创始人模式：Christina Cacioppo，Vanta创始人兼首席执行官

Carolyn，我们今天在Y Combinator创始人模式静修会上与Christina Casiopo在一起。你好，Christina。你好。

Carolyn, we are here today with Christina Casiopo at the Y Combinator founder mode retreat. Hi, Christina. Hi.

你好，Christina。

Hi, Christina.

我喜欢面对面做这些采访。面对面交谈很有趣。Christina，我们已经录制了你完整的Social Radars常规访谈，很快就会发布，那真是太棒了。是的。你不觉得吗，Carolyn？

I love doing these in person. It's fun talking face to face. Now, Christina, we have in the hopper, we have already taped your long form regular Social Radars interview that's gonna be launching pretty soon, which was awesome. Yes. Don't you think, Carolyn?

但今天，我们主要专注于讨论创始人模式的内容，并听取你的看法。不过首先，你能向我们的听众介绍一下Vanta吗？

But so today, we're just really gonna focus on talking about founder mode stuff and get your thoughts on it. But first, will you tell our listeners about Vanta?

是的。我们帮助公司建立并向客户展示信任。实际上，这包括合规认证、安全问卷、信任中心和安全计划。

Yeah. We help companies build out and demonstrate trust to their customers. So practically, that looks like compliance certifications, security questionnaires, trust centers, security programs.

我记得当时对这些东西超级着迷

I remember being super obsessed with all this stuff when

我们当时

we were

我当时就想，我从没想过会对这个这么感兴趣，但这其实是那种非常不性感的领域。是的。对吧？公司们并不真的愿意花时间、金钱或精力，但他们不得不做。所以跟我们讲讲你是怎么开始的

I was like, I never thought I'd be so interested in it, but it's the kind of thing that was very unsexy. Yes. Right? That companies didn't really wanna spend the time or money or energy, but they had to. So tell us a little bit how you got started on

这个。是的。我听过有人称这些为苦差事生意。苦差事。这是个不错的生意领域。

this. Yeah. I've heard someone call these schlep businesses. Schlep. That's a good business to be in.

是的。实际上，我认为这就像处于一个交叉点：你的客户或行业会要求你通过各种合规认证，所以建立这个业务是必要的，但这往往不是让很多创始人或人们早上起床的动力。

Yeah. Which actually, I do think it's like a vantas sit at this intersection of your customers or your industry will make you go through various compliance certifications, and so it's necessary to like build the business, but it tends not to be what gets a lot of founders or folks out of bed in the morning.

袜子也是。

Socks too.

对吧？完全正确。袜子。好吧。所以你处于这种人们不得不做但又不愿意做的交叉点。

Right? Exactly. Socks. Okay. And so you're kind of at this intersection of people have to do it, but they don't want to.

我认为一个非常引人注目的事情是，人们对我们早期的产品非常感激，尽管那产品很糟糕，但他们喜欢的程度远超应有，因为，再次强调，它只是做了他们自己不想做的事情。

And I think one of the really striking things is people were really appreciative about our early product, which was terrible, but they liked it so much more than they should have because, again, it just did this thing they didn't want to do themselves.

你得讲讲关于Segment和电子表格之类的故事。

You have to tell the story about segment and the the spreadsheets and stuff.

是的。早期的时候，没有人做过这样的产品，当你去找行业里的人交流时，他们都说这不可能，而我们选择不相信他们。于是，我们决定尝试不用代码构建产品的早期版本，就像在电子表格里为Segment（另一家YC公司，我们在那里有些朋友）做的那样。嗯。他们很好心地让我们在他们的办公室待着，采访他们的工程师，并尝试构建这个原型。我觉得他们既很友善，也确实需要SOC2认证，但不知道如何获取。

Yeah. So in the early days, no one had kind of built a product like this, and when you went and talked to people in the industry, they said you couldn't, and in order not to believe them. And so, decided to try to build an early version of the product without code, like in a spreadsheet for Segment, another YC company where we had some friends Mhmm. Who are kind enough to let us sort of hang out in their office and interview their engineers and and try to build this prototype. And I think they were both kind enough and they needed a SOC two and didn't know how to get it.

总之，直到他在他们的办公室待了两周，阅读了一堆SOC2报告并尝试将其标准化，然后采访他们的团队，为他们制定了一个路线图，告诉他们该如何去做。那就是产品的第一个版本。然后第二个版本，我们 literally 把那个电子表格带到了另一家YC公司Front，把Segment的表格给了他们，只是稍作修改，看看是否对他们也适用，就这样我们测试了能否将之前零散的过程标准化。结果它确实有效，而且大部分都奏效了。

Anyway, until he spent two weeks in their office reading a bunch of SOC two reports and trying to standardize them, and then interviewing their team and kind of making them a roadmap to here's how you would go do that. And that was the very first version of the product. And then for the second version, we took that spreadsheet literally to another YC company front and sort of gave them segment spreadsheet, but changed just a little bit to see if it worked for them, and that's how we tested if we could standardize what had previously been And it did ad hoc process, and it mostly worked.

那时候你是不是超级兴奋？

And were you super psyched when

当那发生时？是的，有点吧。因为你其实不太确定它是否有效。你就像是，把那个链接滑过桌子递给他们。

that happened? Yeah. Kind of. Because it was you kinda didn't know whether it worked. You sorta, like, slide the sheet of you know, slide the link across the table.

然后他们会说太棒了。对吧？你懂的？

It'd be like it's awesome. Right? You know?

现在你们规模巨大。告诉我们你们有多大。你们超级大。快说说。

And now you're huge. Tell us how how big you are. You're huge. Come on.

有点吧，是的。我们有12,000家客户。Vanta在全球有1,000名员工。整整1,000人。

It's a little yeah. We are 12,000 customers. We have a thousand people who work at Vanta around the world. A thousand people.

是啊。哇。好吧。

Yeah. Wow. Okay.

这么多人。太疯狂了。

That's so many people. It's wild.

天哪。从我们录制Social Radars节目到现在，你们又完成了一轮融资，或者说宣布了一轮融资。

Gosh. And between now and when we taped for the Social Radars episode, you've raised a round, or you announced a round.

是的。我们宣布了一轮融资。完成了D轮融资。估值达到了41.5亿美元。太不可思议了。

Yes. We announced a round. We raised our series d. Valuation was 4,150,000,000.00. Get out.

哦，克里斯蒂娜。

Oh, Christina.

这太棒了。

That's amazing.

太激动人心了。我真为你感到兴奋。是啊。我也是。好吧。

So exciting. I'm so excited for you. Yeah. Me too. Okay.

所以你已经从把Excel表格推过桌面，发展到了D轮融资。是的。告诉我们你学到了什么，作为管理者是如何成长的，也许还有你对创始人模式的理解。这对你来说意味着什么？

So you have gone from sliding that Excel spreadsheet across the table to raising your series d. Yeah. Tell us things you've learned, how you've grown as a manager, and maybe what your experience with founder mode is. What does it mean to you?

对我来说，我认为在最高层面上，创始人模式几乎是一种允许你按照自己想要的方式运营公司的许可。我认为这部分是因为创业旅程非常漫长。即使事情顺利，过程也非常艰难。所以如果你在途中不享受这个过程，它就不会成功，或者对很多人来说不会成功，可能包括我自己。所以你必须要享受这段旅程，或者让这段旅程成为你愿意为之跳下床的动力。

For me, I think at the highest level, founder mode is almost a, like, permission to run the company the way you want to run it. And I think that's in part because the journey is very long. Even when things work, they're very hard. And so if you kind of don't enjoy it along the way, you just it will not work or it will not work for many people, probably myself included. So you kinda have to, like, enjoy the journey or make the journey something you're you, like, jump out of bed for.

对我来说，创始人模式意味着你应该自己弄清楚该怎么做，而不是按照沙丘路的VC们告诉你的去做——那些建议可能有效也可能无效，但如果对你个人无效，那对你的公司也不会有效。

And to me, founder mode, it's like you should figure that out to yourself and not do what, you know, like, Sandhill Road VCs tell you to do, which again, may or may not work, but if it doesn't work for you, it's like not gonna work for your company.

是的。沙丘路的人有没有告诉过你该做什么事情？

Yeah. Did you ever have something that Sand Hill Road people told you to do?

哦，当然有。

Oh, absolutely.

能给我们举个例子吗？是的。

Can you give us an example? Yeah.

让我试着想一个好的例子。我是说，出于某些原因——我想我们在播客里聊过——我们等到有了1000万美元的收入才进行A轮融资。是的，我记得这个故事。是的。

Let me try to think of a good one. I mean, we had so we for very reasons, I think we talked on the podcast, waited until we had $10,000,000 of revenue to raise a series a. Yeah. I remember the story. Yes.

那件事确实很奇怪，而且我觉得不仅仅是奇怪，人们还将其解读为缺乏雄心。或者像是，哦，他们显然不想建立一家风投支持的公司。等等。哦，他们是一家生活方式型公司。没错。

And that was just weird, and I think not just weird, but folks interpreted it as, like, a lack of ambition. Or, like, oh, they don't wanna build a venture backed company, clearly. Oh, wait. Oh, they're a lifestyle company. Yeah.

完全正确。他们是一家生活方式型公司，然后你就想，哦，不。不。不。我在自己的小世界里过得很好。

Exactly. They're a lifestyle company, and you're like, oh, no. No. No. I'm good little world.

大错特错。

Big one.

就像他们当时在接触你，而当你拒绝说，不，我们目前不融资

Like So they were approaching you, and when you said, no. We're not raising

现在不融。太忙了。我们资金充足。谢谢。

it right now. Like, too busy. We're set. Thank you.

是的。他们就会说这是生活方式型生意。对。有意思。

Yes. They'd say lifestyle business. Yeah. Interesting.

是啊。你可以想象，我当时有点恼火。然后我就想，哦，你这么认为？太好了。嗯，我期待着以后有机会再和你聊聊。

Yeah. Which I think as you can imagine, I was, like, kinda annoyed. And then I was like, oh, you think that? Great. Well, I look forward to, like, talking to you at a bit.

是的。就像，你等着看吧。你有没有想过授权给经理们，不仅仅是因为，你知道这是一场马拉松，你说过的，你是为了长远打算，这是一场马拉松，你已经坚持很久了，但是，如果授权的话，也许你的生活会轻松一点。那么，你是如何在日常中抵制这种诱惑的？这是个好问题。

Yes. Like, just you wait. Have you ever been tempted to delegate to managers, not just because, like, you are you know this is a marathon, you've said it, you know, you're in it for the long haul, it's a marathon, you've been around for a long time now, but, like, if you delegate, maybe your life gets a little bit easier. So, like, how do you fight that on a day to day basis? That's a good question.

我的意思是，我确实授权过一些成功和不成功的事情，以及一些我不应该授权的。好吧。所以老话就是，选择你的战场，但我觉得版本应该是，我不知道，作为创始人，我总是很纠结。当事情不顺利时，我总会有点恼火。是的。

I mean, I've definitely delegated stuff that worked and didn't, and that I shouldn't have. Okay. So the trope is like, pick your battles, but I think the version of that is like, I don't know, the founder, I always die. I'm like kind of always annoyed when stuff doesn't work. Yeah.

但我想，我在哪些方面会真的非常恼火？在哪些方面我会有点恼火，但之后能理解并继续前进？尝试足够了解自己，反思那些地方，弄清楚，你知道，哪些下滑我不会完全接受，但我可以忍受，而不是会对自己授权了那件事感到生气。是的。所以就像你说的，这都是关于选择你的战场。

But where am I going to be really annoyed, I guess? And like, where will I be sort of annoyed, but then kind of understand and like can kind of move on? And trying to know myself well enough and reflect on places there to figure out, you know, kind of what am I I won't be like totally okay with the slipping, but I can live with slipping versus like, I will just be like upset at myself for having delegated that thing. Yeah. So it's just all about, like, pick like you said, it's picking your battles.

是的。这是一场马拉松。我必须授权一些事情，但我足够了解自己，知道哪些需要我保持创始人模式。对。好吧。

Yeah. This is a marathon. I have to delegate some things, but I know myself well enough to know which ones I need to stay in founder mode for. Right. Okay.

是的。感觉相信直觉这个概念出现了。每个人对创始人模式都有自己的看法，但他们都说要相信直觉。对吧。你有没有一个故事，是你深刻感觉到某事并坚持到底，尽管其他人有不同意见？

Yeah. Feel like the concept of trusting your gut has come up. Everyone has their own take on founder mode, but they all sort of say trust your gut. Right. Is there a story that you have where you felt something deeply and and followed through on that despite other people?

是的。我也可以给你反面的例子。是的。都说说。好的。

Yeah. And I can also give you the reverse. Yeah. Do do both. Yeah.

反面例子其实是我们失去了一位非常早期且优秀的工程师，他离开后已经并将继续拥有辉煌的职业生涯。我们失去他是因为我们在他上面安排了一个经理，并且某种程度上知道，或者当我听到那个计划时，我就知道行不通。

The reverse was actually we lost, like, a very early and excellent engineer who's gone off and has, like, has and will continue to have an incredible career. And we lost him because we put a manager over him, and like kind of knew or in some ways, like when I heard that plan, I knew it wouldn't work.

是谁的计划要给这个人安排一个经理？

Whose plan was it to put a manager over this person?

他们的经理。本来打算在中间安排一个人。在中间。而且，你知道，就像，安迪·格鲁夫会告诉你这么做吗？对吧？

Their manager. Was gonna put someone in between. In between. And there's, you like, can I there's a there's a know, Andy Grove would have told you to do this? Right?

就像，好吧。这一点都不疯狂。

Like Okay. It wasn't crazy at all.

好吧。

Okay.

我听到后，心想，哦，糟了。这不会顺利的。我应该做点什么。但当时还有其他17件事要处理，我就像个无头苍蝇。然后，在我们告诉这个人的那天，他们去参加了一个面试，结果就离开了。

And I heard it, and was like, oh, shoot. That's not gonna go well. I should do something about it. And then it was kind of like, and there's 17 other things and I'm a headless chicken. And then, you know, kind of the day we told this person, they took an interview and like ended up leaving.

哇。哦。以一种非常友善、友好和专业的方式，但说实话，直到今天，我仍然觉得自己是个傻瓜，我早知道那会搞砸，却没有采取任何行动。而且，我认为Vanta公司因为几年前发生的这件事，确实变得更糟了一点。完全是这样。

Wow. Oh. In a in a very kind and friendly and professional way, know, but it's just actually something you could tell, like, to this day, I still am like, I am an idiot, and I knew that was gonna go badly, and I did not do anything about it. And like, I do think Vanta's, you know, incrementally worse for that having happened years ago. Totally.

哇。是的。就像，你还有点耿耿于怀。是的。我的意思是，说清楚点，我自己过得很好，但，是的，完全是这样。

Wow. Yeah. Like, you're still a little bit obsessed with it. Yeah. And I mean, to be clear, like, I'm being great myself, but like, yeah, totally.

我应该能想到的。是的，百分之百。那反过来呢？显然，那1000万美元，我们都知道那是个很棒的投资。

I should've got that. Yeah. 100%. What about the reverse? Obviously, the the $10,000,000, we know that's a great one.

是的。你...是的。而且我认为无论是从业务成果来看，实际上当时也起到了帮助作用，再次让公司某种程度上更有信心，因为这就像我们做得好是因为我们觉得自己做得好。

Yeah. You Yeah. And I think both from a business outcome, and I think actually it helped at the time, again, the company kind of have more confidence in a way, because it's like we're doing well because we think we're doing well.

不是这样的

It's not

因为我们做得好是因为风投大佬说我们做得好。对吧。或者说那是个不错的额外收获，但我不确定，那种东西可能来得快去得也快。对吧。我认为另一个错误，或者我想说的另一个是，在第一个产品还没完成之前就推出其他产品。

like we're doing well because fancy VC says we're doing well. Right. Or like that's a nice bonus, but like not I don't know, that can come and go. Right. I think the other one or I guess another one is like launching additional products before the first one is done.

即使沿着第一个产品的路线，它也永远不会真正'完成'，但对Vanta来说，我们有时会谈到，我们最初并不是为了成为SOC2工厂而创办的。我故意学究地称它为SOC2工厂。而且我们当时不认为SOC2工厂会是一门好生意。结果证明它其实是非常好的生意。但即便如此，那并不是我们的核心故事。

Even in the vein of the first one, it's never done, but for Vanta, we we sometimes talk about it as we didn't start to be a SOC two factory. I'm gonna purposely pedantically calling it a SOC two factory. And we didn't think a SOC two factory would be a good business. Turns out it's actually a very good business. But still, that's like not the plot.

所以这背后的想法是，我认为也许一个职业经理人会认为，不，那其实是一门好生意。就像，市场还有很大空间，只需要继续投入，继续做这件事。但我们一直觉得，那不是我们做这件事的原因，那不是我们招募人才的目的。再说一次，也许生意很好，财务回报也不错，但这不是我们在这里要玩的游戏。因此，我们更有意识、更早、更大地投资，只是试图让其他产品也运转起来。

And so underlying that is I think like maybe a professional manager would be like, no, was actually a good business. Like, and there's like lots of room on market and like just keep going and investing and like just do the thing. But we kind always thought like that's that's not why we're in this, that's not why we've recruited people. Again, maybe good business, good financial outcome, but like not not the game here. And so, invested more consciously and larger and earlier on and just trying to get additional products working.

因为我们不想只因为那一件事而被人所知。

Because we didn't want to be known for just that one thing.

做一家袜子工厂。

Being a sock factory.

没错。袜子工厂。是的。袜子工厂是另一门生意。像是，还没机会接触。

Exactly. Sock two factory. Yeah. A sock factory is a different business. Like, don't have a chance yet.

我在想刚才你讲的那个故事，关于你直觉上觉得不该让那位经理管理那个人。是啊，你当时太忙了。回顾我在Y Combinator的职业生涯，我觉得大多数让我后悔的重大错误，我想都是因为我当时太忙了。是的。

I'm thinking about the story you just told about how you felt in your gut, like, you shouldn't put the manager over that person. Yeah. You were too busy. I feel like if I look back on my career at Y Combinator, most of the biggest mistakes that I feel regretful about were I think because I was too busy. Yeah.

然后我就想，唉，你知道，我还有别的事要处理，你就这样分心然后继续前进，结果突然之间就变成了一个大问题。关于如何平衡作为一个有百万件事要做的创始人、倾听你的直觉并在即使很忙的时候也据此行动，你有什么建议吗？

And I I thought, ugh, you know, I have other things to fight, and you just get distracted and you move on, and then all of a sudden it turns into this big problem. Is there any advice you have about balancing sort of being a founder who has a million things to do, listening to your gut, and acting upon it when even when you're too busy?

我的意思是，如果我回想我当时太忙都在做什么，一部分是日程表上安排的时间，但其实大部分不是。更像是情感能量，对吧？我花了很多时间在一个团队的部分上，我的意思是，那部分运作得不好，但不是那种感觉我们都在同一条船上的不好。我们是，你知道，隔岸相望，像是在互相指责，这对所有相关的人来说都非常消耗精力。

I mean, if I think of what I was kind of too busy doing, some of it was like calendar blocks of my time, but actually mostly it wasn't. It was like emotional energy. Right? And I was spending a lot of time in a part of the team that, I mean, wasn't working, but like wasn't working in a way where it felt like we were like all in the boat together. We were, you know, across across the shores, like, kind of pointing at each other, and that was just like very draining for everyone involved.

但我回顾那段经历，我觉得就像是，好吧，当你感觉你们是在船上互相指责，而不是在同一条船上时，尽快解决这个问题，因为它太消耗人了，情感上的消耗，然后你就没有足够的精力去处理其他事情了。我知道这有帮助，但这更像是一个……不是日程表的问题。日程表的问题容易解决。而是那种……不，我只是需要躺下休息一会儿，拜托，或者，像是，我无法再思考了。

But I kind of looked back on that and I think it's like, okay, well, when you feel like you're in, you know, in the boat pointing at each other, not in the same boat, Fix that real quick because that is so draining, like emotionally draining, and then you don't have the fortitude for, like, the other stuff. I know that's helpful, but that's kind of a it's like less of a calendar I mean, calendar problems. Those are easy to solve. It's the, like, no. I I just need to lay down for a moment, please, or or, like, I'm done thinking.

是的。是的。

Yeah. Yeah.

随着公司发展到一千人，你对自己直觉的信任感有变化吗？随着你创业时间更长、融资更多，这种感觉有改变吗？

Has your sense of like trusting your gut changed as you've grown to a thousand people? Have you as you've done this for more years, raised more money?

我觉得有变化，而且希望是变得更好。但我现在更关注的是：当你正确并相信直觉时，很棒；当你错误却相信直觉时，希望你能从中学习，让直觉变得更准确。是的。如果你正确却不相信直觉——比如你不想做的事其实是对的——那我也不知道会怎样。

I think so, and I think it's like, hopefully it's getting better. But I think I'm more attuned to whether you're right, or when you're right and you trust your gut, great. When you're wrong and you trust your gut, hopefully you learn, and like, your gut gets better. Yeah. If you're right and you didn't trust your gut, I e you the thing you didn't want to do, I don't know.

这种情况下我会对自己非常生气。我觉得我有点想避免这种状态。所以这几乎像是一种倾向，会让我更愿意相信自己的直觉。对吧？

That is like again, I get really angry at myself. Then and like, that is I just kinda wanna avoid that state, I think. And so it's almost like a virgin to that that will lead me to, like, trust my gut more if that is it. Right. Right?

就像：我可能会错，但至少能从中学习。而不是既错误又痛苦——这样对任何人都没帮助。你不想既错误又痛苦

Where you're like, I might be wrong, but at least I will, like, then learn from it. Yeah. Versus I'll just be, like, wrong and bitter. I'm just, like, not helpful to anyone. You don't wanna be wrong

又痛苦。

and bitter.

痛苦就是，嗯，不太好。不过这次对话太棒了。

Bitter is just, like, not good. Well, this was awesome.

我迫不及待想看到这期节目播出。如果观众觉得有趣，他们一定会非常期待听到你的完整Vanta创业故事——那期节目非常精彩，而且应该很快就会上线。

I can't wait for this to air. And if anyone has found this interesting, they're gonna be so psyched to hear your full Vanta journey because it was such a great episode, and it it should come out pretty soon too.

非常感谢您的邀请。谢谢，克里斯蒂娜。再见。

Thank you so much for having me. Thanks, Christina. Bye.