无上限 #36 | 红杉资本的帕特·格雷迪与阿尔弗雷德·林

我给你举个例子。

I'll give you an example.

想象你发现了一位很棒的工程副总裁，你帮了那位副总裁一个忙，现在那位副总裁说，我爱杰克。

Imagine you found some great VP of engineering, and you did a favor for that VP of engineering, and now that VP of engineering says, I love Jack.

杰克是最棒的。

Jack's the best.

为杰克做任何事。

Do everything for Jack.

说实话，一直都是这样。

All the time, honestly.

是啊。

Yeah.

嗯，如果你回去找那位工程副总裁说，嘿，工程副总裁，这并不疯狂。

Well, it it wouldn't be crazy if you went back to that VP of engineering and you're like, hey, VP of engineering.

你欠

You owe

我。

me.

有没有可能告诉我，比如，你心目中最聪明、最受尊敬的5位工程副总裁

Any chance you could tell me, like, who your five smartest and most respected VP of engineering

都有谁？

friends are?

千万别那么做。

Never do that.

我觉得或许应该...但我真的从没那样做过，我就是...没法强迫自己，虽然我觉得应该这么做。

And I think that might be but, like, I truly never do that, and I just, like, can't make myself, and I think I should.

但想象一下如果你那么做了。

But imagine if you did that.

是啊。

Yeah.

再想象一下如果你十年前就开始这么做了。

And imagine if you started doing that more than ten years ago.

是啊。

Yeah.

想象一下如果你追踪了十多年的所有回复。

And imagine if you tracked all the responses for more than a decade.

对啊。

Yeah.

再想象这一切都存在于一个CRM系统中。

And imagine if that all lived inside of a CRM system Yeah.

那里面有一张硅谷的人才地图。

That has a talent map of Silicon Valley.

没错。

Yep.

不只是那些即将从实验室冒出来的创始人。

Not just the founders who are about to pop out of a lab Yep.

还包括一些成长期公司的第37号工程师之类的。

But also, like, engineer number 37 in some growth stage company.

想象一下你

So imagine that you

那么你想问什么？

And so what are you asking?

你是说，比如，谁是你手下最聪明的五个人？

You're saying, like, who are your five smartest people?

你知道类似这样的东西吗？

You know what's something like that?

针对人才的网页排名算法

Page rank for people.

是的

Yeah.

这是同样的基本原理

It's the same basic thing.

而且你们整个公司都在做这件事

And you have the whole the whole firm's doing this.

我们整个人才团队都在做这件事。

We have the whole talent team doing this.

我们所有的投资者都在参与其中。

We have all the investors doing this.

是的。

Yeah.

这个...我们一直在做这件事。

It it's And we've been doing it.

我们曾经有位合伙人叫布雷特·雷科德，他在十多年前就想出了这个主意，所以我们实施很久了。

We we had a we had former partner named Brett Record who came up with this idea more than ten years ago, so we've doing it for a long time.

是啊。

Yeah.

我的意思是，这并不像那种你可以简单说'哦，这是个好主意'就能搞定的事。

And it's not that I mean, it's not like something that you could just say, oh, that's a good idea.

因为实际执行还需要真正去帮助他人。

I'll just do it because it also requires actually helping people.

就是这样。

And that's it.

你不能把它当作交易来处理。

You can't be transactional about it.

你必须确保人们真的对帮助我们做这件事感到愉快。

You have to make sure that people that they're actually kind of feel good about helping us do this.

是的。

Yes.

事实上，如果你把它变成交易性质，他们只会随便应付让你挂电话。

In fact, if you make it transactional, they'll just give whatever response to get you off the phone.

所以我们非常自豪能在获取之前先给予。

So we very much pride ourselves on making sure that we give before we get.

举个例子，如果我听说某家成长阶段的公司正在快速发展，我可以进入我们的系统，很快了解到这个工程团队处于什么水平——因为我很难想象有多少优秀公司能在没有强大工程团队的情况下发展成为十亿美元级收入的企业。

And so for example, if I hear about some growth stage company that's inflecting, I can go into our system and very quickly get a sense for like what percentile is this engineering team because I can't think of a lot of great companies that became billion dollar plus revenue businesses without having a great engineering team at some point.

所以这是个相当有用的信号。

And so that's a pretty helpful signal.

是的。

Yeah.

其实，这有点跑题了。

Actually, this is a little bit of a side tangent.

我想继续深入探讨这个复杂的话题。

I want to stick with this sort of like the intricacy adventure.

不过快速问一下Eddie，你有没有遇到过这样的情况：投资一个工程团队并不出色的项目，然后你们介入后能帮助他们变强？

But just as a quick Eddie, do you find that there are examples where you can invest in something where the engineering team is not great, and you go in and you're like, we can help make it great?

有很多其他因素能让团队变得出色，还是说如果一开始就不够好，就永远无法变强？

There's so many other things to like that this can become great, or do you think if it's not great from the beginning, it never turns great?

要改变一家公司的DNA非常非常困难。

It's very, very hard to change the DNA of a company.

通常来说，公司需要在某些方面已经很强，然后你才能进行补充完善。

Generally, it starts being great in some aspects, then you can sort of augment things.

但在早期投资阶段，问题是如果他们无法构建产品并且产品无法运作，那项目就根本无法启动。

But in early stage investing, the problem is if they can't build a product and it doesn't work, you're not going to get off the ground.

我认为不同级别的工程师都有其价值所在，因此项目可以启动——就像Nate独自搭建了Airbnb整个系统，并维持了一段时间的单人运作。

Now, I think there are quality engineers at different levels, and so you can get off the ground because Nate built all of Airbnb systems and it's a one person show for a period of time.

但最终你需要招募下一代人才，下一代的领导者。

Eventually, you have to recruit the next generation of people, the next generation of leaders.

这些人可能在某个阶段表现优秀，但之后可能不再胜任，这时你就需要招募新的领导者和新的……

Those people may actually be good for a period of time and they will no longer be good, and have you to recruit the next leader and the next I'll

我给你举几个例子。

give you a couple of examples.

我们在2009年与ServiceNow建立了业务关系。

So we got into business with ServiceNow in 2009.

ServiceNow成立于2005年。

ServiceNow was founded in 2005.

到2009年时，所有代码都是由Fred Luddy一人编写的。

2009, all of the code was written by one person, Fred Luddy.

ServiceNow上市时，大部分代码仍出自一人之手。

When ServiceNow went public, most of the code was was written by one person.

哇。

Wow.

弗雷德·卢迪。

Fred Luddy.

哇。

Wow.

所以他们当时有很棒的工程团队吗？

So did they have a great engineering team?

没有。

No.

是啊。

Yeah.

他们只有一个

They had one

他们有一位出色的工程师。

They had a great engineer.

他们有一个家伙，不是10倍工程师。

They had one guy who was, not a 10 x engineer.

他像是，千倍工程师。

He was, like, a thousand x engineer.

哇。

Wow.

明白吗？

Okay?

所以这是一个例子。

So that's one example.

太疯狂了。

That's crazy.

说实话，我从未听过类似这样的故事。

I've never heard a story quite like that, I don't think, actually.

在Palo Alto Networks情况不太一样。

Not well, in Palo Alto Networks in a different way.

比如，Palo Alto Networks最终建立了一支出色的工程团队，但在很长一段时间里，创始人Nir Zuk就像是那个包揽所有问题的人。

Like, Palo Alto Networks ended up with an amazing engineering organization, but for a very long time, Nir Zuk, the founder, was kinda like the guy who would just fix everything.

是啊。

Yeah.

对吧？

Right?

所以我认为这类例子有很多，总会有一个人贡献着极其不成比例的生产力。

And so I think I think there are a bunch of these examples where there's one person who's actually a crazy disproportionate share of productivity.

另一个例子是HubSpot。

Another example would be HubSpot.

我们在2011年与HubSpot有业务往来，那时候他们有个惊人的故事，但产品却糟糕透顶。

So we got a business with HubSpot in 2011, and at the time, amazing story, awful product.

Brad和Dormesh也会这么说，所以我并非信口开河。

And Brad and Dormesh would say the same thing, so I'm not speaking out of turn.

也许他们会说产品一般，但确实算不上好。

Maybe they'd say mediocre product, but it wasn't great.

这是在CRM系统之前吗？

This was before the CRM?

这是在CRM系统之前。

This was before the CRM.

那时候它还只是一个营销产品。

So at that point, it was only a marketing product.

他们发现了一家由David Cancel和Elias Torres两人运营的叫Performable的公司，并收购了它。

And they found this company called Performable run by these two guys, David Cancel and Elias Torres, and they acquired it.

大多数情况下这种收购效果并不好。

And most of the time that doesn't really work.

但这次他们收购了这两位创始人及其15到20名工程师、产品经理等团队。

In this case, they acquired these two founders with 15 or 20 engineers and product managers and whatever.

结果他们在几年内重建了整个HubSpot平台，HubSpot也从'故事精彩但产品平庸'变成了'故事精彩产品出色'。

They ended up rebuilding the entire HubSpot platform within a couple of years, and then the HubSpot went from being a good story mediocre product to good story great product.

那就是他们开发CRM系统的时候。

That was when they built the CRM.

克里斯托弗·奥唐奈(Christopher O'Donnell)是随着那次收购加入的，正是他构建了CRM系统。

Christopher O'Donnell, who came in with that acquisition, was the one who built the CRM.

显然有很多人参与其中，但他算是核心负责人。

There are obviously a bunch of people involved, but he was kind of points on it.

没错。

Yep.

还有惠特尼·索伦森(Whitney Sorensen)也是通过那次收购加入的，她至今仍是HubSpot的首席技术官，而Klaviyo的创始人安德鲁·比莱基(Andrew Bilecki)也曾是该团队的一员。

And then Whitney Sorensen, who also came in with that acquisition, is still CTO of HubSpot today, and Andrew Bilecki, who is the founder of Klaviyo, had also been part of that team.

我猜有些类型的公司你会觉得产品必须优秀，但工程技术不必登峰造极，我们可以逐步改进。

I guess there are probably some types of companies where you figure the product has to be good, but the engineering doesn't have to be unbelievable, and we can make it better.

而另一些类型的公司则要求创始工程师必须是天才级人物。

And then there are some types of companies where the founding engineer has to be just a genius.

是的。

Yes.

这就是HubSpot魔力的一部分

So that's part of the magic of HubSpot was

比如Airbnb和OpenAI的起步方式可以完全不同。

Like Airbnb and OpenAI can start differently.

是的。

Yes.

是的。

Yes.

是的。

Yes.

这正是我们的观点。

That's exactly our point.

HubSpot成功让优秀的工程师关注营销软件，而大多数顶尖工程师通常不会对此感兴趣。

HubSpot managed to get really good engineers to care about marketing software, which most really good engineers do not.

我认为另一个例子是Open Evidence。

And I think another example would be like Open Evidence.

Open Evidence是一个面向医学的垂直整合基础模型，对吧？

Open Evidence is a vertically integrated foundation model for medicine, right?

他们从底层训练到最终医生使用的应用程序，全部都是自主完成的。

Like all of their own training all the way up to the application that is in doctor's hands.

平庸的工程师团队根本做不到这一点。

You can't do that with mediocre engineers.

正是这支全明星团队才能打造出这样的产品，因为他们最终要与OpenAI和其他通用基础模型竞争。

That is the absolute all star team that was able to build that product because they end up competing with OpenAI and the other broad foundation models.

如果没有顶尖的工程团队作为基础，就不可能实现。

You can't do that if you don't start with amazing engineering.

没错。

Yep.

产品技术含量越高，创始人就必须越专业，工程团队也必须越专业。

The more technical the product, the more technical the founders have to be, the more technical the engineering team has to be.

如果产品技术含量较低，你甚至可以只依赖一个人。

The less technical the product, you can rely on one person, literally.

Airbnb和DoorDash最初就是这样起步的——创始人们本身就出类拔萃。

Airbnb started out that way, DoorDash started out that way where the founders were just exceptional.

他们构建了一切。

They built everything.

随着时间的推移，他们用人来补充这一点。

And over time, they complement that with with people.

Citadel Securities，你知道，他们执行的是微纳秒级的交易。

Citadel Securities, you you really want you know, they're executing a micro nanosecond execution.

你需要一支非常优秀的工程团队。

You need a really good engineering team.

是的。

Yeah.

好的。

Okay.

我们能详细谈谈挑选的问题吗？

Can we talk about picking in some amount of detail?

我认为这部分工作有很多难以讨论的地方，但它显然非常重要。

I think there's so many I think it's a very hard to discuss part of the job, but it's obviously very important.

我认为对你们来说，在某些方面这可能是最重要的，因为你们看到并赢得市场将会非常、非常好。

I would argue, for you all, I imagine in some ways, it's the most important maybe because you're seeing and winning is gonna be very, very good.

显然，你们需要保持这些优势，但还有这个挑选的问题，就像你知道的，每年都得重新挑选得好。

Obviously, you need to keep those very good, but then there's this picking thing, which there's just like you know, every year, you gotta pick well again.

所以我猜你们花大量时间思考这个问题，而且不能只凭感觉。

And so I imagine you spend a ton of time thinking about it, and it can't just be vibes.

不能仅仅因为这个市场很大。

It can't just be this market's big.

氛围感不会坏事。

Vibes don't hurt.

氛围感不会坏事。

Vibes don't hurt.

但你能详细谈谈优秀选材包含哪些要素吗？或许可以选个中间阶段，比如A轮或B轮融资这样的阶段来讨论？

But so can you talk about in some depth what goes into good picking and maybe just to pick a stage in the middle, like a series A or a series B or something like that?

因为成长期有它的特点，种子期也有其特性，不过我们可以先从这里开始。

Because growth is its own thing, seeds its own thing, but maybe we can start.

在A轮、B轮阶段，你们如何讨论优质项目的筛选标准？

How do you talk about what goes into good picking in the series a, series b range?

我可以从两个不同角度来谈这个问题，其一是回归到高倍数回报的资金增值本质。

So I can do this in two different ways, one of which is back to making money on money high multiple returns.

这其实没那么重要，对吧？

That's not that important, is it?

不重要。

No.

但这就是我们的目标所在。

But that that's what we're aiming for.

没错。

Yeah.

在风投基金里，我们...你知道的，就是风险投资基金。

So in a fund, we you know, a venture fund.

嗯。

Yeah.

可能还包括一个成长基金，但我们大约有45到55次投资机会，其中需要有6次能达到10倍或更高的回报

And probably a growth fund too, but this we have about 45 to 55 shots of which we need six to to, like, basically be a 10 x or more

嗯。

Yeah.

在这6次中，需要有3次能带来1亿美元或10亿美元的收益。

Of which of those three three of them of out of the six, we need them to be a $100,000,000 gain or a billion dollar gain.

这才算是一个优秀的基金。

That's what makes for a good fund.

是的。

Yeah.

我们回顾了红杉资本历史上所有的基金，发现其投资失败率很高。

And we look historically at all the Sequoias funds, and there's a high write off rate.

所以当你说挑选项目时，我们真的有那么擅长吗？

So when you say like picking, are we actually that good at it?

现在我们表现最好的基金是Venture十二期，其中包括爱彼迎、Unity和Dropbox。

Now our best fund is Venture twelve, which includes Airbnb, Unity, and and Dropbox.

这三家公司都实现了十亿美元的收益，同时还有10家公司实现了1亿美元的收益。

All three of them were billion dollar gains, but there were also 10 companies that were $100,000,000 gains.

这

That's

太疯狂了。

crazy.

所以这是个优秀的基金。

So that is a good fund.

那里的注销率大约是50%。

The write off rate there was, like, 50%.

所以当你考虑挑选时，你必须有一半的正确率。

So when you when you think about picking, you have to be half right.

但你的观点是，好的挑选不在于不亏钱。

But your point is that good picking isn't not losing money.

好的挑选是

Good picking is

你必须承担风险。

You gotta take risks.

足够高的不对称性纳入率。

A high enough inclusion rate of asymmetry.

所以这里的重点是我们从事的是风险承担业务，你必须能够对那些会爆发的项目下注。

So the point here is we're in the business of risk taking, and you have to be able to take risk on things that will run.

我们在选品中学到的另一点是，你不能只投资少量资金、持有低比例股权却指望项目爆发。

And then the other thing that we've learned about picking is you can't just have things run that you put a small amount of dollars in and have low ownership.

在这个项目上投一百万。

Put a million dollars into this.

但在一个4.05106亿美元的风投基金里，10万美元根本不够。

Not And then that in a venture fund of $405,106 $100,000,000, it's just not enough.

你的持股比例太低，这远远不够。

You don't own enough, it's just not enough.

你必须真正拥有坚定的信念。

You have to actually have conviction.

因此，当你充满信念并专注于正确的公司时，你有一半的时间会犯错。

And so when you have conviction and you focus on the right companies, you're gonna you're gonna be wrong half the time.

你看看，你只是

You look You just

当你审视多支基金中真正成功的投资组合时，比如那些带来十亿美元或五亿美元回报的项目，当时它们是否看起来像是很多人都想抢投的？

When you look at your basket of across many funds of the things that truly ran, like the billion dollar gains, let's say, or the $500,000,000 gains, let's say, did those at the time feel like a lot of people wanted them?

你能在这些轮次的热度和共识度之间找到任何相关性吗？

And can you draw any correlation between how hot and consensus those rounds were?

并不尽然。

Not really.

或者说，当你描述非对称性时——你看到的是不明显或具有特殊形态的事物，而有些融资轮次中九家风投机构都一致认为这看起来不错。

Or because when you're describing asymmetry where you're seeing something that's not obvious or something has a shape, and then you have these rounds where nine venture firms all agree this looks good.

这两者有关联吗？

Do those correlate?

我可以举出很多例子说明它们没有关联，两种情况都存在？

I can give you lots of examples where they don't There's both?

两种情况都存在。

There's both.

对吧？

Right?

以DoorDash的情况为例，他们的种子轮融资非常非常艰难。

So one one of the sort of in DoorDash's situation, the the seed round was really, really hard for DoorDash.

几乎所有人都拒绝了，包括我们，这某种程度上是我的错，因为我没有足够的信心。

Almost everybody passed, including us, and that's kind of my fault for not having enough conviction.

当A轮融资启动时，我想大家都知道这个项目能成，所以他们可能在同一周收到了六份投资意向书，和我们提供意向书的时间差不多。

When the series A came together, I think everybody knew that it was working, so they probably got like six term sheets in the same week that we offered the term sheet.

所以在这种情况下，能否赢得投资机会就变得极其重要。

So in that case, winnability was super important.

能否赢得投资机会极其重要。

Winnability was super important.

而我之前拒绝了，所以我们有点处于落后位置，尽管我们努力保持与公司的联系，了解公司情况并尝试提供价值。

And I had passed, so we were coming a little bit from behind even though we try to stay try staying, with with the company and learning about the company and trying to add value.

在B轮融资时，市场热度极高。

In the series b, it was red hot.

估值从5000万美元飙升至6亿美元。

It went from a $50,000,000 valuation to a $600,000,000 valuation.

嗯。

Mhmm.

虽然可赢性确实非常重要，但没人愿意参与的C轮融资基本维持相同估值（实际略低），结果这轮却成为了最成功的非风险投资之一——成长型投资。

And winnability was really, really important, but the Series C, which nobody wanted to do, was basically at the same valuation, slightly less given that turned out to be one of the best Not venture investments, growth investments.

而D轮融资非常艰难。

And series D was very difficult.

E轮、F轮、G轮则获得了高度共识。

E, F, G, those were super consensus.

这些轮次都实现了盈利。

They all made money.

是的。

Yeah.

但最成功的融资轮次是A轮和C轮，这些当时完全没有达成共识。

But the best rounds were the series A and the series C, and those were not consensus at all.

如果追溯更早，我们连续主导了Okta的四轮融资，包括C轮、D轮、E轮和F轮，因为当时没有其他投资者愿意参与。

If I go further back, we led four rounds in a row with Okta, the series C, D, E and F because nobody else wanted to invest.

当与HubSpot合作时，我们是唯一提交投资条款的机构。

When we got into business with HubSpot, we were the only term sheet.

我记得Zoom的情况，它算是一家相当热门的公司，因为有很多用户在使用其产品，但当时投资Zoom并未形成共识，而且他们当时并没有在融资。

I remember with Zoom, Zoom was like a reasonably hot company because there were a lot of people using the product, but it wasn't a consensus investment and they weren't raising money.

我还记得在我们投资几周后的一次晚餐上，有其他投资者嘲笑我们做了这笔投资。

And I remember a couple of weeks after we made the investment, I was at dinner with some other investors and one of them was making fun of us for having made the investment.

天啊，你们花10亿美元收购Zoom？

Oh my gosh, you paid a billion dollars for Zoom?

太疯狂了，对吧？

How crazy, right?

Snowflake我们错过了，六个月后恳求他们再给我们一次机会，因为在这半年里情况似乎出现了转机，而且那也不是一个共识性的投资。

Snowflake, we passed on Snowflake and then six months later begged them to give us another chance because in that six month period it felt like things had inflected, and that was also not a consensus investment.

因此我认为至少对于我们自己的决策而言，我们的内部数据显示，我们十多年来一直在追踪记录每个人对每笔投资的投票数。

And so I think our internal data at least for our own decision making, we've been tracking, we've been recording the number that everybody votes on every investment for more than a decade now.

我们的内部数据表明，共识与否根本无关紧要。

Our internal data shows that consensus versus non consensus does not matter at all.

这根本不是一个影响因素。

It's just not a factor.

真正重要的是信念的存在。我们采用0到10分制投票（没有5分），6分及以上表示支持，4分及以下表示反对。

Presence of conviction is what matters, and so if everybody is a six, we vote zero to 10, no five, so six and above is positive, four and below is negative.

如果每个人都打6分，那可能就不该进行这笔投资。

If everybody's a six, probably shouldn't make the investment.

这虽然是共识，但没有人真正有信念。

It's consensus, but nobody has conviction.

强烈支持或强烈反对要好得多。

Strong yes, strong no is much better.

如果有三个人打9分而三个人打1分，我们或许应该进行投资，因为9分的存在比1分的存在是更有力的信号。

If three peoples are nines and three people are one, we should probably make the investment because the presence of the nines is a much more powerful signal than the presence of the ones.

但如果你想用数学来描述，我们从事的就是风险承担的业务。

But if you wanna describe that mathematically, we're in the risk taking business.

我们需要这种波动性，因为真相并不在所有人都同意的中间地带。

We we need that volatility because the truth is not somewhere in the middle where everybody agrees.

是的。

Yes.

没错。

Yeah.

我们正在努力构建未来。

We're we're trying to build the future.

未来不会与过去相似，所以如果一切看起来都达成共识，通常是因为我们有可衡量、可与过去比较的东西。

The future does not look like the past, And so if everything looks consensus, it's usually because it's we have something that is measurable to the past, comparable to the past.

就像所有人都在思考这个问题。

It's all like it's everybody's thinking about it.

当达成共识时，价格也会反映这种共识。

And when it's consensus, it all gets priced to consensus too.

假设你有一位优秀的投资者。

Let's say you have an investor who is good.

你对他们很满意，但注意到在六七年时间里，他们的投资组合包含了很多优质资产，却缺乏那些极端高回报的尾部项目。

You're happy with them, but you notice over a period of six, seven years that their portfolio includes a lot of good stuff, but it doesn't have that outlier tail.

你会给予什么指导？

What would your coaching be?

比如，你会给这个人什么建议，让他们的选择更具不对称性？

Like, what would you what advice would you give that person to get more asymmetry into their pick?

就像你说'我要帮你成为更好的选择者'那样。

Like, if you're like, I'm gonna help you be a better picker.

是的。

Yeah.

这不是假设性的。

This is not hypothetical.

我要帮你的方式是

The way I'm gonna help you be

帮助你成为更好的选择者，就是要帮你获得更多的不对称性。

a better picker is by helping you get more of the asymmetry.

我脑海中现在至少有三个不同的名字。

There are at least three different names in my mind right now.

这完全不是假设性的。

This is not hypothetical at all.

所以

So

现在我对你说x。

Now I say x to you.

是的。

Yeah.

不。

No.

你知道，Jim Goetz有个说法叫'正面捅刀'，就是要把你的顾虑或坏消息当面告诉对方，而不是背后议论。

So we're you know, Jim Goetz had this expression front stabbing, which is you wanna tell people whatever concerns you have or whatever bad news to their front instead of like saying it behind their back.

所以我们经常与那些看起来过于规避风险或投资组合中缺乏上行潜力的人进行这样的对话，当这种情况发生时，我们就会开始讨论：嘿，你看起来更像是稳扎稳打的类型。

So we have this conversation all the time with people who seem to be too risk averse or don't have enough of that kind of upside potential in their portfolio, and so when that situation happens, we start having the conversation, hey, you seem to be more in the base hits kind of business.

而我们更偏向于追求全垒打式的业务。

We're more in the grand slams kind of business.

让我们尝试承担更多风险吧。

Let's work on taking some more risks.

比如我们可以一起努力解决这个问题。

Like let's work on this together.

如果多年过去后，他们的风险偏好仍然保持保守——这与我们通常追求的方向截然不同——那么对话就会变成：嘿，你其实很擅长你现在做的事。

And if years go by and their risk appetite remains modest risk appetite, which is very different than what we tend to seek, at some point, the conversation becomes, hey, you're actually very good at what you do.

你应该做些与我们不同的事情。

You should do something that's a little bit different than what we do.

好吧，但具体要怎么说呢？比如'我们应该让你培养更多风险承受能力'这种话。

Okay, but so how do you say that the, like, we should let's get you more risk appetite.

具体怎么做？

How?

我会给

I'll give

你举个具体例子。

you so concrete example.

我们团队现在有个人，过去几年我们一直在合作，事情正是从你现在谈论的这个话题开始的。

There's somebody on our team now who we've been working with over the last few years, and it literally starts with this thing that you are talking about right now.

我们要投资那家公司。

We're going to invest in that company.

哦，不。

Oh, no.

不。

No.

不。

No.

不。

No.

但我们还是得解决这个问题，还得处理那个问题，而且我还有五个电话要打——哦，不。

But we still need to figure out this, and we still need to figure out this, and I have these five more call oh, no.

不。

No.

不。

No.

是的。

Yeah.

我们要投资那家公司。

We're going to invest in that company.

我们现在就去投资那家公司吧。

Let's go invest in that company now.

所以一开始你得用点强硬手段——就像这个例子，虽然我不便点名，但这个人明明非常擅长本职工作，遇到了无数好机会，却总能找出理由拒绝

And so you start with a little bit of a two by four because you can see, you know, in this example I'm not gonna name names, but in this example, like, this person is so good at what they do, and they come across so many interesting opportunities, and they come up with a reason to pass

每一个机会。

on all of them.

嗯。

Mhmm.

所以在某个时刻，你不得不直接说：听着。

And so at some point, you just have to say, look.

这个就是好机会。

This is the good one.

明白吗？

Okay?

我们一起去做这个吧。

Let's go do this one together.

你这样多做几次。

And you do that a few times.

你通过示范来教学。

And you show you basically teach by showing.

然后从阿尔弗雷德或我或其他最后30%把关的人，逐渐过渡到我们只负责20%，再到10%，再到5%，最后这个人就能完全独立操作了。

And you go from it goes from, like, you know, Alfred or me or whoever is the last 30% to to now we're the last 20% to now we're the last 10% to now we're the last 5% to now this person's doing it on their own.

是的。

Yeah.

因为一旦你做过几次，你就会真正适应承担风险。

Because once you've done it a few times, you actually get comfortable with taking the risk.

在这种情况下，那个人是不是已经隐约觉得这是好的，而你只是在鼓励他们相信自己的直觉？

In those in this situation, is the person, like are they like, they kinda know it's good, and you're just encouraging them to trust their instinct?

是不是说要稍微提前一点结束这个过程？

Like, is it about, like, cutting off the process a little bit earlier?

这就是学习的关键吗？

Is that the learning?

这是在给他们一点勇气。

That's giving them a little bit of courage.

Pat提到的是，红杉的每个人来到这里时都带着很多所谓的‘成功’。

What Pat's referring to is, like, everybody here at Sequoia came with a lot of, quote, unquote, success.

他们都上过好学校。

They went to good schools.

他们之前都有出色的职业经历，都是优等生或顶尖学生。

They had great careers beforehand, and they were the a students or the a plus students.

在这个行业里，关键不在于不犯错误。

And in this business, it's not about not making mistakes.

正如我跟你们分享过的，我们表现最好的基金有50%的坏账率。

As I shared with you, our best performing fund had a 50% write off rate.

你有一半时间会犯错。

You're gonna make a mistake half the time.

是的。

Yep.

所以你只需要重新调整，从这个角度来思考问题。

And so you just have to, like, readjust and think about it from that perspective.

对。

Yeah.

我正想说完全一样的话。

I was I was gonna say the exact same thing.

这归根结底还是我们招聘的人选问题。

It goes back to the people we hire.

我们招聘的都是这些竞争心强的优等生。

The people we hire are these competitive overachievers.

勤奋刻苦。

Diligent.

他们中大多数人从小到大一直全科拿A。

Most of them got straight As their whole lives.

对。

Yep.

所以面试时最让他们不适但对我们最关键的问题是：你犯过最大的错误是什么？

And so one of the interview questions that is most uncomfortable for them but most important for us is what's your biggest mistake?

比如你人生中经历过最大的失败是什么？

Like what's the biggest failure you've had in your entire life?

通常最初会得到些敷衍答案，你得不断追问直到听到真实的案例——但很多加入我们团队的人其实没经历过多少失败，所以我们需要帮助他们适应这种心态，否则就难以取得突破性胜利。

And usually get some BS one and you kind of have to keep pushing until you get to a real one, but a lot of the people that join our team haven't had much failure, and so we kinda have to help them get comfortable with it because otherwise we're not gonna get the outlier wins.

要做好这门生意，你确实需要勇气。

To to do this business well, you really do need courage.

是啊。

Yeah.

确实需要。

You do.

你得能够...

You need to be able to hey.

你看，在两个极端情况下——要么为一家你一个月前、两个月前甚至一年前看过却放弃的公司支付离谱的价格。

You know, in in both extremes, if you're gonna pay a ridiculous amount for a company that you saw and passed a month ago or two months ago or a year ago Yep.

就像帕特对Snowflake做的那样

Like Pat did with Snowflake

嗯。

Mhmm.

你必须拥有真正的勇气。

You have to have real courage.

他本可以在一年前决定放弃时投资Snowflake，现在却要放下自尊承认，好吧。

He could have invested a year ago in Snowflake when he decided to pass, and he's like, it's to swallow his pride and actually say, okay.

我犯了个错误。

I made a mistake.

尽管听起来很荒谬，但这一轮我要加码投资。

I'm gonna pay up for this round even though it sounds ridiculous.

我决定这么做。

I'm gonna do it.

完全同意。

Totally.

另一个极端情况是，当所有人都看不上这家公司时。

Or the other extreme where you're like, nobody likes this company Yeah.

全世界只有你看好它。

Anywhere in the world except you.

没错。

Yes.

但这确实是一家好公司。

But it's a really good company.

顺便说一句，这种勇气的事情总是让我觉得在历史故事中听起来非常整洁美好。

And by the way, this this courage thing is like it's the type of thing that always strikes me as very tidy and nice sounding in a historical story.

你知道，你会讲一个故事：我们做了DoorDash这轮投资，做了Snowflake这轮投资，当时所有人都觉得我们很蠢，然后看看结果如何。

You know, you you tell a story of we did this DoorDash round, this snowflake round, everybody thought we were stupid, and then look what happened.

但在当下，当你做了一件所有人都认为很蠢的事情时，我不得不像这样：嘿，伙计们。

But in the moment, when you do something where everybody thinks you're stupid, it's like I'd have to be like, hey, guys.

让我告诉你们我刚做的这笔交易。

Let me tell you about this deal I did.

然后你们转身离开时心想：杰克是真的蠢。

And you guys walk away, you're like, Jack's actually stupid.

就像，你知道的，在那一刻，当周围所有人——你的合伙人不同意你，其他公司的同行都觉得你不是那种‘可爱地犯蠢最后变成Snowflake’式的愚蠢——这种感觉并不好。

Like, you know, it's like well, like, the moment, it doesn't feel good when everybody around, like, your partners disagree with you, your, you know, peers at other firms are like, you're not, like, stupid in the cute, like, this turned into snowflake way.

就像，我们真的只是觉得你工作能力差，而且你得承受这种评价。

Like, we actually just think you're bad at the job, and, like, you have to sit with that.

我认为这对人们来说真的很难。

I think that's really hard for people.

我觉得你说得对，这确实很难，但这也是两种恐惧——害怕错过和害怕显得愚蠢——这两种恐惧阻碍人们做出正确决定。

I think you're right that it's really hard, but it's also the two fears, fear of missing out and fear of looking stupid, the two fears that prevent people from making the right decisions.

你必须设法屏蔽这些恐惧。

You kind have to block out those fears.

关于这一点，我们经常进行内省，对正确或错误的决策进行事后剖析和复盘。

On this note, we do a lot of introspection, postmortems, post parades on decisions that we got right or wrong.

就是特别关注那些极端决策，无论好坏，然后说：好吧，这个错得离谱，为什么？

Just kind of looking at the outlier decisions one way or the other and saying, Okay, this one really wrong, why?

这个做得非常对，为什么？

We got this one really right, why?

有意思的是，我们那些错得离谱的决策，如果玩'五个为什么'游戏——为什么？为什么？为什么？为什么？为什么？

What's interesting about the ones that we get really wrong, every single one of them, if you play the five whys game, like why, why, why, why, why?

每一个最终都归结为某种心理偏见或情绪陷阱。

Every single one of them comes down to some psychological bias or emotional trap.

完全正确。

Totally.

没有一个是计算错误导致的。

None of them come down to an error in calculations.

全都源于那些干扰你判断的潜在因素，我们已经将它们分类整理。

All of them come down to these background effects that were clouding your judgment, and we cataloged them.

我们列出了40种这类情况，这样就能用通俗语言来提前识别它们，从而在犯错前进行讨论。

We have a list of 40 of these things so that we can kind of like use the common vernacular and be able to kind of get in front of them so that we can have a conversation before we make that mistake.

比如：你们这里是否做到了政教分离？

Like, hey, do you have separation of church and state here?

什么是政教分离？

What's separation of church and state?

就是别让追逐的兴奋感影响你的临床决策。

Well, letting the thrill of the chase bleed over into your clinical decision making.

追逐的兴奋感是一种强烈的情感体验——你会爱上创始人，但之后必须冷静下来，抛开情绪，客观评估所有优劣风险，做出明智决策。

The thrill of the chase is a very passionate emotional thing where you're falling in love with the founder, But then you have to come back and put your emotions aside and clinically assess all the merits and risks and make a good decision.

因此将这两件事混为一谈是很自然的，但这可能会让你误入歧途。

And so it's pretty natural to commingle those two things, but that can lead you down the wrong path.

你们作为高级合伙人、管理者、合伙人...

How do you guys as senior partners, stewards, Partners.

合伙人。

Partners.

合伙人。

Partners.

平级合伙人。

Equal partners.

你们如何与资历较浅的年轻合伙人相处？当看到他们做出你认为虽勇敢但实质欠妥的举动时，会如何应对？

How do you how do you with younger partners who are newer, how do you react when you see them doing something where they're doing something that is courageous but you think is genuinely a bad idea?

太棒了。

Love it.

你会觉得，让他们自己吸取教训吧。

You're like, let them learn the lesson.

也许

Maybe

他们不是。

they're not.

保持好奇，而非评判。

Curious, not judgmental.

我们经常与合作伙伴进行的对话是：我注意到你做了这件事。

The conversation that we have with our partners all the time is I observed you doing this thing.

我很好奇为什么。

I am curious why.

当你以这种方式开启对话时，他们立刻会想：呃哦，我做错什么了吗？

When you start a conversation that way, they immediately are like, uh-oh, did I do something wrong?

但如果你真的出于好奇，这会让大家都变得更好。

But if you genuinely come from a place of curiosity, this is what makes us all better.

当有人加入我们的团队时，我们不希望David Khan变成另一个Alfred或另一个Pat。

When somebody joins our team, we don't want David Khan to become another Alfred or another Pat.

我们希望大卫·汗能成为他所能成为的最好的自己。

We want David Khan to become the best possible David Khan he can become.

所以如果大卫去做一些我和阿尔弗雷德不理解的事情，我会非常好奇。

And so if David goes off and does something that's not obvious to me or Alfred, I'm going be pretty curious.

我们知道这家伙才华横溢。

We know this guy is incredibly talented.

他看到了什么我们没看到的东西？

What does he see that we don't see?

他提出了什么我们目前工具包里没有的方法？

What method has he come up with that's not in our toolkit today?

因此我们更愿意让人们放手去做，哪怕犯些错误。

And so we would much rather let people just run, make some mistakes.

他们正在做我们无法理解的事情。

They're doing something that we don't understand.

他们连续做了四次，结果四次都失败了。

They do it four times in a row, and they're zero for four.

好的。

Okay.

现在我们会说，嘿，也许我们不想再那样做了。

Now we're going to say, hey, maybe we don't want to do that anymore.

但我们会从好奇心开始。

But we're going to start with curiosity.

什么

What

除了勇气之外，还有什么让你觉得非常共鸣的？

else besides courage would you sort of that was very resonant.

除了勇气之外，你还会灌输哪些其他经验教训来帮助人们更好地进行选择——这种选择包含非对称优势？

Besides courage, is there anything else that you would imbue as lessons to help people be better at picking as defined by including this asymmetric upside?

我认为与勇气相伴的另一件事是打好自己的比赛。

I think the the other that the other thing that comes with courage is to play your game.

比如，弄清楚你真正擅长什么。

Like, figure out what you're, like, uniquely good at.

就我个人而言，当我刚进入这个行业时，我对投资了解不多，只懂一点点。

Like, for me, when I got into this to this business, I knew not well, I knew a little bit about investing, but not really.

我在这里或那里做过一些种子投资。

I made some seed investments here or there.

是的。

Yeah.

当然。

Sure.

但这个行业的本质是确保你能与未来的顶尖企业合作。

But this business is about making sure you partner with the best companies of tomorrow.

你如何分解这个问题？

How do you break that down?

比如，你是以市场为导向的吗？

Like, do are you market led?

还是以创始人为导向？

Are you founder led?

我当时就觉得，嗯，这挺有意思的。

I just thought of it as like, well, that's interesting.

那创始人与市场契合度呢？

How about founder market fit?

所以我鼓励大家都这样思考——

And so I'd encourage everybody just like

创始人-市场契合度算是你的核心评估标准吗？

Founder how market fit is sort of your lens on things?

这就是我的核心评估标准。

It's my lens on things.

比如Uber，特拉维斯就是Uber的完美创始人。

Like, you can't really For Uber, Travis is like a perfect fit for Uber.

Airbnb的布莱恩也是完美契合。

For Airbnb, Brian's a perfect fit for Airbnb.

DoorDash的托尼同样是天选之人。

For DoorDash, Tony's like a perfect fit.

你没法让他们去实际运营别人的企业。

You can't you they can't go actually run someone else's business.

所以当你去接触一家公司时，首要考虑的是：这个人是否天生就该做这家公司？

So when you go into meeting a company, the top thing you're trying to figure out is, was this person made for this company?

这个人是否天生就该做这家公司并解决这个市场的问题。

This person made for this company and the problems of this market.

你是怎么做到的？

How do you do it?

其实就是通过提问和即兴交流。

Which is, like, by asking them questions and riffing with them.

他们都准备了推销话术，而我总是试着说'好吧'

And they all come prepared with a pitch, and I try to, like, say, okay.

除了这套说辞，你对这个行业还了解什么？

Beyond this pitch, what do you know about this industry?

为什么这个行业会让你感兴趣？

What why why is this industry interest interesting to you?

好的。

Okay.

你最初是为了解决自己的问题而开始的。

You started with a problem that you're solving for yourself.

你还想在这个过程中解决哪些其他问题？

What other problems do you wanna solve along the way?

如果这是你唯一想解决的问题，那空间就不大了，虽然能维持一段时间，但无法支撑你发展到第二阶段、第三阶段和第四阶段。

If that's the only problem you wanna solve, that's not a lot that would be some runway, but that's not going get you to Act two and Act three and Act four.

那些真正传奇的巨头公司，它们都经历了多个发展阶段。

The companies that are just mega legendary companies, they have multiple acts.

这一个问题就能引领你走很长的路。

That one can lead you a long, long way.

可能是十年甚至二十年，但大多数能长久存在并被视为传奇的公司，它们都持续了几十年。

It can be a decade or two decades, but most companies that are around for a long period of time and are considered legendary, they're around for a few decades.

当你接触一家公司时，是否已经预先构想过这家公司应该是什么形态，并据此判断创始人是否符合这种形态？

When you meet the company, have you already, like, visualized this is kind of what shape I think this company is, and I'm therefore trying to figure out if the founder sort of, like, fits that shape?

不。

No.

因为那意味着我知道某些事情，这很糟糕——我们红杉的前运营人员经常讨论这种情况：当你看到问题时会联想到某种场景。

Because that that would imply that I know something that would be bad because situation We often talk about this as for the former operators at Sequoia, you're likely to do that because you see a problem, you think about a situation.

是的。

Yeah.

我知道

I know what

这家公司将会发展成什么样子。

this company will become.

我知道它应该成为什么样子，然后你试图将自己的愿景强加给创始人。

I know what it should become, and then you're trying to force fit your vision onto the founder.

没错。

Yep.

这通常是个错误，因为如果是你的愿景而你强行套用，而创始人又不认同这个愿景，那就错了。

And that's usually a mistake because if it's your vision and you're force fitting that and the founder isn't aligned with that vision, that's a mistake.

另一个错误是，哦，你对这个行业了解这么多，创始人的素质如何其实并不重要，但实际上你并不运营这家公司。

And the other mistake is like, oh, you know so much about this industry, it doesn't matter if the quality of the founder is like, well, you don't actually run this company.

你必须真正让创始人来运营。

You actually have to let the founder run.

因此，我总是带着我们一直在讨论的好奇心来展开这些对话。

And so, I always approach these conversations with, as we kept talking about, curiosity.

在这个行业里，你必须保持极度、极度的好奇心，要深入追问五个层次的为什么、五个层次的做什么、五个层次的怎么做。

In this business, you just have to be very, very curious, and you have to ask questions five levels deep of why, five levels deep of what, five levels deep of how.

通过这个过程，你会与创始人产生共鸣，希望愿景能同时对你和创始人变得更加清晰。

And through that process, you riff with the founder, and hopefully, the vision gets more clear to you and to the founder at the same time.

听着，这至少是十年的旅程。

Look, this is a ten year journey at the minimum.

我认为在某些种子期公司的情况下，由于种子基金的规模越来越大，即使不成功，这也至少是五年的旅程。

I think in some of these situations with seed companies, because of how seed seed funds are becoming larger and larger, it's at least a five year journey even if it doesn't work.

完全正确。

Totally.

如果成功了，你知道，我现在还在Airbnb的董事会。

And if it works, you know, I'm still on the board of Airbnb.

就是这样。

That's it.

到现在已经快二十年了。

That's been a it's almost two decades now.

所以Jensen还在坚持做这件事。

And so then Jensen's still doing it.

是啊。

It's been Yeah.

三十年了。如果你想打造一家传奇地位的公司，就要找到愿意坚持几十年的创始人和团队。

Thirty So if you want to shoot for a legendary status company, you wanna find a founder and a team that wanna go for it for many decades.

是的。

Yeah.

而你自己可能也会在那个董事会待上十年或更久

And then you yourself may be on that board for a decade or

两个。

two.

是的。

Yeah.

你对创始人市场契合这个概念有类似的视角吗？

Do you have an equivalent lens to this founder market fit idea?

嗯，我能否先宏观地给出一个整体框架

Well, can I zoom out and give an overall framework on

你想从哪里开始都行？

Wherever you want?

选一个方向？

Picking?

好的。

Yeah.

好的，完美。

Okay, perfect.

我的视角是包含在这个框架内的，但其中有‘是什么’、‘为什么’和‘怎么做’三个层面。

And my lens fits within the framework, but there's the what, why, the how.

那么我们要寻找的是什么？

So what are we trying to find?

我们试图寻找未来最重要的公司，你可以这样理解：市场决定了公司能发展到多大规模，而创始人决定了公司将发展到多大规模。

We're trying to find the most important companies of tomorrow, And one way that you can think about that is the market determines how big the company can get and the founder determines how big the company will get.

因此市场和创始人显然是两个最重要的变量。

And so the market and the founder are by far the most important variables.

我们在市场中最关心的不是它现在有多大。

And the thing we care about in the market is not how big it is today.

而是它在十年或二十年后会有多大。

It's how big is it going be in ten or twenty years.

所以这更多是一个‘为什么是现在’的问题，而非‘今天存在什么’的问题。

So it's more of a why now question than a what exists today question.

因此‘是什么’部分，我们正在寻找未来最重要的公司。

So the what, we're looking for the most important companies of tomorrow.

为什么？

Why?

我们从事的是发掘非凡企业的业务。

We're in the outlier business.

我们必须承担风险。

We got to take risk.

如果我们真能与未来最重要的企业合作，那正是所有超额回报的来源。

If we can actually get into business with the most important companies of tomorrow, that's where all the outsized returns are going to come from.

如果我们总是只能获得两三倍的回报，就无法为有限合伙人实现我们的使命。

We don't serve our mission for our limited partners if we're just getting doubles and triples all the time.

我们实际上必须找到未来最重要的公司。

We actually have to find the most important companies of tomorrow.

这样也更有趣。

It's also way more fun.

你有没有试过与一家不成功的公司共同成长？又或者，你有没有体验过与一家成功的公司共同发展的过程？

Have you ever tried company building with a company that is not working versus have you ever tried company building with a company that is working?

与一家运转良好的公司共同发展是世界上最简单的事情。

Company building with a company that is working is the easiest thing in the world.

对吧？

Right?

所以这也更有趣。

And so it's way more fun.

至于具体方法，我们在挑选过程中投入了大量考量。

And then the how, there's a lot that goes into the picking that we do.

对吧？

Right?

其中部分原因是共同语言，正如阿尔弗雷德之前提到的，我们有一套规范。

So part of it is the shared language, And Alfred mentioned earlier that we a spec.

我们为种子投资、风险投资、成长投资和扩张投资都制定了规范。

We have a spec for seed investing, venture investing, growth investing, expansion investing.

这套规范其实就是一种共同语言。

The spec is just a shared language.

而针对增长阶段的共同语言就是：新兴市场领导者、独特且具吸引力的价值主张、可持续的竞争优势。

And the shared language for growth specifically is emerging market leader, unique and compelling value prop, sustainable competitive advantage.

如果你把这些标准映射到一组财务数据上，'新兴市场领导者'这一条本质上意味着这将成为未来重要市场中最具影响力的公司，这暗示着高收入规模。

And if you map those onto a set of financials, the emerging market leader piece basically says this will be the most important company in a market that is important tomorrow, which implies high revenue scale.

'独特且具吸引力的价值主张'中的'独特'表明你将获得良好的毛利率，因为你无需在价格上竞争。

The unique and compelling value prop piece unique suggests that you're going to have good gross margins because you're not having to compete on price.

'吸引力'则意味着你将拥有良好的运营利润率，因为你不需要花费大量资金在销售和营销上就能让人们接受你的产品。

Compelling suggests that you're going have good operating margins because you don't have to spend a lot of money on sales and marketing to get people to adopt your product.

可持续竞争优势意味着，这些优质利润率在可观收入规模上产生的自由现金流将会持续一段时间。

And then sustainable competitive advantage says that the free cash flow produced by those nice margins on that nice revenue scale is going to be around for a while.

这些就是我们在一家企业中寻找的特质。

Those are the characteristics we're looking for in a business.

回到我早先说的关于创始人和市场是最重要的因素，当一家公司进入增长阶段时。

Back to what I said earlier about the founder and the market being the most important thing, by the time a company reaches the growth stage.

如果创始人如你所想的那样优秀，那么这些特质很可能已经显现出来了。

If the founder is as good as you think they are, chances are these characteristics have materialized.

因此即使在增长阶段，我们最关心的其实还是创始人。

So the thing we care about most even at the growth stage is actually the founder.

但验证这位创始人是否如我们所想的那么优秀，就要看这些特质是否已开始在业务中显现。

But the sanity check on is this founder as good as we think they are is whether or not these characteristics have started to show up in the business.

至于如何系统化操作，我们和其他人一样有个漏斗筛选流程，我们很早就意识到最重要的决策其实并非周一做出的最终决定。

And then in terms of mechanizing that, we have a funnel like anybody does, and we realized a long time ago that the most important decision is actually not the final decision that happens on a Monday.

最重要的决策是漏斗中段的筛选决策，它决定了哪些项目能进入周一的终审。

The most important decision is the mid funnel decision that determines what gets to a Monday.

当项目进入周一终审阶段时，我们已相当擅长做出决策。

By the time it gets to a Monday, we're pretty good at making the decision.

我们最大的失误往往来自那些根本没能进入周一终审环节的项目。

Our biggest misses are the things that don't even make it till Monday.

就是你虽然看过，但没在真正值得投入时间的项目上花够功夫。

Is you looked, but you didn't spend real time on something that deserved it.

完全正确。

Exactly right.

因此，对于这些漏斗中期的决策，我们建立了更好的流程规范。以前我们只是会议一个接一个开个不停。

And so having better hygiene around those mid funnel decisions, we used to just go back to back meeting to meeting to meeting meeting.

现在，如果会后不留出时间进行复盘讨论，就不能召开会议，这样我们才能具体讨论一下大家对这次会议的看法。

Now you can't have a meeting if you don't save time afterwards for a debrief so that we can have a concrete conversation about what did everybody think about this meeting?

有哪些优缺点？

What are the pros and cons?

核心论点是什么？

What's the thesis?

那么接下来我们该怎么做？同样地，回到我们现有的CRM系统，你参加的每一次会议都要在系统中录入评分。

Where do we go from And similarly, back to our CRM system that we have, every single meeting you take, you put a rating in the system.

你需要根据机会质量进行评分，0到10分，不允许打5分。

You're rating it on quality of the opportunity, zero to 10, no fives.

顺便说一句，这些方法都不是完美的。

And so we just have this kind of by the way, none of that is perfect.

这些都不能保证我们一定能做出好的决策。

None of that guarantees that we're going to make good decisions.

我们只是努力每天进步一点点，希望随着时间推移，最终能获得更多成功而非失败。

It's just trying to get a little bit better every day so that over time, hopefully, we end up with more wins and losses.

我们相信持续复利的力量。

We believe in consistent compounding.

对。

Yeah.

就是不断重复这个过程，调整、调整、再调整、再调整。

So just doing this over and over and over again, adjust, adjust, adjust, adjust.

没错。

Yeah.

因为这种复盘机制，我们五年前可能还没有。

Because the debrief thing, we didn't have probably five years ago.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.