本集简介
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我是杰西卡·利文斯顿,卡罗琳·利维和我是社交雷达。
I'm Jessica Livingston, and Carolyn Levy and I are the social radars.
在这个播客中,我们与硅谷一些最成功的创始人交谈,了解他们是如何做到的。
In this podcast, we talk to some of the most successful founders in Silicon Valley about how they did it.
卡罗琳和我多年来一直合作,帮助了数千家初创公司,至今已近二十年。
Carolyn and I have been working together to help thousands of startups at Y Combinator for almost twenty years.
请像墙上的苍蝇一样旁听我们与创始人交谈,了解他们真实的故事。
Come be a fly on the wall as we talk to founders and learn their true stories.
今天,我们采访的是Y Combinator的总裁兼首席执行官加里·谭。
Today, we're talking to Gary Tan, the president and CEO of Y Combinator.
我们将与加里畅谈他的人生轨迹:从拒绝彼得·蒂尔的工作,到2008年创立一家YCombinator公司,再到创办自己的数十亿美元基金Initialized Capital,最终在今年早些时候重返Y Combinator担任首席执行官。
We go full circle with Gary as we chat about his path from turning down a job with Peter Thiel to founding a YC company in 2008, starting his own multibillion dollar fund, Initialized Capital, and coming back to YC to be CEO earlier this year.
从设计到编程再到投资,本集内容为每个人提供了宝贵的经验和故事。
From design to coding to investing, there are lessons and stories for everyone in this episode.
敬请收听。
Enjoy.
欢迎你,加里。
So welcome, Gary.
谢谢你们邀请我。
Thanks for having me.
我需要念一段给你听。
I need to read you something.
哦,是吗。
Oh, yeah.
我一直在想我们第一次见面的时候,于是翻了翻我的Gmail,找到了一封2008年4月20日你发给我的邮件,你在邮件里说:‘非常感谢你今天举办的精彩活动,也就是Startup School。’
I was thinking about when we first met, and I went back through my Gmail account and found an email from 04/20/2008 that you emailed me saying, I just wanted to thank you so much for the amazing event today, which was startup school.
我们当时在活动上偶然相遇,因为你去参加了,还带着相机拍了很多很棒的照片,然后分享给了我,我特别兴奋。
And we had met there randomly because you were attending it, and you brought your camera and took a whole bunch of amazing photos that you then shared with me, and I was so psyched.
我们把这些照片用在了网站上,等等,但那就是我们第一次见面,2008年4月。
We used those on the website and all of that, but that's when we first met, April 2008.
然后,我马上要问你一个关于摄影的问题,但先稍微铺垫一下:你之后肯定立刻申请了2008年夏季批次。
And then well, I'm gonna ask you a question about photography, but just to put it into a little context, you then must have turned right around and applied for the summer two thousand and eight batch.
哦,当然。
Oh, definitely.
我非常确定,创业学校是我最终下定决心的关键,我从未参加过如此组织得如此出色的活动。
I'm pretty sure that, you know, start up school was the thing that, you know, tipped it over the edge for me, and I'd never been to an event that was that well run.
我印象最深的是,我们旁边坐的每个人都是工程师、产品经理或设计师,全是实干家。
And then the number one thing I remember was everyone we sat next to, they were engineers or product managers or designers and just builders.
他们都说我们能听懂的语言。
And they all spoke our language.
但当你参加大多数科技活动时,你并不会得到这种体验。
Whereas, you know, when you go to most tech events, you don't get that.
你得到的,用YC的说法,就是那种场面气氛。
You get the, you know, sort of in YC parlance, the scene stir.
对吧?
Right?
那些根本不会动手做事的人,只是来蹭那些实干家的资源。
The person who's not really gonna build stuff, they're sort of there to leech off the people who are the builders.
我当时就想,这太疯狂了。
And I was like, this is crazy.
我甚至都不知道这种事存在。
I've I didn't even know this existed.
天啊。
Well, gosh.
我对此感到非常荣幸。
I'm totally flattered by that.
实际上,这个活动组织得非常好,因为我一个人操办的,所以我特别兴奋能拿到一些专业级别的免费照片。
Actually, it's a well run event because I did it single handedly, which was why I was so psyched to get some free photos, professional grade photos.
但说正经的,你曾在斯坦福学习,而我们是在斯坦福举办的活动,我想是在克雷斯吉礼堂之类的吧。
But in all seriousness, you studied at Stanford, and we did the event at Stanford, I think in Kresge or something.
你当时在斯坦福的时候,没参加过类似的活动吗?
Did you not have events like that at Stanford while you were there?
我的意思是,斯坦福很棒,而且我真心相信斯坦福改变了我的人生。
I mean, Stanford is awesome, and I, you know, deeply believe that Stanford changed my life.
但这完全是另一个层次。
But this was another level.
对吧?
Right?
有一种学术简历层面的声望和聪明。
There's sort of the academic resume level of being prestigious and smart.
斯坦福做的每一件事都充满声望和智慧,但YC给我看到的是另一种层次——这些人是实践者和建设者,他们不太在意名声,而更关注实际成果。
And, you know, everything that Stanford does is prestigious and smart, but there is something that is another level about YC that I saw, which was these are people who are practitioners and builders who are less about the name and actually more about the outcomes.
从那以后,我就一直沉迷于此。
I've been addicted to that ever since.
所以你是个摄影师。
So you were a photographer.
你只是个业余摄影师吗?
Were you just an amateur photographer?
你是什么时候开始做这个的?
When did you start doing that?
最有趣的是,我当时在Palantir工作,那时候公司才十几个人,他们让我做网站和招聘页面。
The funniest thing is I was working at Palantir, which when it was like 10 people, and they asked me to make the website and make the jobs page.
然后我意识到,我们根本没有关于公司日常活动的好照片。
And then I realized that we didn't have any good photos of what was going on.
于是我买了一台单反相机,不知不觉就沉迷其中了。
So I got a DSLR camera, and then I sort of got hooked to that.
说白了,这纯粹是为了我们初创公司招聘。
So literally, it was a matter of recruiting for our startup.
我完全是靠自己在晚上,或者在写代码和写PRD文档的间隙,自学了单反摄影。
I taught myself how to do DSLR photography just, you know, in the evenings or like in the cracks between like coding and you know, creating PRD specs.
然后我就真的上瘾了。
And then I just got really hooked.
在我离开Palantir之后,确实有一个时刻。
And there was actually a moment in there when I had left Palantir.
当我去上创业学校时,我甚至考虑过成为一名嘻哈杂志的编辑摄影师。
And when I had gone to start up school, I was actually considering becoming a editorial photographer for a hip hop magazine.
真的吗?
Really?
哇。
Wow.
但你知道,我靠这个根本赚不到钱。
But, you know, I would have never made any money doing it.
但我认为摄影真的很有力量。
But I I thought photography is really powerful.
但你知道,我很幸运去了创业学校,这让我走上了另一条路,让我
But, you know, I'm sort of lucky that I did go to start up school because that put me on a different path, and it put me
踏上
on a
了创办公司的道路。
path of being able to start a company.
今天我们就要好好聊聊这条道路,加里。
And we plan to talk all about that path today, Gary.
我们非常兴奋。
We're very excited.
让我稍微倒回去一下,因为你提到了Palantir。
Me quickly back up because you mentioned Palantir.
首先,你曾在斯坦福大学读书,长大于湾区,但我记得你曾提到你曾面临食物短缺的问题。
So first of all, you were at Stanford, and you grew up in the Bay Area, but I remember you've mentioned you you were food insecure.
你没什么钱。
You didn't have a lot of money.
你进入斯坦福并去了那里。
You get into Stanford and go there.
对你来说,那是一种怎样的体验?
What was that like for you?
我想,这和我预期的几乎一样,甚至在很多方面超出了预期。
I guess it was everything I sort of expected and more in a lot of ways.
最有趣的是,我们都希望世界能像大学那样。
The funniest thing is we all hope that the world is kinda like college.
我不知道,你步入社会,毕业了,然后才发现,哦,天哪。
And I don't know, you go into the world, you graduate, and then you realize, oh, no.
这个世界更像高中。
It's more like high school.
但斯坦福真的很棒。
So but, you know, Stanford was amazing.
我的意思是,那是我见过的最聪明的人。
I mean, it was really really the smartest people I'd ever met.
它实际上迫使我的性格有了一些改变。
It actually sort of forced me to change my personality a little bit.
我记得,我曾经是高中里最聪明的孩子,但我的高中并不出色。
I remember, you know, sort of being the smartest kid in my high school, but I didn't go to a great high school.
我上的是加州一所中等偏下的公立学校。
I went to sort of a mid to low ranked California public school.
但幸运的是,我和老师们建立了很好的联系,我们几乎从头到尾都由同样的老师教了三四年,因为我所在的高中优秀学生太少了。
So but the lucky thing was I really connected with my teachers, and we ended up sort of I realized because there were so few good students in our high school, we ended up having the same teachers pretty much, you know, three or four years all the way through.
因此,我和那十几个参加荣誉和AP课程的孩子们的经历,在某种程度上类似于私立学校。
And so my experience with those sort of dozen other kids who are in the honors AP track sort of resembled a private school in some ways.
但上斯坦福时,我觉得那里有一种卓越,是一群聪明且敏锐的人。
But going to Stanford, I think there's just an excellence, like a a set of people who are just smart and with it.
我意识到自己不再是房间里最聪明的那个了。
And I realized I wasn't the smartest in the room anymore.
如果你们了解迈尔斯-布里格斯性格类型,我实际上从ENTJ型——那种典型的CEO或创始人性格——转变了。
If you guys follow Myers Briggs, I actually went from ENTJ, which is sort of the classic, you know, CEO founder personality.
我有点抱歉。
It's almost, you know, I'm sorry.
你必须死。
You have to die.
然后我变成了ENFP型,这种类型更注重感知、情感和同理心,因为我突然意识到,我在斯坦福的任何一个房间里都不一定是智商最高的。
And then I actually became ENFP, which is much more, you know, sensing and feeling and empathetic because I suddenly realized, oh, I I'm not necessarily the smartest person in that room and at any given room at Stanford.
你申请了其他学校吗?还是从高中开始你就认定斯坦福是你的目标?
Did you apply other places, or did you know Stanford was your goal the entire time you're in high school?
我想最疯狂的故事是,斯坦福的申请截止日期最早。
I guess the craziest story is Stanford had the earliest application deadline.
所以我先写了所有申请斯坦福的材料。
So I wrote all my applications for Stanford.
在我为其他学校写论文的间隙,我读了安·兰德的《源泉》。
And then in between me writing the essays for all the other schools, I had read Anne Rand's The Fountainhead.
于是我修改了我的论文,结果其他所有学校都把我列入候补或拒了。
And so I actually changed my essay, and I got waitlisted and rejected everywhere else.
哇。
Wow.
我把这归功于安·兰德。
And I credit Ayn Rand for that.
幸运的是,我已经不再处于我的安·兰德阶段了。
I'm not in my Ayn Rand phase anymore, thankfully.
但说真的,结果还挺有趣的。
But, you know, it was a very funny outcome to have.
是的。
Yes.
哇。
Wow.
但你知道,知识和思想是非常强大的东西。
But, you know, knowledge and ideas are very powerful things.
所以,当然,很多年后的今天回头看,我觉得大学招生官们显然不太喜欢客观主义者。
So, of course, now many, many years later looking at it, it's like, of course, college admissions essay readers are not big fans of objectivists, I think.
这太棒了。
That's great.
我不知道这一点。
So I did not know that.
这太有趣了。
That's so interesting.
所以你现在在斯坦福。
So you're at you're at Stanford.
你有参与创业,或者对创业感兴趣吗?
Are you sort of involved in startups, or do they peak your interest?
因为你显然毕业后很快就去了Palantir。
Because you obviously went to Palantir soon after.
哦,是的。
Oh, yeah.
我的意思是,我们一直想创办公司,我记得曾和我的大学室友以及一位高中朋友一起申请了斯坦福的E挑战赛,他们很喜欢这个点子。
I mean, we were always trying to start companies, and I remember applying with my college roommate and one of my friends from high school to, you know, the e challenge at Stanford, and they loved the idea.
我觉得那是个广告技术公司。
I think it was an ad tech company.
它最终变成了类似Link Exchange的东西,如果你还记得的话。
It ended up being like what Link Exchange was, if you remember that.
我想说的是
What l I think
阿里·帕尔托维。
Ali Partovi.
对吧?
Right?
嗯。
Yeah.
没错。
That's right.
也许吧。
Maybe.
嗯。
Yeah.
我觉得是。
I think so.
我们最终没拿到投资,我记得他们说我们太稚嫩了,现在我有点理解了。
We ended up not getting funding, and, you know, I remember them saying, oh, like, too green, which now I sort of understand.
站在另一边来看,这还挺有意思的。
Like, it's it's kind of funny to be on the other side of that.
我们其实本来是可以做到的。
We probably could have done it, actually.
我们只是需要认真对待一千倍。
We just needed to take it a thousand times more seriously.
但现在,花了这么多年投资公司、与YC合作,真是挺讽刺的。
But it's so funny now spending so many years funding companies and working with YC.
全身心投入去做一件事,和只是走个过场,其实差别没那么大。
The difference between committing yourself and actually doing it versus, like, sort of going through the motions is not that different, actually.
这只需要一个选择。
It just requires a choice.
我意识到,我们当时就站在选择的边缘,但我们甚至没意识到那个选择的存在。
And I realized, like, we were right there at the precipice of the choice, but we didn't even know it was there.
然后我们就只是,你知道的,没有迈出那一步。
And then we just, you know, didn't make that extra step.
所以我们很可能一毕业就该创办一家公司了。
So we probably could have started a company right right out of college.
你有没有
Did you
你和你的朋友们,有没有一个创业偶像?
and your friends have, like, a startup icon?
我们都想成为像x那样的人。
Like, we all wanna be like x.
我认为比尔·盖茨在高中和大学期间,更像是我们想成为的那种人。
I think Bill Gates through high school and college was, like, a little bit more the person we wanted to be like.
然后,当然,我最终去了微软工作。
And then, of course, I ended up going to work at Microsoft.
我其实很惊讶,那个地方已经变得和我们当年在九十年代读到的、充满冒险精神、热衷于开发新产品的微软大不相同了。
I was actually sort of amazed how different that place had become, like, sort of the swashbuckling, you know, make new products sort of place that we remember reading about for Microsoft back in the nineties.
我的意思是,他们也很刻薄,还会抄袭一切。
I mean, they were also really mean, and they'd copy everything.
你是刚毕业就去微软工作的吗?
Did you work for Microsoft right out of college?
嗯。
Yeah.
嗯。
Yeah.
嗯。
Yeah.
我从2008年就认识你了,却从不知道你曾在微软工作过。
I've known you since 2008 and never realized you worked at Microsoft.
嗯。
Yeah.
我知道。
I know.
那是一个几乎没有初创公司的时代。
And it was a I mean, it was a time where there were no startups, really.
1999年发生了那件事,那也是我上大学的第一年。
1999 had happened, and that was my first year of college.
到了2002年,所谓的Web 1.0泡沫差不多破裂了。
And then by 2002, that was sort of you know, web one point o had sort of burst.
崩得可惨了。
Crashed hard.
是啊。
Yeah.
没错。
That's right.
我记得当时面试了好几家初创公司,结果突然间所有初创公司都不见了。
And I remember, like, interviewing at a bunch of these startups, and then suddenly all the startups were gone.
等等。
So wait a second.
所以你是说,你当时在面试初创公司,但最后却去了微软,从斯坦福毕业后就去了。
So you said oh, so you were interviewing for startups, but took a job out of Stanford at Microsoft.
是啊。
Yeah.
我的意思是,到2003年我大学毕业时,已经几乎没有初创公司剩下了。
I mean, by 2003 when I was graduating senior year, there were really not many startups left.
好的。
Okay.
因为它们都在泡沫破裂时全部消失了。
Because they had all burst in the bubble.
你当时做什么工作?那感觉怎么样?
What job were you doing, and what was it like there?
你在西雅图吗?
Were you in Seattle?
是的。
Yeah.
实际上,从1997年起我就一直在制作网页和基于数据库的网站。
So I I had actually been making web pages and, you know, database backed websites since 1997.
尽管我当时才22岁,但我已经有多年制作网站的经验了。
Even though I was, like, 22, I had many, many years of experience making websites.
而且,你知道,我曾在一家公司工作,他们制作了苹果第一个电子商务网站,那真的很有趣。
And, you know, I worked at one of the agencies that made the first Apple ecommerce store, for instance, and that was really fun.
哦,哇。
Oh, wow.
那就是我,你知道的,我17岁左右坐BART去旧金山时学会编程的地方。
That's where I you know, how I learned to code when I was, you know, 17, I think, taking BART into San Francisco.
而且,是的,我就是超爱写代码和做东西。
And, yeah, I I just loved writing code and making stuff.
所以我不知道。
So I don't know.
到2003年,情况非常令人失望,那种情况真的很不对劲。
By 2003, it was very disappointing, like, that and this was very wrong.
当我今天想到加密货币时,我不禁怀疑我们是否正进入类似于2002、2003年互联网所处的阶段。
When I think about crypto today, I sort of wonder if we're entering, you know, sort of the same phase that the web was in in 2002, 2003.
当我22岁的时候,我想:天啊。
And when I was 22 years old, I thought, oh my god.
我错过了。
I missed it.
结束了。
It's over.
就像,网页时代结束了。
Like, what the web is over.
有趣的是,就在我觉得网页时代终结的时候,一些聪明人,比如从哈佛退学的,正在开发Facebook。
The interesting thing about that was, like, right when I was thinking the web was over, some smart people at who were dropping out of Harvard were working on the Facebook.
那时正是做所有人都认为已经死亡的事情的绝佳时机——人们觉得网页已死,Pets.com已死,这些都不会再回来了,泡沫已经破灭。
It was exactly the right time to be working on what everyone thought was consensus dead, that the web was dead, pets.com is dead, you know, none of this will ever come back, the bubble's over.
对吧?
Right?
对。
Right.
如果说过去二十年教会了我们什么,那就是那只是虚假希望的波动。
If anything now, like the past sort of twenty years has taught us that that was the wiggles of false hope.
也许那就是所谓的,你知道的,在炒作浪潮之后的低谷期。
Maybe that was the you know, there there's sort of this trough after the hype wave.
关于网络,那些想法其实是对的。
The ideas were right about the web.
对吧?
Right?
比如,社交网络一定会出现,只是因为它们还没出现而已。
Like social networks were definitely going to happen just because they hadn't happened yet.
这并不意味着它们永远不会出现。
That didn't mean that it was never going to happen.
你提到 pets.com 真是太有趣了,因为还没等你提到它,那家公司就第一个浮现在我脑海里。
It's so funny that you mentioned pets.com because way before you mentioned it, that's the first company that came to my mind.
我觉得那家公司简直就是网络1.0泡沫破裂的典型代表。
And I'm like, that poor company was the poster child for web one point o crash.
简直太典型了。
Like, just absolutely.
你还年轻,足够天真,可能真的相信了那些说它已经死亡的新闻报道。
You were still young enough to be naive, and you probably believed all the news articles that it was dead.
是的。
Yeah.
嗯,有些部分是,比如,你真的相信去读新闻报道,但别误解了。
Well, some of it is, like, even believing in reading the news articles and believing that don't get this wrong.
我知道很多记者。
Like, I I know many reporters.
他们真的很聪明,但他们也只是在传递第二手、第三手的共识观点,告诉你世界是如何运作的,而不是告诉你实际上正在发生什么。
They're really smart, but they're also sort of telling you the second and third hand, like, consensus view of how the world works, not telling you what is actually happening.
真正正在发生的事情,其实发生在某个卧室、车库,或者像YC初创公司那样,住在两居室的公寓里,研究着一种没人听说过的边缘技术,但人们对此充满热情,比如某个没人知道的小玩具。
And the real thing that was really happening is happening in some, you know, bedroom, garage, like, two bedroom apartment in, you know, a YC startup that is working on a fringe technology that nobody's heard of yet, but people are excited about, like some toy that nobody knows about.
这才是真正正在发生的事情。
And that's, like, the real thing that's happening.
那时候还没有TechCrunch。
There wasn't TechCrunch back then.
那时还没有Twitter。
Twitter didn't exist.
但那时候有《华尔街日报》、《商业周刊》,或者你还记得像《红鲱鱼》这样的行业权威杂志吗?
But there was, you know, The Wall Street Journal or Businessweek or, you know, do you remember, like, the industry standard, you know, or Red Herring magazine?
像这些
Like, there are all these
东西,
things that,
试图告诉你下一个趋势是什么,但那些人其实并不了解。
you know, tried to teach you what the next thing was, but those people weren't.
他们只是错了。
They were just wrong.
你知道,你只是在看六个月或九个月前发生的事情的二手、三手转述。
Like, you know, you're just looking at the second and third hand retelling of stuff that had happened, like, six or nine months ago.
你读的是公关稿件,而真正发生的事情,其实是在某个地方的代码编辑器里,安静地在凌晨两点进行着。
Like, you're reading PR, and the real thing was, like, you know, happening in in in code editor someplace quietly at, like, 2AM.
所以我想聊聊你是怎么去Palantir的,但我必须问一下。
So I wanna get to how you made the move to Palantir, but I have to ask.
去微软工作,会不会让人灰心?
Going to work at Microsoft, is it demoralizing?
哦,是的。
Oh, yeah.
当然会。
For sure.
简直了。
Maximum.
但是
But
就是说,告诉我
It's just like, tell
一点点。
me a little.
给我讲个细节。
Give me a nugget.
那感觉怎么样?
What was it like?
但其中一部分也是,你知道,那是我赚到的第一笔钱。
Some of it though was also you know, this was the first money that I was making.
我觉得我当时的工作年薪大概是7万美元,对于一个22岁的年轻人来说,这简直是前所未有的巨额收入。
You know, I think I got a you know, the job was, like, $70,000 a year, which was, like, more money than I'd ever seen before as a 22 year old.
我觉得我在如何对待金钱这件事上犯了一些错误。
I do think that I made some mistakes about how I should have thought about money.
比如,你知道,我买了一辆全新的车。
Like, you know, I got the got a brand new car.
当然,那是一辆本田雅阁,但却是全新的本田雅阁。
Granted, it was like a Honda Accord, but it was a brand new Honda Accord.
而且,你知道,我在西雅图最时髦的地段租了最好的公寓,这样我就可以在周五和周六晚上和朋友们喝马提尼。
And, you know, I got the nicest leased apartment that I could get in, you know, the fancy part of Seattle so I could go drink martinis with my friends on Friday and Saturday nights.
我后悔这一切,因为你知道,我心里其实想创业,但我还是掉进了陷阱。
I regret all that because, you know, in the background, I knew that I wanted to start a company, but I sort of fell for the trap.
对吧?
Right?
比如,你去上班,整天被那些大公司里根本没在真正创造什么的人欺负,你知道的。
Like, you go to a job, you sort of get, you know, just shat on all day by, like, all the, you know, the the giant company of people who, you know, aren't really building that much.
对吧?
Right?
我简直不敢相信,居然有那么多人只是为了复制RIM黑莓的产品而工作。
Like, couldn't believe how many people there were to just ship a product that was sort of copying what RIM Blackberry was.
所以我最终离开了网页部门,转去开发Windows Mobile。
So I I ended up leaving the web working on Windows Mobile.
他们甚至给了我一个22岁年轻人能拿到的59级项目经理职位。
And they actually gave me, like, 22 year old level fifty nine PM.
他们给了我所有最终让iPhone取得成功的东西。
They gave me all of the things that ended up making the iPhone a success.
所以像音乐和照片之类的,都是挺有趣的场景,但他们把这些都交给了最年轻、资历最浅的产品经理,而且一点资源都不给我。
So like music and photos and like all of the they were pretty fun scenarios, but they gave it to the like lowest newest PM and also gave me no resources at all.
所以我记得当时和一些其他初级产品经理一起做事。
So I sort of remember, like, going with some of the other junior PMs.
比如,一切都围绕着如何整合到Windows系统中展开。
It was all about integration into Windows, for instance.
你知道,Windows Media Player 是个大项目。
You know, Windows Media Player was a big thing.
人们把他们的MP3文件都存在那里。
Like, people stored their m p threes in there.
我记得我们得去Windows Media Player产品经理的办公室等他。
I remember we had to, like, go over to the Windows media player PM's office and, like, wait there.
我朋友带了一根球棒。
My friend brought a bat.
不是真的想威胁他,但那只是作为一种戏剧性的手段。
Like, not to actually threaten him or anything, but it was just, like, sort of, like, a theatrical device.
就像是,嘿,各位。
It's like, hey, guys.
我们真的需要这个东西。
Like, we really need this thing.
有时候他们会给我们。
And sometimes they'd give it to us.
有时候他们会修复这个bug,但很多时候他们不会。
Sometimes they would fix the bug, and often they wouldn't.
这就是为什么它变得这么糟糕。
And then that's why it was so broken.
根本没法完成任何事情,因为那时候的微软已经不再是比尔·盖茨时代那种大量发布软件、努力工作、做出精彩产品的样子了。
Was like impossible to get anything done because, you know, Microsoft by then was not like sort of the Bill Gates, like, ship a lot of software and work hard and, you know, make something awesome.
它变成了一群人盘踞的僵化体系,这些人拿著惊人的高薪,主要靠每年在绩效排名中互相背后捅刀来晋升。
It was sort of the ossified set of fiefdoms of people who, you know, were paid outrageously well and mainly got ahead by backstabbing each other in, like, sort of the the stack rank every year.
所以这里就是一个完全僵化的环境。
So it was just this sort of ossified place.
而且那里工作环境太糟糕了,我不得不靠喝酒和和朋友聚会来自我安慰。
And and then it was such a terrible place to work that I had to, like, sort of self soothe by, like, drinking and partying with my friends or something.
在某个时候,我意识到,没错。
And I at some point, I realized yeah.
我后来意识到,这其实是个陷阱,你知道的。
I realized at some point, like, it was a trap, you know.
这个系统会把你困在一份你不喜欢的工作里,于是你不得不花钱买些你根本不需要的东西,试图让自己感觉好一点。
Like, this the system sort of traps you into a job that you don't like, so then you need to, like, spend money on things you don't need to try to, like, make yourself feel a little bit better.
这就是我22岁时的经历。
And that that was, like, my 22 year old experience.
我也是这么做的,只不过我那时25岁。
I did the same thing, but when I was 25.
所以我觉得,我们中最优秀的人也会这样。
So I think it happens to the best of us.
是啊。
Yeah.
完全正确。
Totally.
如果有人在听的话,其实是有出路的。
And if people are listening, like, there's a way out.
别担心。
Don't worry.
它们是金手铐,但你可以摘掉它们。
They are golden handcuffs, but you can take them off.
没错。
That's right.
那你是怎么加入Palantir的?
So how did you land in Palantir?
你显然为自己做出了改变。
You you decided to make a change for yourself, obviously.
是的。
Yeah.
我的一些朋友和彼得·蒂尔一起创办了一家公司。
Some of my friends started a company with Peter Thiel.
我想他们当时在他对冲基金工作。
I think they were working at his hedge fund.
起初,他们想做一些我并不真正想做的项目。
I guess initially, they wanted to work on some stuff I didn't really wanna work on.
我的父母是来自新加坡和缅甸的移民,母亲这边,我们可以说是从中国和缅甸逃往加拿大的经济和种族政治难民。
My parents were immigrants from Singapore and Burma, and on my mom's side, we're sort of, you know, both economic and ethnically political refugees from both China and Burma to Canada.
我从小就一直担心政治和政府的问题。
I was always worried about, like, politics and the government.
所以,最初,Palantir 的目标是帮助三大情报机构抓捕奥萨马·本·拉登,或用于对人群的监控。
So, you know, initially, Palantir was meant to help three letter agencies catch Osama bin Laden or help with surveillance of people.
但这并不是我真正想参与的领域。
And that wasn't really something I exactly wanted to work on.
后来,他们来找我,说:嘿,你能帮忙做对冲基金软件吗?
You know, later they came and said, hey, could you work on hedge fund software?
我当时就想,哦,好吧。
And I was like, oh, okay.
至于政治相关的事情,或者那些影响三字母机构的事务,我不确定自己是不是合适的人选。
Well, political stuff and things that sort of affect, like, three letter agencies, I don't know if I'm the right person.
但如果涉及市场、宏观经济学,帮助对冲基金,我觉得我可以为这些开发软件。
But, you know, if it's about markets, you know, macroeconomics, and helping hedge funds, you know, I think I can build software for that.
所以我最终拒绝了早期共同创立的机会,但大概一年后,当他们已经起步时,我加入了公司。
So I ended up join I ended up turning down the chance to cofound it early, but I ended up joining maybe a year later after they had gotten started.
而这件事的疯狂之处在于,即使到现在,这个决定几乎肯定让我损失了九位数的收入。
And, you know, the crazy thing about that is that, you know, even today, it it almost certainly cost me 9 figures, that decision.
但另一方面,如果你聪明且有能力,这其实并不重要。
But on the other hand, like, if you're smart and you're skilled, it sort of doesn't matter.
一切最终都会好起来的。
Like, it'll it'll all work out.
至少希望如此。
At least knock on wood.
我的愿望就是,如果你聪明、有能力,能为别人创造价值,钱自然会来。
Like, that's what I want for people, that if you're smart, capable, and you can make things for other people, the money will come.
我完全同意。
I totally agree.
这听起来很有道理。
And it it sound it makes sense.
你当初不加入的决定很有道理。
Your rationale for not joining makes sense.
所以你现在在Palantir。
So you're at Palantir.
你是早期员工,对吧?大概第10个。
You're, like, early employee though, like, 10.
是这样吗?
Is that right?
是的。
Yeah.
嗯。
Yeah.
嗯。
Yeah.
所以我负责设计了标志,我记得就是因为要做网站,我才开始接触摄影的。
So I got to design the logo, and I remember that's why I got into the photography because I had to make the website.
然后我做了招聘页面,我想展示一下,看,怎么样。
And then I made the jobs page, and I wanted to show, like, oh, look.
我们很有趣。
We're fun.
比如,我们有提供午餐和晚餐,还有那些到处都是的豆袋沙发之类的。
Like, we have catered catered lunches and dinners, and, you know, look at all the bean bags around and all that stuff.
我记得去斯坦福大学的苏特大厅,我们会搬去一摞一摞的比萨盒。
So I remember going to Stanford Suite Hall, and we would bring, like, stacks of pizza boxes.
那里是所有软件工程师聚集的地方,他们在斯坦福做他们的Unix课程作业。
This is where all the software engineers would, like, hang out and do their, Unix coursework at at Stanford.
我们会印出这些带有Palantir标志的东西,上面写着:Palantir,来加入下一个谷歌。
We would print out these things with the logo of Palantir, and it'd be like, Palantir, come join the next Google.
人们会吃我们的披萨,但随后却说:你们怎么敢?
And people would eat our pizza, but then be like, how dare you?
我们只是一个十人公司,却宣称自己将成为下一个谷歌。
We're like a 10 person company saying that we're gonna be the next Google.
但你知道,我觉得当时那种氛围是必要的,为了吸引人才、组建起一支真正需要的团队。
But, you know, I just think about that as that was what was sort of necessary to, you know, even put out that vibe was necessary to, like, hire and build, like, the kind of team that was necessary.
当然,Palantir最终成为了一家市值数十亿美元的上市公司,但严格来说,它并不是谷歌,我想。
And, you know, of course, Palantir ended up being a multibillion dollar public company, but it's not exactly Google, I guess.
这件事发生在哪一年?
What what year is it that this is happening?
那是2006年。
This is 2006.
2006年。
2006.
好的。
Okay.
嗯。
Yeah.
在Palantir工作期间,你从初创公司身上学到了什么?
And what did you learn about startups while at Palantir?
因为显然,你迟早会开始考虑自己创业的可能性。
Because obviously, you're starting to think at some point that you might start your own.
在Palantir期间,你学到了哪些特别重要的东西?
What did you learn while at Palantir that was really important?
我认为归根结底,核心其实是软件。
I think at the end at the end of day, it was really about software.
而且,当人们看待Palantir时,他们往往会好奇它是如何运作的?
And, you know, I I think when people look at Palantir, they sort of wonder how does it work?
他们怎么能从政府那里建立起如此庞大的收入流?
How could they build these giant revenue streams from, like, the government?
我认为我学到的最重要的一点是软件和构建技术的能力。
I think the number one thing I learned was software and the ability to build technology.
Palantir有一种技术官僚的特质,这种特质也贯穿于YC,以及我所见过的所有成功技术领域。
There's sort of a technocratic aspect to Palantir that actually runs through YC and runs through everything that I've seen work in technology period.
那就是:建设者们想构建什么?他们有能力构建什么?
Is, like, what do the builders want to build, and what are they capable of building?
而技术资本主义的其他一切,都是围绕着这种技术展开的。
And then everything else about technology capitalism is about, like, latching on to that technology.
所以归根结底,问题就是:软件工程师想要什么?他们能做什么?
So in the end, it's like, what does a software engineer want, and, like, what are they capable of doing?
而围绕这一切的上层结构,基本上都是从这些软件工程师身上榨取价值的,这太疯狂了。
And then everything else, all the superstructure around that is, like, mostly extractive from those software engineers, which is crazy.
当你看微软的时候,它就是这样。
When you look at Microsoft, that's what it is.
对吧?
Right?
这是一家晚期科技控股公司,旨在从真正的大师——即软件工程师、设计师和产品人员——身上榨取尽可能多的钱。
It's a late stage technology holding company meant to extract as much money as possible from the real wizards of the situation, which are, like, the software engineers and designers and product people.
大多数科技公司的平均每位员工利润差异很大,但这是纯利润,有时甚至高达50万到500万美元左右。
The average profit per employee at, like, most tech companies, it it really ranges, but it's pure profit, sometimes, like, half $1,000,000 to, like, 2 to $5,000,000, something like that.
这真的相当惊人。
It's, like, really sort of astonishing.
我认为,最近三五年才出现这种现象,科技公司才开始不得不向顶尖员工支付如此高的薪酬;而在2003年、2005年时,情况并非如此。
And then it's only a very recent phenomenon, I think, the past three or five years that tech started to have to actually pay that amount of money to their top performers back in 2003, 2005.
那时候根本不是这样。
Like, that wasn't true.
你知道,即使是顶尖工程师,他们的年薪也只有30万到100万美元左右。
You know, even your top performing engineers, they'd make, like, $304,100,000 dollars.
但按每位员工计算,他们可能创造了数千万甚至上亿美元的市场价值,而这些价值完全是被剥削走的。
But on a per employee basis, like, they'd probably be making, like, tens or hundreds of millions of dollars worth of market value, and it was, like, purely extractive.
没错。
Yeah.
所以,我认为从Palantir学到的就是,这真的非常有价值。
So, you know, I I think that that's what I learned from Palantir is, like, that's really valuable.
因此,软件工程师以及那些能够为他人创造这些产品和服务的人,不应低估或贬低这些能力的价值,因为世界上每个初创公司和每一家企业都需要它,而且迫切需要。
And so software engineers and people who are able to create these products and services for other people that, like, society desperately needs don't underplay and undersell, like, what that is worth because every startup and every business in the world needs it and needs it desperately.
这就是Palantir所做的。
And that's what Palantir is.
它进入那些根本无法接触到优秀软件工程师的领域,然后应用软件技术,从而产生杠杆效应。
It just goes into these situations that would never have access to a good software engineer and then apply software, and and then there's leverage.
我认为,这贯穿了我整个职业生涯。
And I think that that has, like, played out across my entire career.
我们投资的每一个最终成功的初创公司,其核心都是卓越的技术,这些技术解决了某些问题或需求,而这些需求实际上解锁了人们迫切需要的东西。
Like, every startup that we fund that turns out to be great, the core of it is great technology that then solves some problem or need that, frankly, just unlocks things people need.
嗯,这其实是个很好的过渡,因为现在我要问你关于你如何进入创业学校的问题。
Well, that's a good segue, actually, because now I'm gonna ask you about you come to start up school.
你显然对斯坦福的创业感兴趣。
You're obviously interested in start ups at Stanford.
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你肯定在接下来的几周内申请了Y Combinator。
You you must have applied to YC within the next few weeks.
我的意思是,我想我们那年夏天的面试应该是在五月进行的,顺便说一下,那是在剑桥。
I mean, I think we must have been doing interviews in May for that summer, which by the way was in Cambridge.
但是什么促使你迈出步伐,创办自己的公司呢?
But what led you to take the leap to start your own company?
我最终想成为一名设计师。
I ended up wanting to be a designer.
那时候我26岁,正处于探索阶段。
I was, you know, I was 26 at that time, so I was sort of in my searching mode.
我花了几年时间担任首席工程师、设计师和产品经理,带领一个团队。
Like, I spent a few years as a lead engineer and designer and PM sort of running one of the teams.
然后我想看看只做一名设计师是什么感觉,于是我去了Jen Wolff的另一家初创公司工作,她现在是Initialized的新任管理合伙人之一。
And then I wanted to just, like, see what it was like to be a designer only, so I actually went to work at another startup for Jen Wolff, who actually is now one of the new managing partners at Initialized.
所以她后来来Initialized为我工作,现在她负责Initialized,这挺有趣的。
So she ended up coming to work for me at Initialized, and now she runs Initialized, which is fun.
但那时她是我的老板。
But she was my boss back then.
最有趣的是,当设计师很棒,但也让我晚上有了很多空闲时间。
And the funniest thing was being a designer was great, but it also gave me a lot of free time in in the evenings.
于是我利用自己的时间和设备,独自开发了一个名为Posterous的副项目,这是一个博客平台,和我另一位大学朋友Sachin Agarwal一起做的。
And I ended up working on a side project on my own time, on my own device called Posterous, which was a blog platform, and it was with one of my other college friends, Sachin Agarwal.
它最初只是一个玩具。
It just started as a toy.
他做了一个可以通过邮件发布内容到WordPress博客的东西,后来我加入进来,开始开发网站部分,这样就不再是发布到WordPress,而是发布到Posterous.com这个独立的博客平台。
Like, he made this thing that let you post by email to initially a WordPress blog, and then I came in and started working on the website part of it so that, you know, instead of posting to WordPress, it would be to posterous, you know, .com, its own blog.
我认为它的最大亮点是,当时iPhone刚刚推出。
And the whole claim to fame, I think, was that the iPhone was brand new.
允许发布照片的应用程序还没有流行起来。
Apps that let you post photos had not become popular yet.
这是一个全新的平台。
It was a new platform.
那时候人们还不懂线程,Instagram甚至都还不存在。
Like, people didn't understand threading yet, so Instagram didn't even exist yet.
所以在那一两年里,Posterous 成为了从 iPhone 发送照片最简单的方式。
And so, basically, for maybe a year and a half, two years in there, Posterous was, like, the easiest way to get photos off of your iPhone.
因为你只需进入照片应用,选择想发布的照片,然后点击邮件,按一下 p 键就会自动补全,接着发送就行。
Because you could just go into your photos app, select some photos you wanted to post, and then click email, and it would just you press p, there'd be autocomplete, and then you just send it.
我们因此快速增长,只因为 iPhone 已经存在,但相关应用还很少。
We grew really fast from there just because the iPhone existed and there weren't apps yet.
我记得发布操作简单到极致。
I remember it was dead simple posting.
如果我没记错的话,这几乎是我们的标语。
That was sort of the tagline, if I remember correctly.
所以我们接纳了你们加入 Y Combinator,我得说,我对你那些照片特别兴奋,而且我认识你,我们非常期待见到你和 Sachin。
So we accept you into Y Combinator, and I have to say it was probably helped a little bit that I was so excited about all your photographs, and I knew you, and we were excited to meet you and Sachin.
所以我们接纳了你们。
So we accept you.
你搬到了剑桥。
You moved to Cambridge.
顺便说一下,这是我们在完全迁往硅谷之前在剑桥举办的最后一期Y Combinator项目。
And by the way, this was the last Y Combinator batch in Cambridge before we fully moved to Silicon Valley.
2008年的时候,Y Combinator是什么样子的?
What was Y Combinator like back in 2008?
感觉好像已经是很久以前的事了。
Like, it seems so long ago.
你记得它当时是什么样子的?
What what do you remember it being like?
我记得当时在剑桥度过了一个没有空调的夏天,我们大概只撑了四天左右。
I remember trying to get through a summer in Cambridge without an AC unit, and I think we lasted about, like, four days or something.
天气热得要命。
It was so hot.
我搬到剑桥之前,其实就住在山景城Pioneer Way上,紧挨着Y Combinator的办公室。
And I had actually moved to Cambridge having lived right next to the YC office in Mountain View on Pioneer Way.
不。
No.
当时我就住在海滨,哇。
So I was right there on shoreline at the time, and I Wow.
你知道的,我放弃了我的室友。
You know, gave up my, you know, my housemates.
而且我们这么做也很幸运,因为如果再等一届,Posterous 可能就不会存在了。
And it was lucky too that we did that because I don't think Posterous would have existed if we waited another batch.
因为 YC 2008 年夏天那一届正是雷曼兄弟倒闭的时期,雷曼兄弟真的崩盘了。
Because y c summer o eight was the batch that Lehman died, where Lehman Brothers literally crashed
然后倒闭了。
and died.
08年。
'8.
对。
That's right.
所以我们就在雷曼倒闭的那天,完成了来自我们的种子投资人的70万美元种子轮融资。
So we closed our $700,000 seed investment from our, you know, seed investors the day Lehman died.
然后,那些还没融到资的人,接下来六个月都再也融不到钱。
And then anyone who hadn't raised money did not raise money for another six months.
我记得你和保罗说过,2009年冬天,演示日可能一个投资人都没有了。
And then I remember you and Paul said winter o nine, there might not be any investors at demo day.
所以如果你担心的话,可以延期,等下一两期再回来,因为我们也不知道会不会有投资人出现。
So if you're worried about it, you can defer and, you know, come back in another batch or two because we we don't know if there will be any investing.
直到今天,如果你看一下各个批次,2008年夏季批次实际上是历史上最不成功的一批。
And to this day, if you look at the batches, summer o eight is actually the least successful batch in history.
你这么说真是太有趣了,因为就在这次采访前,我刚想回到那个批次,回忆一下当时还有谁在那个批次里。
That is so funny that you said that because I just before this interview, I was like, I I just wanna bring myself back to that batch and remember who else was in that batch.
我知道Cloudant在那个批次里,但我记不起来了。
Because I knew Cloudant was in it, but I couldn't remember.
我看了那个批次,心想:天啊。
And I looked at that batch and I said, god.
这一批表现得不太好。
This this batch did not do very well.
是啊。
Yeah.
现在,我把这一切都串联起来了。
And now, of course, I'm bringing it all together.
哇。
Wow.
这与今天的情况也相关,但我认为目前初创公司的情况还没像2008年那么糟。
Which is also relevant to today, but I don't think it's as bad as 2008 right now yet for startups.
而且,借个吉言,希望不会往那个方向发展。
And, you know, knock on wood, it doesn't it doesn't go down that way.
当我们面试2009年冬季批次的人时,我们基本上只接受那些能很快赚钱、不需要太多资金维持生存且非常坚韧的人。
When we were interviewing people for winter two thousand and nine, we basically said we're only gonna accept people who can make money very quickly or don't need a lot of money to survive and are really tough.
我们投资的人数只有前一个夏季批次的一半,而Airbnb就是其中之一。
And we only invested in half of the amount of people we funded that the summer before, and Airbnb was one of them.
谢天谢地。
Thank goodness.
我们现在经常讲这个故事,因为它实在太有力量了,你知道,从外部看,人们只看头条新闻。
We use that story all the time now simply because it was so it's so powerful that, you know, on the outside, people look at the headlines.
他们读《华尔街日报》。
They read the Wall Street Journal.
他们读《TechCrunch》。
They read TechCrunch.
他们说:天哪。
They say, oh my god.
天要塌了。
The sky is falling.
一切都完了。
Everything's over.
我还不如去找份工作。
I should just get a job.
然而在2009年,有一家堪称YC历史上最出色的初创公司诞生了,那正是最黑暗的时期之一。
And yet in '9, one of the best YC startups ever came through, like, in sort of it was the darkest, actually.
这是一个非常强大而有力的理念,我认为现在尤其有用,因为如今许多初创公司都处于艰难时期。
That's such a a great powerful idea that I think it's just so useful, especially right now because it is dark times for a lot of startups out there.
但只要你能实现增长和用户留存,做出人们真正需要的产品,外界环境好坏都无关紧要。
But if you can create growth and retention and make a thing that people really want, it doesn't matter whether it's good or bad out there.
我想请你稍微回溯一下,你当初创办了Posterous。
I wanna take you back just one second to you've started Posterous.
你是不是直接走进Palantir老板的办公室,告诉他你要辞职去创业?
Did you walk into your boss's office at Palantir and be like, quitting starting a startup?
当时他的反应是什么?
And then what was the reaction?
天哪。
Oh god.
有趣的是,我进去说了那番话之后,实际上是Jen Wolff来自Initialized公司。
You know, the funniest thing was I went in and did that, and then it was actually Jen Wolff at Initialized.
当时她是初创公司Reared in Commerce的产品负责人。
She was the head of product for the startup, Reared in Commerce, at the time.
她说,你知道吗?
And she said, you know what?
你为什么不干脆辞职去创业,这样还能有医疗保险呢?
Why don't you just go and leave so you can have health insurance?
哦,天哪。
So Aw.
这真是太好了。
Which was very nice.
哎呀。
Aw.
这真是太暖心了。
That is so nice.
是啊。
Yeah.
归根结底,当产品真正起步时,我清楚地记得YC把我们介绍给了当时运营TechCrunch的迈克尔·阿林顿。
At the end of the day, like, once it took off like, I I distinctly remember YC introduced us to Michael Arrington, who ran TechCrunch at the time.
迈克尔非常喜欢,于是把我们的内容放在TechCrunch首页超长时间展示。
Michael liked it so much that he left it on the homepage of TechCrunch, like, extra long.
我记得,它整整一个周末都是TechCrunch的头号新闻,持续了大约48小时。
Like, I think it was, you know, forty eight hours of it was the top story on TechCrunch a whole weekend.
我记得那个周末我们获得了十万注册用户,接下来的一周,十万变成了二十万,之后就一直这样持续增长,虽然没有永远翻倍。
And I remember we got 10,000 sign ups that weekend, and then 10,000 became 20,000 the week after, and it just kept sort of it didn't double forever.
但我清楚地记得,在整整两年里,每个月用户的基数、流量和使用量都以20%到40%的速度持续上升。
But I I just remember the user base in traffic and usage and all of the numbers going up sort of between 2040% every single month for, like, two years straight.
哇。
Wow.
这一切都源于你和YC教会我们如何发布产品,以及如何持续迭代。
And all of it was really from you and basically YC teaching us how to launch and, you know, how to just keep iterating.
我清楚地记得和保罗一起散步时,他狠狠批评了我们的注册流程有多糟糕,而他确实是对的。
I definitely remember going for a walk with Paul, and he sort of berated us actually about how terrible our sign up flow was, and he was right.
我永远不会忘记这一点,因为能够抛开所有背景,以初学者的眼光来看待首页或首次注册流程。
And I'll never forget that because being able to take off all of the context and, like, look at a home page or a first time sign up flow with, like, the eye of a beginner.
真正站在用户的角度去思考。
You know, really put your shoes in a user.
我觉得保罗从未自称是设计师,但真正卓越的用户体验设计的关键,正是对客户和用户的深刻共情。
Like, you know, I don't think Paul's ever described himself per se as a designer, but, like, that is the key to truly great, you know, user experience design is, like, deep, deep empathy for the customer and the user.
没错。
And Yeah.
我真正记得的一件事就是,学会了如何做到这一点,并在产品开发中将它置于一切之上。
You know, that was one of the things I really remember is, like, really learning how to to do that and, like, put that above everything else when building products.
是的。
Yeah.
保罗在告诉你如何改进网站时,从不保留意见。
Paul won't hold back when he's telling you how to improve things about your site.
是的。
Yeah.
这很重要。
Which is important.
我的意思是,我认为YC如今所做的这一点非常出色,优秀的投资者也会这么做。
I mean, I think that that's something YC does today that is so great, and great investors do that.
我们已经投资了。
We're already invested.
而且,卡罗尔和我最近就‘什么是对创始人友好的’进行了一番讨论。
And there's a whole discussion that actually Carol and I had recently about, you know, what is founder friendly?
我认为有一种肤浅且错误的方式来看待对创始人友好,那就是从不说任何关于你正在做的事情的坏话。
And I think there's a facile and wrong way to look at founder friendly, which is like we never say anything bad about, you know, what's going on.
无论你表现得好还是差,我们都支持你。
We just support you, like, whether you're doing well or poorly.
那更像是赋能创始人。
And that's like founder enablement.
但这根本算不上友好。
And that's not even friendly.
比如,如果你的朋友吸毒成瘾,你必须说出来,必须帮他们戒掉毒品,因为这会要了他们的命。
Like, if your friend is addicted to heroin, you need to say something and you need to get them off the drugs because it's gonna kill them.
对吧?
Right?
我认为,在初创公司领域,如今有一个非常有害且令人恐惧的时刻,那就是投资者和风投的委托代理问题往往只是在一味地吹捧创业者。
I think that in startups, it's actually a very toxic and scary moment today where the principal agent problem of investors and VCs often is enable, just puff them up.
哦,反正我在股价上涨时也想多买点这家公司。
Oh, well, I I wanna buy more of this company on the way up anyway.
但如果最终发现这公司并不好,那我就干脆直接消失不管了。
And then if it turns out to be not good, like, I'm just gonna ghost them anyway.
所以这种纯粹交易性、像投币机器一样的‘对创始人友好’,真的让人感到害怕,只会导致更多初创公司倒闭。
So just like this purely transactional, like, sort of coin operated founder friendliness that is pretty scary to see, and it just results in more startups dying.
是的。
Yeah.
没错。
Exactly.
创始人诚实,嗯。
Founder Honest is Mhmm.
是什么?是的。
Is what Yes.
创始人诚实,我们2008年的时候确实就是这样。
Founder Honest, which we were definitely back in 2008 for sure.
在那一期里,你最喜欢哪位晚餐演讲者?
Who was one of your favorite speakers, the dinner speakers in that batch?
哦,我记得比尔·沃纳是其中一位演讲者。
Oh, I remember, like, Bill Warner was one of the guys who spoke.
他创立了Avid科技公司。
He created Avid Technologies.
还有,是的。
And Yeah.
我只记得,听到有人创造了前所未有的东西,以及他是如何偶然发现它的,这真的很酷。
I just remember that being cool to to to hear about someone who had built something that had never existed before and how he sort of stumbled on it.
所以Avid甚至早于Final Cut Pro或Adobe Premiere,它是最早的视频非线性编辑系统之一。
So Avid was even before Final Cut Pro or Adobe Premiere, it was one of the first nonlinear editing systems for video.
我只是记得,听到这样的故事很酷:这里有一种边缘技术,没人了解,却即将彻底重塑一个行业,而他真的做到了。
I just remember that being it's cool to hear stories of here's a technology that is fringe that nobody knows about but is gonna totally remake an industry, and then he did it.
或者,你知道的,TripAdvisor的史蒂夫·考弗。
Or, you know, Steve Kaufer from TripAdvisor.
TripAdvisor。
TripAdvisor.
是的。
Yeah.
他很棒。
And he was great.
他跟我们讲了A/B测试,非常非常懒惰的A/B测试。
He told us about you know, taught us about AB testing and very, very lazy AB testing.
很多人做A/B测试时,实际上会同时开发出A和B两个版本。
You know, a lot of people, when they AB test, they actually build out both A and B.
他说,你甚至不需要构建A或B。
And he said, you don't even have to build A or B.
你只需要做一个按钮,上面写着这是A或B。
You just have to build a button that says that it's A or B.
然后你可以把用户引导到一个错误页面,而人们会原谅你。
And then you can, you know, send them to an error page, and people will just forgive you.
但你可以收集数据,弄清楚是否应该构建A或B,而根本不需要实际构建其中任何一个。
But you can collect the data and figure out whether you should build a or b without ever building either of them.
我认为这些是重要的故事,因为它们教会了你如何坚持不懈地利用有限资源,这是我从YC经历中一直铭记的。
I think those are the important stories because it just sort of teaches you how to be, like, relentlessly resourceful, and that I always remember from my time at YC.
这些都发生在互联网上还没有大量内容的时代。
And those were back in the days where there wasn't, like, tons of content online.
所以我记得喜欢
So I remember love
我喜欢这些概念。
I love concepts.
所以YC成功筹集了一轮不错的种子轮后,Posterous接下来发生了什么?
So after YC raised a nice seed round there, what then happened to Posterous?
我知道你们把Posterous卖给了Twitter。
I know you you sold to Twitter.
不过你并没有去Twitter上班。
You didn't go to work at Twitter, though.
实际上,我和我的联合创始人之间出现了分歧。
So I actually had a cofounder falling out.
所以,你知道的,当事情起起落落时,到2010年我已经精疲力尽了。
So, you know, as things sort of go up and down, I actually was really burnt out by 2010.
Instagram出现了,这直接让我们的增长停滞了。
Instagram had come out, and then that actually flatlined our growth.
但当你身处一片混沌之中,根本不知道这些事情是如何运作的时,你有时甚至不知道自己为什么在增长,也不知道为什么增长突然停止了。
But, you know, when you're in the tornado of not knowing how these things work, you actually sometimes don't know why you're growing, and sometimes you don't know why you stopped growing.
是的。
Yeah.
为什么Instagram更好?
Why was Instagram better?
为什么他们赢了?
Why did they beat you?
他们实际上非常专注于照片,而且上传体验非常流畅、精致。
So they actually were very purely focused on photos, and then they had a very slick and well done upload experience.
当你选择一张照片后,在你输入描述、添加标签等操作时,他们已经在后台上传了所有照片。
So you would select a photo, and then while you were typing the description and tagging things and whatever, they would have already uploaded all the photos in the background.
所以当你点击发布时,照片立刻就出现在互联网上,整个过程非常直观,体验极佳。
So when you click post, it was, like, on the Internet immediately, and it was, just, like, very visceral, super good experience.
除此之外,他们还非常注重构建网络,尽可能多地吸引用户加入这个网络,从而以这种方式取胜。
And then aside from that, they really focused on the network, like, building as many people as possible into that network and just winning that way.
我经常想到的一点是,YC和PG尤其会谈到,新的品类就像元素周期表一样,一直在不断出现。
One of the things I always think about is how YC and PG in particular would talk about there are new categories of the periodic table happening absolutely all the time.
而最能理解和构建这些新品类的人,实际上是那些了解这些技术如何构建的工程师和开发者。
And the best people to understand and build that are actually the engineers and builders who understand how these things are built.
就像最了解下一个元素的人是理解原子结构的物理学家一样。
Sort of like how the best people to figure out what the next, you know, element of the periodic table are physicists who understand the atom.
对吧?
Right?
我认为,这是投资者必须帮助创始人的重要方面之一。
I think that that's one of the really important things that investors have to help founders with.
在当下,你就像身处迷雾之中,不太清楚自己为何在增长,也不清楚下一个类别是什么。
In the moment, you have, like, sort of this fog of war, and you don't really know why you're growing and, like, what that next category is.
而这正是我认为YC、YC合伙人以及真正优秀的投资者能够以非常根本的方式帮助创始人的地方。
And that's actually one place where I think YC and the YC Partners and really good investors, period, can help founders in, like, really fundamental ways.
他们见过太多不同的模式,以及哪些有效、哪些无效。
You know, they've seen so many different patterns and things that have worked and not worked.
而这就是投资者面临的经典难题,类似于卡桑德拉综合征。
And then that's sort of the the classic difficulty of being an investor is like the Cassandra syndrome.
我们只是提供软性建议。
Like, we are soft advisers.
对吧?
Right?
我们其实没有资格告诉别人该怎么做。
It's not really our place to tell people what to do.
我们只能提供信息、故事和相关历史,然后人们必须自己得出结论。
We can only give them the information and the stories and the history of it, and then people have to make their own conclusions.
优秀的创始人确实会这么做。
And really good founders do.
当失败发生时,往往是因为没有正视眼前的数据。
And when failure happens, it's often like not looking at the data that's in front of us.
那么,分歧是如何影响收购以及你没有去Twitter的呢?
So the falling out, how did that play a role in the acquisition and you not going to Twitter and all of that?
是的。
Yeah.
关于创业,最棘手的事情就是维持联合创始人的关系。
This is the trickiest thing around starting companies is just, you know, maintaining that cofounder relationship.
你知道,这是一直以来我通过多年辅导和治疗,希望——敲敲木头——最终克服的问题。
You know, this is something that I've, you know, hopefully, knock on wood, sort of overcome over years of coaching and therapy at the end of the day.
但我意识到,我早期职业生涯中极度回避冲突。
But one of the things I realized was I was horribly conflict averse early in my career.
与其直面冲突,愿意表达真实想法,我选择默默忍受,因为我以为:为了让初创公司成功,我和联合创始人之间的关系必须良好。
Rather than sort of address that and be willing to, like, inflect into conflict and, you know, say what I really thought, I would sort of eat it because I thought, oh, well, in order for a startup to be great, I need my relationship with my cofounder to be good.
所以我只想直接跳到拥有良好关系的阶段,这意味着我从不为我认为正确的事情据理力争。
And so I wanted to skip directly to having a good relationship, which meant that I didn't stick up for what I believed was right.
你知道,这根本不是良好的关系。
You know, that's not a good relationship.
这其实是一种扭曲的纵容。
That's again, like, it's a bizarro version of, like, sort of enabling, really.
我就是这样做的,现在我为此感到后悔。
That's what I did, and I regret it.
现在我们花大量时间帮助人们克服这种问题。
Now we spend a lot of time helping people try to overcome that.
如果说有什么棘手的话,那就是我试图用编程的方式来解决它。
If anything, the tricky thing that I did was I tried to code my way out of it.
我认为,对于今天的许多创始人来说,最棘手的事情就是你抓住了机遇。
And I think that's the trickiest thing today for a lot of founders is you catch lightning in a bottle.
Impostor 无疑抓住了机遇,但你知道,比抓住它更难的是真正留住它。
And imposterous had definitely caught lightning in a bottle, but then, you know, the only thing harder than catching it is actually keeping it.
所以我没有进行那些艰难的对话,而是继续做那些让我们实现产品市场契合的事情。
And so I didn't have the hard conversations, and I tried to keep doing the things that got us product market fit.
我需要做的是成为一个优秀的管理者,学会沟通,处理冲突。
What I needed to do was become a great manager, learn to communicate, work through conflict.
我压抑了太多冲突,以至于我根本睡不着,甚至有点崩溃了。
And I had eaten so much of the conflict, I actually couldn't sleep, and I had a breakdown a little bit.
我根本无法正常工作。
Like, I couldn't function.
你瞧,我都吃不下饭了。
You know, I couldn't eat.
而且,这表现为身体上的不适,真的生病了。
And, like, it manifested in, like, sort of physical like, just being ill.
我知道,我讲这个故事是因为我觉得很多人都会遇到这种情况,但他们却不知道发生了什么。
And, you know, I only tell this story because I think that it happens to people quite a lot, and then they sort of don't know what's happening.
所以,我觉得每个人内心都像有一匹马和一个骑手。
So, you know, and my sense is every human being has sort of like a horse and a rider.
我的问题不是骑手控制得不够。
My problem was not that my rider was not in control enough.
我的骑手控制得太过了,而我的身体不适,正是我的马、我的身体在试图告诉我:嘿。
My rider was too in control, and my physical maladies were a manifestation of my horse or my body, like, sort of trying to tell me, hey.
这对你来说行不通。
This isn't working for you.
这对我们来说行不通。
Like, this isn't working for us.
是的。
Yeah.
那时候你结婚了吗?
Were you married during this time?
幸运的是,尽管我当时处境非常艰难,斯蒂芬妮并没有和我分手。
Luckily, Stephanie did not break up with me even though I was having a really hard time.
我只是想知道你的个人生活是如何与你的事业生活相互交织的,你知道的,
I was just wondering how your personal life, like, meshed with this, you know, business life you
是。
were.
天啊。
Gosh.
我让她承受了太多。
I put her through so much.
但最终我们还是走到了一起,为了完整这个故事,我知道我和我的联合创始人对如何修复Posterous有不同的想法。
So but we did get met like, so to complete the story, I knew that me and my cofounder had different ideas on how to fix Posterous.
他想把它做成类似Google Groups的东西。
He wanted to make it into sort of Google Groups.
我不想做那个。
I didn't wanna work on that.
事实上,我有点说,你知道,谷歌似乎并不想运营谷歌群组。
In fact, I sort of said, you know, Google doesn't seem to want to run Google Groups.
那实际上不是一个生意。
That's not actually a business.
但我也不想让他失望。
But I also wanted to support him.
所以我能支持他的最好方式,就是让他按照自己想要的方式经营公司。
So the best way I could support him was to let him run the company the way he wanted to.
然后我想我联系了哈吉和杰西卡,你知道,我听说YC正在找一位设计师,所以你们在2010年12月左右、2011年1月左右聘用了我作为驻场设计师。
And then I think I reached out to Harge and Jessica about you know, I had heard that YC was looking for a designer, so you guys hired me as a designer in residence in, you know, sort of that December 2010, January 2011.
嗯。
Yeah.
那真的非常好。
That actually really was great.
那太棒了。
That was awesome.
哇。
Wow.
我真不知道你们联合创始人之间有这么深的矛盾。
I don't think I knew the depths of your cofounder conflicts.
这是创业中比较艰难的一面,人们很少深入讨论。
It's a sort of the difficult side of startups that people don't get into too much.
但我很高兴我们请到了你。
But I'm glad that we got you.
我记得你是2011年冬天加入的。
I remember you came on in winter twenty eleven.
让我想想,那时候Harge已经在了。
And remind me, so we had Harge there.
PB那时候也在吗?
Was PB yet there?
嗯。
Yep.
嗯。
Yep.
他当时只是在附近晃悠,然后我觉得那个夏天,我们一群人陆续加入了成为合伙人。
He was, like, sort of hanging around, and then, you know, I think that summer, a bunch of us came on as partners.
一群人。
A bunch.
除了你还有谁?
Who else besides you?
我记得当时有亚伦·伊巴、杰夫·拉尔斯顿、PB。
I remember it was, like, Aaron Iba, Jeff Ralston, PB.
都是同一
All that same
时候。
time.
当时感觉一切都同时发生了。
Were already it felt like it was all at the same time.
我记得到了夏天,你们邀请我和亚伦一起担任风险合伙人。
And I remember by summer, you guys had asked me to be a venture partner with Aaron.
你加入后,做了很多我们的设计工作。
And you came on, and you did a lot of our design design work.
哦,那很有趣。
Oh, that was fun.
我记得。
I remember.
是的。
Yeah.
名片的事,你从我手上接过去了。
Business cards, you took that off of my plate.
是的。
Yeah.
顺便说一下,我至今还留着一整箱你为我做的名片,加里。
I still have by the way, still have an entire box of business cards that you did for me, Gary.
如果需要的话,我很乐意帮你重新设计名片。
I'm happy to, you know, redesign the business cards if necessary.
那Y Combinator怎么样?
How how was YC then?
三年后,当你以合伙人身份加入时,和你当初作为初创公司参与者时相比,感觉有什么不同?
Three years later, how was it different when you came on as a partner from when you had gone through it as a startup?
你还记得吗?
Do you remember?
有趣的是,2008年的时候,很多人忘了,那时候Y Combinator的知名度远没有达到2011年那样的程度。
I mean, what's funny about 2008, and a lot of people forget this, was, like, YC was not widely known the way it is, you know, even by 2011.
对吧?
Right?
Y Combinator在技术圈的一个小众但极其重要的群体中备受尊敬,那就是软件工程师、设计师和产品人员——那些真正关心并热爱它的人。
YC was deeply respected in a fringe, but the most important circle, I think, of technology, which is like it was the software engineers and designers and product people, like the builders who really cared about it and loved it.
我们阅读Hacker News。
We read Hacker News.
我们阅读保罗·格雷厄姆的论文,然后关注那些毕业的校友。
We read Paul Graham's essays, and then we looked at the alumni who were coming out.
所以史蒂夫和亚历克西斯,我们想成为像Reddit那样的公司。
So we wanted to be like Reddit, Steve and Alexis.
我们想成为像德鲁和阿拉什那样的Dropbox。
We wanted to be like Drew and Arash at Dropbox.
当然,后来我们又想成为像布赖恩、内特和乔那样的Airbnb。
And then, of course, later, it's like, we wanted to be like, you know, Brian and Nate and Joe at Airbnb.
有一小群人具备创造前所未有事物的技能,他们所关心的事情比社会上的几乎任何人都更重要。
There's this small set of people who have the skills to build something that has never existed before, and what they care about matters more than pretty much anyone else in society.
我仍然相信,创造者是最重要的群体,而YC正是非常早地意识到了这一点。
I still believe that the builders are the most important people, and that's what YC caught, like, very, very early.
这些人正是我们需要帮助去建设的。
Those are the people to help build.
你过去要么去读研,要么找份工作。
You used to have to either go to grad school or get a job.
不,不是这样的。
Like, no.
不是这样的。
No.
现在,真正有才华的创造者,你应该拥有自主权。
Now builders who are really talented, like, you should actually you should be the one who has the agency.
你应该成为那个CEO。
You should be the one who's the CEO.
下棋最难的不是聪明,而是知道棋子怎么走。
Like, the hard part about playing chess is being smart, not, like, knowing how the pieces move.
我记得保罗谈过这一点,我永远不会忘记,因为我认为这是推动这一切的最强大的引擎之一。
And, you know, that was I I remember Paul talking about that, and I'll never forget that because I think that that's one of the most powerful engines that powered all of this.
到2011年,已经有了Dropbox、Airbnb和Reddit。
And by 2011, there was Dropbox and Airbnb and Reddit.
你知道,当你幸运的时候,你够优秀,我觉得。
You know, when you're lucky, two you're good, I think.
到那时,共识现实和科技界才开始意识到:哦,不妙。
And by then, consensus reality and tech started to realize, oh, no.
YC 这里正发生着一些事情。
YC is there's something happening here.
我记得那时的氛围非常不同。
And I remember that it was a very different energy.
比如在2008年,作为前Palantir和斯坦福的工程师创业时,我们甚至有知名风投问我们:你们为什么选择YC?
Like, in 2008, being ex Palantir and Stanford engineers working on a startup, we had well known VCs ask us, like, why did you do YC?
我们不明白。
We don't understand.
你们明明可以不通过YC就融到资的。
Like, you, you know, could have just raised money without it.
而他们没明白的是,同批的其他人能帮助你、教你这些事情是怎么运作的。
And what they didn't understand was having other people in your batch, like, help you and teach you how these these things worked.
而且,这个社群的力量如此强大,以至于就在最近,我们在与迈克尔·西贝尔的管理董事会议上,他提到我们所有人都是从初创公司成长起来的,我们有YC的朋友,也有非YC的朋友。
And, like, the community was so powerful that, you know, even recently, I think what in our managing director meeting with Michael Seibel, he was mentioning that we all came up through startups, and we had our y c friends and our non y c friends.
对于我们这些在过去二十年里作为创始人、但不属于YC的那些人来说,最让我们震惊的是,他们真的非常孤独。
And the thing that really stood out to us for all the non y c people who were founders through, you know, the past twenty years, they're really lonely.
是的。
Yeah.
孤独感是十倍之多,没错。
Like, 10 times more lonely Yeah.
而且他们几乎不可能有人可以倾诉创业生涯中遇到的所有最糟糕的事情。
And 10 times less likely to have someone to talk to about all of the worst things that happen in their startup careers.
这确实对心理健康、企业的实际成功,以及方方面面都产生了深远影响。
And that has a real impact on mental health and and actually the success of the business and just, like, all the way across.
所以我觉得,现在人们开始意识到这一点,尤其是在过去十年里,YC已经从一个科技圈里人们都问‘那是什么?’的边缘事物,变成了……
And so I think it's cool that people are now realizing that over the past, especially ten years, like, y c has gone from this very fringe thing that people in tech are they're like, what is that?
你知道的。
You know?
然后突然间,我们发现现在有些有趣的事情正在发生。
And then suddenly it was like, oh, some interesting stuff is happening now.
再看看现在人们是如何看待它的。
And then to see what it is you know, how people view it today.
哥们,你们真的太棒了。
I mean, credit to you guys, man.
你们从一开始没人相信,到现在所有人都信服,真的构建起了这一切。
Like, it just have built this from, you know, nobody nobody believes this to, oh my god, now we all believe it.
我觉得花了很长时间,但孤独感正是YC之所以成为YC的原因。
Feel like it took a really long time, but the whole loneliness thing was kind of the reason YC is YC.
我们在2005年只采用批次模式,是为了作为YC的创始人快速学习如何成为天使投资人。
We only did the batch format in the 2005 for us as founders of Y Combinator to get up to speed on how to be angel investors.
但那个夏天,我们立刻意识到,天啊。
But then we immediately realized that summer, like, gosh.
能有一些同伴真是太好了。
It's nice to have some colleagues, if you will.
我的意思是,他们并没有住在一起,但每周二会聚在一起。
I mean, not they weren't living in the same places, but they'd come together on Tuesdays.
我们会把大家聚在一起,当你在做这件非常艰难的事情时,你会感觉有人和你并肩同行。
We'd bring people together, and you sort of felt like someone was in it with you while you were doing this really hard thing.
所以,社区感一直都很重要。
So the sense of community was always important.
当你在YC担任合伙人时,你设计了Bookface,它现在已成为YC社区中非常重要的一部分。
While you were at YC, as a partner, you designed Bookface, which is now a really important part of the YC community.
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是,这很有趣。
I mean, it's fun.
是的。
Yeah.
你做这个是不是想帮助大家记住谁在同一个批次里,并把面孔和名字对应起来?
Did you didn't you do that because you wanted to help people sort of remember who was in the batch and put the faces to names?
是的。
Yeah.
我的意思是,我认为到2011年加速的一个关键因素是,批次规模发生了变化。当我刚加入YC时,大概只有二十几、二十五六家公司吧。
I mean, I I think one of the things that really accelerated by 2011 was, you know, the batch went from sort of when I did YC, it was, you know, '20 ish, 25, 26 companies, I think.
而第一个批次,我是驻场设计师。
And then that first batch, I was a designer in residence.
我觉得那时候是45家。
I think it was 45.
紧随其后,就增长到了60家。
And then right after that, it got to 60.
再之后的一批,大概有90家甚至100家。
And then I think the one after that was, like, 90 or a 100.
是82家,那个批次把YC给搞崩了。
It was 82, and it was the batch that broke YC.
2012年夏季批次。
Summer twelve.
是的。
Yeah.
但那一批里有Coinbase和Instacart。
But then both Coinbase and Instacart were in that batch.
对吗?
Is that right?
没错。
That's right.
所以我认为我们达到了一个临界点,我很快就在与人进行办公时间交流时意识到,这批公司的人根本不知道彼此是谁。
So I think we reached a point, and, you know, I sort of realized it quickly just from doing office hours with people that, like, people in the batch didn't know who else was in the batch.
我们偶尔会听到一些传闻,说有人通过这种方式社交性地利用YC。
And we would hear, like, in the in the margins some stories of people socially engineering YC that way.
比如,他们会说自己是YC公司,而YC公司非常有可能成为其他YC公司的客户。
Like, they would say that they were y c companies, and, you know, y c companies were very likely to become customers of other y c companies.
所以他们会故意说谎,声称自己是YC公司,其实并不是,以此来获取客户或欺骗别人。
So they would, like, you know, get customers or trick people by saying that they were y c when they weren't.
那时我就意识到,糟了。
And that was, you know, when I realized, oh, shoot.
我们需要一种方式,让人们知道谁真正属于这个批次,谁不是。
We sort of need a way for people to know who's actually in the batch versus not.
于是我把它命名为Bookface,这源于《办公室》万圣节特辑中的一个笑话,
And then I named it Bookface because it was sort of a joke from the Halloween episode of The Office where
哦,对。
Oh, yeah.
吉姆把‘Facebook’写在脸上,别人就问:你的装扮是什么?
Jim, like, writes Facebook on his face, and people like, what's your costume?
是书脸吗?
Is it book face?
在这段时间里,你成为了Y Combinator的全职合伙人,但你同时在私下启动了一个副项目。
During this time, you then became a full time partner at Y Combinator, but you started initialized on the side, like, a side project.
对吧?
Right?
我的意思是,你实际上向我们介绍了我们的第一个有限合伙人。
I mean, you kind of kind of told you know, introduced us to our first limited partner.
所以我不确定你是否还记得这件事。
So I don't know if you remember this.
那是演示日。
It was a demo day.
我记得亚历克斯。
I do remember Alex.
对吧?
Right?
对。
Yep.
对。
Yep.
亚历克斯·班加什。
Alex Bangash.
但你知道,当我回过头来看时,Initialized 当时的样子,就像现在的天使投资人联合体一样,或者我们是那些还没有退出经验的年轻合伙人。
So but, you know, I I think when I look back on it, initialized was sort of what an angelist syndicate is now, or we were the younger partners who did not have exits yet.
所以,你知道,我账户里没多少钱,但与此同时,我们说,好吧,我们也想做一些天使投资。
And so, you know, I was did not have a lot in my bank account, but at the same time, we said, well, we wanna be able to do some angel investing as well.
那时候,YC 会提供标准的投资条款,而演示日的核心就是帮助创始人融资,仅此而已。
And that was when, you know, YC would do its standard deal, and then demo day was really about helping the founders raise money, period.
嗯。
So Mhmm.
你知道,那是一个不同的时代,但我们也通过这种方式学到了很多关于投资的知识。
You know, it was just a different time, but we learned a lot about investing that way as well.
你对后期投资学到了什么?
What did you learn about later stage investing?
你发现它和我们在 YC 时作为首批投资者有什么不同?
What did you find was different from being kind of the first investor like we were at YC?
我想,对这些创始人来说,困难从来就没有真正停止过。
I guess it just never really stops being hard for these founders.
我觉得能够看到并帮助他们完成A轮和B轮融资非常有帮助。
I thought it was just very useful to see and just help people raise their series a and their b.
有趣的是,这些内容如今已经以各种形式融入了YC的项目中。
And the interesting thing is, like, that's all stuff that is built into YC today in various programs.
但没错,这一点非常明确。
But, yeah, that that was one thing that was clear.
初创公司从头到尾都需要帮助和支持。
The startups still need help and support, like, all the way through.
你知道,身边有优秀的人会带来巨大影响,这不仅仅是钱的问题。
You know, really good people around you makes a big difference, and it's not just money.
是的。
Yeah.
是投资者。
It's the investors.
对。
Yeah.
而且,你知道,投资者也可能造成很多伤害。
And, you know, the investors can do a lot of damage too.
我的意思是,最好的情况是那些品德高尚、聪明、人脉广泛、能帮助你并且心地善良的人。
I mean, you know, the best version of it is like people who are high integrity, who are smart, who have a great Rolodex, who can help you, and, like, are benevolent.
我认为YC一直以来对我都是这样的。
And I think YC has always been that for me.
当我离开并专注于Initialize时,我非常渴望以YC的方式、SV Angel的方式,或者我们所有尊重的其他人的方式作为榜样。
And, you know, when I was away and working on Initialize, like, that was something that I desperately wanted to model myself after, whether it was the way YC did it or the way SV Angel does it or other people who we all respect.
所以,好吧,加里。
So okay, Gary.
当这期节目播出时,你就是Y Combinator的新任总裁了。
When this airs, you are the new president of Y Combinator.
我们在这里真的形成了一个完整的循环。
We are coming, like, full circle here on this.
我再也无法更兴奋了。
And I I could not be more excited.
我太开心了。
I'm so happy.
我也是。
Me too.
我也是。
Same.
是的。
Yes.
我们都特别开心。
We're all so happy.
而且,你知道,我不会问你太多,因为显然你刚回来,还处于早期阶段。
And, you know, I won't ask you too much because it's obviously like very early days of of you rejoining.
但告诉我,Y Combinator 有什么特别之处?
But tell me about what's special about Y Combinator?
是什么让你回来了?
What what brought you back?
你为什么对在这里感到兴奋?
Why are you excited to to be here?
从纯粹的数字来看,Y Combinator是有史以来最成功的投资公司,没有之一。
YC is actually the most successful investment firm that has ever existed in the history of investing just by pure numbers, period.
当你观察大多数风险投资公司时,它们在长期内能实现三倍净回报就已经算幸运了,因为一个基金可能回报十倍,而另一个基金却只有0.7倍。
When you look at most venture capital firms, they are lucky to be three x net over long periods of time because one fund will be like 10 x and another fund will be point seven x.
但Y Combinator所创造的东西是前所未有的,也许将来也再不会在其他地方重现,除了Y Combinator。
But what y c has created has never existed before and, like, maybe never again, you know, will exist elsewhere other than y c.
这对社会意味着什么?我认为,这正是我在与每个人的一对一交流中听到的众多目标之一:我们真正有可能重塑资本如何分配给所有创意和盈利的事业。
What that means for society is that and this is one of the goals, I think, you know, that I'm hearing in, like, a lot of, you know, the one on ones I'm having with everyone is that we can really potentially remake the way capital is allocated to all creative and profitable endeavors.
而且,这种改变是必要的。
And, like, that's needed.
对吧?
Right?
我们可以帮助创业者。
Like, that we can help founders.
这是有史以来最成功的投资实体,而它根本无意成为一家典型的投资公司。
It is the most successful thing that has ever existed as an investor having no intention of being, like, a classic investment firm.
对吧?
Right?
它的价值观、文化以及做事方式都完全不同。
Like, the values and the culture and, like, the way to do things is so completely different.
我真的认为,如果世界能采纳这些价值观,情况会好得多——这些价值观正是杰西卡、你、保罗以及YC的原始创立者们最初设定的。
And I actually think the world will be far better off if they share the values that, frankly, Jessica, you, and Paul, and the original creators of YC really set out for
我们。
us.
哎呀。
Aw.
嗯。
Yeah.
哎呀。
Aw.
这太好了。
That's so nice.
是啊。
Yeah.
确实如此。
It's true.
我的意思是,这是真的。
I mean, it's true.
这是一个特殊的地方,我很高兴你回到了这里。
It's a special place, and I'm so glad you're found your way back to it.
当你这么说的时候,加里,我脑海中突然冒出一个想法:关于高等教育的未来、大学将何去何从,现在有很多讨论。
You know what I was popped into my head when you said that, Gary, is there's a lot of conversation about where higher education is going, colleges, like universities, what's gonna happen to them in the future?
我觉得这有点牵强,但似乎又有些关联。
And I kind of think that this is really tenuous, but like it's sort of connected.
如果你把所有这些资本用来赋能人们去做不同的事情,而不是走传统路径,我觉得这些都是相关的。
Like, if you if you take all this capital and you empower people to do different kinds of things and not take this traditional path, like, feel like that's all related.
我不确定你是否有意将它们联系起来,但我是这么看的。
I don't know if you meant it to be related, but that's how I view it.
当然了。
Oh, definitely.
我的意思是,这一切确实都是相互关联的,因为我们希望有更多有能力、聪明的人能够创造出解决社会问题的东西。
I mean, it's all it's certainly all connected because we want a lot more people who are capable and smart able to, like, create these things that solve problems for society.
而且走非传统的路径去实现他们的目标。
And take unconventional paths to get there, I think, to get where they wanna be.
我们希望让任何人更容易做到这一点,去创办自己的初创公司,这正是我们创办它的初衷——为那些不知道该做什么或如何做的人提供一种替代选择,让他们更容易打造出人们需要的东西。
We wanna make it easier for anyone to do that, to start their own startup, which was the whole reason we started it, was to create this, like, alternative for people who didn't know what to do or how to do it and make it easier for them to to build something that people want.
我们曾经有一个标语,叫‘YC为局外人而设’。
We used to have this tagline that was YC's for outsiders.
你还记得那个时代吗?
Do you remember that era?
不记得。
No.
是的。
Yeah.
我不记得是谁想出来的了。
I don't remember who came up with it.
YC是为局外人而设的,因为当时的主题是:你不需要走通往精英学校的那条路。
YCs for outsiders because it was like the theme was you don't need to be on this path toward an elite school.
你也不需要留在你的精英学校。
You don't need to stay in your elite school.
只要你有技能并且能动手做,就来和我们一起创造吧。
Like, if you've got skills and can build, just come and build with us.
我们会帮助你。
Like, we'll help you.
加里,我有个问题问你。
My question to you, Gary.
很多人知道这一点,但你真的是个很友善的人。
A lot of people know this about you, but you're a really nice person.
你以友善著称。
You're known for being nice.
我想知道,在你的创业历程或经营公司过程中,友善是否曾经阻碍过你?
And I'm curious if being nice has hindered you ever along the way in your startup journey or running companies?
我想我们之前稍微提到过这一点。
I think we touched on this a little bit earlier.
我的合创者经历中,为了维持和谐,我常常会顺从一些我认为不对的事情,只是不想惹麻烦。
I mean, certainly in my cofounder experience, I in the spirit of harmony, I would sort of go with things that I thought were wrong just because I didn't wanna rock the boat.
这正是我最大的错误:在职业生涯早期,我没有忠于自己,花了许多年才慢慢克服这些问题。
And that was my cardinal sin, was to not be true to myself earlier in my career with many, many years of working through things.
事实上,我认为我经常思考心理咨询和自我成长,甚至包括研究荣格、阿德勒等二十世纪和二十一世纪伟大心理学家的著作。
And actually, I do think that I think about therapy and self work and, you know, even just studying the works of Jung and, you know, Adler and, you know, just the great psychologists of the twentieth and twentieth twenty first centuries.
这些自我成长的方式,才能让我们重新塑造自己。
Like, that's that's the self work that allows us to reprogram ourselves.
所以,我可以很友善。
So I can be nice.
我可以把人当人看待,但同时我也有一个目标和想要实现的东西。
I can treat people like human beings, but there is also a goal and a thing that I want.
尤其是当我领导团队时,这并不是要我专横地告诉别人这是我的想法,而且我没有任何依据。
And especially as I head organizations, it's not about me being prescriptive or saying this is what I think, and I have, you know, I have no justification for it.
你知道吗?
You know?
事实上,我的目标是成为一个极具同理心的领导者,能够吸纳所有人不同的需求和想法。
If anything, my goal is to be the leader is sort of meant to be someone who is incredibly empathic, who can sort of bring in all of the different disparate things that people want.
然后我需要进行整合,让大家都知道我们是一个团队。
And then I need to do synthesis, which is everyone knows that we're we're on the same team.
我们可能在如何实现目标上意见不一,但我们可以就目标本身达成一致。
We may not be on the same page on, you know, how to achieve the goals, but we are we can agree on what what the goals are.
如果出现分歧——而分歧总是会有的,因为我们不是一个人,每个人都有截然不同的经历——人们需要信任我,让我综合大家的各种观点,然后我们做到分歧但坚定执行。
And then if there's disagreement, and there always will be because we're not one person, we all have very different experiences, People need to trust me to make the call to sort of bring in all of the different things that people believe, and then we need to disagree but commit.
最理想的情况是,团队由背景迥异、经历完全不同的人组成,但他们目标一致、诚信可靠,并且真心享受彼此共事,这样我们才能真正做到分歧但坚定执行,共同做出正确的选择。
And the ideal thing is organizations of people who are very different, who have totally different experiences, but who are aligned high integrity and genuinely enjoy working with one another, we can actually disagree but commit and then make the right choice together.
对吧?
Right?
而且,实际上并不需要产生负面情绪。
And it it shouldn't require bad feelings, actually.
如果做得好,人们可以说:虽然我不完全同意,但我理解了。
Like, if done right, people can say, well, I don't exactly agree with it, I understand it.
这没关系。
And that's okay.
这实际上是一个很好的情况。
That's actually like a good scenario.
而且,我与人相处得越多,就越意识到:不。
And, you know, the more I spend time with people, the more I realize, no.
不。
No.
你知道吗?这就是领导力的真谛。
Like, you know, that's that's what leadership is.
这不仅仅是打个电话说‘我们要按我的方式来做,你不同意就要惩罚你’。
It's not necessarily just making a call and saying, we're gonna do it my way, and I'm gonna punish you if you don't agree.
而是真正让人们不仅感到被倾听,而且确实去倾听他们。
It's actually making people not just feel heard, but, you know, actually hearing them.
我认为,把友善和同理心转化为领导力,这才是关键所在。
And that's where I think turning niceness and empathy into leadership, that's where the rubber hits the road.
什么让你开心?
What makes you happy?
什么让这件事变得有趣?
What makes it fun?
我觉得,我仍然对各种类型的创作上瘾。
You know, I I I think that I still just get addicted to various types of creations.
比如,之前在做完办公时间后做Bookface,就是这种形式。
So, you know, earlier, like, working on Bookface after doing office hours was a form of that.
我只是想,哦,晚上我就写点代码,然后发布它。
And I was just like, oh, like, well, in the evening, I'm just gonna, like, write this code and release it.
如果人们喜欢,那就太好了。
And if people like it, that's great.
我不知道。
I don't know.
坦白说,现在拍视频就是我这么做的方式。
To be frank, like, making videos now is how I do it.
你知道,无论是我的YouTube频道,还是我推荐所有父母做的最酷的事情,就是买一个这种设备,要么用你的iPhone,要么买一个像DJI Action 2这样的小型运动相机,然后拍一些两三秒的片段,比如去度假、和孩子过周末、去滑冰之类的。
You know, whether it is for my YouTube channel, but also the coolest thing that I recommend all parents do is get one of these you know, either use your iPhone or you can get, like, one of these DJI Action two's, like these tiny little sports cameras, and just take like two or three second clips of going on a vacation or like a weekend with the kids or going ice skating and whatever.
然后把所有素材导入Final Cut Pro,随便放一首你最喜欢的歌在下面,再剪辑一下,看起来就像一部音乐视频。
And then just drop it all into Final Cut Pro and like drop your favorite song into the bottom and then, like, edit it together, and it, like, looks like a music video.
我超爱你孩子的那些视频。
I love the ones of your kids.
我很喜欢看这些。
I love seeing those.
它们真的非常可爱。
They're really cute.
这真是很好的建议。
So that's great advice.
是的。
Yeah.
好吧。
Alright.
加里,我们占用了你很多时间。
Well, Gary, we've taken up a lot of your time.
很高兴能和你交谈、叙旧,听你分享近况。
We're so happy to talk to you and catch up and hear all about what's going on.
谢谢你们邀请我,也谢谢你们相信我,让我再次回到YC。
Thank you for having me, and thank you for believing in me to have me back at YC.
接下来的几年将会非常令人兴奋。
It's gonna be a very exciting upcoming years.
好了,卡莉。
Alright, Carrie.
谢谢,卡莉。
Thanks, Carrie.
卡莉。
Carrie.
再见了。
See you Bye.
再见。
Bye.
哦,看啊,列维。
Oh, see, Levy.
好的。
Okay.
谁会知道他曾在微软工作呢?
So who knew he worked at Microsoft?
我完全不知道。
I had no idea.
这真是对话中的意外之举。
That's the shock of the conversation.
这正是对话中的意外之处。
That was the shock of the conversation.
下次见到他时,我得问他一大堆问题。
I'm gonna have to just next time I see him, I'm gonna have a lot of questions for him.
我想问一下,他有没有见过比尔·盖茨?
I wanted to ask, did he ever meet Bill Gates?
但我有太多问题了。
But I have so many questions.
和他聊天我真是太开心了,我特别兴奋。
I just had so much fun talking to him, and I I'm so excited.
他是Y Combinator的新任总裁。
He's the new president of Y Combinator.
我觉得这简直太棒了。
I feel like it's just gonna be awesome.
我只是觉得他非常体贴,显然他会是个很棒的老板。
I just really I think he's so thoughtful, so it's obviously, he's gonna be a great boss.
和一个如此体贴、又如此了解自己的人共事,就像他最后说的那些话,全都让人感到温暖、充满信心。
Like, working with someone who's that thoughtful and who knows himself so well, like, that's all the things he said there just at the end just are such feel good confidence building things.
我得说,认识他已经有十五年了。
And I do have to say having known him now, gosh, for like fifteen years.
认识他十五年来,我见证了他的一种变化,我的意思是,他始终是那个同样的加里,那个同样有才华、善良、聪明的加里。
Having known him for fifteen years, I have seen an evolution of I mean, he's always been the same Gary and the same talented, kind, smart Gary.
但我看到他通过成熟,
But I have seen through the maturity and
愿意
a willingness
去面对一些冲突,并以这种方式解决它们。
to get into some conflict and resolve things that way.
而且我
And I
我觉得这很棒。
think I think it's great.
这就像一种自信。
It's like a confidence.
是的。
Yeah.
而且,我不想说得太花哨,但他提到的那份同理心。
And like, and and I and then not to be too cute about it, but like the empathy that he was talking about.
我觉得同理心和自信是不同的地方。
I think the empathy and the confidence feel like what's different.
这就是他的成长之处。
What's, you know, his evolution.
这就是我对它的描述。
That's how I that's how I describe it.
是的。
Yeah.
这很棒。
Which is great.
我特别喜欢看到你认识很久的人展现出蓬勃发展的样子,这让我感到很开心。
I love I just love when when you see someone do it flourishing when you've known them for so long, it that sort of makes me happy.
是啊。
Yeah.
我也是。
Same.
那真是一次非常有趣的访谈。
That was a really fun interview.
太棒了。
So great.
好吧,期待下一次和你聊天。
Well, can't wait to talk to you for the next one.
嗯。
Yep.
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