RWH019：与约翰·斯皮尔斯共话赢得长线博弈

条款和条件适用。

Terms and conditions apply.

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这就是 Alexa 和 AWS AI 背后的故事。

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Alexa's AI capabilities were battle tested across Amazon's massive operations, delivering real measurable impact at scale.

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These same innovations now give other businesses a proven framework to boost efficiency, unlock new revenue streams and gain a lasting market edge.

在 aws.com/ai/rstory 了解 Alexa 的故事。

Discover the Alexa story at aws.comai/rstory.

那就是 aws.com/ai/rstory。

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The more your Bitcoin holdings grow, the more complex your challenges become.

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比特币不仅仅是为了人生。

Bitcoin isn't just for life.

它是为了世代传承。

It's for generations.

好的。

Alright.

回到节目。

Back to the show.

在那些早期的投资岁月里，你遇到了另一位非同寻常的人物——比尔·鲁安，他是巴菲特的挚友。

And then you met one of these other outlier figures in those early days as an investor who was Bill Ruane, was a great friend of Buffett's.

鲁恩也是一个非常善良体贴的人，他把你介绍给了特威迪·布朗公司。

And Ruane also who was a very kind and caring bloke, then introduced you to Tweedy Brown.

所以你在1974年加入了特威迪·布朗公司。

So you started at Tweedy Brown in 1974.

对于那些不了解这家非凡且历史悠久的公司的听众来说，这家公司成立于1920年左右。

For people who are listening who don't really know what an extraordinary and historic firm this is, was founded I think in 1920.

你能谈谈它与本·格雷厄姆、沃伦·巴菲特以及沃尔特·施洛斯之间的联系吗？

Can you talk a bit about the connection that it had with Ben Graham, the connection that it had with Warren Buffett, the connection that it had with Walter Schloss?

这可以说是价值投资界的发源地。

I mean, this is kind of ground zero for the value investing community.

而你在那时加入时，这家公司规模很小，管理的资产大约800万美元。我很想了解当时的情况，以及这家公司在价值投资界的历史。

And you were there at a time when it was a tiny firm managing, I think about $8,000,000 So I'd love to get a sense of what it was like and what the history of this firm was within the value investing community.

当然，当然。

Sure, sure.

这家公司由福雷斯特·特威迪于1920年创立，他是个很有个性的人，经常参加一些在场外交易市场上市的封闭型公司的股东会议。

The firm was founded in 1920 by Forrest Tweedy, who was a real character, and he would go to the stockholders meeting of some very closely held companies that traded in the over the counter market.

当时交易的那些人年纪都不像我这么小。

It traded the people who are not my age.

股票过去都是通过经纪人、做市商之间的电话进行交易，而福雷斯特·特威迪发展出了一种邮购式的做市业务。

Stocks used to trade just by phone calls between different brokers, market makers, and Forrest Tweedie developed a business of market making in a mail order way.

他会去史密斯制造公司，获取股东名单，然后寄出明信片，写明：我愿意以每股10美元的价格收购史密斯制造公司的股票。

He'd go to Smith's manufacturing, he'd learn he'd get a copy of the shareholders list, and he'd send out postcards saying I'm willing to buy shares of Smith manufacturing at $10 a share.

如果你想要以每股11美元的价格帮我买进史密斯制造公司的股票，我可以卖给你。

If you want to buy Smith Manufacturing for me at $11 a share, I'll sell them to you.

他就这样操作，这大概是一个相当不错的小小生意。

So he did this kind of thing, and it was, I guess, a prosperous enough little business.

他后来邀请了一位商业伙伴加入，那就是霍华德·布朗——我两位长期合伙人、已故的克里斯·布朗和现任合伙人威尔·布朗的父亲。

And he added one of his partners in the business, Howard Brown, the father of my two long standing partners, deceased partner Chris Brown, and my current partner Will Brown.

霍华德是个非常出色的人，他专门在粉单股票市场做市。

And Howard was just a great guy, and he made markets in the pink sheet stocks.

他确实比那位先生更胜一筹。

He was really sort of a step above Mr.

杜迪。

Tweedy.

结果发现本杰明·格雷厄姆的办公室也在同一栋楼里。

And it turned out that Benjamin Graham had his office in the same building.

当时，股票交易并不通过存管信托公司转移所有权。

And at that time, stocks were not trade, the ownership was not transferred through the depository trust company.

所有权是通过实际交付股票证书从一个办公室到另一个办公室来转移的，然后人们会把这些证书存入保险库。

It was transferred through actual delivery of share certificates from one office to another, and then people would put those certificates in a vault.

因此，我认为本杰明·格雷厄姆可以方便地通过霍华德·布朗在杜迪布朗公司下达买卖股票的指令，据我回忆，这是最初的联系。

And so I think there was a convenience factor that Ben Graham could place orders to buy and sell stocks with Howard Brown at Tweedy Brown, and that was an original connection as far as I recall the history.

当然，沃伦·巴菲特当时作为一名二十多岁的分析师，在本杰明·格雷厄姆纽曼公司工作，这是一家早期类型的对冲基金或激励性机构。

And of course, Warren Buffett was working as a 20 some year old as an analyst for Benjamin Graham Newman Corporation, which was sort of an early kind of a hedge fund or an incentive.

格雷厄姆纽曼基金的收益模式是按收益的一定比例分成，类似于现在的对冲基金结构。

Somehow the Graham Newman Fund was a percentage of the gain kind of a deal like current hedge fund structure.

所以沃伦当时在那里工作。

So Warren was working there.

汤姆·克纳普，我已故的合伙人之一，也曾与沃伦·巴菲特并肩工作，沃尔特·施洛斯也是如此。

Tom Knapp, one of my deceased partners, also worked side by side with Warren Buffett, and so did Walter Schloss.

当沃伦决定不想再住在纽约市，而想在奥马哈工作时。

And when Warren decided that he didn't want to live in New York City, he wanted to work in Omaha.

他一直与本·格雷厄姆保持联系，当然还有汤姆·克纳普，以及我另一位已故的合伙人埃德·安德森。

He stayed in touch with Ben Graham, certainly with Ben Graham, but with Tom Knapp, and another one of my partners, Ed Anderson, who has also passed away.

埃德是通过在加利福尼亚为查理·芒格工作几年而认识沃伦的。

Ed knew Warren through working for Charlie Munger for a few years out in California.

这就是埃德如何来到特维迪·布朗公司的原因。

And so that's how Ed came to Tweedy Brown.

威廉，霍华德不是那个帮助过沃伦的经纪人吗？

William Wasn't Howard the broker who even helped Warren?

给我们讲讲这个故事吧，太不可思议了。

Tell us the story, it's so remarkable.

霍华德在沃伦·巴菲特眼中是一位能保守秘密、非常非常值得信赖的人。

Howard was well regarded by Warren Buffett as a person who could keep a secret, a person who was very, very trustworthy.

霍华德是个很棒的人，但话比大多数人少。

And Howard was a wonderful person, but a person of fewer words than many people.

他也是个桥牌高手，能非常迅速地记住很多事情，因此他在积累公司股票并保持低调方面非常出色。

He was a bridge player too, he could remember lots of things very, very quickly, and so he was very good at this game of this business of accumulating shares in companies, and being very quiet about it.

所以沃伦信任他。

And so Warren trusted him.

因此，沃伦·巴菲特所持有的伯克希尔·哈撒韦的几乎所有股份——也许是全部股份——都是通过特威迪·布朗作为经纪人逐步购入的。

And so nearly all of the, maybe all of it, maybe all of the shares of Berkshire Hathaway that Warren Buffett owns were accumulated using Tweedy Brown as the broker.

在计算机出现之前，我们通过在卡片上记录每一笔交易来跟踪交易情况。

And we to keep track of the transactions before computers by writing down every transaction on a card.

所以我们为沃伦·巴菲特和伯克希尔·哈撒韦准备了一张卡片，记录他以这个价格、这个价格买入了100股。

So we had our card for Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway, who bought 100 shares at this price, this price.

我想有一次我们开玩笑说：沃伦，如果你把股票退回来，我们就把交易卡片还给你。

And I think one time we choked, well, Warren, we'll send you back transaction cards if you send us back the shares.

为了让我们听众更清楚，这是在1960年代，当时伯克希尔·哈撒韦还是一家位于马萨诸塞州的老纺织厂。

And just to clarify for our listeners, this is back when Berkshire Hathaway, this is in the 1960s, when this was an old textile mill in Massachusetts.

从某些方面来看，这是一项相当糟糕的投资。

And so this was a pretty lousy investment in some ways.

他买的是一个烟蒂股，价格便宜得惊人。

Was a cigar butt that he was buying incredibly cheap.

但因为他是有史以来最伟大的投资者，最终将它变成了投资史上最伟大的成功故事之一。

But then because he was the greatest investor of all time, proceeded to turn it into one of the great success stories in investment history.

我想他买伯克希尔哈撒韦股票时，每股可能只花了10美元左右。

I think he might've been paying $10 a share or something for his stock in Berkshire Hathaway.

是的。

Yeah.

你办公室里另一个传奇人物，我之前提到过的是沃尔特·施洛斯，我们的一些听众可能不了解他有多传奇，但他本人也非常古怪。

Another legendary character that you had in the office who you mentioned previously was Walter Schloss, who, again, some people in our audience won't realize just what a legendary figure he was, but he was also wonderfully eccentric.

你能谈谈沃尔特·施洛斯吗？

Can you talk a bit about Walter Schloss?

沃尔特也曾是雇员，当时他和沃伦、汤姆·克拉普一起在本杰明·格雷厄姆手下担任投资分析师。

Well, Walter also was an employee of He was an investment analyst working for Benjamin Graham at the same time as Warren and Tom Knapp.

沃尔特精力非常充沛。

And Walter had great energy.

他总是在走廊里跑来跑去。

He'd kind of run up and down the hallways and stuff.

他会跑到交易台，而且他非常节俭，生活远低于他的收入水平。

He'd run to the trading desk, and he was a very frugal man, lived very, very below his means.

他在特威迪·布朗公司有一间办公室，我们没有向他收租金，但在早期，他的办公室差不多只有壁橱大小。

And he had office space in Tweedy Brown, and we didn't charge him any rent, but he had, essentially in the early days, he had an office about the size of closet.

事实上，克里斯·布朗曾说，饮水机就在沃尔特椅子和办公桌后面的壁橱里，所以沃尔特要想接水，就得把椅子往后推才能过去。

And in fact Chris Brown used to talk about the water cooler was in the closet beyond Walter's chair and desk, so to get to the water cooler Walter would have to push his chair in so he could get it.

但他是一位非常有趣的投资者，始终坚持自己的投资方法，总是以低于净营运资本、或等于或低于有形账面价值的价格买入股票。

But he was a very interesting investor, he stuck to his knitting, he always bought stocks below net working capital, or at or below tangible book value.

他对这种投资方式感到非常安心。

He felt very comfortable with that approach.

据我所知，他从未真正访谈过公司管理层。

To the best of my knowledge, he never really interviewed managements.

他会查看《价值线》杂志，或者翻阅穆迪手册、标普手册，寻找廉价股票，而且他在分散投资方面很特别。

He would look in Value Line, or maybe look in the Moody's manuals, S and P manuals for cheap stocks, and he was quirky about his diversification.

他会持有大量股票，可能多达一百只，但如果发现某只股票价格从原价下跌，他往往会不断买入，摊低自己的成本。

He would own a lot of stocks, he might own a 100 stocks, but if he found one that would decline from its original price, he would often just keep buying and buying and averaging down his cost.

我曾经了解到，他持有一只叫哈德逊纸业公司的股票，这是一家造纸公司，还拥有森林土地等资产。

And I learned at one time there was one stock he owned Hudson Pulp Company, which was a paper making company and also owned Timberland, etcetera.

这是一家控制型公司，你无法在公开市场上收购控股权，也不能进行要约收购之类的操作。

And it was a controlled company, you couldn't buy control in the open market, couldn't tender for it or anything like that.

因此，这并不是一个激进投资者会去搅动局势的标的。

So it was not a place, it was not a kind of a stock that an activist might stir things up with.

但我了解到，他大约有25%的投资合伙资金都投在了哈德逊纸业上，而他其他的投资则是一大堆零散的小项目，再加上哈德逊纸业这个巨大的重仓。

But I learned that he had about 25% of his investment partnership in Hudson Pulp, and I just he had a kind of a diverse a bunch of little things over here, and then this barbell over here with Hudson Pulp.

他有勇气这样做，但我不会拿自己的净资产去这么干。

He had courage to do that, but I wouldn't do that with my net worth.

所以某种程度上，你其实处在价值投资圈的核心位置，对吧？

So you in a way were really at the heart of the value investing community, right?

你有

You had

公开的，我不清楚那事。

public I don't about that.

嗯，但从物理位置上讲，你们处于这个生态系统的中心。

Well well, but physically, were at the center of this ecosystem.

对吧？

Right?

你有个同事叫汤姆·克纳普，他和巴菲特一起上过哥伦比亚大学本杰明·格雷厄姆的课，之后为巴菲特工作，后来加入了杜威·布朗公司。

You had Tom Knapp was a colleague who'd taken Ben Graham's course at Columbia with Buffett and then worked for him and then joined Tweedy Brown.

你有霍华德·布朗在交易，并帮助巴菲特。

You had Howard Brown trading, helping Buffett.

本杰明·格雷厄姆在三四十年代和五十年代曾使用这家公司的服务作为他的经纪商。

You had Ben Graham as using the firm as a broker for him in the thirties, forties, and fifties.

你们还结识了像比尔·鲁安这样的人。

Were meeting people like Bill Ruin.

所以你们当时都是本·格雷厄姆这个信仰体系的一部分。

So you were you were kind of you were all part of this church of Ben Graham.

从某种意义上说，格雷厄姆的理念在过去近五十年里，定义了你在特威迪·布朗的整个职业生涯。

And in a way, Graham has really defined your entire career over the last almost fifty years now that you've been at Tweedy Brown.

你们从他那里汲取的核心理念是什么？你们显然对其进行了调整和演化，通过研究巴菲特，并加入了你们自己的独特见解。

What was the essence of the idea that you took and obviously adapted and you evolved it over the years by studying Buffett and then adding your own twist to it.

但你们从格雷厄姆那里继承下来的核心思想，究竟是什么，让它在过去半个世纪里如此稳健有效？

But what's the essence of what you took from Graham that has turned out over the last half century to be incredibly robust?

我认为核心就在于对企业价值的评估，现实中的企业价值往往远高于股票市场的估值。

Well, think it has been just the whole idea of valuation of a business, and that the valuations, real world valuations can be much higher than stock market valuations.

一笔交易，比如某只股票的100股买卖价格，并不能代表整个公司的价值，但公司却通过这些报价、通过真实企业中微小的所有权份额来被估值，这被当成了严肃的事。

A transaction, 100 shares of some stock at a price, is not necessarily representative of the value of the entire company, yet companies are valued through these quotations, through fractional ownership interests in real businesses, are taken as serious.

而对我们而言，真正重要的价值是收购价值、清算价值，或者某个公司所能实现的最高最佳价值。

Whereas to us, the real serious value is the value, let's say an acquisition value, or a liquidation value, or the highest and best value for a particular company.

如今对我们来说，主要采用可比公司法，通过收购案例对比，进行类似投资银行的企业估值。

And for us these days, mostly it's using comparables, using acquisition comparables, doing investment banking type appraisals of businesses.

看看水泥制造商的收购交易，观察企业价值与息税前利润的倍数，即EV/EBIT，或企业价值与息税折旧摊销前利润的倍数，即EV/EBITDA。

This is what a cement manufacturer, look at cement manufacturing acquisition deals, and look at multiples of enterprise value to earnings before interest and taxes, EV to EBIT, or enterprise value to earnings before interest taxes, depreciation and amortization, EBITDA.

所以这实际上是两种价格。

So those are they're really two prices.

一种是企业的价格，那会是数百万美元的交易价格，非常严肃的价格。

There's the price of the business, and that would be a multi million dollar transaction price, a very serious price.

而另一种则是人们认真对待的每次一百股的小额股价。

And then there are these little ditzy 100 shares at a time that people take seriously.

因此，我们在买卖股票时心中始终保持着这个独立的估值标准，这极大地帮助了我们，也让我们避开了投资中一些情绪化和行为偏差。

And so we having this independent figure in mind when buying a stock and deciding when to sell it has been enormously useful, and has kept us away from some of the emotional behavioral aspects of investing.

如果你没有这个标准，而你的股票价格下跌，你可能会陷入焦虑。

If you don't have that, and your stock is going down, you could get into a tizzy.

你会非常不安，但如果你知道你的企业实际价值很可能远高于你支付的价格，你就会更加安心、平静。

You'd be quite nervous, but you're more at ease, you're more at peace with some knowledge that your business is likely to be worth a lot more than what you paid for it.

因此，在很多方面，你们对价值的衡量方式已经远远超越了本·格雷厄姆当年的做法，但核心仍然是利用价格与价值之间的差异。

So in many ways you've evolved the way of measuring value, way beyond what Ben Graham might've done back in those days, but still it's all centred on exploiting the discrepancy between price and value.

是的，确实如此。

Yes, indeed.

是的，确实如此。

Yes, indeed.

我认为本杰明·格雷厄姆非常重视那些能够决定企业盈利能力和估值的定性因素。

I would say that Benjamin Graham appreciated qualitative factors that can determine the earning power and the valuation of a business.

但在他的著作《证券分析》或《聪明的投资者》中，并未深入探讨如何评估这些定性因素。

But in his book, Security Analysis or the Intelligent Investor, he didn't really go into how to assess qualitative factors.

他更偏向定量分析，而他写作这些著作时，经济环境更侧重于以资产为基础的企业。

He was much more quantitative, and when he wrote the books that he wrote, it was much more of an asset based business economy.

因此，有形账面价值在营运资本中是一个非常重要的衡量指标。

So tangible book value was a very important measure in working capital.

通过阅读沃伦·巴菲特以及查理·芒格关于定性因素的言论和著作，我们学到了很多。

We've learned a lot from reading Warren Buffett, from reading what Charlie Munger has said and written about qualitative factors.

因此，我们运用了这些方法。

So we use that.

我们从投资于净流动资产股票，逐渐转向了我认为我们第一只更注重盈利的股票——那是克里斯·布朗和我讨论过的一家蜡笔公司，名为宾尼和史密斯。当时它的股价等于账面价值，没有债务，盈利能力良好，我们的买入市盈率非常低，可能只有四倍，最终该公司被收购，价格大概是我们的买入价的两倍。

We graduated from being an investor in net current asset stocks to, I think our first, more of an earnings based stock was a crayon company that Chris Brown and I discussed called Binney and Smith, which was selling at book value, it had no debt, good earnings power, we were paying a very low, maybe four times earnings, and it was eventually taken over, probably double what we had paid.

但那是一家不错的业务，是一家好企业，因此我们对更好企业的某些特征越来越感兴趣，比如那些能产生大量自由现金流的企业等等。

But it was a decent business, it was a good business, so we've become much more interested in some characteristics of better businesses, businesses that generate a lot of free cash flow, etcetera.

但我们仍然会购买那些远低于账面价值的股票，只要我们认为其净有形资产价值是真实的。

But we still will buy things that are deep discount to book type stocks where we think that the net tangible asset value is real.

我记得在2008到2009年金融危机期间，摩根士丹利的股价曾跌至有形账面价值的60%，而公司内部人士——包括首席执行官、首席财务官和其他董事——都在买入股票。

I remember in my own case, when Morgan Stanley around 2008, 2009, in that period, the financial crisis was selling at 60% of tangible book value, and insiders were buying it, CEO, chief financial officer, and directors, other directors were all buying the stock.

我也用自己的账户买入了一些。

I bought some with my own account.

当时人们非常担心摩根士丹利无法续借融资，那段时间金融企业的处境非常动荡，但我认为，它的股价远低于有形账面价值。

There were great concerns about Morgan Stanley not being able to revolve its financing, and it was wild times for financial businesses at that period, but I thought, well, it's way below tangible book.

它拥有一个能产生大量利润的投资管理业务，而这个业务并不需要大量资产投入。

They've got an investment management business that generates a lot of money that's not an asset intensive business.

于是我以低于有形账面价值的价格买入了一些股票，当时股价大约是20美元，而有形账面价值约为30美元；后来股价跌到12美元，我又买了一些，但买得还不够。

And so I bought some less intangible book and at 20, I think it was $20 a share, had around a 30 tangible book, went to 12, bought some more, not enough.

但无论如何，这就是我们最近买入杰弗里斯集团的原因，当时首席执行官以17美元的价格购买了约10,000股，而账面价值约为34美元，我们会购买这类股票。

But anyway, that's the kind of thing, we bought Jefferies Group not too long ago when the CEO bought about 10,000 shares at 17, book was around 34, and we'll buy some of these things.

杰弗里斯的业绩像大多数经纪公司一样波动较大。

Jefferies had a kind of a volatile record as most brokers do.

感觉你并不是纯粹主义者。

It feels like you're not purists.

你并不是只寻找价格合理的超高质量公司。

You're not just looking for amazingly high quality companies at reasonable prices.

你会买入那些非常便宜但有点糟糕的股票。

You'll buy stuff that's really cheap, that's a little ugly.

你也会买入质量更高的股票。

You'll buy stuff that's higher quality.

这可以说是价值投资主题的不同变体。

It's sort of different variations on the theme of value investing.

确实，确实。

Indeed, indeed.

我们甚至会持有某些东西。

We'll even hold on to some things.

我的意思是，伯克希尔·哈撒韦教会了我这一点。

I mean, Berkshire Hathaway taught me that.

我记得，一想到这个就觉得很糟糕，几十年前我会定期更新伯克希尔·哈撒韦的估值，那时更多是基于账面价值的评估方式。

I remember, oh, it's terrible thinking about it, that I would way, way back decades ago, I would do updates, updated valuations of Berkshire Hathaway, and it was really more of a book value type valuation.

我记得曾建议一位持有大量伯克希尔股票的客户，也许你应该稍微分散一下投资。

And I remember suggesting to one of our clients who had a lot of Berkshire Atherway stock that maybe you should diversify a little bit.

我始终为此感到后悔，但这恰恰说明了业务增长的重要性。

And I've always regretted that, but it just shows that business growth is important.

业务增长是重要的。

Mean, business growth is important.

你可以拥有一家私营企业，如果它能产生大量现金流，销售额和利润都在增长，那它就是一个不断增值的资产。

You can own a business that's privately held, and if it's generating a lot of cash, and if the sales are growing, earnings are growing, it's a growing asset.

因此，我们买入了一些价格低廉但我们认为具有较好增长前景和良好竞争地位的企业，虽然它们现在未必还便宜，比如喜力啤酒并不像便宜货那样令人眼前一亮，其市盈率可能超过20倍；雀巢我们则长期持有。

So we have a number of things that we bought cheap that we thought had reasonably good growth prospects, good competitive positions, and they're not necessarily that cheap right now, like Heineken doesn't punch you in the face as a bargain, it's probably over 20 times earnings Nestle, we've owned a long time.

帝亚吉欧，一家酒类公司。

Diageo, the liquor company.

所以我们在这方面，我们跟着这家企业一起成长，因此我们持有一些这样的公司。

So we've got there, we're kind of riding with the business, so we've got a few of those.

高质量的复合型公司。

High quality compounders.

是的，高质量的复合型公司。

Yes, high quality compounders.

稳定。

Stable

盈利者。

earners.

是的。

Yes.

某种程度上，很像汤姆·鲁索风格的股票。

Very much Tom Russo type stocks in a way.

是的，是的。

Yes, yes.

但他显然更是一位纯粹主义者。

But he's more obviously he's more of a purist.

是的，他就坚持这一套。

Yeah, he just sticks with that.

他不会，不会去买那些难看的股票。

He wouldn't No, buy the ugly

他不会去买那些净现金只有一半、净资产收益率低且没有增长的股票。

he's not going to buy some stock at half a net cash with a low return on equity and no growth.

是的。

Yeah.

约翰，关于特威迪·布朗，我们之前提到过一个非常独特的地方，那就是你们确实做了实证研究，就像你所说的，研究内部人士的买入行为。

One thing, John, that's very distinctive about Tweedie Brown that we mentioned before is the fact that you do this empirical research, as you were saying, studying insider buying.

你们公司做的一项具有里程碑意义的研究，后来还发布了白皮书，叫做《投资中哪些方法有效？》

One of the seminal research studies that you did as a firm, and then you published a white paper on, was called What Has Worked in Investing?

投资方法及与卓越回报相关特征的研究。

Studies of Investment Approaches and Characteristics Associated with Exceptional Returns.

我昨天看了下，据我理解，这基本上是对约50项学术研究的综述，这些研究探讨了不同投资标准如何带来极高的回报率。

I was looking at it yesterday and it's basically, as I understood it, an overview of about 50 academic studies of different investment criteria that have produced really high rates of return.

我想知道，如今回顾这项研究以及自1993年你们设立Tweedy Brown国际价值基金——你们的旗舰基金以来所取得的业绩，该基金在过去近三十年中表现非常出色，您现在认为所有这些研究和您自身的经验共同揭示了哪些有效的方法？

And I'm wondering when you look back now based on that research and on the performance that you guys have had since you set up the Tweedy Brown International Value Fund, your flagship fund back in 1993, which has done very well over almost three decades, what do you now believe all of this research and your own experience shows about what works?

我认为，从长期来看，这种方法是有效的，但它并非始终有效。

Well, think that in long run, I think it has worked, but it doesn't work all the time.

我们的策略也并非始终有效。

And our approach has not worked all the time.

作为价值投资者，过去几年我们确实面临巨大挑战，标普500指数的表现极其难以超越，很难在几乎零费用就能投资于这些指数基金的基础上，再获得超额回报。

And we certainly, as a value investor in the last few years, the S and P 500 has been incredibly difficult to beat, to add excess return, to add value above what you can get for almost no fee to invest in these index funds.

这让人感到谦卑，但我相信价值投资方法将继续有效。

So it's humbling, but I think that the value approach will continue to work.

当然，在这些实证研究中，结合高管内部买入这一附加因素的价值投资方法，平均表现极为出色。

And certainly the value approach with the added aspect of C suite top executive insider purchase has worked on average extremely well in these empirical studies.

它是否会继续这样，谁知道呢？

Whether it will continue to do that, who knows?

但它

But it

这很合理，我认为作为投资者，做你自己理解并认同的事情、坚持你的策略，是非常有帮助的。

just makes sense, and I think it's going back to I think as an investor, it's very, very helpful to do something that makes sense to you, to stick to your netting and do that.

所以，约翰，看看你在这些实证研究中强调的那些特征，也就是与高回报率相关的特征。

So John, looking at some of those characteristics that you highlighted in this empirical study, the characteristics that are associated with high rates of return.

我们谈论的是诸如低市净率、低市盈率、低市现率、低市净流动资产率或相对于前股价的比率、高股息收益率、小型公司——这些公司往往增长率更高，也更可能被收购。

So we're talking about things like low price to book value, low price to earnings, low price to cash flow, low price to net current assets or to the previous stock price, high dividend yield, small companies, which tend to have higher growth rates and are more likely to be acquired.

然后，正如你所说，公司内部人士的股票购买模式。

And then as you were saying, this pattern of stock purchases by insiders.

所以，值得强调的是，这些因素都相当明显。

So, I mean, it's worth highlighting that these things are fairly obvious.

它们都相当合乎逻辑。

They're fairly logical.

它们在长期内确实有效。

They do work over time.

但正如你所说，存在一种折磨：这些策略会经历很长一段时间似乎无效。

And yet, as you say, there's this torture that there are these long periods where it doesn't seem to work.

我们刚刚经历了大约九年，这种投资风格并没有特别奏效。

And so we've just gone through, what, about nine years where this style of investing hasn't particularly worked.

它表现得还行，但远远落后了。

It's It's done okay, but it's lagged massively.

在这些非常艰难的时期，你是如何保持信念的？你坚持一种有纪律、审慎、合乎逻辑、你深信不疑且明知长期有效的策略，但它却违背常理，年复一年地折磨你。

How do you keep the faith during these very difficult periods where you're applying a strategy that's disciplined, that's prudent, that makes logical sense, that you believe in, that you know works in the long term, and yet it just defies logic and just tortures you for year after year.

是的。

Yeah.

如果我们对这些研究进行更新，我不知道，逐年来看，结果会是什么。

If we did an update of these studies, I don't know, and we looked at them year by year, I don't know what the result would be.

过去，我们的许多业绩记录确实如此。

It used to be the case well, it was the case with a number of our own track records.

我们有一些数据，分析了为期一年、三年、五年和十年的滚动回报，与指数、基准回报进行了比较。

And we have some data where we've looked at, I think, one year, three year, five year, and ten year rolling returns versus index, versus an index return, versus a benchmark.

过去的情况是，可能现在仍然是，在大约70%的十年滚动周期中，布蒂·布朗的股票会跑赢基准，而30%的时间则跑输。

And it used to be the case, it may still be the case, that in about 70% of the ten year rolling periods, Booty Brown's stocks would beat the benchmark, beat the particular benchmark, and 30% of the time not.

现在你可以反过来审视基准，会发现基准在70%的十年滚动周期中跑输特威迪的回报，仅在30%的周期中跑赢。

Now you can flip it over and look at the benchmark, and you could say that the benchmark was only beating the Tweedie return in 30% of the rolling ten year periods, and was lagging at 70%.

这其中一部分原因在于你如何解读这些数据。

Part of it is the way you flip these things around.

但对我来说，我们没有人确切知道未来会发生什么。

But I think that for me, none of us knows exactly what's going to happen in the future.

如果事情真的那么简单，比如标普指数会持续像过去那样大幅跑赢价值股，那我们所有人都应该放弃价值投资，直接去买标普算了。

And if it was as simple as saying that the S and P would just continue to be outperforming value as much as it has, we should all just give up the value school and just do that.

但我认为，这种情况不太可能发生。

But I think that that's an unlikely thing.

再说一遍，当你投资的是自己的真金白银、自己的财富时，你是想赌一把，还是选择坚持一种对你而言很有道理、且在长期内平均表现良好的策略？

And again, going back to you're investing your own real money, your own wealth, and do you want to take that bet, or do you want to stay with something that makes a lot of sense to you and has worked on average over a long period of time?

而且，这又是真金白银。

And again, it's real money.

这是真金白银。

It's real money.

我可以去买亚马逊的股票，或者我本可以以高得多的价格买入。

I could go out and buy Amazon stock, or I could have bought it much, much higher.

它的增长率非常出色，这是一家极好的企业。

The growth rate is fabulous, it's a fabulous business.

但价格合适吗？

But is the price right?

我对预测未来很长一段时间内极高的增长率并没有太大信心。

I don't have that much confidence in being able to project really, really high rates of growth going far out into the future.

我对这一点实在难以认同。

I just have a hard time with that.

我更容易理解我们所做的事情。

I have a much easier time understanding what we do.

再说一遍，我自己正在投资我的家庭财富，我不想失去它，我会尽我所能。

And again, myself, I'm investing my family wealth, and I don't wanna lose it, I do the best I can.

我认为特威迪·布朗一直最引人注目的地方之一就是，作为内部人士，你们个人投入了巨额资金，与股东们投资的是同一件事。

I think that's always been one of the striking things about Tweedie Brown is that you guys as insiders have enormous amounts of money riding on the same things as your shareholders.

我记得最近查看时，你们和同事们的资产总额大约达到了13亿或15亿美元，没错。

And I I remember looking most recently, I think it was up to about 1.3 or $1,500,000,000 Yes.

来自你们和你们同事的资产。

Of assets from you and your colleagues.

正确。

Correct.

是的。

Yes.

因此，利益高度一致，这在我看来，当我们寻找人来管理我们的资金时，你希望知道你的经理自己也在吃自己做的饭。

So there's a tremendous alignment of interest, which also seems to me that when we're looking for someone to manage our money, you wanna know that your manager is eating their own cooking.

所以如果他们错了，至少他们也在和你一起承受损失。

So if they're wrong, at least they're suffering alongside you.

没错。

Exactly.

没错。

Exactly.

这是共同的痛苦。

It's shared misery.

是的。

Yeah.

但应该指出的是，自1993年以来，这只旗舰基金的回报率——我记得上次查看时，累计回报率约为900%，并且大幅跑赢了MSCI EAFE指数数百个百分点。

But it should be pointed out that your return since 1993 for this flagship fund, I mean, I think when I last checked, it was about 900% was the cumulative return, and it had beaten the MSCI EAFE index by hundreds of percentage points.

所以，对我来说，教训是：从长期来看，这种方法是有效的，但你必须能够承受多年期间看起来愚蠢、脱节的痛苦。

So, I mean, for me, the lesson is that in the long run, this works, but you've got to actually be able to handle the pain of multi year periods where you look kind of foolish and out of touch.

你开始怀疑这种方法是否已经失效。

And you start to wonder if it doesn't work anymore.

而大多数散户投资者都无法做到这一点。

And most retail investors can't do that.

没错。

Exactly.

不，他们做不到。

No, they can't.

人们根本不是这样想的。

It's just not how people think about it.

他们没有那种信念或基本理念，即你拥有一大堆价值远高于当前市场价格的东西，并且你相信事情最终会向好的方向发展，你会赚钱，这合乎逻辑，风险似乎很低，但他们缺乏这种信念。

They don't have sort of the faith or the basic idea that you own a bunch of things that are worth a lot more than their current market quotations, and that you think that things will work out well for you, that you'll make money, it makes sense, seems low risk, but they don't have that faith.

人们只是想要那些超额回报，他们希望在一段时间内积累更多的财富，而这来自于超额回报。

People just want those excess returns, they want to have a bigger pile of wealth over a period of time that comes from excess returns.

你知道，显然在长期内，每年高出一、二、三个百分点的超额回报，最终会带来大多数投资者所期望的结果——在未来的某个时刻，拥有更多可自由支配的财富。

You know, obviously over a long period of time, one, two, three percentage points of annualised excess return results in what most investors want over a period of time, a bigger pile of money, a bigger chunk of wealth to do whatever they want to do with it at some future point in time.

乔尔·格林布拉特告诉我，对他而言，长期跑赢市场的关键在于他愿意承受这些表现不佳的时期，他能够承受这种痛苦。

Joel Greenblatt said to me that the thing that makes it possible to outperform in the long run for him is the fact that he's prepared to handle these periods of underperformance, that he can handle that pain.

所以，你似乎必须深刻理解为什么长期买入廉价股票会有效，并且有纪律坚持下去。

So it just seems like you have to have this deep seated understanding of why this works over time, buying cheap stocks, then the discipline to stick with it.

然后还需要一种固执、反主流、倔强的性格，才能在大众纷纷追逐索拉纳和以太坊并一夜暴富时，坚持走自己的路。

And then the kind of ornery contrarian stubborn personality to be able to go your own direction when the herd is going in the other direction and is making a fortune overnight in Solana and Ethereum.

所以这需要一种特别古怪的人。

And so it requires a certain type of weirdo.

是的，确实如此。

Is that It does.

尤其是，我认为，要以商业方式这么做，更需要一个怪人。

And especially, I think, a weirdo to do it commercially.

这是一门生意，因为你确实会在表现糟糕的时期失去客户。

It's a business, because you do have people abandoning you in the lousy periods.

这本身就是从事这项事业、用自己的钱为他人理财的一部分。

That's just part and parcel to being in the business and doing what you do with your own money for other people.

它并不总是有效，也不总是跑赢市场。

It doesn't always work, It doesn't always beat the market.

它并不总能产生每个人想要的超额回报。

Doesn't always generate what everyone wants, which is excess returns.

当股东离开你时，你会觉得情感上很痛苦吗？

Do you find that emotionally painful when shareholders are leaving you?

因为，显然这会损害你的业务，但你也知道他们在伤害自己，而你一直在试图帮助他们。

Because, I mean, obviously it damages your business, but you're also aware that they're hurting themselves and you've been trying to help them.

你最终让他们在低迷时期锁定亏损，错过了好年份的反弹。

You're ending up having them lock in the bad periods returns and miss out on the rebound during the good years.

嗯，你慢慢就习惯了。

Well, you get used to it.

这是一门不错的生意。

It's been a good business.

我很感激自己长期从事投资管理行业。

I'm very, very grateful to have been in the investment management business for a long time.

我非常幸运，但这就是现实。

I'm terribly fortunate, but that's just what it is.

你不能通过成为指数基金来战胜指数基金，你必须与众不同。

You can't beat an index fund by being one, you have to be different.

我们做过一些研究，进行了一项长达二十七年的研究，我们选取了所有由利普公司列出的股票型共同基金。在起点时，假设有100只这样的股票型共同基金，到了二十七年后的终点，只剩下大约50只。

And we've done studies, we did a twenty, I think it was a twenty seven year study where we took all equity mutual funds that were listed, I guess, by Lipper, And at the starting gate, let's say for every 100 of those equity mutual funds, there were only about 50 at the end of the twenty seven year period of time.

在这50只基金中，大约有25%到30%在长达二十七年的时间里跑赢了标普500指数，而那些跑赢的基金，通常只在大约一半的年份里表现优于指数。

And of those 50, about, I think it was about maybe 25 or 30% had beat the S and P 500 over that twenty seven year period, and the ones that beat it tended to beat it in about half the years.

这并不是一种真正持续稳定的表现。

It wasn't a real, real consistent type thing.

它们有表现好的年份，也有表现差的年份，但最终积累的财富总额还是超过了指数，至少在税前是这样，至少在税前，没错。

They had good years and bad years, but they still developed a bigger pile of money than the index, at least pre tax, at least pre tax, yeah.

我认为强调我们刚才提到的这些观点很重要，因为我希望有一些听众正在听，并在想：哦，原来如此。

I think it's important to kinda hammer in these points that we've been making because I I hope some people out there are listening and are thinking, oh, okay.

所以我明白了什么在长期是有效的。

So I get what works in the long run.

至少这条通往山顶的路径是非常好的。

At least this is one path up the mountain that's really good.

当然还有其他赚钱并取得巨大成功的方式。

There are other ways to make money and and do really well.

但这是普鲁蒂·布朗几十年来一直采用的经过验证的方法，本·格雷厄姆和巴菲特也一直在使用。

But this is a tried and tested way that Pruitti Brown has been doing for decades, that Ben Graham was doing, Buffett was doing.

我们知道这种方法有效，但我们也知道它有多痛苦，而且确实存在一段时间它并不奏效。

We know this works, but we also know how painful it is and that there are periods where it doesn't work.

所以我希望我们的一些观众能明白：我明白了，我要这么做，但我也知道过程中会有些痛苦。

So I'm hoping there are going to be some people in our audience who are like, okay, this clicked, I'm going to do it, but I know that it's going to be painful at times.

没错。

Well, that's right.

当然，确实存在表现不佳的时期，但你仍然在赚钱。

And it depends on there are certainly periods of underperformance, but you're still making money.

你只是没有那些买了表现更好的特定基准的人赚得那么多，无论是那个男人还是女人。

You're just not making as much as the other person, the other woman or man who bought the particular benchmark that's doing better.

但我们刚刚也看到，有人因为加密货币和FTX的崩盘、山姆·班克曼-弗里德的加密帝国，以及人们盲目买入那些以为会永远上涨的热门科技股，而让资金彻底蒸发。

But we've also just seen people having their money just absolutely vaporised with cryptocurrencies and the implosion of FTX, Sam Bankman Fried's Crypto Empire, and all the hot tech stocks that people were buying on the assumption that it would go up forever.

因此，从某种意义上说，我们刚刚经历的这段时期，正是急于求成所带来的危险的完美例证。

So in a way, this is a perfect this period we've just come through is a perfect example of the dangers of being in a hurry.

或者我认为ARC的表现一直不是很好。

Or I guess the ARC performance has not been the best.

是的。

Yeah.

凯茜·伍德斯坦。

Cathy Woodstein.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Right.

对。

Right.

确实如此。

Indeed.

确实。

Indeed.

在这些曾经让人们无比兴奋的事物上，你可能会损失大量金钱。

You can lose a lot of money in these things that previously were so exciting to people.

你已经经历过好几次这种情况，对吧？

And you've lived through this a bunch of times, right?

你经历过七十年代的漂亮五十股、八十年代的日本泡沫、互联网泡沫，现在又经历了最新的加密货币和热门科技股泡沫。

You lived through it with the Nifty fifty in the seventies, with the Japanese bubble in the eighties, with the .com bubble, now with this latest crypto and hot tech stock bubble.

如果要给普通投资者一个教训，告诉他们如何避免麻烦、避开这些狂热，从而在长期内取得成功，你会说什么？

If you were to draw a moral for regular investors on how to stay out of trouble and avoid these kind of manias so that they can succeed over the long run, What would you say?

你希望传达什么样的建议？

What advice would you want to impart?

我会说，我认为加杠杆没什么意义。

Well, I would say that I don't think it makes a lot of sense to leverage.

如果你没有负债、没有杠杆，你更容易保持从容，继续参与市场。

I think you're more able to be at ease and stay in the game if you're not hocked up, if you're not leveraged.

而且如果你买得便宜，对吧？

And if you buy stuff cheap as well, right?

以一定的安全边际

With a margin of That

当然，这正是我们喜欢做的。

certainly has been obviously that's what we like to do.

但我能保证在未来五年内，标普500的表现会比我们的表现更差吗？

But can I guarantee that over the next five years, the S and P 500 will be worse than what we're doing?

根据历史上的涨跌周期，我无法保证这一点。

I can't guarantee that based on the history of winning periods and losing periods.

我认为会，但你得现实一点。

I think it will, but you gotta be realistic.

你无法预测这些事情。

You can't predict those things.

约翰，你曾经对我说过，我们的真正目标并不一定是跑赢市场，尽管我们希望如此，而且最终我们也做到了。

You also said to me once, John, that our real goal wasn't necessarily to beat the market, although we hoped we could and we ended up doing it.

你说过，真正的目标是以低风险的方式赚钱。

You said the real goal was to make money in a pretty low risk way.

这在我看来是一个极其重要的观点。

And that seems to me a hugely important point.

你能再多谈谈这一点吗？

Can you talk a little bit more about that?

因为我们太执着于这场赛马般的竞争，即是否能跑赢市场并创造价值。

Because we're so obsessed with this horse race aspect of whether you can beat the market and add value.

但对我们大多数人来说，留在游戏中，获得不错的回报并生存下来，这似乎是一个相当不错的目标。

But for most of us actually, staying in the game and getting decent returns and surviving, that seems to me a pretty good goal.

这正是我的目标。

That's my goal.

没错。

Yeah.

我的意思是，本·格雷厄姆在《证券分析》中认为，一项投资操作应当具备本金安全和获得满意回报的前景。

I mean, Ben Graham in security analysis had a sense that an investment operation is one that offers safety of principle and the prospect of a satisfactory return.

他并没有说要超越像标普500这样的市值加权指数的回报。

He didn't say a return that beats a market cap weighted index such as the S and P 500.

他真正关注的是赚钱，做那些因为具有安全边际而不太可能亏钱的事情，但这并不是管理资金的商业方式。

He was really looking at making money, doing things that would likely not lose money because they possessed a margin of safety, but that's not the commercial business of managing money in a way.

实际上，顾问们关注的是你过去三年的表现相对于基准的过去五年表现。

It's really it's consultants looking at how did you do the last three years versus a benchmark the last five years.

回到投资开始之初，他们并不一定关注或重视这一点。

Going back to inception, they don't necessarily look or pay much heed to that.

要推销‘满意’的回报真的很难。

It's really hard to market satisfactory.

对吧？

Right?

实际上，对我们大多数人来说，一个满意的回报——我一直觉得，如果我能长期获得接近每年10%的回报，无论是税后、税前，还是通过我的储蓄不断投入最终达到10%，我就已经很好了。

Actually for most of us, a satisfactory return I mean, I always sort of feel like if I could get something approaching 10% a year over time, whether it's after tax returns, before tax returns, or even just me adding to the pot through my savings so that I get to 10, I'm gonna be okay.

我的意思是，几十年后这将会非常棒。

I mean, it'll be fantastic over decades.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Right.

尤其是如果你不用交太多税的话。

Especially if you don't pay too much taxes.

是的。

Yeah.

所以我觉得，这种强调满意回报、避免灾难、持续参与市场的做法被严重低估了。

So I feel like this emphasis on satisfactoriness, avoiding disaster, and staying in the game is vastly underrated.

我们需要更多像你这样的客户。

We need more clients like you.

我会明天把我的钱转过去，约翰。

I'll send over my my my money tomorrow, John.

可惜的是，钱不够多。

Unfortunately, there's not enough of it.

嗯，在Tweety Brown，我确实是那种客户。

Well, I'm certainly that type of client at Tweety Brown.

我们上次见面时，你告诉我一件事，我觉得这非常有趣地揭示了你的性格：你谈到自己天生就非常注重安全。

One thing you told me when we last met that I thought was a really interesting insight into your personality is you you were talking about how safety conscious you were temperamentally.

你对我说，每当我看新车时，我首先看的就是它的碰撞测试结果。

And you said to me, when whenever I'm looking at a new car, the first thing I look at is its crash test results.

你还告诉我，你买了一辆林肯Town Car，因为你看到它在碰撞中表现不错。

And you told me that you'd bought a Lincoln Town Car because you saw that it would do pretty well in a crash.

你能谈谈这个吗？

Can you talk about that?

当然可以。

Sure.

林肯Town Car是最早配备安全气囊的汽车之一。

The Lincoln Town Car was one of the first cars that had airbags.

所以，我本来对买林肯没什么兴趣，因为林肯算是比较张扬的车型，但它有这个优点，我就想：管他呢？

So it was kind of I wasn't really interested in having a Lincoln, because a Lincoln was sort of a showier kind of a car, but it did have that aspect, so I thought, oh, what the heck?

我会稍微讲究一点外观，但也许这能救我一命，因为它有安全气囊。

I'll be a little showy, and maybe it'll save my life because it's got airbags.

但确实，我们刚好有两辆车被淹毁了，因为我们住在那不勒斯的海边，当时发生了严重的洪水，我们公寓协会里其他邻居的车都停在地下，而我们的车却停在外面。

But absolutely, we just happened to have had two of our cars totaled because we're right on the beach in Naples, and we had a big flood surge in our cars and other neighbors' cars in our condominium association are parked underground.

我们失去了两辆车，最近不得不买了两辆新的。

We lost two cars and just had to buy two cars recently.

这两辆车都获得了公路安全保险协会的‘顶级安全选择加’认证。

They were both cars that met the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety designation Top Safety Pick Plus.

这是最高的评级，拥有最好的碰撞测试结果、最好的翻滚测试表现，所有这些方面都是最优的。

This is the highest designation, the best crash test results, the best rollover results, all those things.

所以我们把选择范围缩小到了更重的车型，通常是较重的车，而不是像迷你库珀那样的小型车。

So we narrowed our list just to heavier cars, typically heavier cars, not Cooper Mini or something like that.

你买了什么车，约翰？

What did you get, John?

我妻子买了一辆现代胜达，而我则选了现代旗下更豪华的一款车，叫现代捷尼赛思，适合载女儿或带朋友出去吃饭，后排空间更大，腿部更宽敞。

My wife got a Hyundai Santa Fe, and I got more of a luxury car in that bike from Hyundai, that's called the Hyundai Genesis, which for taking our daughters or for taking some friends out to dinner, they sit in the back seat, it's got more leg room.

这是韩国的等效车型。

It's the South Korean equivalent.

它有点像韩国的豪华轿车。

It's sort of the South Korean limousine car.

它有十万英里的保修期，相当于十年。

It has a 100,000 mile warranty, think ten year.

它的保修非常棒，我觉得J。

It's got a great warranty, and I think J.

D。

D.

普沃斯对它的可靠性评价不错。

Powers has said good things about the reliability of it.

如果我要为你写一篇人物简介，约翰，我会把这当作你生活方式的隐喻。

If I were writing a profile of you, John, I I would be really thinking about this as a metaphor for how you live your life.

对吧？

Right?

它注重安全、耐用、节俭，你知道，一点也不炫目。

Like, it's it's safety conscious, it's durable, it's frugal, you know, it's not super flashy.

嗯，它相对节俭。

Well, it's relatively frugal.

我们过去只买二手车，但它的节俭体现在容量、支出能力和财力上。

We used to buy only used cars, but it's frugal in terms of capacity, of spending capacity, of means.

我一直生活得远低于我的收入水平。

I've always lived below, fairly well below my means.

你曾经告诉我，你从未借过任何钱，没有房贷，从不欠任何人钱。

You once said to me you also had never borrowed any money, that you didn't have mortgages, you never owed anyone any money.

你能谈谈这种生活方式如何让你作为投资者更具韧性，并更好地应对这些充满挑战的时期带来的压力吗？

Can you talk about that way of living as something that enables you to be more resilient as an investor and to deal with the stress of these periods of challenge?

当然。

Absolutely.

回到那个例子，关于税务亏损结转公司，保罗·哈迪曼，当我试图说服我父亲的一个朋友时，他是个非常节俭的人，投资于股票、农田和一些小型公寓楼等，先生。

Going back to the example, the tax loss carry forward company, Paul Hardiman, when I had tried to convince a friend of my father's, a very frugal man who was an investor in stocks and farmland and little tiny apartment buildings and stuff, Mr.

克拉克给我写了一封很好的信，提醒我不要贪心，不要过于自负，他说得完全正确。

Clark wrote me a nice letter about not getting it over your head, not being too greedy, not being too self confident, and he was absolutely right.

正如我之前所描述的，这就像一盆冷水，给我的系统带来了冲击，是一次警醒。

And that was, as I described before, kind of a cold shower, a shock to the system, a wake up call.

所以，那是一方面；另一方面，是我刚成立我的小投资合伙企业时写的一封信，当时我晚上开机场豪华轿车来维持生计。

So there was that, and there was also a letter that I wrote just after I had started my little investment partnership, when I was driving in the airport limousine at night to support myself.

我给沃伦·巴菲特写了一封信，读了一篇刊登在《福布斯》杂志上的精彩文章，讲的是巴菲特合伙企业的长期投资回报，表现极为出色。

I wrote a letter to Warren Buffett, and I read this great article in Forbes Magazine about the Buffett partnership, and about his long run investment returns, which were phenomenal.

我还读过两位金融学教授米勒和莫迪利亚尼写的学术论文，他们提出一个观点：如果你购买了低杠杆、比如资产负债表上没有债务的公司的股票，投资者会自发地进行对冲。

And I had read an academic paper by these two finance professors, Miller and Modigliani, and they had this idea that if you bought shares of a company with low leverage, with let's say no debt on the balance sheet, that investors of their own accord would go out and offset that.

他们会借钱来购买股票，而这些债务本应由公司自己承担，但投资者却自己借债来持有股票。

They would borrow money that the company itself maybe should have had on its own balance sheet, but they would borrow money to own the stock.

所以，这相当于他们把自己的资本结构与公司合并了。

So it was kind of they would merge their capital structure.

结构。

Structures.

所有者的资本结构，无论是个人还是持有无杠杆股票的控股公司。

The capital structure of the owner, call it an individual, call it a holding company with the non leveraged stock.

所以我想，也许巴菲特正是运用了米勒-莫迪利亚尼的这一理念，通过大量杠杆来买入低杠杆的廉价股票。

So I thought, well, maybe Buffett was using this Miller Modigliani idea and using a lot of leverage to buy into very low leverage bargain stocks.

于是我给他写了一封信，他非常友善地回复了我。

And so I wrote him a letter, he was very nice to respond to me.

他说：不，我从未这样想过，我只是觉得使用保证金是个坏主意，你得留在游戏中，不能被逼到绝境。

He said, No, I've never thought of it that way, and I just think that having margin is a bad idea, and you want to stay in the game, you don't want to get tapped out.

因此我认为，没有债务所带来的韧性，能让人更坦然面对市场逆转、低迷期和不顺心的事，因为你必须能持续参与游戏，这是一场长期的游戏，一场关于平均值的游戏。

And so I think that the resilience that not having debt makes one more at peace with reversals, with the down periods, with things that don't go well, and you want to be able to stay in the game, because it's a long run game, it's a game of averages.

对我来说，这确实让事情变得没那么有压力。

And for me, it just made things less stressful.

我知道，我的股票投资组合大幅下跌了，但我的房子没有任何按揭债务。

I knew that, well, my stock portfolio is way down, but don't have any mortgage debt on the house.

我的生活开销低于我的收入水平。

I'm living below my means.

我不是月光族。

I'm not living paycheck to paycheck.

我有一些储备。

I've got some reserves.

我有一些现金。

I've got some cash.

对我来说，这是一种更少压力的生活方式，也是在波动的投资领域中更少压力的生存方式，在这里你确实会经历起伏，确实会有投资失败的股票，确实会遇到各种各样的情况。

It just was for me a less stressful way to live and a less stressful way to live in the volatile field of investing, where you do have ups and downs, you do have stocks that don't work out, you do have all these kinds of things.

所以从行为角度看，这对我很好，但如果我把所有资金都投入股票，我本可以富裕得多。

So for me it's been good behaviorally, but I could be a lot richer if I had put everything into stocks.

长期以来，我一直持有过多的现金，但我并不强求。

I've always had, for a long time I've had probably too much cash, but I don't force it.

我不强求。

I don't force it.

如果找不到我喜欢的投资标的，而且我确实有30:50的分散投资限制，我就会持有更多现金。

If I can't find something I like, and I do have a diversification thirty:fifty constraint, I'll just have more cash.

让我们短暂休息一下，听听今天赞助商的广告。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

特雷，你知道是什么让最优秀的企业脱颖而出吗？

Trey You know what sets the best businesses apart?

是他们如何利用创新将复杂性转化为增长。

It's how they leverage innovation to turn complexity into growth.

这正是亚马逊广告在AWS人工智能支持下所做的事情。

That's exactly what Amazon ads is doing, powered by AWS AI.

每天，亚马逊广告处理数十亿次实时决策，优化整个310亿美元广告生态系统的广告表现。

Every day, Amazon ads processes billions of real time decisions, optimizing ad performance across a $31,000,000,000 advertising ecosystem.

结果是广告活动运行速度快30%，并实现大规模的可衡量业务影响。

The result is campaigns that run 30% faster and deliver measurable business impact at scale.

这正是亚马逊自身推动增长的方式。

And this is how Amazon itself drives growth.

他们的智能AI将营销从资源密集型流程转变为智能自主系统，最大化投资回报率，并赋能营销人员专注于创意和战略。

Their agentic AI transforms marketing from a resource heavy process into an intelligent autonomous system that maximizes ROI and empowers marketers to focus on creativity and strategy.

亚马逊广告正在证明，人工智能驱动的广告不仅仅是未来，更是新的竞争优势。

Amazon Ads is proving that AI driven advertising isn't just the future, it's the new competitive advantage.

更棒的是，每一家企业都可以应用亚马逊内部完善的同一创新蓝图。

And better yet, every enterprise can apply the same innovation playbook that Amazon perfected in house.

前往 aws.comai/rstory 了解亚马逊广告的故事。

See the Amazon ad story at aws.comai/rstory.

那就是 aws.comairstory。

That's aws.comairstory.

初创公司行动迅速。

Startups move fast.

借助人工智能，它们的交付速度更快，并能更早吸引企业客户。

And with AI, they're shipping even faster and attracting enterprise buyers sooner.

但大单带来了更大程度的安全与合规要求。

But big deals bring even bigger security and compliance requirements.

SOC 2 并不总是足够的。

A SOC two isn't always enough.

正确的安全措施可以促成交易，也可能导致交易失败。

The right kind of security can make a deal or break it.

但哪位创始人或工程师能抽出时间来处理这些事务，而不耽误公司建设呢？

But what founder or engineer can afford to take time away from building their company?

Vanta 的人工智能和自动化技术能让您在几天内准备好大单所需的安全合规条件。

Vanta's AI and automation make it easy to get big deals ready in days.

Vanta 持续监控您的合规状态，确保未来的交易不会被阻断。

And Vanta continuously monitors your compliance so future deals are never blocked.

此外，Vanta 会随着您的业务一同成长，并在每一步都提供及时可靠的支持。

Plus Vanta scales with you, backed by support that's there when you need it every step of the way.

随着人工智能改变法规和买家的期望，Vanta 深知何时需要什么，并已打造出最快、最便捷的路径，助您达成目标。

With AI changing regulations and buyers' expectations, Vanta knows what's needed and when, and they've built the fastest, easiest path to help you get there.

因此，认真的初创公司都会早早借助 Vanta 实现安全合规。

That's why serious startups get secure early with Vanta.

我们的听众可通过 vanta.com/billionaires 获得 1000 美元优惠。

Our listeners get $1,000 off at vanta.com/billionaires.

访问 vanta.com/billionaires 可享受1000美元优惠。

That's vanta.com/billionaires for $1,000 off.

新的一年到了，这意味着现在正是开始实现你一直梦想的事业的最佳时机。

It's the new year, which means that it's the best time to finally start the business you've been dreaming about.

就在几年前，我启动了自己的电子商务业务，而Shopify正是我起步所需的完美工具。

Just a couple years ago, I launched my own e commerce business and Shopify was exactly the tool I needed to get started.

当许多人不断将梦想推迟到明年时，我要告诉你们，现在正是抓住眼前机遇的时候。

While many people continually push off their dreams until the next year, I am here to tell you that now is the time to capitalize on the opportunities right in front of you.

Shopify为你提供了在线和线下销售所需的一切。

Shopify gives you everything you need to sell online and in person.

数以百万计的创业者，包括我自己，都已经从普通家庭用户跃升为刚刚起步的创业者。

Millions of entrepreneurs, including myself, have already made this leap from household names to first time business owners just getting started.

你可以从数百个精美的模板中选择，并自定义它们，同时使用其内置的AI工具撰写产品描述或编辑产品图片。

Choose from hundreds of beautiful templates that you can customize and use their built in AI tools to write product descriptions or edit product photos.

随着你的成长，Shopify也会在每一步与你共同成长。

And as you grow, Shopify grows with you every step of the way.

在2026年，停止等待，立即用Shopify开始销售。

In 2026, stop waiting and start selling with Shopify.

注册每月1美元的试用版，今天就开始在shopify.com/wsb销售。

Sign up for your $1 per month trial and start selling today at shopify.com/wsb.

前往shopify.com/wsb。

Go to shopify.com/wsb.

那就是shopify.com/wsb。

That's shopify.com/wsb.

今年，让Shopify陪伴你聆听你的第一个好消息。

Hear your first this new year with Shopify by your side.

好的。

Alright.

回到节目。

Back to the show.

你能谈谈多元化吗？

Can you talk a little about diversification?

因为你的多元化策略也非常独特。

Because your strategy with diversification is also pretty distinctive.

对吧？

Right?

在国际价值基金中，我认为你大约有55%的资产集中在前20个持仓上，这看起来相对集中。

In the in the international value fund, I think you have about 55% of the portfolio in about the top 20 positions, which seems relatively concentrated.

但事实上，我上一次查看第三季度时，你持有大约99只股票。

But actually you own about 99 stocks when I last looked for the third quarter.

所以这实际上是一种集中与分散的有趣结合。

And so it's actually a really interesting mix of being concentrated and diversified.

你能谈谈你对多元化的看法吗？如何平衡通过相对集中来实现超越市场的愿望，以及分散投资以确保生存的重要性？

Can you talk about your view of diversification and how to balance that desire to outperform by being fairly concentrated and the importance of diversifying so that you actually survive?

我认为，从统计上看，价值策略如果具备某种统计上的多元化——即大量标的和多种不同投资——更有可能证明其价值并创造收益。

Well, I think that the value strategy statistically is more likely to prove itself out and add value if you've got kind of a statistical diversification, a lot of large numbers, and a lot of different bets.

因此，我们通常持有相当数量的投资标的，但有时我们会让某些持仓，比如喜力，继续增长，它们可能会占到4%或5%，但我们对这些企业的业务感到安心，也乐于在这样的企业上保持如此集中的持仓。

So we've normally had fairly large number of bets now, but sometimes we let, like a Heineken, we'll let these things roll along, they might become 4% or 5%, but we're comfortable with the business, we're comfortable having that kind of concentration in that sort of a business.

在许多投资组合中，我们对伯克希尔·哈撒韦有相当大的持仓。

In a number of portfolios, have fairly large bets in Berkshire Hathaway.

因为我们长期持有它，而且它的增长速度更快，复利表现优于我们持有的其他股票。

Just because we've owned it for a long time and it's grown faster, it's compounded better than other stocks we've owned.

但我认为，是大数定律的统计原理让这种策略奏效，而且这也显得风险更低。

But I think it's the statistical law of large numbers make the strategy work, and also it just seems less risky.

当我查看你们最新的致股东报告时（我认为是截至九月的报告），你们所在的投资委员会在报告中写道：今天非美国股票为我们提供的投资机会，是我们十多年来见过的最佳之一。

When I looked at your latest report to shareholders, which I think is as of the September, the investment committee that you're part of was writing the report said, The opportunity set being presented to us today in non US equities is one of the best we have seen in well over a decade.

显然，投资美国以外的市场现在已经不太受欢迎了。

It's obviously become pretty unfashionable to invest outside The US.

人们已经失去了信心。

People have kind of lost faith.

在某种程度上，国际投资多年来一直令人失望。

And in some ways, international investing has been a bit of a disappointment for many years.

我查看了国际价值基金的数据，该基金的表现远远领先，但自1983年以来仅实现了约8.1%的回报率，这已经非常出色，因为平均基金的回报率约为5.4%。

I was looking at what the statistics of the international value fund, which has outperformed by a very large distance, but it's only returned something like 8.1% since 1983, which is very good when you compare it to the average fund, which is about 5.4%.

巨大的超额收益。

A big margin of outperformance.

但当我看到这一点时，我想，天啊，所有这些持有外国基金的人，过去三十年里，平均外国基金的回报率只有百分之五出头。

But when I look at that and I think, wow, so all of these people who own foreign funds, the average foreign fund were making five and a bit percent for the last thirty years.

要保持对海外分散投资的信心真的很难。

It's really hard to keep faith in diversifying overseas.

然而，我们从历史中知道，这真的很重要。

And yet we know historically that it's really important.

你能谈谈是否应该进行国际分散投资的问题吗？鉴于当前的投资机会，为什么你觉得现在特别明智？

Can you talk about this issue of whether to diversify internationally and why at the moment it seems like a particularly smart idea to you given the opportunity set?

我想说的是，从业绩记录来看，国际投资在过去曾有过表现优于美国市场的时候，但你对更近一段时期的判断完全正确。

Well, I'd say that in terms of the track records, international investing has had periods in the past where it's performed better than The US market, but you're absolutely right about the more recent past.

我的合伙人鲍勃·韦科夫对国际与美国股票不同业绩时期的最新情况会更了解。

Now, partner, Bob Wyckoff, would be much more up to date on these different track record periods for international versus US stocks.

但显然，目前有大量估值低廉的非美国股票，且基于低估值具有良好的前景。

But clearly, there are a lot of cheap non US stocks, and good prospects based on low valuations.

低估值历史上往往预示着更高的回报。

Low valuations have historically tended to thirty:fifty predict higher returns.

你那份报告中还有一个非常有趣的统计数据，你做了一项研究或引用了一项研究，指出从1969年到2022年，美国市场表现优于国际市场。

You also had a very interesting statistic in that report, which you'd done a study or were citing a study that said from 1969 to 2022, The US market outperformed internationally.

我认为大概是55%的十年滚动周期内如此。

I think maybe it was like 55% of ten year rolling periods.

因此，存在过很长一段时间，海外股票的表现超过了标普指数。

So there were these long periods where overseas stocks beat the S and P.

这似乎表明，教训就是你不应该把所有资金都押在本国股票上。

And it seemed like the lesson was just that you didn't want to be all in on just domestic stocks.

这样说公平吗？

Is that fair to say?

对我们而言，我们会从另一个角度来看待这个问题。

Well, I would say for us, we look at it as a different way.

我已故的合伙人克里斯·布朗过去常说，我们喜欢在美国以外投资，因为这为我们提供了更广阔的廉价商品选择范围。

My deceased partner, Chris Brown, used to say, Well, we like to invest outside The United States because it just gives us a bigger shopping aisle of bargains.

从美国投资者的角度来看，我们旗下的国际基金——特威迪·布朗国际基金——对大部分汇率风险进行了对冲，虽然并非全部，但大部分都已对冲。

And from the standpoint of a US investor in our international fund, Tweedy Brown International Fund, because we hedge the currency risk, large part of the currency risk, not all of it, but a large part of it.

我们将一家企业的回报等同于美国回报加上或减去对冲工具的利率差，以此来衡量本地的美国回报。

We're equating a business in terms of The US return plus or minus the interest rate differential on the hedging instrument to a local US return.

所以，这本质上是另一个寻找廉价资产的地方，而我们在那里发现了相当多的机会。

So basically it's another place to find bargains, and we're finding quite a few there.

我注意到特威迪·布朗国际基金的投资组合中有大约16%配置在英国公司，比如帝亚吉欧、葛兰素史克、BAE系统、联合利华和乐购等。

I was interested to see that Tweedie Brown International has something like 16% of the portfolio in The UK in companies like Diageo and GlaxoSmithKline and BAE Systems and Unilever and Tesco and the like.

作为英国人，我在情感上对这个问题尤为关注。

And obviously, as an Englishman, I'm particularly invested emotionally in this question.

但如今，当你阅读报纸时，总有一种感觉：英国已陷入困境，脱欧是一场灾难，政治上也 dysfunction（失灵）。

But there's a sense when you read the newspapers these days that The UK is a basket case, that Brexit was a disaster, and it's politically dysfunctional.

最好的岁月已经过去。

The best years are behind us.

我觉得很有趣的是，英国的投资比重似乎超过中国投资的三倍以上。

I just thought that was really interesting that it's more than three times the size, I think, of your China investment.

你能谈谈为什么像英国和瑞士这样相对成熟的市场——你们在这些市场也有很大持仓——实际上对你们这样的投资者来说是意想不到的优质投资标的吗？

Can you talk about why these sort of fairly mature markets like The UK and Switzerland, where you also have a big stake, are actually surprisingly attractive hunting grounds for investors like you?

嗯，原因有很多。

Well, a number of them.

这些股票中的许多在数据上 simply 就很便宜。

A number of those stocks just are plain cheap on the statistics.

比如，我们买了一些生产轴承的公司SKF的股票，而公司内部人士也在用自己的钱买入。

And I mean, there's a company SKF in the ball bearings business that we bought some shares of, and insiders have been buying it with their own money.

我不确定，但从数字上看，这只股票真的很便宜。

And I don't know, the stock's really cheap on the numbers.

所以，这又是‘购物通道’的理念，我们今天买入的是全新的、新鲜的便宜货，而不是像喜力或帝亚吉欧这样我们已经持有的公司——尽管它们如果被收购的话也可能被低估，但并没有极度低估。

So again, it's the shopping aisle idea, and the typical bargain that we're buying new, fresh today, rather than a company like Heineken or Diageo that we've been holding, but they're undervalued if somebody bought the company in an acquisition, but they're not super, super undervalued.

如果你以20倍市盈率持有一只股票，而公司把100%的收益都派发了，那么你的回报率就是5%。

And the owner earnings yield, if you own a stock at 20 times earnings, and the company paid out 100% of the earnings, you get a 5% return.

这并不是你期望的10%回报，但你很可能还能获得公司价值增长带来的额外收益。

It's not your 10% return that you're looking for, but you probably get some growth in addition to growth in the value of the business.

因此，从总回报的角度来看，你的表现还不错。

So on a total return basis, you do okay.

但再次强调，最近买入的股票通常是那些在量化指标上更便宜的，而且最近很多还出现了内部人士买入的信号，因此对我们很有吸引力。

But again, the most recent buys would be things that are typically quantitatively cheaper, and in many instances recently, had this insider purchase signal, so they're attractive to us.

你并不是在做自上而下的宏观判断，只是在寻找便宜的东西。

And you're not really making top down calls, big macro calls, you're just finding stuff that's cheap.

没错，我们就是在寻找便宜的东西。

Not, we're finding stuff that's cheap.

你私下里问投资委员会的各个成员对这些事情的看法，无疑会得到不同的观点或细微差别，但核心理念仍然是在全球范围内寻找便宜货。

You ask privately different individuals on the investment committee their opinions about some of these things, undoubtedly would be different ideas or different nuances, but the overriding idea is still just to buy bargains throughout the world.

因此，从商业角度来看，我们的国际基金通过集中于这一领域发挥了作用。

So it happens that commercially our international fund serves a purpose by being concentrated in that.

现在，我个人也投资了国际基金，这是我的最大共同基金持仓之一——特威迪共同基金。

Now I personally, I'm in the international fund, it's one of my largest mutual fund, Tweedie Mutual Fund holdings.

但我还持有美国个股，并且在特威迪布朗价值基金中持有相当大的仓位，这是一只全球基金。

But I also own individual US securities and a fairly large position in the Tweedie Brown Value Fund, which is a global fund.

但在国际基金中，90%是非美国证券。

But in the international fund, it's 90% non US securities.

我不确定这是否回答了你的问题。

I'm I'm not sure whether that answers the question.

中国显然也是一个特别有趣的案例，令人惊讶的是，你们在中国的投资并不大。

China also obviously is a particularly interesting case, and it's striking that you don't have a huge investment in China.

但另一方面，你们持有这些股票，比如我上一次查看第三季度数据时，你们持有阿里巴巴、腾讯、百度。

But on the other hand, you own these stocks like, at least the last time I checked from the third quarter, you had Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu.

很多这些公司都受到了政府严厉监管、经济放缓以及地缘政治冲突担忧的重创。

A lot of so so a trio of these companies that have been hit by the government's very heavy handed regulation and the slowing economy and all these fears about geo political conflict.

我对此有切身利益，因为听了查理·芒格和我认识的路·辛普森（你与他们关系很好）谈论阿里巴巴后，我买入了阿里巴巴，目前亏损了60%。

And I have a vested interest here because after talking to Charlie Munger and Lou Simpson, who I know you were friends with about Alibaba, I bought Alibaba and I'm down 60% so far.

但我很好奇，你们如何看待这些公司，以及如何应对那些声称‘中国现在根本无法投资’的人？

But I'm curious how you think about these companies and how you consider all of the people who are saying, No, no, China now is uninvestable.

这是个很好的问题。

That's a great question.

现在，我不持有阿里巴巴的股票。

Now, I don't own Alibaba.

我曾经持有过一股。

Did own one.

我自己也持有一些中国股票，但如果你问我合伙人，他们可能会说得更好。

I own a few Chinese stocks myself, but I think it would be better if you asked one of my partners about that.

显然，从跟踪这些公司的分析师来看，他们认为这些公司的股价非常非常便宜，而且仍然是在中国具有增长前景的大企业。

Clearly, in terms of the analysts following those companies, they see them on the numbers as being very, very cheap, and still major businesses with growth prospects in China.

但你提出了一个非常好的问题，关于习先生

But you do have a very good question with Mr.

以及他最近的表态和中国似乎正在发生的变化。

Xi and his most recent pronouncements, and the way China seems to be tilting.

在我最近对汤姆·鲁索的采访中，他刚刚说，这属于‘太难处理’的范畴。

In my recent interview with Tom Russo, he just said, Look, this goes on the too hard pile.

他还说，我对阿里巴巴判断错了。

And he said, I was wrong about Alibaba.

它可能表现不错，但实在太难了。

It may do well, but it was just too hard.

他说，本该听巴菲特的话，他说你不需要跳过太高的栏杆。

And he just said, should have listened to Buffett when he said, you don't need to jump over high hurdles.

我觉得这其中有智慧。

I think there's some wisdom in that.

我自己在决定是否购买某样东西时，总是用比较的框架来分析。

I always, myself, when I have a choice of buying something or not, my framework is comparisons.

比如说，我找到了像特易购这样的公司，我个人账户里持有特易购，而且有内部人士买入，市盈率似乎很低，股息收益率也不错。

And let's say I find something, I don't know, like Tesco, I own Tesco personally in my own account, and there've been insider buying, it seemed pretty low price earnings ratio, pretty good dividend yield.

他们拥有大量自己的门店，而不是全部租赁。

They own a lot of their own stores in fee.

他们并非所有门店都是租赁的，因此房地产本身具有价值。

They're not all leased stores, so there's a value in the real estate.

我对这一点感到非常安心。

I felt very comfortable with that.