要做这样的事，首先，最好有个基本的合理理由，但当然，你连第二天要做什么都毫无头绪。

But if you're gonna do something like that, a, it helps if you have some kind of underlying rationale for it, but certainly, you know, you do have the first clue of what you're going to do the next day.

我们已经听到过这些解释，比如斯蒂芬·米勒现在要接管委内瑞拉，或者委内瑞拉政权仍会掌控局面，但会通过持续的石油封锁来控制，而这种封锁似乎已经失效。

And we've heard these explanations of how, you know, Stephen Miller is now gonna run Venezuela, or, you know, the Venezuelan regime will still run it, but they'll be kept in control, through the use of ongoing an ongoing blockade of oil, which already seems to have been broken.

有报道称，已有六艘船同时抵达。

There's reports that a half a dozen ships have now made a simultaneous dashboard.

所以我的看法是，这不过是典型的混乱而已。

So it it that's that's that's my take on it is it's more of the usual chaos.

是的。

Yeah.

不。

No.

我觉得这样形容很好。

I I think that's a good way to put it.

有意思的是，安德鲁，如果我们把这次袭击与对伊朗核计划的袭击联系起来，就会发现总统似乎喜欢那种相对风险低、高曝光度、绝佳的拍照机会，以及各种耀武扬威的机会。

It's interesting, Andrew, if you if we connect this attack to the attack on Iran and its nuclear program, that the president seems to like, again, low comparatively low risk, high visibility, great, great photo ops, and, you know, opportunities for all kinds of chest thumping.

我们能否在2026年初抱一点希望呢？

Could we enter trying to be hopeful here in the early days of 2026.

我们能否将此视为一种迹象，表明这位总统及其政府实际上并没有多少决心去，比如说，对付古巴？

Could we see that as a tell in a sense that that there really isn't much intestinal fortitude on the part of this president administration to, let's say, take on a Cuba

不。

No.

更不用说格陵兰，更不用说加拿大了。

Let alone, a Greenland, let alone Canada.

因为现实是，这两项行动用军事术语来说是精确打击。

Because the reality is that these two operations are you know, the the military parlance is surgical.

用政治术语来说，我认为在他们看来，这是高回报、低风险。

The political parlance is, I think in their view, high high reward, low risk.

是的。

Yeah.

我现在在想爱德华·威尔逊的那句话，说的是人类今天拥有原始的情感、中世纪的制度，以及神一般的技术。

I'm thinking now that line of Edward O'Wilson's about, you know, mankind today, we have, you know, what is it, primitive emotions, medieval institutions, and godlike technologies.

是的。

Yeah.

特朗普可能是这一观点最彻底的体现，你显然能看到美国军队的能力。

And Trump is maybe the fullest extension of that, of the you clearly see the American military's capacity.

我认为没有人能否认，这两项行动在当天都取得了非凡的成功。

I don't think anybody can dispute that that both of those operations were extraordinary successes on the day of the operation.

是的。

Yeah.

这跟特朗普或他身边的人毫无关系。

That's got nothing to do with Trump or anybody around him.

这是美国军队的技能和技术。

It's the it's the skills and technology of the American military.

但是

But the

你每年在某件事上花一万亿美元，持续十年或二十年。

Well, you spend a trillion dollars a year on something for a decade or two.

你当然希望如此。

You'd hope You would hope.

但事情并不总是如预期那样发展。

But it doesn't all doesn't always work out that way.

因此，从这个角度来看，美国人似乎确实能完成这些任务，这让人感到安心。

So it's reassuring in that sense that the Americans do seem to be able to pull off these things.

但正如你所说，这总是选择最简单的做法，从不涉及任何长期战略或长期承受痛苦的意愿。

But as you as you were saying, it's always for the easiest possible take and and and never involves any kind of long term strategy or long term willingness to to absorb pain.

这与他倾向于威胁美国的盟友而非敌人如出一辙。

So it's of a piece with his tendency to threaten America's allies rather than its enemies.

他不会做任何艰苦的工作，也不会承诺派遣美国军队，甚至不会投入美国的资源去参与对抗俄罗斯和乌克兰的战斗。

He's not gonna do any hard work or anything to to to commit American troops, let's say, or even American treasure, to the fight against Russia and Ukraine.

他不会做任何事——他表现出的意愿越来越弱，不愿在台湾问题上对中国采取任何行动。

He's not gonna do anything he's he's showing less and less willingness to do anything to stand up to China over Taiwan.

因此，他不会去应对任何真正意义上的民主国家、美国过去所设想的重大敌人。

So he won't take take on any of the real major significant enemies of democracies, America as it used to be envisaged.

但他非常擅长威胁那些根本无力反击的人，或是本应站在美国一边的人。

But he's really good at threatening people who can't possibly fight back or or people who are supposed to be on America's side.

因此，看到他和他的追随者抓住这一点，说‘格陵兰，你下一个’，真是令人难以置信。

So to see him and his acolytes seizing on this and saying, well, Greenland, you're next, is is just extraordinary.

我的意思是，正如你所说，即使像这样的事，如果他们愚蠢到真去干，也会发现这最终会反噬他们。

I mean, it it it but as you say, even something like that, they if if they if they're stupid enough to get into it, they will discover it's going to come back and bite them.

我认为，这最终会以他们未曾预料到的各种方式反噬他们，尤其是委内瑞拉本国的局势。

This is gonna come back to bite them, I think, in all kinds of ways that they have not foreseen, particularly, events in Venezuela itself.

我见过一些学术观点认为，如果你想看到一场彻头彻尾的叛乱和游击战温床，委内瑞拉具备所有必要条件。

I've seen scholarly arguments that if you wanna see a an absolute petri dish for insurrection guerrilla warfare, Venezuela has all of the ingredients.

没错。

Right.

还有各种派系。

And factions.

而且各方利益高度对立。

And and Highly opposed to stakes.

是的。

Yeah.

当他们背水一战时，他们愿意拼命战斗，等等。

Willing to fight, when their backs are at the against the walls, etcetera.

所以，即使如此，如果你开始瓦解北约——这长期以来似乎是特朗普的策略——但如果你开始攻击一个北约盟友，这无疑是一种特别极端的做法，将会引发一系列连锁反应

So even this is gonna but but if you start breaking up NATO, which was long seemed to be Trump's game, but if it's you know, it's a particularly spectacular way to do it is if you start attacking a NATO ally, the the blowback and the the events that that will set off in terms

美国利益的影响难以估量。

of American interests are hard to calculate.

估量。

Calculate.

我们没谈到两件事。

Two things we're not talking about.

我们没谈埃普斯坦文件，也没谈所谓的‘桑树丛’第三次尝试乌克兰-俄罗斯和平协议的失败，安德鲁。

We're not talking about the Epstein files, and we're not talking about the failure of what now is the third time around the Mulberry Bush, Andrew, on a Ukraine Russia peace deal.

没错。

Yep.

是的。

Yeah.

所以，你知道，这里又有一个奥卡姆剃刀式的论点，即‘转移视线’策略对特朗普来说非常能解释得通。

And it it it so, you know, there again, there would be an Occam's razor argument that that, wag the dog would be very explanatory for Trump.

这当然有可能。

It's certainly possible.

有趣的是，如果你看看早期的民调，他并没有获得任何支持率提升。

What's interesting is if you look at the early polling, he's getting no bump.

在美国，几乎有一种神圣的共识：每当总统发动任何军事行动时，人们往往会团结在总统周围。

It is almost a, you know, holy writ in America that anytime a president launches any kind of military operation, people tend to rally around the Yeah.

总统，人们通常会事后才提出问题，但到目前为止，也许未来几天会有更多变化。

President, and they tend to ask questions later, and they there's to date, well, maybe there'll be more subsequent days.

但目前的早期民调显示，公众对此并不支持。

But the early polling on this shows no no support for it.

我的意思是，有一些支持，但公众中多数是反对的。

I mean, some support, but but majority against it in the public.

所以，即使这是一次‘转移视线’的操作，面对埃普斯坦事件终将曝光的必然性，它又能为他争取多少时间呢？

So even as a wag the dog operation, how much how much delay does this buy him in the face of, you know, the inevitability that the Epstein stuff is going to come out at some point.

所有事情最终都会曝光。

All of it's gonna come out eventually.

而且，从传统意义上说，他们面临的最大必然性是十一月的大选，根据当前的民调数据，这将对共和党造成彻底的灾难——前提是选举真正自由公正。

And the inevitability that's least inevitability in conventional terms that they're facing an election in November, which on current polling data is going to be an utter and total catastrophe for the Republicans, assuming they actually hold free and fair elections.

最近，僧侣辩论会举办了一场关于两国方案的精彩辩论，但九十分钟的时间对于这个充满争议的话题来说，也仅仅触及皮毛。

Recently, the monk debates hosted a fascinating debate about the two state solution, but ninety minutes on this contentious topic can also barely scratch the surface.

毕竟，以色列是一个充满冲突意识形态、身份认同、利益诉求和历史叙事的热点地区。

After all, Israel is a hotbed of conflicting ideologies, identities, interests, and historical narratives.

即使是专家，要跟上这些信息也相当困难。

Even for experts, that's a lot to keep up with.

但这不仅仅是以色列的问题。

And it's not just Israel.

中东正在迅速变化。

The Middle East is changing fast.

联盟关系正在转变。

Alliances are shifting.

新的权力中心正在崛起，长期以来的假设正在实时被改写。

New power centers are emerging, and longstanding assumptions are being rewritten in real time.

如果你想了解真正发生的事情，我邀请你收听我的《Call Me Back》播客。

If you want to understand what's really going on, I'd like to invite you to join me on the Call Me Back podcast.

我是《Call Me Back》节目的主持人丹·塞诺尔。

I'm Dan Senor, host of Call Me Back.

我们的使命是为您提供理解以色列及该地区所需的事实、背景和洞察。

Our mission is to give you the facts, context, and insights you need to make sense of Israel and the region.

我们的撰稿人包括以色列最优秀的记者，如纳达维尔和阿米特·塞加尔，以及美国顶尖的思想领袖，如萨姆·哈里斯和斯科特·加洛韦。

Our contributors include some of the best source journalists in Israel, like Nadaviel and Amit Segal, and top thought leaders in The US, like Sam Harris and Scott Galloway.

所以，如果您准备深入探讨，请在您收听播客的平台搜索《Call Me Back》找到我。

So if you're ready to go deeper, find me on Call Me Back wherever you get your podcasts.

那里见。

See you there.

让我们谈谈可能比较严肃的部分，这会让我们的话题重新回到加拿大。

Let's talk about, potentially the serious part of this, and it'll kinda bring our conversation back around to to Canada.

安德鲁，看起来在这次行动中，虽然我理解你关于将其归因于宏大战略的观点，但确实产生了重大的后果。

It seems, Andrew, that in this action, there is, again, I don't I take your point about imputing to it grand strategy, but there are grand consequences.

这些后果，我认为大致如下：美国的国家安全战略文件明确表达了这样一种观点——北美大陆，乃至延伸至南美和中美洲，是一个势力范围。

And the consequences, I would say, run something like this, that that national security, strategy document set out a very clear, POV from the Americans that, North America, the continent, and extending into South And Central America is a sphere of influence.

是的。

Yeah.

在这个范围内，美国人将根据文件中所述的经济、安全和外交政治原因采取行动。

A sphere of influence within which the Americans, will act for, as they said in the document, economic, security, and, diplomatic political, reasons.

他们实际上宣布了对北美大陆的某种霸权统治。

They, in a sense, declared, a form of, sultanary over over the over the North American continent.

我想向你提出的假设是，我们来看看台湾。

And I guess my hypothetical that I I present to you is, let's look at Taiwan.

设想一下，未来六个月、十二个月或十八个月后的台湾，被中国舰船包围，表面上是为了阻止美国军火运抵台湾。

Let's look at a future Taiwan six, twelve, eighteen months from now surrounded by Chinese ships, obstensibly on the basis to stop American armaments from arriving, into Taiwan.

中国方面声称，这些美国军火会威胁到中国大陆。

The tie the Chinese saying that those American armaments would threaten Mainland China.

中国突然行动，绑架了台湾的总统和总理。

The Chinese swoop in and abduct the president, the prime minister of of Taiwan.

把他们带回北京进行公审。

Take them back to Beijing for a show trial.

那么，鉴于我们现在的行动，我们还有什么立足之地呢？

What leg do we have to stand on then, given our actions now?

是的。

Yeah.

难道不是吗，安德鲁？

Is there not, Andrew?

事实上，即使没有宏大的战略，也可能产生重大的后果，是的。

In fact, even if there's an absence of grand strategy, there are potentially grand consequences Yes.

这些后果源自本周末的事件。

That flow from the events of this weekend.

是的。

Yeah.

当然。

Absolutely.

当然，你问题的答案并不是说我们毫无立足之地。

And, of course, the answer to your question isn't that we'd have no leg.

无论怎样，美国人都没有立足之地。

The Americans would have no leg to stand on whatever.

现在有一种观点认为，到某种程度上，这确实是正确的，即俄罗斯和中国根本不会被任何宏大的道德主张所威慑。

Now there's a school of thought that says I mean, it's been up to a point, it's it's absolutely correct, which is, Russia and China are not going to be deterred by, grand moral, claims anyway.

所以这一切只是真正地承认了现实，如此等等。

So all this is doing is just really recognizing reality, etcetera, etcetera.

我说这在某种程度上是正确的，而其推论是，唯一能威慑他们的就是美国的军事力量，这其实并不真正关乎美国的道德声望。

I say it's true up to a point, And the the corollary of it, it is, the only thing that will deter them is American military force, and it doesn't really it's not really about America's moral standing.

我认为这种说法过于简单了。

I think that is too simple.

我认为你不能如此轻易地将硬实力与软实力割裂开来。

I don't think you can separate hard power and soft power quite so easily.

使美国军事力量得以实现和运作的部分原因，在于其他国家对其合法性的认可。

Part of what makes American military power realizable and and operable is the degree to which it's perceived by other countries as legitimate.

毫无疑问，如果美国愿意，它可以独自行动，而且过去也确实这么做过。

There's no doubt the Americans can just go and do things on their own if they choose to, and they have a history of doing that in the past.

但这次在国际支持或合法性、合法性的主张上尤为匮乏。

But this is particularly denuded of any kind of either international support or claims to legitimacy or legality.

即使在冷战最糟糕的时候，你至少还能将其置于某种宏大战略之中，即我们面对的是一个意图称霸世界的苏联体系。

Even in its worst, in the Cold War, you could at least situate it in some kind of grand strategy, which was, look, we're we're up against a a Soviet system that's bent on world domination.

我们必须做出一些艰难的选择，甚至与一些不光彩的盟友合作，以阻止他们。

We've gotta make some hard choices, some some some nasty allies to try to stop them.

我并不是说那是对的，但至少它还有某种依据。

I'm not saying it was right, but at least it had some kind of basis in something.

这次却没有任何这样的依据。

This is this has no such claim on it.

这是纯粹的单边主义。

It is pure unilateralism.

单边主义。

Unilateralism.

这是最卑劣的动机。

It is of the most base, motivation.

正如我所说，我们并没有声称这里是在捍卫民主之类的理由。

We there's no as I say, there's no claim that we're defending democracy here, etcetera, etcetera.

事实上，我们未来可能会没收委内瑞拉的国家资产——即石油——作为我们‘解放’该国的回报。

In fact, we're we're, potentially expropriating in the future, Venezuela's national asset in the form of oil to pay us back for liberating the country.

所以，正如我所说，如果美国希望有效运用其硬实力，就必须与软实力紧密关联。

So if as I say, if America wants to be able to use its hard power in effective ways, it's closely linked to its soft power.

这与其它国家、其它强国如何看待它密切相关，它们会说：好吧。

It's closely linked to the degree to which other countries, other powers are going to look at it and say, okay.

这件事至少有某种依据，至少我们会支持它，或者选择视而不见。

There's some basis to this, where at least we're either gonna support it or we're gonna look the other way.

也许这次他们能得逞，因为马杜罗明显不合法，且广受憎恶，但这已经把界限推到了极致。

And maybe they'll get away with it in this case because Maduro so was clearly illegitimate, was so widely detested, but it's pushing the boundaries as far as you possibly can.

这种做法为美国树立了先例，也契合了一种更宏大的世界愿景——即我们任由俄罗斯在欧洲为所欲为，任由中国在远东为所欲为，这样一来，它在民主国家阵营中就完全丧失了任何支持。

And the degree to which it sets up precedents for the Americans, the degree to which it does fit into a larger vision of the world where we just basically give Russia a free hand in Europe and we give China a free hand in the Far East, then it is absolutely bankrupt of any support among fellow democracies.

日本绝不会在中东或远东支持这种做法。

That is not something that Japan is gonna support in the Middle East in the Far East.

欧洲人在欧洲问题上也不会支持这一点。

That is not something that the Europeans are gonna support when it comes to Europe.

因此，这使美国陷入孤立，美国会发现单靠军事力量是不够的。

So it is isolating America, and and it will find that its military power on its own is not enough.

嗯。

Mhmm.

如果你面对全世界的反对，你会很快意识到美国力量的局限。

If you have the whole world against you, you're gonna discover the limits of American power pretty quickly.

是的。

Yeah.

安德鲁，从中期和长期来看，是否还存在另一个挑战？即一个势力范围的世界——回顾过去两百年历史，尤其是在西方，这往往会导致大国冲突。

Would there also, Andrew, be an additional challenge again in the midterm and longer term future, which is that a world of of spheres of influence, if you look back through the sweep of the last two hundred years of of history, especially in the West, is a world often that leads to great power conflict.

没错。

Yep.

因为大国之间的联盟会破裂，它们的较小盟友会转向与其他大国结盟，以抵抗施压他们的大国，通过利用它们之间的矛盾——就像第一次世界大战前以及其它重大全球冲突爆发前的局势那样。安德鲁，我们是否正处在这个转折点上？

Because alliances between the great powers break down, their smaller powers begin to form alliances with other great powers to try to resist a great power who is pressuring them by playing them off against another one, in the case of World War one, in the case of the buildups to other larger global conflicts, is it not Andrew precisely at this moment where we transition?

也许这周末以一种更明确的方式发生了这样的情况。

And maybe that's, in a sense, what happens this this weekend in a in a more explicit way.

你知道，现实赶上了理论。

You know, events caught up to theory.

我们现在所处的世界，看起来更像十九世纪，而不是二十一世纪——至少不是前二十五年的样子，这都源于这周末的事件。

And we're now in a world that looks more like the nineteenth century than the twenty first century, at least the first twenty five years of it, with this with the events of the weekend.

当然。

Oh, absolutely.

这简直是一笔奇怪的交易。

And it and it's it's a bizarre trade.

我得承认，特朗普周围的狂热分子在这一点上确实有些真诚。

I'll give the fanatics around Trump credit for some sincerity on this.

他们对1945年到2020年这段时期的分析是：这对美国来说是一场彻底的灾难，一切都出了问题。

Their their analysis of 1945 to 2020, is that this was a a thoroughgoing disaster for America, in which everything had gone wrong.

它开放了边境，各种糟糕的事情发生了；它实行了自由贸易，带来了各种灾难；它参与了多边主义，也导致了各种糟糕的结果——那些糟糕的事情到底是什么？是的。

It had it had had opened its borders and and all sorts of terrible things happened, and it did allowed free trade and all kinds of terrible things, and it had been involved in multilateralism and all kinds of terrible well, what were the terrible things Yeah.

这涉及了前所未有的美国实力和前所未有的美国繁荣，并通过这些国际机构以聪明的方式得以行使和倍增。

That involved unprecedented American power, unprecedented American prosperity, exercised and and and force multiplied in intelligent ways through these international institutions.

我的意思是，左派对它的愤世嫉俗的解读有一定道理，即美国嘴上说着多边共赢，但实际上只是为了自身利益。

I mean, the the the cynical left interpretation of it had some validity, which was the Americans talked him multilateral gain, but it was really an American interest.

嗯，那里确实有很多真相。

Well, there was there was that was a lot of truth there.

这并不一定是谎言。

It doesn't have to be Tell.

这两者不必相互矛盾。

The one doesn't have to be contradictory of the other.

这是一种开明的自我利益。

Was enlightened self interest.

特朗普阵营似乎一心要证明，校园左派对美国权力最愚蠢的理论完全正确，即他们所做的一切，只是为了最愚蠢、最卑劣的动机。

What the Trump people seem bent on doing is proving the most obtuse campus lefty theory about American power is absolutely correct, which is that they're just doing things for the, again, for the stupidest, most venal possible reasons.

是的。

Yeah.

而且还要反过来对付自己的帝国，摧毁真正美国实力的源泉，转而追求——我们只靠军事力量，完全靠自己行事。

And and to turn on their own empire, to dismantle the the sources of genuine American strength, in to to trade it in for well, we're just gonna do everything through military might and all on our own.

用它来交换

Trade it in

换取一些破旧的委内瑞拉油田？没错。

for some clapped out oil fields in Venezuela Well, exactly.

准备好应对五到十年了。

Ready for five to ten years.

那么，如果。

Well, if then.

如果那么。

If then.

如果有的话。

If ever.

我所看到的成本估算

The the the cost estimates that I've seen

一千亿。

100,000,000,000.

范围从一千亿到一万亿，没错。

Range from a 100,000,000,000 to a trillion Right.

要达到任何能对全球石油市场产生显著影响的水平。

To get up to any kind of level where where this would have any kind of significant impact on world oil markets.

人们被这种虚假的全球有三千亿桶石油的说法迷住了。

People get bedazzled by this phony claim of $300,000,000,000 barrels in the world.

这些最大的储量最初根本就是委内瑞拉人编造的。

Largest reserves in all made up to begin with by the Venezuelans.

但即使这是真的，地下的或海底的储量也不同于实际产量，而实际产量最多每天只有一百万桶。

But even if it were true, reserves in the ground or under the sea are different than actual production, which is a million barrels a day at most.

是的。

Yeah.

所以，即使这真的和石油有关，也毫无意义。

So so even if it were venal enough to be about the oil, it makes no sense.

是的。

Yeah.

因此，这是一种独特狭隘、落后且简化的、近乎幼稚的美国实力观，认为19世纪的模式最符合美国的利益。

So it it it it is a peculiarly pinched and backward and simplistic and almost adolescent view of American power that thinks that the nineteenth century model is the model that is most conducive to American interests.

对。

Right.

而战后模式的出现是因为战争，以及那一代人对战争起因的理解——即势力范围、大国竞争、区域联盟的崩溃，这些最终成为1939年至1945年席卷全球的浩劫的煽动性基础。

And the postwar model emerged because of the war and because of an understanding amongst that generation what the causes of that war were, which were spheres of influence, great power competition, competition, regional alliances that, broke down and became, in fact, the incendiary kind of underpinnings of the conflagration that engulfed the world from 1939 to 1945.

它也带来了诸多代价，其中包括核对抗，核……

And it came with the cost, among many, of, nuclear confrontation, nuclear Mhmm.

你知道，美国和苏联之间的竞争令人恐惧，但尚可控制。

You know, competition between the Americans and the Soviets, which was terrifying but manageable.

双方都有理性的人。

There were rational people on both sides.

你知道，它在很大程度上被控制住了，嗯。

You know, it was largely contained to, you know Mhmm.

这些年，又出现了一些其他的核武器国家。

Them plus a few other nuclear powers emerged over the years.

我们现在面临的情况是，我认为几个国家从中得出的教训将是：它们必须拥有核武器。

We are now in a situation where, I think the lesson that that several powers are going to be taken from this is that they're gonna have to go nuclear.

例如，我一点也不会惊讶于日本在未来几年内拥有核武器。

I would not be at all surprised, for example, to see Japan, go nuclear in the years to come.

你知道，欧洲一直在讨论将法国和英国拥有的核武器进行多边化。

You know, the the we're there's been talks in Europe about multilateralizing the Mhmm.

这些核武器的使用。

The use of the nuclear weapons that France and Britain have.

这些可能是不可避免的，可能是我们所处局面的代价之一，但同样令人担忧。

These are maybe inevitable, maybe part of the price of the situation we're in, but again, kind of scary.

我的意思是，我很关注德国正在加强其

I mean, I'm very keen, for example, that the Germans are building up their

嗯。

Mhmm.

军事实力，当然，除非德国选择党上台。

Military might, unless, of course, the AFD gets in.

嗯。

Yeah.

那样的话，情况就有点可怕了。

In which point, that becomes a bit scary.

但我们希望这种情况不要发生。

But let's hope that doesn't happen.

但你正在制造非常不稳定的局面。

But you're you're you're creating really destabilizing situations here.

或者勒庞，国民阵线

Or the or Le Pen, the front nationality

在法国拥有核武器。

in in France with nuclear weapons.

所以，而且again，你知道，所有这些严重不稳定因素的共同点是什么？

So and and, again, you know, who who is what's the common theme in terms of all these deep stabilizing forces?

是俄罗斯在利用西方民主国家的弱点和裂痕，推动每个国家的极右翼民粹势力，包括美国。

It's Russia, working through the weaknesses, the fault lines in the western democracies, promoting the far right populist right in each of these countries, including America.

嗯。

Mhmm.

所以，目前这简直非同寻常——人们正在争论，委内瑞拉这件事对普京来说是得还是失？

So it's, at this point, an extraordinary I mean, peep people are debating about, is this Venezuelan thing a a gain or a loss for Putin?

你可以说，哦，这是一次失利，因为他原本有一个附属国，就是委内瑞拉。

And you can say, oh, it's a loss in that, you know, he had a client state in the form of Venezuela.

但从更大的战略角度来看，是的。

But in a larger strategic sense Yeah.

让美国同意接受一种三大势力范围的世界观，

Getting the Americans to sign on to to essentially a a three spheres of influence view of

意义重大。

the world is huge.

非常重大。

Huge.

而乌克兰的和平谈判在过去真的已经消失了。

And the peace talks in Ukraine simply have gone away in the last Yeah.

在过去七十二小时内。

In the last seventy two.

我不

I don't

我知道。

I know

这是否是巧合。

if that was a coincidence.

是的。

Yeah.

或者

Or

我对这一点并不完全感到难过。

I'm not entirely heartbroken at that.

我知道这听起来会很冷漠。

I that's gonna sound callous.

当然，我们都希望乌克兰能实现和平，但那些和平协议——

Obviously, one wants peace in Ukraine, but those peace Yeah.

美国一直推动的那些细节和条件——

The the details, the terms that the Americans certainly have been pushing.

我的意思是，欧洲人正试图将其拉回现实，但任何类似普京-特朗普方案的条款都将是一场灾难。

I mean, the Europeans are trying to rein it back into something reality, but anything along the lines of the Putin Trump, terms would be a disaster.

感谢您收听安德鲁·科恩的‘僧侣对话’上半部分。

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Thanks in advance for your generous support.

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