RWH064：与Nima Shayegh同行的灵魂归途：重返星辰之路

这就是Alexa和AWS AI背后的故事。

That's the story behind Alexa and AWS AI.

每天，Alexa在17种语言中处理超过10亿次交互，同时将客户摩擦降低40%。

Every day, Alexa processes over 1,000,000,000 interactions across 17 languages, all while reducing customer friction by 40%.

这不仅仅是让生活更便捷，更是改变客户互动方式并创造新的收入来源。

It's not just about making life easier, it's also about transforming customer engagement and generating new revenue streams.

在幕后，AWS AI驱动着70多个专用模型协同工作，打造自然对话，证明企业如何以自信和安全的方式大规模部署AI。

Behind the scenes, AWS AI powers more than 70 specialized models working together to create natural conversations, proving how enterprises can deploy AI at scale with confidence and security.

Alexa的AI能力在亚马逊庞大的运营中经过实战检验，实现了可衡量的大规模实际影响。

Alexa's AI capabilities were battle tested across Amazon's massive operations, delivering real measurable impact at scale.

这些相同的创新现在为其他企业提供了经过验证的框架，以提升效率、解锁新的收入来源并获得持久的市场优势。

These same innovations now give other businesses a proven framework to boost efficiency, unlock new revenue streams and gain a lasting market edge.

在aws.comai/r story了解Alexa的故事。

Discover the Alexa story at aws.comai/r story.

更多信息请访问aws.com/ai/r story。

That's aws.com/ai/r story.

你的比特币资产越多，面临的挑战就越复杂。

The more your Bitcoin holdings grow, the more complex your challenges become.

最初简单的自托管，如今已涉及家族传承规划、复杂的安全决策，以及一个错误就可能损失数代财富的境况。

What started as a simple self custody now involves family legacy planning, sophisticated security decisions, and navigating situations where a single mistake could cost generations of wealth.

标准服务并未为这些高风险的现实情况而设计。

Standard services weren't built for these high stakes realities.

因此，长期投资者选择Unchained Signature——这是一项为认真持有比特币的人士提供的高端私人客户服务，提供专业指导、稳健托管和持久的合作关系。

That's why long term investors choose Unchained Signature, a premium private client service for serious Bitcoin holders who want expert guidance, resilient custody, and an enduring partnership.

使用Signature服务，你将拥有专属的客户经理，他们了解你的目标，并在每一步为你提供帮助。

With signature, you're paired with your own dedicated account manager, someone who understands your goals and helps you every step of the way.

你将享受全方位的入职服务、当日紧急支持、个性化教育、降低的交易费用，以及优先参与独家活动和功能的权益。

You get white glove onboarding, same day emergency support, personalized education, reduced trading fees, and priority access to exclusive events and features.

Unchained的协作托管模式旨在为那些希望自行保管私钥的人士，提供与全球最大比特币托管机构同等的安全保障。

Unchained's collaborative custody model is designed to provide the same security posture as the world's biggest Bitcoin custodians, but for those who prefer to hold their own keys.

了解更多关于Unchained Signature的信息，请访问unchained.com/preston。

Learn more about Unchained signature at unchained.com/preston.

结账时使用代码 Preston 10，可享受首年10%折扣。

Use code Preston 10 at checkout to get 10% off your first year.

比特币不仅关乎一生，更关乎世代传承。

Bitcoin isn't just for life, it's for generations.

好的。

Alright.

回到节目。

Back to the show.

嗯。

Yeah.

你曾提到，在回顾投资历史时，你会发现许多伟大的投资者都经历了非常漫长的超额收益期。

You mentioned somewhere that that when you look at the history of investing, you see that there were these very long periods of outperformance for a lot of the great investors.

这些时期往往让人非常不安。

Can you know, which are very uncomfortable.

对吧？

Right?

它们在情感上非常令人不适，无论是约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯、本·格雷厄姆，还是沃伦和查理。

They're emotionally very uncomfortable, you know, whether it was John Maynard Keynes or Ben Graham or Warren and Charlie.

你能谈谈这一点吗？

Can you talk a little about that?

因为我认为，这正是导致超额收益如此困难的原因之一，正如蒙尼什·帕布里曾经对我说过的，伟大的投资者最重要的品质是承受痛苦的能力。

Because I think I think that's one of the things that makes outperformance so difficult is, as as Monish Pabrai once said to me, you know, the most important quality of a great investor is the ability to take pain.

是的。

Yes.

我认为，无论从哪个层面研究投资历史，都会清楚地看到，在长达数十年的投资历程中，总会经历长时间的跑输市场以及其间巨大的跌幅。

I think that studying investment history at any level makes it clear that over the course of a multi decade investment journey, there will be these large periods of underperformance and large declines inside of those periods.

随便看看历史上一些著名投资者的业绩记录，这一点就变得非常明显。

Just glancing casually at some of the notable investment records of history, this just becomes quite obvious.

你可以看看20世纪30年代，像本·格雷厄姆这样的伟大投资者，他的基金跌幅高达70%。

You could look at the nineteen thirties and great investors like Ben and Graham's fund, I think, declined by 70%.

我记得他那时还在向投资者分红，所以到结束时，初始资本可能已经缩水了80%。

Think he was still making distributions out of his fund, and so I think the starting capital was down maybe 80% by the end.

约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯个人投资组合在20世纪30年代也下跌了80%。

And, you know, the the personal portfolio of John Maynard Keynes, I think, declined by 80% in the nineteen thirties.

他管理的剑桥大学基金组合也下跌了大约一半。

And the portfolio that he was managing at Cambridge declined by, like, half.

你可以看看20世纪70年代，查理·芒格当时有80%的资金集中在两只股票上。

You could go to the nineteen seventies where, you know, Charlie Munger had 80% of his capital in two stocks.

我记得是蓝筹邮票公司和新美国基金，这两只股票当时都非常便宜。

I think it was the blue it was blue chip stamps and the New America Fund, and they were both very cheap stocks.

但他的投资组合在两年内下跌了超过一半，仅这两年就让此前七年的累计收益几乎归零。

But his his portfolio declined by more than half in two years, and those two years alone made the prior seven years of returns, I think, something like zero cumulatively.

就连谢尔比·戴维斯，我最近读到，他在20世纪70年代的个人投资组合也下跌了60%，因为他当时使用了杠杆融资。

Even Shelby Davis, I was reading recently, I think his personal portfolio in the nineteen seventies declined by 60% because he had margin debt at that time.

在20世纪90年代末的最后几年，路·辛普森本人的回报比标普500指数低了50到60个百分点。

You know, in the last few years of the nineteen nineties, Lou Simpson himself was 50 or 60 points behind the S and P 500.

这段短暂的表现不佳，实际上抹去了长达十年的超额收益。

And that little stretch of performance actually wiped out, like, a decade of outperformance against the market.

当然，伯克希尔·哈撒韦本身在过去多年里多次下跌了50%。

And, of course, you know, Berkshire Hathaway itself has declined by 50% multiple times over the years.

所以这样的例子不胜枚举。

So the list goes on and on.

我有点痴迷于研究这些古老的数据，因为它们让我着迷。

You know, I'm kind of a nerd in in looking at these old old records because they they fascinate me.

但我们知道，这些极端波动和表现不佳的时期是非常正常的。

But we know we know that these periods of extreme volatility and underperformance are just very normal.

那么，既然现实如此，你该如何为这种不可避免性构建你的环境呢？

So the question then becomes, given that reality, how should you structure your environment for that inevitability?

你该如何规划你的生活、事业和周围环境？

How should you structure your life and your business and your environment?

我发现，当你真正具备长期视角时，你就会开始在某种程度上学会放手。

And what I found is that when you have a truly long term orientation, you start to just have to surrender in some ways.

你 simply 停止去关注某些类型的问题。

You simply stop engaging with certain kinds of questions.

例如，明年会衰退吗？

For example, will there be a recession next year?

市场即将崩盘吗？

Is the market about to crash?

人工智能是不是一个即将破裂的巨大泡沫？

Is AI a big bubble that's about to pop?

美国的财政状况是否不可持续，并最终导致危机？

Is The US fiscal situation unsustainable and going to lead to a crisis at some point?

这些问题都非常有趣。

These are all very interesting questions.

但在很长的时间跨度下，它们其实并不那么重要。

But over a long time horizon, they just don't matter that much.

多年来，许多人花费大量时间反复思考这类问题，这已成为一种昂贵的分心。

And spending a lot of time sort of ruminating on these kinds of questions has been an expensive distraction for many people over many years.

就我而言，随着时间推移，严重的熊市一定会出现，甚至可能每十年就有一两次。

As far as I'm concerned, there will be severe bear markets over time, and there might be even one or two every decade.

我发现，对于这些时期何时到来，不必过于焦虑。

And I found that it's not worth having a lot of anxiety about when those periods come.

更好的做法是 simply 知道它们终将到来。

It's much better to just know that they will come.

关于卢·辛普森的一个故事让我深受启发，那是他在1987年的经历。

There's a story about Lou Simpson that I that really was instructive to me about this, and it was his experience in 1987.

因此，在1987年期间，他认为股票严重高估。

So he went into the 1987 period thinking that stocks were very overvalued.

我认为当时许多聪明人都认为股票严重高估。

And I think many smart people at that time believed that stocks were very overvalued.

他找不到任何可以做的事情。

He couldn't find anything to do.

因此，他在1987年初就把投资组合的50%转为现金。

So he actually took his portfolio to 50% cash early in 1987.

你可能会觉得这不可思议。

And you might think this is incredible.

这简直是预知未来。

This is, you know, clairvoyance.

多么惊人的市场时机把握。

What amazing market timing.

当他回顾那段时期时，他在高点卖出了股票并缴纳了税款。

And when he reflects on that period, he sold stocks at the highs and paid his taxes.

然后市场崩盘，他稍微投入了更多资金。

And then the market crashed, he sort of deployed a little more capital.

但市场迅速反弹，他没能及时部署资金。

But the market stepped back so quickly that he didn't deploy his capital fast enough.

因此，他在高点做出了正确的决定，但在低点却没有做出正确的决定。

And so he made the right decision at the highs, but didn't make the right decision at the bottom.

这对我来说非常有启发，因为要真正从中获益，你必须多次做出正确的决策。

And this to me was very instructive because you have to make multiple decisions correctly to really take advantage.

我认为在他看来，他认为在扣除所有成本后仍创造了一些价值。

And I think in his estimation, he thinks that he added some value net of all of that.

但也许最好的做法是始终保持满仓投资，随遇而安。

But it may have just been better to remain fully invested and just roll with the punches.

因此，这就是我思考这个问题的方式。

And so that's kind of the approach that I've taken to thinking about this.

是的。

Yeah.

为了就此话题收尾，关于你对宏观经济预测的漠视态度，我从你的股东信中找到了几段特别喜欢的话，想特别提一下。

There just to close the loop on this idea of of your your willingness to ignore macroeconomic prediction, there were a couple of lines I I really like from your shareholder letters that I wanted to highlight.

其中一段来自最近的股东信，你说：‘这个行业一个持久的趣事就是，投资者多么可靠地被那些实际上反复出现的模式所动摇。’

One of them from a recent shareholder letter, you said, one of the enduring amusements of this profession is how reliably investors are shaken by what is in fact a recurring pattern.

对吧？

Right?

这种模式就是市场崩盘、下跌，以及对末日的预测。

This pattern of of market meltdowns and and dips and and predictions of gloom and doom.

你说，如果我们干脆选择不参与这些闹剧呢？

And you said, what if we simply chose not to partake in the theatrics?

我认为这是一个非常重要的问题。

And I think that's a that's a really important question.

正如你所说，这个决定——说‘不’——是一种令人解脱的提问方式。

Just this decision, as you put it, it's a liberating question to to say, no.

我愿意让自己摆脱地缘政治和宏观经济的一切影响。

I I'm willing to free myself from geopolitics and macroeconomics and all all of that.

你所说的这一点，我之所以引用，是因为我认为它浓缩了极大的实用智慧。

And what you said, which I'm I'm quoting because I think it distills an enormous amount of practical wisdom.

你说过，我们专注于拥有那些长期再投资机制能够抵御宏观经济变化的公司。

You said we are focused on owning individual businesses whose long term reinvestment dynamics are resilient to changes in macroeconomic conditions.

你对此有什么想补充的吗？

Do you wanna comment on that in any way?

我认为这触及了投资中一个深刻而根本的真理：如果你能有意识地选择专注于那些能抵御宏观经济变化的公司，而不是试图预测未来会发生什么的话。

I think it gets at such a a profound and essential truth about investing that if you're that you you can make this very conscious decision just to focus on businesses that are resilient to changes in macroeconomics rather than saying, I'm gonna try to predict what's gonna happen.

是的。

Yeah.

我的意思是，我觉得这项工作几乎简单得令人不安。

I mean, I think that this work is it's almost unnervingly simple.

你知道，投资业务其实非常简单。

You know, the investment business is really quite simple.

归根结底，关键在于理解一家企业的经济现实。

And at the end at the end of the day, it's about trying to understand the economic reality of a business.

正如他们所说，路易经常说，关键是预测，也就是理解一家企业未来的经济状况。

And as they said, Lou used to say all the time that it's about predict it's about understanding the future economics of a business.

如果宏观经济对这家企业未来的经济状况会产生巨大影响，那么它可能不是一个好企业。

Now to the extent that the macro economy is going to have a huge impact on the future economics of this business, then it may not be a great business.

如果经济衰退会伤害这家企业，或者将来出现竞争加剧，或者某个产品失败，等等。

To the extent that, you know, going into a recession is going to hurt the business or to the extent that there will be competitive on slots at some point or a product might fail, for example.

企业中随时都可能发生各种状况。

Things can happen in businesses all the time.

我认为，关键在于持有那些能够抵御生活不可避免的动荡的特定企业。

And I think the idea is to own specific businesses that are resilient despite the inevitable sort of turbulence that life presents.

我认为，避开这些我们无法控制的事情，真的能让生活变得简单得多。

And I think it really simplifies life to opt out of a lot of these things that are outside of our control.

我想回头更详细地聊聊卢·辛普森，他显然在很多方面是你作为投资者生涯中的奠基性影响。

I wanna go back and talk in in much more detail about Lou Simpson, who's clearly been, in in many ways, the formative influence in your life as an investor.

你是在2016年左右搬到佛罗里达州那不勒斯，并在2019年之前与卢在他的公司SQ Advisors共事。

And so you moved to Naples, Florida in, I think, 2016 and worked until 2019 with Lou at his firm SQ Advisors.

对于那些还不了解他的人——刚才我们提到了他——卢曾是GEICO的投资主管，这家汽车保险公司现在完全隶属于伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司。

And for people who don't know, who've just heard us mentioning him, Lou was head of investments for GEICO, this auto insurance company that's now owned by Berkshire Hathaway, completely.

他在那里工作了三十一年，从1979年到2010年，在此期间大幅跑赢了市场。

And he was there for thirty one years, I think, from 1979 to 2010, and crushed the market over that period by a huge margin.

你向我推荐了一本书，我昨天刚读了其中关于卢的一章，这是你朋友艾伦·博内洛写的关于集中投资的书，书中讲述了巴菲特最初聘用他的经过。

And you recommended to me a book that I I read a chapter on Lou yesterday, a book by your friend, Alan Bonello, on concentrated investing, where he talks about the circumstances when Buffett first hired him.

巴菲特在见完他之后，有人问他关于个人投资组合的事，而巴菲特在见面后曾说类似这样的话：‘停，把音乐关掉。’

When Buffett said after meeting him said some asked him about his personal portfolio, and then after meeting him said something like, stop stop the music.

我们找到他了。

We found our guy.

他后来简单地说，卢是投资界的大师之一。

And he later said, simply put, Lou is one of the investment greats.

这出自巴菲特在2010年写的一封信。

This is from a letter, I think, that Buffett wrote in 2010.

告诉我们，你第一次见到卢时是什么情景？

Tell us about what it was like when you first met Lou.

因为从某种意义上说，他所营造的文化与你在PIMCO所见的文化完全相反。

Because in some ways, the culture that he created was diametrically the opposite of the culture that you had seen at PIMCO.

这并不是对PIMCO的批评。

And this isn't a criticism of PIMCO.

只是他体现了一种截然不同的东西。

It's just he embodied something very, very different.

绝对如此。

Absolutely.

每当我想到卢，最先浮现在脑海中的记忆就是我们第一次见面的情景。

You know, every time I think of Lou, I the memory that always comes is the first time that we met.

当时我二十多岁。

And I was in my mid twenties at the time.

正如我所说，正如你提到的，我当时在一家相对传统的投资公司工作，那就是PIMCO。

And as I said, you know, as you mentioned, I was working at a more or less traditional investment firm, which was PIMCO.

我记得，我第一份工作时带着一种过度分析的习惯。

And, you know, I remember the energy that I carried with me at my first job was this sort of over analytical habit.

我有一种正式而紧张的氛围。

I had this formality, this intensity.

当我第一次到芝加哥见Lou时，我带着满满的这种能量。

And when I arrived in Chicago to meet with Lou for the first time, I carried a lot of that energy with me.

我们见面的背景是讨论一家我认为他可能会感兴趣的企业。

The context of our meeting was actually to discuss a company that I thought he might be interested in.

在我脑海中，我想象这位令人敬畏的投资传奇人物会严格地质疑我投资论点的每一个细节。

And in my mind, I imagined this very intimidating investment legend was going to rigorously cross examine, you know, every little detail of my investment thesis.

因此，出于不安全感，我带着厚厚一叠研究材料去了芝加哥，里面全是图表、估值和其他所有内容。

And so mostly out of insecurity, I lugged along with me to Chicago, this very thick stack of research material with charts and valuations and and everything.

你知道，我已经准备好了。

You know, I was ready.

从智力上来说，我差不多已经准备好迎战了。

I was sort of ready to go to battle intellectually speaking.

我记得我穿着西装打着领带走进电梯，心跳比平时快了一些，带着厚厚一叠研究资料和我的数据点。

And I remember stepping into the elevator with my suit and tie on and, you know, your heart's beating a little faster than usual, and I lugged along my my data points with me and my with a thick stack of of research.

那是那种漫长的电梯旅程，途中你的耳朵会有点发胀。

And it's one of those long elevator rides of where your ears are sort of popping along the way.

我记得我想着，我会遇到一位助理，或者被领进某个等候区。

And I remember thinking, I'm gonna be met by an assistant or ushered into some kind of waiting area.

但结果，门是开着的，只有路本身站在走廊里，非常朴实，没有一丝正式或做作。

And instead, you know, the door's open, and it's just Lou himself standing in the hallway, very unassuming, no formality, no pretension.

他带我走进一间办公室，那与我前一天刚离开的办公室截然相反。

And he led me into an office that was really the polar opposite of the office that I had just been in, you know, the day before.

那里没有任何彭博终端。

There were no Bloomberg terminals.

那里没有金融电视在播放。

There was no, you know, financial TV on.

那里就像一位学者的图书馆，有一把舒适的椅子，几堆读物，那种宁静的氛围立刻打动了我。

It was like the library of a scholar, you know, a comfortable chair, couple piles of reading material, and this just very calm presence that immediately struck me.

他带我进去时看着我，说：别把自己当客人。

And he looked at me as he led me inside, and he he said, you know, don't make yourself at home.

我给你泡杯咖啡吧。

Let me make you a coffee.

我记得那句话让我一下子愣住了，因为眼前这个人几十年来一直以世界级的水平积累资本，是沃伦·巴菲特多年来多次称赞的人，也是我从大学起就远距离研究的对象。

And I remember that that line just sort of stopped me in my tracks because here was someone who had compounded capital at world class rates for decades, someone who Warren Buffett had praised many times over the years, and someone that I had been studying from afar since college.

你知道吗，我在大学上课间隙打发时间的方式，就是打开一份老版的伯克希尔·哈撒韦13F报告。

You know, my idea of passing time between classes in college was to pull up an old Berkshire Hathaway 13 f.

在那些早期年份，你真的可以往下扫一眼，分辨出哪些持仓是路易的，哪些是沃伦的。

And in some of those early years, you could actually scan down and see which holdings belonged to Lou and which holdings belonged to Warren.

于是我坐在加州大学洛杉矶分校的咖啡店里，试图逆向推导出路易为何买入房利美或穆迪，为何在九十年代初买入耐克并持有二十年甚至更久。

And so I would sit there at the UCLA coffee shop trying to reverse engineer why Lou bought Freddie Mac or Moody's, you know, why he bought Nike in the early nineties and held it for twenty years or more.

而如今，杰里正是这些决策背后的那个人，他却转身去为一个可能明显紧张的20岁年轻人——一个尚未有所成就、才刚刚踏上复利旅程的年轻人——煮咖啡。

And now, you know, Jerry was this person behind these decisions stepping away to make coffee for a probably visibly nervous 20 year old kid who hadn't done anything yet and who was so early in his compounding journey.

我记得当时心里想，我应该给你煮咖啡才对。

And I remember thinking to myself, you know, I should be making you the coffee.

当他回来时，并没有开始一段长篇大论。

And when he returned, he didn't launch into some kind of monologue.

他也没有试图炫耀自己有多聪明。

He didn't try to assert how smart he was.

她带着一种极其真诚的好奇心提出这些问题。

She would ask these questions with this very sincere curiosity.

对于一个拥有如此丰富经验和声誉的人来说，这种开放和接纳的态度实在非同寻常。

And it was this remarkable receptiveness for someone with his experience and with his reputation.

那次初次会面给我留下了深刻的印象，因为它为我打开了一扇窗，让我看到在这份事业中，原来还可以有另一种存在方式。

And, you know, that first meeting left such a deep imprint on me because it kind of opened a window that there was just a different way of being in this work.

它不必是这种拼命竞争、零和博弈的运作方式，不必是这种过度活跃的行事风格。

It didn't have to be this hard charging zero sum way of operating, this kind of hyperactive way of operating.

卢的举止异常谦逊，这与投资界你通常遇到的那种类型截然不同。

Lou carried himself with remarkably little ego, and that was so different from the archetype of person that you typically run into in the investment world.

你知道，通常的经历是，你会遇到一些非常聪明、非常勤奋的人，但不知为何，他们总喜欢夸大自己的成就，向你滔滔不绝地讲他们最近的投资胜利、管理资产规模，诸如此类的事情。

You know, the normal experience is that you come across folks who are very bright, very hardworking, but for whatever reason, they insist on puffing up their accomplishments and telling you all about their, you know, most recent investment win and their assets under management and, you know, all this sort of thing.

而卢却与此大相径庭。

And Lou was just so different from this.

他一些最非凡的成就，往往在你认识他多年后，不经意间才偶然流露出来。

Some of his most extraordinary achievements would just sort of slip out accidentally after having known him for years.

你知道吗？

You know?

他似乎刻意对自我吹嘘的那部分毫不在意。

He seemed deliberately uninterested in indulging that kind of self congratulatory aspect of himself.

他总是很快地说：我不知道。

He was quick to say, I don't know.

当有人反对他或质疑他对某家公司的看法时，他从不防御。

You know, when someone would disagree with him or challenge one of his beliefs on the company, he wouldn't get defensive.

他只是简单地说：‘是啊，也许你是对的。’

He would simply say, yeah, you know, maybe you're right.

我应该再多想想。

I should think about that more.

我真心认为，他的谦逊——也就是他缺乏自我中心——正是他成为优秀投资者的原因，是他成为优秀投资者的重要原因，因为这让他对现实有了更清晰的认识。

And I truly believe that his humility was, you know, his lack of egoism was the reason why he was a good investor, was a big reason why he was a good investor because it gave him a clearer perception of reality.

我和他唯一的一次谈话，我想我可能之前跟你说过。

The one conversation that I ever had with him I I think I may have told you this before.

那是我和查理·芒格以及一些像路这样的人一起参加Zoom早餐会的时候。

This was when I had a Zoom breakfast with Charlie Munger and a few people like like Lou were on the call.

而路，你知道的，他已于2022年去世，当时显然身体已经很不好了。

And Lou already, you know, who passed in in 2022, was already obviously pretty unwell, I think.

他在电话里非常亲切，那通电话非常奇怪，因为天啊。

And he was so lovely on the call, and it was a very it was a very strange call because I gosh.

我们的作业是去读你的书，《理查德·怀斯哈珀》，然后我们再讨论。

We're still our homework is gonna be to study your book, Richard Wisehapier, and then we'll discuss it.

所以我现在处于一种有点尴尬的境地，好像我在这里。

So I'm in this sort of embarrassing position where it's like, oh, here I am.

我要教Lou和Charlie如何投资。

I'm gonna teach Lou and Charlie about how to invest.

当时有个瞬间，你知道，Charlie在整个对话中非常主导，然后有人转向Lou问道：‘Lou，你觉得这本书怎么样？’

And there was a moment where someone turn you know, Charlie was very dominant through the conversation, and then someone turned to to Lou and said, what do you think of the book, Lou?

Lou对此非常友善，礼貌而迷人地说，拥有伟大投资者的故事非常有帮助，因为我们通过故事来学习。

And Lou was really lovely about it, like, very polite and charming and said how helpful it is to have stories of great investors, like, because we learn through stories.

接着我们谈到了阿里巴巴，他和Charlie刚刚买入了这只股票。

And then we were talking about Alibaba, which he and Charlie had just been buying.

你知道，Charlie一直说：‘我全仓买入了。’

And the you know, Charlie had been saying, oh, I'm all in.

Lou却说了一些类似的话：‘我昨天才买入，所以它肯定马上会下跌50%。’

And Lou said something like, well, I just bought it yesterday, so it's bound to go down 50% immediately.

这种说法有种特别自嘲的意味。

And there was something sort of so self deprecating about it.

他并不是在告诉你，我刚买了这个，你知道的？

Like, he wasn't there to tell you, I just bought the you know?

我问他，你为什么买它？

And I asked him, why why did you buy it?

他说，你知道的，这是一个在快速增长国家里的主导型企业，而且价格异常便宜。

And he was saying, well, you know, it's a it's a dominant business in a fast growing country, and it's it's extraordinarily cheap.

但有趣的是，它真的跌了50%。

But it was funny because it did go down 50%.

所以，某种程度上，这非常符合他的风格——他如此谦逊和自嘲。

And so there in a way, it was, like, very typical of him that he was so humble and self deprecating.

某种程度上，也许这也是他意识到，这其实是一场非常艰难的游戏，你总会经历一些事情突然发生的时候。

And in a way, maybe it was also a recognition of the fact this is a really hard game, and you are gonna you know, there you are gonna go through these periods where just stuff happens.

是的。

Yeah.

当然。

Absolutely.

你知道吗，这让我想起一位朋友给我下过一个关于谦逊的定义，我觉得异常精准。

You know, it brings to mind a friend of mine offered me a definition of humility that I think is remarkably precise.

我认为这是对谦逊最出色的定义。

I think it's the best definition of humility that exists.

他说，谦逊就是一种觉知。

He said that humility is the awareness.

它是你对自己完全依赖于一切存在、以及与周围所有人相互依存的觉知。

It's your awareness of your utter dependence on all that exists and your interdependence on everyone around you.

而谦逊的反面，当然是以自我为中心的视角，认为一切都是自己独自完成的，自己才掌控一切。

And the opposite of humility, of course, is like a self centered perspective to think that we did it all alone, that we're the ones in control.

这会蒙蔽你的认知。

That clouds your perception.

它会扭曲你的判断。

It distorts your judgment.

当卢谈到他的投资组合时，这种动态表现得非常明显。

And this dynamic was so clear when Lou talked about his portfolio.

当别人都在推销自己出色的点子时，路易却会说，我觉得这个投资组合只是还行。

When everyone else would pitch their great ideas, Lou would say things like, you know, I think the portfolio is just okay.

也许有点疲软了。

Maybe it's a little tired.

而这可是有史以来最伟大的投资者之一，他却对自己的投资组合如此低调。

And this is, you know, this is one of the best investors of all time, and he's just sort of ho about his portfolio.

而如果你去参加许多大型投资公司的周一早会，你会听到人们为一些平庸的点子拍桌子叫好。

Whereas if you went into the Monday morning meeting of many large investment firms, you would hear people pounding the table on probably mediocre ideas in many cases.

我认为他的谦逊中有一种客观性。

And I think there's something that's objective about his humility.

它让你能够清晰地看待事物。

It allows you to see things clearly.

他的谦逊并不是做作的。

And the his humility wasn't performative.

并不是那种虚伪的、假装谦虚的自夸。

It wasn't like this inauthentic, humble bragging.

这源于一种真实的认知：我们实际上能控制的东西很少。

It came from a real awareness in how little we actually control.

我认为，巴菲特关于‘卵巢彩票’的说法，很好地捕捉了这种精神。

And I think, you know, Buffett's line about the ovarian lottery, I think, captures that spirit so well.

我们都喜欢相信，自己的成功完全归功于自身，认为一切皆可预测。

We all like to believe that we are the sole cause of our own success, that things are so deterministic.

但事实上，生活中投资中任何顺利的事情，很大程度上只是命运的恩赐。

But in truth, you know, so much of anything that goes right in life in investing is really just the beneficence of life.

多年前，我在艾伦·博内洛的书中看到过一句路易说过的话，至今记忆犹新：我们与许多投资者恰恰相反。

There's a really lovely line also in Alan Bonello's book that I remember seeing before many years ago from Lou where he said, we are sort of the polar opposites of a lot of investors.

我们深思熟虑，却行动不多。

We do a lot of thinking and not a lot of acting.

许多投资者则行动频繁，却思考不足。

A lot of investors do a lot of acting and not a lot of thinking.

我想知道，你从他身上学到了什么，关于如何摆脱噪音、干扰，以及华尔街那种赌场般的氛围。

And I'm wondering what you learned from him about the importance of detaching ourselves from the noise and distractions and and the kind of casino element of Wall Street.

是的。

Yes.

在我看来，我认识他的那些年里，卢过着相当平衡的生活。

I think Lou lived a pretty balanced life in the years that I knew him.

他广泛阅读。

He would read broadly.

他有着惊人的幽默感。

He had this amazing sense of humor.

你知道吗？

You know?

他会把锻炼当作优先事项。

He would make it a priority to exercise.

他每天早上都会去散步很长一段时间，或者去游泳。

He would in the mornings, he would go for a long walk or he would go for a swim.

我记得有一次，那绝对是星期中，我想市场是开放的。

I remember on one occasion, it was definitely in the middle of the week, and I think the market was open.

我认为那天我们的投资组合可能下跌了不少。

And I think our portfolio was probably down quite a bit that day.

他只是给我打了电话，说：你知道吗，芝加哥现代艺术博物馆有个新展览。

And he just called me up, and he said, you know, there's this new exhibition at MoMA in Chicago.

你想和我一起去吗？

Do you wanna go with me?

我说：太好了。

And I said, great.

我们就那样整个下午闲逛，看看艺术作品。

And we just spent the afternoon wandering around, you know, looking at art.

你知道，这和你在许多投资公司可能经历的体验非常不同。

You know, this is this is very different from the kind of, the kind of experience that you might have at many many investment firms.

所以，我不会声称自己对这一切都有答案，但我知道的是，如果你打算进行长期投资，并且已经接受了这种波动性，那么如果你总是拼命冲刺、时刻紧绷、对每一个微小数据点都做出反应，只是盯着屏幕上的价格波动，也许这能帮你提升接下来一两个月甚至六个月的表现。

So I, you know, I won't claim to have all the answers about this, but what I do know is that if you intend to have a long term investment journey and you have surrendered to a lot of this volatility, I know that if you're constantly sprinting and you're always wired and you're reactive to every little data point and you're just staring at ticks on a screen, maybe that will help your results for the next month or two months or six months.

但从长远来看，这会彻底摧毁你的健康。

But over the long term, it will completely destroy your health.

它会摧毁你的身心健康。

It will destroy your physical and mental health.

它会损害你的人际关系。

It will strain your relationships.

讽刺的是，它最终会让投资决策变得更糟。

And ironically, it will make the investment decision the worse at some point.

这有点反常：你越努力、越拼命地投资，你的生存时间就越短。

And it's sort of perverse that the harder you push, the harder you try at investing, the shorter your runway.

最终，你知道，复利的关键在于年数。

And in the end, you know, compounding is all about the number of years.

因此，我认为在你的生活中留出空间，是我从他那里学到的、无比宝贵的一课。

And so I think creating space in your life is something that I learned from him and something that's invaluable.

现代投资的很大一部分是撰写备忘录或更新模型。

So much of modern investing is preparing a memo or updating a model.

你知道，有太多反应性行为。

You know, there's so much reactivity.

而正如他所说，很少有人有意识地留出时间进行反思。

And to his point, you know, so much little so so much so little time is intentionally devoted to reflection.

对大多数人来说，很难直观地意识到，散步可能比在Excel模型中增加另一个情景对你的投资组合更有帮助。

And it's not intuitive for most people to think that going for a walk may be better for your for your portfolio than, you know, adding another scenario to your Excel model.

是的。

Yeah.

你过去曾提到，有时你最好的投资洞察力就像偶然降临的礼物。

You you've mentioned in the past that sometimes your best investment insights feel like these gifts of serendipity.

它们并不总是源于机械化的严谨。

They're not they're not always the result of mechanical rigor.

但我还记得你曾告诉我，有意识地以一种非常清醒的方式安排你的生活，为自己创造这种空间感和减少干扰，是多么重要。

And but I remember also you talking to me about the importance of actually kind of structuring your life in a very conscious way to give yourself this kind of spaciousness and lack of noise.

你当时说，这不仅仅是如何安排你的一天、冥想多少时间之类的事情。

And you were you were saying that it's it's not just how you schedule your day and how much meditation you do and the like.

它还包括你选择哪些有限合伙人加入你的基金、你的团队成员是谁，或者你所投资的企业的类型。

It's also your choice of who your limited partners are and your fund and who's on your team if you have a team or the kind of businesses you you hold.

你能谈谈这一点吗？

Can you talk a little bit about that?

因为在我看来，这实际上是创造一种反主流文化生活方式的重要部分，这种生活方式能为你在投资中带来意想不到的优势。

Because it seems to me this is such an important part of actually creating a kind of countercultural lifestyle that gives you a sort of unexpected edge in investing.

是的。

Yes.

优势这个概念很有趣。

Edge is a funny concept.

我们只是想说，

Just to say we would talk

和你聊。

to you

改天再说。

about another time.

我的观点是，无论你构建的是什么——无论是投资合伙关系还是其他任何事物——它最终都取决于你选择如何生活以及支撑这种生活的价值观。

You know, my view is that whatever you build, whether it's an investment partnership or anything else, it ultimately lives downstream from how you choose to live and the values that inform that.

所以我一直努力问自己：你真正追求的是什么？

And so I've I've always tried to ask myself, what are you actually optimizing for?

因为如果我所做的事情与答案不符，以我的性格，我无法长久坚持下去。

Because if what I'm doing is not in alignment with the answer, my personality is such that I will not last very long.

我会在内心某个地方，甚至生理上，开始感受到这种失衡。

I'll start to feel that imbalance internally somewhere, even physiologically.

尤其是在投资领域，复利的力量只有在你长期坚持参与时才会显现出来。

And in investing in particular, the power of compounding reveals itself when you stay in the game for a really long time.

在这里，持久性承载了绝大部分的收益。

Longevity carries most of the freight here.

因此，对我而言，决定做什么的首要原则是：先建造你想要长期居住的房子。

So for me, the first principle in deciding what to do was to ask to to build the house that you wanna live in long term.

你知道，这真的非常关键。

You know, that was really critical.

我见过太多次了，一些非常有才华、人品很好的人，建起了庞大的投资业务，却私下里对随之而来的复杂性深感厌恶。

And I can't tell you the number of times I've seen someone very talented, you know, lovely person build this sprawling investment business only to privately resent a lot of the complexity that comes along with it.

用于投资技艺的时间减少了。

Less time becomes devoted to the craft of investing.

更多时间被花在管理人员、筹资或处理行政事务上。

More time is spent managing people or fundraising or doing administrative tasks.

对我个人而言，投资的技艺是我热爱的部分。

For me, personally, the craft of investing was the part that I loved.

这就是我希望主要花费时间的方式。

That's how I wanted to spend, you know, the majority of my time.

这意味着结构必须极其简单，避免不必要的复杂性。

And that meant that the structure had to be exceedingly simple and free from unnecessary complexity.

这项工作必须符合我的性格，某种程度上也要与我的精力相匹配。

The work had to fit my temperament and it had to sort of match your energy in some sense.

所以今天，我只管理一个投资组合。

So today, I run one portfolio.

持仓少于十只。

There's fewer than 10 holdings.

我一年可能发现一两个新的投资点子。

I might find one or two new ideas in a year.

其余的时间，你会说，是在磨利斧头。

The rest of the year is spent, you know, quote, unquote, sharpening the axe.

这种简洁性为你提供了巨大的反思空间，让你能够清晰思考，不受干扰地做出长期决策，并与鲁米的每一位合作伙伴建立紧密关系。

That simplicity gives you an enormous amount of space for reflection to try to think clearly, space to make long term decisions without distractions, space to have close relationships with every one of Rumi's partners.

你知道，在超过六年的时间里，我们从未有过任何赎回，我认为这对于一种每年波动剧烈的策略来说，堪称某种纪录。

You know, in more than six years, we haven't had a single redemption, which I think is some kind of record for a strategy that's sort of flinging up and down depending on the year.

但这其实反映了我非常幸运地找到了真正高质量的合作伙伴，他们与我们在目标和思维方式上高度一致。

But it's really a reflection of having found you know, I'm so grateful to have found partners who are truly high quality and are aligned in, you know, our goals and and our thinking.

但我认为，这其中始终存在一种内在的张力，这是我长期以来一直在思考的问题。

I think there's always an inherent tension though, and it's something that I've been wrestling with for a long time.

如果能帮助更多人，当然这本质上是更好的。

And it's this idea that if you can help more people, of course, that's intrinsically better.

我花了很多时间纠结这个问题，因为还有什么比为那些你真正建立深厚关系的人提供服务更能带来满足感呢？

It's something I spend so much time wrestling with because what greater fulfillment is it than to be of service to people that you have real relationships with?

从这个角度来看，障碍越多越好。

From that perspective, it's like the more the barrier.

但总需要保持一种平衡，这是需要注意的反向力量。

But there's always this balance that is that is this counterbalance to be mindful of.

我认为，亲密的真实关系是无法无限扩展的。

And I don't think that you can scale close real relationships infinitely.

一旦你将某事物拉伸到超出其自然平衡，我认为它就会从你生活的某个方面索取代价，无论是工作还是个人生活。

The moment that you stretch something beyond its natural equilibrium, I think it exacts a payment from some part of your life, whether it's your work, whether it's your personal life.

而且，拉伸某事物可能会稀释其原本奏效的核心要素，这是我一直在思考的问题。

And, you know, stretching something can dilute what makes it work in the first place, and it's something that I just continue to think about.

当你创立Rumi Capital Partners时，我想应该是2019年10月。

When you founded Rumi Capital Partners, I I think it was October 2019.

那大概是在SQ Advisors关闭，或者Lou决定关闭公司并退休后的几个月。

So it's probably a few months after SQ Advisors closed or after Lou decided to close the firm and and retire.

你还记得他对你的建议吗？

Do you remember his advice to you?

因为看起来，在某些方面，我记得读到过他在盖可保险通常只持有大约八到十五只股票。

Because it seems like in some I I mean, I remember reading that he typically had something like eight to 15 stocks, I think, at GEICO.

当你刚开始担任基金经理时，他给了你什么建议？

What did he advise you as you launched your career as a fund manager?

他的主要关注点是——他给我的主要建议是，专注于取得成果，而不是去做那些别人告诉你应该做的事，比如租个豪华办公室、制作一份路演材料，到处跑去找人募资。

His main focus was to you know, his main advice to me was to focus on producing results rather than doing a lot of the the things that you're told you should be doing, like getting a fancy office and putting together a pitch deck and running around and trying to raise money from all these people.

我非常感激他给了我这个建议，因为最初的几年给了我极大的空间，这不仅在过程中受益，也让我与从第一天起就投资我的人们建立了良好的关系。

And I'm so grateful that he gave me that advice because the first couple of years gave me so much space that I think benefited both in the process, but also the relationships with the people that that did invest with me from day one.

我在新冠疫情爆发前不久，以及2022年另一次市场下跌前不久，创立了Rumi。

And I started Rumi not too long before COVID and not too long before another, you know, decline in 2022.

这些时期的体验却异常平静。

And the experience of these these periods were so serene.

当然，看着账户余额下跌并不会总是让人舒服，但那种感觉却出奇地轻松，因为你感受到整个生态系统中的高度一致，这让一切变得顺畅许多。

You know, not to say that it's always comfortable to watch your account balances declining, but it was about as about as easy as you might expect because you felt this alignment across the ecosystem that just made things much more seamless.

我怀疑，如果我一开始就募集了大量机构资本，那么在这些时期中，可能会有一部分资金离开，而那段经历或许会让人感到不适，你会觉得自己辜负了别人，诸如此类。

And I suspect if I would have raised a lot of institutional capital out of the gate, that probably some percentage of that capital would have left during one or these periods, and maybe that experience would have been, you know, uncomfortable, and you would have felt like you disappointed people and that sort of thing.

我认为他建议专注于为信任你的人创造良好结果，这是明智的。

And I think his advice to just focus on producing a good outcome for the people who trust you was was wise.

‘一致’这个词对你来说似乎至关重要。

That word alignment seems very central to you.

对吧？

Right?

我前几天看了Rumi Partners的创始原则，你提到一种以一致为核心的文化。

I I was looking the other day at the founding principles of Rumi Partners, and and you talked about a a culture rooted in in alignment.

在其他地方，你谈到投资于少数几家卓越的企业，这些企业的领导者同样被一种核心的一致感所驱动。

And elsewhere, you write about investing in a a small number of exceptional business businesses whose leaders are similarly driven by a core sense of alignment.

我认为你的收费结构也非常一致。

And I think you're very aligned in your fee structure as well.

对吧？

Right?

比如，你的管理费很低，并且随着管理资产规模的增长而降低，这样股东就能从规模效应中受益。

Like, you have a small management fee that gets smaller as you get more assets under management so the shareholders benefit from the growth in scale.

如果你的回报超过5%的年门槛，你就能获得激励分配，这个门槛是复利累计计算的。

And you get an incentive allocation, basically, if you beat a 5% annual hurdle, the compound says cumulative.

所以，如果你落后了，追上那只兔子就会变得越来越难。

So if you if you fall behind, it becomes harder and harder to to catch up with the rabbit.

你在股东信中反复提到一句很精彩的话：我完全不关心仅仅因为存在就获得回报。

And there's a lovely line that you repeat a lot in your shareholders where you say, I'm wholly uninterested in being rewarded for simply existing.

因此，你并不是想聚集大量资产，然后只是收取管理费。

So you're not trying to gather lots of assets and then just collect fees.

你能谈谈这种利益一致性的意义吗？

Can you talk about the importance of that sense of alignment?

因为我在你投资的公司中也看到了这一点，比如布鲁克菲尔德，它一直是你的两三个最大持仓之一。我记得你曾评论过，当他们设立一个大型基础设施基金时，会用自己的资金与股东资金共同投资数十亿美元。

Because I see it also in the companies that you invest in that something like Brookfield, which has always been one of your two or three biggest positions, I remember you commenting once about how they would invest billions of their own capital alongside their shareholders' capital if they if they set up a huge infrastructure fund, say.

所以，利益一致似乎对你来说是一个非常核心的主题。

So it seems like alignment is a very central theme for you.

确实如此。

It's very much.

而对齐的概念是另一种无法量化、无法衡量的根本品质。

And the concept of alignment is another root quality that can't be quantified, and it can't be measured.

在投资世界中，我们试图建立规则和启发式方法来强制实现对齐。

What happens in the investment world is that we try to set up rules and heuristics to sort of force alignment.

所以他们会说，你知道，CEO持有公司多少百分比的股份？

So they'll say, you know, what percentage of the company does the CEO own?

当然。

Sure.

你知道，如果他们持有大量股票，那很好，但也不一定。

You know, if they own a lot of stock, that's great, but not necessarily.

我认为对于某些类型的公司、某些类型的人，结果并没有那么重要。

I think for certain kinds of companies, certain kinds of people, the output doesn't matter so much.

比如，如果沃伦·巴菲特持有的伯克希尔哈撒韦股票少一点，我认为他的行为也不会有太大改变。

Like, if Warren Buffett owned a little less Berkshire Hathaway stock, I don't think his behavior would change all that much.

如果你给他一个大型激励计划来激励他实现复利增长，我认为他的行为也不会因此发生太大变化。

If you gave him some big incentive plan to incentivize him to compound, I don't think it would change his behavior that much.

所以，对齐是一种你需要先身体力行，然后结果自然就会产生的东西。

So alignment is something that, you know, I I I think it's best done you have to sort of embody it first, and then the output of that is just the output.

以鲁米为例，我想强调这是一场以绩效为导向的合作关系。

So in in the case of Rumi, I wanted to emphasize that this is a performance oriented partnership.

这并不是关于筹集资本。

It's not about raising capital.

也不是为了取得几年的好业绩。

It's not about having a good couple of years.

而是关于在数十年间持续积累资本。

It's about compounding capital for multiple decades.

当我进行投资时，我考虑的是一个非常长远的时间跨度。

And, you know, I'm thinking in a in a quite long time horizon when when I make investments.

这意味着你也必须找到那些管理者具有相似视角的企业。

And what that means is that you also have to find businesses where the managers of those businesses have a similar orientation.

如果你能在这整个生态系统中统一时间视野、耐心和目标——比如布鲁克菲尔德的布鲁斯·弗拉特在思考未来二十年，鲁米在思考未来二十年，鲁米的有限合伙人也在思考未来二十年——那就对了。

So if you can align that time horizon and that sense of patience and that goal over across the ecosystem, whether it's, you know, Bruce Flatt at Brookfield is thinking about the next twenty years, and then Rumi is thinking about the next twenty years, and Rumi's limited partners are thinking about the next twenty years.

如果你能在整个生态系统中实现这种一致性，那么实现复利增长和获得良好结果的可能性会大大提升。

If you can create alignment across that that ecosystem, the odds of compounding, the odds of a good outcome, I think, are dramatically improved.

像布鲁克菲尔德或AppFolio这样的公司，自成立以来就是你最大的持仓之一，它们是如何体现你所看重的管理特质，以及你所说的长期再投资跑道的呢？

How does a company like Brookfield or AppFolio, which have been two of your biggest positions since inception, how do they embody what you're looking for in terms of of management, but also what you're looking for in terms of what you call long duration reinvestment runways?

因为看起来，对再投资潜力的关注几乎是你在选择企业时最核心的特质。

Because it seems like a focus on on the potential for reinvestment is always almost like the defining quality that you're looking for in a business.

我觉得查理说得最好：你持有某项资产的时间越长，就越能接近该企业内在的再投资回报率。

You know, I think Charlie said it best where the longer you hold something, the closer you will get to the intrinsic reinvestment return of the business.

因此，如果你打算长期持有某项资产，那么企业本身必须能够产生高回报，这是至关重要的。

And so if you intend to own something for a very long time, it's imperative that the business itself is generating high returns.

这并不是说它在财务报表上报告了高回报，而是它具备以高回报进行再投资的能力。

Not to say that it's generating high returns on a reported basis, but it has an ability to reinvest at high returns.

因为如果你只是不断产生现金，却不得不将其作为股息派发或用于股票回购，那就不是内在地推动企业复利增长。

Because if you're just throwing off cash and you have to either dividend it out or buy back stock, it's not intrinsically compounding the business.

因此，我寻找的是那些具备内在能力，能够长期实现资本复利增长的企业。

So I'm I'm looking for businesses that have this intrinsic ability to compound capital over time.

因此，除非我确信企业未来的经济前景和内在价值的复利增长具有长期性，否则我不会买入或加仓任何标的。

And so I basically won't buy things or add to things unless I'm convinced that the direction of the future economics, the direction of the compounding of intrinsic value is long lived.

这就排除了大量不符合条件的投资机会。

So that excludes all kinds of things from the funnel.

我通常不会仅仅因为某样东西看起来在统计上便宜就买入。

I tend not to buy things just because they look statistically cheap.

那些看似未来几年还能凑合，但很可能在未来几年面临某种生存威胁的公司，我不会投资。

You know, these ideas that they seem like they'll be okay just for the next few years, but they'll likely face some kind of existential threat over the next few years.

所以，无论估值如何，我都不会买入正在融化的冰块。

So I won't buy a melting ice cube regardless of valuation.

我不会投资糟糕的商业模式，也不会投资我不相信其利益一致或能力出众的人。

I won't buy, you know, bad business models or people that I don't believe are aligned or talented.

有些人能很好地做到这一点。

Some people can do this well.

有些投资者能很好地做到这一点。

Some investors can do this well.

我不是那种人。

I I'm not one of them.

关于长期再投资，我认为AppFolio是一个很好的例子。

Now, in terms of the long duration reinvestment, I think something like AppFolio is a good example of that.

这是一家向房地产物业管理公司销售软件的公司。

It's a business that sells software to real estate property managers.

最终，该产品极大地减少了房地产行业的无序性。

And ultimately, the product is a significant entropy reduction in the real estate industry.

它为物业管理者节省了大量时间。

So it saves property managers a lot of time.

它减少了对人力的需求。

It reduces the need for labor.

它只是让他们的生活更轻松。

It just simply makes their lives easier.

该产品使你能够完成许多任务，无论是收取租金、筛选新租户、安排维修还是执行租赁合同。

And the product allows you to fulfill many tasks, whether it's collecting rents or screening new tenants or scheduling maintenance or executing a lease.

由于它嵌入在所有这些工作流程中，且物业管理公司的员工都接受了该产品的培训，因此它能够产生极强的用户粘性。

And because it sits in the middle of all these workflows and the employees at the property management company are all trained on this product, it touches you know, it it creates an incredible stickiness.

它在房地产市场中占据了中心地位。

And it touch it sort of enjoys this center of gravity in the real estate market.

当客户使用长达十年、二十年，甚至更久时，许多私营软件公司会利用这种粘性来削减成本、停止创新、增加负债、提高价格。

That stickiness, when you have customers for ten years, twenty years in many cases, many privately held software companies will take advantage of that stickiness by cutting costs, by stopping the innovation, by levering up the balance sheet, you know, jacking up prices.

但AppFolio的理念体现的是一种伙伴关系模式。

But AppFolio's ethos, it sort of embodies a partnership approach.

它是市场上最具客户导向文化的公司。

It's by far the most customer oriented culture in the market.

处于这样的位置，使它们能够采取更长远的视角。

And to be in a position like that allows them to take a much longer term view.

因此，它们倾向于增加对客户真正有帮助的功能。

So they tend to add functionality that is impactful for the customer.

由于它们处于所有这些工作流程的中心，能够持续开发新功能，从而不断提升其定价能力。

And because they're sitting in the middle of all these workflows, they can continuously develop new features and functionality that's increasing their potential for pricing power.

当他们添加这些功能时，可以收取所创造价值的一小部分。

And as they add these features, they can charge, you know, a small sliver of the value created.

随着你在市场中发展壮大，垂直软件业务的特点是你将建立起声誉。

And as you grow in the market, the vertical software business is such that you gain a reputation.

这被称为可参考性，能帮助你获得额外的市场份额。

There's what's called referenceability, which allows you to gain incremental market share.

当有人做出购买决策时，他们通常会联系行业内的朋友，问：‘你们用什么？’

When someone's making a purchase decision, they're usually calling over to a friend of theirs in the industry and saying, what do you use?

对方会说：‘我用AppFolio。’

And they say, oh, I use AppFolio.

因此，随着公司规模扩大，该产品在市场中逐渐成为标准。

And so the product becomes kind of the standard in the market increasingly as you get bigger.

只要善待客户，你就能与他们维持长期关系。

And as long as you're treating customers well, you have these relationships for a long time.

因此，这确实是一种双赢的经营理念，使他们能够为未来十年持续投资资本。

And so it's really a win win sort of ethos and allows them to reinvest capital for, you know, the next decade.

这很有趣，因为他们显然非常以客户为中心，而不是那么关注华尔街。

It's interesting because they're obviously very customer focused and not that Wall Street focused.

对吧？

Right?

我觉得在你们的一封股东信中，你们提到过他们会举办投资者日，但不会进行网络直播。

Like, there was a sense I I think in one of your shareholder letters, you wrote about how they would they would have an investor day, and they wouldn't they wouldn't webcast it.

他们也不会发布文字记录。

They wouldn't have a transcript.

他们会有收益电话会议，但在电话会议中没有问答环节。

They would have earnings calls, and they would have no no q and a session in the earnings call.

你能谈谈这个吗？

Can you talk about that?

因为这似乎和你坚持长期主义、专注于财富的长期复利一样，你也倾向于支持那些对华尔街说‘不’的公司。

Because it seems like in the same way that you're having to be fairly stubborn and obstinate in focusing on the long term on long term compounding of wealth, you're also favoring businesses that are kind of ornery in saying to Wall Street, no.

不。

No.

我们完全愿意抑制短期收益，因为我们致力于长期创造价值。

We're perfectly happy to suppress our short term earnings because we're trying to build value over time.

说得太对了。

It's exactly right.

我认为部分原因是我被这种行为吸引，因为我注意到，当有人在做特别的事情时，他们并不总是需要向华尔街大肆宣扬。

And I think that part of I may be just drawn to it because I notice I notice when someone's doing special, they don't always have to go on and, and broadcast it to Wall Street.

Folio 当然符合这一点。

Now, Folio certainly fits the bill there.

你知道吗？

You know?

这是一种极其低调的文化。

It's an extremely nonpromotional culture.

他们不提供长期财务指引，这令卖方分析师和其他许多基金感到沮丧，因为他们本质上希望公司替他们完成分析工作。

They don't provide long term financial guidance, and that frustrates, you know, sell side analysts and many other funds because they basically want the company to do their work for them.

正如你提到的，他们在季度电话会议中也没有问答环节。

They don't have q and a on their quarterly calls as you mentioned.

你可以听一下他们的电话会议。

The calls you you can listen to one of their calls.

大约十分钟的发言后，他们会说，好了。

It's like ten minutes of prepared remarks, and then they say, alright.

非常感谢。

Thank you very much.

下个季度再见。

See you next quarter.

然后人们就会想，等等，发生什么了？

And, you know, people are left like, you know, what happened?

因此，多年来市场一直严重误解了这只股票。

And for that reason, the stock has been largely misunderstood by the market for years.

而且这些股票长期以来一直由少数几位长期股东牢牢持有。

And the shares have also been closely held by a handful of long term owners for a long period of time.

你知道吗？

You know?

我认为曾经有一段时间，公司超过50%的股份由内部人士持有。

I think at one point, it was more than 50% of the company was held by, you know, people on the inside.

这种流动性不足和缺乏宣传导致股票历史上一直表现出相当大的波动性。

And that illiquidity and the lack of promotionality creates a situation where the shares historically have traded with a fair amount of volatility.

我最近回顾了一下，发现这家公司上市至今大约已有十年了。

I was recently looking back at this, and it was sort of interesting that the company has been public for around ten years now.

在这十年里，公司的收益复合增长相当不错。

And over those ten years, it's compounded quite nicely.

我认为过去十年，长期复合回报率每年都超过了30%。

I think the long term compound return has been more than 30% a year for a decade.

但在过去的十年中，超过一半的交易日里，股价都处于超过20%的回撤之中。

But over those ten years, more than half of the trading days of those ten years were spent in a drawdown of more than 20%.

所以你持有这样一只股价剧烈波动的股票，超过一半的时间你都在经历回撤，我认为这让人很难长期持有这样的股票。

So it's like you hold this stock that's bouncing around, and more than half of the time, you're sort of experiencing this drawdown, which I think makes it quite difficult for people to own something like this.

普雷斯顿，我们先短暂休息一下，听听今天赞助商的广告。

Preston Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

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You know what sets the best businesses apart?

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It's how they leverage innovation to turn complexity into growth.

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Every day, Amazon Ads processes billions of real time decisions, optimizing ad performance across a $31,000,000,000 advertising ecosystem.

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The result is campaigns that run 30% faster and deliver measurable business impact at scale.

而这正是亚马逊自身实现增长的方式。

And this is how Amazon itself drives growth.

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Their agentic AI transforms marketing from a resource heavy process into an intelligent autonomous system that maximizes ROI and empowers marketers to focus on creativity and strategy.

亚马逊广告正在证明，人工智能驱动的广告不仅仅是未来，更是新的竞争优势。

Amazon Ads is proving that AI driven advertising isn't just the future, it's the new competitive advantage.

更棒的是，每一家企业都可以应用亚马逊内部完善的同一创新蓝图。

And better yet, every enterprise can apply the same innovation playbook that Amazon perfected in house.

访问 aws.comai/rstory 了解亚马逊广告的故事。

See the Amazon ad story at aws.comai/rstory.

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That's vanta.com/billionaires for $1,000 off.

新的一年到了，这是实现你一直梦想的事业的最佳时机。

It's the new year, which means that it's the best time to finally start the business you've been dreaming about.

就在几年前，我启动了自己的电子商务业务，而Shopify正是我起步所需的工具。

Just a couple years ago, I launched my own e commerce business and Shopify was exactly the tool I needed to get started.

当许多人不断将梦想推迟到明年时，我要告诉你，现在就是抓住眼前机遇的时候。

While many people continually push off their dreams until the next year, I am here to tell you that now is the time to capitalize on the opportunities right in front of you.

Shopify为你提供了在线和线下销售所需的一切。

Shopify gives you everything you need to sell online and in person.

数百万创业者，包括我自己，都已经从普通家庭用户转变为刚刚起步的创业者。

Millions of entrepreneurs, including myself, have already made this leap from household names to first time business owners just getting started.

你可以从数百个精美的模板中选择，并自定义它们，同时使用其内置的AI工具撰写产品描述或编辑产品图片。

Choose from hundreds of beautiful templates that you can customize and use their built in AI tools to write product descriptions or edit product photos.

随着你的成长，Shopify也会在每一步与你共同成长。

And as you grow, Shopify grows with you every step of the way.

在2026年，别再等待，立即用Shopify开始销售吧。

In 2026, stop waiting and start selling with Shopify.

注册您的每月1美元试用版，今天就开始在shopify.com/wsb销售。

Sign up for your $1 per month trial and start selling today at shopify.com/wsb.

前往shopify.com/wsb。

Go to shopify.com/wsb.

就是shopify.com/wsb。

That's shopify.com/wsb.

今年，让Shopify陪伴您聆听您的第一个好消息。

Hear your first this new year with Shopify by your side.

好的。

Alright.

回到节目。

Back to the show.

你能谈谈长期持有股票的意愿这个话题吗？

Can you talk about this general topic of a willingness to hold stocks for a long time?

因为显然，你的基金还不是很老。

Because obviously, your your fund isn't that old.

它已经有六年半的历史了，但有一些股票你从一开始就持有，我假设你会继续持有多年。

It's six and a half years old, but there are these stocks that you've held since the very beginning that I assume you'll continue to hold for many years.

但当你观察许多伟大的投资者时，你过去曾写过，比如本·格雷厄姆从1948年起持有GEICO，菲利普·费舍尔从1955年起持有摩托罗拉，巴菲特1973年买入《华盛顿邮报》，汤姆·鲁索1986年买入雀巢，路·辛普森1993年买入耐克，而查理，我认为是1997年买入了好市多，他们只是简单地持有。

But when you look at a lot of the great investors, you've written in the past about how, for example, Ben Graham owned GEICO from 1948 or Phil Fisher owned Motorola from 1955 or Buffett bought the Washington Post in 1973 or Tom Russo bought stocks like Nestle in 1986 or Lou Simpson bought Nike in 1993 or Charlie, I think, bought Costco in 1997, and they would just kinda hold.

查克·艾克在2002年投资美国铁塔公司也是如此。

Same thing with Chuck Acre with his American Tower investment in 2002.

你能谈谈在持有卓越企业时面临的挑战吗？即使最卓越的企业也会经历非常糟糕的时期。

Can you talk about the challenge of holding exceptional businesses when even the most exceptional businesses go through these periods that are pretty awful?

当然可以。

Absolutely.

我喜欢在空闲时间做的一件事，就是逆向分析伟大投资者的伟大投资。

It's something that I like to spend some of my free time doing, which is to reverse engineer the great investments of the great investors.

不仅关注那些表现优异的时期，我更想深入了解那些一无所获的漫长岁月，那时你很难按兵不动。

And not just those periods where things are going great, but I'm really keen to understand those long stretches of time where nothing happens, and it's hard for you to sit on your hands.

当你看到其他所有东西都在上涨，你开始想，我的现有公司表现并不好，于是你被远处更绿的草地所诱惑。

And you start to see everything else going up, and you start to think, you know, this you know, my my current companies are not doing so well, and you get seduced by greener grass over there.

我认为，长期持有一家企业，关键在于能够清晰地看到你所拥有的东西。

And I think so much about so much of holding a business for a long period of time is to be able to see what you have clearly.

你知道吗？

You know?

鲁米有一句名言：能够看到荆棘，同时依然看见玫瑰。

Rumi has the quote where he says, to be able to look at the thorn but also still see the rose.

因此，要对所拥有的事物有平衡的认识，不被长期的业绩低迷所左右。

And so to have a balanced understanding of what you have and not to be swayed by these long periods of underperformance.

你知道，好市多就是一个让我印象深刻的例子，查理在九十年代初买入了这只股票，并一直持有到去世。

You know, Costco is an example that I find to be quite striking because Charlie bought the stock, I think, in the early nineties, and he held it until his death.

你知道，他持有了几十年。

You know, he held it for decades.

在这段时期内，你可能会一看，哇。

And within that period, you could look and say, wow.

你知道，我认为这只股票几十年来一直以接近两位数的高增长率复利增长。

You know, I think the stock has compounded in the high teens for multiple decades.

因此，结果非常美好。

And so it was a wonderful outcome.

但在2000年到2010年之间，股价几乎没有任何变动。

But there was a period, I think, between 2000 and 2010 where the stock didn't move at all.

我认为它基本上是持平的。

I think it was basically flat.

我想理解这个案例，因为很少有人会认为像好市多这样的公司会在整整十年里毫无起色。

And I wanted to understand this case because it's very few people would think of something like Costco flatlining for an entire decade.

但事实上，他们在上世纪九十年代末期非常有雄心。

But really what happened was that they went into the late nineties, and they were very ambitious.

他们认为自己每年可以新开10%到15%的门店，同店销售额也能实现个位数高位增长。

They thought they could grow, you know, new stores at 10 or 15% a year, and their comps, you know, their same store sales would grow in the high single digits.

所有这些都会与运营杠杆效应叠加在一起。

And all of that would sort of roll up with operating leverage.

最终就能实现每股收益中 teens 水平的复合增长。

You'd get to mid teens earnings per share compounding.

这听起来很棒。

And that sounds great.

但实际情况是，在2000年代初，他们意识到自己野心过大，不得不有所收敛。

But what happened is that in the early two thousands, they realized that they sort of they sort of over overshot on their ambition, and they had to rein it in.

因此，他们的门店扩张速度放缓，同店销售额也受到一些公司特定问题的影响，包括来自山姆会员店和沃尔玛等竞争对手的压力。

So their store growth went down a little bit, and their same store sales were getting impacted by a number of, you know, company specific issues, including competition from folks like Sam's Club and Walmart.

股价大幅下跌，从上世纪90年代末的50倍市盈率，下降到2000年代初，大概是2003或2004年的12倍市盈率。

And the stock declined quite a lot, and it went from, I think, 50 times earnings in the late nineties down to 12 times earnings somewhere in the early two thousands, maybe 2003, 2004.

在那段时期，很少有投资公司能坚持持有这样的股票，因为人们很容易认为：山姆会员店会扼杀他们，这个行业的利润率太低了。

And I would you know, very few investment firms would be able to hold a stock like that for the whole way because throughout that period, it's so easy to say, well, Sam's Club is gonna come kill them, and this business has low margins.

你完全可以编造出各种故事来让自己退出这个仓位。

And you can concoct all of these narratives to shake yourself out of the position.

我想我曾经问过查理：他到底看到了什么，才让他能长期持有这样的股票？

And I think what I once asked Charlie, what did he see that allowed him to own something like this for such a long period of time?

他的回答首先提醒我：别忘了，在山姆会员店开在街对面的市场，我们实际上是在降价。

And his answer the first thing he did was actually remind me, don't forget that in markets where Sam's Club was opening stores across the street, we were actually cutting our prices.

所以你可以想象，那位非常敏锐的华尔街分析师在做渠道调研、观察门店情况时，会发现这家公司的定价能力很弱，因为只要萨姆俱乐部一进入，他们就会降价。

So you can imagine, you know, the very sharp Wall Street analyst is doing his his channel checks and looking at what's going on in the stores, and he would find that this business doesn't have any pricing power because everywhere that Sam's Club's coming, they're cutting their own prices.

如果开销成本必须不断降价，那好生意又在哪里呢？

So what kind of good business is Costco if they have to cut their own prices?

但当然，这些都只是暂时的现象。

But, of course, these were all temporary dynamics.

查理的回答是，他们的产品质量在不断提升。

And Charlie's answer was that the product quality was improving.

管理层正直可靠。

The management was ethical.

你知道的。

You know?

企业文化是论功行赏的。

The culture was meritocratic.

这些根本性的特质，从来不会出现在任何电子表格或任何花哨的研究报告中。

These are all root qualities that wouldn't wouldn't wouldn't ever have shown up in any spreadsheet or in any, you know, fancy research report.

但正是这些根本特质让他能够持有这只股票数十年，从未被震荡出局。

But the root qualities were what allowed him to own the stock for multiple decades and never get shaken out of it.

是的。

Yeah.

这真的很有趣。

It's really interesting.

我读了你关于与他共进晚餐的描述，那是在他2023年底以99岁高龄去世前仅仅几个月的事。

I was reading your account of of your dinner with him, which I think was just a few months before he passed away at the age of 99 back in late twenty twenty three.

我深受触动的是，他谈到的所有让他多年来一直持有 Costco 的原因，本质上都是定性的。

And I was really struck by the fact that all of the things he talked about that enabled him to stay in in Costco for all those years were really qualitative.

对吧？

Right?

比如坚定不移地维护客户信任、员工忠诚、产品卓越、正直的人才、 meritocratic 文化等等。

So unwavering commitment to customer trust or employee loyalty or product excellence or ethical people or meritocratic culture or whatever.

这确实强化了你之前所说的：要寻找那些不一定体现在表格中的特质，但它们确实存在。

So it really reinforces what you were saying before about trying to look for qualities that aren't necessarily expressed in a spreadsheet, but they do exist.

但你必须善于识别这些特质。

But you have to be attuned to to recognizing them.

你在其中一封致股东的信中提到过一些非常棒的观点。

And you said you said something really nice in in one of your shareholder letters where you discussed this.

你在谈论股票经历停滞期的困难时写道：这或许正是那些拥有不同性格、心态和结构的人能够获得长期吸引力回报的原因。

You you were talking about the difficulty of going through these periods of stagnation, for a stock, and you wrote this may be precisely why attractive long term returns are available to those with a different temperament, orientation, and structure.

我认为这触及了一个非常重要的点：你需要从理智上理解为何要保持耐心，但同时也需要一种性格特质——正如查理常说的延迟满足能力，如果你没有这种延迟满足的基因，真的很难做到。

I I think that gets at something really important that you need this kind of intellectual understanding of why you wanna be patient, but there is an element of temperament that, you know, as Charlie would talk about the ability to defer gratification, that if you don't have that deferred gratification gene, it's really hard.

但还有一个结构问题：你必须将你的投资机构设计成能让股东允许你采取长期视角，而我认为几乎没有人能做到这一点。

But then there's also this issue of structure that you actually have to have structured your investment firms so that your shareholders will allow you to be long term, which I think almost nobody has been able to do.

比如，乔什·塔拉索夫就是这样。

Like, that, you know, you have like, Josh Tarasov has.

你必须有点固执，才能说：我根本不是做资产募集生意的，所以我乐于静悄悄地让资金复利增长。

Like, there are you have to be kinda slightly ornery to sort of say, well, I'm just not in the asset gathering business, and so I'm perfectly happy to sit and just quietly compound money.

是的。

Yeah.