RWH003：如何在投资游戏中获胜——与乔尔·格林布拉特对话

华尔街已经有十三年没有上涨了。

Wall Street hadn't gone up in thirteen years.

市场没有上涨，离开的人也不多。

The market hadn't gone up and not many people left.

我跟那些去了的人谈过。

The people who went, I talked.

我知道有些朋友总是跟我讲他们的成功事迹和正确决策之类的。

I know there were friends who always told me about their winners and what they did right and everything else.

后来我基本上不再跟这些人来往了，因为世界很大。

And basically stopped talking to those people because it's a big world out there.

当然，你总会错过成千上万个本可以、应该、可能买入的东西。

Of course, you're going to miss thousands of things that woulda, coulda, shoulda bought.

如果你只专注于你正在做的事情并且做得很好，这才是你需要明白的。。

If you just concentrate on the things that you're working on and they do well, that's really what you have to realize.

至于比特币，就像沃伦·巴菲特说的，把它归入两心牌游戏。

Bitcoin, throw in, as Warren Buffett would say, the two heart pile.

我为什么不该寻找那些一英尺高的障碍？

Why shouldn't I look for the one foot hurdles?

对我来说这是个十英尺高的障碍。

To me is a 10 foot hurdle.

我不知道该如何评估它的价值。

I don't know how to value it.

我很自律地没有参与其中。

I feel disciplined that I didn't play.

威廉，当你观察围绕比特币的行为时，我找不到比'狂热'更贴切的词了，你真的能看到这种强烈的信仰。

William When you look at the behavior around Bitcoin, the kind of, I can't think of a better word than zealotry, you really see this intense belief.

在许多持有者中，这几乎像是对比特币的一种宗教信仰。

It's almost like a religious belief in Bitcoin among a lot of the owners.

这里是否发生了根本性的改变，出现了一种新范式，真正带来了新事物？就像90年代末我们突然意识到那些.com公司，尽管存在泡沫，但确实有改变我们生活的真实价值。

Is there something that's fundamentally changed here, a new paradigm where there really is something new, where this is like in the late '90s where we suddenly realized that these .com companies, even though there was a bubble, there was something real that was going to change our lives.

或者你看着比特币和其他加密货币，认为这是1999、2000年的另一面，只是非理性繁荣的又一次爆发，人们就是这样容易冲动？

Or do you look at Bitcoin and the other cryptocurrencies and think it's the other side of 1999, 2000, that it's just another outbreak of irrational exuberance, and this is just how people get?

我必须完全诚实地讲，我对此持不可知论态度。

And I must say this totally honestly, I'm agnostic here.

不知道。

Don't know.

威廉，是啊。

William Yeah.

你问错人了。

You're asking the wrong guy.

我站在你这边。

I'm in your camp.

我不知道。

I don't know.

我经历得够多，明白自己对大多数事情都一无所知。

And I've been around long enough to know that I don't know most things.

我只知道少数几件事。

I know a few things.

所以我坚持投资于我所知的少数领域。

And so I stick to investing in the few things that I know.

人们曾试图向我论证比特币的各种用途或它应该存在的理由。

People have tried to make a case for me for the various uses for Bitcoin or why it should stay.

我不能说我完全不屑一顾。

I can't say I'm completely dismissive.

我并非完全持否定态度。

I'm not completely dismissive.

我是说，哎呀，我真的搞不明白这个。

I'm saying, Gee, I really can't figure this out.

我没有任何依据来判断它会涨还是跌。

I have no basis on which to say it's going to go higher or lower.

我不得不承认某些艺术品确实非常精美且可能很有价值，真正优秀画家的作品会持续保值，而其他艺术品则不然，甚至现在价格高昂的作品也可能不是好的投资选择。

I would have to admit that certain art is very nice and maybe valuable and will continue to have value from really good painters and other isn't, other pieces of art aren't, or even things that are expensive now may not be good investments.

这全在观者眼中。

It's in the eye of the beholder.

我真的不知道。

I don't really know.

关于比特币有各种各样的论点。

There's all kinds of arguments for Bitcoin.

嗯，还有很多其他加密货币。

Well, there's plenty of other cryptocurrencies.

供应量有限吗？

Is there a limited supply?

供应量不是有限的吗？

Is there not a limited supply?

比特币实际上有个名字，所以它是个品牌。

Bitcoin actually has a name and so it's a brand.

也许它会像一些伟大的印象派画家那样发展出一个名字并保持其价值，甚至可能成为一种货币。

Maybe that stays and maybe it stays like some of the great impressionists develop a name and they keep their value over time and they do become thirty:fifty a kind of currency.

我不知道。

I don't know.

你的孩子们会因为这个唠叨你吗？

Do your kids nag you about this?

我记得有一次我女儿玛德琳对我说，爸爸，你为什么不买比特币？

I remember my daughter, Madeline, at one point saying to me, Dad, why don't you own Bitcoin?

我还记得霍华德·马克斯的儿子告诉他，你需要持有比特币。

And I remember Howard Marks' son telling him, You need to own Bitcoin.

我觉得霍华德确实有点开窍了，他说，是啊，可能有些东西我没理解。

Howard, I think, did kind of open his eyes a bit and say, Yeah, maybe there's something I'm not understanding.

我在想这是不是代际差异的问题，年轻一代会施加压力让你跟上时代、开阔眼界，还有那种对家庭理财持'好吧老古董'的态度？

I'm wondering if this is a generational thing where you see pressure from your kid's generation to smarten up and open your eyes and the sort of okay boomer kind of attitude towards household focus?

威廉，在很多方面我确实觉得自己是个老古董，但我不会投资一个自己几乎不了解、也不擅长预测的领域。

William I definitely feel okay boomer in many areas, but I'm not going to invest in an area that I know very understand little about, not very good at predicting.

如果我有其他我认为自己懂行的选择，我想我会坚持在那里，而且我并不觉得遗憾。

If I have other choices where I do think I understand the game, I think I'm going to stay there and I don't feel bad.

我的一个合伙人作为程序员为我们做了很多计算机方面的工作。

One of my partners does a lot of computer work for us as a computer programmer.

我记得他结婚时收到了2枚比特币，那时每枚大概60美元。

I think for his wedding, he got 2 Bitcoins, I think when they were at $60 each.

我想他现在还留着其中一枚。

I think he still has one of them.

所以并不是说我很晚才接触到这个。

So it's not like I wasn't exposed to this pretty early on.

只是这不是我的专长领域。

It's just not my game.

我能教给孩子们的东西不多。

There's not much I can teach my kids.

我一开始就承认了这一点。

I admitted that upfront.

其实我认为这里有一个非常有力的教训可以教给你的孩子，那就是只参与你有能力获胜的游戏。

Actually think there's a really powerful lesson there to teach your kids, which is just the discipline to play games that you're equipped to win.

根据我多年来与众多优秀投资者的访谈，这一点在我看来是如此一致——坚持只参与你有优势的游戏。

That seems to me from all of the interviews that I've done with so many great investors over the years, that's so consistent, that discipline to stick with games where you have an advantage.

威廉，我认为你说得对，但如果你真的想参与这类游戏，拿出一小部分投资组合来尝试也未尝不可——可能是为了学习，也可能是以防自己看漏了什么。

William I think that's true, but also not crazy in my mind if you want to play these games to put a small portion of your portfolio, maybe to learn, maybe just in case you're not seeing something.

去赌场玩，可能输掉几百美元后我会觉得难受。

Go to the casino and maybe I'll lose a couple $100 after that, I feel bad.

我知道胜算不在我这边。

I know the odds are against me.

我又不会算牌。

I'm not counting cards.

所以看看周围还是挺有意思的。

So it's fun to see and look around.

只要控制在投资组合的1%到2%以内，想怎么玩都行，开心就好。

If you limit it to one or 2% of your portfolio, do whatever you want or have a good time.

说不定还能学到点东西。

Maybe you'll learn something.

不知道该说什么了。

Don't know what to say.

我仍然认为这是一种纪律，意味着用剩下的98%去做你擅长的事。

I still consider that discipline, meaning doing with the other 98% what you know how to do.

我并非看不起任何尝试新事物的人。

I'm not looking down my nose at anyone who tries something new.

这某种程度上是你学习的方式。

It's kind of the way you learn.

我认为你只需要合理控制投机性投资的规模就够了。

I think you just have to size your bets appropriately for speculation and that's all.

我不想极端地说'我永远不会碰那个'。

I don't want to be extreme and say, I'll never touch that.

我的自律性很强。

I'm so disciplined.

我想极端地说'我永远不会用我在乎的钱去碰那个'。

I want to be extreme in saying, I'm never going to touch that with money I care about.

这是我的娱乐资金或诸如此类的钱。

This is my fun money or whatever it might be.

那么也许我能学到些东西，说不定还能中个彩票。

Then maybe I'll learn something and maybe it'll be a lottery ticket.

我也不知道。

I don't know.

我有几笔风险投资，明知可能很愚蠢，但在那些领域里我渴望学习并观察结果。

I have a couple of venture capital investments that I've made that I know are probably stupid, but in their areas I'm interested in learning and seeing what happens.

没有什么比真金白银投入更能看清事态发展了。

There's nothing like having money on the line to see what happens there.

所以我仍然，第一，对事情能顺利发展抱有希望。

So I'm still, A, hopeful that things work out.

我投资了一家很小的电池技术公司，我认为它可能会改变世界，但也很可能破产。

I'm invested in a very small battery technology company that I think may change the world and likely will go bankrupt.

这将是个有趣的观察过程。

That's going to be fun to watch.

当然，我不会把投资组合的大部分押在这上面，但我觉得在这个领域学习很有趣。

Of course, I'm not going to put a big part of my portfolio in it, but I think it's fun to learn in that area.

所以如果你能正确理解事物的背景，合理评估它们的规模，我不想对任何事情制定硬性规定。

So there's if you contextualize things correctly, if you size them correctly, I I don't want to make any hard and fast rules about anything.

我对这方面已经足够了解了。

I've I I know enough about that.

我们稍事休息，听听今天赞助商的内容。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

你持有的比特币越多，面临的挑战就越复杂。

The more your Bitcoin holdings grow, the more complex your challenges become.

最初简单的自我托管如今已演变为家族遗产规划、复杂的安全决策，以及应对一个失误就可能让世代财富付诸东流的高风险局面。

What started as a simple self custody now involves family legacy planning, sophisticated security decisions, and navigating situations where a single mistake could cost generations of wealth.

标准服务并非为应对这些高风险现实而设计。

Standard services weren't built for these high stakes realities.

这就是为什么长期投资者选择Unchained Signature——一项为认真持有比特币并寻求专业指导、稳健托管及长期合作伙伴关系的客户提供的高端私人服务。

That's why long term investors choose Unchained Signature, a premium private client service for serious Bitcoin holders who want expert guidance, resilient custody, and an enduring partnership.

通过Signature服务，您将拥有专属客户经理，他们理解您的目标并全程为您提供帮助。

With signature, you're paired with your own dedicated account manager, someone who understands your goals and helps you every step of the way.

您将享受尊贵的一对一服务，包括当日紧急支持、个性化教育、降低的交易手续费，以及独家活动和功能的优先参与权。

You get white glove onboarding, same day emergency support, personalized education, reduced trading fees, and priority access to exclusive events and features.

Unchained的合作托管模式旨在提供与全球顶级比特币托管机构同等级别的安全防护，同时满足那些希望自主掌控私钥的用户需求。

Unchained's collaborative custody model is designed to provide the same security posture as the world's biggest Bitcoin custodians, but for those who prefer to hold their own keys.

了解更多关于Unchained Signature的信息，请访问unchained.com/preston。

Learn more about Unchained signature at unchained.com/preston.

结账时使用优惠码Preston 10，可享受首年10%折扣。

Use code Preston 10 at checkout to get 10% off your first year.

比特币不仅关乎当下生活，更关乎世代传承。

Bitcoin isn't just for life, it's for generations.

当你经营小企业时，雇佣合适的人选能带来天壤之别。

When you're running a small business, hiring the right person can make all the difference.

合适的招聘人选能提升团队实力、提高生产力，并将业务推向新高度。

The right hire can elevate your team, boost your productivity and take your business to the next level.

但寻找这样的人选本身就像一份全职工作。

But finding that person can feel like a full time job in itself.

这时LinkedIn招聘就能派上用场了。

That's where LinkedIn jobs comes in.

他们新推出的人工智能助手能消除招聘中的猜测环节，为你精准匹配符合要求的顶尖候选人。

Their new AI assistant takes the guesswork out of hiring by matching you with top candidates who actually fit what you're looking for.

它无需你翻阅成堆的简历，而是根据你的标准筛选申请人并突出显示最佳匹配，既节省时间又能在合适人选出现时快速行动。

Instead of sifting through piles of resumes, it filters applicants based on your criteria and highlights the best matches, saving you hours and helping you move fast when the right person comes along.

最棒的是这些优秀候选人已经在LinkedIn上了。

The best part is that those great candidates are already on LinkedIn.

事实上，通过LinkedIn招聘的员工比通过主要竞争对手招聘的员工留任至少一年的可能性高出30%。

In fact, employees hired through LinkedIn are 30% more likely to stick around for at least a year compared to those hired through the leading competitor.

第一次就招对人。

Hire right the first time.

免费发布职位请访问linkedin.com/studybill，然后使用LinkedIn职位的新AI助手进行推广，让寻找顶尖候选人变得更轻松快捷。

Post your job for free at linkedin.com/studybill then promote it to use LinkedIn jobs new AI assistant, making it easier and faster to find top candidates.

免费发布职位请访问linkedin.com/studybill。

That's linkedin.com/studybill to post your job for free.

条款与条件适用。

Terms and conditions apply.

你知道是什么让顶尖企业脱颖而出吗？

You know what sets the best businesses apart?

正是他们如何利用创新将复杂性转化为增长。

It's how they leverage innovation to turn complexity into growth.

这正是亚马逊广告借助AWS人工智能技术正在实现的目标。

That's exactly what Amazon ads is doing powered by AWS AI.

亚马逊广告每天处理数十亿实时决策，优化310亿美元广告生态系统的表现。

Every day, Amazon ads processes billions of real time decisions, optimizing ad performance across a $31,000,000,000 advertising ecosystem.

最终实现的广告活动运行速度快30%，并带来可衡量的规模化商业影响。

The result is campaigns that run 30% faster and deliver measurable business impact at scale.

而这正是亚马逊自身推动增长的方式。

And this is how Amazon itself drives growth.

他们的智能代理AI将营销从资源密集型流程转变为智能自主系统，最大化投资回报率，并让营销人员能专注于创意和策略。

Their agentic AI transforms marketing from a resource heavy process into an intelligent autonomous system that maximizes ROI and empowers marketers to focus on creativity and strategy.

亚马逊广告证明，AI驱动的广告不仅是未来趋势，更是新的竞争优势。

Amazon Ads is proving that AI driven advertising isn't just the future, it's the new competitive advantage.

更棒的是，每家企业都能运用亚马逊内部完善的创新策略手册。

And better yet, every enterprise can apply the same innovation playbook that Amazon perfected in house.

了解亚马逊广告的故事，请访问aws.comai/rstory。

See the Amazon Ads story at aws.comai/rstory.

网址是aws.com/ai/rstory。

That's aws.com/ai/rstory.

好的。

All right.

回到节目。

Back to the show.

威廉刚才谈到

William talked a bit

你的第一个绝妙策略——构建一个专注于特殊情境、不对称赌注的集中投资组合，这些就像一英尺高的跨栏，其他人根本没注意到。

about your first great mousetrap, this idea of having a concentrated portfolio of special situations, unfair bets, things that were kind of one foot hurdles that other people weren't looking at.

这让我在某种程度上意识到，第二个伟大的商业模式——如果我的理解没错的话——是当你开始转向更好的企业，至少作为投资组合的一部分时。我认为这个转变大约发生在2000年，当时你逆向分析了巴菲特对可口可乐的投资策略，然后想到：等等，也许我可以用同样的方法投资穆迪。

And it struck me in some ways that the second great mousetrap, if I'm thinking about this correctly, was when you started to shift towards better businesses, at least as part of your portfolio, which I think that evolution happened around 2000 when you reverse engineered what Buffett had done with Coca Cola and said, Well, wait a second, maybe I can do the same thing with Moody's.

我想知道你是否能谈谈这个转变过程，以及你从巴菲特身上学到的关于伟大企业的特质。

And I wondered if you could talk a bit about that evolution and what you learned from Buffett about what makes a company great.

是什么让你开始思考：或许除了购买这些极度便宜的公司外，还有另一种同样高效的投资方式？

What made you start to think maybe actually instead of just buying these ultra cheap companies, maybe there's another way to play this game that is also really effective?

威廉 没错。

William Right.

所以为了改变这一点，即使读了足够多巴菲特的书并追随他的一切做法，其实早在1990年前，我就想说我想买好企业。

So just to change that, even reading enough Buffett and following everything he does, really even before 1990, I would say I wanted to buy good businesses.

我只是想捡便宜，但我什么都想要。

I was just cheap, but I wanted everything.

我在经营五年后缩减业务规模并退还所有外部资金的原因之一，就是我想同时拥有便宜和优质的企业。

One of the reasons that I downsized my business after five years and then gave back all the outside capital is because I wanted to own both cheap and good.

如果找不到太多这样的机会，那很遗憾，我只能退回资金，坚持投资既便宜又优质的企业。

It's too bad if I can't find that much of this, I'm just going to give back money and just stay in cheap and good.

我确实理解优质企业。

I do understand good.

我认为你提得很好，我什么时候会愿意为好企业支付在我看来很高的价格或公允价值？

I think you properly bring up, well, when could I pay what in my mind was a lot of money or fair value for something in a good business?

这正是你提到的关键点。

And that's what you're bringing up.

穆迪是我最早愿意支付超过20倍市盈率的企业之一。

Moody's was one of the first that I was willing to pay over 20 times earnings for.

当时主要是因为利率要高得多。

At that time was a lot because interest rates were much, much higher.

它是最佳企业之一，因为不需要资本投入，而且拥有品牌和特许经营权，行业内参与者寥寥无几。

Was one of the best businesses out there because it took no capital and they had a brand and a franchise and there were only a few people in there.

穆迪公司有很多优势。

There were a lot of good things about Moody's.

我其实非常喜欢这个企业。

I actually love the business.

我按照你的建议，回溯分析了巴菲特收购可口可乐的案例。

I went back and reverse engineered, as you suggested, Buffett's purchase of Coca Cola.

我记得那大概是在1990年左右。

I believe that was in 1990 or so or whatever it was.

回过头看他当时的出价，并根据两家企业的差异做出调整。

Back to look at what he paid and made adjustments for the differences in the businesses.

比如可口可乐需要再投资部分资金以实现增长，而穆迪基本不需要。

For instance, Coke had to reinvest some of its money to grow and Moody's really didn't.

所以你在穆迪能保留更多盈利。

So you got to keep more of your earnings in Moody's.

我愿意为此支付略高的价格，并相应调整估值。

I was willing to pay a little more and made an adjustment for that.

这相当于评估我现在为穆迪支付的价格，相对于巴菲特当年买可口可乐的价格——他随后五到八年里让资金翻了四倍左右。

Sort of went to see what am I actually paying for Moody's today relative to what Buffett paid for Coke, where he kind of quadrupled his money in the next five or eight years, whatever it was.

我觉得只要能获得那个回报率的任何比例就很不错了，尤其当我认定这是同类企业时。

And I thought any percentage of that would be pretty good for me, especially if I thought this was that kind of business.

结果表明，如果要进行同类比较，他为可口可乐支付了10美元。

It turned out that if you want to put apples to apples, he paid $10 for Coke.

当我做完所有调整后，按照这个等价基础计算，我们为穆迪支付了13美元。

When I made all the adjustments, we were paying $13 for Moody's on this equivalent basis.

如果10美元能翻四倍，那么13美元涨到40美元也相当不错，相比10美元涨到40美元，我认为支付这样的溢价是合理的，因为这些优质企业能以接近你认为值得购买的价格入手。

If the $10 was going to quadruple, 13 going to 40 was also pretty good as opposed to 10 going to 40 and thought that that was a reasonable premium to pay because these quality businesses that you can buy anywhere close to what you think they might be worth buying.

通过这样的比较，这个模型完美地引导我学会为那些极其优秀的企业支付溢价。

And so just comparing things, it was such a great model to use to get me into paying up for great, great businesses.

从某种意义上说，这是克隆策略在实际应用中的绝佳范例。

So in a sense, it's a beautiful example of cloning at work.

正如我在书中提到的莫尼什·鲍尔布里策略，即真正逆向解析那些更聪明、更有智慧或经验更丰富之人已得出的结论。

The strategy I talk about in my book from Monish Powerbry, where you really reverse engineer what someone who's smarter, wiser, or more experienced has figured out.

你会想，啊，我不需要重新发明轮子。

You say, Ah, I don't need to reinvent the wheel.

这正是他们的思考方式。

That's what they were thinking.

威廉，是的。

William Yeah.

我认为有时候原创思维被高估了。

I think sometimes original thinking is overrated.

我宁愿像世界上最聪明的人那样思考，他在我的领域里取得了最大的成功。

I'd rather think like one of the smartest guys in the world who's been the most successful in my area.

如果我能复制这一点，似乎是个合理的选择。

If I can copy that, seems like a reasonable thing to do.

所以我同意你的观点。

And so I agree with you.

威廉，你在某种程度上多年来一直从远处研究巴菲特，但我想我没说错的话，你直到很久以后才见到他，那时你带着你在哥伦比亚大学教的一个班级去拜访他。

William You were in some sense studying Buffet from afar for many years, but I think I'm right in saying that you didn't meet him until much later when you went to visit him with a class that you were teaching at Columbia.

我在想，你是否能谈谈那段经历，以及你从与大师亲身相处中学到了哪些无法仅通过阅读关于他的书籍或年度股东信就能领悟的东西。

And I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about that experience and what you learned from actually being in the presence of the master that you couldn't necessarily learn just from thirty:fifty reading books about him or reading his annual shareholder letter.

嗯，说实话，我认识到了自己其实非常害羞，尽管我期待这次会面已久。

Well, I'll tell you, I learned about myself that I'm incredibly shy because I had been looking forward to this for a long time.

因此当时见到这位在商业领域乃至生活方式上都堪称我偶像的人时，我表现得比预期更为拘谨。

And so I was a little more reserved than I wanted to be at that time, meeting my idol in my business and in many ways the way he leads his life.

那次会面中，他带我们所有人共进午餐，并进行了精彩的问答环节，这让我受益匪浅。

And what I took away from meeting with him and he took us all out to lunch and we had a great question and answer session.

虽然很多人通过影像资料见过他这样的互动，但亲身经历他专门为我的班级安排这场私人聚会，感受截然不同。

I think plenty of people have seen him do this on film in some way, but actually having it done in person just with my class, just taking us all out.

他把鼓鼓的钱包递给我保管，我还和他拍了张很棒的合影。

He handed me his fat wallet and I got a good picture with him.

我只想说，他如此成功却这般谦逊，让我深感震撼。他对整个班级包括我都倾注了大量时间、善意与优雅，看得出他真心乐在其中。

I would just say that I was stunned at how gracious he was, someone this successful, how much time and kindness and graciousness he had with the whole class that he had with me, that he really enjoyed it.

这就是我最大的感受——不知是否能算作一课，但我领悟到的是：哇，这位全球最受敬仰的成功人士之一，至今仍保持着如此谦逊与优雅的风范。

And that's most of what I I don't know if there's a lesson in there, but I guess the lesson I got was, wow, this is one of the most successful admired people in the world and he's still so humble and gracious.

这太不可思议了。

That's incredible.

而且与你遇到的大多数远不及他那样成就斐然、回馈社会的人相比。

And more than most people you meet who have nowhere near his level of accomplishment and contributing back society and everything else.

然而他却能如此谦逊、优雅且乐于分享。

And yet he was able to be so humble, gracious, and sharing.

我脑海中浮现的词汇是'榜样'。

The word role model is what comes to mind.

哇，能在现实生活中见证这一切真是太棒了，而且毫无夸张成分。

Wow, it was great to see it in real life and that wasn't hyped.

多么了不起的人啊。

What an amazing person.

如果你只是做些平凡的事，比如保持谦逊和优雅，也会产生深远影响。

If you just do ordinary things like be humble and gracious, it goes a long way.

这就是我最大的感悟。

That's what I walked away with.

真是个不可思议的人。

Just incredible human being.

离开后我对他更加钦佩了，这原本是件很难做到的事。

I admired him even more after I left, which was hard to do.

威廉，你认为近距离目睹这一切对你产生了持久的影响吗？

William And do you think seeing that up close has had an enduring effect on you?

这是否让你思考，想要变得更像那样？

Has it made you think, want to be more like that?

因为我认为亲眼目睹行为榜样具有巨大的力量，我记得有过类似的经历——我去洛杉矶采访查理·芒格，并参加了《每日新闻》的会议。

Because I think there's something about seeing the behavior model that's hugely powerful that I remember having a similar experience where I went to interview Charlie Munger in Los Angeles and I went to the Daily Journal meeting.

我记得之后——我在会议前采访了他，然后他进行了约两小时的问答环节。

And I remember afterwards, I'd interviewed him before the meeting and then he does something like two hours of question and answers.

然后这群人，这些门徒们又待了几个小时，他一直在回答问题。

And then these group is, these disciples kind of hang out for another couple hours and he just keeps answering questions.

我看着这位90岁老人家的仁慈，他始终耐心解答问题。

And I look at the kindness of this 90 year old guy who just keeps answering questions.

他向来以脾气暴躁、粗鲁著称，对愚人毫无耐心。

And he always had this reputation for being very gruff and bruce and not suffering fools.

但我想，天啊，其实他对待像我这样千里迢迢来见他的怪人时，展现的是深沉的仁慈。

And I thought, God, actually there's a deep kindness here in treating these weirdos like me who've come 3,000 miles to see him.

事实上，我记得那次会议上最深刻的就是这个，比他说过的话都更让我难忘。

And that actually, I remember that more than anything that he said, I think at that meeting.

真正看到这位身体虚弱的老人以——我不好意思在书里这么说，所以没直接说是爱——但确实就是爱的方式对待他的追随者们。

Was actually seeing this physically ailing old man treating his disciples with I was embarrassed to say this in the book, so I didn't actually say it was love, but it actually was.

那其中有一种真正的精神慷慨、善意与爱。

There was a real generosity of spirit and kindness and love to it.

我离开时对沃伦·巴菲特也有同样的感受。

I walked away feeling the same way about Warren Buffett.

显然他们已经共事很久了，这是有原因的。

Obviously they've been together for a long time and there's a reason for it.

我想这也更加独特。

I guess it's also more unique.

我是说，就像我说的，我认识很多成就不如他们的人。

I mean, like I said, I know many people less accomplished.

基本上除了我真正深爱的家人，我认识的所有人都是如此。

Pretty much anyone I know other than those I truly love in my family.

如果我们只谈论外界，我认识许多成就不如或成就很高但缺乏这些品质的人。

If we're just talking about the outside world, I know many people who are less accomplished or very accomplished, but less accomplished who don't have those qualities.

我经常思考这个问题。

I think about it a lot.

我希望自己至少能记住它对我的影响，并尽可能效仿其中的某些部分。

I would hope that I at times remember to what an impact it had on me and to the extent that I can emulate any piece of that.

当然，这是我会渴望做到的事情。

Of course, it's something that I would aspire to do.

但我认为这是两位非凡的三五十岁男性

But I think these are two extraordinary thirty:fifty men

为此感谢上帝。

and thank God for that.

他们对我以及众多其他人来说是多么好的榜样啊，能这样评价别人是件美好的事。

What role models for me and so many other people they've been, and that's a nice thing to say about somebody.

我记得尼克·斯利普曾在一次采访中对我说，是的，我们很幸运能与他们同处一个时代，活在同一时期。

I remember Nick Sleep once saying to me in the middle of an interview, he's like, Yeah, we're just lucky to be in the same generation as them, to be alive at the same time.

确实如此。

It is.

作为榜样，这非常了不起。

It's remarkable, the role model.

那么让我们来看看乔·格林布拉特提出的第三个伟大捕鼠器，从某种意义上说，这并不是一个新发明。

So let's go to the third great mousetrap that Joe Greenblatt came up with, which I think is the In a sense, it's not a new mousetrap.

这是对其他理论的提炼，那个神奇公式——你提取了巴菲特和格雷厄姆思想的精华，最终得出了两个非常简单的衡量标准，说明其实不必搞得那么玄乎复杂。

It's a distillation of the others, the magic formula where you took kind of the distilled essence of Buffett and Graham, and you came up with really two very simple metrics to say, Yeah, actually you don't need to be that exotic and complicated about this.

我想知道你是否能谈谈这个，因为你所做之事的纯粹简洁性给我留下了极其深刻的印象。

And I wonder if you could talk about that because it struck me just the sheer simplicity of what you were doing was tremendously powerful.

这对我自己的生活产生了重大影响。

That's had a big impact on my own life.

我在思考你是如何能够将投资这类非常复杂的游戏简化处理的。

I think about the ways in which you were able to play these very complicated games like investing and to simplify.

这几乎让我想到人生中的一个重要准则——将极度复杂的事物简化的能力

That strikes me almost as a master principle in life, the ability to reduce thirty:fifty tremendous complexity

提炼出简单而有效的精髓。

to a simple essence that works.

这个过程很有趣，我试图简化当初写《你也可以成为股市天才》时的思考过程，那本书讲述我在哥谭资本的特殊情况投资经历。

It's been interesting, the process of trying to simplify what was I thinking when I wrote You Can Be a Stock Market Genius about my years at Gotham and special situation investing.

其实写起来相当容易，因为我早就决定不会在这方面做太多研究。

It was actually pretty easy to write because early on I decided, well, I'm not going to do a lot of research on this thing.

只是想如实记录下当时的真实想法。

Just want to write down what was I thinking actually at that time.

我为什么要这么做？

Why did I do that?

因为如果写书前没做研究，那为什么要分享投资后才了解的内容呢？

Because if I didn't do the research before the book, well, why am I sharing something that I'm doing after I made the investment?

所以归根结底，还原当时的思考过程，用最简单的方式解释清楚，这就是我的出发点。

So boiling it down, what was I thinking at that time, explaining it in the simplest form started me out there.

写完《你也可以成为股市天才》后，我也意识到这本书其实是按MBA水平写的。

I also, after I wrote You Can Be a Stock Market Genius and realized it was really written at an MBA level.

后来我开始教MBA课程时意识到，天啊，如果没有相关背景知识，读者根本无法真正理解那本书的内容。

Then I realized that when I started teaching MBAs and realized that, boy, if you didn't have this background, you weren't really going to understand what I said in that book.

乔尔，这促使我进一步简化内容，因为写书的初衷并不是培养未来的对冲基金经理。

Joel And so started me on simplifying things even more because that wasn't the goal of writing a book to help a lot of future hedge fund managers.

真正的目的是教授投资之道。

It was really to teach investing.

因此在哥伦比亚大学任教时，每次设计新课程或使用案例时，我都力求简化以便更好地讲解。

And so when I had the opportunity at Columbia to teach, every time I thought of a new lesson to teach or use an example or whatever, I tried to simplify it so that I could explain it better.

正是这种写作与教学实践帮助我不断简化、再简化，直指问题的本质。

So just the practice of writing and teaching really helped me simplify, simplify, simplify to really get to the essence of what was I really saying.

当年在商学院时，我曾与两位挚友Rich Pazina和Bruce Newberg合写过一篇关于本杰明·格雷厄姆选股法的论文。

And back when I was in business school, I wrote with two great friends of mine, Rich Pazina and Bruce Newberg, a paper on Ben Graham stock picking.

他有个神奇公式：只购买股价低于清算价值的股票。

He had his own magic formula, which was buying stocks only when they were selling below liquidation value.

格雷厄姆总是持有30支左右符合该特征的股票组合，并证明其能战胜市场。

And Ben Graham always had a portfolio of 30 or so stocks that he bought that had those characteristics and showed how that would the market.

我的总结是：只要不亏钱，其他选择大多都是好的。

The way I'd boil that down is, well, if you can't lose money, most of the other alternatives are good.

如果你买得足够便宜，价格只有现金价值的一半，那很难亏得更多。

If you buy it cheap enough and it's selling at half its cash value, tough to lose much more.

所以只要不破产，结果很可能是正面的。

So it'll probably be positive if you're not going to go broke.

因为我深受巴菲特影响，宁愿买好生意也不愿在商业世界的渣滓中淘金——我渴望以便宜价格拥有优质企业。

Because I had been buffetized where I'd rather buy a good business rather than trolling in the dregs of the business world, I'd love to own a good business cheap.

我决定更新这项研究。

I figured I'd update that research.

曾与两位同窗好友合著过一篇《投资组合管理》期刊论文，我确实很想对其进行更新。

Had written a paper for the journal portfolio management with my two co students and friends, and I really wanted to update it.

我一直着迷于这样一个事实：就像格雷厄姆那样，仅仅买入一批具有特定特征的股票就能赚钱。

And I was always fascinated by the fact that just buying a pile of stocks that had certain characteristics like Graham did could make you money.

现在我有了更新的想法——我还想买入优质企业。

Now I have this updated idea that I I'd also want to buy good businesses.

如果我像在商学院时那样测试这个更新后的想法会怎样？

What if I tested this updated idea like I did back in business school?

2000年代初进行这项研究时，计算机条件比1979年好多了，我还雇了一位至今仍与我们共事的优秀程序员来测试这些想法。

And computers were a little better off than in 1979 when I went to do this in the early 2000s and hired a good computer programmer that still works with us to test these things.

我只是凭直觉决定，好吧，让我们找个粗略的标准来衡量'优质'，再找个粗略的标准来衡量'便宜'。

I just stuck my finger in the air and I said, all right, let's find a crude metric for good and let's find a crude metric for cheap.

衡量'优质'的粗略标准是高有形资本回报率。

Crude metric for good was high returns on tangible capital.

你读读巴菲特的信就会发现，这正是他寻找的标准。

You read through Buffett's letters, that's really what he's looking for.

除了无形资产因素外，这也是他考量的硬性标准之一。

And then besides the intangibles, but that's one of the criteria, that's one of the hard criteria he'd look at.

然后寻找在量化基础上显得便宜的企业——比如银行利率5%时，持有这家企业的收益能达到10%，而且预计还会增长，听起来就更划算。

Then looking for businesses that are cheap just on a quantitative basis where if you could get 5% in a bank and you could get 10% yield by owning the earnings of this business, And you thought it was going to grow, that sounds better.

所以我会选择买入。

So I'll go buy that.

越便宜越好。

The cheaper, the better.

于是我把这两者结合起来，想知道会发生什么。

And so combining those two, I wonder what would happen.

我们通过计算机运行了很长时间的数据，可以追溯到1987年。

Ran it through the computer over a long period of time where we had good data back to 'eighty seven.

结果证明效果非常好。

It turned out it worked really well.

买入既便宜又优质的企业。

Buying cheap and good businesses.

如果你这样做并按十分位分组，结果发现第一组胜过第二组，第二组胜过第三组，第三组胜过第四组。

If you did that and put them into deciles, it turned out that the top decile beat the second decile beat the third decile beat the fourth decile.

乔尔，有趣的是这个结论确实成立。

Joel Now, was interesting about that was that that was true.

你可以绘制一张漂亮的图表，显示越便宜越好的企业在未来表现更佳，不是回顾过去，而是展望未来。

And you could have a nice looking chart that showed the cheaper and better, the better it did going forward, not backwards, but forward.

按十分位数排序。

In order by decile.

但结果也显示，如果你在2000年进行这种投资，买入最便宜且表现最好的前十分之一股票，同时做空表现最差、最昂贵且无资本回报或亏损的后十分之一股票，即对看好的股票投入一美元，同时对最昂贵的股票做空一美元。

But it also turned out that if you were doing that kind of investing in the year 2000, where you bought the top decile, the cheapest and the best, and you shorted the worst decile, the most expensive and no returns on capital or losing money, and you put a dollar into the favorites and you shorted a dollar of the most expensive.

如果你那样做了，在2000年你会亏光所有钱。

If you did that, you would have lost all your money in the year 2000.

尽管如果你熬过血本无归的阶段，接下来几年情况会逆转。

Even though if you had lived past losing all your money, it would have reversed over the next few years.

众所周知，2000年价值股大幅回撤，高价股遭遇重创，但最终你本可以挽回所有损失。

The year 2000, as everyone knows, value stocks came way back and expensive stocks got crushed and you would have made all the money back.

我常说零的复利效果不佳。

I've often said zero doesn't compound very well.

知道这一点很有好处。

It's good to know.

换句话说，要做到这一点很难。

So in other words, it's hard to do that.

所以你可以做的一件事就是买入那些既便宜又优质的股票，期待获得良好回报。

So one thing you could do is just buy the cheap ones and the good ones and hope to get a good return.

在我写的一本几乎无人问津的书《大秘密》中，我总说它至今仍是个大秘密。

And in a book that I wrote called The Big Secret that almost no one read, and I always say it's still a big secret.

那本书里我长篇大论讨论过的一个无人关注的话题是：一个经理人真的优秀吗？

One diatribe I went on in that book that really no one read was looking at, is a manager actually good?

你该如何衡量这一点呢？

How should you measure that?

你是应该以基准为参照来衡量，还是应该以无风险利率为参照来衡量？比如说，如果我挑选了几只股票，预期能获得15%或20%的回报，而市场却上涨了25%，但我认为购买这些股票的风险非常低。

Should you measure it versus a benchmark or should you measure it versus, let's say, a risk free rate that if I'm picking a few stocks that I think I can make 15 or 20% on, if the market goes up 25, but I thought I was taking very little risk buying these things.

我对这些企业了如指掌。

I knew these businesses really well.

当时无风险利率是5%或3%，或者其他什么数值。

The risk free rate was 5% or 3% or whatever it was at the time.

我获得了15%的收益。

I got 15%.

我是个糟糕的投资者吗？

Am I a bad investor?

我也不知道我本可以买入的其他3000只股票是什么情况。

Or I don't know what the other 3,000 stocks I could have bought are.

我只了解我所知道的。

I knew what I knew.

我做了我的功课。

I did my work.

我稳稳地获得了15%或20%的回报。

I made a 15% or 20% return very securely.

我做得不错吧？

I do well?

所以实际上没有人真正注意到这个观点，无论是支持还是反对。

So no one really picked up on that one way or the other.

其他所有人都在关注基准测试之类的东西。

The rest of the world is on benchmarking and everything else.

如果你能长期实现15%或20%的回报率，我会说你是个相当不错的投资者。

If you can bang out 15 or 20% returns over time, I would say you're a pretty good investor.

而且很难衡量你承担了哪些风险。

And it's very hard to measure what are those risks you took.

这与你买入的股票波动幅度毫无关系。

It has nothing to do with how much the stock bounces around that you bought.

真正关键的是你面临多大的亏损风险？

It really has to do with what was the risk that you would lose?

你承担的风险是否仅略高于无风险利率？

Did you take very little more risk than let's say the risk free rate?

你到底是不是个优秀的投资者？

Are you a good investor or not?

这就是我之前讨论的内容。

That was just the discussion I had.

所以我认为如果你买入那批顶级股票，你就能处于相当有利的位置，赚取可观收益——即使经风险调整后，也远优于无风险利率。

So I think if you buy that top group, you're in pretty good shape that you're going to make good money, much better than the risk free rate, even on a risk adjusted basis.

威廉，我在推特上发了个请求，告诉大家我周四要采访乔·格林布拉特。

William I put out a request on Twitter where I said to people, I'm going to interview Joe Greenblatt on Thursday.

你们有什么问题要问吗？

Do you have any questions here?

我对我收到的海量回复感到震惊。

And I was amazed at the enormous number responses that I got.

人们反复询问的一个问题，我想说的是，就是神奇公式是否已经失效，它是否还像以前一样有效，以及你是否仍然相信它。

One of the recurring things that people ask a lot, I would say, is whether the magic formula has become less effective, whether it still works as well as ever, whether you still believe in it.

还有很多人想知道，你是否看过托比亚斯·卡莱尔的方法，他说实际上你可以调整乔尔的方法，完全忽略业务质量的衡量标准，只专注于低价股票，忽略投资资本回报率，只关注企业价值与运营收益的比率。

And also there were a bunch of people who wanted to know, have you looked at things like Tobias Carlisle's approach, where he says, Actually, you could tweak Joel's approach and totally ignore the measure of business quality and just focus exclusively on cheap stocks, ignoring return on invested capital, just focusing on, I think he says, enterprise value to operating earnings.

而且实际上你会做得更好，因为低价融资股票往往会随着时间回归均值。

And you'd actually do even better because cheap, financed stocks tend to revert to the mean over time.

所以还有一种更简单的方法，可能比你用神奇公式识别出的'又好又便宜'股票策略更有效。

So there's an even simpler approach that might work better than the simplicity of the cheap and good stocks that you were identifying with the magic formula.

我知道刚才说了很多，但你的头脑比我更敏锐。

Know I've thrown a lot at you there, but you have a better mind than I do.

你能告诉我们这些观点中是否有任何是有效的吗？

Can you update us on whether any of these thoughts are valid?

这本小书的乐趣在于，我并没有让计算机运行成千上万次，然后说‘两个指标，便宜和优质，好吧，这样效果最好’

The fun of the little book was that I did not spin the computer thousands of times and say, two items, cheap and good, okay, that worked the best.

我没有那样做。

I didn't do that.

我说，让我想一个衡量便宜的粗略指标。

I said, Let me think of a crude metric for cheap.

让我想一个粗略的指标来区分优劣股，组合成一个投资组合，看看效果如何。

Let me think of a crude metric for good, split them, put together a portfolio and see what happens.

这是我们最初进行的测试。

Was the very first test we ran.

它效果很好。

It worked well.

我还为此写了一本书。

I wrote a book about it.

我并不是说，我让计算机运行了上千次才得出这个最佳方案。

It wasn't meant to say, I spun the computer thousands of times and I came up with this and this was the best one.

我说，这很合理。

I said, This makes sense.

然后我们做了一个我认为相当有效的测试，结果出奇地好且有序。

And then we did one test, which I think is pretty valid and it worked incredibly well and in order.

所以我认同'低价策略'也非常有效的观点。

And so I agree with the work that cheap also works very, very well.

只不过它波动性更大。

Happens to be more volatile.

所以这取决于你如何衡量收益或风险。

So it depends how you measure returns or risk.

我也不用波动性来衡量风险。

I don't measure risk by volatility either.

事实证明，如果你投资那些能产生大量现金流的企业，通常它们的资本回报率都很不错。

It also turns out that if you're buying big cash flow generating businesses, usually they're getting good returns on capital.

这样想吧，如果你开一家店能获得30%的收益，再开新店时我就得更新案例了。

Think about it this way, if you open a store and make 30%, if you open a new store and I got to update my examples.

但如果你开一家店能在有形资本上获得30%的回报，这已经相当不错了。

But if you open a store and earn 30% returns on tangible capital, that's pretty good.

世界上没多少地方能让你的资金获得30%回报，所以也许你该再开一家店。

Not many places in this world you can take money and get 30% returns, so maybe you should open another store.

当然，如果能开一家资本回报率达60%的店，听起来就更好了。

And of course, if you can open a store and earn 60% on capital, that sounds better.

但真正的问题是：我能开一千家回报率30%的店，还是只能在回报率下降前开三四家60%的店？

But the real question is, can I open a thousand of those stores that earn 30% and only three or four stores that earn 60% before that return comes down?

那么哪种才是更好的长期投资？

Then which is the better long term investment?

必须确保有形资本回报足够可观。

Has to be good enough return on tangible capital.

当你写书告诉人们'只需买少数几家好公司'时，你要确保它们既便宜又优质，而不是像买上千家公司那样指望其中200家会比另外200家表现更好。

When you're writing a book and telling people, just buy a handful of companies and you want to make sure they're cheap and good, not like you're buying thousands of companies and this 200 will do better than this 200 or whatever.

你不是在购买200家公司。

You're not buying 200 companies.

所以我希望确保人们投资安全、价格低廉且优质。

So I wanted to make sure people were safe and cheap and good.

我仍然认为这非常有效。

I still think it's very valid.

我不会对数据提出异议，只想说如果单纯买便宜的股票确实表现更好，但波动性也更大。

I won't argue with any of the data other than to say that if you just buy cheap, it does do better, but it's also more volatile.

我用两种方式管理投资组合，效果都不错。

I run portfolios both ways and they're both good.

我想说的是，我们从2010年开始运行的一个投资组合，我相信那完全是基于购买廉价股。

What I will say is that we've run a portfolio since 2010, I believe that's just strictly buying cheap.

实际上是质优价廉。

It's actually cheap and good.

还包含了有形资本回报率的考量。

Has an element of return on tangible capital.

这不是五五开。

It's not fiftyfifty.

这个策略表现极其出色，几乎与标普500指数不相上下，这非常惊人，但它实际上是一个深度价值投资组合，在那段时间里碾压了所有其他价值投资组合。

And that's done incredibly well, almost as good as the S and P 500, which is incredible, but it's a deep value portfolio, which has crushed any value portfolio during that time.

我们还有大量关于我称之为'价值1000'的数据。

And we also have a lot of data on, I call it the value 1,000.

我们还拥有大量关于排序的数据，这是一个约600至700只股票的组合，权重倾向于从最大的1000只股票中挑选出的低价股。

We also have a lot of data of just ordering, it's about a 600 or seven 100 stock portfolio that's weighted towards cheapness chosen from the thousand largest.

我拥有这个投资组合的大量历史数据。

I have a lot of data over history on this portfolio.

数据显示，按照当前定价方式，我们观察标普500及其估值水平，未来两年可能只有个位数回报。

What it would show you is the way it's priced today, the way we look at the S and P and where its valuation is, it looks like it's going to have single digit returns over the next two years.

但这并不意味着一定会发生。

It doesn't mean that'll happen.

也不意味着这已经根据利率进行了调整。

It doesn't mean that's adjusted for interest rates.

也许它会表现得更好，因为利率低于历史水平。

Maybe it'll do better because interest rates are lower than historically.

如果你回顾过去三十年的数据并进行同类比较，数据显示未来两年的回报率将在中等个位数。

If you look back and use the data for the last thirty years, apples to apples, it says mid single digit returns over the next two years.

而根据同样的分析，这个价值投资组合显示，基于历史表现，我认为它将在未来几年内获得35%至40%的收益。

Whereas that value portfolio using the same analysis says, I think it's going to earn 35% to 40% over the next couple of years based on past history.

因此，未来表现非常、非常值得期待。

So positioned very, very well to do well in the future.

在我看来，它很容易就能赶上甚至可能超越标普500指数。

Looks to me like it'll easily catch up to the S and P and maybe exceed it.

那将会是件好事。

That'll be good.

威廉，当你用‘我们运营一个投资组合’这个说法时

William So when you use the phrase, you said, we run a portfolio.

考虑到你已经发现了这么多赢得游戏的不同绝佳方式——有些非常系统化，有些非常多元化，有些非常集中——你如今是如何管理自己的资金的？

When you think about how you manage your own money these days, given that you've come across all of these different great ways of winning the game, some very systematic, some very diversified, some very concentrated.

你用自己的钱做什么投资？

What do you do with your own money?

威廉，哦，这个问题问得好。

William Oh, that's a great question.

所以我两者都做。

So I do both.

我的大部分资金都投资于多元化投资组合，更类似于'神奇公式'的运作方式。

Most of my money is invested in diversified portfolios, more similar to the way the magic formula works.

因为那需要全职投入。

That's because that's a full time job.

我们有一个庞大的研究团队和技术团队来运作这些投资组合。

We run a big research team, a big tech team to implement those portfolios.

有些是多空策略，有些是纯多头策略。

Some of it's long short, some of it's long only.

我还在一些优质企业持有集中头寸，比如谷歌和微软这类知名公司。因为在我看来，这些顶级企业是我职业生涯中前所未见的优质标的，其估值仍未完全体现，属于值得长期持有的'巴菲特式'选择。

I also have concentrated positions in some really good businesses that you would know like Google and Microsoft, because some of those top names are businesses like I've never seen in my career that still do not look fully priced to me, that are just climb and hold them, Warren Buffett type choices in my mind.

开始了

It's on

两者都在做

doing both.

那是一个非常被动的投资组合，因为我真正全职工作是管理这些多元化投资组合

That's a very passive portfolio because really my full time job is running these diversified portfolios.

并不是因为我认为这是更好的策略

It's not because I think it's a better strategy.

我两种都喜欢

I like them both.

我认为它们都是全职工作，而我只能选择其一，我已经做了三十年其中一种

I think they're both full time jobs and I can only choose one and I did one for thirty years.

我现在在做些让我觉得有趣的事情

I'm doing something else that's fun for me.

我喜欢它们各有不同的原因

I like them both for different reasons.

其中一个波动性要小得多。

One's far less volatile.

另一个虽然波动较大，但风险调整后的30:50比例依然表现良好

One's far still gets very nice risk adjusted thirty:fifty

回报。

returns.

集中于优质低价企业的投资组合同样效果惊人

The concentrated portfolios in cheap good businesses also works incredibly

那么，如果你打算长期持有少数几家你认为极其优秀的企业——某种程度上这与你在哥谭资本时期的初始策略有所不同，那时你更倾向于在发现更具交易价值的企业时进行买卖，而现在可以持有亚马逊、微软、谷歌这类公司——有哪些企业你能安心持有五年、十年甚至十五年，并自信地说‘我确实不需要频繁交易’呢？

So if you were going to just tuck away a handful of really good businesses for years that you think are just vastly superior businesses, which in a sense is a little different than your original approach The with Gotham Capital, where you were happier to trade when you found something much sort of businesses you could hold now, Amazon, Microsoft, Google, those sort of things, what could you tuck away quietly for five, ten, fifteen years and say, Yeah, I don't really need to trade much.

这些就是卓越的企业。

These are just superior businesses.

乔尔：没错。

Joel Right.

所以我采取这种策略的原因之一，也是巴菲特最终转向这种模式的原因在于：如果你愿意投入大量精力构建一个高度集中的特殊情境投资组合，那需要耗费大量工作。

So the reason why I'm doing that and one of the reasons why Buffett ended up moving towards that is if you're willing to put a lot of work into a, let's say special situation portfolio, very concentrated special situation portfolio, that takes a lot of work.

要做那种深度调研工作，真正理解这些企业并持续跟踪动态，这需要全职投入，而我没有那么多时间。

To do the kind of work, the deep dive work that you need to understand those businesses and really follow what's going on is a full time job, which I don't have the time to do.

所以，赚钱的途径其实有很多种。

So another, there's a lot of ways to make money.

另一种方式是买入你认为价格合理的好企业，因为我懂得如何评估企业价值。

Another is to buy good, what you view as cheap businesses, because I know how to value businesses.

这些企业我可以长期持有，让它们自然发展。

That I can just leave alone and let them do their thing over a long period of time.

你提到的那些公司，我还有一两家想补充，比如谷歌、亚马逊和微软。

The names you mentioned, there's one or two more that I want to mention, but Google, Amazon, and Microsoft.

我投资组合中有一部分是这些公司的股票，我不打算动它们，因为我认为它们的估值仍然合理。

I have a portion of my portfolio that's in those that I'm not going to touch because I still don't think they're expensive.

它们的价格比其他一些标的更充分，但并未完全到位。

They're more fully priced than some other things, but they're not fully priced.

我仍然认为这些标的能带来非常可观的风险调整后收益。

I still think I can get very good risk adjusted returns in those names.

我认为这些企业拥有我前所未见的特许经营权——通常那些大数字（我猜可以这么称呼）表明，某些时候增长会停滞。但由于互联网和我们能够触及全球市场、接触比以往更庞大的受众群体，再加上网络效应、进入壁垒等因素

In And those are businesses that I think have franchises that I've never seen other words, usually the large numbers, I guess it's called, says that at some point you got to stop growing, but because of the internet and We the ability to reach the entire world and much bigger audiences than you ever could, and then the network effects and the barriers to entry and all those things,

我从未见过这样的情况。

I've never seen them before.

在我职业生涯中，从未见过如此优秀的企业

I've never seen businesses this good before in my

我们都知道IBM、宝丽来或通用电气的结局，随便列举几个曾被世人誉为最伟大企业的名字。

all know what happened to IBM or Polaroid or GE, or you name some of the names that people thought were the greatest businesses of all time.

显然它们都遭遇了瓶颈。

Obviously they come up against something.

而由于网络效应的存在，我看不到这种情况会发生在它们身上。

And I don't see because of the network effects here that happening.

当然这种情况确实可能发生。

It could happen for sure.

TikTok横空出世并创造了新事物，世界变化越来越快，但仍有少数几家企业让我感到安心。

TikTok came out of nowhere and it's created things and the world's moving faster, but there are a few handful of businesses that I feel comfortable with.

你提到了其中几家，我在这些公司都有相当规模的投资，虽然它们最初并没有现在这样的规模。

You named a few of them and I have decent sized positions in those and they didn't start out as decent size as they are now.

威廉，多年来你在识别其他基金经理方面也有着非常出色的记录，无论是迈克·巴里还是刘诺伯特（Norbert Liu）都是你早期就支持的例子。

William You've also over the years had a remarkably good record at identifying other fund managers who you back very early on, whether it was Mike Burry or Norbert Liu was another one.

我相信还有其他我不知道的例子。

I'm sure there are others that I don't know about.

我还想知道，因为你在哥伦比亚商学院任教了大约二十三年。

I'm wondering also because you taught over something like twenty three years at Columbia Business School.

所以你接触过大约800名MBA学生这样的群体。

So you saw this cohort of something like 800 or so MBA students.

我很好奇，当你观察这些学生以及像巴里和刘诺伯特这样的年轻投资者时，你从他们身上看到了什么特质——比如性格、天赋、独特思维或独立思考能力。

And I'm wondering when you looked at both the students and at these young investors like Barry and Norbert Liu, what you saw in them when you looked at certain other investors and you could see, Oh yeah, this person's got the temperament or the talent or the weirdness or the independence of mind.

你在这些投资者身上寻找什么特质，让你觉得'没错，这里有种X因素让我愿意押注他们'？

What was it that you looked for in these investors that made you think, yep, there's a kind of X factor here that makes me want to bet on them?

威廉，其实这些都不是感性因素。

William It really weren't touchy feely factors there.

这更像是思维融合，在我读到他们关于投资想法的分析报告时，就像你提到的那两个案例一样。

It was more like a mind meld where I read in both those cases you mentioned an investment write up that they did on an investment idea.

然后我说，‘这个方面呢？’

And as I'm saying, What about this?

他们回答。

They say it.

接着我又问，‘那那个方面呢？’

And then I'm saying, But what about that?

然后他们接着说了。

Then they say it next.

那这个呢？

And what about this?

哦，他们接下来会这么说。

Oh, they say it next.

他们的思维方式与我的思考方式如此一致。

So the way they were thinking was so in line with the way I think about things.

我说，好吧，他们回答了我所有的问题，甚至更多，他们在这里做了一些非常出色的工作。

Said, All right, they're answering all the questions that I would have and even some more, they've done some really great work here.

所以我立刻就明白了。

And so I knew it right away.

我读了几条投资理念。

I read a couple of ideas.

我想伯里当时正在网上发帖，我读了他的一些想法后说，好吧，我不需要知道更多了。

I think Burry was posting on the internet and I read a few of his ideas and I said, All right, I don't need to know anymore.

至于诺伯特，我们在1999年创办了价值投资者俱乐部，我和合伙人约翰·皮特里一起创建的。

And Norbert, we opened in 1999, I opened with my partner, John Petrie, something called the Value Investors Club.

这种方式很合适，因为我总是在批改论文。

And it was a way because I'm always grading papers.

1999年互联网还比较新，我一直对投资俱乐部的概念很着迷。

In 1999, internet was kind of new and I was always fascinated with the idea of an investment club.

互联网似乎是个绝佳的交流方式，你不需要约定时间，可以和世界各地的任何人见面交流想法和其他一切。

And the internet seemed like a great way to meet when you didn't have to pick a time and you could meet with anyone from around the world and share ideas and everything else.

我们当时并没有管理外部资金。

We weren't running outside money at the time.

我们当时觉得，如果能创办这个俱乐部，而且加入俱乐部的途径不是付钱——因为那时候雅虎留言板对投资毫无价值。

We thought that, boy, if we start this club and the way to get into the club was not to pay any money because the Yahoo message boards were worthless at the time for investing.

那上面有太多垃圾信息了。

There's so much garbage on there.

我说，好吧，如果你能在我班上拿到A+，班上40个学生中会有两三个能在他们的投资理念报告上获得A+——那主要是课堂作业，写一份投资理念报告，我会进行点评。

Said, all right, if you could get an A plus in my class, there are two or three kids out of the 40 in my class that would get an A plus on their paper if they wrote an investment idea up, which was mostly the homework in the class, write an investment idea up and I'll critique it.

如果我给你打了A+，你就能加入俱乐部。

If I would've given you an A plus you can get into the club.

所以在哥伦比亚大学——这所常春藤盟校商学院里，可能有两三年的时间，他们从一开始就相当优秀。

And so there may be two or three years at Columbia, an Ivy League business school where they were pretty sorted to begin with.

然后你到达了那里。

And you got there.

所以它变得比哈佛还难进。

So it became harder than Harvard to get into.

只有极少数提交投资理念申请的人能够加入。

A very small percentage of people who put in an application with an investment idea got in.

后来我们意外地形成了一个投资理念相近、擅长分析的群体，不知不觉中成了对冲基金经理的'美国偶像'。

Then we ended up starting a community of people who thought the way that we did about investing and could do good analysis and became a little bit of American Idol for hedge fund managers inadvertently.

我们这样做只是因为发现了一份研究报告。

We just did it so that it really came about because we had found a write up.

我们曾以为自己是世界上唯一想到这个绝妙点子的人。

We had thought we were one of the only people in the world to have come up with this great idea.

这基本上是我们见过的最佳投资之一，当时公司股价约12美元，但资本结构复杂。

It was basically one of the best investments we had ever seen where the company was trading for about $12 but it had a complicated capitalization.

我们计算后发现它拥有约24美元现金，还附带一项优质业务。

The way we had it figured was it had about $24 in cash and a good business attached.

所以能用12美元买下这个，听起来相当划算。

So if you can buy that for $12 that sounded pretty good.

我们认为由于其复杂性，当时世界上只有我们少数人看透了这一点。

We thought because it was so complicated, we were one of the only people in the world who had figured it out.

但雅虎留言板上的约翰·佩特里发现也有人看透了这一点。

But John Petrie on Yahoo message board found someone who had figured it out as well.

总之我脑海中灵光一闪。

A light bulb went off in my head anyway.

我说，哎呀，原来外面还有聪明人。

I said, Gee, there's intelligent life out there.

要是我们能聚集一批这样的独立分析师会怎样？

What if we could put together a bunch of these independent?

后来发现撰写那份分析报告的人其实在一家超市熟食柜台工作，这本身也是个有趣的故事。

It turned out the gentleman who wrote that up was actually working behind a deli counter at a supermarket, which is an interesting story in itself.

但这说明人才可能藏在意想不到的地方，有些人确实非常优秀。

But it said that maybe there's some talent in unlikely places, people who are very good.

这就是价值投资者俱乐部的起源。

That was the genesis of the Value Investors Club.

威廉，等等，那个人后来怎么样了？

William And wait, what became of that guy?

后面那个人

The guy from behind

我不想详细讨论熟食店的事。

the I deli don't want to go into it.

他最终为我认识的人做分析师，做得相当不错。

He ended up working, being an analyst for people I know and doing quite well.

之后我没有密切关注，但这份工作让他进入了这个行业。

I haven't followed it very closely since then, but it ended up getting him a job in the industry.

价值投资者俱乐部的很多人都遇到过这种情况。

And that's happened to a lot of people on the Value Investors Club.

当我读到刘诺伯特发表的观点时，我说这太棒了。

When I read an idea posted by Norbert Liu, I said this amazing.

我实际上在哥伦比亚大学用了他的一些观点，展示如何构建投资理论。

I actually used some of his ideas at Columbia showing this is the way to put together an investment thesis.

他最早的两篇分析报告之一让我们觉得，天啊，我们真想和这家伙共事。

And one of his first two write ups told us that, Boy, we'd like to be in business with this guy.

就这样。

That's all.

我们最终支持他进入商界。

We ended up backing him into business.

威廉，显然你和罗布·戈尔茨坦多年来一直保持着出色的合作伙伴关系。

William You've also obviously had this great partnership with Rob Goldstein going back many years.

如果我没记错的话，他应该是1989年加入你的团队，刚从塔夫茨大学以最优等成绩毕业。

I think if I'm right in saying he joined you in 1989, fresh out of being Magna Cum Laude at Tufts.

他可能比你年轻八岁左右。

He was maybe eight years younger than you.

经过所有这些不同的发展阶段，最近他一直在你的网站上管理着一个高度分散的多空投资组合。

And so through all of these different iterations, most recently with the long short, very diversified portfolio, he's been at your site.

我觉得这很有趣，因为在投资领域你会看到很多这样的伟大合作伙伴关系。

And it was interesting to me because you see a lot of these great partnerships in investing.

巴菲特有芒格，霍华德·马克斯有布鲁斯·考什，尼克·斯利普有凯斯·扎卡里亚。

Buffett obviously has Munger, Howard Marks has Bruce Kosh, Nick Sleep has Case Zakaria.

这些都是合作伙伴关系。

They're all of these partnerships.

显然，有一个可以交流想法的人非常有帮助。

There's obviously something very helpful about having someone to bounce ideas off.

巴菲特总是把芒格称为'可怕的否决者'。

And Buffett always refers to Munger as the abominable no man.

我很好奇你能否谈谈你与罗布的关系，我们大多数人对他了解不多，他在这个游戏中扮演什么角色，以及拥有一个合作伙伴有何帮助。

And I was curious if you could tell us something about your relationship with Rob, who most of us don't actually hear much about, and what it is that he brings to the game and how it helps to have a partner.

为什么有用，无论是为了防止你的

Why useful, whether it's to guard against your

自己的三十比五十

own thirty:fifty

傲慢、盲点、无知还是偏见？

hubris or blind spots or ignorance or bias?

拥有一个合作伙伴实际上能带来什么？

What does it actually do to have a partner?

我很高兴你提到查理·芒格关于'说不的人'的类比，因为罗布是我认识的最具独立思考能力的人之一。

I'm so happy that you brought up that analogy with Charlie Munger about the no man because Rob is one of the most independent thinkers I know.

所以即使我带着自认为很棒的想法去找他也没用。

And so it doesn't matter if I come to him with an idea that I think is great.

在他完成自己的研究之前，我的想法对他毫无分量，他绝不会以任何方式成为唯唯诺诺的人。

That carries no weight with him until he's done his work and will not be a yes man in any way, shape or form.

他尊重我，所以会先做研究，然后决定是否同意。

He respects me, so he'll do the work and then decide whether he agrees.

我对他也是同样的态度。

I feel the same way about him.

他提出的任何想法都有价值，但我想自己做研究。

Any ideas that he comes up with, value, but I want to do my own work.

我们彼此都很直率，因为我们天生就只想找到正确答案。

And we're both not shy with each other because we're wired just to want to get to the right answer.

我认为合伙人之间可能存在某些动态因素，包括某种情感、过往历史或其他可能影响决策的因素。

I think there's dynamics between partners that may come into play, including emotion of some sort of past history or you name what could come into play.

但如果你能专注于眼前的事实，保持冷静，愿意伤害对方的感情——或者觉得你不会伤害他们的感情，因为他们其实想听你的真实想法——这就是我们的相处方式。

But if you can just focus on what are the facts in front of me and be cold hearted and be willing to hurt the other's feelings or feel like you're not going to hurt their other feelings because they actually want to hear what you have to say, that's our relationship.

所以如果一个想法能同时通过我们两人的关卡，通常就是个相当不错的点子。

So if it gets past both of us, it's usually a pretty good idea.

要闯过这关很难。

It's hard to get through.

他大多数时候都会否决。

He'll say no most of the time.

我对他很苛刻，因为尽管我尊重他，但正因如此我更要对那个想法进行深入研究。

And I am difficult with him because even though I respect him, I respect him enough to do the work on that idea.

另一个原因是，合伙关系很难维持，因为如果一出问题就互相指责——而问题总是会出现——那合作就无法进行下去。

And the other part of it is, is that it's hard to be partners because if you're pointing fingers when things go wrong and things always go wrong, things won't work.

因此我想说，在这方面我们都是成熟的人，如果犯了错，那就是我们共同的错误，因为我们只做双方都同意的事情。

And so I would say we're both big boys in that sense that if a mistake's made, it was both our mistakes because we only do things that we agree with together.

没有人会擅自行动，各做各的。

Someone's not off doing their own thing and this other one's doing their own thing.

我不会为了不伤害他的感情就随声附和。

I don't agree to go along just not to hurt his feelings or anything.

我们就是非常直截了当。

We're just very blunt.

我们同舟共济。

We're in it together.

这才真正是伙伴关系。

And so that's really a partnership.

我们只是试图探寻真相。

We're only trying to get to the truth.

这确实非常困难，因为个性差异、频繁出错、错事、压力这类问题会让这种关系难以维系。

And it's just very hard because with personalities and things going wrong a lot and stress and things of that nature, very hard to keep that kind of relationship going.

我真的认为这更多归功于罗布在这方面令人难以置信的品质，而不是我。

I really think it's more towards the incredible qualities Rob has in that regard rather than me.

至少需要一个人来保持这种精神。

You need at least one person to maintain that spirit.

罗布非常无私、体贴且思想独立。

Rob is very selfless and thoughtful and independent minded.

作为合作伙伴，尤其是在投资行业，我想不出还有比他更合适的人选。

And as a partner, I couldn't think of anyone better to be in, especially in the investment business.

我认为自己只是个普通的企业分析师，这点我之前可能告诉过你。

One of the best, I think I told you, I consider myself an average analyst when you're looking at businesses.

罗布是我见过最优秀的人之一，他能直击问题核心。既然我们只追求真相，这节省了大量时间。

Rob is one of the best I've ever seen And and cuts to the heart of matters very since we're only going for truth, that saves a lot of time.

我们的合作效果出奇地好。

It's just worked out incredibly well.

我认为如果我们分开行动，会比现在犯更多错误。

I think we would've made many more mistakes apart than together.

我注意到最杰出的投资者往往因为大多数时候都是对的，就认为自己能比任何人做得更好。

What I've noticed that happens to some of the most brilliant investors is since they're right most of the time, they probably could do better than anybody else.

其中有些人甚至当别人提醒'嘿，你忘了这个'时，也停止倾听他人意见。

Some of them stop listening to other people, even when they say, Hey, hey, you're forgetting this thing.