第87集：萨特论自由与自欺

您正在收听《部分检视人生》，这是一档由几位曾立志以哲学为业、后又重新思考人生选择的哲学播客。第87期节目的探讨主题大致是：什么是人类的自由？我们阅读了让-保罗·萨特的三部作品：1946年的论文《存在主义是一种人道主义》、1943年《存在与虚无》第一编第二章的论文《自欺》，以及1944年的戏剧《禁闭》。

You're listening to The Partially Examined Life, a philosophy podcast by some guys who at one point set on doing philosophy for a living, but then thought better of it. Our question for episode 87 is something like, what is human freedom? We read three works by Jean Paul Sartre. His essay, Existentialism is a Humanism from 1946. The essay, Bad Faith, which is chapter two of part one of nineteen forty three's Being and Nothingness, and his play, No Exit from 1944.

您可访问partiallyexaminedlife.com参与讨论、获取文本及更多信息。我是马克·林森迈尔，此刻正以真诚之心从威斯康星州梅迪辛向您播报。

You can join the discussion, get the texts, and lots more information at partiallyexaminedlife.com. This is Mark Linsonmeyer speaking to you from Medicine Wisconsin in good faith.

我是塞斯·帕斯金，在德克萨斯州奥斯汀做非本真的自己。

This is Seth Paskin being what I am not in Austin, Texas.

我是韦斯·阿尔文，在马萨诸塞州波士顿。

This is Wes Alwyn in Boston, Massachusetts.

我是迪伦·凯西，客观事实位于威斯康星州米德尔顿。

This is Dylan Casey factually in Middleton, Wisconsin.

'事实性'的副词形式是什么？

What is the adverb for facticity?

你在米德尔顿且具有事实性，不是吗？

You're in Middleton and you're facticity. Are you not?

对啊。带着事实性？

Yeah. With facticity?

不是'事实上地'，是'事实性地'。事实性地...这样说不通。

It's not factually. It's factically. Factically. This doesn't work.

我是迪伦·凯西，从威斯康星州米德尔顿事实性地播报。

This is Dylan Casey factically from Middleton, Wisconsin.

不，那样也行不通。

No. That doesn't work either.

但身处米德尔顿就意味着心怀不诚，因为这是个位于中间的不稳定地带。

But to be in Middleton is to be in bad faith because it's a metastable place in the middle.

是啊。我在密歇根州的米德兰长大，所以我对‘中间状态’深有体会。

Yeah. And I grew up in Midland, Michigan. So I'm full of being in the middle.

难怪你是个亚里士多德主义者。

No wonder you're an Aristotelian.

好了。我们已经从中榨出两个哲学笑话了

Alright. We'd milled two philosophical jokes out

我觉得他的船应该叫‘中庸之道’。

of that. I think his boat is called the golden mean.

不，不是。虽然这确实很讽刺。

No. No. Though it is gallow.

我们先定下基本规则，上次没这么做。讨论的基本原则包括：第一，尽量不要假设听众读过我们讨论的内容或具备任何哲学背景；第二，不要提出基于约定阅读材料之外的论点。别说‘你要是读过萨特后期作品《禁闭2：便秘篇》就能理解我了’。

Let's put out the ground rules. We didn't do that last time. Ground rules for our discussion include, number one, try not to assume that our audience has read what we're talking about or has any other background in philosophy. Number two, don't make arguments that hinge on something other than what we've agreed to read. Don't say, you'd understand me if only you'd read Sartre's later work, No Exit two on Constipation.

除非你听过野兽男孩未发行的专辑《布鲁克林无出口》，否则你根本听不懂这个梗。

You'd only understand this if you'd listen to the unreleased Beastie Boys album, No Exit to Brooklyn.

不错。第三，我们将严谨精确地表达，除非更啰嗦的说法可能更有趣。我是说...更有意思。

That's nice. Number three, we will be rigorous exact in all that we say unless doing otherwise would be potentially more long winded. I mean I mean amusing.

这倒挺有趣的。

Which was amusing.

于是我们终究又回到了存在主义。虽然感觉我们从未离开过这个话题。

So we return at last to existentialism. Although it feels like we never left.

有人认为这是'终究'，也有人持不同看法。

Some of us think of it as at last. Some of us think of it otherwise.

你这话是什么意思？

What do you mean?

我相信我们会深入探讨的。

I'm sure we'll get into it.

你不想谈谈焦虑、绝望、恐惧和孤寂这些酷炫词汇吗？它们可都在我们第一篇论文里被顺便提及过。

You don't want to talk about angst and despair, und dread, und forlornment, all those cool words mentioned in passing in our first essay?

就是萨特否认属于存在主义范畴的那些概念？

That Sartre denies as being part of existentialism?

不，不，不。他对这些下了定义。他只是将其定义为——好吧，处于痛苦中并不完全是件消极的事。

No. No. No. He defines them. He just he defines them to that well, that's not such a downer to be in anguish.

当你感到痛苦时，你只是意识到了自身行为的全部重量——它们具有道德意义。这就是痛苦的本质。这是重大责任，但并非令人窒息的悲观绝望。只是对现状的清醒认知。

When you're in anguish, you're just realizing the full weight of your actions that they have moral import. That's all that anguish is. It's a big responsibility, but it's not crushing pessimistic despair. It's just having a good grasp of what the situation is.

我对此存有疑问，但我觉得我们应该先梳理他实际表述的内容。

I have my questions about it, but I think that we should go through what he actually says before.

哦，真的吗？

Oh, really?

我们应该先过一遍人文主义的论文，然后再讨论那个关于恶意欺诈的。

We should go through the humanism essay and then we could go through the bad faith one.

嗯，我同意。

Yep. I agree.

我们先说说存在主义是什么意思吧。对，因为他确实给出了定义，谢天谢地。

Let's say what existentialism means. Yeah. Because he does actually define it, thankfully.

嗯，存在先于本质。

Well, existence before essence.

没错。那这意味着什么呢？他举了裁纸刀的例子——这在《禁闭》里也出现过——说明本质实际上先于存在。对吧？他认为这表明它有某种生产公式，或者他也谈到了特性。

Right. So what does that mean? He gives the example of a paper knife, which also shows up in No Exit as something where essence actually precedes existence. Right? Which he takes to be that it has a kind of formula for production or he talks also of qualities.

所以它是根据预先构想的概念或蓝图被制造出来的，那就是它的本质。

So it's got a preconceived concept or blueprint according to what which it is produced and that's its essence.

它有一种可以达成或达不到的卓越性。正因如此，它拥有自身的优秀品质。对吧？这是亚里士多德式的概念。

It has an arete that it can live up to or not. It has its own excellence because of that. Right? It's an Aristotelian thing.

对。说它有本质，也等于说它有一种或好或坏可实现的本性。是的，所以我会说是亚里士多德式的卓越。嗯，某物可以或多或少地成为它自己，而这需要它具备本质上的本性。

Yeah. To say it has an essence is also to say it has a nature which it can fulfill worse or better. Yeah. So I would say Aristotelian excellence. Yeah, something can be more or less itself and it has to have a nature in essence to do that.

也许'本性'这个词用得不妥。本性是针对有生命的生物体而言的。是的。

Maybe nature is the wrong word. Nature is for animate biological things. Yeah.

甚至不必讨论它实现这一功能的优劣，关键在于我们需要某种东西——就像需要锋利之物来切割，于是我们创造、制造或生产出这种锋利且能切割的物品，从而满足需求。如此一来，需求或功能先于物品的实际存在。

Don't necessarily even talking about how well or poorly it fulfills that function, the point is that there's a need for something like we need something sharp to cut, hence we create or build or produce this thing which is sharp and can cut and then it can fulfill that. In that way, the need or the function precedes the actual existence of the object.

对萨特而言确实如此。他给出了一个有趣的解释来说明他的意思。

For Sartre, it does. Right? He gives an interesting what he means

当他说本质先于存在时。

when he says essence precedes existence.

我是否误解了——这是否意味着只有人造物的本质才先于存在？

Am I wrong to take that as meaning that the only things for which the essence precedes existence are artifacts?

对人类显然不适用。动物界或许也是，因为...

Well, it's certainly not the case for human beings. I don't know. I think it would be for animals as well because

不，我指的是岩石、河流或空气这类自然物。

Well, no. It's just to say rocks or the river or air.

他此处未涉及。他只是在论证'人性存在'这一观念与'造物主上帝存在'的观念密不可分。

He doesn't address that here. He's just saying this in the context of trying to argue that the idea that there is a human nature is indelibly tied to the idea that there is a creator god.

没错。萨特将人视作上帝生产的裁纸刀，并将本质概念绑定于'先有设计理念后制造物品'的过程——这并非传统的哲学本质观。我们需要指出：他出于自身目的，对本质作出了极具倾向性的诠释。

Right. For Sartre, he thinks of man as a paper knife produced by god, and he's tying the idea of an essence to someone who has a concept and then goes about producing that thing, which is not really the traditional philosophical view of essence. So it's something we should point out. He's giving his own very tendentious account of essence for his own reasons.

一方面是人类偶然性与自由意志的问题——这是他最终的落脚点；另一方面则源于'存在先于本质'，人类没有目的论终点。我们不同于裁纸刀。分析中令我困惑的是：是否存在本质先于存在之物？他举了裁纸刀的例子。

On the one hand, there's the question of the kind of contingency and freedom involved in human beings, which is where he ends up at. And then there's the well, that's because existence precedes essence and human beings don't have a teleological end or whatever you want to say. We're not like the paper knife. That part of the analysis I've been trying to sort of get my head around about, are there anything for which essence precedes the distance? He gives the example the paper knife.

显然人造物可以。除此之外呢？但更广泛的论点在于反对决定论。

Well, certainly artifacts. Yeah. Yeah. Anything besides artifacts. But the broader argument, right, is against determinism.

因此，你可以观察世界上任何缺乏超越性主体性的部分——这对人类至关重要，正是这种主体性让他们得以实现存在先于本质。我们稍后会详谈这一点。但任何缺失这种主体性的事物，我认为都可以论证其处于本质先于存在的状态，即它们以确定性方式运行。你可以根据无生命物体的属性预测其行为模式。同理，人们可能想说人类不过是生物有机体，属于我们能用自然主义理解的世界一部分。

So you could look at any part of the world for which there's no transcendent subjectivity, which is the key thing for human beings, which is going to allow them to have their existence precede their essence. And we'll talk about that. But anything lacking that subjectivity, I think you could argue is in an essence precedes existence situation, which is to say it's run deterministically. So you can map out the way inanimate objects are going to behave based on their properties. And similarly, people would want to say, well, human beings are just biological organisms, they're part of a world that we can understand naturalistically.

无论你想分析人的性格还是大脑，你都可以说每个行为都是某种必然结果——不论是源于其特定性格还是普遍人性，或是更广泛的共性特征，你都可以将其视为确定性系统。比如这个犯罪的人，你可以说他天生是罪犯，或者大脑构造异常，是个精神病患者。你可以用这些本质属性来解释其行为，这就是主张本质先于存在时的逻辑。

And whether you want to analyze their character or you want to analyze the brain, you can say every action is just sort of an inevitable result of whether it's their particular character or whether it's human nature in general, some more general character, you can treat them as a deterministic system. So you could say this guy who committed a crime, well, he was a criminal or something was different about his brain. He was a psychopath. You can attribute to them all these kind of essential qualities that explain their behaviors. And that's what you do when you say essence precedes existence.

相反，主张存在先于本质并非否认性格的存在（显然性格是存在的），而是强调主体性高于一切。它超越既定特质，允许任何人在任何时刻做出选择。

By contrast, to say existence precedes essence is to say not that there's no such thing as character, obviously there is, but that subjectivity trumps that. It transcends it and it allows anyone to make a choice at any particular moment.

我这样理解对吗：主体性的核心在于主体具有自我驱动的动力？他会将其描述为选择。

Am I right to say the core of the subjectivity is that the subject has a motion of itself? He'll describe it as choice.

自发性。对，他有时也这么称呼。

A spontaneity. Spontaneity. Yes. Also calls it sometimes.

嗯，可以。

Yep. That's fine.

是啊，他把选择和自发性等同起来很奇怪对吧？我们通常认为选择是理性审慎的决定。

Yeah. That's weird that he calls choice and spontaneity the same thing. Right. When we think of choice as rational deliberative choice. Right.

但他确实认为，那些被他人归因于性格的行为，在他看来都是前反思选择的结果——是你自发做出的、需要负责的选择。

But he really thinks that all what somebody else might say is your character that then determines your current action, he would say, is sort of the result of a predeliberative choice, a spontaneous choice on your part that you're responsible for.

对，或者说前反思的。他在《自欺》文末明确指出，所谓选择绝非理性审慎的抉择。

Yeah. Or pre reflective. Yeah. He uses that word and at at the end of the bad faith essay, he makes very clear that by choice, he does not mean rational deliberative choice.

我之前没明确意识到必须是前反思的。我理解它可以是未经深思的自发行为，但我原以为他持更强立场——人类内在存在某种（我称之为）情感内核，正是这种主体性的根源，使得他们不完全受制于韦斯你所说的外部世界 deterministic 活动。

I guess it just wasn't clear to me that it had to be pre reflective. I understand that it could be spontaneous in the sense of not being deliberative. But I guess I took him to be taking the stronger stance that there just is a well, I'm calling it emotion interior to let's just take human beings that is sort of the root of that subjectivity. That makes it so that they're not solely subject to the deterministic activity of the external world that you were talking about, Wes.

是啊。听起来你几乎是在用亚里士多德的方式解释萨特。一种内在的运动

Yeah. I mean, it sounds almost like you're explaining Sart via Aristotle there. A motion internal to the

如果运动只是用来描述一种模式——这正是‘运动’这个词的本义——那么我想他会接受这种说法。但如果是要用它来描述某种机制

Well, if motion is supposed to just describe a pattern, which is what the word motion actually does, then I think he would be okay with that. If it's supposed to describe a mechanism

或是某种倾向性

Or a tendency towards

对。那我认为他会感到不安，因为意识、我思（cogito）作为所有哲学的起点、绝对自由的意志、自发性，这些本应是某种完全透明的东西，它自身不具实体性。所以实际上，我们无法给出更深层的解释。

yeah. Then I don't think he'd be comfortable with that because, right, consciousness, the cogito, the starting point of all philosophy, the ultimately free will, the spontaneity, that is supposed to be something that's really utterly transparent in a certain way, that it has no being unto itself. So really, there's no further explanation that can be given.

它是一种虚无。

It is a nothingness.

没错。你可以用本体论来定义它，说它是一种虚无，它向周围事物施加虚无。你可以谈论你的体验，但我认为除了说‘这就是你’之外，他不会接受其他解释。这是你的责任。是你的过错。

Yeah. You could make these ontological characterizations of it and say, it is a nothingness, it imposes nothingness on the things around. You can talk about your experience, but you just I don't think would be comfortable other than saying, it's you. It's your responsibility. It's your fault.

除此之外，我只想再谈谈这个机制。

You know, other than that, I just wanna say more about the mechanism.

当我说‘运动本身’时，我指的是这种运动不是外部作用的结果，而是一种内在活动。

What I mean when I say a motion in itself is I mean that it is a motion that arises not as a result of external action, is an internal activity.

我只是不确定他是否会接受‘内在与外在’的区分。意识的透明性恰恰意味着它不是容器，不需要反映外部世界的事物——这种笛卡尔式的图景——意识只是对外界的纯粹开放。当我们描述意识时，我们实际上是在描述我们正在交互的事物，仅此而已。然后，自我才...

I just don't know if he's gonna be comfortable saying that there is internal versus external. That that's the point of consciousness being transparent, that it's not a container that then has to then, you know, see reflections of things in the outside world, this sort of Cartesian picture, but consciousness is just a pure openness to the outside. You know, if we're describing consciousness, we're describing the things that we're interacting with and only and then, right, the self Right.

我们本质上是在描述世界，而意识只是笼罩其上的迷雾，一种虚无般的迷雾

We're describing the world essentially, and the consciousness is just a mist, a nothingness kind of mist over

是的。于是自我便成为了世界中的一个存在。

Yes. And then so the self becomes a thing in the world.

但我认为迪伦尝试探讨意识是好的，因为它凸显了萨特在这方面的激进观点。他可能会对试图定义意识具有某种本质使其如此运作的说法感到不适。通过称之为虚无，听起来很奇怪，但他试图表达的是意识并非世界上另一个普通存在，我们无法将意识、思想或感受摆在桌上供众人检视和指认。从这个意义上说，意识是一种虚无。

But I think Dylan, attempt to get it talking about consciousness is good because it highlights Sartre's radicalness on this. Because he probably would be uncomfortable with trying to say, well, there's some kind of nature to consciousness that makes it do what it does. And by calling it a nothingness, it sounds really weird, but he's trying to get at the fact that consciousness is not just one other thing in the world, then we can't put consciousness or our thoughts or feelings on the table in front of us and as a group poke at them and point to them and point them out to each other. Consciousness is a nothingness in that sense.

他在《存在主义是一种人道主义》的论文中避开了这个术语。我注意到全文都未提及。

He avoids that term in the existentialism as a humanism essay. I noticed it's not in there at all.

没错。而且我认为他大量讨论了主观性，对吧？

Right. And I think he talks a lot about subjectivity. Right?

迪伦，我也觉得你提出的质疑很有价值——当他将存在与本质对立时，我们确实该问：除人造物外，任何事物是否具有本质？虽然这与他在《存在主义是一种人道主义》中强调个人责任的核心论点不完全相关，但我记得翻阅《存在与虚无》时，他提到过类似观点：若谈论自然，则无所谓毁灭。比如雪崩发生时，自然界并未摧毁任何事物，只是将物质从一处重新分配到另一处。

I also think it's useful as you were going, Dylan, to start questioning, you know, if he's gonna contrast existence in essence to ask that question that you were asking, well, does anything besides artifacts have an essence? And though that's not completely germane to his focus in the existentialism as a humanism essay, which is all about personal responsibility, I do remember when I was just flipping through Being Nothingness, him saying something like, if you're talking about nature, there's no destruction. Right? If an avalanche just happens in nature, it doesn't destroy things. All it does is redistribute matter from one place to another.

只有当人类进行价值评判时，这才成为毁灭。因为这是我建造或认可的完整结构被粉碎。因此，若没有人类意识的反思，自然界就不存在目的性。一旦摒弃造物主学说，本质上也就摒弃了自然界中的所有本质。

It only becomes destruction when there's a human sort of evaluating it. It becomes destruction because this is a structure that I built or that I recognize as a coherent whole, and it's being smashed apart. So there is no purposefulness in nature without human consciousness reflecting on it. Once you get rid of the doctrine of a creator god, really, you get rid of essences altogether in nature.

这在我看来有些夸大其词。难道真的不存在独立于人类评判的毁灭概念吗？除非你认为事物的存在本身也依赖于人类评价。

That seems to me to be overstating it a little bit. Right? Is it really the case that there's no idea of destruction that's outside of human evaluation? I guess the only way you would say that is that the only way in which there are things at all is by human evaluation.

是的。关键在于'意义'这个词。称某物摧毁他物是一种价值判断。他说过，世界本身没有判断，在这个意义上世界没有意义。

Yes. The operative word is meaning. To say something destroys something else, that's taking a judgment stance. And he said, there's no judgment in the world. There's no meaning in the world in that sense.

唯有人类赋予意义。存在的只是相互作用的事物，而所谓从较好状态转向较坏状态（或反之）的概念，只伴随人类意识产生。

Only human beings provide meaning. What there are just things that interact and that the idea that it moves from a better to a worse state or vice versa is something that only comes with human consciousness.

嗯。我认为毁灭概念未必是价值判断。如果你说世界充满相互作用的事物，自然会引发疑问：某物存在或不存在究竟意味着什么？

Yeah. I guess I just deny that the notion of destruction is a value judgment necessarily. And that if you say that the world is full of things that interact, it seems to me you automatically prompt the question of well, what does it mean for that thing to exist or not exist?

这不是今天阅读的主题。

This is not the subject of today's reading.

我想我回到了这样一个事实：尽管这两篇阅读材料都指向类似'存在先于本质'的观点，以此作为这种世界观的哲学基础，但它实际上并不依赖于此。这实际上是一个关于人类彻底主观性的主张。即便如此，他只是将其作为假设或主张，然后在此基础上讨论责任等等。他并未深入探讨存在先于本质这类主张所隐含的本体论、形而上学或世间万物的存在方式。

I guess I'm brought back to the fact that both of these readings, though he points to something like existence precedes essence as a way of pointing to a kind of philosophical foundation for this point of view, it's really doesn't rest on that. It really is a claim about radical human subjectivity. And even then, he's just taking that as the assumption or the claim and then working with that about responsibility and da da da da. He's not delving into what the ontology or the metaphysics or the way in which things in the world are or are not that would be implied by a claim like existence precedes essence.

他确实给出了理由。

He does have a justification.

这个理由是基于上帝的。对吧？

It's justified based upon God. Right?

对，完全正确。他试图阐明的是无神论的后果。这在第三页。所以如果上帝不存在，就没有人能像人类对裁纸刀那样为人类定义本质，也没有人能按照蓝图来构建人类。

Right. Exactly. What he tries to say is that he's spelling out the consequences of atheism. So this is on page three. So that if there is no God, then there is no one to be the man what man is to the paper knife and to provide him with an essence by building him according to a blueprint.

然后他有一个非常——这是个非常有用的引述。这就是为什么我要带大家回到第三页的内容。那么说存在先于本质是什么意思呢？我们是指人首先存在，遭遇自己，在世界上涌现，然后才定义自己。所以如果存在主义者认为人不可定义，那是因为人最初什么都不是。

And then he has a really this is a really useful quote. This is why I've brought us back to this on page three. So what do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world, and defines himself afterwards. So if man as an existential sees him as not definable is because to begin with he is nothing.

他塑造自己，如此等等。然后你会看到所有这些在自我投射之前都不存在。所谓投射本质上就是我们的规划。

He makes himself and so on and so forth. And then you get all this before the projection of the self, nothing exists. So the projection being what we will essentially, what our projects are.

在文章接近结尾处，我认为他提出了自己的替代方案：这种有神论观点可以说是自然科学的源头。它认为存在某种上帝视角，可以对事物进行价值中立的描述，存在独立客体，它们可能有目的论，以及整个亚里士多德框架。而他反对这一点，主张从笛卡尔的'我思'开始。我们的出发点确实是个体的主观性，这是严格的哲学原因决定的。在出发点处，除了这个真理不可能有其他真理。

Toward the end of the essay, I think he gives his alternative that this theistic point of view, you could say, is the father of natural science. It is the father of viewing things that there is some god's eye view and a value free description you could give to things and all that kind of stuff, and independent objects, and they could have teleologies, and the whole Aristotelian framework. The thing he opposes to that is to start with the Cartesian Cogito. Our point of departure is indeed the subjectivity of the individual for strictly philosophic reasons. At the point of departure, there cannot be any other truth than this.

'我思故我在'，这是意识达到自身时的绝对真理。任何从人处于自我实现时刻之外开始的理论，都是因此压制了真理的理论。因为在笛卡尔'我思'之外，所有客体都不过是或然的，任何不依附于真理的或然性学说都将崩溃为虚无。这实际上是另一种表述方式，我认为是我们上次讨论萨特后紧接着讨论梅洛-庞蒂时得出的唯一实质性观点：包括谈论人类行为被某种原因导致（比如说是你的大脑让你做某事）在内的自然科学讨论，都是从实际经验中抽象出来的。所以如果我们要建立行动哲学，就不应该着眼于这种衍生的、次级的自然科学产物。

I think, therefore, I am, which is the absolute truth of consciousness as it attains to itself. Every theory which begins with man outside of the moment of self attainment is a theory which thereby suppresses the truth. For outside of the Cartesian Cogito, all objects are no more than probable, and any doctrine of probabilities, which is not attached to a truth, will crumble into nothing. This is an another way of stating, really, the only substantive point I think we got out of the Merleau Ponte episode that we did right after we talked about Sartre last time, which is that the talk of natural science, including talk of human beings being caused to do something, saying that your brain makes you do things, that is all an abstraction from actual experience. So if we're gonna have a philosophy of action, we don't look to this derived natural science secondary thing.

我们将建立行动哲学，并因此在伦理学中，我们关注直接的、未经抽象的具体经验，这种经验中我们体验到自己是绝对自由的，没有本质，等等等等。

We're gonna have a philosophy of action, and and with that in ethics, we look at the immediate unabstracted concrete experience, and that is one where we experience ourselves as absolutely free, as not having an essence, blah blah blah.

没错。在同一页稍后部分，他谈到了个人主观性的绝对真理。本质上，他只是在重申笛卡尔的'我思故我在'，即无论我们的感知和信念是否与外部世界相符等等，你可以将那些存而不论，因为你能绝对确定的是你正在经历那些体验或持有那些信念，我们能够直接且确定地触及意识的内容。而这必须成为我们的出发点。

Right. And later on on the same page, right, he talks about the absolute truth of one's subjectivity. Basically, he's just reprising the Cartesian Cogito, which is to say whatever the truth of our perceptions and beliefs, whether they correspond to an outside world and so on and so forth. You bracket that out, that doesn't matter because what you do know with absolute certainty is that you're having those experiences or those beliefs, the contents of consciousness, we have this immediate certain access to. And that has to be our starting point.

他在这方面采取了毫不掩饰的笛卡尔立场。

He's taking an unabashed Cartesian line on this.

除了他者存在的部分。是的。

Except for the presence under others. Yes.

嗯，马上会谈到这点。他还引入了黑格尔和康德的元素。这里混杂着他选择性借鉴的内容。所以主观性才是那个超越性的存在。这里有个引述也呼应了我们之前关于无生命物体的讨论。

Well, get to that right. He brings in some Hegel and Kahn as well. He's got a whole soup here of selective, borrowings. So that subjectivity is the transcendent thing. And we actually get a quote here which also relates back to our talk of inanimate objects.

他展开了关于人类尊严的论述。他认为只有他的理论才能赋予人类尊严。他在你们正在阅读的马克11页上说：各种唯物主义都会导致人们将他人（包括自己）视为客体——即一系列与桌椅石头无异的、由既定品质和现象构成的预定反应模式。

He goes into the dignity of man argument. His theory is the only one which will lend itself to the dignity of man. He says all kinds of this is on the same page you were reading Mark 11. All kinds of materialism lead one to treat every man including oneself as an object. That is as a set of predetermined reactions in no way different from the patterns of qualities and phenomena which constitute a table or a chair or a stone.

但相比之下，这种超越性的主观性——正因为它不是物质世界中的存在——不能被简单视为将按既定规则展开的确定性现象。正是在主观性中，你才能获得他所倡导的那种根本性自由。

But by contrast, this transcendent subjectivity, right, is because it's not a material thing in the world, it can't be treated as just this deterministic phenomena which is gonna unfold according to these rules. And so it's subjectivity where you get this radical kind of freedom that he's espousing.

是的。这就是为什么他会将这些问题称为'自欺'、焦虑状态和绝望——这些都不是心理学问题，因为心理学意味着第三人称描述的科学视角，但那些都是后设概念。当你用这种源自笛卡尔'我思'的行动哲学语言讨论时，你实际上是在探讨形而上学问题：你遭遇的存在危机，其本质远比表象更深刻。既然我们在讨论这个形而上学框架，要不要先勾勒'自欺'在这个框架中的定义？

Yes. Which is why he's gonna refer to these problems like bad faith and the state of anxiety and despair that these are all these are not psychological problems because psychology implies, you know, the science, this third person description, but that's all later. That's an abstraction. When you're talking in the language of this philosophy of action that is fundamental, that it comes out of the Cartesian Cogito, then you're talking about really metaphysical problems, that you're having an existential crisis, that there's something more fundamental to it than that. So since we're talking about this metaphysical structure, should we just sketch what bad faith is within that?

还是你想先讨论

Or do you wanna talk about the

让我们先读完这篇论文再讨论自欺。

Let's finish this paper before we get to the bad faith.

他在论文结尾确实提到了自欺。

He does bring up bad faith at the end of the paper.

是的。我只是觉得这个概念很有用，即使是用来分析这里面提到的实际例子。

Yeah. I just I think it's a useful concept even for examining the practical examples that are in here.

好的。你们想试试看吗？

Okay. You guys wanna do it?

在存在主义中，他在接近结尾处提到了‘自欺’。他讨论了我们如何评判事物，以及是否一切都是相对的这类问题。他说，我们在他人面前做出选择，也在他人面前选择自我。首先，我们可能会做出判断——这可能是非逻辑的而非价值判断——某些选择基于错误，而另一些基于真理。当我们断言某人处于自欺状态时，我们也可能评判这个人。

Well, in the existentialism, he brings up bad faith towards the end. He's talking about how we can judge things and whether or not, you know, everything's relative and stuff like that. He says, we choose in the presence of others and we choose ourselves in the presence of others. First, we may judge, and this may be illogical rather than a value judgment, that certain choices are based on error and others on truth. We may also judge a man when we assert that he's acting in bad faith.

如果我们定义人的处境为一种没有借口或外部援助的自由选择状态，那么任何躲藏在激情背后的人，任何编造某种决定论理论的人，都是在自欺。有人可能会反驳说，但他为什么不能选择自欺呢？我的回答是，我并非对他进行道德审判，而是称其自欺为一种谬误。在此我们无法回避对真理的判断。自欺显然是一种谎言，因为它掩盖了人完全自由的承诺。

If we define man's situation as one of free choice in which he has no recourse to excuses or outside aid, then any man who takes refuge behind his passions, any man who fabricates some deterministic theory is operating in bad faith. One might object by saying, but why shouldn't he choose bad faith? My answer is that I do not pass moral judgment against him, but I call his bad faith an error. Here, we cannot avoid making a judgment of truth. Bad faith is obviously a lie because it is a dissimulation of man's full freedom of commitment.

因此，在这篇文章中，这是他阐述我们如何拥有判断力、为何能做出判断、以及为何能称某人为骗子或说某人错误的部分原因。这部分内容在某种程度上限定了我们经验的极端主观性。

And so, in this essay, it's part of his articulation of how we have judgments and why we can make judgments and why we can call somebody a liar or say somebody's wrong. And it's in part qualifying the radical subjectivity of our experience.

没错。我们通过忽视自身超越性的主观面，把自己当作被决定的事物，从而自欺地认为自己没有选择或不自由。在自欺章节中，我们也可以走向另一个极端——处于虚无状态时，你会看到关于如何在超越性主体视角与作为具有特性和倾向的现实世界存在者之间切换的完整论述。正是通过在这两种视角间跳跃，你才能欺骗自己并陷入自欺。

Yeah. So we deceive ourselves into thinking that we don't have choices or that we're not free by ignoring this transcendent subjective side of ourselves and treating ourselves as if we're just determined things. And we can go the other way as well in the bad faith section and being in nothingness, we get a whole account of the different ways you can sort of go between viewing oneself from the perspective of a transcendent subject or an actual physical being in the world with character and tendencies. And it's by jumping between those two different points of view that you can deceive yourself and be in bad faith.

关于如何阐明这个自欺问题，我的一个疑问是：当他谈到我们总是有选择时，一方面他在将其与决定论（认为我们没有选择）相对立。他说，看吧，你永远都有选择。嗯。最初的反应可能是：好吧，确实如此。

One question I had about trying to articulate this issue of bad faith is when he talks about us always having choices, On the one hand, he's contrasting that with the notion of determinism that we have no choice. And he's saying, look, you always have choices. Mhmm. And one initial reaction is that, well, okay. Yeah.

严格来说我们或许有选择。但你忽略了也许所有这些选择都是糟糕的、不受欢迎的或存在其他问题。这使得自欺问题在我看来变得复杂。当有人说‘我没有选择’时——是的。

Maybe strictly speaking, we have choices. But you're forgetting that maybe all those choices are bad choices or undesirable or any number of other things. And that the question of bad faith seems to me to be complicated by that. When someone says, well, I don't have any choice. Yes.

当然，可能他们确实在欺骗自己，实际上有他们逃避的选择，他们本应更坚强面对，要么是软弱要么是自欺。我们可以讨论这种区别。他不会将其描述为软弱，而会称之为处于自欺状态。如果我们保持真诚，就会做出正确的事——某种程度上几乎像柏拉图式的理念。

Of course, it might be that they're actually lying to themselves and that they do have a choice that they are shirking from that they ought to just be stronger with respect to or are either being weak or they're lying to themselves. And we can talk about that difference. He wouldn't characterize it as weakness. He would characterize it as being in bad faith. And if we had good faith, then we would do the right thing a la kinda almost like a platonic thing.

但完全可以设想，在选择的领域中，有些选择根本不值得选。因此你会觉得没有选择。这不是技术层面没有选择的问题，而是没有值得选的东西。而他似乎甚至没有考虑过这种区别。

But it seems perfectly conceivable that in the realm of choices, they're just not ones that you feel like are choice worthy. So in that way, you feel like there are no choices. And that it's not a question of having no choices technically. It's that there's nothing that feels choice worthy. And that distinction, he doesn't seem to even consider.

这么说可能有点矫情，但你看，你总是有选择的。对吧？要知道，即使你在海洋中央溺水，你可以选择沉溺，也可以选择永远踩水挣扎。

It seems to be a a little whiny to say, well, look, you always have choices. Right. You know, you know, just because you're drowning in the middle of the ocean, you could decide to drown yourself, you could decide to try to tread water forever.

你是想现在讨论这些批评意见，还是先继续推进课程内容？

Do you wanna get into these criticisms now, or do we wanna plow through the material first?

不妨先抛出这个观点来聚焦他的意图。他为何要引入'自欺'这个概念？这在《存在主义是一种人道主义》中明确提到——他想说明：即便我们没有基督徒那样的道德准则，我依然可以合理地对你们进行评判。传统做法是查阅道德准则后指责你行为不当，而他的替代方案是指控你犯逻辑错误，指控你自相矛盾。我认为这是所有非道德实在论者必须采取的策略。

It's good to just throw this out as a a way of trying to focus on what he's trying to do here. Why is he introducing the concept of bad faith in the first place? And that's made explicit in the existentialism is a humanism essay, where he's trying to say, even though we don't have moral rules in the way that Christians do, I can still be judgmental about you, legitimately. So the the substitution for old fashioned, you know, I consult the moral rules, you're doing the wrong thing, so I call you out on it, is that I can accuse you of a logical error. I can accuse you of contradicting yourself, which I think is basically the move that everybody that is not a moral realist has to take.

如果说你本性中存在某些东西（或某些人说的特定欲望），而你当前行为与这些欲望相矛盾——他不会这么说。因为欲望听起来太心理学了。他要强调的是本体论层面：这是我们存在结构中最根本的，我们可能陷入这种'自欺'状态。

To say that there's something that you have in your nature some other people might say that you have certain desires, that what you're doing now contradicts those desires. He's not gonna say that. He's gonna, again, say because desire, that almost sounds like it's psychologically. He wants to say this is ontological. This is fundamental to the structure of our being that we can be in this bad faith.

随着深入阅读关于自欺的论述，你会发现避免自欺似乎极其困难

And as you read farther in the bad faith, it looks like it's it's really hard to avoid bad faith

确实。

Right.

这是由于根本的模糊性：我既是永远有选择权的超越性主体，又具有事实性——我扎根于世界，过去的行为塑造了可称为性格的东西。我们不断在这两者间徘徊，这预示着他论述的结局。在我看来，似乎不存在特定正确答案。

Because of this fundamental ambiguity between, am I a transcendent subject where I always have a choice, but I have facticity. I'm rooted in the world. I there were past actions that I took that built up something that I could call my character. And the fact that we're constantly treading a line between those, this is again to anticipate the end of his story. To me, it looked like there wasn't any particular right answer.

但他的公关说辞在《存在主义是一种人道主义》中抹去了这些困难，只想宣称：我们不需要传统道德评判，因为有这种新方法。

But his PR machine is crossing out such difficulties in the existentialism as a humanism essay, and he just wants to say, we don't need old fashioned moral judgments because we have this new way of doing it.

没错。但这种新方法其实就是康德主义——他自己承认这点，然后说康德的普遍原则太抽象无法指导行动。当我说这就是康德时，指的是他在人道主义文末的表述。但正如马克你指出的，这里没有先验价值指引我们。嗯。

Right. But the new way of doing it is just Kant, which he acknowledges and then says, but Kant's universal principles are too abstract to help us with action. So when I say it's just Kant, he's just saying that this is at the end of the humanism essay. But Mark, as you just pointed out, there's no a priori values that guide us. Mhmm.

所以自欺就是我们的道德标准。但要达到这点，必须指出某人自相矛盾。引用原文：'具体情境中的自由除了自身之外别无目的。当人认识到价值取决于自身，在这种被遗弃的状态下，他唯一能意愿的就是将自由作为所有价值的基础。'

So the bad faith is our moral criterion. But to get there, we have to say someone is in a contradiction. And here's a quote. Freedom in respect of concrete circumstances can have no other end and aim but itself. And when once a man has seen that values depend on himself, and that state of forsaken this, he can only will one thing and that is freedom as the foundation of all values.

现在，回想康德的观点，他极具智慧的道德理论完全不依赖于任何外在因素，尤其是上帝，对吧？他的核心思路是：让我们考察道德可能性的条件，那就是意志。我们必须拥有自由意志。而要使意志自由，它就不能自相矛盾。因此，不矛盾律告诉我们，道德行为就是那些我们能普遍意愿的行为，因为意志必须具有普遍性，否则就无法自洽——它不能违背自身存在的逻辑，而这正是道德的本质。

Now, remember from Kant that Kant's very clever idea driving morality from nothing whatsoever, certainly not from God, right? Is to say that, well, let's look at the conditions for the possibility of morality and that's willing. We got to have free will. Well, for will to be free, it can't be contradictory. So the law of non contradiction, contradiction, say, okay, well, whatever is moral is just what we can will universally because will also has to be universal or else it doesn't make sense in such a way that it doesn't undermine itself, that it doesn't undermine the very idea of having a will and that's morality.

我认为萨特的理论与此有惊人的相似之处。

And you're getting something very similar here, I think, in Sartre.

文章开头几段提到'痛苦'这个概念时，也出现了类似绝对命令的表述——这个存在主义的热门术语曾被广泛讨论。他说，当一个人全情投入某件事时，他不仅在选择自己的未来，同时也在为全人类立法。在这样的时刻，人无法逃避那种彻底而深重的责任感。重点不仅在于我们完全自由，更在于我们完全负责。

Something that also sounds like a version of the categorical imperative is just a few paragraphs into the essay when he introduces the concept of anguish. You know, that this is one of those existentialist buzzwords that had been kicked around. He says, what that means is when a man commits himself to anything, fully realizing that he's not only choosing what he will be, but is thereby, at the same time, a legislator deciding for the whole of mankind. In such a moment, a man cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility. It's So not just that we are completely free, it's that we are completely responsible.

这听起来很像康德，但他认为与康德的关键区别在于：康德相信这种推演能得出行为的正确答案，而对萨特而言，这只能说明根本不存在可依赖的正确答案——没有任何外在标准，可你依然要承担巨大责任。从这个角度看，反倒更接近尼采的永恒轮回思想：你的每个选择都像是被无限次重复的意志行为。

So it sounds very much like Kant, but he thinks that the difference between him then and Kant is that Kant thinks that this calculation gives you a right answer for how to act. Whereas, all it does for Sartre is say, look, there is no right answer that you can appeal to. Nothing sort of outside your own thinking about But yet, you have this huge responsibility regardless. You know, in this way, it almost sounds more like Nietzsche's eternal recurrence. Whatever you do, you're sort of willing ad infinitum.

你的选择会产生深远回响。所以行动前务必深思熟虑，并全身心投入你的决定。

You're willing it big time. So think really carefully before you do something and do it with your whole being.

没错。他在文中举的例子就是那个要在照顾母亲和参军作战间做抉择的人。康德的准则、宗教或其他道德体系都无法给出答案。这是个任何道德系统都无解的困境，而萨特的体系同样不提供解决方案。与康德的区别在于：对康德来说，参战还是尽孝应该存在某个准则帮你决定。

Right. So his example in this essay is the guy who has to choose between staying home and helping his mother who really needs his help or going to war. The use of a Kantian maxim or religion or any other system isn't going to provide you with an answer. This is a moral dilemma for which there's no good solution with any moral system and his doesn't provide you with a solution anyway. So the difference between here and Kant is that in this making of a choice whether to go to war to help your mother, for Kant presumably there would be some maxim that would help you decide.

避免自相矛盾未必会导向特定选择。但对萨特而言，不矛盾只意味着你必须做出选择——选A或选B，但这个原则不会告诉你该选哪个。就此而言，他的体系和康德一样无法真正解决道德困境。但核心理念是：每个选择都具有同等价值。

So in avoiding contradicting yourself, you wouldn't necessarily come out on one side or the other. But for Sard, the avoidance of contradiction just means that you commit to it and you choose one or the other and it's not gonna help you choose which one. So his system is just as good as Kant's in that sense as far as actually helping you to resolve moral dilemmas, it doesn't. But the idea is that each choice is equally good.

因此，尽管不存在上帝预设或人际间可验证的客观行为准则，尽管没有现成的道德规范可循，他仍认为这并非随意选择的问题。关键在于你意识到：如果你诚实地面对人类自由与责任的处境，这种重压会让你避免做出轻率的决定。

And so even though there's no prewritten God ordained or otherwise interpersonally objective and verifiable right way to act, even though there's no set of moral rules that we can refer to, he still thinks it's not just a matter of sort of arbitrary choice. That just the fact that you have this weight on you, that if you're considering that, if you're being honest with yourself, you're clear about what the human situation of freedom and responsibility is, that you're not going to just make any old whimsical choice.

但人也可能懦弱。比如若他因胆怯而不参战就是问题所在，对吧？如果出于价值观选择照顾母亲则另当别论。所以单凭选择结果无法判断是否'自欺'。

Well, also, you can be a coward. So for instance, if he didn't go to war because he was a coward, that's a problem. Right? If he doesn't go to war because he's making a choice and he values taking care of his mother more than going to war, that's one thing. So you can't tell from what choice he made whether he's in bad faith.

但他对懦弱的批判——推崇古希腊式的勇武精神'不应畏惧战斗'——为什么我不能清醒地将'厌战'纳入价值观？见鬼了我干嘛要去打仗？当然要逃啊。这难道不矛盾吗？

But the stress on cowardliness really advocating, you know, bravery in the old Greek style, you should not be afraid to fight. Why can't I just make it a self conscious part of my values that I think fighting is why the hell would I wanna go there and fight? Of course, I'm gonna run from that. Mean, isn't it

从萨金特的角度看，如果出于善意做出选择就是正当的？那么因为懦弱而逃避斗争，是否意味着你对此事怀有恶意？

that the choice from Sargent's point of view is legitimate if it's done in good faith? And so that being cowardly and avoiding the fight because you're a coward would mean that you were in bad faith with respect to it?

任何以'我是X'这类自我定义作为决策依据的行为都属恶意。不存在'我是懦夫'或'我是勇者'的标签——当你用固有属性框定自己，让行为从这些属性中机械产生时，就是在恶意逃避对这些行为的责任。

Well, to make any decision where you say I am X and you characterize yourself in some way, therefore I'm not gonna do this is to be in bad faith. There's no I am a coward, I am brave and therefore To be in bad faith, right, you treat yourself as a determined thing. You treat yourself as this thing with properties and your actions are gonna flow from those properties and so you get off the hook as far as responsibility with regards to those actions.

好的。这让我想到你们之前的解读方式。听起来合理，但用萨特的理论就让我困惑——包括康德所说的意愿为何必须普遍且一致这点也始终费解。

Okay. So this brings me to the way you guys were characterizing it. It sounded right to me, but it was confusing to me for Sartre. And it has been confusing with regarding Kant is why willing has to be universal and why willing has to be consistent.

是否因为道德本身具有普遍一致的特性？所以当我们谈论道德时，它必然具备这些特征？还是说康德的意愿理论另有深意...

And is that just because in order for it to be moral, that's a characteristic of morality. And so therefore, if I'm going to speak of something being moral, it's going to be consistent and universal. Or is it something separate from that? The Kantian idea is that willing would

若意愿缺乏普遍性和一致性，它就不再是意愿。当你的意愿破坏意愿本身存在的根基时，这种自我瓦解的意志已非真正的意愿。

be cease to be willing if it weren't universal and consistent. So if you will something that undermines the grounds for the possibility of willing, will is just not the type of thing that would do that. Right? It self destructs in that sense.

但普遍性和一致性是两回事。我理解一致性——比如指责某人自相矛盾时，这种完整性要求似乎植根于人格存在的基本条件。

But these are two different things, the consistency and the universality. The consistency, I understand. Like, I really think that works in terms of accusing somebody of something, that you're being inconsistent with yourself and that there's something sort of built in what it is to be a personality at all that requires some kind of integrity.

普遍性源于被意愿的内容必须具有必然性，而缺乏普遍性就无法达成必然。虽然我无法透彻解释，但基本逻辑如此。

The universality is because what's willed must be necessary, and you can't have anything that's necessary without that universality. And I don't understand it well enough to fully explain it, but that's the basic idea.

明白了，这部分我可以暂时搁置。

Okay. So I'm willing to bracket that.

但萨特需要重点讨论——当他回应质疑说'你的意愿关乎全人类'时，这个论断本身缺乏依据。

But we should discuss it for Sartre because I think for Sartre when he tries to respond to these objections and he says, well, when you will, you will for all mankind, there's no justification of that.

我本有问题要问，但既然马克提到一致性的合理性——按你刚才的解释，似乎与萨特强调选择彻底主观性的观点矛盾。如果说需要保持一致性否则会自我毁灭，但萨特明明主张根本不存在所谓'自我'。若没有参照标准，不一致又从何谈起？

Well, had a question about that, but I wanted because Mark just brought it up the question of consistency making sense. I wanted him to explain it to me because the way you just described it, it seems to me to go against the way Sartre characterizes the radical subjectivity of our choices. So when I say I need to have consistency because if I don't have consistency, then I kind of annihilate myself. But I thought that was the whole deal that I don't have any self, period, to annihilate. If you don't have something to compare to, what does it even mean to be inconsistent?

没错。他在《存在主义与人道主义》中给出的答案是：虽然不存在一致的人性，但存在一致的人类境况。而人类境况就是自由的境况。这是我们所有人都身处其中的处境。因此，如果你否认这一点，那么你就是在自相矛盾——因为在我看来，这之所以是你个人的矛盾（而非单纯否认事实），最合理的解释是：你的自由不仅是你的一项特质，它就是你本身。

Right. Well, the answer he gives in existentialism and humanism is that while there's no consistent human nature, there's a consistent human condition. And the human condition is the one of freedom. And so that is the situation that we're all in. And so if you deny that, then you're being inconsistent with yourself because the best way I can see is why this is an inconsistency on your part as opposed to just denying a fact, is that your freedom is not just a fact about you, it is you.

你就是自由。是的。你的意志即自由。所以只要拥有意志本身...

You are the freedom. Yeah. You are your will is freedom. And so just to have a will at all

说你是人类，就等于说你是自由的存在。

To say you're a human being is just to say you are the free thing.

对。这让我回到先前关于自由本质的问题——因为他所谓的自由并非指你能为所欲为。他并非荒谬地宣称你当然可以飞翔之类。他着重强调我们具有彻底的偶然性，但根据定义，我们的存在本身又蕴含着深刻而持久的自由，且这种自由始终受制于约束。

Yeah. And so then I brought back to my earlier question about the nature of this freedom because he doesn't mean freedom in the sense that you can do absolutely anything. He's not being absurd and saying, well, of course, you can fly or whatever. He makes a big deal about a kind of radical contingency of us. But yet we have, by definition, by our existence, a deep and abiding freedom and it is yet a freedom under constraint.

是否简单理解为：由于我是意愿主体，所以存在其他可选项？这就是其含义吗？那种技术性的选择概念——无论这些选择是否像真正的选择？是这个意思吗？

Is it just as simple as well, there are other things that I could do because I'm a willing being. Is that what it means? That technical notion of choice making regardless of whether those choices seem like real choices or or not? Is that what that means?

线索之一出现在《自欺》文末，他说'我们的自欺如同睡眠与做梦'。对吧？但这仍是选择。正如我们早前指出的，这与理性审慎选择的观念不同。

One of the clues is in the the end of the bad faith essay where he says, we're in bad faith in the same way as we sleep and dream. Right? And yet it's a choice. So as we pointed out earlier on, it's a different conception of choice than the idea of rational deliberative choice.

你刚才引用的表述听起来很像关于存在与本质的论述。但我们是存在先于本质。因此这里存在某种张力：他关于自由本质的论断听起来很像在描述我们的本质（我们作为何种实体），并以此为基础来论证我们能做什么、不能做什么、如何决策等等。而同时他又声称这是完全开放的。

That quote that you just read sounds very much like a quote about being and about essence. But we have existence preceding essence. And so there's this kind of tension where the claims that he's making about the nature of our freedom seem to sound a lot like claims about our essence, the kind of entity we are. And then appealing to that as a way to ground claims about what we can and can't do and make decisions and choices and all those kinds of things. And then at the same time, say that it's utterly wide open.

我在试图理解：他所说的'完全开放'究竟是指何种不幼稚的涵义。

I'm trying to figure out what is the unaive way he means it's utterly wide open.

在《存在主义是人道主义》中，我认为他最精彩的回答是讨论笛卡尔名言'征服自己而非世界'的部分。此时他正在定义另一个存在主义术语——绝望。因为这句话的含义极其简单：我们将自己限制在意志范围内，或限制在能使行动可行的概率总和内。每当人有所意愿时，总存在概率因素。

In existentialism's humanism, I think the best answer he gives is when he talks about Descartes quote, conquer yourself rather than the world. So this is when he's defining another one of these existentialism buzz terms, despair. Because the meaning of the expression is extremely simple. It means we limit ourselves to a reliance upon that which is within our wills or within the sum of the probabilities to render our action feasible. Whenever one wills anything, there are always elements of probability.

如果我要接待乘火车或电车来访的朋友，我会预期火车准时到站且电车不会脱轨。我仍处在可能性领域，但人们不应考虑与行动无直接关联的可能性。当某些可能性不再影响我的行动时，我必须对其失去兴趣。

If I'm coming upon a visit from a friend who may be coming by train or tram, I suppose that the train will arrive to the point of time where that the tram will not be derailed. I remain in the realm of possibilities, but one does not rely upon any possibilities beyond those that are strictly concerned in one's action. Beyond the point at which the possibilities under consideration cease to affect my action, I have to disinterest myself.

换句话说，别为无法掌控的事情担忧。

In other words, don't worry about what you can't control.

对。虽然听起来像老生常谈，但当我试图理解自由时，翻阅更多关于虚无的存在，后来书中专门讨论了'存在与行动的自由'部分。我又看到了笛卡尔同样的名言——当他说'征服自己而非世界'时，其核心含义与我们应当不带希望地行动是一致的。这就是我刚刚从《存在主义与人道主义》中读到段落的结尾。嗯。

Right. Well, I mean, it sounds like that little chestnut here, But then when I was trying to understand freedom, flipping through more of being in nothingness, and, you know, later in the book, there's a whole being and doing freedom section. And so I saw this same quote from Descartes. When Descartes said, conquer yourself rather than the world, what he meant was at bottom the same, that we should act without hope. So that's the the end of this paragraph that I was just reading from Mhmm.

在书中后期讨论自由与事实性（处境）时，《存在与虚无》也出现了相同观点。我觉得必须提这个，因为这正是你提出的问题本质，迪伦——如果你发现自己溺水于海中，究竟还有什么真正伟大的选择？萨特的表述是：'事物的逆阻系数不能成为反对我们自由的论据，因为正是通过我们预先设定的目标，这个逆阻系数才得以显现。'换言之，你现在觉得处境艰难的唯一原因，是你自己已经做出了某些承诺。

From existentialism of humanism. The same thing shows up in being in nothingness much later in the book where he talks about freedom and facticity, the situation. And he just I feel like I need to bring this up just because this is exactly the issue you put forward, Dylan, you know, that, you know, if you found yourself drowning in the sea, like, what kind of great choices really are there? And the way he says it is the coefficient of adversity in things cannot be an argument against our freedom, for it is by us, by the preliminary positing of an end, that this coefficient of adversity arises. So in other words, the only reason we think that things are so hard on you right now is because you, yourself, have taken up certain commitments.

你确立了特定目标，于是发生的这些事就成了阻碍。研究生时期教授这样解释：你只能控制自己，可以掌控对事物的态度。所以'我正在溺水，该怎么办？'涉及的自由——如你列举的选项，我可以继续踩水。

You've adopted certain purposes, which then these things that are happening are obstacles toward. So the way this was explained to me in grad school was pretty much that you have control over yourself. You can control your attitude in regard to things. So the freedom involved in I'm drowning, what do I do? Well, I could keep trying to tread water, you know, those options you gave.

重点不在于那些选项本身，更像是道家或佛教徒会回应的方式：你可以让心境平和，转变目标

It's not that those options are really it's more think of sort of what the Taoist or the Buddhist would respond here. Like, well, you could just put your mind at peace and shift your goals

这个

Well

然后说'现状即是如此'，我将以平静和尊严接受命运，通过这种方式掌控自我。

and say, this is the way Yeah. That things are now, and I'm going to take my fate with some peace and dignity and have control over yourself that way.

这听起来像他反对的寂静主义。不过有趣的是，我今天刚读到一篇关于海上遇险者的报道。

That sounds like the quietism to which he objects. But I think actually, you know what's funny? I just read an article today about a guy who was stranded at sea.

对，《纽约时报》登的。

Yeah. It was on the New York Times.

没错。你看了吗？那人做了很多事——他脱下有浮力的靴子，后来就靠靴子漂浮。

He did. Yeah. Did you read that? So he did tons of things. He took off his boots, which turned out to be buoyant, then he was able to float on his boots.

然后他找到了一些浮标，割断其中一个，又漂到另一个浮标那里。他基本上做了各种各样的事。但我不认为重点在于，如果你被困在海上，你应该期待有很多选择来实现你成为总统之类的计划。不过，我也觉得你们说得对。我们对这里自由的含义了解不多，因为传统上阐述某种非天真的自由意志感的方式，就是谈论理性思考。

And then he found his way to some buoys and cut one and then floated over to another buoy. He basically did all kinds of stuff. But I don't I don't think the point is that you should expect that if you're stranded at sea, you have a lot of options that you're gonna fulfill your project of becoming president or something like that. But also, think you guys are right. We don't have a lot of information about what freedom means here because the classical way to spell out some sense of free will that is not just, naive is to talk about rational deliberation.

对吧？那是通往自由的一条路。而他明确拒绝了这条路。但自由可能涉及不自欺、不处于坏信仰中。这就是他谈论自由的有限意义，某种程度上是对理性思考主题的变体。

Right? That's a path to freedom. And that's one he explicitly rejects. But it could be that freedom though involves not deceiving yourself, being in bad faith. And that's just the limited sense in which he's talking about freedom, which is sort of a variation on the rational deliberation thing.

对吧？因为你知道，理性思考要求我们运用所有信息和推理能力来做决定。而在这里，我们的要求只是保持好信仰，不自欺。所以我认为，一旦我们更多地讨论坏信仰和好信仰，就会更清楚自由可能意味着什么。

Right? Because you know, rational deliberation, we're supposed to use all the information and our reasoning powers to make a decision. In this case, our requirement is just that we maintain our good faith that we don't deceive ourselves. So I think once we start talking more about bad faith and good faith, we'll have a better idea of what freedom might mean.

所以我手头这本《存在与虚无》的副本里没有关于坏信仰的章节？

So the copy of Being in Nothingness that I have doesn't have the chapter on bad faith in it?

可以在网上找到。

It's available online.

不，不，我后来在网上读了。但为什么这个版本没有收录，我就不知道了。我搞混了，结果读了第二部分第一章，讲的是'自为'的直接结构、自我的在场、'自为'的事实性等等。非常有趣，也许哪天我们会读到那部分。萨特对自由是什么的看法，韦斯，是通过他关于前反思意识和反思意识的形式化概念来解释的。

No, no, I read it online afterwards. But why it's not in this edition, I have no idea. But I got confused and I ended up reading part two, chapter one, which is Immediate Structures of the Four Itself, presence of self, facticity of the for itself and so on. It's very interesting, maybe someday we'll get around to reading that. Sartre's idea of what freedom is, Wes, it's explained through this very formal idea he has about what pre reflective and reflective consciousness are.

你知道，有前反思意识，他称之为'自在'，就是你的事实性或你在世界中存在的事实性。然后当你对那个'自在'有反思意识时，就有了'自为'，这是另一种东西。他有一个非常复杂的结构来解释反思意识如何需要'自在'，但'自在'又不是它的基础。他有个观点认为意识是其所不是。他的意思是，比如过去，反思意识看着过去，过去是'不是'的东西，它不再存在，不在当下，但它仍然是构成意识的一部分。

You know, that there's pre reflective consciousness, which is what he calls the in itself, which is just your facticity or the facticity of your being in the world as it were. And then when you have reflective consciousness about that in itself, then there's for itself, which is a different sort of thing. And he has a very complicated structure that he explains about how reflective consciousness requires the in itself, but the in itself is not a foundation for it. He has this idea about consciousness being that it is what it is not. And what he means by that is, take for example, the past, the reflective consciousness looks at the past and the past is what is not, it doesn't exist anymore, it's not present, but it's still constitutive of what consciousness is.

所以当他说意识是其所不是时，部分意思是指过去这个'不是'的东西是意识的一部分。而自由是他将同样的概念应用于未来的方式。因此，意识相对于未来是其所不是，因为存在所有这些可能性，它们与'自在'——即作为反思意识基础的当前前反思意识——没有因果关系。

And so when he says that consciousness is what it is not, he means that in part that the past what is not is part of what consciousness is and freedom is his way of applying that same concept to the future. So, consciousness is what it is not with respect to the future because there are all these possibilities and they're not causally related to the in itself, the present pre reflective consciousness that's the basis for reflective consciousness.

对，也就是说我们可以意愿某事。我们拥有所有这些可以投射的未来可能性，也就是说可以意愿。

Yeah, so which is to say we can will something. We have all these future possibilities that we can project to, which is to say will.

是的，但对他来说不存在因果关系。自由在某种程度上是从因果决定中解脱出来，或者我想你早些时候提到过严格意义上的决定论。

Yes, but for him there's no causal relationship. Freedom is somehow freedom from being causally determined or I think you mentioned this early on determinism in a kind of strict sense.

是的。未来的可能性在因果上先于我们的行为，对吧？我们伸手去够一个可能性。并不是说我们被某种前因推动，而是主动去追寻它。

Yeah. And future possibilities are causally antecedent, right, to our behavior. We reach for a possibility. It's not as if we're being pushed by some antecedent cause, but we're reaching for it.

没错。对他来说关键要明白，这种自由几乎是由意识的本体论结构所保证的。这不是心理事实，甚至不是严格因果决定论意义上的事实。

Yeah. Exactly. And for him, it's important to note this freedom is almost guaranteed by the ontological structure of consciousness. It's not a psychological fact. It's not even determinism in the kind of strict causal fact.

意识的结构就是既作为其所是，又作为其所不是——这个双重性对他而言至关重要。

The structure of consciousness is to somehow be both what it is and what it is not, and that that's very important to him.

仅仅拥有主观性这一事实，意味着你能觉察某些可能性并追求它。这本身就保障了某种自由。

Just the fact that you have subjectivity and you can become aware of some possibility and then go for that possibility. One can think of that as guaranteeing a kind of freedom.

几乎可以说主观性的本质就在于此。不在于你能觉察可能性，而在于主观性始终指向其所不是，并由此构成自身。

Almost that that's what subjectivity is. Not that you can be aware of a possibility, but that subjectivity is pointed towards what it is not, and it's constituted by that.

对我而言，这与关于虚无的讨论完全吻合。意识就是虚无——当我们感知时，不仅感知眼前这张大桌子，更感知可能性。我们以过去和未来的维度思考，不仅思考在场之物，更思考缺席之物。这绝非仅仅是头脑中的活动。

And to me, this all just smashed together with the talk about nothingness, and consciousness is nothingness that when we perceive something, we don't just perceive that there is the big table in front of me. We perceive possibilities. We think of in terms of the past and the future. We think in terms not of just of what's there, but what's not there. And that, again, this is not just something that's going on in your head.

这些是体验本身的属性。这才是原初领域，所有科学都是后来的抽象。我们讨论的就是这个层面。就此而言，意识就是虚无，它投射着虚无。

These are properties of experience itself. And that is, again, the primary field from which all science and stuff are later abstraction. This is the realm that we are talking about. So in that sense, consciousness is a nothingness. It projects projects nothingness.

它看见虚无，它即是虚无。

It sees nothingness. It it is nothingness.

能否将其与模糊性对比？他所说的虚无与多重性、深层模糊性之间的区别是什么？

Can you contrast that with ambiguity? What's the distinction that he's making between it being a nothingness as opposed to a multifarious plurality, a deep ambiguity.

对吧？我认为这两者是相同的。记得我们上次关于萨特现象学的播客讨论胡塞尔时就说过——每个遭遇的客体（包括随时间构建的'自我'这个公共客体）都呈现为超验的，具有我们看不见的侧面。这不正是你说的'我只看到它的一面'吗？

Right? I think those are the same thing. Because remember when we were talking about this in our our last podcast on Sartre about phenomenology and Husserl before him, we talked about this really solely in terms of every object that we encounter, including the object that is our self that's built over time, it's public object. It presents itself as transcendent as having sides that I don't see. And so it seems like that is like what you're saying that, you know, I just see one side of it.

我甚至不知道其他面是什么。我只知道还有其他面。也许它基本上是平的，我会发现它根本不是一个非常立体的物体。所以它以这种方式呈现出一种模糊性。因此，超越性就是一种模糊性，正如他所描述的那样，你可以争论这种描述也是一种虚无，我看不出他在这两者之间有什么区别。

I don't know even what the other sides are. I know that there are other sides. Maybe it's mostly flat, and I would find that it's not a very three-dimensional object at all. So it it presents itself as an ambiguity in this way. So a transcendence is an ambiguity, just the way he characterizes it, which you could just argue with this characterization is is also a nothingness that I see He doesn't see a difference between those.

不。

No.

我认为虚无只是意识，而不是那些超越性的对象。

I think it's just consciousness that's the nothingness, not the transcendent objects.

难道不是我们与那些对象的互动创造了超越性吗？我知道我们又回到了这种更大的形而上学图景，我们无法真正解决。

Isn't it the fact that it's our interaction with those objects that is creating the transcendence? I know we're going back to this sort of bigger metaphysical picture that we can't really hand out.

不，不。所以我们必须将其与超越性联系起来，超越性是‘是’与‘不是’之间的鸿沟，无论是未来、过去，还是可能性与现实，诸如此类。而意识超越了‘是’到‘不是’，‘是’与‘不是’之间的鸿沟就是虚无。虚无就是那个鸿沟。

No. No. So we have to tie this back to transcendence is transcendence of the gap between is and is not, whether that's future, past, or possibility versus actuality, what have you. And consciousness transcends the is to the is not and the gap between is and is not is the nothing. Nothingness is that gap.

好的。说意识超越了‘是’，就是说你拥有主观性，你有这些主观体验，你可以意愿并做所有这些事情，这超越了你作为一个物理存在的本质，在这个世界上有一个受制于确定性科学法则的大脑，等等。

Okay. To say consciousness transcends the is is just to say that the fact that you have subjectivity, you have these subjective experiences, and you can will and do all these things transcends your nature as a physical being in the world with a brain subject to deterministic scientific laws and so on and so forth.

回到那个雪崩的事情，迪伦，这就是为什么他说破坏的概念，当事物相互作用时，它们只是相互作用。对于物理事物的相互作用，没有描述或意义的归属。

To go back to that avalanche thing, Dylan, that's why he's saying that the concept of destruction that when things interact with each other, they simply interact. There's no attribution of description or meaning that's applied to interaction of physical things.

我应该把虚无理解为‘无物性’吗？

Should I read nothingness as no thingness?

是的。我的意思是，这是一个俏皮的词。是的。我的意思是，他真正想说的是有一个本体论的范畴虚无。它根本没有存在。

Yeah. I mean, it's a playful word. Yeah. Mean, what is he really means that there's an ontological category nothingness. There's no being at all to it.

他书中有整章关于这个的内容，我们没有读，而且我认为我们在这里得不到正确的答案。

He has whole chapters of the book on this that we didn't read and I don't think we're gonna get the right answer here.

对，我理解这一点。但当你称那个间隙为虚无时，我完全不明白那究竟意味着什么。甚至‘虚无’这个词本身就很模糊。

Right. I understand that. But that gap when you call it a nothingness, it's not at all clear to me what that even means. Just even the term a nothingness. It's just

我认为就我们的目的而言，将意识视为非世间之物是一种很有帮助的思考方式。

Not I think for our purposes, it's that consciousness is not a thing in the world is a pretty helpful way to think about it.

好的。如果我想将意识理解为一种活动而非世间之物，是否走得太远？或者从萨特的角度看，我是否过于极端了？

Okay. Am I going too far if I want to understand consciousness as an activity but not a thing in the world? Or from Sartre's point of view, am I going way too far?

嗯，这个...我不确定。因为我们没有为这个阅读材料做准备，无法回答这些问题。

Well, I yeah. This I don't know. And because we didn't read this for our we can't answer these questions.

回到人类行为这个话题上来。

Bring it back to human action.

我想我最初想到的是自欺。因为当我初次试图理解它时，我以为只是对自己撒谎。所以我认为当自欺时，我是在误解自己。但我们讨论的方式更倾向于负面定义——如果我以为自己受到任何约束，就是在否认自己的自由，这就是自欺。

Well, I guess I guess what I had in mind was was bad faith. Because when I first was trying to understand it, is I thought of it as just lying to myself. And so, I was thinking of it as well, when I have bad faith, I am misunderstanding myself. But the way we've been talking about it is it's more of a negative definition of that I am in bad faith if I'm thinking that I am in constrained at all. I'm denying my freedom.

这是另一种理解方式。这不是普通的自我欺骗，只有一种谎言：即你毫无选择的谎言。

And that's a different way to understand. That's not lying to yourself except in only one way. You have only one lie. That is the lie of that you have no choices.

对，但这是特定类型的自我欺骗。没错。

Right. But it's one particular kind of self deception. That's right.

是的。因此这不同于我通常认为的——关于我当前短暂的存在状态或自身处境的自我欺骗。

Yes. And and so that's different than what I would normally think of as lying to myself about something about even my current transitory state of being or my own state of affairs.

没错。这不是广义的自我欺骗，而是一种特定类型的自我蒙蔽。

Right. It's not lying to yourself in general, that's a particular kind of self deception.

对自己撒谎，否认自己的自由，是一种方式。这是最容易理解的。所以如果你说，我无能为力。我只是个懦夫。所以我逃跑了。

Lying to yourself about your own freedom is one way of doing it. It's the easiest way to understand. So if you say, I couldn't help it. I'm just a coward. That's why I ran away.

那就是把自己当作一个客体。更难理解的方式不是否认自己的自由，而是真正否认自己的责任。

Then that is treating yourself as an object. The way that's more difficult to understand is not when you're denying your own freedom, but you're really denying your own responsibility.

或是你的超越性。对吧？是的。你可以否认任何一方面。

Or your transcendence. Right? Yeah. You can deny either horn.

是的。没错。关于责任，我理解他谈论存在主义的方式是一种人文主义，这正是我试图与他谈论一致性的方式联系起来的地方。我甚至不确定他是否用了这个词，但在虚无中。他在虚无中举了一个例子，关于两个男人争论其中一人是否是同性恋。

Yeah. Right. So the responsibility, I get the way he talks about an existential is a is a humanism is what I'm trying to connect to the way he talks about consistency. I don't even know if he uses that word, but in being in nothingness. He gives this example in being in nothingness about two guys that are arguing about whether one of them is a homosexual.

恋童癖。是你吗？就像他用恋童癖来解释同性恋的地方？我完全没理解那一点。

Petarast. Was that you you were Like, used where he glosses homosexual with Petarast? I didn't understand that at all.

那是翻译的失误吗？还是...是的。我也在疑惑这一点。

Is that an accident of translation? Or yeah. I was wondering about that too.

我以为他在这里两者都提到了。

I thought he said both in here.

他交替使用这两个词。

He uses them interchangeably.

是的。我觉得这非常奇怪。

Yes. Which I found totally bizarre.

但是...是的。我们就这样吧，那是很久以前的事了。那是第四章。好吧。他是个开明的人，尽管如此，仍然没有平静。

But Yeah. So let's just it was a while ago. It was the fourth. Okay. He was a liberal guy, given given that, but there's still no peace.

他愿意为那个恋童癖者辩护。

He's willing to defend the pederast.

马克，我想你在总结中已经提到了。你刚才说，某人参与了许多同性恋行为，却否认自己是同性恋者。

I think you said it in your summary, Mark. You just said, somebody who engages in a lot of homosexual acts but denies they're homosexual.

是的。好吧。

Yes. Okay.

就这么简单。

That's that simple.

没错。所以他的朋友试图让他承认自己是同性恋。而他并没有否认自己的自由，说我不是同性恋。因为看起来，如果他说自己是同性恋，那就像是给自己钉上了标签。但如果他说，哦，我永远是自由的。

Exactly. So his friend is trying to get him to admit that he's a homosexual. And he's not denying his own freedom and saying, I'm not a homosexual. Because it seems like if he says he's a homosexual, then he that's when he's, like, nailing himself down. But if he says, oh, I'm ever free.

谁知道我明天会做什么？那么他对自由这一困境的角是接受的，但责任这一角，我再次将其解释为一致性。如果你反复做某事，却否认这一点，并说，哦，不。我只是那个超然的主体，那么你就是在否认你的事实性、你的历史、你的过去。这个例子中奇怪的是，虽然他说那个否认自己同性恋身份的人是自欺欺人，但他的朋友试图让他承认这一点，却也是自欺欺人，原因正好相反。

Who knows what I'll do tomorrow? Then he's okay with the freedom horn of the dilemma, but it's the responsibility horn, which I, again, I'm interpreting as consistency. That if you're doing something repeatedly and you're denying that of yourself and you're saying, oh, no. I'm just the transcendent subject, then you're denying things about your facticity, about your history, about your past. What's weird in this example, just to give the end of it, is while he's saying that the guy who's denying his homosexuality is in bad faith, his friend who's trying to get him to admit it is also in bad faith for the opposite reason.

是的。提倡真诚的人也是自欺欺人。是的。我们要不要完整地讨论一下自欺欺人的论点？

Yeah. The advocate of sincerity is in bad faith. Yes. Should we go through the whole bad faith piece argument?

继续吧。填补这个空白。我以为我们已经讨论到那里了。

Go ahead. Fill in the gap. I thought we had already gotten there.

好的。我试着在这里做个小小的总结。自欺欺人是一种自我欺骗，但与实际的欺骗不同，在后者中，你有两个人，一个是骗子，知道自己是个骗子，另一个则不知道，对吧？在自欺欺人的情况下，你必须同时是骗子和被欺骗者，这就产生了一种本体论上的问题。所以他想主张的是，我们必须相当反思性地知道自己在自欺欺人。

Alright. I'll try and give my little summary here. Bad faith is a kind of self deception, but unlike the case of actual deception where you have two human beings and one of them is a liar and knows that he's a liar and the other one doesn't, right? In the case of bad faith, you have to be both the liar and the deceived at the same time, which creates a kind of ontological problem. So what he wants to claim though, is that we must know know we're in bad faith pretty reflectively.

我必须既知道又不知道，这将是这个问题的结果。在这样做时，他对弗洛伊德提出了批评，对吧？因为解释自欺欺人的一个简单而正确的方法就是谈论无意识，人们欺骗自己。所以他给出了一个关于弗洛伊德的解释，其中有意识，他将其等同于自我，无意识，他将其等同于本我。顺便说一句，他将这些等同起来是错误的。

I must both know and not know is gonna sort of be the outcome of this. So in doing this, he gives this critique of Freud, right? Because it would be an easy way and the right way, by the way, of explaining bad faith would be to talk about the unconscious and the people deceive themselves. So he gives an account of Freud where you have the conscious, which he identifies with the ego and the unconscious, which he identifies with the id. By the way, he's wrong to identify those things.

因此存在一个传感器，阻止被禁止的冲动进入意识。于是你得到了这个双重主体——人无意识的部分和有意识的部分。他提出的问题是：这个审查机制应置于何处？顺便说，这种将主体一分为二的方式在弗洛伊德理论中之所以便利，是因为它等同于两个人中一个是骗子而另一个不是的情境结构。这是解决'既是欺骗者又是被欺骗者'这一本体论难题的巧妙方法。

So there's a sensor that prevents forbidden impulses from coming to consciousness. And so you get this dual subject, the unconscious part of the person and then the conscious part. And so he asked the question, well, where do you place this censorship faculty? And by the way, the reason why that, dividing the subject up into two is so convenient in the Freudian way is that because you just get the same structures that you would if you had two people and one was a liar and one wasn't a liar. So it's a very convenient way of solving this ontological problem of being both the deceiver and the deceived.

最终他会主张：审查机制不能置于无意识中，因为无意识冲动实际在努力进入意识；也不能置于意识中，因为审查者必须知道自己在压抑什么及如何操作——这样我们就会知道自己没意识到的事物，显然行不通。他认为这削弱了弗洛伊德理论。可惜的是，本我不等同于无意识，自我也不全属于意识。

Ultimately, he's going to claim that you can't place this faculty of censorship in the unconscious because the unconscious impulses are actually striving to become conscious. And then he's going to say that you can't place the faculty of censorship in consciousness because the censor must know what it's suppressing and how to do that. And so then we'd know what it is we're not conscious of, so that wouldn't work. And so this he sees as sort of deflating Freud's theory. Unfortunately, the id isn't just the unconscious and the ego isn't just conscious.

在弗洛伊德理论中，无意识包含本我，而自我与超我的大部分也属无意识。审查机制属于前意识（自我的一部分），是自我功能。正因自我的大部分本就无意识——就像打网球时的程序性记忆是无意识的——审查者也能无意识地压制被禁冲动，并作为自我的一部分运作。

The unconscious for Freud, it's the id and then large portions of the ego and the superego are unconscious. And the censoring faculty is part of the preconscious, which is part of the ego. It's an ego function. And it can be that because large parts of the ego are in fact unconscious. So in the same way that you're unconscious when you have a lot of know how when you play tennis and it's unconscious, you can have a sensor who knows how to suppress forbidden impulses and do it unconsciously and have it be part of the ego.

萨特讨论这个让我觉得奇怪，因为弗洛伊德已详尽阐述过，且精神分析学界对此有海量文献。但他给出的像是学生对弗洛伊德的粗浅理解。不过我们姑且接受他的批评：如果摒弃弗洛伊德的双重主体模型，假设存在一个既知道又不知道的统一意识（为完成自我欺骗），他称之为'排斥与吸引的双重活动'，但本质仍是统一体。为解释自欺，我们得到这种诡异的意识本体论——比如他举的例子：因出轨而性冷淡的女性。

I find it weird that Sartre would write about this because Freud spelled it out in great detail and there's tons of psychoanalytic literature on this very topic, but he's sort of giving this kind of schoolboy rendition of Freud. But let's take his criticisms for granted and say, okay, if we get rid of this Freudian model of a dual subject, and we say that we have to have a unified consciousness that both somehow knows and doesn't know at the same time, right, in order to deceive itself. He calls it a double activity of repulsion and attraction, but ultimately it's a unity. So we get this weird ontology to consciousness in order to make bad faith work where so for instance, he gives an example of women who are made frigid because they've been unfaithful. Right?

她们因出轨而对丈夫失去性反应。萨特坚持认为这并非无意识过程（这主张当然很荒谬），而是女性有意识地分散注意力向自我证明'我是性冷淡'，进行着某种蓄意的自我欺骗与注意力转移。

So they've been unfaithful, so they they're no longer sexually responsive to their husbands. And he wants to talk about this in terms of nothing's happening unconsciously, which, of course, is ridiculous. That's his claim. But rather, she's consciously distracting herself in order to prove to herself that she's frigid. She's engaging in a kind of willful self deception and self distraction.

这就是他提出的替代理论。

And so that's the alternate theory.

对。他声称在治疗情境中，只要深挖总会发现当事人其实知情，只是在糊弄你，并不存在独立的无意识实体在运作——这只是他的断言。

Right. He claims that in therapeutic situations that you always find out when you dig far enough, the person actually was aware of this. They're just dicking around with you and that it's not a a separate unconscious entity that's doing the acting. That's just a claim he makes.

他们既知情又不知情。这里又出现他关于'同时知道与不知道的双重活动'的怪异主张，具体如何解读实在难以把握。

Well, they're aware and they're not aware. There's a moment of again, he makes some very strange claims about the double activity of the knowing and not knowing at the same time. Right? And it's hard to know how to read that exactly.

你认为他给出了连贯的、能替代弗洛伊德双重主体理论的方案吗？

Do you think he gives a coherent picture, coherent alternative to Freud's dual subject idea?

这是个有趣的可能性，但我尚未充分理解其运作机制。说到底，我认为这其实没那么重要。

It's an interesting possibility, but I I don't understand it well enough to know how it would work. In the end, I don't think it matters that much, actually.

不。不。我只是想绕过而已。

No. No. And I was just gonna bypass Right.

抱歉。

Sorry.

整件事除了要说明他——就像他那个时代许多对弗洛伊德无意识概念持怀疑态度的人一样——只是觉得这难以置信，拜托，思维怎么可能无意识？思维从定义上就是有意识的。我...我不理解。实际上，我对此有些同感，就像我们上次讨论拉康时那种共同的挫败感。

The whole thing other than to say that he, like many people of his time who were skeptical of Freud's notion of the unconscious, just thought that it was inconceivable that come on. How could thinking be unconscious? Thinking is, by definition, conscious. I I don't understand. And, actually, I was a little sympathetic to it in the same kind of frustration that we were having during our last discussion of this with Lacan.

主体性在哪里体现？无意识是个行为主体吗？是否存在某个主体将事物从意识转移到无意识？他对所有这些的解决方案就是再次说：不。主体性是意识体验、体验本身的基本事实。

Where is agency going on? Is the unconscious an agent? Is there an agent that's shifting things from the conscious to the unconscious? His solution to all that is just to say, again, no. Agency is a primary fact of conscious experience, of experience itself.

因此像弗洛伊德这样采取科学立场、谈论心理元素间因果关系的人，其实再次违背了萨特的基本现象学指导——关于如何做哲学、哲学的起点是什么，以及我们究竟该如何分析这类问题。我不清楚萨特会如何解释其他形式的精神疾病。难道真的所有问题都归结为你是在有意识地欺骗自己？

And so that somebody who's taking a scientific tack like Freud and talking about causality among elements of the psyche is just, again, violating Sartre's basic phenomenological instruction, you know, about how to do philosophy, of what the starting point of philosophy is, and thereby how we would analyze something like this at all. It's unclear to me what Sartre would say about other forms of mental illness. Like, is really everything is gonna be a matter of you're consciously dicking with yourself?

是啊。去和精神分裂症患者谈选择吧。选择的概念实际上并无帮助。人们受其性格驱使，你每天都能看到。对他们说'哦，我只要做出选择就行'根本无济于事。

Yeah. And talk to the schizophrenic about choices. And the idea of choice isn't actually helpful. People are driven by their characters, and you see it every day. And it doesn't help them to say, oh, I'm just gonna make choices.

我要做个萨特主义者或安·兰德主义者，要靠意志力摆脱困境——他们需要的是治疗。在发生实质性改变前，他们需要的是与他人的治疗性互动。这是我在根本上不同意萨特的一个方面。

I'm gonna be a Sartrean or an Ayn Randian and I'm gonna will myself out of it. They need therapy. They need therapeutic interactions with other human beings before they are gonna change substantially. And that's one area where I fundamentally disagree with Sartre.

我们刚才是在批评萨特的'自欺'概念吗？

Were we criticizing Sartre's notion of bad faith?

对。其实我想等到最后再提出批评，但谈到弗洛伊德时实在忍不住。就弗洛伊德这个具体案例而言，他完全错了，因为他根本没读过弗洛伊德——从他说的内容就非常明显。任何读过弗洛伊德的人都不会声称本我等同于无意识、自我等同于意识。这是精神分析最基础的常识。

Yeah. You know, I wanted to wait to voice my criticisms at the very end actually, but I couldn't help myself with the specific Freud. I mean, in the case of Freud, he's just specifically wrong about because he didn't read Freud and it's very obvious from reading what he has to say. No one who read Freud would ever claim that the id is identifiable with the unconscious and the ego with the conscious. That's psychoanalysis 101.

人们可以谷歌搜索'结构图'，会看到完全否定这一点的完整图示。这是学习弗洛伊德时最早接触的内容之一，因为他本质上提出过两种理论后又将其融合。这是两种不同的心理理论，但以特定方式协同运作。这是第一个批评点。另一个让我困扰的是他关于自由和选择的观点。

People can Google structural diagram and they'll see a whole diagram which outlines the negative of that fact. And it's one of the first things you learn about because Freud essentially had two theories and then melded them. They're different theories of the psyche, but they work together in a very specific way. So that's one criticism. But the other criticism is I am bothered by the idea, his idea of freedom and having these choices.

我认为自己才是懦夫，是找借口的那个。好吧，既然如此，我就要站在那一方辩护——如果人们真心想要改变（他确实明确提到了改变），那么治疗性途径远比萨特所鼓吹的单纯靠意志力做出某些选择要好得多。

I think I'm the coward. I'm the excuse maker. So okay. So that I'm gonna be the advocate on that side of things and say that if people really do wanna change, and he does explicitly talk about change in this, then a therapeutic approach is gonna be far better than whatever it is that Sartre is advocating about simply willing oneself into making certain choices.

我不确定是否捕捉到了这点。在听完马克的总结并阅读了关于'自欺'的章节后，这并不是最突出的感受。

I'm not sure that I picked up on that. You know, in terms of bad faith, after listening to Mark's summary and after reading the section on bad faith, that's not the thing that came to the fore.

自欺是个重要概念。人们确实会自我欺骗。我对意识本体论有不同见解——我认为弗洛伊德的解释更胜一筹。此外对其道德影响我也持异议。

Bad faith is an important idea. People do deceive themselves. So I have a disagreement about the ontology of consciousness, right? I think Freud had a better account of that. And then I have a disagreement about the moral upshot of that.

但自欺这个概念本身很重要，它是真实存在的。他举的那些例子非常精彩——约会中的女子和咖啡馆侍者。

But the actual concept of bad faith, I think is important. It's a real thing. And I think these examples he gives are awesome. The woman on her date, and then the waiter in the cafe.

所以你可以承认自欺存在且具有道德重要性，同时仍坚持弗洛伊德学派并相信...

So you could accept that bad faith exists and is morally important. You could still be a Freudian and believe in bad

关于自欺，当然。人们在自我欺骗且并不真正了解自己。精神分析的核心理念就是'认识你自己'——这是哲学自省传统的变体，但基于治疗而非纯理性途径。

about bad faith, of course. People are deceiving themselves and they don't know themselves very well. The whole point of psychoanalysis is to know thyself. It's a variation on the philosophical self examination, but it's premised on a therapeutic as opposed to simply rational approach.

我认为需要重新引入主体间性要素——他再次强调：虽然我的出发点是笛卡尔的'我思'，但我不同意...

One element I feel we need to throw back in here is the intersubjective element that, again, he says, yes, my starting point is Descartes cogito, but I disagree with that in

这只是他在拙劣地拼凑理论，可悲地把黑格尔学说生硬地贴在笛卡尔框架上。

This is just him Jerry rigging his theory in a really pathetic way. He's plastering on a little Hegel onto Descartes.

让我读读《存在主义与人道主义》这段：'与笛卡尔哲学相反，与康德哲学相反，当我们说'我思'时，是在他者临在下把握自我，我们对他者的确信与对自身等同。因此，人在'我思'中直接发现的不仅是自我，还有所有他者，且他者是自我存在的条件。'明白吗？我们讨论过这个黑格尔渊源——自我是公共性的，我们对自己并无特权通道。

Well, let me just read this this sentence from extensionalism and humanism. Contrary to the philosophy of Descartes, contrary to that of Kant, when we say I think, we are attaining to ourselves in the presence of the other, and we are just as certain of the other as we are of ourselves. Thus, the man who discovers himself directly in the Cogito also discovers all the others and discovers them as a condition of his own existence. Right? So we've, you know, discussed where that comes from in terms of Hegel about, you know, how the self is a public thing and we don't have privileged access to ourselves.

但萨特确实认为我们对自身有特权通道。'主体性的绝对确定性'——这应该是直接引述。

But Sartre does think we have privileged access to ourselves. And the absolute certainty of subjectivity, I think is a direct quote.

但我们也同样绝对确信他人的自由。正如我们对自己的自由确信无疑，我们也同样确信他人的自由。在文章结尾处，他指出——正如你所描述的——这是一种康德式的转向，即伦理在于尊重并促进他人的自由。这也同样确定，我们对他人的立场与对自身的立场是相似的。是的。

But we are also absolutely certain of the other. And just as we are absolutely certain of our own freedom, we're also absolutely certain of the other's freedom. And by the end of the essay, he says that we're then like you were describing that this is a Kantian move, that ethics becomes respecting the freedom of the other and promoting that. That's also certain that we're on a similar stance with regard to other people that we are to ourselves. Yeah.

我们处于相似的认识论立场。

We're in a similar epistemic position.

他试图抵挡那些典型批评——人们指责他未能承认意识的本体论条件在于对他者意识的认知。因此他正努力将这一观点重新纳入其理论体系。

He's trying to fend off the typical criticisms that he was receiving about, well, you're not acknowledging the fact that an ontological condition of consciousness is the consciousness of the other. And so he just wants to pull that back into his theory.

如果你相信他者构成自我的一部分，就像《禁闭》剧中展现的——通过他人眼光认识自己是定义自我的重要环节，那么他人对于破除自欺就至关重要。他并非简单要求你命令自己保持真诚，而是需要真正的自我反思。就像同性恋案例中，无论你对此感受如何，都可以选择'这就是我今天的身份'。我自己也有类似体验——比如对饮食极度自律，除了正在进食的时候。

If you believe that the other is constitutive of the self, that those those go together with that we need other people in the no exit play, a very very big part of it was being able to see yourself through other people's eyes and that's part of what defines you, that other people could be essential for working through your bad faith. He's not just saying, you have to just command yourself to be in good faith. You just have to be properly self reflective because part of what that means then is to just like in the in the homosexual case that, you know, however you feel about it, like, oh, this is what I choose to be today. You know, I have a similar thing with, you know, I'm really disciplined about my diet except during the times when I'm eating, you know. Yeah.

所以这种自我认知，比如萨特举的另一个例子：'我多么勇敢——当然除了真正需要勇敢的时刻'，但平时99%的时间我都勇敢，只要没人追着我跑。因此获取他人视角，哪怕只是想象'别人会如何客观看待我的行为'，正是克服自欺的方法。

So this view that I might have of myself or I think that I'm another example of Sartre's that I'm so brave. Oh, but except when I actually am confronted and I need to be brave, then but still, I'm brave, like, 99% of the time, you know, when I'm not being chased by anybody. So getting the view of of another person then, even just imaginatively seeing, like, well, how would other people look objectively at what I'm doing? That's what you do to get over bad faith.

不。那个例子中他其实在批判批评者。他称之为主奴辩证法。拉康某种程度上试图统一黑格尔与弗洛伊德的理论。

No. In that example, he's criticizing the critic. Right? And he calls it a master slave dynamic. Lacan, of course, is kind of trying to unify Hegel and Freud in a certain sense.

这让我们回到核心问题：他者其实严重威胁着我们的本真性。因为他者的欲望会成为我们的欲望，而我们不得不解开这团乱麻。咖啡馆侍者的例子就很能说明问题。

So it gets us back to some of that, which is that the other is actually a huge problem for our authenticity. Because the desire of the other becomes our desire. And then we have to untangle all that. So I think the example of the waiter in the cafe is a good one there. Right?

他描述咖啡馆里某个刻意扮演'完美侍者'角色的服务员，其行为带着做作的自我意识。关键在于这种表现暗示着一种自我认知：'这就是我的本质'。

Us the talks about a waiter in a cafe who's sort of playing the role of being waiter, being good at his job in an affected or self conscious way. And the whole point is that there's an implied self conception of, okay. Yeah. This is who I am. This is my essence.

'这就是我的性格或类型，我正在践行这种类型'。但人类根本不存在固定类型，人总是超越其自在存在。侍者本可以反思自身处境，却试图将自己实现为'咖啡馆侍者'这个自在存在——而这样的存在本就不存在。

This is my character, or this is my type, and I'm fulfilling that type. But of course, there is no such type for human being. Human beings transcend their in itself. He can form reflective judgments about his condition. So he's trying to realize himself as the the being in itself of a cafe waiter, but there is no such thing.

这某种程度上解除了他的选择功能，成了逃避其他可能性的借口。当然并非所有侍者都处于这种自欺状态，但这个特例表明：当我们接受某种类型学或角色时，部分动机来自他人期待。他正是通过这个例子阐述这点。

And it kind of relieves him of his choice making function, right? It becomes an excuse for not doing something else or could. Not every waiter of course is in that faith, but this is the particular example. So in this sense, you know, when we take a typology or character, it's part of it is what other people expect of us. And he talks about that in this example.

人们期望你扮演某些特定角色，无论是服务员还是杂货店主，他们只想把你视为那个角色。对吧？这是我们初次见面时最先询问的问题之一，比如问对方以何为生。我们试图通过这种分类来理解他们的本质。而对萨特而言，这种对人理解的方式正是‘自欺’的表现。

People expect you to fill these certain roles, whether it's the waiter or the grocer, and they wanna think of you as just that. Right? And that's one of the first things we ask people when we meet them and, you know, we ask them what they do for a living. We're trying to give them this typology by which we can understand their nature, let's say. When for Sartre, that kind of understanding of people is in bad faith.

这其中哪一方处于‘自欺’状态？

Which side is in bad faith in that?

在这个例子中，服务员是‘自欺’的典型。

In this case, the examples of a waiter in bad faith.

服务员之所以‘自欺’，是因为他认为自己就是服务员，而非将服务员视为他扮演的角色或类似身份。

The waiter's in bad faith because he thinks that he is a waiter rather than thinking that a waiter is a role that he has or something like that.

没错。他将这视为本质。他将所有行为都归因于这个特定类型，而非自发行动。对吧？如果我不是试图符合类型定义的服务员，我的行为就会不同。

Exactly. He thinks of it as an essence. He relegates all his actions to that particular type as opposed to simply acting spontaneously. Right? So if I weren't a waiter trying to fulfill my type, I would behave differently.

比方说，我可能不会做所有‘服务员式’的举动——比如以特定姿势端着胳膊，让白餐布完美垂落。我可能不会如此卖力地扮演这个角色。当然我也可能只是在表演，可能自知在表演，但那就不同了。

I might not be doing all the waiterly things, let's say. Holding my arm in a certain way and having the the white cloth draped over it perfectly. I might not be enacting that role with such vigor. I might of course, and I might just be playing at it. I might know I'm playing at it, but that would be different.

我不认为这有区别。《存在主义是一种人道主义》另一篇文章里有句话：表演的情感与真实的情感，是几乎无法区分的两件事。他以一个纠结参战还是留家照顾母亲的人为例——两种选择各有理由。他可以说‘我留下照顾母亲是出于公民责任’或‘因为关心母亲’，但他无法确知自己的动机。我们永远无法确定表演的情感与真实情感本质上是否相同。

I don't know that it's different. So there's a quote in the other essay in the existentialism as a humanism, says a sentiment which is play acting and one which is vital are two things that are hardly distinguishable from one another. And he uses that in the example of the guy who's he's trying to decide whether to go off to war or not, or should he stay home and take care of his mother, you know, that there's sort of reasons for doing each. And he could say, oh, well, I stayed home to take care of my mother because I have this civic responsibility, because I care for my mother. But he doesn't know for sure what his motives were, that we never know for sure that a sentiment, again, which is ploy acting and one which is real, are basically the same.

这就是服务员案例的问题所在：一方面他高度自觉地在扮演服务员角色。如果只是单纯完成工作——接单、走菜——就像韦斯你说的，他不会如此‘典型服务员式’地表现。他像在舞台剧中表演般行事。

And so that's kind of the problem with the waiter here is that, in one sense, he's putting on the role of a waiter very self consciously. If he was just doing his job, you know, taking the orders and walking back, then as you said, Wes, he wouldn't be, like, all cliche waiterly about it. He's doing it like he's in a play, playing and

成为佩戴最多装饰徽章的服务员。对，她是个办公室太空船。

being a waiter maximum number of pieces of flair that you can have. Yes. She's an office spacecraft.

我能理解萨特为何觉得这令人恼火，但这让我想起尼采谈论过相同现象——在我们最近《快乐的科学》那期节目里。当人们开始不再认同自己的工作，开始表演时，那反而是他们最具创造力和突破性的时刻。所以这家伙将服务员角色发挥到极致，他肯定会得到史上最高小费。

And this is I could see why Sartre would find that irritating, but this also reminded me of when Nietzsche talked about the same thing When people get to the point where they're play acting this was in our gay science episode just recently. When people get to the point where they don't identify with their jobs anymore, where they're play acting, then that's actually when they sort of get creative and awesome about it. So that this guy is taking waiterdom to its height, and he's gonna get the biggest damn tip.

让我读读萨特实际是怎么说的，因为我觉得我没能很好地跳出来。让我们看看咖啡馆里的这位侍者。他的动作迅捷而向前，有点过于精确，有点过于急促。他朝顾客走来的步伐略显太快，弯腰的姿态又显得过分热切。

Let me read what Sartre actually has to say because I I don't think I've done a good jump. So let us consider this waiter in the cafe. His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes toward the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly.

他的声音、眼神流露出对顾客点餐过分殷勤的关注。所以可能让你感到不适。最后，他回来时试图在步伐中模仿某种自动机器人的僵硬姿态，同时托着餐盘，像走钢丝者般不顾一切地让它处于永远不稳定、永远被打破的平衡状态，又不断通过手臂和手的轻微动作重新恢复平衡。哇。是的。

His voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. So he's creeping you out maybe. Finally, there he returns trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automaton while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tightrope walker by putting it in a perpetually unstable, perpetually broken equilibrium, which he perpetually reestablishes by a light movement of the arm and hand. Wow. Yeah.

不同类型的顾客或许会欣赏这一切，但抱歉，我猜对他有些烦躁。在我们看来，他的所有行为都像一场表演。

A different sort of patron might admire all this, but sorry to, I guess, grumpy about him. All of his behavior seems to us a game.

任何听过我们关于伯克森幽默理论那期节目的人，应该会觉得这极其熟悉。这种机械式的行为方式，伯克森对萨特在这方面有主要影响。那么为什么这不仅仅是有趣的？

Anybody that listened to our Berkson on humor episode, this should sound extremely familiar. This acting mechanically in this way, Berkson was a primary influence on Sartre here. So why is this not just funny?

让我说完。是的。他致力于将自己的动作像机械装置一样串联起来，一个调节另一个，他的姿势甚至声音都像是机械的。他赋予自己事物般的敏捷和无情的迅速，或者说赋予自己。是的。

So let me let me finish. Yeah. He he applies himself to chaining his movements as if they were mechanisms, the one regulating the other, his gestures and even his voice seeming to be mechanisms. He gives himself the quickness and pitiless rapidity of things or gives himself. Yeah.

他在玩耍。他在自娱自乐。但他玩的是什么？我们无需观察太久就能解释清楚。他正在扮演咖啡馆服务员的角色玩耍。

He's playing. He's amusing himself. But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it. He is playing and being a waiter in a cafe.

这完全是一种仪式状态。公众要求他们意识到这是一种仪式。有杂货商的舞蹈，裁缝的舞蹈等等。确实有许多预防措施将人禁锢在他所处的角色中，仿佛我们永远害怕他可能逃脱，可能突然摆脱他的处境。最终，咖啡馆的服务员不能像这个墨水瓶就是墨水瓶那样，直接成为一个咖啡馆服务员。

It's wholly a condition of ceremony. The public demands of them that they realize it is a ceremony. There is the dance of the grocer, of the tailor, and so on. There are indeed many precautions to imprison a man in what he is as if we lived in perpetual fear that he might escape from it, that he might break away and suddenly elude his condition. Ultimately, the waiter in the cafe cannot be immediately a cafe waiter in the sense this inkwell is an inkwell.

换句话说，没有本质。人类不像墨水瓶由其本质决定那样，由他们的服务员本质决定，因为他可以形成关于他处境的反思性概念，这些概念是超越的，或者它们指向超越。所以最后一点是，我试图在咖啡馆服务员的存在中实现，仿佛不仅仅是我的权力赋予他们的价值和紧迫性，关于我的职责和我职位的权利，仿佛不是我每天早晨起床的自由选择。所以你对自己说，我是一个服务员，这就是我所做的。这不再是一个选择。

In other words, there's no essence. Human beings aren't determined by their waiter essence in the way that an inkwell is determined by its essence because he can form reflective concepts concerning his condition and those are transcendent or they refer to the transcendent. So the final bit is what I attempt to realize as a being in the waiter of the cafe waiter as if it were not just in my power to confer their value and their urgency about my duties and the rights of my position as if it were not my free choice to get up each morning. So you say to yourself, I'm a waiter, this is what I do. It's no longer a choice.

我认为这就是人们滑入这种固化立场的反对点，他们将自己视为拥有某种性格或社会或世界中的某种地位，然后他们基于此行动。

And I think that's the objection where people slide into this kind of sedimented position where they see themselves as having a certain character or a certain position in society or the world, and then they act out of that.

是的。我是说，一旦你说他在扮演服务员，这让我想到他是自我反思的，他有点像尼采可能会赞同的那种讽刺者。但事实上，他日复一日地这样做，如果你扮演得那么认真，那就和宣称自己就是那个东西没有区别了。所以即使通过扮演，你在某种意义上宣称自己不是那个东西。我是扮演者。

Yes. I mean, soon as you say his play acting at being a waiter, that makes me think that he is self reflective about it, that he's sort of being an an ironist in the way that maybe Nietzsche would have approved. But the fact that he does this all the time, day after day, like, that again, if if you're play acting that hard, then that's indistinguishable from actually claiming yourself to be that thing. So even if through play acting, you're in a sense claiming yourself not to be that thing. I'm the play actor.

其实我并不是服务员，我只是在扮演服务员的演员。如果你过度沉浸在这种刻意的反讽表演中，实际上你恰恰在确认自己就是服务员。你这是自欺欺人。

I'm not actually the waiter. I'm the actor at being the waiter. If you do that so much, then you're in fact even through this attempted act of irony, you're just affirming that you are the waiter. You're in bad faith.

我认为关键在于，我们最终通过将行为归因于某种类型，从而逃避了对自身行动的责任，对吧？以这种方式扮演角色，而不是说'这是我选择在这个清晨起床。我能成为别的什么吗？当然，还有无数其他可能性。'

Well, I think the idea is that ultimately that we abdicate responsibility for our actions, right, by attributing them to some type. To inhabit that role in that way, as opposed to saying, this is my choice to get up at this time in the morning. Could I be something else? Yeah. There's all there's a million other possibilities.

我选择这个。我选择当一名服务员。

I choose this. I choose to be a waiter.

所以他完全基于这个特定服务员给他带来的不适感做出判断——尽管他根本不了解对方。他认为自己能像我们说的那样，从外在表现看穿本质。你不可能拥有完全不为外人所知的内心世界。如果你真的在思考、疑惑或幻想，人们通过观察就能察觉。因此他自以为有资格下此论断，把这个家伙当作哲学上令人反感的'自欺'范例。

So he's just basing this all on just how creepy this particular waiter seems to him that he doesn't really know. He thinks he could tell in the same way that we said that, you know, yourself is sort of public. You can't really have this whole inner life that is totally secret to everybody. Like, if you're really thinking about stuff and wondering and dreaming, people are gonna be able to tell just by looking at you. So that he thinks himself able then to pass this judgment and use this dude as a philosophical example of objectionable bad faith.

为公允起见，我们姑且说这个服务员可能处于自欺状态。好吧，我不知道萨特会怎么说。但在我看来，你无法仅凭表象判断——或许能猜测，但那个扮演服务员的家伙完全可能是自主选择这个角色。

To be charitable, let's just say that the waiter could be in bad faith. Alright. I I don't know what Sartre would say. But to me, I don't think you can tell just from mean, I you might be able to tell, guess. But to me, the same waiter who's playing at being a waiter could be choosing that.

为什么不行？是的，如果你说他过分殷勤，他那种做派让你不适...好吧。

Why not? Yes. If you say he's too solicitous and he creeps you out in the way he's yeah. Okay.

没错。没有人类会真正那样行事。你把自己变成了自动机器——从这种存在主义批判到我们之前讨论过的'新工作'话题其实只有一步之遥：任何具备思考能力的人都不可能日复一日从事这种工作，除非他们在自我欺骗，认为这是自然法则，是命中注定，所以不得不每天起床。

Right. Right. No human being could actually act like that. That you're you're making yourself into an automaton that it's not, again, that far a jump from this sort of existentialist critique to the whole new work discussion that we have had before of, like, there's no way that any thinking reflective person could actually do this kind of job day after day unless they're bullshitting themselves and think that it's just kind of a law of nature and this is my lot in life. And so I just have to get up.

如果他们真的需要每天运用意志力做出选择'我要去工作'...也许有些人确实觉得咖啡馆工作完全符合性情，乐在其中，沉浸其中，感觉当个'本真'的服务员时最自由。但想象在肯德基或你能想到最压抑的地方——我认为他就是在这样强加于这个服务员：把自己变成自动机器是多么可悲可怕，没有人类...虽然我想说没有人类能真正做到，但鉴于他对自由的强调，我甚至不确定他能做这种断言。

If they actually had to exert the will and make the choice day after day that I'm gonna maybe there are some people that working at this cafe is this is actually fits my temperament perfectly, and I really enjoy it, and I'm getting into it, and it's my thing, and I feel no more free than when I'm being an authentic waiter. But imagine that at KFC or whatever the most depressing place you can imagine, and this is, I think, kinda what he's imposing on this guy that, like, how depressing and awful to sort of make yourself into this automaton that no human being but I wanna say no human being can really do that. But given his emphasis on freedom, I don't even know that he can make that kind of claim.

这个服务员正在行使他的自由，问题在于他对此自我欺骗了。

The waiter is exercising his freedom. It's just that he's deceiving himself about it. I think that's the problem.

不，他并没有自我欺骗。萨特在'自欺'章节花了相当篇幅说明：自欺不同于对自己撒谎或自我欺骗。因为他说...

No. He's not deceiving himself about it. I mean, Sartre spends a fair amount of time in that bad faith section talking about how bad faith is not like lying to yourself or deceiving yourself. Because what he says

不，他说这是一种自我欺骗的形态。

No, he says it's a species of deceiving yourself.

萨特在讨论自欺的章节中曾指出，对自己撒谎或自我欺骗的前提是，你内心某处知道某些事实为真却告诉自己并非如此，或某些事为假却告诉自己并非如此——为了能够欺骗自己，你必须先知道自己正在欺骗自己什么。

Sartre at one point says in the bad faith section that to lie to oneself or to deceive oneself requires the knowledge that such and such is true and you're telling yourself that it's not, or such and such is false and you're telling yourself that it's not. Some part of you would have to know what it was you were deceiving yourself about in order to be able to deceive yourself.

我认为他想表达的是，奇怪的是，这就是其结构本质。

I think he wants to say that is the structure, weirdly enough.

考夫曼实际上将'bad faith'翻译为自我欺骗。所以我觉得如果我们想做这种区分，这里可能丢失了一些微妙之处。

Kaufman actually translates bad faith as self deception. So I I don't I think there's a subtlety that we're losing there if you wanna make that distinction.

因此我们应当欣然承认——这是在我PDF版本的第109页——只要我们将自我欺骗与普通谎言区分开，就可以承认自欺是对自身的谎言。接着他展开论述：普通谎言涉及两个人时很容易解释，一方知道是谎言并有意欺骗，另一方不知情而被骗。而自欺因涉及欺骗自己，才产生了这个弗洛伊德试图解决（但萨特拒绝）的本体论难题。

So we shall willingly grant so this is on page a 109 of my PDF version. We shall willingly grant that bad faith is a lie to oneself on condition that we distinguish the lie to oneself from lying in general. And that's where he goes into this whole thing where lying in general, because you have two people, it's easy to explain. One knows it's a lie and willingly deceased and the other doesn't know and they're deceived. It's the fact that bad faith involves lying to oneself that generates this ontological problem to which Freud is one possible solution that he rejects.

而他提出的解决方案在我看来有些模糊，但似乎涉及他所谓的'亚稳态'与'转瞬即逝的立场'概念，即人在知与不知之间快速切换的状态。

And then his solution is somewhat unclear to me, but I think it involves this idea of what he calls the metastable and the evanescent position where you sort of get this quick alternation between knowing and not knowing.

没错。这不可能是直白的自我欺骗——不是你说一次谎就信以为真，然后按谎言行事。因为你会意识到自己正在对自己撒谎，这种欺骗会立即崩塌，所以必须像萨特所认为的那样不断自我更新——

Right. It can't be a straight up self deception in the sense that you tell yourself a lie once, and then you believe it. And now I'm acting according to that lie. This has to be something because you realize, you know, you're the one telling yourself a lie that sort of immediately collapses, so it has to be ever renewed just in the way that Sartre thinks that

是的。

Yeah.

我们所有的态度都在自发意志中不断更新，那么自我欺骗同样也是这种转瞬即逝的切换过程。

All of our attitudes are ever renewed in a matter of spontaneous will, then my fooling myself is something likewise that is a matter of this evanescent switching.

对。这就是'转瞬即逝'和'亚稳态'想要表达的——就像马克说的那种交替状态。这如同跳跃，而在弗洛伊德理论中，意识与无意识之间有条分界线，这道屏障将它们隔开。

Yeah. That's what you're evanescent and metastable are meant to get at that. Yeah. Just that alternation that Mark is talking about. It's like jumping, so where Freud you have this line between the conscious and the unconscious and that that's a sensor and it keeps them apart.

对萨特而言，意识中仅存在一条界限，你在认知与无知之间跳跃。

For Sartre, there's just a line within consciousness and you're jumping from knowing to not knowing.

我稍后能读点内容吗？好的，第49页：'自欺的情形不可能相同，正如我们所说，这实际上是对自己的谎言。确实，实践自欺的人隐藏了令人不快的真相，或将令人愉悦的虚假呈现为真相。因此自欺在表面上具有谎言的架构。但改变一切的是这个事实：在自欺中，我是向自己隐藏真相。'

Can I read something a little later on? All right, so page 49, The situation cannot be the same for bad faith if this as we have said is indeed a lie to oneself. To be sure, the one who practices bad faith is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting as truth a pleasing untruth. Bad faith then has in appearance the structure of falsehood. Only what changes everything is the fact that in bad faith it is from my self that I'm hiding the truth.

因此，欺骗者与被骗者的二元性在此并不存在。相反，自欺本质上暗示着单一意识的统一性。对。所以我想从这个意义上，我理解你说的自我欺骗，但他强调的是，这种自我欺骗并非像你体内有两个不同部分，一个在欺骗另一个那样运作。这不是它的运作方式，这也是他不认同弗洛伊德解决方案的原因。

Thus, the duality of the deceiver and the deceived does not exist here. Bad faith on the contrary implies in essence the unity of a single consciousness. Right. So, I guess in that sense, I understand what you're saying where it is self deception, but he's saying that it's not self deception in the sense of there's like two different parts of you and one is deceiving the other. That's not the way it works, which is why he doesn't like the Freudian solution because Right.

在他看来，弗洛伊德的解决方案假设了某种以无意识形式存在的自主他者，能够从外部向你投射事物，而你可能对此受骗，这仍然保持着'mitzvah sign'（如他前文所述）的结构。

In his mind, the Freudian solution posits some sort of autonomous other in the form of the unconscious that can kind of throw things at you from the outside and you can be deceived about them, it still maintains the structure of mitzvah sign as he says right above that.

单一意识意味着它不像'mitzvah sign'。'mitzvah sign'是自我与他者的关系。

The single consciousness means it's not like mitzvah sign. Mitzvah sign is self and other.

不，不。我是说我认为他觉得弗洛伊德的答案仍保持着那种结构。

No. No. I'm saying I think he thinks that the Freudian answer still maintains that structure.

对。好吧。

Right. Okay.

是的。我需要直接删除关于Mitzhine的引用，还是你会解释它是什么？

Yep. Am I gonna have to just remove the references to Mitzhine or are you gonna explain what it is?

'Being with'我刚解释过。就是...嗯...它是'自为'然后...然后'他者'。对吧？

Being with I just explained it. It's just Yeah. It's It's the for itself and then the and then the other. Right?

'mit'在德语里就是'与'的意思，仅此而已。

The mit is just with in German, that's all.

是的。为他人存在，与他人共在。但在这种语境下，谎言、虚假与欺骗的结构意味着，当涉及他人参与时——比如你欺骗他人或他人欺骗你——这种结构成立。而当你谈论自我欺骗时，这种结构就不合理了，因为这里并不存在两个独立个体，其中一个隐瞒或虚假披露某些事情。

Yeah. Being for the other, being with others. Yeah. But in this context, what it means is that the structure of lie or falsehood and deception, he says, there's a structure that holds when you're talking about others being involved, like you deceiving another or another deceiving you. And that structure doesn't make sense when you talk about you deceiving yourself because it's not like there are two individuals involved, one of whom is withholding something or disclosing something falsely or whatever.

你无法以同样的方式欺骗自己。

You can't lie to yourself in that same way.

对。本体论不能像标准案例那样存在两个人，一个欺骗者一个被欺骗者。

Yep. The ontology can't be like the standard case of where there's two people and one is deceived and one is deceived.

我们现在讨论的这种自欺，即我表现出的不诚实，似乎与我当前基于事实性的处境密切相关——包括我过去的行为如何塑造了现在的我。而另一方面，我否认自己的未来可能性（这更具前瞻性）。这两者在我看来并不相同，但他似乎将二者都视为不诚实。

The way we're talking about it right now is the kind of self deception of the bad faith I have seems to be deeply involved with the relationship I have right now considering my facticity. The kinds of things I've done and how they structure what I am and where I am now. And then there's another aspect of it in which I deny my freedom which would be more forward looking. And those two don't seem to be the same thing to me. But he seems to talk about both of them as bad faith.

没错。因为它们指向相同的本体论结构——我们既是超越性的存在，又是过去性的存在。

Right. Because they refer to the same ontological structure. The fact that we are both the transcendent and past.

在这两种情况下，我们都在利用它们来自欺。对吧？

In both cases, we're using them to deceive ourselves. Right?

将其理解为自欺而非单纯的意志力缺失（即我的意志甚至无法坚持自己真正想做的事）能带来什么认知价值？或许他...

What am I gaining by understanding it as deceiving myself as opposed to understanding it's just a failure on my part? That my will is incontinent with respect to what I even want to do. Maybe he

想探讨比意志力缺失更微妙的情况，比如那个与约会对象陷入不诚实状态的女孩例子。

wants to get it more subtle cases than incontinence, like take the example of the girl who's in bad faith with her date.

需要我直接读这段吗？就在这里高亮显示。好的。关于不诚实的章节分为三部分：第一部分引入概念（赛斯刚才读的），也是讨论弗洛伊德理论的部分。

Should I just read that? I have it highlighted right here. Sure. So the bad faith chapter has three parts. And the first one is where he introduces the concept and that's what Seth just read from, and that's where the whole discussion of Freud comes in.

他说弗洛伊德理论并无帮助，因此要深入探究不诚实的模式——这是第二部分。在侍者案例之前，他首先举了这个例子：设想一位女性首次同意与某位男性约会。

And he says, look, that didn't help. So really dig figure out what bad faith let's just look at patterns of bad faith. That's the second part. And the first example he gives before the waiter example is this one. Take the example of a woman who has consented to go out with a particular man for the first time.