RWH058：比尔·尼格伦的制胜之道

史蒂夫是一位了不起的老师。

And Steve was an incredible teacher.

遗憾的是他两年前去世了，但他独自运营这个项目约十五年，之后一直担任顾问直至项目五十周年纪念。

He unfortunately passed away two years ago, but he ran the program single handedly for about fifteen years and then was an advisor to it up through its fiftieth anniversary.

我认为史蒂夫的特别之处在于他既精通学术金融，又深谙现实世界——他为投资管理公司提供投资组合建议，这与我在明尼苏达大学接触的那些高度学术化、不擅长将学术金融与现实世界结合的金融教授截然不同。

And I think what made Steve so special was he had a foot in academic finance, but also a foot in the real world, advising an investment management firm on their portfolios, as opposed to the finance professors I'd been exposed to at the University of Minnesota that were very academically oriented and didn't really have much of a feel for how to blend academic finance with what was going on in the real world.

与哥伦比亚大学或布鲁斯·格林沃尔德（他在价值投资课程方面做得很出色）不同，麦迪逊分校并不以某种特定投资理念闻名。我认为这正是史蒂夫的独特之处——他会深入了解我们，知道什么能引起我们共鸣，推荐书籍或其他深造途径，为我们打开他认为有吸引力的门。

And Steve, unlike Columbia or Bruce Greenwald, who's done a great job with the value investing class there, Madison wasn't known for a specific investment philosophy, and I think that was one of the things that really made Steve special, was he would get to know us and have an idea of what might resonate with us, suggest books or other ways of furthering our education, kind of opening those doors that he thought might be appealing.

与我同届毕业的同学大多至今仍是密友，他们中有非常成功的成长型股票投资者、对冲基金投资者、共同基金投资者和债券投资者——全都出自同一个项目。

And the students that I graduated with, most of whom are still close friends, you know, they're very successful growth investors, hedge fund investors, mutual fund investors, bond investors that all came out of that same program.

我们都怀着敬意将史蒂夫视为取得今日成就的关键原因。

And we all look at Steve reverentially as the reason that we were able to be as successful as we were.

这个项目的另一个特点是它吸引了那些独自钻研的‘书呆子’孩子——通常不是社交圈里最受欢迎的类型。

I think the other thing about the program, it kind of attracted these nerdy kids that were kind of off on their own, again, not usually the most socially popular kids.

我们当时觉得自己对投资的兴趣就像独角兽一样独特。

We thought we were kind of unicorns in being interested in investments.

当时我们13个人组成的小组一起度过了整整一年。

Then there'd be a group of 13 of us that spent the whole year together.

我说的'一起度过'是指那时候商学院还没有要求先在投行工作两年，再去私募干三年，然后才会考虑录用你。

And when I say spent the time together, this was before business schools had do two years at an investment banking firm and then three years in PE and then we'll consider taking you.

我们都是刚出校门的新人。

We were all right out of school.

当时正处于人生阶段，除了学业外确实没什么其他事情占据我们的时间。

We were at a stage of life where we didn't really have anything to consume our time other than school.

现在我和那里的年轻人聊天，市场收盘后我们会去喝杯啤酒，结果四点半他们就急着要回家陪老婆孩子。

I go talk to the kids there now and we'll go out for a beer after the market closes and then at 04:30, they're telling me they have to get home to their wives and kids.

任何来给我们演讲的人，我们都会想办法留他们到凌晨两点，一方面是为了挑战，更因为这些人是成功的投资界人士。

Anybody that came and spoke to us, we would try to keep out till two in the morning, first because it was a challenge, but also these were people that were successful investment people.

我们想尽可能多地向他们学习。

We wanted to learn as much as we could from them.

就是这样一群年轻人朝夕相处，这段经历成为我职业生涯中无比宝贵的资源——在投资圈各个领域都取得成功的朋友们。

So it was this group of kids that spent so much time together, and, you know, it's been an invaluable resource throughout my career to have friends that have succeeded in so many areas, in the investment community.

你随后去了密尔沃基的西北互惠人寿保险公司，在那里做了几年股票分析师。

You you then went off and spent a couple of years as a stock analyst at an insurance company in in Milwaukee, Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance.

你过去多次谈到，从很多方面来看，那段经历至少对你来说是个反面教材，让你明白不该那样投资——当时人们只是因为华尔街推荐就蜂拥买入某些公司股票。

And and you've talked quite a lot in the past about, in many ways, how that was a good example for you at least of how not to invest, what what you were having to do there with people kind of piling into companies because they were recommended by Wall Street.

快进一下时间线，从某种意义上说，是你的教授史蒂夫·霍克拯救了你，他打电话对你说：

And just to fast forward a little bit, you would you would then, in some ways, saved by your professor, Steve Hawk, who who basically calls you and says, look.

我班上有个校友叫克莱夫·麦格雷戈，他准备给你打电话并提供工作机会，你应该接受。

There's a alum from my my course, Clive MacGregor, who's about to call you and would like to hire you, and you should take take the job.

于是你在1983年大学毕业几年后加入了哈里斯合伙公司，并在此工作了42年至今。

So you then go off in 1983, a couple of years after college, to Harris Associates, which is where you've been for the last forty two years.

说说你去见克莱夫·麦格雷戈时的情形吧，他是八十年代初哈里斯合伙公司的资深明星人物，当时他邀请你和其他合伙人共进晚餐。

Tell me when you when you went and met Clive McGregor, who was one of one of the, I I guess, senior senior stars at at Harris Associates back then in the early eighties, and he invited you out for for dinner with other partners from the firm.

那次经历是怎样的？

What what was that experience like?

你意识到自己终于接触到什么？或者说在投资界找到归宿时，那种'这就是我当下该在的地方'的感受是怎样的？

What did you realize you were getting exposed to in terms of, in a sense, finally coming home and finding a place within the investment world that you were like, oh, this is where I should be at least for now?

在那家保险公司工作时，我学到了几件事，既关乎自我认知，也关乎身处一个企业成败不由投资决定的商业环境。

So at the at the insurance company, there were a couple things that that I learned partially about myself, but also about being a part of a business where the success or failure of the business was driven by something other than investments.

就像任何寿险公司一样，他们的成功取决于销售寿险的能力。

Like any life insurance company, their success was going to be determined by how well they sold life insurance.

而投资部门更像是采取一种‘别搞砸就行’的策略。

And the investment side was more of a don't screw it up approach.

这正是我想在下一份工作中避免的情况。

And that was something I wanted to avoid, whatever my next job was.

我希望加入一家以投资业绩决定成败的公司。

I wanted to be at a firm where the success or failure was driven by the investment results.

我意识到的另一件事是：作为分析师，如果我的投资理念与基金经理不同，我的工作对他们就毫无价值。

The other thing I realized was that as an analyst, if I didn't share the same investment philosophy that the portfolio managers were using, my work wasn't going to be useful to them.

无论分析质量多好、结果多成功，只要不符合他们的投资标准，就永远行不通。

Didn't matter how good it was, how successful or unsuccessful, if didn't meet the criteria that they wanted for their investments, it was just never going to work.

所以参加芝加哥北部郊区某乡村俱乐部晚宴时，我满脑子都在思考这些问题。

So those were the things I was focused on when I went to this dinner at a country club in, one of the Northern suburbs of Chicago.

他们很体贴地选了个对我们双方都差不多中间的位置，尽管他们是四个人开车过来吃晚饭，而只有我一个人开车过去。

They generously picked a spot that was kind of halfway for both of us, even though there were four of them driving up for dinner and just me driving down.

我当时在寻找的是，能否确信他们的思维方式与我一致，且他们的成功是由投资驱动的。

I was looking for, could I get comfort that they thought the same way I did and that their success was driven by how invested.

然后我们开始讨论股票。

Well And we started to talk about stocks.

这不是一次正式的面试。

It wasn't a formal interview.

就是聊聊你最近在做的一些项目。

It was discuss some of the things you've been working on.

当我开始谈论某只股票时，我能看到他们之间交换的那种心照不宣的眼神。

And I'd start talking about a stock and I could see these sideways glances kind of knowing looks going on among them.

直到被录用后我才明白，他们之所以那样看是因为几乎每个我提到的股票都是他们正在研究或持有的，这就是他们想深入探讨的原因——他们不仅想了解我的认知程度，还想看看能否从我这里学到什么。

And I didn't realize till after I'd been hired that the reason they were looking like that is almost every stock guy was bringing up was something that they were currently working on or owned, and that was the reason they wanted to delve in so deeply to see they were not only trying to see how much I understood but see if they could learn anything from me.

对我来说，这极大地印证了他们也同样重视我用来支撑投资建议的诸多指标。而当他们开始讨论其他正在研究的标的时，我发现那些也都是我曾考虑过的项目。

To me, I took that as tremendously reassuring that they were actually caring about a lot of the same metrics that I was using to justify my investment recommendations And the similarity when they started talking about some of the other names they were working on, they were things that I had considered working on.

因此，我对我们在投资理念上的契合感到相当自在。

So I was quite comfortable we had a match in the way we thought about investing.

他们的公司专注于高净值投资，主要服务于芝加哥地区的客户以及橡果共同基金。

Their firm, all it was, was high net worth investments, mostly in the Chicagoland area for customers and also the Acorn Mutual Fund.

他们全部的成败都取决于客户资金的投资表现。

And their entire success or failure was based on how well they invested client money.

而这正是我所期待的挑战。

And that was the challenge that I wanted.

投资领域相比会计行业吸引我的一点在于：在会计行业，如果你比旁边的合伙人优秀10%，或许能多赚10%的收入。

And one of the things that appealed to me of investing compared to the accounting world, In the accounting world, if you're 10% better than the partner sitting next to you, maybe you could make 10% more money.

但在投资界，如果你优秀10%，就意味着要么拥有极其成功的职业生涯，要么沦为平庸并被指数基金取代的天壤之别。

The investing world, if you're 10% better, that's the difference between having a very, very successful career and being average and being replaced with an index fund.

这种能让自己能力成倍放大的赌注，正是我真正渴望且在保险公司从未感受过的。

So that leveraged bet on myself something that I really wanted and never felt I had at the insurance company.

你也很幸运在哈里斯公司遇到了老板彼得·福尔曼，在你从研究分析师晋升为研究总监的那些年里。

You also got lucky that you had this boss, Peter Foreman, at Harris for the years that you were a research analyst before you became director of research.

这大概是在八十年代早中期的时候吧。

So this is in in the early to mid eighties, I guess.

你之前向我描述他时，说他是个极其精明、富有常识的投资者，特别擅长分析管理层和评估人才。

And you described him to me before as this incredibly savvy sort of common sense investor who had a great gift for analyzing management and kind of sort of assessing people.

这显然已成为你工作中非常重要的一部分。

That's clearly been a really important part of what you've done.

我知道你至今已经参加过数千次管理层会议了。

I know you've done thousands of management meetings at this point.

你觉得从彼得·福尔曼那里，你早期学到了哪些关于评估管理层的方法？如何判断他们是否与你理念一致、是否有才华、是否会坑你、是否只顾自己利益？

What do you think you started to learn very early on from Peter Foreman about how to assess management and how to figure out whether they were aligned with you, whether they were talented, whether they were gonna screw you, whether they were looking out for themselves.

在那几年里，你从他身上领悟到了什么？

What what did you figure out during those years from him?

彼得是位了不起的导师，是投资界真正传统的老派人物。

So Peter was an amazing mentor, just real old school in the investment business.

他虽然没有显赫的学术背景，但工作态度无人能及。

Didn't have a great academic background, but his work ethic was second to none.

他的街头智慧令人惊叹。

His street smarts were amazing.

他与管理团队建立关系的能力让我受益匪浅。

His ability to form relationships with management teams was something I learned a tremendous amount from.

我最初是个过度自信的年轻人。

I started out as an overconfident kid.

我以为凭借出色的量化分析能力就能成为伟大的投资者。

I thought because I had great quantitative skills that I could be a great investor.

我当时很好奇这个在量化方面并不精通的人是如何取得如此辉煌的投资业绩的。

And I kind of wondered how this guy who was not that savvy quantitatively had amassed the track record that he had.

早期有次IPO路演来到芝加哥，彼得问我要不要去参加然后回来向他汇报。

And early on, there was a, IPO roadshow that was coming through Chicago, and Peter asked me if I could go to it and report back to him.

连公司名字都不记得了，这对故事不重要。

Don't even remember the company's name, it's not important to the story.

但我回来后说：彼得，这个管理团队真的令人印象深刻。

But I came back and I said, Peter, this was a really impressive management team.

彼得把雪茄叼在嘴里，深吸了一大口，吐着烟圈说：'在你见过100个管理团队之前，我不想再听到你谈论管理质量的问题。'

And Peter stuck his cigar in his mouth, takes a big, drag on the cigar, exhales, says, I don't ever want to hear you say another word about quality of management until you've seen a 100 of them.

当然，这个人很出色。

Of course, this guy's impressive.

他是公司的CEO。

He's the CEO of his company.

他们能当上CEO是因为拥有出色的社交能力。

They get to be CEO because they've got good interpersonal skills.

他们很会夸夸其谈。

They can talk a great game.

你以为你能判断他是否出色吗？

You think you can tell if he's impressive or not?

等你见过100个CEO后再来找我谈。

Come back to me after you've seen a 100 of them.

我当时沮丧极了，还以为自己提出了重要见解。

And I was so crestfallen, I thought I had made this important observation.

当然，事后看来，彼得百分之百是正确的。

And of course, in hindsight, Peter is 100% right.

当你见过100个管理团队后，你就能开始分辨哪些是顶尖的十分之一——那些真正与股东并肩、只专注于最大化长期每股价值的团队，而光谱另一端的人可能更关心自己作为公司CEO的职业生涯价值。

After you've seen a 100 management teams, you can start to tell who's the top decile, which are the ones that are really side by side with the shareholders, only focusing on maximizing long term per share value, to those that on the other end of the spectrum are maybe more concerned about how valuable their career will be as CEO of the company.

如果他们让公司规模扩大，就能赚更多钱，于是追求那些实际上不会增加每股价值的增长路径。

And if they make the company bigger, they'll make more money and they pursue growth paths that don't really add per share value.

后来我与卢·辛普森成为朋友，他当时负责GEICO的投资组合，我从卢那里学到：我原本采用的方法是先找到真正便宜的标的，再试图判断管理团队是否值得投资——其实你可以反过来操作。

Later, I became friends with Lou Simpson, who was running the investment portfolio for GEICO, and learned from Lou the approach that I was taking of identify something that's really cheap and then try to figure out if the management team was good enough to invest with, you could you could do it backwards.

先确定你真正想投资的人选，再看能否证明股票足够便宜到值得与他们合作。

Figure out who the people are you really want to invest with, and then look to see if you can justify the stock as being cheap enough to invest with them.

我认为'两者兼备'这个经验教训至今仍驱动着Harris Associates（橡树标记）的投资理念。

And I think the lesson that you need both is something that still drives Harris Associates, Oakmark's investment philosophy today.

仅股票便宜是不够的。

It's not enough to have a cheap stock.

仅管理团队优秀也是不够的。

It's not enough to have great management.

你真正需要的是公司价值被低估与管理团队卓越这两者的结合，且团队要专注于最大化长期每股价值。

You really want that combination of a company that's undervalued and an exceptional management team that's focused on maximizing long term per share value.

在实际操作中，你能做些什么来戳穿这些能言善辩的销售人员的论点呢？

And in practical terms, what can you do to kind of poke holes in the argument of these very slick salesman?

对吧？

Right?

当你与他们见面时，他们总是滔滔不绝地重复着对无数人说过的话，而且表达得既雄辩又有魅力。你会采取什么方式来打乱他们的节奏，或者验证实际执行是否配得上这份魅力？

When when you when you meet them and they're they're always telling you what what they've told a million people and they do it very eloquently and charismatically, What do you do to try to knock them off script or to test whether the execution actually lives up to the the charisma?

到我担任研究总监时——大概是1990年左右，也就是在哈里斯工作七年后——我在大多数管理层会议中的角色就是试图让他们脱离预设的脚本。

So by the time I'd become director of research, which I think was around 1990, so after seven years at Harris, my role in most of the management meetings was to try to get them off script.

我不希望由我们的分析师来做这件事，因为有时这会损害合作关系。

I didn't want our analysts to be the ones doing that because sometimes that could harm the relationship.

他们可以替这个带着团队跑偏的‘疯狂叔叔’打圆场。

They could kind of apologize for the crazy uncle who is taking them down this other path.

我记得有家化工公司——大型上市公司，备受推崇——来我们这里做推介时，直接拿出了他们的演示手册。

But I remember a chemical company coming in here, large cap company, very highly thought of, and they take out their pitch book.

他们一开始就谈到需要做一笔收购，因为他们需要完善他们的'三脚凳'结构。

And one of the first things they started talking about was how they needed to make an acquisition because they needed to complete their three legged stool.

我就问，三脚凳有什么好的？

And I said, what's so great about a three legged stool?

那人看着我，仿佛听到了世界上最荒谬的问题。

And the guy just looked at me like it was the most nonsense question he'd ever heard.

我说，我奶奶就有一个这样的凳子，我一点都不喜欢它。

I said, well, my grandma has one of those and I don't I don't even like it.

它一点都不稳。

It's not stable.

只要你往任何一边施力，它就会翻倒。

If you put weight on any of the sides, it'll tip over.

我实在想不通为什么会有人想要三脚凳。

I can't imagine why anyone wants a three legged stool.

让他去为一个从未被质疑过的东西辩护，结果就是他合上了演示册，开始和我们进行一对一的讨论。

And getting him to defend something that no one had ever second guessed basically got him to close the presentation book and talk to us, like just a one on one discussion.

我们发现，如果能让他们合上推介手册直接与我们交谈，就能更深入地了解他们自认为成功的原因、驱动力以及目标。

And we find we learn so much more about why people think they're successful, what motivates them, what their goals are, if we can get them to close the pitch book and just talk to us.

这至今仍是我们参与任何管理层陈述或会议时的目标——让我们彼此真诚对话。

And that continues to be a goal in any management presentation or management meeting that we're a part of today, is let's just talk to each other.

我们不希望你向我们做正式汇报。

We don't want you making a presentation to us.

谈谈对你真正重要的事。

Talk about what matters to you.

谈谈你如何评判成败。

Talk about how you're going to judge success or failure.

谈谈你如何激励团队。

Talk about how you motivate people.

至于你用来填充模型的所有数据，我们可以从投资者关系部或财务部门获取。

And all the numbers that you use to fill in your models, we can get that from investor relations or maybe somebody in the finance department.

没必要为此浪费CEO的时间。

We don't need to waste the CEO's time with that.

可以说，哈里斯成功最重要的一个方面在于你们很早就确立了这些核心原则。

It seems like one of the most important aspects of the success of Harris in a sense is that you came up with these core principles.

确实，我认为很早就有三条核心原则成为了指导方针。

Really, I think three core principles pretty early on that have become kind of guiding principles.

我想知道，a. 你能否总结一下这些原则，b. 同时解释为什么拥有如此明确的投资策略如此重要。

And I I wondered, a, if you could sum them up, but, b, give us a sense of why it's such an important thing to have this very well defined investment strategy.

因为我发现伟大的投资者们一再展现出这一点。

Because I I see this again and again with the great investors.

对吧？

Right?

说到三条腿的凳子理论。

And talking of of three legged stools.

我记得查克·阿克拉曾向我讲述他的三条腿凳子理论，即他始终运用的三个核心原则。

I remember Chuck Akrae talking to me about his three legged stool, right, where there were three core principles that that he used all of the time.

汤姆·盖纳也有他反复使用的四个筛选标准。

Tom Gaynor has these four filters that he comes back to again and again.

因此，从某种意义上说，将事物提炼成这些可以应用于几乎每项投资的核心原则的能力确实非常重要。

And so it seems really important in a in a sense, the ability to distill things down to these these essential principles that you can apply to almost every investment.

所以请告诉我们，a) 这些原则是什么，以及 b) 为什么这种提炼过程如此有价值。

So tell us, a, what those principles are and, b, why that's so valuable, that process of distillation.

嗯，我认为其价值的一个原因在于外界信息实在太多了。

Well, I think one of the reasons it's valuable is there is just so much information out there.

这比起我八十年代开始职业生涯时，现在这个问题更加严重。

And this is an even bigger issue today than it was in the eighties when I started my career.

如果你想的话，你可以花上数月时间了解一家公司的所有信息，但可能仍然无法掌握全部可用资料。

If you wanted to, you could spend months and months learning everything there is to know about a company and you probably still wouldn't get everything that's available.

因此，你必须设法将所有信息过滤到真正影响你投资决策的关键部分。

So somehow you have to be able to filter down all that information to what's really going to matter to your investment decision.

1983年我刚加入这里时，彼得·福尔曼曾对我说：'当你收购一家公司时，你得到两样东西。'

And when I started here in 1983, Peter Foreman said to me, When you buy a company, you get two things.

‘你得到资产负债表和运营它的人，你最好对这两者都感到满意。’

You get the balance sheet and the guy who's running it, and you better be happy with both of them.

而今天我们关注的这三个方面，与四十多年前彼得让哈里斯关注的内容并没有太大不同。

And the three things that we look at today aren't all that different than what Peter had Harris looking at more than forty years ago.

我们说要关注三个方面。

We say the three things we want.

第一，我们希望股价相对于企业内在价值有大幅折让。

We want a large discount to underlying business value.

我们会基于对公司七年后价值的预估进行折现计算，希望能以当前预估实际价值的60%左右价格买入。

So we try to make a guess based on what we think the company could be worth seven years from now, discounted back to today, we'd like to buy at something in the 60s cents on the dollar what we think the business is actually worth.

对我们而言，价值意味着全现金收购方为买下整个企业所能支付的最高价格，同时仍能获得足够的投资回报。

And to us, worth means what's the maximum price an all cash buyer could pay to own the whole business and still earn an adequate return on investment?

如果能以这个价值的60%买入，我们会非常非常满意。

And if we can get it at 60% of that, we're very, very happy.

第二，我们希望股息收入与每股价值增长的组合至少能对标标普500的预期收益。

The second thing is we want the combination of dividend income and expected per share value growth to at least match what we expect for the S and P 500.

假设标普500股息率略低于2%，预计盈利增长6%到7%，那么我们希望投资组合中公司的这两项指标合计至少达到8%到9%。

So if you say the S and P yield a little less than 2%, probably is expected to grow earnings at 6% or 7%, we'd like companies where that combination is 8% or 9% at a minimum.

所以可能是像奥驰亚这样股息率约9%但盈利增长预期不高的公司，也可能是像字母表这样股息不多但增长更快的企业。

So it could be an Altria that pays out a yield that's about 9% and isn't expected to grow earnings, or it could be an Alphabet that doesn't pay much of a dividend but is expected to grow faster than that.

我们不在乎回报以何种形式出现，但之所以有此要求，是因为价值投资有时会将你引向那些结构上处于劣势、辉煌岁月已成过往的公司。你几乎是在打一场赌：要么企业价值快速下跌至公允水平，要么投资者快速推高估值让你获利退出。

We don't care which form the return comes in, but the reason we want that is value investing can sometimes lead you to these structurally disadvantaged companies whose best days are in the rearview mirror, And you're kind of fighting a battle of will the business value decline rapidly enough that that's the way you'll get to fair value or will investors mark the value up quickly enough that you can sell at a profit?

我们不愿买入这类价值陷阱，因为我们采取超长期投资视角，相信从买入到最终卖出的时间跨度越长，企业价值增长空间越大。

We don't want to be buying those kinds of value traps because we want to take a very long term time horizon and believe the more time that elapses from our purchase to our eventual sale, the greater the business value will be over that time period.

第三点，和所有人一样，我们想要卓越的管理层。

And then thirdly, we want, like everybody, we want exceptional management.

但对我们而言，卓越主要体现在他们与外部股东目标一致——致力于最大化中长期每股企业价值。

But to us, that exceptional largely means that they are aligned with outside shareholders in having a goal of maximizing intermediate to long term per share business value.

我们要避开那些不考虑分母效应、一味追求规模扩张的企业。

And we want to avoid the companies that don't use a denominator and just are trying to grow their size.

这对我们很重要，因为平均持股周期通常在五到七年。

The reason that's important to us, our average holding period tends to be five to seven years.

想想这个时间跨度，管理层做出的重要决策——其影响是今天根本无法建模预测的。

And if you think about that timeframe, the important decisions a management team has that you really have no concept of how to model today.

这些决策可能涉及出售部门、收购新业务，甚至出售整个公司、回购股份或进行并购，这些都将对我们作为投资者的回报产生极其重大的影响。

It might be the opportunity to sell a division, buy a new division, maybe even sell the entire company, repurchase shares or make acquisitions, those decisions are going to have a very, very meaningful impact on what our return is as an investor.

我们想要确保管理层在一点三十分时

And we want to make sure that management one:thirty is

至少在目标追求上与我们保持一致。

aligned with us in at least what they're trying to accomplish.

对我们而言，这应当是实现长期每股业务价值的最大化。

And that to us should be maximizing long term per share business value.

我们稍事休息，听听今天的赞助商信息。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

想象一下，用能真正理解客户的技术来扩展您的业务。

Imagine scaling your business with technology that understands your customers, literally.

这就是Alexa和AWS人工智能背后的故事。

That's the story behind Alexa and AWS AI.

每天，Alexa以17种语言处理超过10亿次交互，同时将客户摩擦降低了40%。

Every day, Alexa processes over 1,000,000,000 interactions across 17 languages, all while reducing customer friction by 40%.

这不仅仅是让生活更便利，更是关于改变客户互动方式并创造新的收入来源。

It's not just about making life easier, it's also about transforming customer engagement and generating new revenue streams.

幕后，AWS AI驱动着70多个专业模型协同工作，打造自然对话，证明企业如何能自信且安全地大规模部署人工智能。

Behind the scenes, AWS AI powers more than 70 specialized models working together to create natural conversations, proving how enterprises can deploy AI at scale with confidence and security.

Alexa的人工智能能力在亚马逊庞大的业务运营中经过实战检验，实现了可量化的大规模影响。

Alexa's AI capabilities were battle tested across Amazon's massive operations, delivering real measurable impact at scale.

这些相同的创新如今为其他企业提供了经过验证的框架，用以提升效率、开辟新收入来源并获得持久的市场优势。

These same innovations now give other businesses a proven framework to boost efficiency, unlock new revenue streams and gain a lasting market edge.

探索Alexa的故事，请访问aws.comai/rstory。

Discover the Alexa story at aws.comai/rstory.

网址是aws.com/ai/rstory。

That's aws.com/ai/rstory.

正值新年之际，这意味着现在是实现你梦想事业的最佳时机。

It's the new year, which means that it's the best time to finally start the business you've been dreaming about.

就在几年前，我创办了自己的电商业务，而Shopify正是我起步所需的完美工具。

Just a couple years ago, I launched my own e commerce business and Shopify was exactly the tool I needed to get started.

尽管许多人总把梦想推迟到下一年，但我要告诉你，现在正是把握眼前机遇的最佳时机。

While many people continually push off their dreams until the next year, I am here to tell you that now is the time to capitalize on the opportunities right in front of you.

Shopify为您提供线上和线下销售所需的一切支持。

Shopify gives you everything you need to sell online and in person.

包括我在内的数百万创业者，已从家喻户晓的品牌跃升为初创业主，迈出了创业第一步。

Millions of entrepreneurs, including myself, have already made this leap from household names to first time business owners just getting started.

从数百款精美模板中任选一款进行定制，使用内置AI工具撰写产品描述或编辑商品照片。

Choose from hundreds of beautiful templates that you can customize and use their built in AI tools to write product descriptions or edit product photos.

随着您的成长，Shopify将全程伴您同行。

And as you grow, Shopify grows with you every step of the way.

2026年，别再等待，立即通过Shopify开启销售之旅。

In 2026, stop waiting and start selling with Shopify.

立即注册每月1美元的试用计划，今天就开始销售：shopify.com/wsb。

Sign up for your $1 per month trial and start selling today at shopify.com/wsb.

请访问shopify.com/wsb。

Go to shopify.com/wsb.

那是shopify.com/wsb。

That's shopify.com/wsb.

让Shopify伴你迎接新年新气象。

Hear your first This new year with Shopify by your side.

初创企业行动迅速。

Startups move fast.

借助AI技术，它们的产品迭代更快，能更早吸引企业级买家。

And with AI, they're shipping even faster and attracting enterprise buyers sooner.

但大订单往往伴随着更严格的安全与合规要求。

But big deals bring even bigger security and compliance requirements.

仅通过SOC2认证有时并不足够。

A SOC two isn't always enough.

安全措施是否到位可能决定交易成败。

The right kind of security can make a deal or break it.

但哪位创始人或工程师能抽离宝贵时间来处理这些呢？

But what founder or engineer can afford to take time away from building their company?

Vanta的人工智能和自动化技术让大额交易能在数日内轻松准备就绪。

Vanta's AI and automation make it easy to get big deals ready in days.

Vanta持续监控您的合规状态，确保未来的交易永远不会受阻。

And Vanta continuously monitors your compliance so future deals are never blocked.

此外，Vanta能随您业务扩展，全程提供及时的支持保障。

Plus Vanta scales with you, backed by support that's there when you need it every step of the way.

面对AI不断改变的法规和买家预期，Vanta精准掌握所需内容及时间节点，并为您打造了最快速便捷的实现路径。

With AI changing regulations and buyers' expectations, Vanta knows what's needed and when, and they've built the fastest, easiest path to help you get there.

这就是为什么严肃的初创企业都选择早期通过Vanta实现安全合规。

That's why serious startups get secure early with Vanta.

我们的听众可享vanta.com/billionaires专属1000美元优惠。

Our listeners get $1,000 off at vanta.com/billionaires.

访问vanta.com/billionaires立减1000美元。

That's vanta.com/billionaires for $1,000 off.

好的，我们回到节目中来。

All right, back to the show.

令我印象深刻的是，你在某种程度上建立了这种非常严谨、一致且可复制的流程，同时强调这三个支柱。

It's striking to me that in some ways you've had this very rigorous, consistent, replicable process with this emphasis on these three pillars.

而另一方面你又具备相反的优点，即这种灵活、非教条的价值投资方式——比如你非常钦佩的比尔·米勒，就能投资亚马逊、谷歌、奈飞这类公司。

And on the other hand, you have the opposite virtue, which is this kind of flexible, non purist approach to value investing where, like someone like Bill Miller, who I know you admire a lot, you were able to buy things like Amazon and Google and Netflix and and the like.

能否谈谈你的投资理念是如何演变的？是什么让你开始考虑无形资产这类因素？

Can you talk about just how your view of investing evolved over the years so that you were able to start thinking about things like intangibles and the like?

对。

Right.

我不认同'不够纯粹'这种说法。

I don't like the description that it's less pure.

我认为我们所做的正是纯粹的价值投资，只是我们承认GAAP会计体系确实是为有形世界设计的。

I think what we do is is very pure value investing, but we acknowledge that GAAP accounting was really constructed for a tangible world.

我本人出身会计领域，会计的基本原则就是：若某物无法被触摸或感知，就不应出现在资产负债表上。

Accounting's the world I come out of, and the basic principle of accounting is if you can't touch or feel something, it doesn't belong on the balance sheet.

比如这张桌子若被采购，会计处理会预估其使用寿命为十年，十年后残值为零。

So if this desk got purchased, the accounting for it would be you estimate that it's going to last for ten years, it's not going to be worth anything at the end of a decade.

所以你会把这张桌子的成本按10%的比例逐年计入损益表作为费用项。

So you take the cost of this desk and 10% of it goes through the income statement as an expense item every year.

这在以工业为主的世界里运作得相当好。

That worked pretty well for a world that was primarily industrial.

如果你回顾我职业生涯初期，股价与每股账面价值的关联性相当高。

And if you go back to the start of my career, the correlation of stock prices to book value per share was pretty high.

如今这种关联性几乎为零。

Today that correlation's almost zero.

我不认为这是因为投资者疯了，或是现在的市场价格与企业价值毫无关联。

And I don't think it's because investors have gone crazy or that the market today, prices bear no resemblance to business value.

我认为这是巴菲特在80年代初购买可口可乐时最早认识到的一点。

I think it's what Buffett was one of the first people to recognize in the very early '80s when he bought Coca Cola.

这是他首次以高于市场倍数的价格进行的收购之一，这让许多价值投资者感到困惑。

And it was one of his first purchases that was above a market multiple and lots of value investors.

当时人们反复讨论：这到底是怎么回事？

There was all this discussion back and forth of what in the world is going on?

他如何能证明这项投资的合理性？

How can he justify this investment?

沃伦在谈论此事时说过一句话，他说可口可乐最有价值的资产甚至不在资产负债表上。

And one of Warren's lines when he talked about it was to say that Coca Cola's most valuable asset wasn't even on the balance sheet.

那就是它的品牌价值。

It was its brand name.

这个品牌价值是通过年复一年的广告投放和客户体验积累起来的。

And that had been built up through years and years of advertising, customer experience.

但会计界认为其价值为零。

The accounting world viewed it as worth zero.

于是我们开始思考这个问题，以及它如何适用于其他企业和支出，比如制药公司的研发费用、消费品公司的广告费、以及像有线电视行业这样处于新兴阶段企业的销售费用。

So we started thinking about that and how that might apply to other businesses and other expenses, like R and D for pharmaceutical companies, advertising for consumer products companies, sales expenses for companies that were kind of at an emerging stage like the cable TV business.

早年间，有线电视公司通常以约10倍EBITDA的价格被私有化收购。

So way back in my early days, cable TV companies were routinely getting taken private at something like 10 times EBITDA.

然而它们却拥有负账面价值、负盈利，且没有一家公司支付股息。

Yet they had negative book value, negative earnings, none of them paid a dividend.

价值投资界普遍回避有线电视供应商。

The value investing community generally shunned cable TV providers.

我们仔细研究了利润表，然后问道：问题出在哪里？

And we went through the income statement and said, Where's the disconnect?

为什么私募股权能在这里看到价值，而你却看不到任何体现在净利润中的价值？

Why is private equity seeing value here when you can't see any of it reflected in net income?

我们查看了厂房设备的折旧表，那些可能使用五十年的地下电缆却按五年期限折旧。

And we looked at a depreciation schedule for plant and equipment, that cable in the ground that was probably going to last fifty years was getting depreciated over five.

在扩大客户群时，客户获取成本被直接费用化——尽管有线电视用户的平均在网时长超过七年。

Customer acquisition cost as you were trying to grow your customer base, expense even though the average cable TV customer would be a customer for more than seven years.

我们调整了这些项目的会计处理，使其更贴近资产在现实中的实际损耗情况。

And we changed the accounting on those to more replicate real world decay of those assets.

经过这样调整后，盈利数据更符合私募机构和有线电视公司使用的现金流标准——他们评估每个有线用户价值约1000美元，因为能产生100美元的EBITDA。

When you did that, the earnings looked more consistent with the cash flows that the private equity firms and other cable companies were using to say a cable sub tended to be worth about $1,000 because they were generating $100 of EBITDA.

我们成功将这些指标应用于公开股票市场，在价值投资者普遍不看好的时期，进行了几笔相当大规模的有线电视投资。

And we were able to utilize those metrics with public equities to make some pretty significant cable TV investments at a time where that was viewed as unusual for a value investor.

我们在80年代初持有安进公司（当时最大的生物科技公司之一），当时我们考察的是企业价值除以研发前现金流。

We owned Amgen, one of the largest biotech companies in the early '80s, when we looked at what's the enterprise value divided by pre R and D cash flow.

按照这个指标，它比传统制药公司更便宜，尽管其产品的专利寿命是默克、百时美施贵宝、辉瑞等公司的数倍。

And it was cheaper than the traditional pharmaceutical companies on that metric, even though the patent life for its products was multiples the length of what it was for Merck, Bristol Myers, Pfizer.

所以在我任职的这四十年里，我们一直在做同样的事情。

So we've been doing the same thing for the forty years that I've been here.

只是随着经济的变化，我们转向了更注重信息的经济模式，无形资产变得愈发重要，我们需要重新调整损益表和资产负债表以更好反映现实经济情况的公司比例也越来越高。

It's just as the economy has changed and we've moved to more of an information economy where intangibles are so much more valuable, it's getting to be a higher and higher percentage of our companies that we need to recast the income statement and balance sheet to better reflect real world economics.

我们长期关注并持有的公司之一Netflix，让我们惊讶的是其单用户估值还不到HBO的一半。

One of the companies that we had looked at and owned for some time, Netflix, it struck us that on a per subscriber basis, it was selling at less than half of what HBO was.

HBO的用户数在下降，而Netflix的用户数却在快速增长。

HBO was declining in subs and Netflix was growing subs rapidly.

我记得分析师汇报时得出的结论是：如果Netflix向用户收取与Spotify相同的月费，其估值将低于市场平均水平。

And our conclusion was I remember when our analyst presented it, he said, if Netflix charged the same monthly price to subscribers that Spotify charged, it would sell at less than a market multiple.

我们对员工和朋友进行的调查（虽不严谨但具有参考性）显示，人们认为Netflix订阅的价值远超其他月度订阅服务。

And surveys that we had done of employees and friends, I mean, nothing super scientific but anecdotal, said people valued their Netflix subscription way more than any of their their other monthly subscriptions.

因此他们实际上是通过定价策略进行投资，将价格作为获取客户的武器，以此实现比其他流媒体平台更快的增长。

So they were effectively investing via price to grow using that price as a customer acquisition weapon to grow much more rapidly than any of the other streamers.

我们基于其用户价值应更接近有线电视用户的信念买入了这只股票。

And we bought it on the belief that their subs should be valued more like cable TV subs.

我们分析的角度之一是他们一年内增长了2500万用户。

And one of the ways we looked at it was we said they grew subs 25,000,000 in one year.

我们认为每个用户的价值可能接近1000美元。

We thought those subs could be worth close to a thousand dollars apiece.

这相当于250亿美元的收入。

That's the equivalent of $25,000,000,000 of income.

当时该股市值约1500亿美元，甚至可能还未实现GAAP净利润——多数价值投资者认为这很荒谬。

And the stock at the time, I don't think it was even making GAAP net income, had a market cap of something like $150,000,000,000 Most value investors thought that was ridiculous.

我们分析认为其交易价格仅为其业务基础价值年增量的约六倍。

We were looking at it saying it sells at about six times the annual increment of value that adding to their base business value.

所以对我们而言，这就像一只低市盈率股票。

So to us, it was like a low PE stock.

在我看来，价值投资界似乎存在某种冲突或分裂——近年来出现的新一代投资者认为，我们应该像巴菲特持有可口可乐、比尔·米勒持有亚马逊，或是尼克·斯利普和凯斯·阿奎尔持有亚马逊那样，只需买入优秀企业并长期持有。

It's it it feels to me like there's some kind of conflict or schism within the value investing community in a way that there there's a there's a relatively new generation over recent years that decided we should just be buying great businesses and holding them for many years in the way that Buffett did with Coke or Bill Miller did with Amazon or Nick Sleep and Case Acquire did with Amazon.

某种程度上，当我观察你或乔·格林布拉特这样非常注重估值的投资者时，感觉你们处于中间地带——比如你们多年前在两百美元左右买入亚马逊，持有到六月前后才卖出。

And in a sense, when I when I look at you or someone like Joe Greenblatt, who are very valuation oriented, it feels like you're sort of in between, right, where you bought something like Amazon, say, in the two hundreds many years ago, and you held it, I think, into the June and then sold.

因此你的优势在于始终与估值紧密挂钩。

So part of your strength is that you've remained very much tethered to valuation.

你一直保持着这种估值纪律。

You've always kept this valuation discipline.

但另一方面也存在缺点——你无法长期持有这些真正伟大的公司。

And then on the other hand, there's this downside, which is that you don't get to write these companies, these really great companies for many years.

而且我听说你反对'复利机器'这个说法。

And I've I've heard you object to the term compounders.

当我向乔·格林布拉特问及巴菲特永久持有的穆迪公司时，他曾对我说：

And and Joe Greenblatt said to me at one point when I asked him about Moody's, the the Buffett had held forever.

乔当时的反应是：'是啊。'

Joe was like, yeah.

我总是过早卖出。

I've always sold too soon.

你知道，这就是吝啬鬼的问题所在。

Everything you know, this is part of the problem being cheapskate.

我总是过早卖出。

I've always sold too soon.

你能谈谈那种矛盾感吗？一方面渴望投资真正伟大的企业，另一方面又不想因支付过高价格而陷入困境。

Can you talk about that sense of of tension between the desire to to write a great business that's truly great and the tension of not wanting to get caught out overpaying for something?

当然。

Sure.

当我们的分析师推荐买入某家公司时，他们会预估该公司未来七年的盈利潜力，然后我们进行折现计算，目标是折价买入。

When our when our analysts make a recommendation that they want us to buy something, they make their best estimate of what the company can earn over the next seven years, and then we discount that back, and we're looking to buy at a discount.

我们会根据业务风险程度、资产负债表等因素，设置卖出目标价——通常是当前估算企业真实价值的85%到95%之间。

And we'll set a sell target that depending on the riskiness of the business, the balance sheet, etc, be somewhere between 8595% of our guess of what the true business value of the company is today.

在持股期间，分析师的工作就是及时响应所有新信息，确保他们对企业价值的评估能实时反映最新情况，而不仅仅是推荐股票时的认知。

And during the time we own the stock, the analyst's job is to respond to all new information and make sure their estimate of business value reflects everything we know up till that moment, not just what we knew at the time when they recommended the stock.

所以我再次强调，我们典型的持股周期大约是五年。

So again, I said our typical holding period's about five years.

我们预期所持有的公司其商业价值每年增长约8%到10%，因此到卖出时，你的卖出目标应该比买入时高出50%左右。

We would expect most of the companies we own to be growing business value something like 8% to 10% a year, so you're somewhere 50% or so higher on the sell target by the time you sell than you were at the time you bought it.

我认为大多数价值投资者以保守为傲，但我们试图抑制这种倾向，我们更看重准确性。

One of the other things I think most value investors pride their self on conservatism, we try to discourage that and we prize accuracy.

从我们开始买入一只股票到卖出的整个过程中，我们都在努力剔除数字中的任何保守成分，确保我们是基于真实最佳猜测、最准确的估值进行卖出。

And the whole path of when we start buying a stock until we sell it is trying to squeeze out any conservatism in our numbers and make sure we're selling on our true best guess, most accurate estimate of value.

我们的信念是，如果一只股票达到了目标价，继续持有而非将资金转投至另一只我们认为仅值其60%的股票，将会损害预期回报。

And our belief is if a stock attains that, to continue owning that stock rather than recycling that capital into another that's at 60% of what we think it's worth would be hurting our expected return.

确实如此。

And yes, it's true.

有些公司以超常速度增长的时间远超我们预期，也有些公司停止增长的时间早于我们的判断。

Are companies that have continued to grow at supernormal rates much longer than we had anticipated they would, but there are also companies that stopped growing sooner than we thought they would.

我认为事后很容易对那些少数本可以持续表现优异的股票产生卖出懊悔，而忽略了对所有已卖出股票进行深入分析后，你会发现多数都是在相当及时的时机退出的。

And I think it's really easy in hindsight to have some sellers remorse those small handful of names that would have really continued to do well, as opposed to doing a deep dive into all the names you sold and looking at all the ones that you actually got out of on a pretty timely basis.

采用卖出目标价并未阻止我们持有苹果股票长达十二年。

Using cell targets didn't prevent us from owning Apple for twelve years.

我们最初买入苹果股票大约是在2009年，然后在疫情期间的2021年左右卖出。

Now, we first bought it, I think, in 2009, we sold it shortly into the pandemic, around 2021.

几乎在这整个持有期间，苹果的估值都低于市场平均水平。

Almost that entire time period, Apple was selling beneath a market multiple.

我们在这只股票上获得了30倍收益，但这得益于分析师每个季度都勤勉地更新估值，确保新的卖出目标价能反映所有超预期增长。

We made 30 times our money on the stock, but it was the analyst diligently updating every quarter, making sure that the new sell target reflected all the growth that had exceeded our expectations.

我们买入时并未预期能获得数十倍回报。

We didn't buy the stock thinking we'd make tens of times our capital on it.

我们买入是因为当时股价只有内在价值的三分之二。

We bought it thinking it was selling at two thirds of value.

在我看来，买入这些优质企业后从不重新评估、一味持有的做法，某种程度上会让你变成趋势投资者。

So I mean, to me, the idea that you buy these high quality businesses and never ever reassess and just hold them kind of turns you into a momentum investor.

当某只股票超过其业务价值估值时，要么是你没有准确评估其全部价值，要么就是在玩击鼓传花的游戏。

Once something passes an estimate of business value, then then you're either you haven't properly accounted for everything in that business value or you're playing somewhat of a greater fool game.

我想深入探讨你们的流程，尤其是你们如何避免思维错误和可预测的行为错误，我认为这是哈里斯成功的关键因素之一。

I I want to talk in some depth about your processes and and in particular about how you avoid thinking errors and predictable behavioral errors because I think this has been one of the most important aspects of Harris's success.

上次我们在2015年交谈时，有件事让我印象深刻——当时我们深入讨论过这个话题，因为你刚发表过关于向非价值投资者学习的演讲。

And one of the things that really struck me last time we spoke back in, I think, 2015, we talked a lot because you had just given a speech, I think, about what you could learn from non value investors.

我们当时重点讨论了迈克尔·斯坦哈特。

And we talked a lot about Michael Steinhardt.

他在挑战投资者寻求确认性证据的习惯方面，对你产生了许多深刻而重要的影响。

And there were some really interesting and important ways in which he influenced you in terms of challenging the habit that most investors have of seeking confirming evidence.

你能谈谈斯坦哈特吗？

Can you talk about Steinhardt?

因为我觉得现在很多听众甚至都不知道他是谁。

Because I think a lot of our listeners don't really even know who he is at this point.

我的意思是，显然他已经退休了。

I mean, obviously, he's retired.

他现在已经八十多岁了。

He's in his eighties.

某种程度上，我认为他的声誉已经受损，因为他卷入了'我也是'运动，并因收藏中被指控有掠夺文物等问题而惹上麻烦。

In some ways, I think his reputation has been tarnished because he got me too'd and he got in trouble for accusations about looted antiquities and the like in his collection.

但他显然是最伟大的对冲基金经理之一，而且与彼得·福尔曼是朋友。

But he's clearly one of the great hedge fund managers, and he was friends with Peter Foreman.

对吧？

Right?

所以你见过他。

So you got to meet him.

能谈谈他是如何正面影响你的投资方式的吗？

Can you talk about how he influenced your way of investing for the good?

没错。

Right.

而且早在八十年代我刚加入哈里斯合伙公司时，我们还是一家经纪公司。

And and also back when, I had first joined Harris Associates in the nineteen eighties, we were also a brokerage firm.

所以我们根本没有足够的资本来充分利用分析师团队产生的所有投资构想。

So we didn't have nearly enough capital to fully utilize the ideas that our analyst team was generating.

所以我们偶尔会有机会向迈克尔推销投资点子。

So we would get opportunities occasionally to pitch Michael on ideas.

你可能会觉得我们的股票筛选团队是个充满挑战甚至令人紧张的环境，二十个人围坐一桌，试图找出你想法中的漏洞——因为我们想在用客户资金冒险之前先发现自己的错误。

And you think our stock selection group might be a challenging or intimidating environment where you've got 20 people sitting around the table trying to poke holes in your ideas because we want to identify our mistakes before we actually lose client money on them.

一对一地向迈克尔推销想法的经历，让我真正认识到那些自以为已精通的想法中，其实还存在许多未知。

One on one pitching an idea to Michael, that really taught me what I didn't know about ideas that I thought I had become an expert on.

我认为迈克尔的卓越之处在于，他的对冲基金在其整个存续期间实现了约25%的年化复合回报率。

I think one of the things that made Michael great and his hedge fund record had like a mid twenties percent compound rate of return throughout its entire existence.

我记得基金大概运作了二十年，每年增长率都超过20%。

I think it lasted maybe twenty years, growing at 20 plus percent a year.

是的。

Yeah.

我记得是二十八年间保持每年25%的增长率，大概是这样。

I I think it was twenty five percent a year for twenty eight years, something like that.

没错。

Yeah.

我记得，

I remember,

巨大，难以置信的回报。

huge, unbelievable return.

无与伦比的记录。

An unmatched record.

而我的迈克尔不仅对市场有着惊人的直觉，他还总是挑战自己的思维。

And my Michael was not not only someone who had an incredible feel for the markets, but he would always challenge his own thinking.

他经常做的一件事是，如果有人带着一个想法来找他，他会邀请那个人共进午餐，然后找到对同一只股票最看跌的华尔街分析师，也邀请那个人共进午餐，你们三个人就会在午餐时坐下来讨论。

One of the things that he frequently did is if somebody was coming to him with an idea, he would he would invite that person for lunch and then find the most bearish person on that same stock, who was a Wall Street analyst, and invite that person to lunch, and the three of three of you would just sit and talk during a lunch.

那是个令人紧张的环境。

That was an intimidating environment.

我有过一次这样的机会。

I had an opportunity to do that once.

再次，我意识到作为一名分析师，我还有多少成长的空间。

Again, I I learned how much opportunity there was for me to grow as an analyst.

真的吗？

Really?

跟我说说那次经历。

Tell tell me about the experience.

我从来没听说过——我很想听听当时和他一起处于那种情境下到底是什么感觉。

I've never heard of I'd love to hear what it was actually like to to be in that situation with him.

所以他点了三明治当午餐。

So he order sandwiches for lunch.

然后比尔认为我应该买美国航空的股票，因为公司资产负债表上有大量现金。

And it's like, Bill thinks I should buy American Airlines because it's got so much cash on the balance sheet.

所有债务都明确用于飞机采购。

All of its debt is lined up specifically against aircraft.

这样就有能力向股东支付大量股息。

There'd be an ability to dividend a lot of this to shareholders.

当时同一张餐桌上还有位来自华尔街大投行的航空业分析师也在吃午餐。

And then there's an airline analyst from one of the big Wall Street firms at the same table also eating lunch.

我是一名综合分析师，所以我对航空业了解并不深入。

I'm a generalist analyst, so it's not that I know so much about airlines.

有一天我在研究钢铁公司，另一天研究航空公司，又一天研究有线电视股票，而我正与一位专门研究航空业三十年的专家同桌，听他指出我的分析中遗漏了哪些要点。

One day I was looking at a steel company, one day an airline, another day a cable TV stock, and I'm sitting at the table with somebody who's spent thirty years studying only airlines saying, Here are the things I think are missing from this analysis.

而我感觉，迈克尔感觉，我相信那位分析师也清楚意识到了这一点。

And I felt, Michael felt, I'm sure analyst felt that it was pretty clear.

那天我并没有赢得这场辩论。

Hadn't won the debate that day.

但迈克尔称之为'变异认知'。

But Michael called it variant perception.

他想了解自己持有的每一笔多头或空头头寸，与行业专家的观点有何不同。

He wanted to know any position he had long or short, how he differed from the strongest voice on the other side of position.

因此他会主动邀请他们共进午餐，告诉他们为什么他认为自己错了。

So he would seek this out for anything in his portfolio.

任何他持有的多头头寸，他都希望有人能坐下来与他共进午餐，告诉他为什么他错了。

Any long he had, he wanted somebody to come sit down and have lunch with him, tell him why he was wrong.

对于任何空头头寸，他都会邀请多头方来阐述为何不应持有该空头立场。

Any short he had, he'd get the long to come in and say why he thinks he shouldn't be short the position.

我认为他具备一种非凡能力，能够吸收所有信息、加以处理并形成投资决策。

And I think the ability to take in all of that information, process it, and come to an investment conclusion was something he was unusually capable of.

迈克尔运用差异认知的理念，促使哈里斯合伙公司采用了魔鬼代言人审查机制。

Michael's use of variant perception is why Harris Associates adopted a devil's advocate review.

每当有分析师向我们提出新投资建议时，会另派专人花两三天研究该股票，查阅能找到的最佳看空报告，并陈述不应买入的理由。

Whenever we have an analyst presenting a new idea to us, somebody else takes the challenge of spending a couple days on that stock, reading the best short reports that they can find on it, and presenting to us why we shouldn't buy the stock.

我们试图在会议中效仿迈克尔的做法，同时呈现交易双方的观点。

And we try to mimic that presentation of both sides of the equation in our meetings the same way Michael did.

对于已在我们核准名单上多年的股票，我们同样会进行这种双向审视。

We also do that with names that have been on our approved list for multiple years.

作为高度数据驱动的机构，我们发现随着时间推移，最容易出现疏漏的是那些已在核准名单上四五年的股票——它们既未达到预期表现，又未差到让我们彻底否定最初的投资逻辑。

We're a very data driven organization, and we found out one of the areas over time we tended to get sloppy in was the names that had sat on our approved list for four or five years, not quite achieving what we had hoped they would, but not performing poorly enough as businesses to make us think we didn't know that our thesis was wrong.

顺便说，我听了你与克里斯·贝格的播客，非常欣赏他关于更喜欢用‘假设’而非‘论题’的说法，因为后者听起来显得我们过于武断。

And and by the way, I I listened to your podcast with Chris Begg, and I loved his statement that he he likes hypothesis better than thesis because thesis just sounds like we have way too much certainty.

我们尝试通过要求对已在批准名单上超过一年的标的进行魔鬼代言人式审查来应对这个问题，即由某人针对同一证券提出做空论点。

We try to challenge that by requiring a devil's advocate review after something's been on our approved list for more than a year, that somebody comes to the table basically presenting a short argument on that same security.

这帮助我们理解与市场及自身预期的差异，并识别判断我们或对方观点正确的关键指标。

And it helps us understand how we differ from the market and our expectations, and helps us know what the signposts are to tell if we're right or the other side of the argument is right.

我认为有时我们低估了这个行业即使犯错仍能成功的可能性。

I think sometimes we underestimate how wrong we can be in this business and still be successful.

如果考虑我们的基本策略——以六折价格买入，九折价格卖出，且持有五年期间企业增速与标普相当，那么60到90的价差应能在五年内带来约50个基点的额外收益。

If you think about our basic approach, buying at 60¢ on the dollar, selling at 90¢, and the business growing the same as the S and P during the five years we hold it, well that 60 to 90 should give us like an incremental 50 points over five years.

若预测完全准确，我们每年理应能跑赢市场上千个基点。

If we were exactly right on our forecast, we should be beating the market by a thousand points a year, basis points a year.

但实际扣除基金费用后的超额收益约为200-300个基点。

But the reality has been more like 200 to 300 basis points after you add back the cost, the expense ratio for the fund.

因此我们的正确率大约在25%-30%之间。

So our correct ratio is something like 25, 30%.

这使得快速识别错误标的、将其移出组合并将资金重新配置到成功概率更高的标的变得至关重要。

And it makes it so important that we figure out as fast as we can the names that we're wrong on and get those out of the portfolio and get the capital recycled into the names where there's a better probability that that we are successful, that our hypothesis is correct.

我们的魔鬼代言人审查（再次借鉴了迈克尔的反向观点模型），是我们用来减少对那些基本面表现不如预期的公司保持耐心的方式之一。

And our devil's advocate reviews, again, modeled after Michael's variant perception, is one of the ways that we have helped, I guess, lessen our patience with companies that aren't fundamentally performing the way we had expected to.

价值投资就是在两种极端之间保持平衡：一方面需要无限耐心（当企业经营良好但股价低迷时），另一方面又要避免变得固执僵化、拒绝根据新信息做出调整。

Now value investing is this tension between having eternal patience, which you need to be able to have if the business is performing well and the stock isn't, versus the other end of that spectrum where you become stubborn and you won't react to new information.

我们希望在股市表现失常时保持极大耐心，而在企业表现不如预期时极度缺乏耐心。

We wanna be very patient when the stock market isn't acting right and very impatient when the business isn't performing the way we expect it to.

我认为你在哈里斯合伙公司时异常注重流程驱动。

You were unusually process driven, I would say, at Harris Associates.

这是一个非常连贯的流程。

It's a very consistent process.

而且我认为这正是公司强大实力的重要组成部分。

And I I think this is part of the great strength of of the firm.

你能谈谈从提出新投资构想到纳入投资组合的完整流程吗？

Can you talk about the process for pitching a new idea and then it getting into the portfolio?

比如从周一早晨提交书面提案开始，到周二投资会议的审核流程，再到进入核准名单，最终由投资组合经理投票通过的完整过程。

Like, from guiding us through from the written pitch that's given on a on a Monday morning to the vetting process at the Tuesday investment meetings to it getting on the approved list and to to the vote by the portfolio managers.

因为这种方法非常独特且相当系统化。

Because it's very unusual and quite systematic, the approach.

是的。

Yep.

这份资料包就在我们通话前刚送到我手上。

So this this packet, just came to me today right before we started our call.

里面包含分析师推荐的所有新投资构想、所有反对意见审查，以及对我们现有持仓的年度审查报告——分析师们需要至少每年审查一次，但会将这些审查安排在需要采取行动的时间节点。

In it is any new ideas that analysts are recommending, any devil's advocate reviews, reviews on all of our existing holdings where analysts are expected to review them at least annually, but to target those reviews toward points in time that are action oriented.

他们要么希望我们增持或减持，要么就是我们的投资假设发生了重大变化。

They either like us to be adding or trimming or where there's been a significant change in our hypothesis.

所以我们今天下午和晚上都会研读这些材料，对照卖方报告核查部分信息，这些将构成明天讨论的基础。

So we will all spend this afternoon and this evening reading through this, checking some of the things with sell side reports on these same companies, and then that forms the basis for our discussion tomorrow.

新投资构想平均每周大概能收到一个。

So new ideas, we get probably about one a week on average.

这里的分析师平均每年大概会提出四到五个这样的构想。

Typical analyst here will maybe do four or five of those over the course of a year.

他们会撰写一份报告，我们有一系列标准化的统计表格，但在书面部分，我们希望分析师能展示为何我们认为该股票被低估、为何我们对其价值增长有信心，以及为何这是一个我们愿意投资的管理团队。

They'll do a write up that basically we've got a bunch of standardized statistical sheets, but the written part, we want the analysts to show why we believe the stock is cheap, why we're comfortable the value is going to grow, and why this is a management team we're comfortable investing with.

在明天的会议上，我们将为每个新提案花费半小时到四十五分钟。

And at the meeting tomorrow, we'll spend half an hour to forty five minutes on each new idea.

分析师会进行几分钟的概要陈述，然后各种质疑就会接踵而至。

The analyst will give a couple minute summary and then all the arrows come out.

我的意思是，会议上每个人都会试图提出论点，说明分析师可能错了。

I mean, everyone at the meeting is trying to present an argument why the analyst might be wrong.

讨论结束后，由三位投资负责人组成的股票筛选小组将投票决定该股票是否应列入核准名单，多数票将决定其是否上榜。

And at the end of that discussion, three of our investment leaders, who form our stock selection group will vote on whether or not that stock should be on the approved list, and a majority vote controls whether or not it's on the list.

人们有时会认为像克莱德·麦格雷戈或我本人托尼·库纳里斯这样长期在此投资的经理人，可以随意购买我们管理的投资组合中的任何股票。

People sometimes assume that people like Clyde MacGregor or myself, Tony Kounaris, that have been long term investors here, that we can just buy whatever we want in the portfolios we manage.

事实并非如此。

That's not true.

我们都受限于这份核准股票名单。

We're all constrained by this approved list of stocks.

如果我们愿意，可以推荐股票；如果我们愿意，可以请分析师研究它，但必须经过流程、获得委员会批准并列入清单后，我们才能考虑将其加入投资组合。

We can recommend a stock if we want to, we can ask an analyst to work on it if we want to, but it has to go through the process, be approved by the committee, and then put on the list before we can consider adding it to a portfolio.

我们的清单上约有100只符合橡树基金投资资格的股票。

Our list has about 100 names on it that would be eligible for the Oakmark fund.

这意味着在销售额、净利润或股东权益排名前250的大型企业。

That means a big business in the two fifty largest sales net income or shareholders' equity.

我们不投资大盘股，因为我们不想在公司因估值过高而被推入大盘股领域时承担风险。

We don't do large cap because we don't want to be exposed in times that smaller companies get pushed up into the large cap space by excessive valuations.

我们不想局限于那些正被挤出大盘股领域的大型企业。

We don't want to be limited to the big businesses that are getting pushed out of the large cap universe.

我们不希望这些股票成为禁区。

We don't want those to be off limits.

总之，我们的名单上大约有100只股票。

So anyway, we've got about 100 names on the list.

迈克·尼古拉斯、鲍比·伯格和我将坐下来讨论所有新想法以及现有投资组合。

Mike Nicholas, Bobby Bureg, and I will sit down and talk about all the new ideas as well as the existing portfolio.

在市场像本季度迄今为止这样动荡的时期，我们平均每月大概会讨论两次。

We probably average twice a month in times where the markets are hectic like they've been so far this quarter.

我们可能每周都会开会，而在市场较为稳定时，可能每月一次。

We might be meeting every week, And at times when the market is more stable, it might be monthly.

我们会讨论：这个标的能为我们的投资组合带来新价值吗？

And we'll talk about does this name add something to our portfolio?

它是否更便宜？

Is it cheaper?

它能起到分散风险的作用吗？

Is it a diversifier?

有人认为它应该被加入投资组合。

Somebody thinks that it should be added to the portfolio.

我们三人都可以推荐增持某只股票，由小组内三分之二投票决定是否将其纳入组合。

And any of us can recommend that a stock gets added and a two out of three vote in that group determines if it goes into the portfolio or not.

因此实际上，我和他们的角色都类似于决胜票。

So effectively, my role as well as theirs is sort of a tiebreaker.

如果两人意见一致，第三个人的想法就无关紧要。

If two people agree, it doesn't matter what the third person thinks.

如果两人意见相左，那么第三个人将成为决定性的一票。

If two people disagree, then the third person is the controlling decision maker.

我们一直采用这种方式，是为了确保在人员更替时，不会让毫无经验的新人突然承担独立决策者的角色。

And we have been using that approach because we want to make sure that whenever personnel transitions occur, that we aren't throwing somebody who's brand new into decision making into a role where they're a sole decision maker.

我认为这是我们如此重视流程的原因之一，也是许多投资公司面临的难题。

I think that's one of the reasons why we focus so much on process, and I think something a lot of investment firms struggle with.

有些领导团队习惯于独断专行，在业务决策上为所欲为，直到离职当天都紧握决策权，然后甩下一句'祝你们好运'。

You have this leadership group that's used to getting their way and being able to implement whatever decisions about the business they want to, and they maintain that total decision making control right up to the day they walk out the door, then it's kind of, Good luck, guys.

你把权力交给那些从未体验过自己的意见能推动决策的人。

You turn it over to people that haven't been in a position of their opinion driving a decision making.

我们特意通过团队决策的方式来避免这种情况。

And we've intentionally tried to avoid that by doing team oriented decision making.

我们不希望失去任何一个人就导致无法继续以Harris一贯的方式做出决策。

We don't want the loss of any one person to ruin the ability to continue making decisions in the same manner Harris has always made them.

那么你们如何防范这个过程中可能出现的各种潜在风险呢？

So How do you guard Bill against the various potential downsides here, right, to this process?

因为显然这个机制运作得很好，但也存在变得不够融洽的风险。

Because clearly clearly, it's worked really well, but there are dangers of whether it could get less than collegial.

就像人们在桥水基金对雷·达里奥的抱怨那样——我曾几次邀请他上过播客。

The the sort of things people complain about at Bridgewater, right, under under Ray Dalio, who who who I I had on the podcast a couple of times.

我当时就问他这种极端透明、绝对坦诚的做法可能带来的刻薄风险。

And I asked him about the dangers of sort of unkindness in this kind of radical transparency, radically truthful approach.

这是其一。

So there's that.

另一方面也存在群体思维的风险——当决策涉及这么多人时，不像某些基金采取独狼式决策。

Then there's the danger on the other side of of kind of groupthink when there are so many people involved in decisions instead of the kind of lone wolf approach at some funds.

你们如何避免这些陷阱？

How do you manage to avoid those pitfalls?

嗯，就像之前你提到的问题——我们似乎介于传统价值派和'买入伟大企业永不卖出'理念之间。

Well, kind of like the question before where you said it looks like we kind of straddle between a traditional value camp and buy great business doesn't don't ever sell them.

我认为我们在这里也处于中间状态，团队规模足够小，每个人都有能力质疑任何决策。

I think we're kind of in between here as well, where we think the group is small enough and we all have an ability to challenge any decisions.

要争取两个人中至少一人同意你的观点，这并不困难。

It's not overwhelming to try to get one other person out of two people to agree with you.

不像有十二个决策者需要争取八九人同意的情形——我认为当规模过大时确实存在群体思维风险，有时最优秀的想法并不对所有人显而易见。

It's not like it's a group of a dozen decision makers and you need to get eight or nine to agree, where I think there is a risk when you get that large that groupthink is a problem and kind of the best ideas sometimes aren't obvious to everyone.

而要说服合伙人团体中的多数人接受某个好主意，我认为这反而会让我们错失一些最成功的投资理念。

And to convince the majority of a partnership group that it's a good idea, I think would keep you out of some of our more successful ideas.

因此我认为我们规模足够小，只要有人对某件事有极强的信念，通常都有能力说服至少另一个人。

So I think we're small enough that anything that somebody has tremendous conviction on, they've usually got the ability to convince somebody else.

但另一方面你也不希望有人做决策时可能带着不符合客户长期利益的目标。

But the other thing you don't want is somebody making decisions and maybe having goals that aren't in the client's long term interest.

这个行业很容易陷入赌徒式毁灭结局——当你对某家公司做出错误决策后，总想通过加倍押注下一个决策来翻本，这实际上正把股东带向违背他们利益的歧途。而当你需要说服一群人共同行动时，就很难走到这种危险境地。

This is an easy business to pursue a gambler's ruin kind of outcome, where you make a bad decision on one company and you think you can kind of make up for it by double waiting the next decision, and you're taking your shareholders down a path that is not in their interest when you do that, that's a very hard place to get to when you need to convince a group of people to do something.

同样困难的是——比如我有朋友认为英伟达是只好股票，但我无法将其纳入价值投资框架时，就几乎不可能将其纳入我们的投资组合。

It's also tough, like if I've got a buddy that says Nvidia is a great stock, but I can't put it into a value framework, it's virtually impossible for me to get that into our portfolio here.

因此，采用这种小团队模式也降低了我们行为与向客户承诺不一致的风险。

So the risk of us doing something different than what we tell clients we're doing is also diminished by having this small team approach.

我们甚至不喜欢'团队'这个词。

We don't even like the word group.

团队这个词听起来人太多了。

Group makes it sound like it's too many people.

但我们发现这种三人小组规模非常易于管理，能让我们避免走向两个极端。

But these three person teams, we find a very manageable size and kinda keeps us in the middle of the problems at either extreme.

当股票开始表现不佳或业务偏离预期时，处理流程是怎样的？

What's the process like when a stock starts to underperform or the business diverges from expectations?

因为我之前听你提到过'错误管理协议'，这个听起来很宏大的专业术语似乎就是用来处理出问题的状况。

Because I I've heard you talk in the past about your mistake management protocol, which sounded like a very grandiose and impressive term for when things start to screw up.

请详细说明这个流程，我知道你们甚至有个环节会更换分析师来避免锚定效应等问题。

So take take us through that process because I know there are even processes at a certain point where you'll shift coverage to a different analyst to prevent anchoring and the like.

使用'协议'这个术语是刻意为之，就是为了强调它在我们的流程中的重要性。

The use of the term protocol was intentional to make it sound as important as it is to our process.

我们认为快速识别错误并将资金重新配置到成功概率更高的领域，是我们长期成功的关键之一。

We think rapid identification of mistakes and getting capital redeployed into something where we have a higher probability of success is one of the keys to our long term success.

首先，我们认为错误是方向中性的。

So first thing is we think about mistakes as direction neutral.

当你未能准确预测时，就是犯了错误。

A mistake is when you don't get a forecast right.

公司业绩远超你的预测与远低于预测同样都是错误。

It's just as much a mistake if the company comes in way above your forecast as if it comes in way below.

我们将这两种情况都视为错误，并在错误发生时给予额外关注。

We consider either a mistake and as worthy of extra attention when a mistake happens.

其次，我们根据公司基本面而非股价来定义错误。

The second thing is we define mistakes in terms of company fundamentals, not stock price.

对我们而言，错误意味着我们未能正确预测公司基本面的任一方向。

So to us, a mistake is we didn't project company fundamentals correctly either direction.

当这种情况发生时，无论该股票对我们而言表现如何，我们都会提高关注度。

And when that happens, regardless of if the stock has been a decent stock for us or not, we increase the attention.

这样做的目的是我们希望错误能最顺畅地退出投资组合，而不是让错误持续存在。

The goal of this is we want the path of least resistance to be our mistakes exit the portfolio rather than mistakes linger.

我认为我们很多人常犯的一个错误是，有时会认为无知是维持现状的借口。

I think an error a lot of us make is we tend to think sometimes ignorance is a defense of the status quo.

我其实对卖出这只股票了解得不够多。

I don't really know enough to sell this stock.

我们更倾向于说，如果我对买入它了解不够，那么我对它留在投资组合中也了解不够。

We would like to say, If I don't know enough to buy it, then I don't know enough for it to stay in the portfolio.

因此一旦出现错误迹象——比如基本面偏离分析师预测10%到15%——我们就会立即要求股票选择小组进行审查，以了解问题所在、为何不违背我们的假设，以及为何不应预期会出现第二次错误。

So at the first sign of a mistake, and think of that as fundamentals deviating 10 to 15 from what the analyst had projected, we ask for an immediate review in front of the stock selection group to give us an understanding of what went wrong, why it doesn't violate our hypothesis, and why we shouldn't expect there to be a second error.

我们这样做的原因之一（再次强调我们非常注重数据）是，研究显示在我们犯过一次、两次、三次错误的公司中，出现后续错误的概率总是更高。

And one of the reasons we do this, again, that said we're very data driven, we've looked at companies where we've made one mistake, two mistakes, three mistakes, and the likelihood of an additional mistake is always higher after first mistakes.

你会发现很多价值投资者的本能反应是：当公司业绩不及预期时，他们会说'股价下跌了20%，但我的估值只下调了10%，所以现在比昨天更有买入价值'。

You find a lot of value investors who their knee jerk reaction to a shortfall in company performance is to say, Well, the stock's down 20%, but my value estimate's only down 10, so it's actually a better buy today than it was yesterday.

我们用自己的数据验证过这一点，至少对我们而言，这种情况很少成立。

We've checked that on our own data, and at least for us, that's rarely true.

通常这个错误预示着未来更有可能出现更多错误。

Usually that mistake is a signal that future mistakes are more likely.

因此，在分析师首次出现这种情况后，如果股票筛选小组中有人建议将该股票移出名单，他们可以提出建议，然后进行投票表决。

So after the analyst does this the first time, if anyone on the stocks election group wants to recommend the name get removed from the list, they can recommend that, and there'll be a vote.

如果委员会另外两人中有任何一人同意该建议，该股票就会被移出名单。

If one of the other two people on the committee agrees with them, the stock's off the list.

如果后续再次出现失误，标准流程是立即启动魔鬼代言人复核机制。

If there's a follow-up mistake, the typical process is to immediately require a devil's advocate review.

如果没有分析师自愿参与，我们会指定一名分析师负责，并要求其在接下来一到两周内尽快完成陈述报告并向小组汇报。

An analyst will get assigned that if nobody volunteers, and we ask them to rush that presentation and in the next one to two weeks present it to the group.

如果此时股票仍保留在名单上，我们通常会从头开始，再次与管理团队会面（最好是在他们的办公室），重新确立一个我们认为足够有力的投资假设——这个假设要强到如果我们现在不持有该股票，今天就会买入它。

If the stock stays on at that point in time, we will generally then go and of start at square one and meet with the management team again, preferably in their offices, and get us to recommit to a hypothesis that we think is strong enough that if we didn't own the stock, we'd be buying it today.

如果出现第三次失误，标准流程是考虑更换分析师负责该标的。

If there's a third shortfall, the typical process is to say, let's shift analyst coverage.

这么做主要有两个原因。

And there are two reasons to do that.

首先，初始分析师可能过于固守其原始预测，对新信息的反应不如新接手的人敏锐。

First being the initial analyst is probably too anchored on their original forecast and they aren't being as reactive to new information as a fresh set of eyes might be.

但第二个原因同样重要，即最初的分析师可能已失去说服力。

But the second reason and equally important is that the first analyst has probably lost their voice.

如果有人第三次对你说‘我知道我在这件事上错了三次，但我仍强烈建议你买入’，这就像耳边噪音；而一个没有预设立场的新分析师说‘你知道吗？’

If somebody comes to you and the third time says, I know I've been wrong on this three times, but I still really want you to buy this, it's kind of like just noise in your ear, where a fresh analyst who has no reason to come out on either side pro or con, a fresh analyst saying, you know what?

我是从零开始研究的。

I started with a clean sheet of paper here.

我真心看好这个标的，希望将其纳入投资组合，这比原分析师更能成功推动该标的进入客户账户。

I really like this, and I want it purchased in accounts, is much more likely to successfully get that name into client accounts than the original analyst would have been.

因此这对我们而言是个重要流程。

So for us, it is an important process.

我们鼓励分析师对投资观点提出质疑。

We encourage analysts to challenge us on ideas.

分析师们很早就知道我的门永远敞开，并且我会奖励那些进来说‘我认为您在XYZ问题上可能因为某些原因判断有误’的人。

I mean, analysts learn very early on that my door is open, and I reward people for coming in and saying, I think you might be wrong on x y z because of these reasons.

这是非常扁平化的。

It's very horizontal.

我们都会互相挑战。

We all challenge each other.

而且，你知道，我认为在某些组织中，分析师们会觉得除非其他分析师失败，否则自己就无法成功。

And, you know, I think in in some organizations, analysts think they can't succeed unless another analyst fails.

我认为我们'团队成功或团队失败'的理念对我们的长期成功也非常重要，这从分析师开始研究一个想法时就适用。

I think our concept of the team succeeds or the team fails is also very important to our long term success, and that applies from the time an analyst is working on an idea.

他们不必对此保密。

They don't have to be secretive about it.

这是一个协作的过程。

It's a collaborative process.

在尝试发现错误时也是如此。

The same is true in trying to identify mistakes.

我认为这种协作过程是我们成为从疫情中恢复最快的团队之一的原因。

I think that collaborative process is one of the reasons we were one of the fastest groups back from COVID.

要知道，我们在办公室外度过的那六到八周对我们来说很痛苦，因为我们太习惯于走到隔壁办公室，找到愿意对你的观点提出质疑的人，也许他们还有能帮上忙的联系人，而我们就是无法通过Zoom进行这些日常交流。

You know, the six or eight weeks that we spent out of the office was painful to us because we're so used to being able to walk to the next door office and have somebody who's willing to challenge you on an opinion, maybe has a contact that would be helpful, and we just weren't making those check ins with each other via Zoom.

很多时候，这种交流是作为与股票无关的谈话的后续发生的。

A lot of times it happens as a follow-up to a conversation that had nothing to do about a stock.

你们在聊昨晚小熊队的比赛有多精彩，然后你会说，哦对了，你和Netflix或Liberty Media的某某人聊过吗？

You're talking about how great the Cubs game was last night, and then you say, Oh, by the way, have you ever talked to this person at Netflix or Liberty Media or whatever?

随意的闲聊会变成业务讨论，而当大家都在家办公时，这类交流发生的频率远不如我们习惯的那样。

The casual conversation turns into a business conversation and those weren't happening as frequently as we're used to when we were all trying to work out of our homes.

我知道部分原因在于要非常擅长招聘团队合作者，你过去曾提到喜欢那些不太擅长运动但非常热爱体育竞争的人。

I I know some of this depends on just being really skillful about hiring team players, and you've talked in the past about liking people who were not very good at sports but were very competitive in the way in loving sports.

是否也与你们激励员工的方式有关，从而让他们真正协作？

Is is some of it also about the way you incentivize people so that they actually collaborate?

基于你对企业内部激励的理解和重视，你是如何设计这种结构的？

How do you structure it given your understanding and appreciation of incentives within businesses?

你是如何设计结构让他们行为得当的？

How do you structure it so they behave properly?

因此在年底时，我们薪酬委员会的成员会与所有研究合伙人讨论，了解在过去一年中谁对他们帮助最大。

So at the at the end of the year, the people who are on our compensation committee will talk to all of the research partners about who's been most helpful to them over the course of the year.

所以这不仅仅是评估某人推荐了这五只股票的表现是优于还是逊于市场，或者客户组合中投入了多少资金。

So it isn't just evaluating that this person recommended these five stocks and they either outperformed or underperformed or how many dollars got put into client portfolios.

而是其他人认为谁的工作值得敬仰？

It's who do other people think their work is worth looking up to?

在过去一年中，谁最帮助他们发展对所跟踪公司的思考方式？

Who helped them the most throughout the course of the year to develop the way they were thinking on the companies that they were following.

如果在年底时，某人的名字没有出现在这个过程中，我们会立即警觉。因为我们认为团队的构建方式决定了这里的每个人都应该能够以提升大家工作质量的方式帮助他人。

And alarm bells go off to us if at the end of the year, somebody's name doesn't come up in that process Because we think the way the team has been constructed, everyone here should be able to help other people in a way that elevates the quality of everyone's work.

因此，其他分析师如何根据帮助程度对团队其他成员进行排序，明确成为我们薪酬流程的一部分。

So it's it's explicitly part of our compensation process how other analysts rank order the rest of the team in terms of how helpful they've been.

你们是如何应对这些与市场脱节或市场整体表现糟糕的高压时期的心理压力的？

How have you dealt with the psychological pressure of these very intense periods where you're out of sync with the market or the market is doing terribly in general?

我是说，我记得你们在2000年、2007年以及金融危机期间都经历过艰难时期。

I mean, I remember you you went through difficult periods in 2000, in 2007, then during the financial crisis.

然后然后，我我我前几天还在看。

Then then again, I I I was looking the other day.

我记得你其中一只基金最糟糕的三个月回报率大概是32.5%左右。

I think the the worst three month return you had for the one of the funds was something like 32 and a half percent.

2020年初市场暴跌时你也亏损了。

You were down at the start of 2020 when the market was getting clobbered.

你实际上是如何在情绪上应对这种强度和压力的？

How do you actually handle emotionally the the intensity and the pressure?

嗯，你知道，我最喜欢的爱好之一是葡萄酒，所以这是一种方式。

Well, you know, one of my favorite hobbies is wine, so that that's one way.

这是个玩笑。

That's a joke.

我我可能会沉迷其中。

I'd I'd send me to it.

我确实喜欢研究葡萄酒、收藏葡萄酒，当然也喜欢喝葡萄酒，但那绝不是应对压力的方式。

I I do enjoy studying wine, collecting wine, also drinking wine, but that that's that's no way to deal with stress.

我认为关键在于我们坚信股票价格与企业价值终将趋于一致，而且我们投资的管理团队会积极推动这一目标的实现。

I think a big part of it is our belief that eventually stock prices and business values have to come together and that we are invested with management teams that will be proactive about making that happen.

因此，如果我们的预测正确——如果我们对企业当前价值及未来某个时点价值的判断准确，那么期间的股价波动反而可能成为机遇：管理层可以更低成本回购股份，或进行原本难以企及的并购。

So if we're our forecast, if we're right in our belief of what a business is worth and what it's going to be worth at some point in time, the swings up and down in the interim, if anything, or an opportunity for the management maybe to repurchase shares more cheaply, maybe to make acquisitions at prices they couldn't otherwise have thought about making them.

加入哈里斯时，那些经历过多次周期的资深合伙人对我帮助很大。

I think it was helpful to me when I joined Harris to have older partners who had been through cycles many times.

他们总说：‘别担心这个’。

Them saying, Don't worry about this.

‘我们之前经历过这种情况’。

We've been through this before.

‘事实上，这种时期往往是我们创造价值的时候’。

This in fact is a time where we usually add value.

这些话对我至关重要。

That was really important to me.

作为这里资历最深的员工，我的职责之一就是把这种信心传递给年轻的分析师们。

One of my roles as the longest tenured employee here is to instill that confidence in our younger analysts.

我们团队中大约只有20%的人经历过互联网泡沫，可能还有15%到20%的人经历过次贷危机。

It's something like 20% of our team only was was here at the .com bubble and maybe another 15 or 20 for the great financial crisis.

2020年新冠疫情爆发时，半数员工都还没加入公司。

Half the employees weren't here when COVID hit in 2020.

所以我不能简单对他们说：还记得次贷危机时的情形吗？那几个月看起来多么黯淡，但对我们重组投资组合而言却是绝佳机会。

So I can't just say to them, well, you remember when the GFC hit and how dark it looked for for a few months and what a great opportunity that created for us to restructure portfolios.

因此在解封日后的几天，我不仅给投资团队，还向全体员工发送邮件表示：这是我们大放异彩的时刻。

So the day, a couple days after liberation day, I had sent out an email to not just the investment team but all the employees saying like this is our time to shine.

这些时期往往是我们创造价值的时候——无论是投资决策、客户沟通，还是主动联系客户告知他们不必恐慌，并说明我们的应对措施。

These are the periods we tend to add value in, that's on the investment side, that's on client contact, proactively reaching out to tell the clients, this isn't a time to panic, here's what we're doing.

当客户确信我们没有玩忽职守，而是在主动利用市场混乱创造价值时，他们晚上就能睡得更安稳。

If clients get comfortable that we're not asleep at the wheel and that we're trying to proactively take advantage of the chaos, they sleep a lot better at night.

我认为我们这些老员工作为文化传承者，有责任将这种信心传递给年轻分析师——不仅仅是分析师群体。

And I think those of us who've been here a long time, it's our job as culture warriors to instill that confidence in the younger analysts, not just the analysts.

也不希望运营部门的同事担心自己会失业。

Don't want the operations people worried that they're going to lose their jobs.

希望每个人都能在这段艰难时期发挥出最佳状态。

Want everybody performing at the peak of their ability during these difficult times.

如果你担心公司是否会倒闭、自己是否会失业，就无法做到这一点。

You can't do that if you're worried if the business is going to exist, do I have a job?

我们这些经历过多次危机的人面临的挑战，就是要帮助年轻人渡过难关，就像四十年前别人帮助我那样。

Those of us who have been through it multiple times before have the challenge of of helping the younger people get through that just like I was on the other side of that forty years ago.

上次我们交谈时，讨论过你所说的'工作时间与个人时间奇怪地模糊交织'现象，以及作为投资者要学会管理这种状态是多么具有挑战性。

When you and I last spoke, we talked about what you described as the the weird blurring of work time and personal time and how challenging it is just to learn to manage that as a as an investor.

这是个极其耗费精力的游戏，用你的话说，它会逐渐成为你的一部分。

It's such an all consuming game and that as as you put it, it becomes you.

我想知道你是否会给哈里斯公司的年轻分析师和基金经理们建议，告诉他们如何平衡这种冲突——既要拼命工作以在高度竞争的行业中保持竞争力，又要设法维持某种生活状态，使其具有可持续性，不会破坏家庭、损害健康等等？

And I was wondering if you give advice to the younger analysts and fund managers at Harris about how to handle this conflict between needing to work unbelievably hard so that you can be competitive in a super competitive business and yet somehow manage to have some sort of life so that it's sustainable and you don't wreck your family and ruin your health and the like?

是的。

Yeah.

我认为这方面有几点需要注意。

I I think there are a few things there.