RWH020：纪律性成长投资者与弗雷德·马丁

股价跌到了50，他拉起了线，所有基金经理都冲进来抄底，最低到了6。

It dropped to 50, and he pulled up string, and all the PMs jumped in and bottomed at six.

所以我一直在观察这件事。

So I'm watching this.

明白吗？

Okay?

从那时起，我在股票上赚了很多钱。

And then from that point on, I started making a lot of money in stocks.

我再也没有停止过。

I've never stopped.

我认为，我看到了公司真实价值与股价之间的差异，这种差异在1973年到1974年市场触底的两年间被压缩了。

And I think it was I saw the dichotomy between the company real value and the price of the stock, and it was it was compressed in a two year time frame from, you know, the '73 to the bottom of the market in '74.

我记得你还跟我讲过一个非凡的故事，说你一直在关注康宁玻璃公司，然后你去找了你的老板，我记得你说他是个极其聪明、非常优秀的投资者。

I remember you also telling me an extraordinary story where you had been following I I think it was Corning Glass, and you went to you went to your boss who who I remember you saying was an incredibly smart guy and a really good investor.

他说：看。

And he said, look.

我根本看不到这里的收益。

I I don't really see any earnings here.

我看不出任何价值。

I don't see any value.

他说，别担心这个。

And he said, don't worry about it.

这是一只信仰股。

It's a faith stock.

他是信托部门的负责人。

Well, he was the head of the trust department.

他是个非常聪明的人。

He was a brilliant guy.

他很喜欢它。

Loved it.

他是个了不起的人。

He was a fabulous guy.

他说，别担心Safaes的股票。

He said, don't worry about Safaes stock.

他们所有的收益都来自未合并的子公司。

All of their earnings were from their unconsolidated subs.

你知道吗？

You know?

而且它的估值倍数很高。

And it was an expensive multiple.

就像这样，你知道，我只是看着，但我想，哇。

It was like so, you know, I just watched, but I thought, wow.

好吧。

Okay.

所以，早上好。

So good morning.

它曾经是

It was

所以，弗雷德，当你经历过那样的时期，亲身感受到其中的疯狂，这如何为你后来经历1999年、2000年、2007年，或者疫情前那段充满风险的时期做好了准备？

So, Fred, when you saw a period like that, having lived through it viscerally and seen the nuttiness of it, how did that prepare you for the experience of, say, '99, 2000 or then 2007 or or then the period with the fangs before COVID?

因为比如在2020年3月，你曾在你的网站上写过一些内容。

Because you wrote something in March 2020, for example, where you said this is in one of your one of your insights on your website.

上面写道：在‘漂亮五十’之后四十年，在思科兴衰之后二十年，股市再次陷入‘好公司、差股票’的困境。

It says, forty years after the nifty fifty and twenty years after the rise and fall of Cisco, the stock market is once again in the grip of the great company lousy stock syndrome.

这些严重高估的股票名单中，包括许多小公司，但也包括美国市值最大的五家公司：微软、苹果、谷歌、亚马逊和脸书。

The list of extremely overpriced stocks includes many small companies, but also includes the five largest companies in The US by market cap, Microsoft, Apple, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.

当时你预测，如果计算这五只股票的潜在回报——它们占标普500指数总市值的约20%——你预期它们的年回报率约为负3%，而那时所有人都极度看涨。

And you were predicting at that time if you compute the likely return for these five stocks that were about 20% of the S and P's entire value, you were expecting them to make about minus 3% a year at exactly the time when everyone was very bullish.

那么，你能谈谈这段早期经历是如何让你为后来那些人们痴迷于伟大公司、却忽视了‘好公司也可能成为糟糕投资’的狂热时期做好准备的吗？

So can you talk about how that early experience in a way prepared you for later periods of euphoria when people would become obsessed with great companies without realizing that a great company can be a lousy investment?

在我一生中，真正出现过三次极端高估的情况。

There have been really three times in my lifetime where you just had really extreme overvaluation.

因此，可供学习的统计样本并不多。

And so that's not a large statistical sample to learn from.

所以我会告诉你，从量化角度来看，我从中学习了很多。

So I would tell you that I have I think, quantitatively, I learned a lot from it.

我稍后会解释这一点。

I'll explain that in a minute.

但从情感上讲，我不确定。

Emotionally, I don't know.

你知道，这真的让人痛苦。

You know, it just it's miserable.

明白吗？

Okay?

因为下跌时总是非常痛苦，就像我们现在正在经历的那样。

Because the backside is always really miserable like we're going through right now.

所以它让我为接下来的情况做好了准备，它确实产生了一些影响。

So what it prepared me for, it it did something.

我提到过，我们正在撰写一部关于风险的巨著，因为格雷厄姆一直说：管理好风险，回报自然会水到渠成。

And I mentioned that we're working on a a magnum opus on risk because I think the whole Graham always said, manage the risk and the return will take care of itself.

所以，你知道，不是所有的风险都是一样的。

And so one of the, you know, not all risks are the same.

估值过高是一种可以分散的风险。

Overvaluation is a risk you can diversify.

如果你有25只、25只股票的投资组合，或者50只股票，而它们都被高估了，你还是会亏钱。

If you have 25 a stock, 25 stock portfolio that's overvalued, all the stocks or 50 stocks, you're gonna lose money.

我不在乎。

I don't care.

最终，它们的价格会回落到应有的水平。

Eventually, they're gonna sell back to what they should sell for.

所以你无法通过分散投资来消除这种风险。

So you can't diversify that away.

这也很容易量化。

It's also easy to quantify.

实际上，这是很容易量化的。

It is actually easy to quantify.

你能看出来某些东西明显定价过高。

You can tell when something's, like, way overpriced.

但由于各种原因，处理起来真的很难。

It's just really hard to deal with it for a variety of reasons.

1973年我没遇到这种情况，因为我还不是投资组合经理，但我只是观察并利用了它的下跌时机，找到了真正便宜的股票，赚了很多钱。

I didn't have this happen in in '73 because I wasn't a portfolio manager, but I just observed and I took advantage of the backside of it by finding stocks that were really cheap and making a lot of money with them.

所以那还好。

So that was okay.

1999年到2000年是我职业生涯中最糟糕的时期，原因有很多。

Ninety nine, two thousand was the worst period of my career for a variety of reasons.

我1997年才开始做股息增长投资。

I just started DGI in '97.

我当时到处被解雇。

I was getting fired all over the place.

俄亥俄州阿克伦市有一位名叫奥施拉格的投资经理，属于橡树联合公司，他是这一轮周期中的凯西·伍兹。

There was a money manager in Akron, Ohio named Oschlager, Oak Associates, which was the Kathy Woods of this cycle.

我那时在阿克伦有很多客户，他们都在解雇我，把资金转投给那个人。

And I had a whole bunch of clients in Akron, and they were firing me and reinvesting it in this guy.

当然，他让他们的资产下跌了80%到90%。

And, of course, he took them down 80 or 90%.

我为他打造了非常出色的投资组合。

I had beautiful portfolios for him.

是的。

Yeah.

比如，他对思科进行了巨额押注。

And he had an enormous bet on Cisco, for example.

所以他持有这些了不起的公司，它们就像当时的FAANG股，或者像上世纪七十年代的‘漂亮五十’股。

So he he owned he owned these incredible companies that were like the they were like the Fangs or they were like the Nifty fifty.

这些公司都是优秀的企业。

They were great businesses.

但我记得你曾对我说，他彻底毁掉了股东的利益，因为你知道，也许让他们把投资组合的10%投在高风险资产上就够了，但他们却把所有资金都交给了他。

But I remember you saying to me, he just immolated his shareholders because they, you know, would have been fine maybe for them to have 10% of their portfolio in a racy thing, but they were giving him all that money.

他说，我要你所有的钱，我觉得这纯粹是我的看法，但这种态度中有一种极其傲慢的成分。

He said, I want all your money, which I thought was it's just my opinion, but I that's there's a hubris there that's pretty extreme.

所以那是我第一次真正看到管理业务和管理投资组合所带来的负面后果。

So that was kind of the first time I saw actually managing a business and managing portfolios, the blowback.

我的客户们把股票直接放进他们的投资组合里。

I had clients sticking stocks in their portfolios.

两三个客户没有解雇我，但他们至少对我生气了十年甚至更久。

Two or three clients didn't fire me, but they stayed mad at me for at least a decade or longer.

有一个人解雇了我。

One guy fired me.

他的妻子继续留在我这边，而现在他又成了我的粉丝。

His wife stayed with me, and now he's a fan again.

二十年后。

Twenty years later.

明白吗？

Okay?

还有一个人只是对我很生气。

And another guy did was just mad at me.

部分原因是他们对自己把股票放进投资组合感到尴尬。

Part of it was they were embarrassed that they stuck stocks in there.

他们亏惨了，你知道的，因为那些他们放进来的股票。

They got killed, you know, because stocks they stuck yeah.

我会允许人们放一两只进去。

I would let people put one or two in.

就这些了。

That was about it.

但这太痛苦了。

But it was miserable.

我讨厌这样。

I hated it.

为了澄清一下，你的大部分业务是管理独立账户，因此你典型的独立账户起始点，我想，最低是1500万美元。

And just to clarify, this is because most of your business is managing separate accounts, and and so a typical separate account with you might the the starting point, I think, the minimum is 15,000,000.

我记得你曾经对我说过，平均账户规模是3000万美元。

I remember you once saying to me that the average account is 30,000,000.

所以这些人的整体水平应该相当专业，但他们还是被狂热情绪裹挟，看着你赚了12%、13%、14%就坐不住了。

So these are people who are supposedly pretty sophisticated on the whole, but they were still getting caught up in the euphoria and were looking at you making twelve, thirteen, 14%.

我们心想：你到底在搞什么鬼？

And we're like, what the hell are you doing?

实际上，要追溯到很久以前，因为我们服务客户的时间很长，很多被逮捕的人，我们一开始还有一段有趣的故事。

It was actually, just to go way back because we've had customers for a long time, a lot of the people that were arrested, we'd started with a a funny story.

我想他们最初只投入了二三十万美元。

I think they started with couple 2 or 300,000.

现在他们已经有4500万美元了。

They have 45,000,000 now.

明白吗？

Okay?

他们在1999年把我解雇了。

They fired me in '99.

所以他们一开始只有20万美元。

So they started with 200,000.

那时候他们大概有1000万美元左右。

They probably had 10,000,000 at the time or something like that.

他们解雇了我，但他们都是很棒的人。

They fired me, and they're wonderful people.

于是我给他们打了电话。

And I I called them up.

我说：我把这封信撕了。

I said, I'm tearing this letter up.

我不接受这个决定。

I don't accept this.

我们之间的合作关系太好了。

You we have too good a working relationship.

你们不能解雇我。

You can't fire me.

他们说，我们来谈谈这件事。

And they they said, we'll talk about it.

他们整晚讨论了这件事，然后说，我们改变主意了。

They talked about it overnight, and they said, we changed our mind.

我们会继续和你合作，他们仍然是我们的客户。

We're staying with you, they're still customers.

所以当时我并没有那样做。

So it wasn't that I had at that time.

在我们有了更多资金运作后，我们提高了最低门槛。

We raised our minimums after we had more money to run.

但你知道，我们以前有一百万美元的最低要求。

But, you know, we used to have a million dollar minimum.

对我来说意义最重大的一件事是，我让许多勤奋的人赚了很多钱。

And one of my one of the things that's been meant the most to me is I've taken a lot of people that were hardworking people and made them a ton of money.

所以那些人原本在转变，你知道，我曾去爱荷华州北部拜访一些医生，我罕见地对客户发了脾气。

And so that was the people that were turning you know, I I went down to see some doctors in Northern Iowa, and I I lost my temper, which I rarely do at a client.

他们批评我，说像你提到的那样，当时我们的收益率是17%，但人人都知道每年25%是稳拿的。

And they were criticizing me, telling me like you're saying, at the time we were doing 17%, but everybody knew 25% a year was in the in the bag.

他们开始批评我，还说你根本不懂怎么买成长型股票。

And they start criticizing me, and and they said, you don't really know how to buy growth stocks.

我发火了。

And I I lost my temper.

我说，听着。

I said, look.

我抗压能力很强。

I I have a thick skin.

我能承受很多压力，但你们至少得准确地批评我，因为你们根本不懂自己在说什么。

I can take a lot of heat, but you at least have to be accurate in how you're criticizing me because you don't know what you're talking about.

那个团队的首席医生，你猜怎么着？三年后，我再次去那里时，他追到车旁感谢我，说：‘你救了我们’，我怎么感谢你都不为过。

The lead doctor in the group, watch this, three years later, followed me out after I came down three years later out to the car and thanked me and said, you saved us, and I can't thank you enough.

所以他们并没有解雇我们，但我当时确实被狠狠地攻击了。

And so they they didn't fire us, but I was just taking a beating.

所以这次，我先暂时把2007年放一边，因为2007年的基础是金融系统的疯狂。

So this time and I I'm I'm gonna put o seven aside for a second because that was I think the basis of o seven was the craziness of the financial system.

我认为金融系统的问题不在于估值过高。

I think the financial system, it wasn't so much overvaluation.

而是整个系统濒临崩溃的边缘。

It's just that the system was this close to collapsing.

让我印象最深的是2021年。

The one that sticks in my mind is 2021.

我必须说，在面对这种情况时，我们做到了我有史以来最出色的表现。

And I have to say, I think we did a the best job I've ever done in the face of that.

明白吗？

Okay?

因为现实是，我们进入市场时，有些股票价格过高。

Because the reality is that, you know, we go into this and we have some stocks that are too expensive.

它们有巨大的未实现收益，而我们的客户中有很多需要缴税的。

And they have huge unrealized gains, and we have a lot of taxable clients.

那你们怎么做呢？

So what do you do?

我们直接卖掉了其中一大批，并削减了大量持仓，降低了投资组合的估值风险。

And we sold outright a bunch of them and trimmed a lot of them and derisked the valuation of the portfolio.

因此，我们今年进入市场时，投资价值已经高于我们的门槛收益率，这么说吧。

So we enter this year and with good investment value above our hurdle rate, if you will.

明白吗？

Okay?

市场下跌反而提升了我们的回报，但现在我们的投资组合不再被高估了。

And the down market just elevated our return, but we don't have an overpriced portfolio now.

所以我们对此并不担心。

So we're not worried about that.

市场上仍然存在被高估的股票，它们最终会回归到应有的价值水平。

There's still overpriced stocks around, and they'll eventually sell whatever value they should sell at.

所以我认为这次我们做得更好了，但情况依然糟糕。

So I think we did better this time, but it's still miserable.

我的意思是，我一直在关注市场，我们下跌了。

I mean, I'm I'm watching the markets, and we're down.

我们并没有下跌。

We're not down.

我认为，从十一月的高点算起，我们下跌了18%或19%。

We're down, I think, 18 or 19% from the peak of November.

这还不算太糟。

It's not too bad.

但我看到到处都是惨状。

But I'm looking at the carnage everywhere.

我不知道你有没有看到特斯拉今天的表现。

I don't if you've seen Tesla today.

它在市场中被彻底击垮了。

It's getting just destroyed in the market.

所以我们没有经历其他人那样的断崖式下跌。

So we're not we we don't have the waterfall declines that others are experiencing.

我们确实有几只表现不佳的股票，但这种情况一直都有。

We've had a couple of bad stocks, but we always do.

但还是让人很痛苦。

But it's still miserable.

我讨厌这样。

I hate it.

是啊。

Yeah.

但你之前特别警告过，你在写关于特斯拉的文章时说过它严重高估了，

But you had warned specifically, you said Tesla was dangerously overvalued when you wrote about this in

这是蒂姆·利斯特。

It's Tim List.

在2020年3月。

In March 2020.

所以，我的意思是，我引用了你当时写的一句话，我认为在这些罕见时期到来时，这句话对我们很有启发：有纪律的投资者必须尊重金融领域的重力法则，减持或抛售那些严重高估的公司。

So, I mean, the quote that I took from what you wrote at the time that I think is a very helpful thing for us to bear in mind when these infrequent periods happen, you said the disciplined investor must honor the financial laws of gravity and reduce or sell those companies with extreme overvaluations.

有纪律的投资者必须忽视因相对表现落后而带来的不适与焦虑，这是避免或卖出推动市场股价的股票时不可避免的结果。

The disciplined investor must ignore the discomfort and anxiety that comes from lagging relative performance, an inevitable outcome from avoiding or selling the stocks that are driving the market.

所以我认为这触及了一个非常根本的真相。

And so I think that kinda that gets at a really essential truth.

对吧？

Right?

这确实很痛苦。

That this is painful.

有很多焦虑。

There's a lot of anxiety.

有很多不适。

There's a lot of discomfort.

但拥有纪律，某种程度上回到了你在越南时期的观点：正是纪律和流程挽救了你的生命。

But having discipline, in a way, gets back to your idea from your period in in Vietnam that it's the discipline and the process saves your life.

确实如此。

It absolutely does.

但我认为你抓住了一个关键点，那就是这仍然非常令人不安。

I I but I I think you're on really a key point, which is it's still very uncomfortable.

你仍然会经历很多，你知道，我们从客户那里听到各种各样的抱怨。

You you're still gonna experience so, you know, we get mixed complaints from clients.

你知道吗？

You know?

我不久前接到一个客户的电话，他们抱怨说。

They they would complain about their I got a call not too long ago from a client.

哦，你知道，我今年赚了很多，但现在却亏了。

Oh, you know, I paid huge gains and are down this year.

对吧？

Right?

所以我让他们冷静下来。

So and I I got them calm down.

所以他们稍微责怪了我们一下。

So they they blame us a little bit.

我得跟他们说，你们得穿上大人的裤子，因为税收法律不是我定的。

And I have to sort of say to them, you gotta be put your big boy pants on because I don't make the tax laws.

所以这让人不舒服。

So it's uncomfortable.

你心里也明白，这件事的后续不会好看。

And you kinda have the idea that the backside of this isn't gonna be pretty.

如果特斯拉股价涨到峰值，我记得是4.11美元或4.07美元，现在是124美元左右——不过这只是我们的猜测。

If Tesla goes through I think it hit $4.11 at the peak or $4.00 7, it's a 124 today or something like And our guess is it's a guess.

它可能值80美元。

It was it may be worth 80.

只是个大概估计，70左右吧。

Just a rough guess, 70, something like that.

所以它已经接近了，但还没回到当初的水平。

So it's it's getting close, but it's not where it was.

但它

But it

别担心这个。

Don't worry about it.

这是一只信仰股。

It's a faith stock.

嗯，没错。

Well, it's a that's right.

这是一只信仰股。

It's a faith stock.

你知道吗？

And I you know?

顺便说一下，每股80美元时，它仍然是美国历史上最伟大的成功故事之一。

And and by the way, at at $80 a share, it's still one of the great success stories in American history.

我的意思是，它仍然值2500亿美元以上，是的。

I mean, it would still be worth 250,000,000,000 plus Yeah.

作为一个初创公司，我认为这非常了不起，但它还没达到巅峰，当时特斯拉的市值超过了全球所有其他汽车公司市值的总和。

As a start up, which I think is remarkable, but it's not at its peak, it was the market value of Tesla was greater than the market value of all the other auto companies in the world combined.

所以我说这一点是想告诉你，估值是最容易计算的事情之一。

And so it was and my point in saying it to you is valuation is one of the easiest thing to compute.

你可以相当准确地估算出来。

You can be pretty accurate.

但它也是最难应对的事情之一，因为在上涨过程中你会面临追涨的压力。

It's also one of hardest things to cope with because you have the chasing on the way up.

我们曾花费无数次会议向客户解释，为什么我们的表现没有标普中盘成长指数那么快，并展示该指数的高估情况等等。

You know, we spent countless meetings explaining to clients why we weren't going up as fast as the Russell mid growth index and showing the overvaluation of the index and all that stuff.

然后，当市场转向下行时，我们面临的是另一组问题，比如美联储会把利率提高到多高？

And then then you get to the backside, and now we have a different set of concerns as, you know, how high is the Fed gonna raise rates?

明年会是什么样子？

What's next year gonna be like?

你知道的？

You know?

不管我们愿不愿意，我们都会被拖入下行趋势，虽然情况没那么糟，但我们还是被带下去了。

And we get carried down whether we like it or not with the the general, you know, not as bad, but we get carried down.

你知道吗？

You know?

所以，我绝不希望你以任何方式、任何形式。

So it's it's I don't want you to any way, shape, or form.

我不是在寻求同情。

I'm not looking for sympathy.

这是业务的一部分。

This is part of the business.

这就是本质。

This is what it's about.

在我看来，如果你想真正做好这件事，你就必须承受痛苦，必须感到不适。

And you have to suffer, and you have to be uncomfortable, in my opinion, if you're gonna be really good at it.

你必须不断质疑自己，想着，这次真的不一样了吗？

You have to keep questioning yourself thinking, you know, is this time is it different this time?

这次我们是不是颠覆了金融引力定律？

Are we have the laws of financial gravity inverted this time?

这有不同吗？

Is it different?

你知道，我只是觉得，投资时保持平衡感这个概念你永远不能放弃。

You know, I just think that the idea that you can never I call it keeping your sense of balance when you're investing.

你总是说，价格是你付出的，价值才是你得到的。

You always say price is what you pay, value is what you get.

如果你的投资组合定价合理，你就处于平衡状态。

You're on balance if your portfolio is well priced.

明白吗？

K?

你必须明白，你几乎总是处于某种不适的状态。

You have to understand that you're almost always gonna be at some state of discomfort.

这就是生活。

That's just life.

是的。

Yeah.

K？

K?

嗯。

Yeah.

你知道吗？

You know?

如果你想舒服，就不该当投资经理。

If you wanna be comfortable, you shouldn't be an investment manager.

我们先休息一下，听一下今天赞助商的广告。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

当你经营一家小企业时，雇对人至关重要。

When you're running a small business, hiring the right person can make all the difference.

合适的员工能提升你的团队、提高生产力，把你的业务推向新高度。

The right hire can elevate your team, boost your productivity and take your business to the next level.

但找到这样的人本身可能就像一份全职工作。

But finding that person can feel like a full time job in itself.

这就是LinkedIn职位的用武之地。

That's where LinkedIn jobs comes in.

他们的新AI助手通过为你匹配真正符合需求的顶尖候选人，消除了招聘中的猜测成分。

Their new AI assistant takes the guesswork out of hiring by matching you with top candidates who actually fit what you're looking for.

无需再翻阅大量简历，它会根据你的标准筛选应聘者，并突出显示最匹配的人选，帮你节省数小时时间，在合适人选出现时快速行动。

Instead of sifting through piles of resumes, it filters applicants based on your criteria and highlights the best matches, saving you hours and helping you move fast when the right person comes along.

最棒的是，这些优秀的候选人已经都在LinkedIn上。

The best part is that those great candidates are already on LinkedIn.

事实上，通过LinkedIn招聘的员工，至少留任一年的可能性比通过主要竞争对手招聘的员工高出30%。

In fact, employees hired through LinkedIn are 30% more likely to stick around for at least a year compared to those hired through the leading competitor.

一次就招对人。

Hire right the first time.

免费在linkedin.com/studybill发布你的职位，然后推广它以使用LinkedIn职位的新AI助手，更轻松快捷地找到顶尖候选人。

Post your job for free at linkedin.com/studybill, then promote it to use LinkedIn jobs new AI assistant, making it easier and faster to find top candidates.

免费发布职位，请访问linkedin.com/studybill。

That's linkedin.com/studybill to post your job for free.

适用条款和条件。

Terms and conditions apply.

想象一下，借助真正理解您客户的科技来扩展您的业务。

Imagine scaling your business with technology that understands your customers, literally.

这就是 Alexa 和 AWS AI 背后的故事。

That's the story behind Alexa and AWS AI.

每天，Alexa 在 17 种语言中处理超过 10 亿次互动，同时将客户摩擦降低 40%。

Every day, Alexa processes over 1,000,000,000 interactions across 17 languages, all while reducing customer friction by 40%.

这不仅仅是让生活更轻松，更是改变客户互动方式并创造新的收入来源。

It's not just about making life easier, it's also about transforming customer engagement and generating new revenue streams.

在幕后，AWS AI 驱动着 70 多个专用模型协同工作，打造自然对话，证明企业如何以自信和安全的方式大规模部署 AI。

Behind the scenes, AWS AI powers more than 70 specialized models working together to create natural conversations, proving how enterprises can deploy AI at scale with confidence and security.

Alexa 的 AI 能力在亚马逊庞大的运营中经过实战检验，实现了大规模的可衡量影响。

Alexa's AI capabilities were battle tested across Amazon's massive operations, delivering real measurable impact at scale.

这些相同的创新现在为其他企业提供了经过验证的框架，以提升效率、解锁新的收入来源，

These same innovations now give other businesses a proven framework to boost efficiency, unlock new revenue streams,

并获得持久的市场优势。

and gain a lasting market edge.

访问 aws.com/ai/rstory 了解 Alexa 的故事。

Discover the Alexa story at aws.comai/rstory.

那就是 aws.com/ai/r story。

That's aws.com/ai/r story.

你的比特币资产越多，面临的挑战就越复杂。

The more your Bitcoin holdings grow, the more complex your challenges become.

最初简单的自托管，如今已涉及家族传承规划、复杂的安保决策，以及应对单次失误就可能损失数代财富的状况。

What started as a simple self custody now involves family legacy planning, sophisticated security decisions, and navigating situations where a single mistake could cost generations of wealth.

标准服务并未为这些高风险的现实情况而设计。

Standard services weren't built for these high stakes realities.

因此，长期投资者选择 Unchained Signature——专为认真持有比特币的人士提供的高端私人客户服务，提供专业指导、稳健托管和持久的合作关系。

That's why long term investors choose Unchained Signature, a premium private client service for serious Bitcoin holders who want expert guidance, resilient custody, and an enduring partnership.

使用 Signature 服务，您将配备专属客户经理，他们了解您的目标，并在每一步为您提供帮助。

With Signature, you're paired with your own dedicated account manager, someone who understands your goals and helps you every step of the way.

您将享受全方位的入职服务、当日紧急支持、个性化教育、降低的交易费用，以及优先参与独家活动和功能的资格。

You get white glove onboarding, same day emergency support, personalized education, reduced trading fees, and priority access to exclusive events and features.

Unchained 的协作托管模式旨在为那些希望自行保管密钥的用户，提供与全球最大的比特币托管机构同等的安全保障。

Unchained's collaborative custody model is designed to provide the same security posture as the world's biggest Bitcoin custodians, but for those who prefer to hold their own keys.

了解更多关于 Unchained Signature 的信息，请访问 unchained.com/preston。

Learn more about Unchained signature at unchained.com/preston.

结账时使用代码 Preston 10，即可享受首年 10% 的折扣。

Use code Preston 10 at checkout to get 10% off your first year.

比特币不仅关乎一生，更关乎世代传承。

Bitcoin isn't just for life, it's for generations.

好的。

Alright.

回到节目。

Back to the show.

我想您还经历过另一件对您影响深远的事情，首先，我认为在 1973 年，您父亲工作的经纪公司破产了。

You had another very formative thing happen to you, I guess, where well, first of all, I think in 1973, the brokerage firm that your father worked for went bankrupt.

而且我记得你告诉我，你母亲基本上失去了她的遗产，而他损失了五十万美元，这在当时是一笔巨款。

And and I think you said to me that your mother basically lost her inheritance, and he he lost half $1,000,000, which was a huge amount of money in those days.

所以这对你来说非常个人化，你亲眼目睹了愚蠢、狂热和缺乏谨慎所付出的代价。

And so so this was very personal, you seeing the price to pay for folly, exuberance, lack of carefulness.

因为我记得，当我为你写的书做采访时，你非常坦诚地说：看。

Because I remember you were incredibly candid when I interviewed you for my book in saying, look.

我父亲是个非常好的人，但却是个糟糕的投资者。

My father was just a wonderful man, but a terrible investor.

我想知道，目睹这场个人灾难的发生，是如何影响你作为投资者对生存和避免灾难的专注的。

And I was wondering how watching this personal disaster unfold also informed your focus on survival, on avoiding catastrophe as an investor.

我退伍后，我和妻子上了我父亲的船。

I get out of the Navy, and my wife and I were on up on my dad's boat.

他在密歇根州的密歇根湖有一艘船，当时电话打来，说公司破产了。

He had a boat in Michigan, Lake Michigan, when the call came saying the firm had gone under.

所以，我的意思是，我们就正好在那里。

So it was like, I mean, we're right there.

你知道吗？

You know?

他是个强硬的人，也是个乐观主义者，所以挺过来了。

And he he was a tough guy, and he was an optimist, so he weathered it.

但那真是让人震惊。

But it was like, wow.

但值得一提的是，我妈妈原谅了他，但这确实是个沉重的打击。

And my mom, to her credit, you know, forgave him for it, but it was, you know, it was a blow.

我的体会是，你必须做足功课。

My takeaway was you gotta do your homework.

你必须保持怀疑态度。

You have to be a skeptic.

你得去核实一切。

You gotta check stuff out.

如果事情说不通，就别做。

If it doesn't make sense, don't do it.

是的。

Yeah.

我现在对这件事非常着迷，虽然我不认识塞奎亚的这些人，但他们投资了FTX。

I I'm fascinated right now with and I don't know any many of these people at Sequoia, but they invested in in FTX.

FTX至少没有经过审计的资产负债表。

And FTX didn't have audited financial statements, at least for the balance sheet.

这让我感到非常困惑。

And it just fascinates me.

你怎么可能在没有经过审计的财务报表的情况下进行投资呢？

How could you invest in something without audited financial statements?

我不知道你是否还记得房利美，你知道的，它曾经以某种方式垮台了，但从1999年或2000年到2005年，它都没有经过审计的财务报表。

And I don't if you remember Fannie Mae from, you know, when it and it went under in a way, but I think from '99 or 2000 to o five, it didn't have an audited financial statement.

然而，专业投资者仍在购买它的股票。

And yet professional investors were buying the stock.

在我看来，你必须保持怀疑态度，永远不能放松警惕，因为你不能仅仅因为某个客户讲了个有趣的故事就去投资。

And it it just seems to me that you have to be a skeptic, and you can't let your guard down ever because and you you can't buy something because a funny story by this client.

他仍然是个客户，他总是会去佛罗里达的退休社区。

He's still a client, and he he would always he got a retirement home in Florida.

最糟糕的是，和退休的首席执行官们一起去打高尔夫，因为他们总有一些热门消息，虽然他们自己都没搞清楚，却觉得股价会大涨。

And the worst thing is go out and play golf with retired CEOs because they always have some hot story that they don't even evolve, but they think it's gonna go up a lot.

他总是跟我讲什么‘聪明钱’，我终于忍无可忍了。

And he was always telling me about the smart money, and I finally had enough.

于是我跟他说：‘你看看我们的业绩记录，我们才是聪明钱。’

And I said to him, you know, if you look at our track record, we're the smart money.

他从此再也没提过这事。

And he never brought it up again.

但你到底该听多少别人的建议呢？

But how much taking tips from people?

你知道的？

You know?

你总会听到那些聪明人都在买这个，或者很多人都在进场。

Well, you hear all the smart guys are buying this or, you know, all these people are in it.

或者我认为，像FTX这样的事情发生的一部分原因，是他进入了交易流程。

Or I think part of what happened with, like, FTX, he got in the deal flow.

你知道吗？

You know?

所以如果你是红杉资本，你必须投资这个项目，因为你还有其他项目在排队。

And so if you're Sequoia, you gotta buy the deal because you got other deals coming.

我只是不认为对投资组合中的每一笔投资都高度关注是不理性的。

I just I don't think it's irrational to think that you're gonna sweat every investment in your portfolio.

你永远不会对任何投资掉以轻心。

You're never gonna let your guard down on any investment.

不管它有多大，我都无所谓。

I don't care how big it is.

你必须这么做，因为你根本不能放松警惕，必须非常严谨。

You're you're gonna because you you can't you just have to be pretty anal about it.

这是一种观点，但我认为你必须核实每一件事。

It's a point of view, but I think you gotta check everything out.

你必须不断提问。

You gotta keep asking questions.

你曾经对我说过，弗雷德，风险管理的黄金法则是了解你所拥有的东西。

When you once said to me, Fred, the the golden rule of risk management is to know what you own.

与其他伟大的真理不同，这句话听起来像是陈词滥调。

Unlike all great truths, it sounds like a total platitude.

但如果你想想，如果能深入检查FTX、房利美或这些公司的内部情况，或者只是说‘无法深入检查’，人们本可以避免多少麻烦。

But if you think about how much trouble people would have avoided by really looking under the hood of, FTX, if that was possible, or Fannie Mae or many of these companies or just saying, can't look under the hood.

我不知道。

I don't know.

这是不可能的。

It's not possible.

但这个简单的规则对我来说是一个巨大的启示，就是越来越意识到：我对伟大投资者的心理、生活和思维方式相当了解。

But that simple rule and this has been a big revelation for me is just increasingly to think, well, I know a fair amount about the psychology of great investors and their lives and how they how they think.

但我真的不太具备理解公司财务状况的能力。

But I really am not very well equipped to understand the finances of companies.

我对它没什么兴趣。

I'm not very interested in it.

尽管我曾在《福布斯》工作，为《财富》等杂志撰稿，没错。

And even though I worked at Forbes and wrote for Fortune and stuff like that Right.

我只是不想坐那儿读10-K报告之类的东西。

I just don't really wanna sit around reading 10 k's and stuff like that.

我真的提不起兴趣。

It just doesn't interest me.

认识到自己不具备分析和评估企业价值的能力，这种认知既令人痛苦，又令人解脱。

And just that recognition that I'm not equipped to analyze and value businesses has been kind of painful and very liberating at the same time.

首先，我特别喜欢你书中对你采访对象的个人反应。

First of all, I, one of the things I really, really enjoyed about your book was your own personal sort of reaction to the people you're interviewing.

我觉得这太棒了。

I thought it was fantastic.

谢谢。

Thanks.

我是认真的。

And I mean that.

我觉得这真是一本很棒的书。

I think it I think it's really a great book.

你知道，我跟你说过，我对此感觉很复杂。

You know, I I mentioned to you that I had such a mixed feeling.

你真的看透了我们，而我一向喜欢低调一点，这让我有点不安。

You were you really got us, and I I like to be a little bit under the radar, which was, you know, a little bit disconcerting.

但关于我的那段，你写得如此准确，让我很想看看你对其他人的描述。

But that short section on me, you got it so accurately that I wanted to find out what you wrote about everybody else.

我读了这本书。

I read the book.

我真的非常喜欢，我可能会在明年左右再读一遍。

I I really was really I'll read it again one of these probably the next year or so.

我会再读一遍，因为我觉得这本书很有价值。

I'll read it again because I think it's quite valuable.

我突然有了一个领悟，本来想说的

I had an insight I was gonna

好吧，我想说的是，我在写像你或查理·芒格这样的人时（我在同一章中写过他们），其中一个重要的教训就是意识到：我并不是你。

Well, what I was gonna say is one one of the great lessons for me of writing about people like you or Charlie Munger, I wrote about in the save chapter, was to realize I'm not you.

我不适合玩这个游戏。

I'm not well equipped for this game.

所以我认为，你的优势之一，没错，就是早在你职业生涯初期，这不仅仅是你的天性使然。

And so I think your I I mean, you you part of your advantage, right, is that very early in your career also, it wasn't just your wiring.

你很早就开始准备CFA考试了。

You you started for your CFA.

我想你是在1978年获得这个资格认证的。

I think you you got it in the designation in 1978.

所以你当时正在研读本·格雷厄姆的《证券分析》。

So you were studying Ben Graham's book, security analysis.

因此，你很早就开始学习这个游戏的规则，并将其内化于心。

And so you you were kind of learning the rules of the game and internalizing them very early.

所以我想了解，在经历了1973年非理性繁荣和1974年崩盘之后，你是如何从本·格雷厄姆的研究中走出来的。

So I wanted to get a sense of how you came out of studying Ben Graham after the irrational exuberance of '73 and then the crash of of seventy four.

然后你在77、78年左右研究格雷厄姆。

Then you're studying Graham around 7778.

你一定因此对市场运作方式、游戏规则以及金融领域的‘重力法则’有了清晰的认识。

You must have come out with this sense of clarity about how the game works, about what the rules of the game are, what the laws of gravity, financial gravity are.

你能跟我们分享一下，通过深入研究格雷厄姆，你对投资的基本规则形成了哪些信念吗？

Can you give us a sense of what you came to believe about the fundamental rules of investing having studied Graham in this deep way?

当然。

Yep.

但先别急。

But hold that.

我只是想夸你一下，

Just I just wanna make to compliment you on

我喜欢任何以这些话开头的句子。

I like any sentence that begins with with those words.

嗯，不是的。

Well, no.

但我没告诉过你，我在塔夫茨大学的时光几乎毫无用处。

But I, what I didn't tell you so my time at TUC school was pretty useless.

我只记得关于它两件事。

What I only remember two things sort of about it.

一件事是，有一次他们请了一位来自波士顿某公司的基金经理来作夜间讲座，我被深深吸引住了。

One is that one time they had a guy, a money manager come from Boston from some Boston firm for to give a night talk, and I was just enthralled.

这是我在塔夫茨大学期间为数不多记得的事情之一。

It was one of the few things I remembered about tech school.

另一件事是我们必须修一门统计学课程，而我在统计学方面有着异常高的天赋。

The other thing was that we had to take a statistics course, and I had a freakishly high aptitude for statistics.

我记得去参加期末考试时的成绩。

And I I remember going to the final exam in my grade.

我进期末考试时的分数比班上第二名高出20%。

My score going into the final was 20% higher than the next guy in the class.

所以，对数字有天赋，这确实是一份巨大的礼物。

So having a facility for numbers, okay, is a huge gift.

对吧？

Right?

因为，你知道，拥有很高的数学天赋，这其实很奇怪。

Because, you know, when having a high math aptitude and this is really strange.

我记得小时候在小镇长大时，走路回家的路上，车子开过，我会盯着车牌号，把数字重新组合、相加、相减，试图让结果变成零。

I remember when I grew up in a small town in the end, I'd be walking home and cars would go by and I watched the license plates, and I would jigger the numbers around, add them up, and subtract, add them together so I could get to zero.

我的天，谁会这么做啊？

I mean, who does that?

所以你敏锐地指出了这一点，事实上，当你刚开始当理财经理时，你根本不知道自己会不会做得好。

So you're you're perceptive in saying and the truth is when you start off as a money manager, you don't really know if you're gonna be good at it.

对吧？

Right?

你只是一个年轻人，正在努力尝试。

You're just a young guy and you're you're trying hard.

而你要意识到，大多数人对此并没有兴趣。

And for you to realize that mostly, don't have the interest in it.

所以我给你举个例子。

So I just I I'll give you an example.

直到上个月，我都没花过任何时间在加密货币上。

I have spent until the last month no time on cryptos.

我去找了那些年轻人，问他们这是什么？

I went to my young guys and said, what is it?

这是一种货币。

It's a currency.

但这不是投资。

Well, that's not an investment.

我们别管它了。

Let's not worry about it.

我现在对此非常着迷。

I'm fascinated now.

我正在阅读所有我能找到的关于FTX的信息，因为我对这场‘尸检’非常着迷。

I'm reading everything I can about FTX because I'm fascinated with the autopsy.

我热衷于从中学到发生了什么，以及我们可以从中吸取什么教训。

I'm fascinated with learning from this as to what happened, what can we learn from it.

因此，这对我来说只是一个感兴趣的领域。

And so this is just an area of interest for me.

而对你来说，这并不会是一个感兴趣的领域。

And for you, it wouldn't be an area of interest.

对你而言，真正感兴趣的是能够敏锐地从基金经理中识别出优秀的那一批人，弄清楚他们究竟做了什么。

What is an area of interest for you is being able to very perceptively pull out from money managers, the good ones, what it is that they do.

我的意思是，这是一种天赋。

And, I mean, it's a gift.

所以我认为你正在追随自己的天赋。

And so I think you're following your gift.

你明白吗？

You know?

但如果你想要进入资产管理行业，却不读书，不理解经审计的财务报表和未经审计的财务报表之间存在巨大差异，那么对我来说，这就像一盏霓虹灯一样醒目。

But if you try to come into money management and you're not reading you're you're not understanding that there's a big difference between audited financial statement and an unaudited statement, and, you know, that's like for me, it's like a neon sign.

你懂的？

You know?

是的。

Yeah.

而我觉得，如果听到经审计的报表，我的眼睛就会开始发呆。

Whereas I think I would hear the audited statement, and my my eyes would start to glaze over.

没错。

Yeah.

明白了。

Got this.

而我呢，会去看一些关于藏传佛教之类的冷门书籍，然后觉得，哇，真酷。

Whereas I look at some obscure book on, you know, Tibetan Buddhism or something, and I'm like, oh, cool.

那里可能有些东西能与这个相关，能与这个联系起来。

There could be something there that relates to this, that relates to this.

对，没错。

And Yeah.

不。

No.

那是你的优势。

That's your that's your strength.

对。

Yeah.

我认为你必须做那些你天生痴迷且擅长的事情。

I think you have to somehow be doing what it is that you're naturally obsessed with and good at.

对。

Yeah.

但你也算幸运，因为你是在正确的领域学习的。

But you also I mean, you you got lucky in a sense that you you studied in the right church.

对吧？

Right?

所以你研究了格雷厄姆，然后你明白了。

So you studied Graham, and you got Yeah.

我确实研究过。

I did.

这些是投资的基本法则。

There were these fundamental laws of investing.

而且在某种程度上，我认为我们应该为我们的听众明确指出这些投资法则，因为从某种意义上说，它们是你五十年来所做一切的基石。

And it it seems like in some way I I mean, I think we should spell out what some of those laws of investing are for our listeners because in a way, they're the backbone of what you've done for fifty years.

我想说的第一个法则是，你曾经说过，折现至内在价值是预测未来回报的最佳指标。

And and the first one I would say is you once said the discount to intrinsic value is the best predictor of future returns.

所以你能谈谈专注于内在价值而非市场价格吗？因为这是一个非常根本的理念。

So can you talk a little bit about just the focus on intrinsic value as opposed to market price, which is just it's such a fundamental idea.

确实是。

It is.

确实是。

It is.

让我先回应一下阅读本·格雷厄姆对我意味着什么：它告诉我，你无需了解市场的所有细节，也能系统性地进行投资。

Let me preface that by sort of responding to what reading Ben Graham did for me was say, there is a path you can systematically invest in the markets without knowing all the pieces of it.

而巴菲特则继承了他的理念。

And Buffett comes along and takes his stuff.

正是他将本的理念付诸实践，并以一种对追求长期成功的人而言极其清晰的方式加以阐述。

He was the one that took Ben's stuff and put it into practice and articulated it beyond that in a way that makes perfect sense to people who are serious about long term success.

因此，他们让我明白：你完全可以做到这一点。

So what they did for me is say, you can do this.

这条路是存在的。

There is a path.

没错。

Yeah.

这并不是随机的。

It's not just random.

这些是游戏的规则。

There are these rules of the game.

这并不是随机的。

It's not random.

这些都是游戏的规则。

They're rules of the game.

因此，第一条规则是：价格是你付出的，价值是你得到的。

And so the number one rule is price is what you pay and value is what you get.

好吧。

Well okay.

那我们来拆解一下。

So let's unpack that.

明白吗？

Okay?

难点在于，一家公司值多少钱？

The hard part of that is what's a company worth?

这听起来就像，弗雷德，这是投资入门一零一。

And that sounds like, Fred, that's like investing one zero one.

但让我们再更深入地分析一下。

But let let's unpack that a little bit more.

如果你对自己说，我们要专注于一件事，而且我们会再进一步，因为我们购买的是成长型公司。

If you say to yourself, we are gonna be focused and and we're gonna do one more twist because we're buying growth companies.

我们会推算未来的价值。

We're gonna push out a future value.

我们会做出预测，然后做出我们的决策。

We're gonna make a forecast, and we're gonna make our decision.

看看今天的股价，但我们要看它七年后的价值。

Look at the stock price today, but we're gonna see what it's worth out seven years.

我们会跨越一个经济周期。

We're gonna go past an economic cycle.

明白吗？

Okay?

所以我们要做一些预测。

So we're gonna do a little bit of forecasting.

我们可以谈谈这个。

We can talk about that.

但我们会在这个脑子里构建内在价值的概念。

But we're gonna build this intrinsic value thing in our heads.

我们认为七年之后，忘了股票本身。

We think in seven years, the cup forget the stock.

这家公司值x。

The company is worth x.

明白吗？

Okay?

这就是我们要做的。

That's what we're gonna do.

我学到的一件事是，这让我们能够做得更好，因为你知道，你总想不断反思自己。

One of the things that I've learned that that's opened us up to do because I you know, you always wanna keep back checking yourself.

对吧？

Right?

不断挑战自己。

Keep challenging yourself.

所以我们是价值投资者。

And so we're a value investor.

最终，我们购买的是成长型公司，但我们非常关注价值。

Ultimately, we're buying growth companies, but we pay a lot attention to value.

在过去十五年里，许多价值投资者都失败了。

A lot of the value investors have imploded the last fifteen years.

这是我们的猜测。

And here's our guess.

他们认为衡量廉价股票的最佳指标是市盈率。

They thought the best measure of a cheap stock is a price earnings ratio.

我的一个同事罗布是个非常出色的人。

One of my guys, Rob, is a brilliant guy.

我们开始思考，市盈率是不是衡量企业价值的唯一方式。

We started thinking about is a p ratio the only way to think about the value of a franchise.

那自由现金流呢？

How about free cash flow?

那美国现在是一个轻资产经济呢？

How about the fact that America is a much more asset light economy now?

因此，它们不需要在建筑上投入那么多，所以自由现金流更高。

And so they don't have to put as much back in a building, so free cash flow is higher.

诸如此类。

Yada yada.

利润率更好。

Margins are better.

等等等等。

Yada yada yada.

那像Arm Holdings这样的公司呢？它们只出售智能手机设计的特许权使用费？

How about companies like Arm Holdings that sell only the royalties to the designs for the smartphones?

对吧？

Right?

我的意思是，我们扩展了价值的定义。

I mean so we expanded our notion of value out.

我们有两家公司从盒装软件的订阅模式转向了Autodesk模式。

We had two companies that shifted from shrink-wrap software subscription model into an Autodesk.

我们持有它们。

We held them.

它们的利润暴跌了，因为你把收入推后了。

Their earnings collapsed because you pushed the revenues out.

支出依然存在。

Expenses are still there.

所以一两年内，利润大幅下降。

So for a year or two, the earnings go way down.

但订阅的生命周期价值高于盒装软件。

And then but the lifetime value of subscription is higher than shrink-wrap software.

明白吗？

Okay?

所以我认为我们很好地传达了这一点：我们永远不会违背这一原则，但我们会保持开放的态度，去思考并拓展我们的理解，而不是争论这个原则。

So I thought we did a great job of saying, we're never gonna violate the principle, but we will be open to thinking about it and broadening our understanding as opposed to debating the principle.

我无法告诉你，因为所有这些事情都需要消耗情感和心理上的精力，以及分析上的精力。

And I can't tell you because all this stuff takes emotional and mental bandwidth, analytical bandwidth.

如果我们一直在争论，比如价格是你付出的，而价值是你得到的，但这次不一样之类的。

If we're debating, you know, price is what you pay and value is what you get, but this time it's different or whatever.

它的价格这个概念相对简单。

The idea of the price of it is relatively easy.

看看这家公司的市场价值。

Look at the market value of the company.

你知道的吗？

You know?

算出这家公司七年后的总价值。

Figure out what the total value of the company is in seven years.

如果它的预期回报足够高，那就再次买入。

And if it has a high enough expected return, it's again to buy.

我的意思是，这部分很简单。

I mean, that's the easy part.

困难的部分在于整个价值的概念。

The hard part is this whole notion of value.

我相信你可以提高判断价值的能力。

And I believe that you can get better at at how you figure out value.

我们现在使用概率加权的预期回报，通过概率方式估算它们的价值。

We use a probability weighted expected return now that we probabilistically figure out what they're worth.

我们并不是试图做出精确的预测。

We're not trying to be an accurate forecast.

我们想要的是可实现的预测。

We want an achievable forecast.

这两者之间有巨大差异。

There's a big difference between those two.

因此，你可以做很多事情。

And so there's a lot of things you can do.

你可以在这方面变得更好。

You can get better at this.

我认为我们在做预测方面越来越熟练，这意味着我们在预期回报上也变得更好。

And I think we are getting more and more skilled at making forecasts, which means that we're getting better at the expected return.

再回到这一点，弗雷德，关于遵守流程，我认为你多年来能够生存并表现优异的原因之一，是你有意识地坚持了一种围绕三个步骤构建的一致投资方法。

And to get back again, Fred, to this idea of adherence to process, one of the reasons why you've survived and outperformed, I think, over so many years is that you very consciously have this consistent investment approach that's built around three steps.

所以当你在1997年左右创立你的公司——纪律成长投资者公司时，你就把这一点写了下来。

And so when you founded your firm, Disciplined Growth Investors, back in, I think, '97, you wrote this down.

我想知道你能否为我们详细讲解一下这三个步骤，因为从某种意义上说，这是这些金融引力定律非常实际的应用。

And I I wondered if you could just take us through those three steps, because in a way in a way, it's a very practical application of these kind of financial laws of gravity.

这将帮助我们理解你是如何利用这些金融引力定律的。

It'll help us explain how you take advantage of those laws of financial gravity.

那么第一步是什么？

So the first stage is what?

第一步是理解你所拥有的东西。

So the first stage is understanding what you own.

你知道吗，我们再来梳理一下。

You know, again, let let's parse this out.

别让我们的分析师一看到公司就开始想着做预测，否则你会跳过其他步骤。

Let's not have our analysts look at a company and and already start thinking about building a forecast because you're gonna skip the other steps.

那么高管薪酬怎么样？

So what's what's executive compensation like?

你知道，他们是怎么赚钱的？

What is you know, how do they make money?

他们做的是什么样的业务？

What kind of business do they have?

好的。

Okay.

他们的利润率如何？

What are their margins?

他们做得怎么样？

How good are they?

你知道吗？

You know?

所有这些方面。

All those kind of things.

如果你搞不清楚他们是怎么赚钱的，就留给别人吧。

And if you can't figure out how they make money, leave it for somebody else.

我的意思是，承认这一点其实是一种基本的谦逊。

I mean, there's a basic humility in saying, yeah.

我的意思是，安然事件就救了我们。

I mean, the save us with Enron.

当安然股价从10美元一路跌向零时，我们曾关注过。

We looked when Enron hit $10 a share on its way to zero.

因为它看起来像是个有趣的生意。

Because it looked like an interesting business.

我们曾研究过它。

We looked at it.

财务报表太复杂了。

The the financial statement was so complicated.

我们只好举手投降，说我们看不懂这个。

We just threw our hands up, said we can't understand this one.

我们让别人去处理吧。

We'll let somebody else have it.

所以，接下来的重点不是预测。

So the idea is this isn't a forecasting effort that comes next.

而是一个理解的过程。

This is an understanding effort.

我们能弄清楚他们的商业模式吗？

Can we figure out how they do business?

好吧。

Okay.

他们做什么，诸如此类的事情。

What they do, yada yada.